

From Text to Political Positions on Foreign Aid:  
Analysis of Aid Mentions in Party Manifestos from 1960 to 2015

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Abstract:

Looking at texts of election manifestos, this paper examines whether there are systematic differences among political parties within and across countries in how they position themselves on foreign aid. Conventional wisdom suggests that left-leaning parties may be more supportive of foreign aid than rightwing parties, but also that foreign aid may not be sufficiently electorally salient for parties to stake out positions in campaign materials, such as manifestos. We leverage a new data set that codes party positions on foreign aid in election manifestos for 13 donors from 1960 to 2015 and find that parties differ systematically in how they engage with foreign aid. Left-leaning governments are more likely to express positive sentiment vis-à-vis aid than right-leaning governments. We evaluate the effects of positions on aid outcomes and find that positive aid views expressed by the party in government translate into higher aid commitments, though only for left-leaning parties.

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## Introduction

Governments justify foreign aid as a response to development needs in poor countries, but its level and modality depend on political and economic conditions in donor countries. While research has long seen aid as an instrument of statecraft used to advance developmental and non-developmental goals,<sup>2</sup> we know less about how parties and governments discuss aid within the context of domestic electoral politics, or how these discussions relate to aid outcomes. Some have argued that little partisan debate exists in foreign policy and this is why foreign policy is often so consistent.<sup>3</sup> However, preferences about foreign policy instruments, including trade, military intervention and sanctions, seem to differ by partisanship and to vary across the left-right ideological spectrum.<sup>4</sup> Because aid commitments vary over time and across countries, a growing number of scholars have begun to examine these differences in aid policy by looking into variation in political institutions across donor countries as well as the role of ideology within donor countries over time.<sup>5</sup> For example, Tingley finds that as governments become more conservative, their aid effort falls, but primarily for the poorest recipient countries, while foreign aid to middle income countries is unaffected.<sup>6</sup> Brech and Potrafke show that left-leaning political parties, when in government, increase foreign aid spending, while right parties advocate foreign aid cuts.<sup>7</sup> According to Noel and Therien domestic political preferences for redistribution result in higher spending on the poor abroad.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> For example, see Baldwin 1985, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009.

<sup>3</sup> For example, see Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007.

<sup>4</sup> Mintz 1988; Fordham 2002; Milner and Judkins 2004; and Milner and Tingley 2015.

<sup>5</sup> For example, see Noel and Therien 1995; Fleck and Kilby 2006; Milner 2006; Milner and Tingley 2010; Tingley 2010; Dreher, Minasyan, and Nunnenkamp 2015; Dietrich 2016; and Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Bryant 2016.

<sup>6</sup> Tingley 2010.

<sup>7</sup> Brech and Potrafke 2014.

<sup>8</sup> Noel and Therien 1995; See also Therien and Noel 2000. More recently, Prather 2018 finds that preferences for redistribution positively affect support for foreign aid only for individuals who have an internationalist foreign policy orientation.

However, this positive relationship between ideology and aid spending appears not to be uniform across OECD countries. For instance, the election of right-leaning parties in the United Kingdom (2009), Sweden (2005), and the United States (2000) led to increases in foreign aid spending that, *prima facie*, would be at odds with expectations derived from the literature.<sup>9</sup>

In this paper, we examine how parties discuss foreign aid in their electoral manifestos — the election platforms party leaders write in the lead-up to election campaigns and which often serve as policy pledges to be carried out if a party wins office. Election manifestos offer the best source of data on cross-national party positions on specific issues across countries and time. Virtually all parties across the democratic world issue detailed manifestos outlining the policy positions that will form the basis of their campaign. Policy pledges made in these documents are often viewed as policy commitments. And should the party win office, parties are expected to give priority to policies written into their manifesto. Because parties all write manifestos for the same purpose — to make a comprehensive statement of the party’s policy priorities in the context of election campaign aimed at their electorate — they offer better data on policy priorities than other elections statements, such as speeches, which may be tailored to particular audiences and do not come with the same level of commitment from the party leadership.

Comparative elections researchers generally find that electoral platforms reveal preferences about what parties would like to do if elected to office and that these policy positions, conditioned by electoral system, impact voters and electoral outcomes.<sup>10</sup> And there is recent empirical evidence that parties actually do tend to fulfill their electoral pledges.<sup>11</sup> Less evidence

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<sup>9</sup> OECD 2015.

<sup>10</sup> Powell 2000; McDonald and Budge 2005; and Ezrow 2010.

<sup>11</sup> Mansergh and Thomson 2007; Thomson et al. 2017.

exists specifically with respect to foreign policy,<sup>12</sup> and we seek to uncover whether the same holds with respect to foreign aid policy.

We explore whether and why parties differ systematically by ideology both in what they promise during campaigns, and how they act on these promises upon winning office. While literature on policy pledge fulfilment finds that parties tend to keep their electoral promises,<sup>13</sup> little work has looked at how ideology interacts with particular policy areas. We examine precisely this interaction on the important question of foreign aid commitments. Theoretically, we expect that parties on the left and the right to differ in their discussion of foreign aid with respect to content, sentiment and how this content translates into action. We expect parties of the left to engage more with foreign aid and to discuss it more positively than right parties. We also expect them to follow through on their promises more than right parties as the issue is of greater importance to their voters.

On the basis of a novel coding scheme that accounts for political party sentiment and preferences vis-à-vis foreign aid, we systematically code hundreds of party platforms in their original languages for thirteen of the largest foreign aid donors, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, Canada, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland from 1960 to 2015.<sup>14</sup> These donors account for the vast share of foreign aid. Annually, they hold a share of at least 80 percent out of all the OECD DAC donors.

Using these data, we examine differences over time and across country in the way that parties discuss aid. In particular, we examine whether parties view foreign aid in a positive or

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<sup>12</sup> Budge and Hofferbert 1990 look specifically at pledges with respect to foreign and defense policy in the US context.

<sup>13</sup> For example, see Thomson et al 2017.

<sup>14</sup> Among the five largest aid donors, we are only missing Japan, but Japanese parties did not have a history of writing manifestos prior to 2000, meaning that comparable data are not available for much of our sample: see Proksch, Slapin, and Thies 2011.

negative light and whether their ideological affinities shape the amount they commit to recipient countries. We find that, over time, the amount of space in electoral manifestos dedicated to foreign aid has varied across countries and parties of all political stripes. Left-leaning parties are more likely to positively engage with foreign aid. Right-leaning parties, in contrast, are more likely to discuss aid in a negative way. Parties are also not equally likely to follow through with their expressed sentiment when in government: a positive relationship between foreign aid commitments and mentions of aid in manifestos only holds for left-leaning governments. Right-leaning parties that mention aid positively are less likely to follow through with higher aid commitments. We suggest that right-wing voters are less likely to care about aid and hold parties accountable on this dimension.

