

Issue linkage across international organizations:
Does European countries' temporary membership in the
UN Security Council increase their receipts from the
EU budget?

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Abstract

What explains the outcome of bargaining between European Union member states? While existing research on decision-making in the EU highlights the importance of member states' structural power, preference intensity, and the EU's institutional design, this paper introduces an additional source of bargaining power in negotiations between EU members: Through issue linkage EU members leverage temporary privileged positions in other international organizations to obtain more favorable bargaining outcomes in the EU. Specifically, EU member states are more successful in bargaining over the EU budget while they hold a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. As temporary members of the UN Security Council EU members can promote security interests of other European countries inside the most important UN body, and they can use their influence to secure economic side-payments in the form of larger receipts from the EU budget. The study tests this argument by investigating over-time variation in EU budget receipts of individual member states that served on the UN Security Council as non-permanent members. Analyses of new data on EU spending between 1976 and 2014 show that EU members obtain an additional 937 million Euro from the EU budget over the course of a two-year term on the UN Security Council, on average. This amount corresponds to a fifth of EU members' average annual receipts from Brussels. Thus, the study reveals intricate linkages between bargaining processes inside the EU and the UN.

1 Introduction

With annual budgets of more than USD 150 billion combined, the European Union and the United Nations have far greater resources than any other international organization in the world (Ingadottir, 2011). Even though their membership and mandates overlap and issue linkage is common within both, we do not know whether and how bargaining processes across these two uniquely capable international organizations are connected. This paper investigates whether states can leverage a privileged position in one international organization to augment their leverage inside another. Specifically, this study empirically shows that European Union (EU) member states are more successful in bargaining in the EU while they hold a non-permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Temporary membership in the UN Security Council enables EU members to promote the interests of other European countries inside the most important UN body. Their influence at the UN allows these EU members to secure economic side-payments, which take the form of larger receipts from the EU budget. Over the course of a two-year term on the UN Security Council, EU members obtain an additional 937 million Euro in net receipts from the EU budget, on average. This amount corresponds to 20 percent of the EU members' average annual receipts from Brussels in 2014. Thus, this study reveals that bargaining processes inside the world's largest international organizations (by budget and staff size) are intricately linked.

Issue-linkage has long been recognized as a core function of international regimes (Keohane, 1984) and as a routinely used strategy in intergovernmental negotiations (Sebenius, 1983; Davis, 2004; McKibben, 2015). The literature on intergovernmental bargaining in international organizations concurs that decisions in international organizations are rarely taken in isolation but rather linked to simultaneous or anticipated future decisions. For instance, Moravcsik (1998, 1991, p. 25) argues that major reforms of the EU were shaped through bargaining between the Union's three most powerful members, France, Germany, and the UK, which bought off minor powers through side-payments. In a similar vein, Schneider (2009, 2011) shows that each round of EU enlargement brought with it side-payments to the perceived losers of enlargement. More diffuse forms of reciprocity are also common in international organizations: Heisenberg (2005, p. 69) explains that the prevailing consensus in the Council of the EU is "shorthand for 'selling' preferences that are not strongly held for advantages in

other issue areas or in future negotiations ('favor bank').” EU member states reciprocally grant each other pre-election windfalls from the EU budget in order to improve incumbents’ chance of winning national elections (Schneider, 2013). In addition to linking substantive choices, member states of international organizations also establish inter-temporal linkages between decision-making procedures in these institutions: Stone (2011) argues that the most powerful members of an international organization exercise informal control when their core interests are at stake, in exchange for granting minor powers an outsized influence on the organization’s policies at other times.

While the literature on bargaining inside international organizations ascribes great causal weight to issue linkage, it focuses on issue linkage within individual organizations rather than across organizations, even though the same states simultaneously interact with each other in multiple institutions. A notable exception is the literature on vote-buying in international organizations, which shows that great powers use their strong influence in international financial institutions and multilateral aid providers to buy developing countries’ votes in other international fora - and especially in the UN Security Council - with aid and loans (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Eldar, 2008; Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2009*b,a*; Lim and Vreeland, 2013; Vreeland and Dreher, 2014; Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2015). While this literature has enriched our understanding of issue linkage across international organizations, it cannot explain the causal relationship investigated in this study. First, this literature focuses on the exchange of developing countries’ votes against side-payments through international organizations controlled by developed countries; thus it leaves open the question whether issue linkage across international organizations also occurs between developed countries. Second, European countries rarely qualify as swing voters on the Council whose votes would be worth buying.¹ Therefore, vote-buying in the UN Security Council cannot account for the finding that EU members secure economic side-payments from the EU budget while serving as non-permanent members in the UN Security Council.

This paper explains why temporary members of the UN Security Council obtain side-payments even without selling their votes. Unable to enforce formal EU treaty obligations that require concertation, consultation, and exchange of information re-

¹This is because they are not “sure to vote against the donor in the absence of a vote-aid trade, but could be swayed to vote differently by an enticement” (Vreeland and Dreher, 2014, p. 35). Even in the absence of vote-buying, EU members that temporarily serve on the UN Security Council are more likely to vote with potential vote-buyers (United States, United Kingdom, and France) than any other UN Security Council member (see Voeten (2000) and Lai and Lefler (2011) on UN voting).

garding the work of the UN Security Council, EU member states have turned to offering side-payments to those EU countries that serve as non-permanent Security Council members in order to entice them to promote the interests of EU member states that do not have a seat at the Security Council's famous horseshoe table. The causal mechanism that links EU members' behavior in the Council to their receipts from the EU budget is diffuse reciprocity: EU members secure higher EU budget receipts while serving on the Security Council, and this side-payment is tied to the expectation that they will pursue other EU members' interests if and when the Council's agenda touches on them. To test this argument, this study leverages the exogenous timing of EU members' two-year terms on the UN Security Council. Analyses of over-time variation in individual EU members' receipts from the EU budget show that joining the UN Security Council is associated with a large windfall from the EU budget. This paper presents the first empirical evidence of economic side-payments made to European states that serve as temporary members on the UN Security Council. While the existing literature cites numerous examples of issue linkage *within* the European Union, this paper presents and empirically tests the argument that EU decision-makers also link the Union's intergovernmental bargaining with negotiations in other international organizations. Thus, this study shows that states can use a temporary privileged position in one international organization to attain a better bargaining position in another institution. This conclusion suggests that states' position in networks of international organizations shapes the interactions that take place within each of these organizations. In turn, this finding informs the increasingly prominent network analysis approach to the study of international relations and organizations (see, e.g., Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery, 2009; Maoz, 2012; Bueger, 2013).

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Part two and three provide a background on interstate bargaining over the EU's budget and over the UN Security Council's response to security threats. The following part introduces the argument that bargaining over the EU budget and negotiations in the UN Security Council are intricately linked. Part five summarizes the research design for empirically testing this proposition. The empirical results from a qualitative plausibility probe, parametric and non-parametric quantitative analyses, tests of causal mechanisms and alternative explanations, and covariate balance analyses are presented and discussed in part six. Part seven concludes.

2 Negotiating the EU's budgetary allocation

The procedures for devising and adopting the EU's budget have repeatedly changed over the years (Lindner, 2006). Since the 1980s, multi-year agreements on spending priorities, which are called "Financial Perspectives", have laid down the broad contours of the EU's budget. The EU Commission, which is composed of international civil servants, prepares the first draft of the Union's annual budget on the basis of the parameters set out in the multi-year framework agreement. Following two readings in the intergovernmental Council of the EU and the directly elected European Parliament, the budget is adopted by a qualified majority in the Council of the EU and a simple majority in the Parliament. While the Parliament's importance in the budgeting process has gradually increased, it has traditionally had "a negligible impact on the broad outlines of the budget since it is substantially easier to garner a simple majority in the Parliament than it is to garner a qualified majority in the Council" of the EU (Kauppi and Widgrén, 2004, p. 224-5, see also Carrubba, 1997, p. 473 on the Parliament's restrained role during an earlier period).

