Regulatory Coordination and Division of Labor in International Regime Complexes

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Abstract

In many issue areas, the presence of multiple international regulatory bodies creates obstacles to effective global governance. These obstacles take two primary forms: 1) regulatory arbitrage arising from legal inconsistencies, and 2) duplication of effort resulting from overlapping mandates. A growing literature on international regime complexity has documented these problems in a wide range of issue areas, but less attention has been paid to strategies intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) use to counteract them. In this paper, I explore when IGOs — as organizations have done in other contexts — engage in *regulatory coordination* and cultivate a *division of labor* to ameliorate the negative consequences of regime complexity. Using a newly collected dataset of IGO policy documents, I show that IGOs are likely to coordinate their rules when they share multiple members, when they have highly institutionalized structures, and when the regime complex contains a large, central IGO to serve as a coordinating focal point. Greater membership overlap also facilitates the emergence a division of labor; as IGOs become more institutionalized, however, they become less adaptable and are less likely to divide labor with other organizations.

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1 Introduction

The last several decades featured tremendous growth in the number, size, and substantive scope of international bodies seeking to regulate state behavior. This proliferation of international organizations has altered the basic multilateral architecture that governs interstate cooperation in many issue areas. Issues such as trade and global health, which were once regulated by a relatively integrated regime, are now governed by a complex network of distinct institutions with partially overlapping mandates and memberships. Raustiala and Victor (2004) coined the term "regime complex" to describe these networks,[1] and scholars have documented the presence of regime complexes in a wide range of issue areas.[2]

The international organizations that comprise a regime complex may or may not act in concert. When organizations do not coordinate their standards, rules, and activities, the quality of global governance may decline. Scholars have identified a long list of unwanted conditions that arise in poorly coordinated regime complexes. They can engender legal inconsistencies, induce duplication and inefficiency, encourage organizational competition, and dilute previously constructed focal points (Alter and Meunier 2009; Raustiala and Victor 2004; Rosand 2006). These conditions are troubling because they give rise to two specific forms of undesirable behavior: 1) regulatory arbitrage, which occurs when actors capitalize on loopholes or inconsistencies in regulatory systems in order to circumvent regulation, and 2) duplication of effort, which results in an inefficient distribution of finite resources.

Regulatory arbitrage is a concept most frequently used in the literatures on law and finance; it typically describes a financial transaction or exchange specifically designed to

[1] Raustiala and Victor define regime complex as an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area (279).

[2] Examples include fisheries management (Young 2011), climate change (Biermann, Pattberg, van Asselt, and Zelli 2009; Keohane and Victor 2011), trade liberalization (Davis 2009), intellectual property (Helfer 2009), and refugee policy (Betts 2009).

profit from inconsistent regulations or laws.[3] Multinational firms often confront multiple, overlapping regulatory authorities emanating from different countries. In these cases, they have a strong incentive to leverage inconsistencies in regulation to escape compliance with burdensome requirements. States in an international regime complex are in a highly analogous position. Much of the literature on regime complexity has highlighted dischord and inconsistency in IGO regulations.[4] Indeed, many state strategies that have been emphasized in this literature — including "forum-shopping", "regime-shifting", and other behaviors associated with "contested multilateralism" — are examples of regulatory arbitrage.[5]. From a global governance perspective, regulatory arbitrage is undesirable because it allows states to escape compliance with international commitments; it is the fundamental problem created by legal inconsistencies in a regime complex.

Duplication of effort occurs when two or more organizations independently devote resources to the same activity and fail to achieve potential gains from cooperation or specialization. It is problematic because it leads organizations to incur unnecessary costs and results in an inefficient distribution of available resources. Several scholars have noted the tendency of regime complexes to produce duplication of effort: Hoffman (2009) highlights a "lack of inter-institutional cooperation and coordination [which] has created inefficiencies" (45) within the Western crisis management regime, and Rosand (2006) laments the "duplication of efforts...which have limited the different bodies overall contribution" (406) in the counterterrorism regime complex.

Because they are characterized by multiple, overlapping regulatory institutions, all regime

[3]This definition comes from Portnoy (1997), who formally defines regulatory arbitrage as "those financial transactions designed specifically to reduce costs or capture profit opportunities created by different regulations or laws."

[4]See Raustiala and Victor (2004) for a discussion of "legal inconsistencies" in the regime complex for plant genetic resources (280); Helfer (2009) on the "competing regulatory approach" taken in the intellectual property regime (40); and Davis (2009) on the "potential for contradictory legal rulings" in international trade (25).

[5]See Helfer (2004), Raustiala (2006), and Morse and Keohane (2014), respectively, for a discussion of forum-shopping, regime-shifting, and contested multilateralism.

complexes have the potential for regulatory arbitrage and duplication of effort. However, this does not imply that regime complexes are doomed to suffer from pervasive non-compliance and wasteful inefficiency. IGOs (and the member states that comprise them) have incentives to ameliorate these problems when possible. Thus we should expect IGOs in a regime complex to pursue cooperative strategies designed to limit regulatory arbitrage and minimize duplication of effort. Specifically, IGOs may engage in *regulatory coordination* and cultivate an explicit or implicit *division of labor* to address the fundamental problems associated with regime complexity.

Using a newly collected dataset on IGO policy documents in three regime complexes, I present the first statistical evidence of regulatory coordination and the emergence of a division of labor in international regime complexes. I further explore the conditions under which IGOs pursue these strategies. I argue that certain structural features of a regime complex — specifically, the level of membership overlap and the presence of a large, focal IGO — facilitate both regulatory coordination and division of labor. A regime complex's structure shapes opportunities and incentives for IGOs to cooperate with one another. As a result, some regime complex strucures are associated with higher levels of regulatory coordination and division of labor than others. IGO-level features, such as the degree of institutionalization, have conflicting effects: highly institutionalized IGOs are more likely to engage in regulatory coordination, but are less adaptable and thus less likely to cultivate a division of labor with other IGOs.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section (Section 2), I examine regulatory arbitrage and duplication of effort in more detail, and I also delve into the primary strategies IGOs have to address these problems. In Section 3, I advance a set of theoretical arguments about why regime complex structure and certain IGO-level features should influence the ability of IGOs to engage in regulatory coordination and achieve a division of labor. Section 4 tests these arguments using a new dataset of IGO policy doc-

uments in the election monitoring, counterterrorism, and intellectual property rights regime complexes. The paper concludes with suggestions for future research.

2 Cooperation Problems in Regime Complexes

Two fundamental problems threaten global governance in international regime complexes. First, inconsistencies in international rules and regulations create the potential for regulatory arbitrage, allowing targets of regulation to reduce compliance. Second, overlapping mandates often results in duplication of effort, leading to an inefficient use of resources. In this section, I describe each problem in greater detail and introduce the two primary strategies — regulatory coordination and division of labor — that IGOs use to ameliorate them.

