

The Financial Consequences of International Organization Legitimacy: Evidence from a Global Field Experiment

Jiseon Chang

The University of Texas at Austin

Mirko Heinzl

University of Glasgow

Daniel Nielson

The University of Texas at Austin

Abstract:

Resource constraints on international organizations (IOs) have intensified as they have come under pressure from governments questioning their legitimacy. In response, IOs increasingly aim to diversify their resource base by raising funds from non-state actors and even individual donations. However, little is known about the factors driving such donations by the public. We argue that IO legitimacy matters and differentiate between: a) procedural, b) performance-based, and c) norm-driven legitimacy. We then analyze how legitimacy shapes donations to two IOs that rely on the public for a substantial share of their resources: UNICEF, an intergovernmental organization, and Save the Children, an international non-governmental organization. We conducted a global field experiment by varying statements on these IOs' legitimacy as part of Facebook advertisements soliciting donations from 20,769,988 individuals in five countries representing some of the biggest Facebook advertisement markets in each World region (Brazil, Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom). Our results show that the impact of different types of legitimacy on individual donations differs across countries and organizations. These findings imply that the impact of different types of legitimacy on citizens' real-world decisions is much more heterogenous than previously assumed.

Introduction

The rise in International Organizations' (IO)¹ authority since the Second World War amplified IO contestation in political discourse (Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012). Political parties, citizen groups, and actors in the media increasingly question the legitimacy of IOs (Börzel and Zürn 2021; de Vries, Hobolt, and Walter 2021). While scholars long discussed whether IOs conform with normative standards of legitimacy (Buchanan and Keohane 2006), the rise in contestation exposed the need to understand sociological legitimacy—"the acceptance of IOs' right to rule by states and societies" (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015, 452). In response, studies focused primarily on the causes of citizens' and elites' legitimacy beliefs (Anderson, Bernauer, and Kachi 2019; Dellmuth et al. 2021; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020; Ghassim, Koenig-Archibugi, and Cabrera 2022; Johnson 2011; Nielson, Hyde, and Kelley 2019).

However, we know much less about the consequences of citizens' legitimacy beliefs towards IOs. Some argue that IO legitimacy is relevant because it affects member-state compliance (Hurd 1999) or the politicization of IOs (Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012). However, these processes are far removed from citizens who have arguably little direct influence on them. Studies on the impact of IO legitimacy belief on citizens' direct actions towards IOs are missing. In contrast, our study focuses on a key consequence in the immediate control of citizens and that is central to IOs' capacity to fulfill their mandates: the ability of IOs to raise financial resources.

Financial resources are essential to help IOs address critical global cooperation problems, such as fighting climate change, overcoming poverty, or safeguarding children's rights globally (Patz and Goetz 2019; Reinsberg 2017). Theoretically, there should be a clear link between IO legitimacy beliefs and the degree to which people are willing to fund them. However, the only existing empirical study shows a weak correlation between legitimacy crises and member-state funding for IOs (Bes, Sommerer, and Agné 2019).

Moreover, studies on the decisions of citizens to donate to IOs remain absent. This omission is important as IOs increasingly turn to citizens to fund their operations. International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have long raised funds directly from citizens. But intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are now also turning to citizens to increase their financial resources. Such fundraising campaigns are particularly prominent in the field of humanitarian

¹ When speaking of IOs in this paper, we refer to both intergovernmental organizations and international non-governmental organizations.

assistance. Humanitarian IGOs, such as the World Food Program, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), routinely ask citizens for donations to fund their operations.

We study the impact of statements regarding IO legitimacy on citizens' donations to IOs through a global field experiment conducted in December 2022 with 20,769,988 social media users in a diverse sample of five countries from different world regions (Brazil, Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom). Despite their relevance for establishing the external validity and real-world importance of IOs, field experiments are scarce in the study of IOs and largely absent in research on IO legitimacy (for an exception using a survey-based field experiment, see Nielson et al. 2019).

In our study, we probe whether the three most prominent types of IO legitimacy—procedural legitimacy, performance-based legitimacy, and norm-driven legitimacy—impact the ability of two IOs to raise funds directly from citizens. Our study leverages Facebook's A/B testing function for advertisements to perform a natural field experiment in soliciting donations from individuals for two IOs: the IGO UNICEF and the NGO Save the Children. We randomly assigned different ad texts to probe the impact of the three types of IO legitimacy, and 33,474 Facebook users clicked on links leading them to the IOs' donation websites. Our findings show that the impact of IO legitimacy and the relative importance of the three different types of legitimacy for citizens' donation decisions varies substantially across country contexts and organizations. And many of the substantively and statistically significant results cut in the opposite direction of predictions derived from empirics gathered in advanced industrialized countries. Our massive sample of citizens—most from lower-income yet globally important countries—suggests high heterogeneity of treatment effects on citizen donations in reaction to statements priming different aspects of IO legitimacy.