### **Ideology, Party Aid Mentions, and Aid Spending: a two-part argument**

The majority of studies that investigate the relationship between ideology and aid commitments rely on the conventional Right-Left ideology scale from the MARPOR project<sup>15</sup> suggesting that more left-leaning parties advocate for more aid. However, this aggregate measure subsumes numerous domestic and foreign policy dimensions and does not explicitly consider political party positions on foreign aid. We believe that isolating party preferences on foreign aid enables us to not only understand the extent to which positions in favor of or against foreign aid correspond with existing aggregate right-left measures, but also understand how they relate to actual giving of aid. The coding of party positions on foreign aid allows us to provide a better test of hypotheses linking ideologically driven positions on foreign aid to outcomes.

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<sup>15</sup> Formally known as the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) and Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP).

Because foreign policy, and, for that matter, foreign aid policy, may be the least salient dimension in the political battle for votes, one might expect parties to underspecify their positions on foreign aid. However, party rhetoric about the importance of foreign aid and its future use can become heated around election day, especially during times of economic hardship.<sup>16</sup> What is more, a quick glance at party manifestos across donor countries reveals that foreign aid policy is a consistent policy theme, exhibiting interesting temporal, cross-donor, and cross-party variation in terms of space devoted to foreign aid, expressed support for aid and corresponding delivery preferences.

Making specific mentions of aid policy in election manifestos differs from off-hand remarks on the campaign trail, both because manifesto statements represent a carefully considered electoral strategy drafted by the party elites and because specific statements in election manifestos are viewed as election pledges to be carried out upon winning office. Indeed, governing parties do tend to carry out these pledges. However, we expect the way they carry out pledges to vary depending on how voters (and in particular, partisans) view particular issues. The literature on party pledges has not, to date, examined the interaction between ideology and particular issues when examining pledge fulfillment, but that is precisely what we do here.

We argue that the nature of aid mentions in manifestos ought to vary with party ideology, both because of the nature of the aid issue, itself, and because of differing attention that voters on the left and the right pay to it. First, we expect some variation in foreign aid mentions at election time attributable to ideology. Despite rightwing parties' occasional discussion of foreign aid, in general, the literature suggests that leftwing parties are more likely to engage and engage positively with aid. We theorize that the influence of ideology on foreign aid mentions has its origins in

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<sup>16</sup> Brech and Potrafke 2014; Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Bryant 2016.

domestic ideological cleavages. Specifically, individuals hold different beliefs about the appropriate role of the state in goods and services delivery and these beliefs motivate people to support or oppose foreign aid. Left-leaning individuals value (more) involvement of the state in goods and service delivery. Because foreign aid represents a specific type of international goods and services delivery, left-leaning individuals are likely to hold more favorable views towards foreign aid. On the other hand, right-leaning individuals who champion market efficiency and individual decision-making favor less state involvement. They are more likely to be skeptical about the merits of the state as an international donor, favoring instead individual contributions to charities. They are thus more likely to express negative views of publicly funded foreign aid. Political parties of the right and the left know the beliefs of their voters and take them into account when drafting political party manifestos.

However, the literature also suggests that foreign aid policy has become a policy around which a norm has developed to speak positively, regardless of ideological stripe. Positive mentions of aid may result, in part, from the acceptance of poverty reduction as an increasingly powerful international norm. The Millennium Development Goals and their successors, the Sustainable Development Goals, are manifestations of this global norm. To Fukuda-Parr and Hulme poverty reduction has become institutionalized as a norm that instills global responsibility.<sup>17</sup> Yet, as critics have pointed out, in many cases governments pledged support for poverty reduction but failed to act on them, suggesting that poverty reduction may be institutionalized but not implemented equally across the board.<sup>18</sup>

As parties compete over votes we expect them to recognize that poverty reduction has become a global norm, and that foreign aid is the most obvious foreign policy mechanism for

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<sup>17</sup> Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

promoting it. While some parties, primarily on the left, think that offering aid is the moral thing to do, others simply acknowledge that it has become a global standard that requires them to talk-the-talk to avoid the image of a “nasty” party.<sup>19</sup> Whether the talk gets implemented once parties govern is, however, a different question. We suggest that relative to parties on the left, conservative parties are less likely to walk-the-walk and implement the foreign aid pledges made in their manifestos when in government. In other words, left-leaning governments are more likely to increase their aid commitments in line with the (relatively positive) statements they make regarding aid in their manifestos.

There are several reasons why conservatives might be less likely than their left-leaning counterparts to turn positive foreign aid sentiment into higher aid commitments. First, we know that, on average, conservative voters are less supportive of aid increases than their left-leaning counterparts.<sup>20</sup> More importantly, though, we suggest that, compared to their left-leaning counterparts, conservative voters are less likely to consider foreign aid policy to be a priority. If foreign aid is not a priority, the costs associated with cheap talk are lower. We also posit that for left-leaning members of the public, policy positions on foreign aid may be more consequential for making decisions about whom to support in upcoming elections than for their right-leaning voters. While our primary empirical analysis of the conditional effect focuses on manifesto text and aggregate aid commitment data, we probe the plausibility of the mechanism that explains the effect with originally collected public opinion data.

Thus, we hypothesize:

**H1)** Left-leaning parties to be relatively more likely to engage with foreign aid than right-leaning parties in their manifestos;

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<sup>19</sup> Hulme 2015.

<sup>20</sup> Milner and Tingley 2013; Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Bryant 2016.



**H2)** Left-leaning parties to be more likely to mention aid in a positive light than right-leaning parties;

And finally,

**H3:** Aid commitments of left-leaning governments to be more likely to increase with the number of positive mentions of foreign aid in their election manifestos, compared with right-leaning governments.

## Data

To examine these hypotheses, we have coded party's foreign aid positions over time across thirteen countries, including the United States,<sup>21</sup> the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, Canada, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland from 1960 to 2016.<sup>22</sup> For party positions on foreign aid, we require humans to carefully code the text because we want to capture the sentiment — positive or negative — behind the position.<sup>23</sup> We also want to understand whether parties discuss conditions applied to aid, or what the objectives are associated with foreign aid. Only human coding allows us to get at nuance regarding preferences and ultimately, a better understanding of the foreign aid decision-making process.