2.1 Regulatory Arbitrage

A major challenge to effective global governance in regime complexes is the possibility of regulatory discord among institutions that operate in the same policy space but do not have an explicit, agreed-upon hierarchy for rule making. Raustiala and Victor (2004) describe "legal inconsistencies" in the regime complex for plant genetic resources, and further argue that "legal conflict among overlapping rules...is a recurring and difficult challenge for regime artchitects" (300). Similarly, Helfer (2009) finds institutions adopting a "competing regulatory approach" in the intellectual property regime (40), and Davis (2009) notes "the potential for contradictory legal rulings" among the set of institutions governing international trade (25). In other words, a common feature of regime complexes is inconstistency in law or regulatory practice.

The existence of legal inconsistencies creates incentives for the targets of regulation. Strategic actors seek to minimize costs. If the compliance costs of competing regulations differ, states or other actors will prefer to recognize the authority of the lowest-cost regulator

(this incentive is the impetus for forum-shopping behavior in regime complexes). In some cases, this can create a "race to the bottom" effect that empowers the weakest regulatory authorities. When possible, actors will also leverage inconsistencies to escape compliance with burdensome requirements — e.g., by exploiting gaps in regulatory authority, or by claiming the absence of a clear global standard on a particular issue. These are strategies that would not be possible in a fully harmonized international regime, or one with a clear hierarchy in rule-making authority. The net effect is a reduction in compliance with international rules, norms, and standards.

In the literature on financial regulation, the type of behavior described above is known as regulatory arbitrage. Arbitrage traditionally refers to behavior by firms; it describes a trading strategy that relies on a difference in price among two or more goods.[6] *Regulatory* arbitrage occurs when the difference arises from inconsistencies in regulation. Firms engage in regulatory arbitrage to avoid costly rules and circumvent certain regulatory authorities. When Riles (2014) argues that "regulatory arbitrage depends on a rich ecosystem of diverse regimes and types of laws, which are not organized into any clear, coherent, hierarchical whole" (65), the connection to international regime complexity is obvious. Multinational firms and states in a regime complex confront a very similar environment, and as a result they both turn to regulatory arbitrage to minimize compliance with regulations. This implies that IGOs in a regime complex share the same challenge as financial regulators: how to ensure compliance in an inconsistent regulatory landscape.

How have financial regulators dealt with the problem of regulatory arbitrage? The most commonly cited remedy is complete harmonization of laws and standards. If the targets of regulation face a single set of rules, the costs of compliance are constant across regulatory authoirties, and regulatory arbitrage ceases to be an attractive strategy. Harmonization,

[6]This definition is borrowed from Hull (2000).

however, can be difficult if not completely infeasible.[7] IGOs in a regime complex have different member states, mandates, and decision-making mechanisms, usually with no formal hierarchy of authority; the likelihood of all organizations agreeing to a single, comprehensive set of rules is quite low.

When harmonization proves unrealistic, regulatory bodies have turned to an alternative approach: creating formal rules for handling potential overlaps in regulatory authority. Instead of agreeing on a single set of rules, this approach mitigates legal inconsistencies by defining how far "each regulatory authority extend[s], and what should be done when these overlap"(Riles 2014, 66). In the legal literature, this approach is known as the "Conflict of Laws" or "Private International Law". Its goal is to create a sufficiently coordinated set of laws, rules, and standards such that actors cannot circumvent them through regulatory arbitrage. Usually, "Conflict of Laws" rules focus on the proper scope of regulatory authorities; these rules may be formulated through new legislation or through case law as courts consider implementation of existing regulations (Riles 2014).

Does something akin to the "Conflict of Laws" approach occur in international regime complexes? I argue that IGOs and their member states have a strong incentive to formulate rules about potential overlaps in their authority, for the same reason regulatory authorities have done so in other contexts: it increases the likelihood of compliance by preventing targets of regulation from engaging in regulatory arbitrage. The analogy is not perfect — formal legislatures and courts are relatively rare in international organizations, making a formal "Conflict of Laws" strategy infeasible — but IGOs can and do coordinate their rules, norms, and standards in other ways. IGOs sometimes cede authority of an issue to another body; they engage in joint rule-making on issues of potential regulatory overlap; they instruct their secretariats to coordinate rules and activities; and they use subsequent policy rules to de-

[7]See Riles (2014) for a discussion of the challenges and costs associated with harmonization.

conflict inconsistent regulations. I call this behavior *regulatory coordination*.[8]

Regulatory coordination is the primary strategy IGOs use to limit regulatory arbitrage in international regime complexes. In Section 3, I investigate the circumstances under which IGOs are likely to engage in regulatory coordination. Before doing so, however, I turn to a second cooperation problem associated with international regime complexes: duplication of effort.

2.2 Duplication of Effort

International regime complexes are characterized by overlapping mandates among IGOs. In practical terms, this means several regulatory bodies claim responsibility for the same issue. Duplication of effort arises as a consequence of this environment. Similar rule-making efforts, capacity building activities, and development of techincal expertise are often undertaken independently by two or more IGOs in a regime complex. While a certain degree of duplication may be desirable, many of these activities create inefficiencies that limit the effectiveness of global governance.

Several scholars have noted the tendency of regime complexes to duplicate effort. When discussing the Western crisis management regime, Hoffman (2009) highlights a "lack of inter-institutional cooperation and coordination [which] has created inefficiencies" (45). Similarly, Rosand (2006) describes the "duplication of efforts...which have limited the different bodies overall contribution" (406) in the counterterrorism regime complex. Because IGOs are constrained by finite budgetary and human resources, excessive duplication limits the total quantity of activities that can be accomplished within a regime complex.

Formally, duplication of effort in regime complexes occurs when two or more organizations independently devote resources to the same activity and fail to achieve potential gains

[8]Few scholars have investigated efforts by IGOs to coordinate their rules, norms, and standards, despite its clear connection to cooperation in the context of overlapping institutions. Beirmann's (2007) study of "inter-organizational network" is a notable exception.

from cooperation or specialization.[9] This duplication can take several forms. Perhaps the clearest form occurs when two IGOs independently incur material costs to carry out very similar initiatives, such as the delivery of specialized technical assistance. For example, in 2011 and early 2012, both APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum independently carried out capacity building workshops in Asia focused on preventing cyberterrorism. Duplication can also occur more broadly, however; in addition to material costs, IGOs incur investment costs when determining which issues to prioritize. When IGOs choose to regulate state behavior on a sub-issue like cyberterrorism, they incur costs associated with developing skills and information specific to the sub-issue. In these cases, duplication limits the range of sub-issues that can be addressed in a regime complex.

What, if anything, can organizations in a regime complex do to minimize duplication of effort? The primary strategy is to cultivate an explicit or implicit *division of labor* among IGOs. A division of labor occurs when an organization adapts its regulatory focus to achieve gains from specialization with other IGOs. It can arise from a formal agreement between organizations, or more informally as IGOs interact over time, realize the presence of comparative advantages, and come to occupy a specific niche among other organizations in the regime complex.