The impact of IO legitimacy on individual donations

We study the impact of IO legitimacy on individuals' inclination to donate to support them. The existing literature has highlighted the importance of institutional features for explaining IO legitimacy (Tallberg and Zürn 2019). Specifically, authors have increasingly converged on three types of IO legitimacy based on their procedures, performance, and the normative relevance of their mandate (Binder and Heupel 2015; Dellmuth, Scholte, and Tallberg 2019a; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Hurd 2008; Nielson, Hyde, and Kelley 2019; Tallberg and Zürn 2019; Verhaegen, Scholte, and Tallberg 2021). We discuss these three IO features in turn and highlight how they could impact individuals' decisions to donate to IOs.

First, individuals may base their decisions to donate to IOs on procedural legitimacy. As Dellmuth et al. (2019a, 628) explain: "For advocates of procedure, the legitimacy of an IO derives from the way the institution functions, irrespective of the effects of its policies." In this view, the decision-making process of IOs is critical to understanding their legitimacy. Individuals would be inclined to accept policy outcomes that disfavor them or are against their preferences if they agree with the process that gave rise to these outcomes (Hurd 2008). Indeed, the literature on donations shows that individuals are concerned about how their money is used and are responsive to the communication of organizations seeking to raise funds from them (Bhati and Hansen 2020). If citizens know that IOs follow processes they value, they may be more inclined to entrust them with their money as they will be reassured that it will be used following good organizational practices. Based on this argument, we expect that individuals are sensitive to process-related information when deciding whether to donate to a given IO. Therefore, we hypothesize:

H1: Individuals will click more on donation links when high procedural legitimacy of the organization is emphasized

Second, donation decisions might be impacted by IOs' performance-based legitimacy. Dellmuth et al. (2019a, 628) highlight: "For advocates of performance, the legitimacy of an IO derives from its consequences, irrespective of how the institution formulated and executed the relevant policy." Individuals perceive IOs as legitimate if they can deliver on their mandates and produce tangible societal benefits (Binder and Heupel 2015; Dellmuth, Scholte, and Tallberg 2019a; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020). This expectation also aligns with existing studies on individuals' motivations to donate to charity. Efficacy is one of the key reasons that motivate people to donate, as people are more inclined to give when they believe their donation will make a positive difference (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011). Performance-based legitimacy is important as it reassures individuals that the

organization that they donate to will be able to use their money to good effect. Indeed, survey research shows that people are more likely to prefer donations to charities they have confidence in (Sargeant, Ford, and West 2006; Tonkiss and Passey 1999). We anticipate that individuals faced with statements about IOs' performance-based legitimacy will be more inclined to donate to them. Hence, the second hypothesis is:

H2: Individuals will click more on donation links when high performance legitimacy of the organization is emphasized

Third, the normative importance of IO mandates may sway individuals to donate to them. So far, our theoretical expectations were based on the expectation that individuals care about how IOs reach their goals or whether they reach their goals. However, the normative desirability of the goals themselves could also play an important role (Lister 2003; Nielson, Hyde, and Kelley 2019). IOs work to address some of humanity's biggest problems. In our study, we selected IOs that address child poverty—a goal widely endorsed as normatively desirable. Individuals that donate to IOs are likely to be susceptible to the issue in question and will be more inclined to contribute to the IO if they perceive the mandate as important. Indeed, the literature on individual donations shows that individuals are sensitive to the goal of donation campaigns (Bhati and Hansen 2020). For example, natural disasters appear to outperform human-made disasters in donation campaigns (Zagefka et al. 2011). Consequently, we expect that mentioning the mandate of IOs will increase donations and our third hypothesis is:

H3: Individuals will click more on donation links when the (normatively important) mandate of the organization is emphasized

Experimental Design

We study the impact of IO legitimacy on individual donations through a natural field experiment conducted from Dec 21, 2022 to January 3, 2023 with 20,769,988 users of the social media site Facebook in five countries: Brazil, Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom.² Our selection of countries aimed to maximize our study's external validity and generalizability. Therefore, we selected the largest Facebook markets in each UN World region. These were Egypt (Africa), India (Asia), the United Kingdom (Europe), and Saudi Arabia (Middle East). We chose the second biggest ad market, Brazil (Americas), over the USA to increase the cost-effectiveness of our study.

² The experiment received IRB approval from the University of Texas at Austin (STUDY00002978) and is pre-registered at Open Science Framework.