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<sup>21</sup> The United States is dropped from models that use a ParlGov measure of ideology as they are not in the ParlGov data.

<sup>22</sup> Text files of election manifestos were downloaded from the MARPOR website: <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/>. It is worth noting that the manifesto project has categories that consider foreign aid (categories 107 and 109: *Internationalism: Positive* and *Internationalism: Negative*), however these categories also consider statements on a wide variety of other topics such as international courts, global governance, statements about the UN, and statements about global resource planning. The coding of these variables is, thus, not appropriate for our purposes as we cannot know what proportion of statements in these categories relate to aid.

<sup>23</sup> While there are sentiment dictionaries suited to measuring negativity and positivity in political texts, it is unclear how these would work on texts specifically about foreign aid, for example, see Soroka 2014. Off-the-shelf sentiment dictionaries are generally not well-suited to specific, technical policies where human coders are often more accurate, Loughran and McDonald 2011. To give one example, the word “eradicate” is listed as a negative word in the commonly used Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary, but a sentence suggesting that “increasing aid would help eradicate global poverty and disease” presents aid in a positive light.

We undertook the coding of manifestos in several steps. First, we parsed the original party manifestos into domestic and international/foreign policy-related sentences. To isolate these international sentences we employed undergraduate students from the University of Essex to identify and record all sentences engaging with an international policy issue. We required student coders to either be native speakers or speak the language fluently. At the end of this process, we were able to extract every sentence from a manifesto that involved international policy or outcomes. With this information we can examine the extent to which parties differ on the amount of text devoted to foreign issues. In a subsequent step, we asked two students to separately identify all sentences devoted to foreign issues that touched the topic of foreign aid in a given manifesto. With this information we can examine the extent to which parties differ on the amount of text devoted to foreign aid policy across all foreign policy. Finally, we asked the two students to independently code all foreign aid related sentences as either positive, negative, or neutral in sentiment. In the appendix (Appendix A) we present a series of examples of positive, negative and neutral mentions of foreign aid. After each coder has coded all of the relevant statements, we calculate the number of aid statements (total, positive, and negative) and the number of words in these statements for each coder by country. The variables we employ use the mean of the two coders. However, to determine whether the coders are able to accurately code manifesto content, we present the correlation between our variables, calculated separately for each coder and within each country — the mean correlation is 0.86 with the highest values for the variable capturing overall amount of discussion related to aid. Correlations are also very high for positive aid statements and somewhat lower for negative aid statements, which is understandable as there are fewer of them. Indeed, both coders agree that no Spanish manifestos mention aid negatively.

Overall, we are confident that our coders were able to code the statements. We include the coder correlation matrix in the appendix (Table B1).

Manifesto space devoted to foreign aid does not change much over time, ranging between one and two percent (or approximately seven sentences) on average. If we look only at manifesto text devoted to international issues, foreign aid content ranges between seven and 15 percent. To assess how statements regarding foreign aid vary with party ideology, across country and over time, we run a series of OLS regressions. Specifically, we take manifestos as our unit of analysis and calculate our dependent variable as the number of sentences about foreign aid per 1,000 words. We regress this dependent variable on a measure of government ideology, country fixed-effects and time period fixed-effects (as well as party fixed-effects in robustness tests), clustering our standard errors on parties. Our primary ideology measure is a trichotomous recoding of the standard MARPOR left-right (rile) scale for ease of interpretation — left, center, and right. In total, we run four models using four dependent variables — total aid sentences, positive aid sentences, negative aid sentences, and positive minus negative aid sentences Figure 1 depicts the effects (with 95% CIs) of shifting ideology from left to right on foreign aid mentions in manifestos across our four models. The x-axis depicts the change in the number of statements mentioning foreign per 1000 words of text. Each horizontal line presents the effects from a separate model using a different operationalization of the dependent variable, *foreign aid mentions*, and the y-axis has no meaning. The depictions of these model effects are stacked to facilitate comparison of these ideology coefficients for the different measures of our dependent variable across the models. The specific operationalizations are labeled above the line. We report the regression tables in the appendix.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> See Tables C1-C3. We also run the same set of models using the original “rile” scale and find the similar results, which we report in the appendix. We lose statistical significance on foreign aid mentions using the *Num Positive Statements* dependent variable with the continuous measure of ideology, but the effects remain statistically significant when using the number of negative mentions, as well as positive minus negative mentions. Some may

## Effect of Ideology on Aid Mentions

Moving from Left to Right




Figure 1: Effect of Ideology on Aid Mentions. Expected Values from Four OLS Models with 95% Confidence Intervals.

We find no overall statistically significant effect of ideology on the number of aid mentions, *Num Total Aid*, and therefore little support for H1. Right party are slightly less likely to mention aid than left parties, but not significantly so, as indicated by the 95% confidence interval crossing the vertical line at zero. The average manifesto is roughly 14,000 words, meaning that right parties, on average, have less than one fewer sentence about aid than left

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argue that we are losing information by using a trichotomous rather than a continuous measure, but this assumes that movements in the continuous measure are real and not an artefact of the measurement process. Given the difficult nature of measuring ideology, we are not convinced that this is the case. We favor presenting the trichotomous measure both because it is less susceptible to measurement error and because it eases interpretation, but we are comforted that our substantive results hold when using the continuous measure.

parties in their manifestos.<sup>25</sup> The effect on the number of positive mentions of aid, *Num Pos Aid*, is statistically significant and substantively much stronger, providing strong support for H2. Right parties, on average, make 1.4 fewer positive statements about aid than left parties. Interestingly, they also make more negative statements, *Num Neg Aid*, as indicated by the third line on the graph, and their negative statements outweigh their positive statements. Right parties make, on average 1.8 more negative statements than positive statements compared with leftwing parties. The coefficient on *Pos-Neg Aid* represents the effect of positive statements after subtracting negative statements. Again, the right-left effect is negative and statistically significant. Overall, there is variation in how parties discuss aid in their manifestos as a function of ideology, with leftist parties slightly more likely to mention aid and significantly more likely to mention aid positively. Right parties, on the other hand, are more likely to discuss aid in a negative light.<sup>26</sup>

### **Foreign aid outcome data and analysis**

To evaluate H3 we measure what parties actually do when in power. If parties' electoral programs are a reflection of their plans for governing we would expect parties to be more likely to implement policies that are in line with their preferences as stated in their manifestos. Since decisions to allocate aid are made annually by governments as a whole, and not necessarily by

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<sup>25</sup> The coefficient on *Ideology* in this model is -0.028 and a move from left to right is a change of two units, meaning the point estimate of the effect is calculated as  $-0.028 * 2 * 14 = -0.784$ . This is the point estimate displayed graphically in the top line.