In principle, a division of labor can occur along a number of dimensions. IGOs might cultivate a division of labor based on geography, with each IGO responsible for regulating behavior and encouraging implementation in a specific geographic region.[10] More commonly, a division of labor emerges with respect to functionally defined sub-issues. In the counterterrorism regime complex, for example, some organizations focus on aviation security (e.g.,

[9]Notably, this definition does not assume that all duplication is undesirable; IGOs and their member states may wish to replicate work across multiple fora for a variety of reasons. The emphasis here is on inefficiencies created by uncoordinated IGO behavior.

[10]The regime complex for election monitoring most closely approximates this division of labor, since it is composed primarily of regional bodies. However, several IGOs in that regime complex (e.g., the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)) observe elections in many regions, resulting in some duplication of effort.

the International Civil Aviation Organization) while others focus on terrorism finance or preventing nuclear terrorism.

A division of labor is not easy to achieve. It requires cooperation, communication, and a certain level of trust among IGOs in a regime complex. Yet the very existence of multiple IGOs with overlapping mandates suggests that the organizations' member states have differing preferences over the best approach to regulating a specific issue area. In these cases, an IGO will not always be willing to treat another organization's rules or activities as a substitute for its own. However, we can identify some conditions that make a division of labor more likely to emerge. These conditions are the focus of the following section.

3 Regulatory Coordination and Division of Labor

The preceding section introduced two fundamental problems — regulatory arbitrage and duplication of effort — that tend to arise in international regime complexes. It also highlighted two strategies IGOs can use to ameliorate these problems. Regulatory coordination reduces the incentive for regulatory arbitrage by deconflicting inconsistent rules, and a division of labor minimizes duplication of effort and captures efficiency gains from specialization.

In this section, I explore the circumstances under which regulatory coordination and division of labor will occur empirically. Both strategies require IGOs to cooperate with one another, but this cooperation does not occur automatically. As I will demonstrate, some regime complexes are more successful than others when it comes to regulatory coordination and division of labor. When will IGOs succesfully coordinate their rules, norms, and standards to address regulatory inconsistencies? When will they adapt their regulatory focus to allow a division of labor to emerge?

I argue at least two types of variables affect the likelihood of regulatory coordination and division of labor among IGOs. First, the membership structure of a regime complex

shapes IGO interaction, influences information flows, and ultimately creates incentives for cooperation or discord among IGOs. In the following section, I elaborate on the notion of regime complex structure, and I highlight two structural features in particular — the degree of membership overlap and the presence of a large, focal IGO — that facilitate both regulatory coordination and the emergence of a division of labor. Second, certain institutional properties of IGOs affect their ability to engage in regulatory coordination and specialization. Highly institutionalized IGOs with enhanced bureaucratic capacity are more likely to engage in regulatory coordination; because these organizations are less adaptable, however, they are less likely to establish a division of labor with other IGOs.

3.1 Regime Complex Structure

A central driver of IGO cooperation in a regime complex is the *structure* of the regime complex itself. By regime complex structure, I mean the set of overlapping IGO membership patterns that underpin each regime complex. Membership patterns are important because they determine the set of states that bargain over international rules in each regulatory body. They also determine the extent to which states are subject to the jurisdiction of multiple IGOs, and they provide a means for thinking about connections between IGOs in a regime complex.

A useful way to visualize regime complex structure is to depict regime complexes as networks of IGOs, linked by shared member states. Figure 1 displays a network representation of three regime complexes in different issue areas. IGOs are represented by nodes (circles), and lines between nodes signify the degree of membership overlap between each IGO. As the figure makes clear, regime complexes can be structured quite differently.

Figure 1: Regime Complex Structure in Three Regime Complexes



Unlike individual institutions, regime complexes typically do not benefit from a consciously designed structure. An international organization may be purposively designed at a single point in time (Koremenos et al. 2001), but a regime complex is a conglomeration of many organizations constructed during different periods and for different purposes. In other words, regime complexes do not reflect a single master plan; instead they evolve from a patchwork of separate institution-building efforts. A regime complex can be altered by any group of states that decides to construct a new international organization. As a result, the structure of a regime complex is often determined by a series of uncoordinated decisions made by different actors at different times.

Scholars have long recognized that circumstances in which individual actors rationally pursue their self-interest can lead to outcomes that are collectively suboptimal (Olson 1965; Hardin 1968). Indeed, these sorts of collective action problems have been cited as a major reason that states construct multilateral institutions in the first place (Keohane 1984). But just as uncoordinated individual behavior can yield suboptimal outcomes, so can uncoordinated institution building efforts yield regime complexes that, from a global governance perspective, are suboptimal. As a result, some regime complexes are structured in such a way that makes the basic tasks of global governance — including the coordination of international rules and the emergence of an efficient division of labor — more difficult to fulfill.

A regime complex's structure shapes opportunities and incentives for IGOs to cooperate with one another. Recall that links between IGOs represent overlapping membership. There are several mechanisms through which overlapping members might affect the propensity of IGOs to engage in regulatory coordination and develop a division of labor. First, shared members facilitates communication between IGOs. State participation in an IGO entails repeated interaction. It brings states into contact more frequently, often at multiple bureaucratic levels. Member states thus become a key conduit for information flow from one IGO to another. Second, IGO membership may also have a socialization effect on states. IGOs are social as well as contractual environments, and as such IGO membership could make a state vulnerable to persuasion by other member states, or open a state up to broader strategies of social influence such as collective shaming (Johnston 2001). These processes can drive the preferences of IGO members to partially converge (Greenhill 2010), facilitating cooperation between IGOs. Third and finally, overlapping membership usually implies jurisdictional overlap between IGOs (i.e., the IGOs are attempting to regulate behavior in the same set of member states). This raises the potential for regulatory arbitrage and duplication of effort, which in turn increases the demand for regulatory coordination and division of labor.

These three mechanisms occur simultaneously, and they have complementary effects. Whether overlapping members are conduits for communication, targets of socialization, or drivers of demand for cooperation, the effect is that overlapping membership should be positively associated with IGO attempts to coordinate global rules and standards.[11] Overlapping members should also facilitate the emergence of a division of labor among IGOs.[12] Hypoth-

[11]The relationship between IGO membership and coordination has been cited by other scholars in both the network analysis and international relations literatures. For a formal justification of the argument that increasing links (modeled as communication pathways) always (weakly) improves the chances of coordination in social networks, see Chwe (2000). See Judd, Kearns, Vorobeychik (2010) for experimental evidence relating increasing overlap between network cliques to greater success in consensus tasks. For evidence that co-membership in IGOs can lead to a convergence in state interests, see Greenhill (2010).

[12]For a detailed discussion of division of labor in regime complexes, including the effect of "multiple members", see Gehring and Faude (2014).

esis 1 flows directly from this discussion.