While some EU members contribute significantly more to the EU budget than they receive, other states benefit from substantial net financial transfers from the EU, because their receipts surpass their contributions. The EU's budget for 2014 provides for expenditures that amount to Euro 142 billion; 87 percent of these funds are spent on structural funds and the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (European Commission, 2015). Eligibility for funding from these programs is based on the need for aid and economic reform, and thus EU member states with large agricultural sectors and those whose economic development lags behind the EU average receive more funding from the EU budget than others (Aksoy and Rodden, 2009).

The economic factors listed in the formal mandates of the EU's various programs cannot fully explain EU budget allocation (see, e.g., Kauppi and Widgrén, 2004; Aksoy and Rodden, 2009). According to the Commission, the annual budget appropriations explicitly leave room for "necessary political negotiations" (European Commission 2008, p. 159, cited in Schneider, 2011, p. 4). Kauppi and Widgrén (2004) argue that 'power politics' shape the outcome of these negotiations in the Council; their empirical analyses show that the distribution of voting power in the Council explains most of the variation in EU budget allocation across member states. Small states are favored in the distribution of EU transfers; because of their over-representation in the EU Council,

small states are attractive coalition partners for states that assemble a legislative coalition through issue linkage (Rodden, 2002; Mattila, 2006; Aksoy and Rodden, 2009). Moreover, small states that can credibly threaten to veto EU enlargements successfully obtain side-payments in the form of larger receipts from the EU budget (Schneider, 2011). Finally, the proposal-making power associated with the rotating Council presidency enables member states to attain preferable negotiation outcomes (Aksoy, 2010; Aronow, Carnegie and Marinov, 2013). All these studies show that the allocation of the EU budget is not exclusively ‘need-based’, as the official mandates of the EU’s programs would suggest. Instead, EU member states’ receipts from the Union’s budget are also shaped by states’ structural power, leverage derived from the Union’s institutional rules, and EU members’ issue-linkages strategies.

3 Bargaining inside the UN Security Council

Deliberations and negotiations in the Security Council mostly take place in informal meetings of some or all members, which are held off the record and which are closed to non-members. The UN Security Council is responsible for responding to threats to international peace and security, which can take the form of military aggression, interstate crises, civil war, mass atrocities, terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Frowein and Krisch, 2002). The Council has vast discretion in designating crises or actions as threats to international peace and security (Wellens, 2003; Matheson, 2006). The Council’s tool kit for addressing security threats includes authorizing military interventions against aggressors, deploying peace operations, establishing transitional administrations, imposing sanctions, initiating criminal proceedings before international tribunals, and sponsoring crisis diplomacy efforts (Luck, 2006).

The UN Security Council has fifteen members, five of whom are permanent (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The other ten members serve on this body for non-renewable two-year terms. Apart from France and the United Kingdom, the UN Security Council typically includes one or two EU member states as non-permanent members. The adoption of a resolution by the Council requires nine positive votes. The permanent members have the right to veto any non-procedural decision by the Security Council. Formal models indicate that the voting power of non-permanent Council members is very small (O’Neill, 1996; Winter, 1996; Voeten, 2001; Hosli et al., 2011, p. 171). At the same time, accounts by diplomats who served on the

Security Council suggest that the Council’s non-permanent members exert substantial influence on the Council’s work on several issues (see, e.g., Ryan, 2003; Pleuger, 2005; Keating, 2008). A recent study leverages the natural experiment of the rotation of Africa’s Security Council seats between African regions to show that minor powers with non-permanent seats have a sizable impact on the Council’s response to civil wars in Africa (Mikulaschek, 2014). Non-permanent Council members can use their influence inside the Security Council to build ‘diplomatic capital’ to be spent on the pursuit of unrelated foreign policy goals. In the words of the former ambassador of New Zealand on the Security Council “a term in the Security Council - at the recognized pinnacle of global prominence - is a rare opportunity to lift the national game and perform at the global level and achieve an impact which is disproportionate to actual size. Achieving success in this environment allows a small state a unique opportunity to recharge its diplomatic capital which can be of benefit for many years to come” (Keating, 2008).

4 Temporary UN Security Council membership as a source of bargaining power in EU budgetary negotiations

Issue linkage is a widely used bargaining strategy in international organizations. Linkage is established “by the players’ beliefs that cooperative behavior in one setting influences the prospects for cooperation in other settings characterized by different issues” (Lohmann, 1997, p. 30). Issue linkage can be either express or implied (Sebenius, 1983, p. 288). It encompasses side-payments and log-rolling bargains (Davis, 2004, p. 156). Substantive issue linkage ties together two issues that exhibit some intellectual coherence while tactical issue linkage connects unrelated issues for the purpose of manipulating the bargaining outcome (Aggarwal, 1998, p. 16-7). Bargains over side payments or log rolls may be struck over two or more decisions in the same international organizations (internal issue linkage), or they may involve an exchange of a vote in one institution for a vote in another institution (external issue linkage).² Linking together disparate issues can open up possibilities for mutually acceptable bargains (Young, 1989, p. 365) when governments have varying preference intensities across different issues, with marginal gains in some issue-areas more important to some than to others.

²This distinction is inspired by the typology of log-rolls in Eldar (2008, p. 5).

How can EU member states translate temporary membership in the UN Security Council into more favorable bargaining outcomes in the EU? The argument in brief is as follows: EU member states attach great importance to the work of the UN Security Council. At the same time, they have failed to effectively institutionalize the promotion of the interests of EU members that do not serve on the UN Security Council inside that body. In the absence of formal procedures that successfully translate these interests into policies of the UN Security Council, EU member states have resorted to issue linkage: EU member states that temporarily serve on the UN Security Council promote the interests of other EU member states in exchange for larger receipts from the EU budget while they occupy a privileged position at the UN. Thus, their ability to promote the interests of other EU member states at the UN Security Council enhances the leverage of EU member states in bargaining over the EU budget.

The UN Security Council plays a key role in the foreign and security policy of the European countries.³ The fact that the UN's headquarters in New York and Geneva were the first places outside Brussels where EU member states implemented an institutionalized coordination process shows that they attach great importance to the UN (Rasch, 2008, p. 2, 8). As of 2006, 1,300 coordination meetings were held annually in New York (Farrell, 2006, p. 33). Already in 1970, when the European Political Cooperation (which preceded the Common Foreign and Security Policy) was inaugurated, EU member states declared that they should try to coordinate their positions in international organizations. In 1987, the Single European Act turned this proclamation into a commitment. The 1993 Maastricht Treaty aimed to oblige UN Security Council members to coordinate their actions and to speak with one voice (see article 34 of the Treaty on European Union as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon). One year later, the EC Council opened an office in New York.

As impressive as these steps toward coordinating European foreign policy may appear, they did not successfully harmonize EU member states' policies inside the UN Security Council. The EU Council's office in New York remains a "liaison and informa-

³For instance, the European Security Strategy, which was drafted by the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and adopted by the European Council in 2003, stresses that "the fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." (European Council, 2003, p. 9). The Council has imposed sanctions or established field missions in many crisis theaters in the EU and its neighborhood, such as in Cyprus, the former Yugoslavia, Libya, Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. It also provided the legal mandate for numerous EU military missions and placed Kosovo under UN administration in 1999.

tion bureau” rather than a political institution, and individual member states “call the shots” (Farrell, 2006, p. 37; see also Winkelmann, 2000, p. 423). More importantly, EU members with permanent seats on the UN Security Council do not consistently implement their obligations under the EU Treaty to inform other member states, to concert their positions, and to defend the EU’s positions and interests on the Security Council (Rasch, 2008; Winkelmann, 2000, p. 427). France and the UK view the EU Treaty’s stipulation that EU member states shall carry out these obligations “without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter” (art. 34) as an authorization to withhold privileged information from EU member states that do not serve on the UN Security Council, to refrain from consulting other EU members on confidential negotiations inside the Council, and to refuse to use the veto right conferred to them by the UN Charter to defend the EU’s interests (Rasch, 2008; Hill, 2006, p. 57). They also repeatedly blocked steps toward institutionalizing EU coordination in the UN Security Council, such as the proposal by Germany and Spain to offer a seat to the EU Presidency within their delegations in New York during their term on the Council (Pirozzi, 2012, p. 97). In conclusion, consecutive attempts to institutionalize the pursuit of European interests on the UN Security Council by adding formal coordination obligations to the EU Treaty have not been successful.