<sup>26</sup> In the appendix (Figures C1 and C2) we offer descriptive visualizations of two of our main dependent variables – Aid Mentions and Positive Aid Mentions. We see substantial variation across countries in how often parties mention aid. Parties in Norway, Sweden, Canada, the U.S., and Germany tend to mention aid more and tend to mention it more positively. Parties in Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, France and Spain make fewer mentions, and therefore also fewer positive mentions. The time trends are not overly strong, but there does seem to be quite a number of mentions in the early period, a large drop, followed by a significant increase again from the mid-1960s through the early 1990s. The late 1990s experience a drop again, followed by relatively high numbers of mentions in the most recent years.

individual parties, we need to ensure that our analyses are conducted at the country-year level. We convert our manifesto and party ideology variables, which are measured at the party-election level, to the country-year level. Additionally, to measure ideology, we take advantage of the estimates provided by ParlGov,<sup>27</sup> which is also our source for cabinet composition data and parliamentary seat shares. ParlGov constructs its ideology measure by rescaling existing expert survey data on party positions. When constructing our manifesto and ideology variables we focus on the parties in government.

Our next concern is which government parties are important. We assume that, especially in coalition governments, parties will attempt to gain control over the ministries in which they and their constituencies are more interested.<sup>28</sup> Green parties, for example, will be more likely to want to head the environmental ministries. The party in charge of the ministry responsible for aid, then, might have a greater interest in aid than other government parties. One option is to weight its preferences about aid based on its manifesto more heavily than the preferences of other government parties.<sup>29</sup> Because a budget needs to be passed by the legislature, however, the party in control of the aid ministry is unlikely to have *carte blanche* on foreign aid commitments. We therefore create different aid and ideology measures for each government cabinet. For our aid measures, we focus first on the Prime Minister's party. We then estimate and report the same models using the party in charge of the development agency as robustness measure in the appendix (Table D1). Each aid measure in the model is the score of that party based on the election manifesto from the previous election. For the ideology measures, however, we weight

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<sup>27</sup> <http://www.parlgov.org/>.

<sup>28</sup> Laver and Shepsle 1996.

<sup>29</sup> This assumption follows from recent literature that finds that portfolio allocation matters for election pledge fulfillment, Thomson, et al. 2017.

each government party's ideology by its share of legislative seats controlled by all government parties.

Finally, there can be multiple cabinets in a year. Sometimes a government resigns and parties are expected to agree upon a new cabinet in the absence of an election. In most cases, the parties in government do not change significantly. Still, the potential of multiple governments in a year complicates the construction of our measures based on a government. We average our measures across any governments in office during a year.

*Dependent variable.* For our dependent variable we use aid commitments as a percentage of GDP. The data are from the OECD's Creditor Reporting System which lists aid commitments by project from 1990 until the present. The projects are either of bilateral character or channeled through international organizations. We sum up the aid commitments by donor to get a total of all commitments by year and then divide the yearly total by the donor's GDP. The benefit of using the OECD CRS data, though only available from 1990 onwards, is that it represents the most complete data in terms of donor reporting. The longer OECD DAC foreign aid time series is subject to high levels of underreporting during the 1970s and 1980s. We opt for coverage quality at the expense of over time coverage.

Aid as a percentage of GDP is never very large. In our sample, it ranges from .05% to just about 1%. Aid does show a bit of an increase over time. In the 1990s, aid as a percentage of GDP averaged between 0.20% and 0.30%. Since 2009, it has consistently averaged 0.40% or more. There are also some differences across types of countries. Scandinavian countries in our sample (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) average between 0.50% and 0.63% over the sample.

The Anglo-American countries (U.S., Canada, and the UK) average around 0.20% with other countries (France, Germany, and Finland) all around 0.28%.

### *Control variables*

Finally, we control for other economic and political variables that might affect a donor's aid commitment decisions. First, we include a variable for *GDP growth*, drawn from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators*. The effect of this variable is unclear. On the one hand, aid might increase as GDP increases. As a donor's economy grows, politicians might decide to be even more generous with foreign aid. On the other hand, if aid decisions are more static than as the donor's economy grows, aid as a percentage of GDP might decrease.

Second, as a measure of a country's wealth, we include the log of GDP per capita in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Wealth should have a positive association with aid commitments — donor countries with higher GDP per capita should give more foreign aid. This variable is also from the *World Development Indicators*.

As another measure of donor economic conditions, we include the unemployment rate as a percentage of the total labor force, again from the *World Development Indicators*. If a donor is facing their own economic problems in terms of out of work populace, the government might shift spending from foreign aid to domestic problems.

We also control for the number of terrorist attacks in a donor country. Attacks, especially foreign ones, might convince politicians to divert money away from foreign efforts and again to focus on domestic ones. This data is drawn from the *Global Terrorism Database*. We sum up the total number of attacks in a donor country in each year.



Finally, migration into a donor country might affect their giving of foreign aid. Donors with larger inflows of immigrants might be more willing to give more foreign aid than donors with smaller inflows. We take this variable from the OECD's *International Migration Database*, logging the total inflow of migrants.

### *Models*

In all our models, we include country level fixed effects to control for any country-specific factor that is not included. We also cluster the standard errors at the country level. We include dummy variables for each 5-year period to control for any time effects. Because of data availability, the models cover the years 1990 to 2014.<sup>30</sup>

### *Results*

In Table 1, we determine whether our manifesto variables, *Average Aid Mentions* and *Positive Aid Mentions*, have an independent effect on foreign aid commitments in our set of countries. Our argument suggests that we should not expect to see an average effect of our manifesto variables but rather a conditional effect with leftist parties “walking-the-walk” while conservative parties simply “talking-the-talk”, but not translating their support of foreign aid into higher aid commitments while in office. In columns 1 and 2 of the table, we include our first manifesto measure, *Average Aid Mentions*, focusing on manifestos from the Prime Minister's party. The variable is not significant. In both models, however, our ideology measures influence aid commitments independently and in the expected direction. In column 1, we include our general left-right ideology measure of parties from ParlGov in government weighted by their

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<sup>30</sup> As mentioned above, the U.S. drops from the analyses using the general left-right measure from ParlGov, meaning we only have 12 donor countries in some analyses.