> **H1: IGOs with greater membership overlap are more likely to engage in *regulatory coordination* and are more likely to develop a *division of labor*.**

The political science literature on international cooperation suggests another feature of regime complex structure that is likely to facilitate cooperative behavior between IGOs. Martin (1992) notes that "structures that facilitate bargaining and allow states to identify a focal point will contribute to cooperative outcomes" (776). This "focal point" hypothesis dates at least to Schelling (1960), who argued that if communication is limited, the presence of conspicuous focal points may provide a natural coordination mechanism for states. Such focal points can be natural or constructed; the crucial element is that actors recognize the focal point and have some incentive to draw on it to solve the cooperation problem. What could serve as a focal point at the level of the regime complex? One possibility is a conspicuously large IGO. If one IGO dominates the regime in terms of membership size, other IGOs may explicitly or implicitly use it as a coordination device, shape their own rules and regulatory priorities around those of the focal IGO. From this insight we gain our second hypothesis about regime complex structure:

> **H2: The presence of a large, inclusive IGO in a regime complex makes organizations more likely to engage in *regulatory coordination* and to develop a *division of labor*.**

3.2 Institutional Variables

In addition to the membership structure of a regime complex, there are institutional features of individual IGOs that may influence their propensity to cooperate with each other. Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004) suggest variation in an IGO's level of institutionalization has a meaningful effect on several important outcomes. Highly institutionalized

IGOs are those in which member states empower a central bureaucracy with a significant amount of resources, technical expertise, and coercive power. These IGOs have a greater capacity for building and maintaining cooperative relationships with other organizations compared to their less institutionalized counterparts. As a result, IGOs with higher levels of institutionalization should be more effective at regulatory coordination.

H3: Highly institutionalized IGOs are more likely to engage in *regulatory coordination* with other IGOs.

At the same time, institutionalization is also likely to limit an IGO's ability to adapt and thus its likelihood of dividing labor with other IGOs. This occurs for at least two reasons. First, large bureaucracies tend to develop highly structured, reproducable routines that are resistant to change. Hannan and Freeman (1989) call this phenomenon *structural inertia*; they argue large organizations will be particularly susceptible to structural inertia and thus will struggle to adapt to changing environmental conditions. Since division of labor requires adapting an organization's regulatory priorities, IGOs with large bureaucracies will be less likely to embrace this strategy. Second, IGO bureaucracrats tend to develop a vested interest in maintaining and expanding the scope of their authority. They will resist ceding authority over particular sub-issues to other organizations and become strong advocates of maintaining an IGO's regulatory authority in the entire policy space. The net result is that highly institutionalized IGOs will engage in less division of labor.

H4: Highly institutionalized IGOs are less likely to engage in *division of labor* with other IGOs.

Finally, IGOs often establish official institutional relationships with each other that may influence their propensity for regulatory coordination and division of labor. For instance, Aggarwal (1998) argues that states use "nesting" relationships to reconcile new institutions with existing ones. Similarly, IGOs often invite other organizations to participate in their deliberations, meetings, and activities as formal or observer members. These institutional

relationships should facilitate regulatory coordination by increasing information exchange between IGOs. As these relationships build trust between IGO member states, they may also induce a division a labor between organizations.

H5: IGOs are more likely to engage in *regulatory coordination* and a *division of labor* when they are legally nested within or share formal institutional relationships with other IGOs.

The following section tests these hypothesized empirical relationships using a new dataset on IGO policy documents in three regime complexes.

4 Data and Analysis

To investigate empirical patterns in regulatory coordination and division of labor, I collected time-series data on three regime complexes: election monitoring, counterterrorism, and intellectual property rights. I selected these particular regime complexes for two reasons. First, they represent a diverse variety of topics, from human rights to security to economic issues. Each issue area entails its own set of cooperation problems that complicate the task of global governance, so maximizing variance on issues helps test the generalizability of the hypothesized relationships. Second, each regime complex has been the focus of previous scholarly attention.[13] The existence of previous work helps to establish the conceptual bounds of each "issue" and limits subjectivity in determining which regulatory bodies are participants in each regime complex.

For each issue area, I first identify the set of IGOs that participate in global governance of that issue. To be considered part of the regime complex, an IGO must formally include the relevant issue in its institutional mandate or actively regulate member states' behavior

[13]See Kelley's extensive work (2009, 2012) on the election monitoring regime complex; Helfer (2004, 2009) for an examination of the intellectual property regime complex; and Rosand (2006) on the counterterrorism regime complex.

in the issue area.[14] Table 1 displays the IGOs included in the regime complexes for election monitoring, counterterrorism, and intellectual property rights. The table also includes the year of entry for each IGO.[15]

[14]This excludes IGOs that occasionally reference an issue area but cannot be said to participate in global governance of the issue. IGOs which condemned terrorism immediately after the 9/11 attacks, for example, do not automatically become part of the counterterrorism regime complex.

[15]IGOs can enter a regime complex in two ways. First, a new IGO may be constructed in order to govern interstate cooperation in the relevant issue area; in these cases, the year of entry corresponds to the year the IGO was created. Second, an existing IGO may expand its mandate to include the relevant issue area; in these cases, the year of entry corresponds to the year in which the issue area was formally added to the IGO's mandate (this often coincides with an IGO formally establishing a subsidiary body to govern member behavior in the issue area).

Table 1: International Organizations in the Election Monitoring, Counterterrorism, and Intellectual Property Regime Complexes

Regime	Acroynm	Organization	Year Added
Election Monitoring	OAS	Organization of American States	1962
	AU	African Union	1989
	CS	Commonwealth Secretariat	1989
	COE	Council of Europe	1989
	OSCE	Org. for Security & Cooperation in Europe	1990
	UN	United Nations	1990
	EU	European Union	1993
	ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	1997
	SADC	Southern African Development Community	1997
	CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States	2001
Counter-terrorism	SAARC	South Asian Assn. for Regional Cooperation	1987
	AU	African Union	1999
	OAS	Organization of American States	1999
	UNSC	United Nations Security Council	1999
	COE	Council of Europe	2001
	FATF	Financial Action Task Force	2001
	G8	Group of Eight	2001
	ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization	2001
	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	2001
	ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum	2002
	APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	2002
	IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency	2002
	OSCE	Org. for Security & Cooperation in Europe	2002
	EU	European Union	2004
	SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization	2004
	UN	United Nations	2006
	GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum	2011
Intellectual Property	WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization	1967
	CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity	1994
	FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization	1994
	WTO	World Trade Organization	1994
	WHO	World Health Organization	1996
	UN	United Nations	2000

To measure regulatory coordination and division of labor, I use the set of all policy

documents produced by IGOs in each regime complex. For each year that a particular IGO is part of a regime complex, I collect all publicly available documents produced by the IGO that pertains to the relevant issue area. Examples of these documents include texts of formal treaties, resolutions, decisions, technical guidelines, codes of conduct, meeting summaries, mission reports, and best practices. For the election monitoring, counterterrorism, and intellectual property regime complexes, this collection yields a total of over 2,000 policy documents.

4.1 Regulatory Coordination

Regulatory coordination occurs when two IGOs attempt to minimize regulatory arbitrage by addressing potential overlaps in regulatory authority. If organizations are engaging in this behavior, it should be observable in the corpus of policy documents produced by IGOs in the regime complex.