We used Facebook’s A/B testing feature, in which treatments are randomly assigned to appear in the feeds of Facebook users. The feature evenly divides the exposure of the Facebook ads so that there is randomization among the experimental conditions we want to compare. In order to provide for a more balanced test and to minimize potential confounds from idiosyncracies of the algorithm, we maximized the “reach” of the ads rather than clickthroughs or engagement (Orazi and Johnston 2020). Using this approach minimizes duplicate responses and unbalanced distribution across socioeconomic characteristics. Individuals below the age of 18 or those not on the Facebook platform were excluded from the sample. Respondents were Facebook users that voluntarily engaged with Facebook ads and clicked on the provided webpage link. Data on the Facebook ads were collected following Facebook policies. All participants that clicked on the Facebook ad were redirected to the donation page of each IO. All participation was voluntary, all information provided was truthful, and no personally identifying information was collected.


Our primary outcome measure of interest is click rates—the number of people who select the provided link in the advertisement divided by the number of people who see the ad. One might question whether clicks actually represent individual decisions to donate. Adena and Hager (2020) test whether click-based studies accurately represent donation decisions by partnering with a charity in Germany. They show that click-based studies do not do the best job in representing how much money is donated. However, they do predict well how many people donate. Since we are interested in how IO legitimacy influences individuals’ donation decisions, rather than maximizing the money IOs can raise with their campaigns, we deem this limitation acceptable.

Facebook users were randomly exposed to an ad with content asking them to donate to IOs. The ad had the following components: Facebook page name, image, headline, quick headline, and a URL website. In the ad, the treatment messages and the relevant headline were randomly assigned using Facebook’s A/B testing platform. Below the treatment headline, the ad showed an image of a child. When exposed, the participants could choose whether they wanted to click on the link in the ad, which directly routed them to the IOs’ donation websites. The participants could also engage with the post by liking or sharing the post with others. We chose the advertiser's name “Assistance Activities Project” to be as neutral as possible while not misrepresenting where the ad was coming from.³ Figure 1 displays an example ad fielded in the United Kingdom.⁴

³ Prior to the study, we contacted both organizations to inform them we were performing the study and to invite expressions of any concern or additional feedback. No objections were raised.

⁴ See Appendix D for more sample advertisements.

Figure 1: Sample advertisement



We randomized the IO and different sources of their legitimacy. As discussed, we study both the impact of legitimacy on donation motivation towards an intergovernmental organization, UNICEF, and a non-governmental organization, Save the Children. We selected the two organizations because they are two very prominent IOs focusing on the same mandate—to aid children globally. Table 1 displays the treatment variations in the ads soliciting donations from UNICEF, while Table 2 displays the different treatments used to study the inclination to donate to Save the Children. All treatments were translated into Portuguese (Brazil), Arabic (Egypt and Saudi Arabia), and Hindi (India).⁵

⁵ Appendix E displays our treatment text in all four languages.

Table 1: UNICEF treatments

Treatment	Language	Link
Placebo	Donate to children in need.	UNICEF
Procedural Legitimacy	Donate to UNICEF. A multilateral organization that is transparent and independently evaluated.	UNICEF
Performance-based legitimacy	Donate to UNICEF. A multilateral organization with a demonstrated track record of delivering food globally.	UNICEF
Norm-driven legitimacy	Donate to UNICEF. A multilateral organization to help children globally.	UNICEF

Table 2: Save the Children treatments

Treatment	Language	Link
Placebo	Donate to children in need.	Save the Children
Procedural Legitimacy	Donate to Save the Children. A non-governmental organization that is transparent and independently evaluated.	Save the Children
Performance-based legitimacy	Donate to Save the Children. A non-governmental organization with a demonstrated track record of delivering food globally.	Save the Children
Norm-driven legitimacy	Donate to Save the Children. A non-governmental organization to help children globally.	Save the Children

The placebos ask for a donation to children in need and link to UNICEF or Save the Children on the donation page. For the treatment texts, we needed to operationalize the concepts of procedural legitimacy, performance-based legitimacy, and norm-driven legitimacy. We operationalize procedural legitimacy based on transparency. Dellmuth et al. (2019b) discuss six sources of procedural legitimacy: participation, transparency, efficiency, expertise, impartiality, and proportionality. Since we were strictly limited by Facebook advertising parameters in the space for our ads, we decided to focus on transparency as one key source of procedural legitimacy. Research on charitable giving shows that Individuals are sensitive to the transparency of organizations in their donation decisions (Xiao et al. 2022), and IOs are often criticized for lack of transparency (Honig and Weaver 2019). Furthermore, transparency is often a precondition to assess the other sources of procedural legitimacy, as it is hard to understand IOs' efficiency, expertise, or impartiality without the IO sharing information on its operations and decision-making process. Therefore, transparency about IO operations and results can reassure individuals that IOs follow established procedures when implementing development projects. For performance, our ads discuss that each IO has a “demonstrated track record” of delivering food to children globally. We

use the wording demonstrated to imply that performance is verified and less subjective. Finally, we highlight IO's mandate to help children globally for our norm-driven legitimacy treatment.