The failure of formal mechanisms to translate the interests of EU members that do not serve on the UN Security Council into the positions taken by their European colleagues inside the Council created a pressure to achieve this objective through the pursuit of informal issue linkage. Unable to enforce the obligation of EU member states that serve on the UN Security Council to coordinate their positions, EU member states use side-payments to entice countries that temporarily serve on the UN Security Council to share information about the Council’s deliberations and to promote the interests of those EU members that do not serve on the Council. These positive incentives take the form of higher receipts from the EU budget over the course of the two-year terms of non-permanent members of the Security Council.

Why do EU members need to offer side-payments to other European states to entice the latter to pursue the formers’ interests in the UN Security Council? The failure of formal mechanisms aimed at achieving European coordination inside the UN Security Council does not fully answer this question. Two additional conditions need to be satisfied for issue linkage to occur. The first prerequisite is that EU members with a temporary seat on the UN Security Council are in a position to effectively promote the

interests of other EU member states if they choose to do so. They can do so in two ways. First, they can share privileged information about the UN Security Council's closed-door deliberations and about the positions of individual Council members with other EU member states. Thus, they enable other EU member states to influence the Council's work through informal bilateral contacts with other Council members. Second, EU members that temporarily serve on the Council can directly influence the Council's work in ways that affect the interests of other EU member states. In 1993, for instance, the Belgian government drafted a non-paper on behalf of the European Community for the UN Secretary-General, which became the basis of the UN Secretary-General's report titled *An Agenda for Peace* that redefined the role of the United Nations in the post-Cold War era (Liegeois, 1993, p. 8). Belgium also drafted all UN Security Council resolutions on the former Yugoslavia, together with France and the United Kingdom, prior to its exit from the UN Security Council at the end of 1992 (Liegeois, 1993, p. 16-7). During its term on the Security Council in 2011 and 2012, Germany was in charge of drafting the Council's resolutions on Afghanistan (Lieberman, 2013). Germany's work impacted the interests of many EU member states, whose troops were deployed to Afghanistan under a mandate of the UN Security Council at the time. Between 2006 and 2010, Belgium and Austria chaired the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council, and they used this role to push for reforms of the UN Security Council's counter-terrorism regime that aimed to make this regime compatible with decisions on human rights by the European Court of Justice.⁴ These are but a few examples of instances in which EU member states influenced the UN Security Council's work in ways that impacted the interests of the EU and those of its member states.

The second precondition for issue linkage is that EU member states' preferences and the intensity of their preferences over the security policies on the UN Security Council's agenda do not perfectly align. Different EU member states have specific regional interests rooted in their history, geography, and economic and political relationships. Prominent examples include the engagement of Belgium in Central Africa and Spain in the Mediterranean (Tallberg, 2008, p. 693). Their intense preferences over security threats related to these regions are not shared by all other EU members. EU members that serve as temporary members of the UN Security Council may not be willing to incur political costs from promoting security interests of other EU member states inside

⁴Author's phone interview with a Belgian diplomat on 8/4/2015. See also United Nations Department of Public Information (2010).

the Council. These political costs arise when an EU member promotes policies inside the Security Council that are not favored by some great powers, thus creating friction that makes it more difficult for this EU member to build coalitions inside the Council to promote its own priorities. Costs also arise when Council members share privileged information about the body’s deliberations with EU members that do not serve on the Council, because attempts at greater transparency of confidential negotiations tend to “offend” permanent Council members (see, e.g., Gowan 2014, p. 6).⁵ In the absence of issue linkage, non-permanent members of the UN Security Council prefer to use their limited agenda-setting power and bargaining leverage in the Council to address the security concerns that matter most to themselves and refrain from speaking out on issues that affect some of their EU colleagues. This explains why EU members resort to side-payments to EU members with a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in order to incentivize them to promote the interests of EU members that lack a seat on the Council.

5 Research design

5.1 Identification strategy and estimation procedure

Annual bargaining over the EU budget is a hard case for testing the argument that EU members obtain side-payments from fellow EU members while they serve on the UN Security Council. This is because most distributional bargaining occurs for the multiannual financial frameworks, leaving little leeway for side-payments agreed in the context of annual budget negotiations (Lindner, 2006; Schneider, 2013).⁶ If evidence of side-payments can be found in the outcome of annual budget negotiations, it is likely that EU members with temporary seats on the UN Security Council also secure side-payments in other arenas of EU decision-making.

This study leverages over-time variation in individual EU member states’ receipts

⁵The permanent representative of Belgium on the Security Council in 2007 and 2008 explains the cost of sharing confidential information with EU members outside the Council: “one cannot ... expect the EU Security Council members to lay all their cards open on the table. However much they would like to be EU-loyal, they have loyalties, and perhaps obligations too, towards the other Security Council members that they must respect for the sake of being and continuing to be trusted fellows within that principal organ of the United Nations.” (Verbeke, 2006, p. 55)

⁶At the same time, Aksoy (2010) and Schneider (2013) show that states can use annual budget negotiations to secure greater gains when they hold the Council presidency and ahead of close national elections.

from the EU budget to systematically investigate whether temporary membership in the UN Security Council is associated with larger revenues from the Union’s budget. In other words, the study does not compare whether some countries receive more funds from the EU budget than others, but it evaluates whether any given country receives more funds when it serves on the UN Security Council than that same country does otherwise. Thus, it investigates an unbalanced panel of country-year observations for each EU member that served, at any point, as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and for each year during which it was part of the EU.

The causal identification strategy rests on the assumption that the timing of an individual EU member state’s two-year term on the UN Security Council is unrelated to other determinants of over-time variation in that country’s receipts from the EU’s budget.⁷ The identifying assumption merely implies that co-variation between a given EU member state’s Security Council membership status and its success at securing receipts from the EU budget are not driven by some time-varying characteristic that explain both the timing of temporary Security Council membership and over-time variation in EU budget receipts. Covariate balance analyses support this assumption (see Part 6.6), which is plausible since the timing of the process through which a country joins the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member greatly varies from the timing of bargaining over the EU budget. The formal timetable for the adoption of the EU’s annual budget for year t runs from March to December of year $t - 1$, but in practice the bulk of budgetary bargaining takes place during the second half of the year $t - 1$ (Aksoy, 2010, p. 191). States attain non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council for a non-renewable two-year term through a secret election in the UN General Assembly where each UN member state has one vote. European states typically announce their candidacy for election to the UN Security Council between four and fifteen years before the election takes place.⁸ The vote is held in September, and all elected countries join the Council on 1 January of the following year. Under an arrangement that dates back to 1965, the ten seats for temporary UN Security Council members are allocated to specific world regions. Two non-permanent Security Council seats are always filled by states in the ‘Western Europe and Others’ caucus, which includes the fifteen EU members prior to the 2004 enlargement, Malta, Western

⁷This assumption is consistent with the empirical observation that the same time-invariant characteristics of countries (such as size) may both influence the likelihood of serving as a non-permanent Security Council member and their overall success in EU budgetary bargaining.

⁸For instance, Ireland announced in 2005 its candidacy for a seat on the Council in 2021 and 2022 (Irish Parliament, 2013).