To explore regulatory coordination between IGOs, I parse all relevant documents to see whether they make reference to other IGOs in the regime complex. A particular IGO may reference another IGO in a policy document for several reasons. It may express approval or disapproval of another IGO's policies or activities, cite another IGO's rules in support of its own policy standards, or seek to clarify the relationship between its own rules and those of other IGOs. Alternatively, a reference may reflect the simple fact that an IGO invited representatives from another IGO to participate in its own policy deliberation process. An accurate measure of regulatory coordination therefore requires knowledge of the subjective nature of each IGO reference.

I code the IGO references according to the criteria described in Table 2. Each reference receives a score from 1 to 5, with "1" denoting a passing or irrelevant reference and "5" denoting an explicit attempt to deconflict and/or harmonize rules with another IGO. A missing reference is coded as a zero. These scores are then used to calculate a measure for

regulatory coordination for each pair of IGOs in a given year.[16].

Table 2: Regulatory Coordination: Coding Scheme

Score	Action	Criteria	Example
1	Passing Reference	IGO A refers to IGO B's activities or rules on a matter not directly relevant to the specific issue area	"…welcomed the adoption by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) of the Pelindaba Treaty on the Establishment of an African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone."
2	Relevant Reference	IGO A refers to IGO B's activities or rules in the specific issue area	"The commonwealth secretariat also mounted a three-person [election monitoring] mission under the leadership of the Hon. Chris Carter, a former New Zealand Minister."
3	Intent to Coordinate	IGO A makes an explicit effort to coordinate its activities or rules with IGO B	"The secretariat had been asked to contact the FAO, the secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity and UPOV to request factual information on their activities."
4	Cooperative Action	IGOs engage in a joint endeavor (e.g., a declaration, workshop, or mission); or IGO A endorses a set of rules or activities undertaken by IGO B.	"The secretariat cooperates with a number of intergovernmental organizations, notably with WIPO pursuant to the agreement between WIPO and the WTO which entered into force on 1 january 1996 and the joint initiative on technical cooperation."
5	Deconfliction and Rule Harmonization	IGO A articulates rules for managing overlapping jurisdiction with IGO B; or IGO A explicitly accepts IGO B's authority	"[APEC members] are implementing the measures called for in relevant UN Security Council resolutions and are putting in place the legal and regulatory mechanisms to implement Resolution 1373."

Figure 2 demonstrates the results of this coding scheme for one particular IGO, the European Union (EU), in the counterterrorism regime complex in 2005. The results are consistent with what we might expect. The EU is highly coordinated with the Council of

[16]To calculate regulatory coordination between two IGOs in a specific year, I take the average coordination score across all relevant documents in that year.

Europe, with which it shares many members, as well as the Financial Action Task Force and the United Nations Security Council. Other organizations, like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), do not engage in regulatory coordination with the EU. Table 1A in the appendix includes the exact text of all IGO cross-references used to calculate these scores.

Figure 2: EU Regulatory Coordination with other IGOs, 2005 CT Regime



The regulatory coordination score is dyadic, measuring coordination between pairs of IGOs in each year. However, it can also be used to estimate the aggregate level of regulatory coordination among all IGOs in a regime complex. Figure 3 displays observed regulatory coordination in the regime complexes for election monitoring, counterterrorism, and intellectual property rights over several years. Regulatory coordination exhibits significant variation, both across issue areas and over time.

Figure 3: Average Regulatory Coordination in 3 Regime Complexes



In the previous section, I identified four key variables that should influence the likelihood that two IGOs will engage in regulatory coordination. Membership overlap, the presence of a large IGO, the degree of IGO institutionalization, and the existence of formal institutional relationships are all hypothesized to positively affect regulatory coordination. To test these hypotheses empirically, I constructed the following variables:

- *Membership Overlap* is a count of the number of shared members between each pair of IGOs. IGO membership data comes from the Correlates of War IGO Dataset, with missing data supplemented by consulting the website of each IGO.

- *Largest IGO* measures the size of the largest IGO in the regime complex, in terms of membership.

- *Institutionalization* is a 3-point scale of IGO institutional structure, following the cod-

ing scheme introduced in Boehmer et. al (2004).[17] Higher scores indicate more institutionalized IGOs.

- *Nested*, *IGO Member*, and *IGO Observer* are dichotomous variables measuring, respectively, whether an IGO is legally nested within another IGO and whether an IGO is a formal member or observer member of another IGO.

In each case, the unit of analysis is the IGO dyad-year.[18] Table 3 provides some initial evidence of the relationship between these independent variables and regulatory coordination, the outcome of interest. It displays the average level of regulatory coordination among subgroups of IGO pairs. In each case, the cross-tabulations are consistent with the hypothesized effect.

Table 3: Regulatory Coordination among IGO Dyads

	Membership Overlap		Largest IGO		Institutional-ization		Nested	
	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	No	Yes
Regulatory Coordination	0.197	1.028	0.543	0.702	0.370	0.868	0.605	1.475

Note: IGOs with high membership overlap are those with membership overlap higher than the sample median; others are considered to have low membership overlap. The same method was used for other variables. All differences are statistically significant at the .05 level.

Of course, other factors are likely to influence the level of regulatory coordination among IGOs. If these factors are also correlated with any of the key independent variables, omitting

[17] I use the following coding rules, which are lifted directly from Boehmer et. al (2004): IGOs are coded as 1 (*minimal*) if they contain plenary meetings and committees without an extensive bureaucracy (e.g., the Group of Eight); 2 (*structured*) if they contain formal procedures and rules along with structures of assembly, nonceremonial executives, and/or bureaucracies to implement policy (e.g., the OAS); and 3 (*interventionist*) if they contain mechanisms for mediation, arbitration, adjudication, and/or other means to coerce state decisions (e.g., the European Union).

[18] For the *Institutionalization* variable, I assign the highest institutionalization score obtained by either IGO in the dyad.

them can introduce bias. The most important potential confounder is the preferences of IGO member states. State preferences almost certainly influence the extent to which two IGOs will coordinate their rules, norms, and standards: when two IGOs have member states with highly aligned preferences, they will face more pressure to coordinate and even harmonize regulation. Because IGOs are created by states, state preferences also affect the values taken by the independent variables listed above.

I control for IGO member state preferences in two ways. First, I identify a measure in each issue area that represents a plausibly exogenous driver of states preferences for cooperation. For the counterterrorism issue area , I use the number of annual terrorist attacks in each state as reported in the University of Maryland Global Terrorism Database (GTD).[19] For election monitoring, I rely on states polity scores as reported in the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2013). For intellectual property, I use annual data on patent applications per capita from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) as a measure of state preferences. I then calculate the average difference in member state preferences for each pair of IGOs. I call the resulting variable *Preference Difference*.

As a second measure of member state preferences, I calculate the average 'affinity" between member states of each pair of IGOs. Affinity scores measure similarity in state preferences based on voting positions in the UN General Assembly; the data comes from Gartzke (2006). I call this variable *Member Affinity*.

To test whether the relationship between regulatory coordination and the key independent variables holds after controlling for member state preferences, I estimate a series of regression models. The results are presented in Table 4.