Results

In this section, we present the results of our global field experiment. Of the 20,769,988 users that saw our advertisements, 33,474 clicked on the link bringing them to the donation side⁶. While this conversion rate is objectively low, it is well in line with standard clickthrough rates in social-media advertising and appreciably greater than many. The low conversion rate reflects the naturalism of the study environment. We display more descriptive statistics on the clicks and reach of our different ads in Appendix A. Using t-test with unequal variance, the paper compares differences in link clicks among the treatments. To attain the t-statistic, we divide the standard deviation by the square root of the number of observations and units in the sample: $s \div \sqrt{n}$. We then take the value we obtained from subtracting μ from \bar{x} and divide it by the value we obtained from dividing s by the square root of n : $(\bar{x} - \mu) \div (s \div \sqrt{n})$. More formally, we estimate:

$$t = \frac{\bar{x}_1 - \bar{x}_2}{\sqrt{s^2 \left(\frac{1}{n_1} + \frac{1}{n_2} \right)}}$$

Here, t is the t-value, \bar{x}_1 and \bar{x}_2 are the means of the two groups being compared, s^2 is the pooled standard error of the two groups. The number of observations in each group are n_1 and n_2 . Facebook gave us raw aggregate data for the number of people the ads reached and who clicked on the ads. To calculate the t-test, we converted each placebo and treatment groups into vectors to get their variances and applied the formula discussed above.

We present our results using coefficient plots in the main body of the article. The Appendix further includes tables of the t-test results including multiple comparisons adjusted p-values—using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure (Appendix B). Additionally, robustness checks detailed in Appendix C employ randomization inference, a non-parametric technique that randomly reassigns experimental conditions in 10,000 draws and computes the test statistic directly from the permutations (Gerber and Green 2012). The vast majority of the presented coefficients remains

⁶ Appendix F lists the links that participants were directed to from the ads.

statistically significant when adjusting for multiple comparisons and the results from randomization inference are substantively identical to the results reported in the main text.

Figure 1: The legitimacy of UNICEF and individual donations




Figure 1 displays the average number of clicks in each treatment and the placebo group for the field experiments soliciting donations for UNICEF. While the results show considerable heterogeneity in the impact of IO legitimacy statements on individual donations across countries, one finding stands out: None of the treatment groups outperforms the placebo that focuses entirely on helping children in need. However, we find negative impacts ($p < 0.05$) of at least some of our IO legitimacy treatments on the number of clicks in the UK, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Brazil. This finding implies that individuals are more willing to donate to children in need, more generally, than to donate when they read that the donation is supposed to go to UNICEF. Furthermore, we see some differences between treatment groups. Norm-driven legitimacy

outperforms procedural legitimacy in Brazil and has a more substantial impact on clicks than procedural and performance-based legitimacy in Egypt. The other differences between treatment groups are not statistically significant ($p < 0.05$).

Figure 2: The legitimacy of Save the Children and individual donations




Figure 2 shows the results of a similar analysis focusing on Save the Children. The placebo again outperforms the treatment groups consistently. In Figure 2, the placebo attains more clicks ($p < 0.05$) than at least one of the legitimacy treatments in all five countries. Furthermore, we see some broader heterogeneity across countries. In India, norm-based legitimacy outperforms performance-based legitimacy. In the UK, procedural legitimacy is stronger than norm-based legitimacy. In Saudi Arabia, performance-based legitimacy increases clicks compared to procedural legitimacy. In Egypt, procedural legitimacy matters more for donations than performance-based

legitimacy. There are no statistically significant differences between treatment groups in Brazil. Finally, norm-driven legitimacy outperforms performance-based legitimacy in India.

Conclusion

While many studies have focused on the causes of citizens' IO legitimacy beliefs, we know little about its consequences. Therefore, we studied the impact of factual statements regarding IO legitimacy on a decision citizens can take that has direct consequences for IOs: to donate to support their operations. Based on established theoretical arguments in the literature, we differentiated three types of IO legitimacy: procedural legitimacy, performance-based legitimacy, and norm-driven legitimacy. We then tested their impact on the financial contributions of individuals to an IGO, UNICEF, and an NGO, Save the Children, through a natural field experiment conducted with 20,769,988 citizens in five countries—Brazil, Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom—through Facebook.

We highlight three important implications of our study for debates on organizational drivers of donations and IO legitimacy. First, we found that more people clicked on the donation link in the placebo condition than on at least some of the IO legitimacy treatments in all countries. Once individuals are probed to think about IO legitimacy rather than simply focusing on the goal of their donations, their inclination to contribute decreases. The finding shows that organizational factors matter much less than previously assumed once donation studies are conducted in the field rather than in opinion surveys and when they are conducted in important countries that are mostly (aside from the UK) not European or North American.