European states that are not EU members, as well as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Except for Cyprus, which forms part of the group of Asian states, all states that joined the EU since 2004 are members of the Eastern European group, for which one non-permanent seat on the Security Council is reserved. In the ‘Western Europe and Others’ and in the Eastern European group, the number of candidate countries typically exceeds the number of open seats. Therefore, candidate countries campaign for election to the UN Security Council for several years (Malone, 2000). Whether a given EU member state wins or loses the election in the UN General Assembly in a given year is plausibly orthogonal to over-time variation of that country’s EU budget receipts, because the decision to run for election predates annual budget negotiations by several years. There is no reason to suspect that that country’s membership in the UN Security Council affects its receipts from the EU budget through any mechanism other than issue linkage.⁹ If EU members that serve as temporary members of the UN Security Council are able to leverage their influence on the Council’s work to attain side-payments through the EU’s annual budget, we expect that their UN Security Council membership during year $t - 1$ will have a positive effect on the transfers they receive from the European Union during year t , which was negotiated during year $t - 1$.

Table 1 lists all EU members that served as non-permanent Security Council members between 1976 and 2013. During this period, for which detailed data on EU budgets is available, thirteen EU members served as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council. Germany served five times, Italy four times, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain twice, and Austria, Greece, Luxembourg, Slovakia, and Sweden had one two-year term on the Council after acceding to the EU. Thus, states that joined the EU early had more opportunities to be elected onto the Council. Moreover, large EU member states serve on the UN Security Council more often than small states.¹⁰ At the same time, large EU members attain a larger share of the EU budget than small states simply by virtue of the size of their population and national economy. This fact does not confound the estimation of the effect of UN Security Council membership on EU budget receipts, because all statistical models include country fixed-effects.

⁹Structural funds and agricultural aid account for the vast majority of EU member states’ receipts from the EU budget; these are entirely unrelated to the agenda of the UN Security Council. Serving as a temporary member of the UN Security Council membership does not imply any financial or military obligations that could be shared with other EU member states (see Part 6.5 below).

¹⁰Dreher et al. (2014) also observe this pattern in other world regions.

Table 1: EU member states with non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council, 1975-2013

| Year | Number of EU members | 1st EU member on UNSC | 2nd EU member on UNSC | 3rd EU member on UNSC |
|------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 2013 | 28 | Luxembourg | | |
| 2012 | 27 | Germany | Portugal | |
| 2011 | 27 | Germany | Portugal | |
| 2010 | 27 | Austria | | |
| 2009 | 27 | Austria | | |
| 2008 | 27 | Belgium | Italy | |
| 2007 | 27 | Belgium | Italy | Slovakia |
| 2006 | 25 | Denmark | Greece | Slovakia |
| 2005 | 25 | Denmark | Greece | |
| 2004 | 25 | Germany | Spain | |
| 2003 | 15 | Germany | Spain | |
| 2002 | 15 | Ireland | | |
| 2001 | 15 | Ireland | | |
| 2000 | 15 | Netherlands | | |
| 1999 | 15 | Netherlands | | |
| 1998 | 15 | Portugal | Sweden | |
| 1997 | 15 | Portugal | Sweden | |
| 1996 | 15 | Germany | Italy | |
| 1995 | 15 | Germany | Italy | |
| 1994 | 12 | Spain | | |
| 1993 | 12 | Spain | | |
| 1992 | 12 | Belgium | | |
| 1991 | 12 | Belgium | | |
| 1990 | 12 | | | |
| 1989 | 12 | | | |
| 1988 | 12 | Germany | Italy | |
| 1987 | 12 | Germany | Italy | |
| 1986 | 12 | Denmark | | |
| 1985 | 10 | Denmark | | |
| 1984 | 10 | Netherlands | | |
| 1983 | 10 | Netherlands | | |
| 1982 | 10 | Ireland | | |
| 1981 | 10 | Ireland | | |
| 1980 | 9 | | | |
| 1979 | 9 | | | |
| 1978 | 9 | Germany | | |
| 1977 | 9 | Germany | | |
| 1976 | 9 | Italy | | |
| 1975 | 9 | Italy | | |

Note: The table lists all EU member states that served as members of the UN Security Council on non-renewable two-year terms between 1975 and 2013. It shows that in most years, one or two EU members served as temporary members of the UN Security Council. Over time, the EU's representation on the UN Security Council grew stronger due to successive EU enlargements. In addition to the non-permanent Council members listed in the table, France and the United Kingdom hold permanent seats on the Council.

The analysis does not address the separate question whether France and the United Kingdom receive higher receipts from the EU budget in exchange for representing European interests on the UN Security Council. The choice to focus on EU countries that temporarily serve on the UN Security Council was made for substantive and methodological reasons. Econometrically, the permanent membership of France and the UK in the Security Council renders it impossible to use country-fixed effects models to estimate the effect of their participation in the Council on over-time variation in EU budget receipts. The use of pooled regression models that leverage cross-country variation would be problematic since France and the UK undoubtedly vary on a number of dimensions from other EU members (in addition to their permanent seat on the Security Council).

All models have panel-corrected standard errors. Since Durbin-Watson tests of an untransformed model point to serial correlation of the error terms, all models use a Prais-Winsten transformation of the error term to correct for AR(1) autocorrelation within panels.

5.2 Data and variables

The primary dependent variable in this study measures EU members' receipts from the Union budget lagged by one year (in millions of constant 2014 Euro). Original data on EU budget receipts was gathered from the European Commission's *Annual Reports on Allocated Expenditure*. Additional analyses investigate EU members' lagged net receipts from the EU budget (measured in millions of constant 2006 Euro) using data that was compiled by the European Court of Auditors and presented in Schneider (2011).

The main independent variable of interest is a binary measure that captures whether a given state was a temporary member of the UN Security Council at the time when the EU budget for a given year was negotiated (i.e., during the preceding year). Information on the UN Security Council's composition was retrieved from the website of the UN Security Council. The models control for several variables that have been found to be associated with the size of EU member states' receipts from the EU budget. The natural log of population (in millions) is included since larger countries qualify for higher EU funds, all else being equal. The natural log of the number of persons employed in the agricultural sector and the national GDP as a share of the EU average


serve as proxies for the eligibility for funds from the Common Agricultural Policy and the Union’s structural funds. The data on each of these variables was published by Eurostat. EU Presidency takes a positive value if the country presided over the Council of the EU during the first or second half of the year during which the budget was negotiated. ‘SSI Council (perc.)’ relies on the Shapley-Shubik index (SSI) to conceptualize voting power in the Council of the EU. It defines the power of a state as the frequency with which that state’s membership in a coalition on the Council of the EU is pivotal when all voting coalitions are assumed equally likely. Domestic EU support is measured as the percentage of citizens who believe that “EC/EU membership is a good thing” minus the percentage of those believing that “EC/EU membership is a bad thing” in the Eurobarometer survey. The two final controls account for the EU’s successive enlargements. The number of EU members accounts for increasing conflicts over the EU budget, and a dichotomous measure labeled ‘extraordinary phase’ records whether a country experienced distributional conflict from the year after accession to the year before the EU adopts a new multi-annual budget plan. Data for these last four controls was presented in Schneider (2011). Table 4 in the Appendix summarize the descriptive statistics of all variables. While EU budget data is available from 1976 to 2014, some of the controls are only available for the period between 1977 and 2006. Therefore, the descriptive evidence on EU budgets, presented in the first part of the next section, covers the entire period for which budget data is available, while the temporal scope of the cross-sectional time series models in subsequent parts of the results section is limited to the period from 1977 to 2006.

6 Results and discussion

6.1 Descriptive evidence

Between 1976 and 2014, 13 EU member states served 26 two-year terms on the UN Security Council. Figure 1 shows how these states’ receipts from the EU budget evolved before, during, and after each of these terms. The blue line depicts the average of these 26 time series. It shows that in each year, EU members’ average receipts stay within a range of approximately ± 250 million Euro from last year’s receipts, with one major exception: the budget that was negotiated during their first year on the UN Security Council increased EU members’ receipts by 780 million Euro, on average. In only five

Figure 1: EU budget receipts before, during, and after UN Security Council term




Note: The figure displays the change in receipts from the annual EU budget before, during, and after 26 terms on the UN Security Council served by EU members between 1975 and 2013. Year $t=0$ is the first year of the two-year term (shaded area). The budget data for year t describes the budget that was negotiated during year t . The blue line shows the average change in EU budget receipts for the 26 time series. It shows that EU members that join the UN Security Council receive 780 million Euro more, on average, from the first budget that was negotiated after they joined the Council. During the second year on the UN Security Council ($t=1$) receipts typically revert back to their normal levels.

of these 26 cases, EU members received fewer EU funds from the first budget that was negotiated after they gained a seat on the Council.¹¹ During the second year on the UN Security Council, EU budget receipts tend to revert back to normal.