[19]National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2012). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.

Table 4: Determinants of IGO Regulatory Coordination

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Membership Overlap	.0061**	.0103**	.0105**	.0113**
	(.0004)	(.0011)	(.0011)	(.0016)
Largest IGO	.0056**	.0051**	.0050**	.0048**
	(.0019)	(.0018)	(.0018)	(.0018)
Institutionalization	.3144**	.2243**	.2147*	.2121**
	(.0281)	(.0359)	(.0373)	(.0379)
Preference Diff		-.7511**	-.7276**	-.6775**
		(.1266)	(.1266)	(.1839)
Member Affinity		.5943**	.5690**	.5647**
		(.1494)	(.1494)	(.1590)
Nested			-.2435	-.2740
			(.1723)	(.1765)
Formal Member			.8457**	.8517*
			(.3543)	(0.0009)
Observer			.0495	.0404
			(.0672)	(.0698)
EM Regime				.2040
				(.2547)
CT Regime				.1912
				(.2451)
IPR Regime				-1.4900**
				(.4312)
Observations	2228	1215	1215	1215
Adjusted R-squared	.180	.1677	.1716	.1706

Note: Intercepts not shown. Statistical significance is denoted by * ($p < .05$), ** ($p < .01$).

The first column (Model 1) is a linear model that includes only *Membership Overlap*, *Largest IGO*, and *Institutionalization* as independent variables. In this reduced form model, all three variables have a positive and statistically significant relationship with regulatory coordination. Model 2 incorporates the variables *Prefrence Difference* and *Member Affinity* to control for the effect of member state preferences, and Model 3 incorporates variables measuring institutional links between IGOs. In each model, the coefficients for *Membership Overlap*, *Largest IGO*, and *Institutionalization* are positive and statistically significant at the .01 level. In addition, being a formal member of another IGO appears to have a positive and significant affect on the level of regulatory coordination between IGOs. Throughout, the estimated effect of member state preferences is consistent with intuition: as *Preference Difference* increases, IGOs become less likely to coordinate their regulatory standards. Similarly, IGOs engage in more regulatory coordination when their member states have higher preference "affinity".

Models 1-3 pool data on each of the three regime complexes. However, the nature of international cooperation is likely to differ across issue areas. An important source of heterogeneity is the type of cooperation problems that structure states in- teraction on each issue (Martin 1992). As a result, states may face different incentives in the counterterrorism regime complex than they do in the regimes for election monitoring or intellectual property rights. To control for issue-specific cooperation problems as well as other sources of unobserved heterogeneity, Model 4 incorporates fixed effects for the three issue areas under examination. The sign and substantive size of key variables are unchanged in this model.

The results are robust to a number of alternative specifications, including the inclusion of year polynomial terms to control for time dependence, a random effects model, and the use of variable slopes by issue area. The regression models consistently support the hypotheses for regulatory coordination described in Section 3. Aspects of regime complex structure — including the degree of membership overlap between IGOs and the presence of a large, inclu-

sive IGO — encourage greater regulatory coordination. Similarly, institutional features of IGOs, including the level of institutionalization, positively affect coordination of IGO rules, norms, and standards. Now I turn to exploring division of labor in international regime complexes.

4.2 Division of Labor

Measuring division of labor among IGOs is very difficult, for a number of reasons. First, as mentioned earlier, labor can be divided along a number of possible dimensions. IGOs could distribute regulatory effort geographically, for example, or divide labor by functionally-defined sub-issues. Second, there are few reliable measures of regulatory priorities that can be used to determine where each IGO is focusing its efforts. Organizational mandates sometimes spell out the specific issues and regions and IGO will focus on, but this is an imperfect signal of how organizational effort is actually expended.

To overcome these challenges, I first focus on a single regime complex — counterterrorism — where division of labor is most likely to occur along functional rather than geographic lines. The transnational nature of international terrorism makes a geographic division of labor difficult to justify. Perhaps as a result, in the post-9/11 environment IGOs in the counterterrorism regime complex have overwhelmingly organized their efforts into functional sub-issues, such as aviation security, terrorist finance, cyber-terrorism, and criminalization of terrorist acts. As a measure of an organization's regulatory priorities, I estimate the attention each organization pays to particular sub-issues in the set of policy documents they produce.

To gauge the relative attention each organization pays to key sub-issues, I use a structural topic model (Roberts et al. 2014) on all policy documents produced by IGOs in the counterterrorism regime complex. A topic model is a statistical tool for estimating latent

themes, or topics, in a body of text.[20] Given a large number of documents, a topic model can inductively recover the primary topics discussed in the topics, identify the words most closely associated with each topic, and estimate the proportion of each document devoted to each topic. Structural topic models improve on this basic technique by allowing for the incorporation of document metadata, such as authorship and year.

To explore the topics discussed by IGOs the counterterrorism regime complex, I estimate a 10-topic structural topic model[21] on the 677 policy documents produced by IGOs in the regime complex from 1999-2013. I included the author IGO of each document and the year it was written as covariates. Of the ten topics estimated by the model, eight plausibly represented specific sub-issues or regulatory priorities which IGOs could use to establish a division of labor. Figure 4 displays three of these topics, along with the words that appear most frequently in each topic.

[20] Technically, "topics" are probability distributions over the set of terms that appear in the documents. See Blei (2012) for an introduction to the topic modeling methodology and an overview of existing models.

[21] As in most other topic models, the structural topic model requires the analyst to specify *ex ante* the number of topics to be estimated. I estimated a variety of models with 5-20 topics and selected the 10-topic model because it scored highest on the dimensions of "exclusivity" and "semantic coherence" (see Roberts et al. 2014).

Figure 4: Most Common Words, Select Topics

"Nuclear/Aviation Security"	"Terrorist Finance "	"Criminalization"
secur	money	person
nuclear	servic	act
organ	account	offenc
materi	launder	crimin
Safety	compani	section
resolut	fund	legal
measure	payment	order
aviat	transact	author
act	bank	investig
develop	case	crime
provid	transfer	properti
instrument	busi	proceed
icao	custom	court
aircraft	cash	subject
air	jurisdict	prosecut
transport	sector	polic
radioactiv	oper	parti

Note: As in most topic modeling applications, words have been stemmed and converted to lower case. The figure displays the 17 highest probability words in each of three topics. Topic labels are assigned by the author.

As the figure demonstrates, the topics estimated by the model are closely associated with functional sub-issues that arise in the regulation of states' counterterrorism policies. Among the rules, reports, and policy declarations produced in the IGO regime complex, some documents focus on preventing nuclear terrorism (signified by words like "nuclear" and "radioactiv"), others on halting the flow of funds to terrorist groups ("money", "payment", "transfer"), and others on criminalizing terrorist acts ("offenc", "crimin", "investig").