Second, we showed that the impact of IO legitimacy on individual donations varied substantially in different contexts. Different types of IO legitimacy mattered more than others, depending on the country we studied and the organization we focused on. That said, there are some indications that norm-driven legitimacy fares better than performance-based legitimacy and procedural legitimacy in soliciting donations from UNICEF. The same is not true for Save the Children, where we find substantial differences in the most impactful IO legitimacy treatment across countries. These findings imply that more attention should be paid to norm-driven legitimacy and heterogeneity across IOs, two often neglected factors in survey experimental studies focusing on IO legitimacy. More importantly, most studies use hypothetical IOs, which might mask considerable heterogeneity across organizations regarding which type of legitimacy matters for citizens.

Third, our findings clearly show that studies on the drivers of public support for IOs do not necessarily generalize to citizens' behavior toward IOs in the real world. Existing research on the sociological legitimacy of IOs has broadly focused on establishing the importance of performance-based and procedural legitimacy for public support for, and confidence in, IOs. We do not question the internal validity of these findings. However, our field experiment demonstrates that citizens care about different sources of IO legitimacy when making real-world decisions on donating to IOs. More research is needed to understand how IO legitimacy translates to other types of real-world choices of citizens, like seeking out information from, joining a protest against, or following an IO policy that targets the actions of individual citizens.

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Appendix A. Descriptive statistics

Table A. Experiment Details

	Brazil	Brazil	Egypt	Egypt	Saudi	Saudi
Treatment	Reach	Link clicks	Reach	Link clicks	Arabia	Arabia
	Reach	Link clicks	Reach	Link clicks	Reach	Link clicks
Placebo (UNICEF)	179393	264	902919	1915	378175	593
Norm (UNICEF)	182081	248	928001	2006	379520	512
Performance (UNICEF)	169825	206	887426	1723	363137	503
Procedural (UNICEF)	166528	183	895872	1753	371075	539
Placebo (STC) ⁷	171360	236	904705	1897	383553	621
Norm (STC)	173696	191	875265	1760	368256	524
Performance (STC)	163200	169	878723	1659	357378	532
Procedural (STC)	164448	189	859392	1768	367745	474

	India	India	UK	UK
Treatment	Reach	Link clicks	Reach	Link clicks
Placebo (UNICEF)	421376	633	212032	143
Norm (UNICEF)	463302	738	211840	133
Performance (UNICEF)	444416	697	206208	108
Procedural (UNICEF)	435840	682	210368	110
Placebo (STC)	423552	645	206304	143
Norm (STC)	451456	694	200512	86
Performance (STC)	434303	582	204224	100
Procedural (STC)	432641	627	200386	124

⁷ STC indicates Save the Children.