**Table 1: Prime Minister's Party: The Effects of Manifesto Measures on Aid Commitments as Percentage of GDP**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Average mentions of aid by PM party	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)				
Average mentions of pro aid by PM party					0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.003** (0.001)
Avg alt. left-right score by gov weighted by seats	-0.008* (0.005)		0.004 (0.007)		-0.008 (0.006)		0.005 (0.007)	
Avg mkt econ score by gov weighted by seats		-0.005* (0.002)		-0.002 (0.004)		-0.005* (0.002)		-0.002 (0.004)
Avg aid1 by PM party X Avg left-right score			-0.001 (0.001)					
Avg aid1 by PM party X Avg mkt econ score				-0.000 (0.000)				
Avg pro aid1 by PM party X Avg left-right score							-0.002** (0.001)	
Avg pro aid1 by PM party X Avg mkt econ score								-0.001 (0.000)
Unemployment, total	-0.015*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.014*** (0.002)
GDP growth	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)
Log GDP per capita	-0.170 (0.133)	-0.184 (0.136)	-0.131 (0.145)	-0.187 (0.134)	-0.155 (0.143)	-0.172 (0.138)	-0.105 (0.159)	-0.174 (0.137)
# Terrorist incidents	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Log immigration	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.005 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.013)

Constant	2.290 (1.361)	2.386 (1.461)	1.805 (1.545)	2.434 (1.447)	2.112 (1.460)	2.244 (1.477)	1.614 (1.649)	2.296 (1.453)
N	242	267	242	267	242	267	242	267
Clusters	12	13	12	13	12	13	12	13
R <sup>2</sup>	0.511	0.516	0.531	0.526	0.508	0.513	0.536	0.521

Note: Models include country fixed effects and half-decade dummies (not shown to conserve space). Standard errors are clustered by country.

share of seats. In column 2, we included the average market economy score of the parties in government weighted by their share of government seats. This variable is from the MARPOR project, with leftist parties having smaller values and right parties having larger values. As mentioned above, aid commitments range from about 0.05% of GDP to just over 1% of GDP. The market economy score is also significant across models. Moving from a far left party with a score of 0 to a far right party with a score of 10 would decrease aid commitments by about 0.05%. The results are very similar when we look at the results for the second manifesto variable, *Positive Aid Mentions*, presented in columns 5 through 8. *Positive Aid Mentions* does not have an independent effect on aid commitments as shown in columns 5 and 6.

To test our main hypothesis about differences in the extent to which donor governments of various ideological stripes follow through with their aid commitment we repeat the analyses but now include an interaction between each of the ideology measures and the corresponding manifesto variables from the PM party: *Average Aid Mentions* (columns 3 and 4) and *Positive Aid Mentions* (columns 7 and 8). As expected the interaction terms are negative and significant in all four regressions. Because it is easier to interpret interactive effects by plotting the effects, Figure 2 presents the marginal effects of *Average Aid Mentions* and *Positive Aid Mentions* at different levels of ideology on aid commitment as a percentage of GDP. Plots that use the market economy score as the conditioning variable look very similar.

## Marginal Effects of Aid Mentions on Aid Commitments by Government Ideology




Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Aid Mentions on Aid Commitments by Ideology with 95% confidence intervals.

The left panel of Figure 2 plots the effect of the interaction for *Average Aid Mentions*, while the right panel of Figure 2 shows the effect of the interaction for *Positive Aid Mentions*. The left graph shows that predicted commitments increase with aid mentions by left parties, but not with aid mentions by Right parties. The effects are even stronger, as expected, when looking at positive mentions. The rug plot at the bottom of the figure presents the density of the data across the range of government ideologies. While there are a few data points that extend beyond 5, we truncate the scale because of the scarcity of data points at the far right. The figures suggest that 5 additional positive aid mentions are associated with an increase of 0.025 percentage points in foreign aid commitments by a leftwing government, but none for a rightwing government.

We interpret these findings to suggest that parties on the left may be more likely to follow through with their commitment on foreign aid. Conservative parties, on the other hand, may

engage with foreign aid, and may do so in a positive way, but they ultimately do not feel the need to follow-through with their electoral promises when it comes to state-run foreign aid.

### Probing Plausibility of the Conditional Effect of Party Rhetoric and Outcomes

We suggest that the difference in policy implementation records between the left and right may result, in part, from the possibility that parties of the left are more likely to raise foreign aid positions in public, prior to elections, than their right-leaning counterparts; that constituents of conservative parties are less likely to consider foreign aid a policy priority than constituents of parties on the left; and that policy positions on foreign aid may be more consequential for making decisions about whom to support in upcoming elections for left-leaning voters than for their right-leaning counterparts.

To probe the plausibility of this explanation we incorporate relevant questions into the Aid Attitudes Tracker (AAT) survey<sup>31</sup> administered in Germany from November 9 to December 4, 2017, following the parliamentary elections in September. The sample comprises 6,108 respondents and is nationally representative. The first question asks: “Thinking about the political party, with which you identify primarily, have you heard if this political party has adopted a position on foreign aid spending? The answer choices included “yes,” “no” and “don’t know.” We focus our reporting on results for the six major parties currently represented in the German parliament (CDU/CSU, SPD, Die Grünen, Die Linke, FDP, and Alternative für Deutschland). Of people who identified with parties on the left (Die Grünen, Die Linke, and SPD) an average of 32 percent said that their party had adopted a policy position on foreign aid

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<sup>31</sup> The AAT is a nationally representative public opinion survey that tracks changes in attitudes across countries (United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany) over time.

prior to the elections.<sup>32</sup> Of respondents who identify with the right end of the spectrum (Alternative für Deutschland, CDU/CSU,<sup>33</sup> and FDP) only an average of 21 percent had heard their party adopt a position on foreign aid. For the FDP the percentage of respondents is 19 percent. These data provide prima facie evidence that left-leaning voters are more likely to be aware of their parties foreign policy positions than their right-leaning counterparts.

Subsequently, we ask: “Do you think that foreign aid spending is a priority for the political party with which you identify?” Of people who identified with parties on the left an average of 24 percent said that foreign aid spending was a priority for their party. Among respondents identifying with right parties we find fewer people stating that foreign aid is a priority issue for their party. The average across parties is 14 percent. These data substantiate our claim that left-leaning members of the public are more likely to think of foreign aid as a priority issue for their party than right-leaning members of the public.