One way to measure regulatory priorities is to calculate the attention each IGO is devoting to each functional sub-issue in a given year. This is straightforward given the results of the topic model, and it helps us begin to approximate division of labor between IGOs. A division of labor emerges only if IGOs are willing to shift their regulatory priorities: IGO A chooses to specialize in one sub-issue while IGO B specializes in another. If this occurs

in the counterterrorism regime complex, we should see the regulatory priorities of two IGOs diverge, meaning they come to differ in the attention they devote to functional sub-issues.

Figure 5 demonstrates this dynamic with respect to two IGOs, the EU and the OSCE, in the counterterrorism regime complex. In the year 2009, these organizations had a very similar distribution of regulatory priorities. Two years later, in 2011, there is some evidence that a division of labor has begun to emerge. The EU increased its focus on regulating terrorist finance (yellow bar) and decreased its focus on nuclear and aviation security (blue bar). The OSCE, on the other hand, has begun to specialize in nuclear and aviation security and has minimized its attention to terrorist finance.

Figure 5: Emerging Division of Labor, OSCE and EU



To quantify the division of labor between each pair of IGOs, I calculate the Kullback-Leibler difference between each pair of organizations' topic distribution in each year. This quantity increases as two IGOs begin to prioritize different sub-issues, and increases as they devote regulatory effort to the same sub-issues. I then use this outcome variable to test the hypotheses on IGO division of labor developed in Section 3.

As with regulatory coordination, I estimate a variety of regression models to test the relationship between the key independent variables — *Membership Overlap*, *Largest IGO*, *Institutionalization*, and the presence of formal institutional relationships — and division of labor among IGOs. In addition to the controls for state preferences discussed above, I also incorporate a measure of the number "Great Power" states that are members of only one IGO in each pair.[22] The latter is included to test the argument advanced by Gehring and Faude (2014) that a balanced distribution of political power among IGOs will produce "particularly sophisticated forms of institutional adaptation."

Coefficient estimates from the fully saturated linear model, along with 95% confidence intervals, are displayed in Figure 6.[23] These estimates suggest *Membership Overlap* has a positive and statistically significant effect on division of labor, but the substantive size of this effect is quite small (division of labor increases by .013 for each additional shared member between IGOs). Observer status and differences in great power membership also appear to facilitate a division of labor among IGOs. *Largest IGO* has no significant associated with division of labor. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, *Institutionalization* actually decreases division of labor between IGOs.

[22]Here, "great powers" are defined as those states which constitute at least 2% of global GDP
[23]For full regression results, see Table 2A in the Appendix

Figure 6: Determinants of IGO Division of Labor



5 Discussion and Future Research

This paper identifies two fundamental problems associated with global governance in international regime complexes: regulatory arbitrage and duplication of effort. These are problems inherent to regime complexes, and to other environments featuring multiple, overlapping regulatory authorities. It also described strategies IGOs can use to mitigate these problems. To reduce the incentive for regulatory arbitrage, IGOs and their member states can engage in regulatory coordination — deconflicting inconsistent rules, establishing agreements over regulatory scope, and, where possible, harmonizing standards. This strategy has proven useful in regulating financial firms, and I have provided some evidence that IGOs have used it in the regime complexes for election monitoring, counterterrorism, and intellectual property rights.

To mitigate duplication of effort, IGOs can develop an implicit or explicit division of labor among themselves. A division of labor is more difficult to achieve than regulatory coordination because it requires a deeper level of cooperation and trust between IGOs. I

introduced a novel measure of division of labor, based on differences in two organizations' regulatory priorities, and explored the circumstances in which division of labor has occurred in the counterterrorism regime complex.

The empirical evidence presented in this paper is far from conclusive, but it represents an important step in understanding when IGOs are able to overcome the challenges associated with regime complexity. The results presented above provide initial evidence that the network structure of a regime complex, as well as institutional features of individual IGOs, have a measureable, substantively significant effect on regulatory coordination in international regime complexes. Some institutional features, like the provision of observer status to partner IGOs, appears to increase division of labor. In general, however, highly institutionalized IGOs lack the adaptability necessary to develop a division of labor with others.

Several interesting implications flow from these findings. First, it underscores the fact that many contemporary regime complexes are not designed in a way that ensures optimal policy coordination and efficient use of finite resources. Regime complexes are typically constructed in an unsystematic and uncoordinated manner. To save time and resources, states often turn to existing organizations to govern new issue areas that might be optimally regulated by a different constellation of institutions. This creates coordination problems and inefficiencies in global rules and standards. The analysis in this paper suggests that greater conscious planning and oversight of regime complex construction can pay significant dividends in terms of the quality of global governance.

Second, future scholarship should more directly tackle the question of how regime complex structure develops and evolves. This paper takes regime complex structure and institutional variables as given, and asks what impact it has on regulatory coordination. But regime complex structure and the institutional features of IGOs are determined by states. The factors that drive this process — those that lead states to join institutions, create new IGOs, or shift the design of existing ones — are important areas of inquiry.

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Appendix

Table 1A: Cross-References between the EU and other IGOs, 2005 CT Regime

IGO Author	IGO Cited	Text of Reference
ARF	EU	"The Meeting was attended by representatives of Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, **European Union**, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, United States and Vietnam."
COE	EU	"The Council of Europe is concerned about certain practices that have been adopted, particularly in the fight against terrorism, such as the indefinite imprisonment of foreign nationals on no precise charge and without access to an independent tribunal, degrading treatment during interrogations, the interception of private communications without subsequently informing those concerned, extradition to countries likely to apply the death penalty or the use of torture, and detention and assaults on the grounds of political or religious activism, which are contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5) and the protocols thereto, the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ETS No. 126) and the Framework Decision of the Council of the **European Union**."
COE	EU	"Welcoming the co-operation between the Council of Europe and these organisations and institutions, in particular the **European Union**, the OSCE and the United Nations" ... "Bearing in mind Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1656 (2004) and noting the proposals contained therein recommending the revision of the European Prison Rules and the drawing up, in conjunction with the **European Union**, of a European Prisons Charter"
COE	EU	"Parties which are members of the European Union shall, in their mutual relations, apply Community and **European Union** rules in so far as there are Community or European Union rules governing the particular subject concerned and applicable to the specific case, without prejudice to the object and purpose of the present Convention and without prejudice to its full application with other Parties"

Table 1A (cont.)