Appendix B. T-tests & Benjamini-Hochberg large sample adjustment

Appendix C.1. T-tests for UNICEF treatments

Country	Comparison	Estimate	CI low	CI high	Mean 1	Mean 2	Statistic	P-value
India	Performance vs. Placebo	0.000091	-0.000073	0.000255	0.001593	0.001502	1.085	0.278
India	Procedure vs. Placebo	0.000066	-0.000099	0.000231	0.001568	0.001502	0.786	0.432
India	Norm vs. Placebo	0.000063	-0.000103	0.000228	0.001565	0.001502	0.740	0.459
India	Norm vs. Performance	0.000025	-0.000139	0.000188	0.001593	0.001568	0.295	0.768
India	Norm vs. Procedure	0.000028	-0.000136	0.000192	0.001593	0.001565	0.336	0.737
India	Performance vs. Procedure	0.000004	-0.000162	0.000169	0.001568	0.001565	0.042	0.966
Brazil	Procedure vs. Placebo	-0.000373***	-0.000611	-0.000134	0.001099	0.001472	-3.065	0.002
Brazil	Performance vs. Placebo	-0.000259*	-0.000501	-0.000016	0.001213	0.001472	-2.089	0.037
Brazil	Norm vs. Placebo	-0.000110	-0.000355	0.000136	0.001362	0.001472	-0.876	0.381
Brazil	Norm vs. Performance	0.000149	-0.000088	0.000386	0.001362	0.001213	1.233	0.218
Brazil	Norm vs. Procedure	0.000263**	0.000031	0.000496	0.001362	0.001099	2.219	0.026
Brazil	Performance vs. Procedure	0.000114	-0.000116	0.000344	0.001213	0.001099	0.974	0.330
Egypt	Procedure vs. Placebo	-0.000164**	-0.000296	-0.000032	0.001957	0.002121	-2.440	0.015
Egypt	Performance vs. Placebo	-0.000179***	-0.000311	-0.000047	0.001942	0.002121	-2.665	0.008
Egypt	Norm vs. Placebo	0.000041	-0.000093	0.000175	0.002162	0.002121	0.596	0.551
Egypt	Norm vs. Performance	0.000220***	0.000088	0.000352	0.002162	0.001942	3.278	0.001
Egypt	Norm vs. Procedure	0.000205***	0.000073	0.000336	0.002162	0.001957	3.053	0.002
Egypt	Performance vs. Procedure	-0.000015	-0.000145	0.000114	0.001942	0.001957	-0.230	0.818
Saudi Arabia	Procedure vs. Placebo	-0.000116	-0.000291	0.000060	0.001453	0.001568	-1.288	0.198
Saudi Arabia	Performance vs. Placebo	-0.000183*	-0.000358	-0.000008	0.001385	0.001568	-2.051	0.040
Saudi Arabia	Norm vs. Placebo	-0.000219**	-0.000391	-0.000047	0.001349	0.001568	-2.497	0.013
Saudi Arabia	Norm vs. Performance	-0.000036	-0.000204	0.000132	0.001349	0.001385	-0.421	0.674
Saudi Arabia	Norm vs. Procedure	-0.000103	-0.000273	0.000066	0.001349	0.001453	-1.198	0.231
Saudi Arabia	Performance vs. Procedure	-0.000067	-0.000240	0.000105	0.001385	0.001453	-0.767	0.443
United Kingdom	Procedure vs. Placebo	-0.000152*	-0.000299	-0.000004	0.000523	0.000674	-2.014	0.044
United Kingdom	Performance vs. Placebo	-0.000151*	-0.000299	-0.000002	0.000524	0.000674	-1.993	0.046
United Kingdom	Norm vs. Placebo	-0.000047	-0.000200	0.000107	0.000628	0.000674	-0.595	0.552
United Kingdom	Norm vs. Performance	0.000104	-0.000041	0.000249	0.000628	0.000524	1.403	0.160
United Kingdom	Norm vs. Procedure	0.000105	-0.000040	0.000250	0.000628	0.000523	1.422	0.155
United Kingdom	Performance vs. Procedure	0.000001	-0.000138	0.000140	0.000524	0.000523	0.012	0.990

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.031$ (BH false discovery rate: 10%); *** $p < 0.012$ (BH false discovery rate: 5%)

Appendix C.2. T-tests for Save the Children treatments

Country	Comparison	Estimate	CI low	CI high	Mean 1	Mean 2	Statistic	P-value
India	Procedure vs. Placebo	-0.000074	-0.000237	0.00009	0.001449	0.001523	-0.884	0.377
India	Performance vs. Placebo	-0.000183**	-0.000343	-0.000023	0.00134	0.001523	-2.238	0.025
India	Norm vs. Placebo	0.000014	-0.000149	0.000178	0.001537	0.001523	0.172	0.863
India	Norm vs. Performance	0.000197**	0.000039	0.000355	0.001537	0.00134	2.449	0.014
India	Norm vs. Procedure	0.000088	-0.000073	0.000249	0.001537	0.001449	1.072	0.284
India	Performance vs. Procedure	-0.000109	-0.000266	0.000048	0.00134	0.001449	-1.362	0.173
Brazil	Performance vs. Placebo	-0.000342***	-0.000577	-0.000107	0.001036	0.001377	-2.851	0.004
Brazil	Procedure vs. Placebo	-0.000228	-0.000468	0.000012	0.001149	0.001377	-1.861	0.063
Brazil	Norm vs. Placebo	-0.000278**	-0.000512	-0.000043	0.0011	0.001377	-2.317	0.020
Brazil	Norm vs. Performance	0.000064	-0.000156	0.000285	0.0011	0.001036	0.569	0.569
Brazil	Norm vs. Procedure	-0.00005	-0.000276	0.000176	0.0011	0.001149	-0.431	0.667
Brazil	Performance vs. Procedure	-0.000114	-0.00034	0.000112	0.001036	0.001149	-0.986	0.324
Egypt	Performance vs. Placebo	-0.000209***	-0.000340	-0.000078	0.001888	0.002097	-3.128	0.002
Egypt	Procedure vs. Placebo	-0.000040	-0.000174	0.000095	0.002057	0.002097	-0.577	0.564
Egypt	Norm vs. Placebo	-0.000086	-0.000219	0.000047	0.002011	0.002097	-1.267	0.205
Egypt	Norm vs. Performance	0.000123	-0.000008	0.000253	0.002011	0.001888	1.844	0.065
Egypt	Norm vs. Procedure	-0.000046	-0.000181	0.000088	0.002011	0.002057	-0.679	0.497
Egypt	Performance vs. Procedure	-0.000169	-0.000301	-0.000037	0.001888	0.002057	-2.514	0.012
Saudi Arabia	Performance vs. Placebo	-0.000130	-0.000310	0.000049	0.001489	0.001619	-1.426	0.154
Saudi Arabia	Procedure vs. Placebo	-0.000330***	-0.000502	-0.000158	0.001289	0.001619	-3.759	0.000
Saudi Arabia	Norm vs. Placebo	-0.000196**	-0.000372	-0.000020	0.001423	0.001619	-2.183	0.029
Saudi Arabia	Norm vs. Performance	-0.000066	-0.000241	0.000110	0.001423	0.001489	-0.734	0.463
Saudi Arabia	Norm vs. Procedure	0.000134	-0.000034	0.000302	0.001423	0.001289	1.562	0.118
Saudi Arabia	Performance vs. Procedure	0.000200	0.000028	0.000371	0.001489	0.001289	2.282	0.023
United Kingdom	Performance vs. Placebo	-0.000203***	-0.000352	-0.000055	0.000490	0.000693	-2.683	0.007
United Kingdom	Procedure vs. Placebo	-0.000074	-0.000232	0.000083	0.000619	0.000693	-0.926	0.354
United Kingdom	Norm vs. Placebo	-0.000264***	-0.000410	-0.000119	0.000429	0.000693	-3.565	0.000
United Kingdom	Norm vs. Performance	-0.000061	-0.000193	0.000071	0.000429	0.000490	-0.902	0.367
United Kingdom	Norm vs. Procedure	-0.000190***	-0.000332	-0.000048	0.000429	0.000619	-2.627	0.009
United Kingdom	Performance vs. Procedure	-0.000129	-0.000274	0.000016	0.000490	0.000619	-1.744	0.081