Finally, we ask respondents about the importance of foreign aid for their decision to support parties: “Which of the following statements comes closest to how you feel: A political party’s position on foreign aid is (INSERT ANSWER OPTION) to whether I support the party.” The answer choices included “very important,” “important,” “neither important nor unimportant,” “unimportant,” “not at all important,” and “don’t know.” Of people who identified with parties on the left an average of 40 percent across parties said that the party position on foreign aid was either very important or important in their decision to support the party. Of respondents who identify with parties on the right, the same average percentage across parties is only 24 percent of people. This difference in answers between right and left political parties suggest that for members of the public who identify with parties of the left, foreign aid positions

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<sup>32</sup> A more detailed breakdown by party is offered in the respective tables (Table E1-E3) in Appendix E.

<sup>33</sup> The CDU/CSU has held the German Ministry for Cooperation and Development since 2013.

are more important in their decision to support the party than for members of the public who support parties of the right. The implications for party leadership would be that, in light of these differences, parties of the left feel more pressure to implement their proposed policies than their conservative counterparts.

## **Conclusion and Future Directions**

We have explored the impact of ideology on a party's foreign aid position in its electoral manifesto and how these positions translate into action. On the basis of newly collected data on party positions on foreign aid, we find evidence that parties discuss aid differently in their manifestos. Leftist parties are more likely to discuss aid positively than rightist ones. We argue that this pattern results from ideological differences in how voters view the state in goods and service delivery: the left is more in favor of state-funded development assistance than the right. The parties, in turn, anticipate their constituents' perceptions and formulate corresponding party positions. This lends support for existing work that associates left parties with greater aid efforts.

We also find that leftist parties are more likely to follow through with their electoral commitments regarding aid than parties of the right – that is, their positive mentions of aid are less likely to translate into action. We find evidence that as the number of pro-aid mentions in manifestos increase, left parties commit more while right parties do not change behavior. Existing research examining party pledges in electoral manifestos conducted at the aggregate level finds no impact of ideology on parties' willingness or ability to fulfill promises.<sup>34</sup> Our research suggests that aggregate level analysis could mask interesting variation at the policy level when it comes to

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<sup>34</sup> Thomson, et al. 2017.

the relationship between ideology, action and what is stated in the election platform.<sup>35</sup> Lastly, we have offered evidence from German public opinion data to suggest that voters supporting left vs right wing parties have different views regarding the importance of aid. Leftwing voters state that they are more likely to pay attention to their parties' positions on aid, believe it is a priority for their party, and find it important when considering their own support of the party. Thus, leftwing parties have a greater incentive to take seriously what they put in their electoral manifestos with respect to aid.

Overall, we hope that the new data set on aid mentions will be useful to other scholars who want to better understand whether and how parties communicate their positions on foreign aid before elections and how these positions influence policy outcomes. While scholars of party politics and elections have long used electoral manifestos as a source of data to understand ideology and political competition, they have been underutilized as a source of data in understanding foreign policy and international politics. We have demonstrated that they provide a useful source of data on policy positions with respect to foreign aid that relate to aid outcomes for at least some parties.

These hypotheses cannot be tested with the current state of the data on foreign aid commitments over time and across donors as conventional data sets do not code foreign aid along these dimensions. To understand what the politics of foreign aid are about, it is therefore important to look beyond available commitment data to other sources that reveal what political parties are advocating in foreign aid.

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<sup>35</sup> Although it is worth noting that we are not looking at pledges, per se, but rather mentions of aid. The differences could be less stark if we were to code pledges in the same manner as Thomson, et al 2017.



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## Supplementary Appendix

### Appendix A

#### Examples of aid mentions in select party manifestos in the United States and United Kingdom:

##### Positive Mentions:

- “We will target foreign assistance to high-impact goals: fostering the rule of law through democratic government;”<sup>36</sup>
- “With his latest budget, the President is fulfilling his historic commitment to request \$4 billion over three years for the Global Fund, and the President remains committed to robust funding for PEPFAR and the Global Fund in the future.”<sup>37</sup>
- “We will help at least 11 million children in the poorest countries gain a decent education, improve nutrition for at least 50 million people, who would otherwise go hungry; and help at least 60 million people get access to clean water and sanitation, to stop terrible diseases;”<sup>38</sup>
- “Globally we are pressing for a doubling of aid backed by getting international agreement to an International Finance Facility as supported by the Commission for Africa.”<sup>39</sup>

##### Negative mentions:

- “Decades of massive aid have failed to spur economic growth in the poorest countries where it has often propped up failed policies and corrupt rulers;”<sup>40</sup>
- “The Clinton administration has diverted aid from our friends to support U.N. operations and social welfare spending in the Third World.”<sup>41</sup>

##### Neutral mentions:

- “Eighty percent of our bilateral aid goes to the poorest countries;”<sup>42</sup>
- “Many of the world’s biggest challenges are from violent conflict to rapid population growth to environmental threat are caused or exacerbated by global poverty and inequality.”<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> 2008 Republican manifesto, United States.

<sup>37</sup> 2012 Democrats manifesto, United States.

<sup>38</sup> 2015 Conservative Party manifesto, United Kingdom.

<sup>39</sup> 2008 Labour Party manifesto, United Kingdom.

<sup>40</sup> 2008 Republican Party manifesto, United States.

<sup>41</sup> 1996 Republican Party manifesto, United States.

<sup>42</sup> 1992 Conservative Party manifesto, United Kingdom.

<sup>43</sup> 2001 Labour Party manifesto, United Kingdom.

## Appendix B: Correlation of Measures of Aid Mentions Across Coders

Table B1 presents the correlation of our three measures of aid mentions when constructing them on the basis of only one coder rather than both. The lower correlations on Neg-Aid result from lower numbers of negative mentions. The UK is missing because both coders agree that there are no negative aid mentions. Spain is missing because one coder says there is only one negative aid mention while the other coder codes no negative mentions. Thus, there is a high level of agreement between coders. The negative correlation in Ireland is also due to coders agreeing that there are very few negative mentions, but disagreeing what statements are, in fact, negative.

Table B1: Correlations between Coders of our Three Measures of Aid Mentions: Any Aid Mentions, Positive Aid Mentions, and Negative Aid Mentions.