COE	EU	"REQUEST the Council of Europe to continue its work in the field of terrorism, including the development by CODEXTER of country-profiles on counter-terrorism capacities, the follow-up to activities concerning victims of terrorism, monitoring compliance with the treaties, and to strengthen its co-operation with other organisations and institutions active in the field of the fight against terrorism and organised crime, notably the United Nations, OSCE, the **European Union** and INTERPOL"
COE	EU	"Parties which are members of the European Union shall, in their mutual relations, apply Community and **European Union** rules in so far as there are Community or European Union rules governing the particular subject concerned and applicable to the specific case, without prejudice to the object and purpose of the present Convention and without prejudice to its full application with other Parties"
COE	EU	"As to the last preambular paragraph, and following a proposal resulting from a common position by the member States of the **European Union**, it was decided to amend the text proposed by the Bureau in accordance with the corresponding article of the **EU** Framework Decision on combating terrorism."
COE	EU	"The representative of Luxembourg, which held the presidency of the **European Union**, presented a proposal on behalf of the **European Union** for the inclusion in Article 23 of a specific provision dealing with the relations between this Convention and Community and EU rules (the so-called 'disconnection clause') and explained the rationale for the proposal, clarifying that it was not intended to jeopardise the object and purpose of the Convention."
COE	EU	The delegation of Sweden supported the practical approach of the United Kingdom and drew the attention of the delegations to Article 5 of the Convention on Cybercrime: 'System interference'. It stated that such attacks were already penalised by states under "regular" penal law, which provides a sufficient basis for co-operation. Moreover, the Council Framework Decision on attacks against information systems - for any criminal motive, not only a terrorist one - has been successfully implemented and such an approach could also be adopted by other non-**European Union** member states on a general basis. In this context, it considered premature to proceed with elaboration of a new protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime."
EU	FATF	"The EU has already put in place provisions for freezing terrorist assets. The next stage is to implement the EU-wide legislation concerning money laundering and cash transfers, and to agree steps to impede money (wire) transfers by terrorists. In addition, tackling the misuse of the non-profit sector remains a priority. We must also ensure that financial investigation is an integral part of all terrorism investigations. These measures and others which build on the **Financial Action Task Force**'s recommendations, form part of the EU's comprehensive strategy for combating terrorist financing."

Table 1A (cont.)

EU	UN	"Working with others beyond the EU, particularly the **United Nations**, other international organisations and key third countries, to deepen the international consensus, build capacity and strengthen cooperation to counter terrorism"... "The EU will work to reinforce the international consensus through the **United Nations** and other international bodies and through dialogue and agreements (which include counter-terrorism clauses) with key partners, and will work for agreement of a **UN** Comprehensive Convention against Terrorism."
EU	UNSC	"...This, however, should be without prejudice to the international obligations accepted by the Member States to freeze without delay funds or other assets of terrorists, terrorist organisations or those who finance terrorism, in accordance with the relevant **United Nations Security Council** resolutions."
EU	FATF	"The Community action should continue to take particular account of the Recommendations of the **Financial Action Task Force** (hereinafter referred to as the FATF), which constitutes the foremost international body active in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. Since the FATF Recommendations were substantially revised and expanded in 2003, this Directive should be in line with that new international standard."
EU	UN	"...'serious crimes' means, at least: (a) acts as defined in Articles 1 to 4 of Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA; (b) any of the offences defined in Article 3(1)(a) of the 1988 **United Nations** Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances..."
EU	FATF	"...call on Member States to implement all the FATF (**Financial Action Task Force** on Money Laundering) recommendations and to adopt measures to improve the traceability of transfers of funds, the identification of clients and the implementation of surveillance obligations, while avoiding the indiscriminate use of profiling in the banking and financial context and ensuring respect for fundamental rights, especially the right to data protection;"
EU	COE	"Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the European Council, to the Council and, for information, to the Commission, the Governments and Parliaments of the Member States, the **Council of Europe**, and the United Nations and its specialised agencies."
EU	UN	"Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the European Council, to the Council and, for information, to the Commission, the Governments and Parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, and the **United Nations** and its specialised agencies."
EU	COE	"Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the European Council, to the Council and, for information, to the Commission, the Governments and Parliaments of the Member States, the **Council of Europe**, and the United Nations and its specialised agencies."

Table 1A (cont.)

FATF	EU	"Information provided by the countries indicate that the problem of human trafficking and smuggling translates geographically mainly into a south to north and east to west flow of persons. In Europe we have seen networks trafficking women from some non **European Union** countries into the **European Union**, notably the destinations being the larger developed countries in Western Europe. The newer members of the **European Union** currently remain largely transit countries."
G8	EU	"The G8 has developed a methodology and checklist for the auditing of port and maritime security. This product was amended and adopted as Interim Guidance by the IMO's 79th Maritime Safety Committee in December 2004, and is numbered as MSC/Circular 1131. G8 members will conduct self audits and share experience in order to prepare recommendations for the IMO, with European members coordinating through the **European Commission**, on possible amendments to the checklist and guidance."
IAEA	EU	"The Agency has continued to seek liaisons, collaboration and coordination with other regional, transnational and international organizations, including, but not limited to: the UN Security Council's Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC), Interpol, the World Customs Organization (WCO), Europol, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the **European Union** (EU), and the Universal Postal Union (UPU)"
OSCE	EU	"The OSCE participating States that are Members of the **European Union** draw the attention of the other participating States to the institutional structure of the **European Union**. Insofar as there are Community or **European Union** rules governing the particular subject covered by the World Customs Organization (WCO) Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade referred to in the Ministerial Council draft decision on further measures to enhance container security (MC.DD/4/05/Rev.l), participating States that are Members of the **European Union** will apply amongst themselves the Community and **European Union** rules governing the particular subject concerned, without prejudice to the object and purpose of the above-mentioned draft decision, namely, to encourage the implementation of the WCO Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade."
OSCE	EU	"Continue its co-operation with other OSCE structures and institutions, as well as with the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UNCERD), the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the **European Commission** against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), the **European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia** (EUMC), the Task Force for International Co-operation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research, and with other relevant institutions and civil society, including non-governmental organizations;"

Table 1A (cont.)

UNSC	EU	"Urges all States and relevant international organizations to contribute to strengthening the capacity of regional and subregional organizations, in particular of African regional and subregional organizations, in conflict prevention and crisis management, and in post-conflict stabilization, including through the provision of human, technical and financial assistance, and welcomes in this regard the establishment by the **European Union** of the Peace Facility for Africa;"
UN	EU	"States may also include in this exception subsection more specific references to include certain crimes related to terrorism. An example that could be used is the following approach of the 2002 **European Union** Framework Decision against Terrorism: Serious crimes or acts of violence committed with the aim of: a) causing death or serious bodily harm or intimidating a population; or b) unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act; or c) seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization."
UN	EU	"Other fora such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and regional bodies such as the Council of Europe and the **European Union** have adopted a number of measures and standards...Directive 2005/60/EC of the **European Parliament** and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing."

Table 2A: Determinants of IGO Division of Labor

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Membership Overlap	.0116**	.0090**	0129**
	(.0023)	(.0033)	(.004)
Largest IGO	-.0045	.0004	-.0019
	(.0063)	(.0066)	(.0064)
Institutionalization	-.3253**	-.3524**	-.4004**
	(.0491)	(.0702)	(0691)
GP Diff	.0220	.0622*	-1.87*
	(.0160)	(.0258)	(.7596)
Preference Diff		-1.912*	.0684**
		(.7788)	(.02598)
Member Affinity		1.2359**	1.0927**
		(.4206)	(.4148)
Nested			-1.519**
			(.5540)
Formal Member			-.1937
			(.4656)
Observer			.6501**
			(.1531)
Observations	2228	1215	425
Adjusted R-squared	.180	.1677	.1173

Note: Intercepts not shown. Statistical significance is denoted by * ($p < .05$), ** ($p < .01$).