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.031$ (BH false discovery rate: 10%); *** $p < 0.012$ (BH false discovery rate: 5%)

Appendix C. Randomization Inference

C.1. Brazil




Figure C.1.1. Procedural (UNICEF) Treatment




Figure C.1.2. Performance (UNICEF) Treatment




Figure C.1.3. Norm-driven (UNICEF) Treatment




Figure C.1.4. Procedural (STC) Treatment




Figure C.1.5. Performance (STC) Treatment




Figure C.1.6. Norm-driven (STC) Treatment

B.2. Egypt




Figure C.2.1. Procedural (UNICEF) Treatment




Figure C.2.2. Performance (UNICEF) Treatment




Figure C.2.3. Norm-driven (UNICEF) Treatment




Figure C.2.4. Procedural (STC) Treatment




Figure C.2.5. Performance (STC) Treatment




Figure C.2.6. Norm-driven (STC) Treatment

B.3. Saudi Arabia




Figure C.3.1. Procedural (UNICEF) Treatment




Figure C.3.2. Performance (UNICEF) Treatment




Figure C.3.3. Norm-driven (UNICEF) Treatment




Figure C.3.4. Procedural (STC) Treatment




Figure C.3.5. Performance (STC) Treatment




Figure C.3.6. Norm-driven (STC) Treatment

C.4. India




Figure C.4.1. Procedural (UNICEF) Treatment




Figure C.4.2. Performance (UNICEF) Treatment




Figure C.4.3. Norm-driven (UNICEF) Treatment




Figure C.4.4. Procedural (STC) Treatment




Figure C.4.5. Performance (STC) Treatment




Figure C.4.6. Norm-driven (STC) Treatment

C.5. United Kingdom




Figure C.5.1. Procedural (UNICEF) Treatment




Figure C.5.2. Performance (UNICEF) Treatment




Figure C.5.3. Norm-driven (UNICEF) Treatment




Figure C.5.4. Procedural (STC) Treatment




Figure C.5.5. Performance (STC) Treatment




Figure C.5.6. Norm-driven (STC) Treatment

Appendix D. Facebook Ads Examples

Figure D.1. Brazil




Figure D.2. Egypt and Saudi Arabia




Figure D.3. India




Figure D.4. United Kingdom

Assistance Activities Project ... X
Sponsored

Donate to children in need.



unicef.org
Donate to children in need. [Learn more](#)
Donate to children in need.

Like Comment Share

Appendix E. Facebook Ads Language Translations

Table E.1. Arabic

Treatment	Translation
Placebo1	تبرع إلى الأطفال المحتاجين.
Procedural legitimacy (UNICEF)	تبرع إلى يونيسف وهي مؤسسة متعددة الأطراف وتمارس عملها بشفافية ويتم تقييمها بشكل مستقل.
Norm-driven legitimacy (UNICEF)	تبرع إلى يونيسف وهي مؤسسة متعددة الأطراف من أجل مساعدة الأطفال على مستوى العالم.
Performance legitimacy (UNICEF)	تبرع إلى يونيسف وهي مؤسسة متعددة الأطراف لديها سجل حافل لإيصال الغذاء على مستوى العالم.
Procedural legitimacy (STC)	تبرع إلى منظمة إنقاذ الطفولة وهي منظمة غير حكومية وتمارس عملها بشفافية ويتم تقييمها بشكل مستقل.
Norm-driven legitimacy (STC)	تبرع إلى منظمة إنقاذ الطفولة وهي منظمة غير حكومية من أجل مساعدة الأطفال على مستوى العالم.
Performance legitimacy (STC)	تبرع إلى منظمة إنقاذ الطفولة وهي منظمة غير حكومية لديها سجل حافل لإيصال الغذاء على مستوى العالم.