How likely is it that this pattern merely arose due to random chance? Permutation tests allow us to answer this question without any parametric assumptions (Pesarin and Salmaso, 2010; Keele, McConnaughy and White, 2012). If serving on the UN Security Council does not increase receipts from the EU budget, receipts will be the same, in expectation, irrespective of whether a EU member is temporarily on the Council or not. If so, then one should obtain outcomes that are similar to the observed outcome depicted in Figure 1 even if the timing of the 26 Security Council terms is

¹¹These are the first year's of Austria's first term as an EU member, Denmark's second term, Germany's fifth term, Italy's fourth term, and Spain's first term.

Figure 2: Distribution of estimated effect under null hypothesis and observed effect



Note: This figure displays the observed average change in EU budget receipts during the first year on the UN Security Council (in red) and the distribution of the corresponding mean for 300,000 randomly selected data permutations, which were generated by randomly reshuffling the timing of UN Security Council membership in the 26 ten-year time series shown in Figure 1. If the observed average change shown in red was due to random chance, we would expect many of the permutations to yield results that are similar to it. However, only 0.1 percent of the permutations yield a result that is at least as positive as the observed result, suggesting that the increase in EU funds member states secure during the first year on the UN Security Council is very unlikely due to random chance.

randomly reshuffled within each ten-year time series. Permutation tests are conducted by randomly reshuffling the value of the binary variable of interest, which indicates whether the EU member just joined the Council before the EU budget was negotiated or not. Its value is separately reshuffled within each of the 26 time series. The 26 reshuffled time series are combined and stored, and the process is repeated many times. A large number of permutations of the observed data is generated in this way. The null hypothesis that the UN Security Council membership does not increase receipts from the first EU budget negotiated as a Council member is tested by calculating a p-value on the proportion of permutations with a value of the test statistic that is at least as supportive of the alternative hypothesis (that the null hypothesis is incorrect) as the average that was actually observed and shown in Figure 1 (Pesarin and Salmaso, 2010; Dafoe and Caughey, 2012). If only a small number of permutations yield values that are as extreme as the observed value of the test statistic, the null hypothesis can be rejected with a high level of confidence. Figure 2 compares the distribution of the means of the data permutations with the observed mean. The permutation test rejects the null hypothesis that EU members do not receive more EU funds from the first budget that is negotiated while they serve on the UN Security Council ($p < 0.01$). If this null hypothesis is assumed to be true and if membership in the UN Security Council is randomly reshuffled many times, then we find that only less than 0.1 percent of the data permutations that are generated in this process display a positive effect of joining the UN Security Council on EU budget receipts that is at least as large as the one that was observed. In short, random chance is a very unlikely explanation of the EU budget windfall during the first year on the UN Security Council.

6.2 Qualitative plausibility probe

The case of Ireland's term on the UN Security Council in 2001 and 2002 illustrates that temporary UN Security Council membership is associated with higher EU budget receipts. After a multi-year campaign that cost 1.5 million Euro (de Breadun, 2000), Ireland defeated Italy in a vote held in the UN General Assembly on 10 October 2000. Even before it entered the Council, it was expected that "Ireland's approach will by and large reflect the overall stance of the European Union on foreign policy issues" (*Ibid.*). This expectation was met over the following two years (Ryan, 2003, p. 22). On the Council, Ireland insisted on providing more comprehensive weekly briefings for

all EU members than in previous years; this initiative was very positively received by EU countries that did not serve on the Council, leading Germany and Spain, which replaced Ireland on the Council in 2003, to vow to continue this innovation (Doyle, 2004, p. 96). Ireland was also open to bilateral requests for briefings from other EU countries, unlike France and the United Kingdom (Doyle, 2004, p. 99, see also Rees, 2003, p. 248). Ireland's willingness to share information came at a critical time, when EU members started, in January 2001, to hold regular briefings ('Article 19' meetings) on the Council's work for those EU countries without a seat on the Council (Rasch, 2008, p. 78-80). Ireland also placed great emphasis on articulating EU priorities in the Council, in contrast to the other two EU members (Doyle, 2004, p. 96, see also Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs (Irish Parliament), 2002, p. 25).

Ireland's EU-centric approach to its term on the UN Security Council was surprising in light of Ireland's position as an outlier among EU members at the UN. Between 1990 and 2002, Ireland's votes in the General Assembly diverged more frequently from the EU's majority position than the votes of any other EU member, except for France and the United Kingdom, whose insistence on independent diplomacy at the UN was discussed above (Young and Rees, 2005). Ireland voted more often in line with developing countries on Palestine, the Middle East, and Apartheid than any other EU member (*Ibid.*). At the turn of the millennium, the top priority for Irish foreign policy was to demonstrate that European integration did not diminish the autonomy of Irish diplomacy at the UN (Gillissen, 2006), especially while the government was campaigning for a popular vote in favor of the EU's Treaty of Nice in two referenda in June 2001 and October 2002. The UN figured prominently in the campaign against the treaty, which contrasted European security policy and a gradual loss of Ireland's neutrality with Ireland's traditional focus on the UN (Connolly and Doyle, 2005, p. 362).¹² Thus, Ireland's choice to use its term on the UN Security Council to promote EU policies and coordination was far from obvious.

Ireland's dedication to EU coordination in the UN Security Council coincided with a strong increase in the country's receipts from the EU budget. In the four years before Ireland took a seat on the Council, its annual receipts from the EU budget decreased by 486 million Euro, on average, reflecting Ireland's growing wealth. In contrast, the 2002 budget, which was the first one negotiated after Ireland joined the Council, increased Ireland's receipts by 304 million Euro. The two following EU budgets provided for

¹²E.g. a campaign poster against the Nice Treaty read 'Hello NATO, good-bye UN' (Doyle, 2004, p. 74).

another total increase of 128 million Euro, before the trend reverted back to the status quo before Ireland's UN Security Council membership, with annual receipts shrinking by 308 million Euro, on average, over the next four years. This pattern aligns with the observable implication of the argument tested in this paper. Moreover, issue linkage played a key role in two major foreign policy decisions of the government of Bertie Ahern, who was Ireland's prime minister at the time of its Security Council term: the government's muted criticism of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was motivated by concern about future economic relations with the U.S., which were viewed as tied to Ireland's position on the Iraq war (Connolly and Doyle, 2005), and the decision to deploy Irish peacekeepers to Chad and the Central African Republic has been ascribed to Ahern's desire to win French support for his candidacy as EU President (Henke, 2012, ch. 6). In conclusion, it is plausible that the windfall from the EU budget during Ireland's term on the UN Security Council and Ireland's EU-centric diplomacy in the Council were causally linked. The next part of this paper presents results from a systematic test of this argument that uses data on all EU members that temporarily served on the Council.