Country	Aid	Pro-Aid	Neg-Aid
United States	0.997	0.983	0.991
Canada	0.967	0.965	0.757
United Kingdom	0.987	0.989	.
Ireland	0.989	0.980	-0.034
France	0.944	0.625	0.974
Spain	0.769	0.695	.
Germany	0.970	0.900	0.500
Finland	0.982	0.818	0.987
Sweden	0.940	0.925	0.244
Norway	0.942	0.864	0.899
Denmark	0.945	0.846	0.952
Australia	0.982	0.970	0.762
New Zealand	0.968	0.963	0.893

## Appendix C -Part I: Regression Tables for Ideology and Manifesto Measures

Table C1: Effect of Trichotomous RILE Ideology on Multiple Manifesto Measures

	(1) Num Total Aid	(2) Num Pos Aid	(3) Num Neg Aid	(4) Pos-Neg Aid
Ideology	-0.028 (0.025)	-0.051** (0.022)	0.013** (0.006)	-0.064*** (0.024)
Norway	0.137 (0.182)	0.011 (0.174)	0.021 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.177)
Denmark	-0.330* (0.180)	-0.336** (0.163)	0.005 (0.013)	-0.341** (0.161)
Finland	-0.165 (0.203)	-0.237 (0.170)	0.011 (0.021)	-0.248 (0.167)
France	-0.576*** (0.165)	-0.529*** (0.151)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.527*** (0.150)
Spain	-0.585*** (0.160)	-0.569*** (0.146)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.559*** (0.144)
Germany	0.065 (0.162)	-0.060 (0.148)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.055 (0.147)
United Kingdom	-0.195 (0.172)	-0.150 (0.161)	-0.015 (0.009)	-0.135 (0.156)
Ireland	-0.457*** (0.164)	-0.400*** (0.151)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.391*** (0.149)
United States	-0.073 (0.166)	-0.059 (0.153)	0.002 (0.009)	-0.061 (0.150)
Canada	-0.071 (0.214)	-0.041 (0.204)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.043 (0.202)
Australia	-0.457*** (0.173)	-0.399** (0.159)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.391** (0.156)
New Zealand	-0.521*** (0.170)	-0.466*** (0.156)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.459*** (0.154)
1965-1969	-0.048 (0.094)	-0.048 (0.091)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.050 (0.091)
1970-1974	-0.247** (0.115)	-0.216* (0.114)	0.000 (0.007)	-0.217* (0.114)
1975-1979	-0.163 (0.115)	-0.172 (0.112)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.170 (0.112)
1980-1984	-0.060 (0.112)	-0.104 (0.109)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.107 (0.110)
1985-1989	0.011 (0.113)	-0.061 (0.105)	0.011 (0.009)	-0.072 (0.105)
1990-1994	0.070 (0.142)	-0.032 (0.130)	0.040** (0.020)	-0.073 (0.133)
1995-1999	-0.140 (0.114)	-0.129 (0.115)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.124 (0.115)
2000-2004	0.049 (0.138)	0.023 (0.131)	0.001 (0.007)	0.022 (0.131)
2005-2009	0.021 (0.124)	-0.025 (0.119)	0.013 (0.011)	-0.039 (0.119)
2010-2013	-0.055 (0.126)	-0.107 (0.121)	0.004 (0.008)	-0.110 (0.121)
2014-2016	0.044 (0.108)	0.024 (0.110)	0.013* (0.008)	0.011 (0.110)
Constant	0.794*** (0.252)	0.788*** (0.243)	-0.018 (0.014)	0.807*** (0.243)
N	797	797	797	797
Clusters	111	111	111	111
R <sup>2</sup>	0.197	0.191	0.070	0.186

Note: Sweden and 1960-1964 are reference categories. Figure 1 is based on the results presented in this table.

**Table C2: Effect of Trichotomous RILE Ideology on Multiple Manifesto Measures with Party and Country Fixed Effects (Fixed Effects Not Displayed)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Num Total Aid	Num Pos Aid	Num Neg Aid	Pos-Neg Aid
Ideology	-0.117*** (0.042)	-0.121*** (0.039)	0.007* (0.004)	-0.128*** (0.041)
N	797	797	797	797
Clusters	111	111	111	111
R <sup>2</sup>	0.372	0.381	0.293	0.388

This table presents the effects of ideology on aid mentions, controlling for party and country effects, meaning the results represent within party change over time. We do not include party fixed effects in the main models because much of the variation we wish to explain is across party rather than within party, but we find similar effects here when we do. In some cases they are stronger than the results with time-period fixed effects presented in the main paper. We cannot include both party and time-period fixed effects in the same model. Given the electoral cycle, if we were to include both party and time period fixed effects, we would only have one or two observations per party within each time period, greatly limiting the variation in the dependent variable and leading to unstable estimates.



**Table C3: Effect of Continuous RILE index on Multiple Manifesto Measures**

	(1) Num Total Aid	(2) Num Pos Aid	(3) Num Neg Aid	(4) Pos-Neg Aid
Right-Left Ideological index	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002* (0.001)
Norway	0.143 (0.182)	0.016 (0.174)	0.020 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.177)
Denmark	-0.333* (0.176)	-0.337** (0.159)	0.004 (0.012)	-0.341** (0.158)
Finland	-0.164 (0.202)	-0.236 (0.169)	0.011 (0.021)	-0.247 (0.168)
France	-0.578*** (0.162)	-0.529*** (0.148)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.526*** (0.146)
Spain	-0.581*** (0.159)	-0.564*** (0.146)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.554*** (0.144)
Germany	0.066 (0.157)	-0.055 (0.144)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.048 (0.142)
United Kingdom	-0.201 (0.173)	-0.156 (0.162)	-0.015 (0.009)	-0.141 (0.157)
Ireland	-0.453*** (0.161)	-0.392*** (0.148)	-0.012* (0.006)	-0.380** (0.146)
United States	-0.081 (0.160)	-0.063 (0.147)	-0.000 (0.009)	-0.062 (0.144)
Canada	-0.068 (0.213)	-0.038 (0.201)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.038 (0.199)
Australia	-0.462*** (0.166)	-0.396** (0.151)	-0.012 (0.007)	-0.384** (0.148)
New Zealand	-0.518*** (0.167)	-0.460*** (0.153)	-0.010* (0.006)	-0.450*** (0.151)
1965-1969	-0.047 (0.095)	-0.048 (0.091)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.050 (0.092)
1970-1974	-0.244** (0.113)	-0.210* (0.111)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.208* (0.111)
1975-1979	-0.160 (0.112)	-0.164 (0.109)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.159 (0.109)
1980-1984	-0.063 (0.109)	-0.103 (0.105)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.104 (0.105)
1985-1989	0.012 (0.112)	-0.056 (0.103)	0.009 (0.009)	-0.064 (0.103)
1990-1994	0.067 (0.137)	-0.030 (0.125)	0.037* (0.019)	-0.067 (0.128)
1995-1999	-0.146 (0.110)	-0.130 (0.110)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.122 (0.110)
2000-2004	0.049 (0.134)	0.029 (0.127)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.030 (0.127)
2005-2009	0.023 (0.123)	-0.020 (0.117)	0.011 (0.011)	-0.032 (0.118)
2010-2013	-0.052 (0.126)	-0.102 (0.120)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.104 (0.120)
2014-2016	0.057 (0.106)	0.045 (0.107)	0.008 (0.007)	0.037 (0.106)
Constant	0.741*** (0.227)	0.682*** (0.216)	0.013* (0.008)	0.670*** (0.214)
N	797	797	797	797
Clusters	111	111	111	111
R <sup>2</sup>	0.196	0.188	0.079	0.183