Table E.2. Portuguese

Treatment	Translation
Placebo1	Doe para crianças em necessidade.
Procedural legitimacy (UNICEF)	Doe para a UNICEF—organização multilateral transparente e avaliada de forma independente.
Norm-driven legitimacy (UNICEF)	Doe para a UNICEF—organização multilateral para ajudar as crianças em todo o mundo.
Performance legitimacy (UNICEF)	Doe para a UNICEF—organização multilateral com história comprovada de alimentar o mundo.
Procedural legitimacy (STC)	Doe para Save the Children—organização não governamental transparente e avaliada de forma independente.
Norm-driven legitimacy (STC)	Doe para Save the Children—organização não governamental para ajudar as crianças em todo o mundo.
Performance legitimacy (STC)	Doe para Save the Children—organização não governamental com história comprovada de alimentar o mundo.

Table E.3. Hindi

Treatment	Translation
Placebo1	ज़रूरतमंद बच्चों की वित्तीय मदद कीजिए।
Procedural legitimacy (UNICEF)	यूनिसेफ को दान करें। यूनिसेफ एक बहुपक्षीय संगठन है जो पारदर्शी और स्वतंत्र है।

Norm-driven legitimacy (UNICEF)	यूनिसेफ को दान करें। यूनिसेफ एक बहुपक्षीय संगठन है जो बच्चों की मदद करता है।
Performance legitimacy (UNICEF)	यूनिसेफ को दान करें। यूनिसेफ एक बहुपक्षीय संगठन है जिसका खाना बाटने में सिद्ध ट्रैक रिकॉर्ड है।
Procedural legitimacy (STC)	ज़रूरतमंद बच्चों की वित्तीय मदद कीजिए।
Norm-driven legitimacy (STC)	सेव द चिल्ड्रन को दान कीजिए। सेव द चिल्ड्रन एक निर्लाभ-संगठन है जो पारदर्शी और स्वतंत्र है।
Performance legitimacy (STC)	विश्व स्तर पर बच्चों की मदद करने के लिए सेव द चिल्ड्रन को दान कीजिए। सेव द चिल्ड्रन एक निर्लाभ-संगठन है।

Appendix F. Facebook Ad Links

All ads showed the same shortened link.

- Save the Children Link: savethechildren.org
- UNICEF Link: unicef.org

The actual links for each country differed as we directed those that clicked on the ads to the local links in each country if there were any. The actual links for each country, where the people were directed, is as below:

Brazil

- Save the Children:
https://support.savethechildren.org/site/Donation2?df_id=7626&7626.donation=form1&s_kwid=AL9048!3!334973341131!e!!g!!save%20the%20children%20donate&gclid=Cj0KCCQiAyMKbBhD1ARIsANs7rEEQJiwjl-FgaCXDTPhFy5o1lQE0BKU0Te3RWSLd3Lvu9XR0QJ8FnY4aAp1pEALw_wcB&gclid=aw.ds&adobe_mc_sdid=SDID%3D58566F6527E11243-04099C9488931A41%7CMCORGID%3D6B0E659F56A9E70D7F000101%2540AdobeOrg%7CTS%3D1668407078
- UNICEF: <https://help.unicef.org/global?language=pt-br>

Egypt

- Save the Children:
https://support.savethechildren.org/site/Donation2?df_id=1620&1620.donation=form1
- UNICEF:
https://help.unicef.org/?country=EG&GCLID=cJWkcaIa7VwCbHbueIWaxIELTIO3CTVSsu5s2W_MPU1H8pws-ajSW_GxdWDvfNOj70qmEP1lm4H8ErOcokqqaVd_bWe&gclid=aw.ds

Saudi Arabia

- Save the Children:
https://support.savethechildren.org/site/Donation2?df_id=1620&1620.donation=form1
- UNICEF: <https://www.unicef.org/gulf/ramadan>

India

- Save the Children: <https://www.savethechildren.in/donate/>
- UNICEF: <https://help.unicef.org/in/drtv2022-homepage>

United Kingdom

- Save the Children: www.savethechildren.org.uk/donate
- UNICEF: www.unicef.org.uk/donate/