6.3 Results from cross-sectional time series models

Non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council has a substantial effect on EU member states' receipts from the Union's budget. Since the timing of EU members' UN Security Council membership is exogenously determined (see above), individual EU members' receipts from the EU budgets should be higher, in expectation, while they serve on the UN Security Council than otherwise. Country- and year-fixed effects models may thus show the expected effect even if they do not include controls for other determinants of success at distributive bargaining in the EU, because these potential confounders are expected to be orthogonal to the timing of Security Council membership. Model 1 in Table 2 shows that while a given EU member holds a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, its annual receipts from the EU budget are 512 million Euro higher than they are otherwise. This result is robust to including controls and to removing time fixed effects (see Models 2 and 3). Temporary UN Security Council membership is also associated with higher net receipts from the EU budget. The effect is significant ($p < 0.05$) in the full model, weakly significant ($p < 0.055$) in the model without year fixed-effects, and it approaches significance ($p < 0.103$) in Model 4,

Table 2: Non-permanent UN Security Council membership and EU budget allocation, 1977-2006

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Independent variables | Receipts | Receipts | Receipts | Net receipts | Net receipts | Net receipts |
| Temp. UNSC member ($t-1$) | 511.8** (210.2) | 502.6** (230.9) | 540.2** (217.3) | 399.2 (243.8) | 468.7* (243.1) | 509.3** (235.4) |
| Population size (ln.) | | 13,240*** (3,943.0) | -5,383.6 (6,149.9) | | -6,137.1 (5,160.0) | -5,105.1 (6,668.0) |
| Agricultural labor force size (ln.) | | -875.2* (519.4) | 476.3 (467.8) | | 66.39 (460.1) | -53.25 (521.9) |
| GDP/cap. relative to EU | | -13.09* (7.528) | -3.735 (8.107) | | 5.057 (7.731) | 14.32 (9.424) |
| SSI in EU Council | | -392.8*** (134.6) | -252.0* (131.8) | | 516.5*** (96.31) | 290.0** (127.4) |
| EU Presidency | | 137.7 (122.0) | 177.6 (124.9) | | 173.7 (131.3) | 147.3 (130.8) |
| Domestic EU support | | 0.858 (7.314) | -2.0 (7.1) | | 17.00** (6.894) | 20.79*** (7.450) |
| EU size | | -7.747 (59.41) | 219.6*** (75.1) | | 52.81 (40.51) | -112.4 (78.06) |
| Extraordinary phase | | -185.0 (312.0) | 830.5** (433.6) | | 374.1 (249.7) | 1,160.0** (444.3) |
| Country f.e. | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year f.e. | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 305 | 303 | 303 | 304 | 302 | 302 |
| Number of panels | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 |
| R^2 | 0.868 | 0.888 | 0.891 | 0.423 | 0.579 | 0.616 |

Note: *** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .1$. Panel regression with AR(1) Prais-Winsten correction and panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Positive coefficients designate variables' positive marginal effects on receipts (Models 1-3) or net receipts (Models 4-6) from the EU budget in million Euro.

which does not include any controls.

The increase in EU funds is both statistically and substantively significant. During their two-year term on the Council, EU members gain more than 1 billion Euro in additional receipts from the EU budget and approximately 937 million Euro in additional net receipts. The latter amount (in 2006 constant Euro) corresponds to 0.5 percent of the median EU country's GDP in 2014. Denmark, Greece, and Slovakia served on the UN Security Council in 2006, the most recent year included in the analyses summarized in Table 2. During that year, Denmark received 1.77 billion Euro from the EU budget, while Greece and Slovakia received 8.01 and 0.82 billion Euro, respectively. The average increase in net receipts from the EU budget over the course of a two-year term on the Council (1.02 billion Euro, see Model 6 in Table 2) amounts to 58 percent of Denmark's total annual receipts in 2006, 13 percent of Greece's income from the 2006 EU budget, and 124 percent of the EU funds paid to Slovakia during the same year.

6.4 Analysis of causal mechanisms

The windfall from the EU budget that is associated with UN Security Council membership could stem from specific or diffuse reciprocity. Specific reciprocity consists in the exchange of items of equivalent value in a strictly delimited sequence through issue linkage whereas diffuse reciprocity involves conforming to generally accepted standards of behavior, does not necessarily require equivalence in the value of traded items, and unfolds through a less narrowly bounded sequence of events (Keohane, 1986, p. 4). Specific reciprocity would thus involve a trade of a specific action (e.g., a vote) in the UN Security Council in exchange for economic side-payments. In contrast, diffuse reciprocity may feature a side-payment in exchange for less tangible favors that are not clearly delimited in advance; such favors may consist in information-sharing throughout the two-year term on the Council as well as the preparedness to pursue other EU members' interests if and when the Council's agenda touches on them.¹³ The theoretical argument presented in this paper rests on the mechanism of diffuse reciprocity.

¹³Repeated interaction between a moderate number of governments over a long period of time encourages reputational sanctions and norms of mutual trust, which render such non-simultaneous issue linkage possible (Aksoy and Rodden, 2009, p. 625, Rodden, 2002, p. 160).

Table 3: Non-permanent UN Security Council membership and EU budget allocation: receipts by year of Council term, 1977-2006

| | Model 7 | Model 8 | Model 9 | Model 10 | Model 11 | Model 12 |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Independent variables | Receipts | Receipts | Receipts | Net receipts | Net receipts | Net receipts |
| 1st year on UNSC ($t-1$) | 626.2** (254.6) | 651.2** (263.9) | 659.1*** (252.3) | 565.5* (287.5) | 689.1** (285.3) | 674.6** (280.0) |
| 2nd year on UNSC ($t-1$) | 341.9 (270.0) | 356.7 (289.4) | 416.4 (271.3) | 216.5 (297.6) | 230.9 (308.4) | 324.6 (295.7) |
| Population size (ln.) | | 26,380*** (7,940.0) | -5,283.6 (6,172.9) | | -5,161.7 (5,055.3) | -4,211.8 (6,621.4) |
| Agricultural labor force size (ln.) | | -1,800.8* (1,038.6) | 467.2 (465.9) | | 84.51 (455.3) | -68.18 (519.9) |
| GDP/cap. relative to EU | | -13.08* (7.531) | -3.610 (8.117) | | 3.643 (7.455) | 13.39 (9.323) |
| SSI in EU Council | | -394.0*** (133.6) | -256.7** (130.1) | | 505.5*** (93.84) | 281.3** (125.5) |
| EU Presidency | | 140.1 (121.7) | 177.9 (125.0) | | 173.8 (130.8) | 145.5 (130.4) |
| Domestic EU support | | 1.084 (7.285) | -1.185 (7.170) | | 17.35** (6.777) | 21.30*** (7.416) |
| EU size | | -10.94 (59.29) | 211.0*** (74.26) | | 48.45 (39.60) | -121.2 (77.14) |
| Extraordinary phase | | -155.3 (309.9) | 865.7* (440.2) | | 414.1* (238.4) | 1,151.0** (445.0) |
| Country f.e. | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year f.e. | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 305 | 303 | 303 | 304 | 302 | 302 |
| Number of panels | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 |
| R^2 | 0.866 | 0.885 | 0.889 | 0.428 | 0.577 | 0.615 |

Note: *** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .1$. Panel regression with AR(1) Prais-Winsten correction and panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Positive coefficients designate variables' positive marginal effects on receipts (Models 7-9) or net receipts (Models 10-12) from the EU budget in million Euro.

The timing of the side-payment helps adjudicate between alternative causal mechanisms (Grzymala-Busse, 2011). Specific reciprocity would have the observable implication that side-payments are made whenever the recipient does a favor in return. Assuming that both years of a term on the Council offer an equal number of opportunities for such favors, we would expect to observe a similar number of side-payments during EU members' first and the second year on the Security Council. In contrast, diffuse reciprocity has the observable implication that EU members provide a side-payment to the UN Security Council member upfront with the expectation that the EU member with a seat on the UN Security Council will return the favor in the future if and when an opportunity arises. This dynamic is similar to the logic Vreeland and Dreher (2014, p. 17) ascribe to vote-trading in the UN Security Council in exchange for development aid to developing countries. Thus, diffuse reciprocity implies that side-payments are most likely to be made early on during EU members' temporary Council membership, i.e. through the first budget that is adopted after the election of the EU member to the UN Security Council.

The empirical evidence is more consistent with a diffuse reciprocity mechanism than with specific reciprocity. The EU budgetary windfall associated with a seat on the Security Council materializes in the first budget that is negotiated after the EU member's election onto the Council (see Figure 1). The effect of membership in the UN Security Council on EU budget receipts and net receipts is only significant during the first year on the Security Council. During the latter half of a term on the Council, EU receipts are insignificantly higher than they are otherwise (see models 7-12 in Table 3). These results suggest that diffuse reciprocity is the more plausible causal mechanism that underlies issue linkage, in line with the theoretical argument presented in this paper.

6.5 Tests of alternative explanations

Further analyses show that the additional revenues from the EU budget associated with temporary membership in the UN Security Council are not some type of burden-sharing that compensates EU members that join the UN Security Council for the costs of serving on the Council. Holding a temporary seat on the Security Council does not impose any legal obligations. In practice, however, temporary membership in the Security Council often leads countries to contribute more UN blue helmets (see, Bove

and Elia, 2011; Voeten, 2014). If additional revenues from the EU budget compensated EU members on the Security Council for the cost of contributing more personnel to UN peace operations while serving on the Council, we would expect that EU members contribute more UN peacekeepers when they serve on the Council than they do at other times. However, three country fixed-effect Prais-Winsten regressions of the number of UN peacekeepers contributed by EU members on UN Security Council membership shows that EU members do not contribute more UN peacekeepers when they hold a temporary seat on the Council; this result is robust to including or excluding year fixed effects and all controls in the main model (see Models 13-15 in Table 5 in the Appendix). These analyses cover the period from 1990 to 2014, for which data on individual states' contributions of troops, military observers, and civilian police is available from Perry and Smith (2013). Since EU members do not contribute significantly more peacekeepers when they serve on the UN Security Council, an alternative explanation based on burden-sharing is implausible.¹⁴

A temporary term on the UN Security Council is often associated with a temporary increase in the foreign ministry's budget.¹⁵ If EU members used the additional resources earmarked for diplomacy in the UN Security Council to boost their capacity to successfully negotiate on the EU budget, the association between a seat on the Security Council and higher EU budget receipts would be spurious. Country fixed-effect Prais-Winsten regressions of the number diplomats who represent a given EU member state vis-à-vis the EU in Brussels on that state's presence on (or absence from) the UN Security Council and on the other covariates and fixed effects in Model 5 above indicates that EU members do not significantly enhance their diplomatic strength in Brussels while serving on the UN Security Council (see Models 16-18 in Table 5 in the Appendix).¹⁶ Therefore this analysis refutes the alternative explanation based on

¹⁴It is equally implausible that the additional receipts from the EU budget are designed to share the cost of campaigning for election onto the Security Council. While systematically collected data on the cost of campaigns is unavailable, anecdotal evidence suggests that the additional revenues from the EU budget associated with temporary membership in the Security Council dwarf the cost of running for a seat on that body, thus making compensation for campaign expenditure an implausible alternative explanation. For instance, Australia's electoral campaign against Finland and Luxembourg in 2012 was expected to cost 12.7 million AUD (approximately 8.7 million EUR at the time) (Sydney Morning Herald, 2010), Ireland spent 1.5 million EUR to campaign against Italy and Norway in 2000 (de Breadun, 2000), Canada's campaign in 1998 against Greece and the Netherlands cost 1.9 million CND (approximately 1.1 million EUR at the time) (Malone, 2000, p. 13), while the cost of the same country's campaign against Finland and Greece ten years earlier was "in the tens of thousands of dollars" (Sears, 1988).

¹⁵For instance, Belgium created five additional diplomatic positions at its permanent mission to the UN in New York while it served on the Security Council in 2007 and 2008 (Genin and Fischer, 2007, p. 18).

¹⁶This analysis relies on original data on the number of staff of each EU member's permanent representation

foreign ministries' resource allocation.

6.6 Covariate balance tests

Covariate balance analyses corroborate the identifying assumption (explained and justified in Part 5.1), which implies that there are no time-varying factors that determine both the timing of a given EU member state's Security Council membership and over-time variation in that state's success at securing receipts from the EU budget. An OLS regression of EU members' presence on (or absence from) the UN Security Council on all the control variables in the model and country-fixed effects shows that not a single predictor of receipts from the EU budget is significantly associated with membership in the UN Security Council at the 90 percent confidence level (see Table 6 in the Appendix). When year-fixed effects are added to this model, only one control ('important year') becomes significant; random chance seems to be the most plausible explanation since EU members typically cannot anticipate which year will be an important one for the EU when they announce their candidacy for a seat on the Security Council four to fourteen years ahead of time. The models control for important years to avoid bias. Apart from this variable, the timing of an EU member's temporary membership is not explained by factors that the previous literature has identified as determinants of EU members' receipts from the EU budget. Covariate balance on observables assuages concerns about covariate imbalance on unobservables, which cannot be included into the model as controls. Thus, this result corroborates the conclusion that the windfalls from the EU budget associated with a non-permanent seat on the Security Council are due to issue linkage rather than endogeneity and selection bias.

7 Conclusion

EU members that join the UN Security Council as non-permanent members experience a substantial increase in EU budget receipts. This effect of holding a temporary privileged position at the UN is consistent with the argument on issue linkage presented in this paper: unable to enforce formal rules that require concertation, consultation, and

to the EU in Brussels for the period from 1994 to 2014. The data was extracted from the Interinstitutional/Official Directory of the European Union, which was published once a year between 1994 and 2014, except in 2008 and 2013; data is missing for these two years and unavailable prior to 1994.

exchange of information regarding the UN Security Council, EU member states offer side-payments to those EU countries that serve as non-permanent Council members in order to incentivize them to share information about the Council's confidential consultations and to promote the interests of those EU members that are not represented on the Council. Thus, this study shows that bargaining processes in the UN and in the EU are intricately linked.

The timing of the EU budget windfall that the Union's members receive when they hold a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council suggests that diffuse reciprocity is the causal mechanism that explains issue linkage between bargaining processes in the two largest international organizations in the world. Future research should more systematically investigate the other side of the issue-linkage that bargaining over the EU budget to temporary membership in the UN Security Council by examining how EU member states use their influence as non-permanent UN Security Council members for the benefit of other EU member states. This analysis will shed more light on the mechanism that explains the empirical pattern shown in this paper.

This study makes three contributions to the literature on the UN Security Council. First, it complements and extends the existing literature by showing that developing countries are not the only states that receive side-payments while temporarily serving on this body. Second, it reveals that side-payments are even made to those Council members that are the most unlikely candidates for vote-buying. Even in the absence of a side-payment, EU members with a temporary seat on the Council are more likely to vote with potential vote-buyers (United States, United Kingdom, and France) than Council members in any other world region; therefore, vote-buying is an implausible explanation of the findings in this paper. Instead of buying votes, side-payments to EU members are made in exchange for more intangible favors. By suggesting that vote-buying is not the sole - and perhaps not even the main - rationale for side-payments to UN Security Council members, this study sheds new light on previous findings of side-payments to members of the Council. Finally, this paper helps answer a question about Security Council elections that the existing literature has left open: why do the most competitive elections for seats on the UN Security Council pit against each other Western developed countries, even though they are not eligible for the side-payments discussed in the previous literature? While states seek a temporary seat on the Council in order to shape the body's substantive work (Mikulaschek, 2014), their desire to temporarily boost their leverage in EU bargaining may constitute an

additional motivation for EU members to incur the costs of campaigning for election to the UN Security Council.

The findings in this paper also make an important contribution to the literature on intergovernmental bargaining in the EU. While previous studies on bargaining in the EU Council concur on the importance of internal issue linkage (i.e., explicit or implicit linkage between EU decisions), this paper presents the first empirical evidence on external issue linkage (i.e., links between bargaining in the EU and negotiations in other international organizations). Thus, it reveals that holding a temporary privileged position in another international organization is a source of bargaining power in intergovernmental negotiations in the EU - in addition to structural and issue-specific power, the EU's institutional design features, and internal issue linkage strategies, which have been the focus of the previous literature.

While the analyses in this paper are restricted to the European Union and the United Nations, temporary privileged positions in other international organizations may also increase states' bargaining power across institutional fora. Organizations as diverse as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, African Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council assign temporary privileged roles to their member states, which may enhance the latter's bargaining power in other institutional fora. In turn, privileged roles in other organizations may also improve states' leverage inside the UN Security Council. Thus, Belgium's ambassador on the Security Council observed that "the Republic of Congo can capitalize on chairing the African Union in 2006" during its term on the Council (Belgian Senate, 2006, p. 7, author's translation).

At a time regime complexes are becoming ever denser and when the mandates of international organizations increasingly overlap (see, e.g., Keohane and Victor, 2011; Morse and Keohane, 2014), the substantive importance of issue linkage across international organizations is likely to increase over time. If these trends continue in the future, states will find a growing number of opportunities to leverage a key role in one international organization to augment their bargaining power in another.

Appendix

Table 4: Descriptive statistics, 1977-2006

| Variable | <i>N</i> | Mean | St.dev. | Min. | Max. |
|-------------------------------------|----------|---------|---------|-----------|----------|
| Receipts | 305 | 5,833.0 | 4,744.7 | 14.39 | 20,360.0 |
| Net receipts | 304 | -191.1 | 3,958.6 | -17,360.0 | 9,336.0 |
| Temp. UNSC member ($t-1$) | 305 | 0.115 | 0.319 | 0 | 1 |
| 1st year on UNSC ($t-1$) | 305 | 0.059 | 0.236 | 0 | 1 |
| 2nd year on UNSC ($t-1$) | 305 | 0.056 | 0.230 | 0 | 1 |
| Population size (ln.) | 305 | 16.13 | 1.433 | 12.80 | 18.23 |
| Agricultural labor force size (ln.) | 303 | -1.383 | 1.619 | -5.878 | 1.147 |
| GDP/cap. relative to EU | 305 | 104.0 | 43.20 | 28.94 | 301.2 |
| SSI in EU Council | 305 | 6.779 | 4.227 | 0.952 | 17.86 |
| EU Presidency | 305 | 0.154 | 0.362 | 0 | 1 |
| Domestic EU support | 305 | 51.42 | 21.18 | -18.00 | 86.00 |
| EU size | 305 | 14.19 | 4.629 | 9 | 25 |
| Extraordinary phase | 305 | 0.125 | 0.331 | 0 | 1 |
| UN peace operation contribution | 185 | 329.9 | 452.9 | 0 | 3,434 |
| EU mission size | 144 | 55.11 | 20.72 | 7 | 121 |

Note: In line with the empirical strategy of this study, the descriptive statistics only describe those EU countries that ever served as temporary members on the UN Security Council.

Table 5: Non-permanent UN Security Council membership and contributions to UN peace operations & EU mission size

| | Model 13 | | Model 14 | | Model 15 | | Model 16 | | Model 17 | | Model 18 | |
|-------------------------------------|------------------|------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Independent variables | UNPO contrib. | UNPO contrib. | UNPO contrib. | UNPO contrib. | UNPO contrib. | UNPO contrib. | EU mission | EU mission | EU mission | EU mission | EU mission | EU mission |
| Temp. UNSC member ($t-1$) | 32.63 (72.68) | 20.77 (73.54) | 20.77 (73.54) | 10.61 (69.52) | 10.61 (69.52) | 1.279 (1.458) | 0.434 (1.813) | 0.434 (1.813) | 0.434 (1.813) | 0.434 (1.813) | 1.254 (1.701) | 1.254 (1.701) |
| Population size (ln.) | | -5726.0*** (2085.0) | -5726.0*** (2085.0) | -75.24 (2769.1) | -75.24 (2769.1) | | 233.1*** (64.88) | 233.1*** (64.88) | 233.1*** (64.88) | 233.1*** (64.88) | -45.05 (107.3) | -45.05 (107.3) |
| Agricultural labor force size (ln.) | | 597.9* (322.7) | 597.9* (322.7) | 336.4 (259.5) | 336.4 (259.5) | | -3.813 (9.424) | -3.813 (9.424) | -3.813 (9.424) | -3.813 (9.424) | -4.216 (11.71) | -4.216 (11.71) |
| GDP/cap. relative to EU | | 4.558 (3.397) | 4.558 (3.397) | -0.709 (2.309) | -0.709 (2.309) | | 0.099 (0.144) | 0.099 (0.144) | 0.099 (0.144) | 0.099 (0.144) | 0.200 (0.142) | 0.200 (0.142) |
| SSI in EU Council | | 681.0*** (123.8) | 681.0*** (123.8) | 512.7*** (111.3) | 512.7*** (111.3) | | -8.108* (4.630) | -8.108* (4.630) | -8.108* (4.630) | -8.108* (4.630) | -2.561 (4.795) | -2.561 (4.795) |
| EU Presidency | | -53.42 (61.93) | -53.42 (61.93) | -44.04 (50.86) | -44.04 (50.86) | | -1.148 (1.829) | -1.148 (1.829) | -1.148 (1.829) | -1.148 (1.829) | -2.195 (1.669) | -2.195 (1.669) |
| Domestic EU support | | -0.381 (2.497) | -0.381 (2.497) | -5.779** (2.542) | -5.779** (2.542) | | -0.104 (0.099) | -0.104 (0.099) | -0.104 (0.099) | -0.104 (0.099) | -0.097 (0.104) | -0.097 (0.104) |
| EU size | | 93.99*** (30.12) | 93.99*** (30.12) | 18.60 (34.89) | 18.60 (34.89) | | -1.110 (0.966) | -1.110 (0.966) | -1.110 (0.966) | -1.110 (0.966) | 0.933 (0.980) | 0.933 (0.980) |
| Extraordinary phase | | 12.48 (128.7) | 12.48 (128.7) | | | | 2.834 (2.836) | 2.834 (2.836) | 2.834 (2.836) | 2.834 (2.836) | 6.926*** (1.892) | 6.926*** (1.892) |
| Country f.e. | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year f.e. | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 259 | 154 | 154 | 154 | 154 | 222 | 143 | 143 | 143 | 143 | 143 | 143 |
| Number of panels | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 |
| R^2 | 0.392 | 0.496 | 0.496 | 0.631 | 0.631 | 0.854 | 0.835 | 0.835 | 0.835 | 0.835 | 0.771 | 0.771 |

Note: *** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .1$. Panel regression with AR(1) Prais-Winsten correction and panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Positive coefficients designate variables' positive marginal effects on the number of troops, military observers, and civilian police the EU member contributed to UN peace operations (Models 13-15) or on the size of the staff in the EU member's diplomatic representation to the EU in Brussels (Models 16-18). Model 13 analyzes the period from 1990 to 2014, for which data on the dependent variable is available, while the temporal scope for Model 16 ranges from 1994 to 2014, since data on the number of diplomatic representatives of EU members in Brussels is not available for earlier periods. Models 14-15 and 17-18 are restricted to periods that end in 2006 since some control variables are not available for more recent years. Model 15 omits the control for 'extraordinary year' to avoid a computationally singular system.

Table 6: Non-permanent UN Security Council membership and determinants of EU budget receipts

| Independent variables | Model 19 | Model 20 |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| | UNSC member | UNSC member |
| Population size (ln.) | -0.297 (0.764) | 0.281 (1.225) |
| Agricultural labor force size (ln.) | 0.029 (0.113) | -0.039 (0.163) |
| GDP/cap. relative to EU | 0.002 (0.001) | 0.001 (0.002) |
| SSI in EU Council | -0.011 (0.023) | -0.007 (0.029) |
| EU Presidency | 0.012 (0.051) | 0.010 (0.053) |
| Domestic EU support | -0.002 (0.002) | -0.001 (0.002) |
| EU size | 0.004 (0.011) | 0.011 (0.022) |
| Extraordinary phase | -0.118 (0.073) | -0.296** (0.122) |
| Country f.e. | Yes | Yes |
| Year f.e. | | Yes |
| Observations | 303 | 303 |
| Number of panels | 13 | 13 |
| R^2 | 0.083 | 0.122 |

Note: *** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .1$. OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. In order to specify conservative covariate balance tests standard errors are not inflated by clustering them. Positive coefficients designate variables' positive marginal effects on the likelihood that a given EU country holds a temporary seat on the UN Security Council, controlling for several possible confounders. Model 20 includes year fixed effects, which are omitted from Model 19.

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