Note: Sweden and 1960-1964 are reference categories. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Appendix C – Part II: Country and Time Fixed Effects:** Figures C1 and C2 below plot the fixed effects from models 1 and 2 in the Appendix Table C1 (above). They offer descriptive visualizations of two of our main dependent variables – Aid Mentions and Positive Aid Mentions. We see substantial variation across countries in how often parties mention aid. Parties in Norway, Sweden, Canada, the U.S., and Germany tend to mention aid more and tend to mention it more positively. Parties in Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, France and Spain make fewer mentions, and therefore also fewer positive mentions. The time trends are not overly strong, but there does seem to be quite a number of mentions in the early period, a large drop, followed by a significant increase again from the mid-1960s through the early 1990s. The late 1990s experience a drop again, followed by relatively high numbers of mentions in the most recent years.

### Predicted Aid Mentions




Figure C1: Predicted Effects – Aid Mentions by Country and Time Period Per 1,000 Manifesto Words

### Predicted Positive Aid Mentions




Figure C2: Predicted Effects – Positive Aid Mentions by Country and Time Period Per 1,000 Manifesto Words

Appendix D: Regression Tables for Manifesto Measures and Aid Commitments

Table D1: Aid Ministry Party: The Effects of Manifesto Measures on Aid Commitments as Percentage of GDP

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Average mentions of aid1 by aid ministry party	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)				
Average mentions of pro aid by aid ministry party					-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Avg alt. left-right score by gov weighted by seats	-0.010* (0.005)		-0.006 (0.005)		-0.010 (0.006)		-0.005 (0.005)	
Avg mkt econ score by gov weighted by seats		-0.005** (0.002)		-0.004 (0.003)		-0.005** (0.002)		-0.004 (0.003)
Avg aid1 by aid min party X Avg left-right score			-0.000 (0.001)					
Avg aid1 by aid min party X Avg mkt econ score				-0.000 (0.000)				
Avg pro aid1 by aid min party X Avg left-right score							-0.001 (0.001)	
Avg pro aid1 by aid min party X Avg mkt econ score								-0.000 (0.000)
Unemployment, total	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.001)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.001)	-0.014*** (0.002)
GDP growth	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.003)
Log GDP per capita	-0.112 (0.182)	-0.135 (0.173)	-0.103 (0.189)	-0.140 (0.174)	-0.096 (0.190)	-0.128 (0.173)	-0.088 (0.200)	-0.133 (0.174)
# Terrorist incidents	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Log immigration	-0.005 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.005 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.017)
Constant	1.686 (1.893)	1.865 (1.865)	1.559 (1.988)	1.912 (1.877)	1.532 (1.957)	1.797 (1.851)	1.453 (2.060)	1.856 (1.861)
N	242	267	242	267	242	267	242	267
Clusters	12	13	12	13	12	13	12	13
R <sup>2</sup>	0.509	0.515	0.511	0.517	0.509	0.515	0.516	0.516

Note: Models include country fixed effects and half-decade dummies (not shown to conserve space). Standard errors are clustered by country

**Appendix E: Detailed Evidence by Party from the Aid Attitudes Tracker.**

This appendix describes the AAT in greater detail. As stated in the manuscript the first question asks: “Thinking about the political party, with which you identify primarily, have you heard if this political party has adopted a position on foreign aid spending? The answer choices included “yes,” “no” and “don’t know.” On average 21 percent of respondents said that they had heard about their party adopt a foreign aid position, while 36 percent said that they did not hear their party adopt a position. 42 percent of the respondents said that they did not know.

In Table E1 below, we focus our reporting on results for the six major parties currently represented in the German parliament (CDU/CSU, SPD, Die Grünen, Die Linke, FDP, and Alternative für Deutschland). We focus our reporting on results for the six major parties currently represented in the German parliament (CDU/CSU, SPD, Die Grünen, Die Linke, FDP, and Alternative für Deutschland). Of people who identified with parties on the left as e.g. Die Grünen, 38 percent said that their party had adopted a policy position on foreign aid prior to the elections, while of respondents linked to Die Linke 34 percent said that their party had adopted a position. On the conservative end of the party spectrum we find that people are less likely to have heard their party articulate a position on foreign aid. Of respondents who identify with the Alternative für Deutschland only 18 percent heard their party adopt a position on foreign aid. For the FDP the percentage of respondents is 19 percent. Concerning the two governing parties of the center, CDU/CSU and SPD: for respondents who identified with the SPD 25 percent noted a policy position expressed in the run-up to the elections while among respondents who identified with the CDU/CSU 29 percent noted a policy position on foreign aid. These data provide prima facie evidence that left-leaning voters are more likely to be aware of their parties foreign policy positions than their right-leaning counterparts.

Table E1. Answers to Question “Thinking about the political party, with which you identify primarily, have you heard if this political party has adopted a position on foreign aid spending?”

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Don't Know (%)
Die Grünen	38	30	32
Die Linke	34	33	33
SPD	25	39	36
CDU/CSU	29	34	37
FDP	19	46	35
AfD	18	48	34

The second relevant question asks: “Do you think that foreign aid spending is a priority for the political party with which you identify?” The answer choices included “yes,” “no” and “don’t know.” On average 15 percent of the respondents said that, yes, foreign aid was a priority for their political party, while 52 answered that it was not a priority. 33 percent of the respondents answered that they did not know.

In Table E2 below we focus reporting on the six parties: Of people who identified with parties on the left as e.g. “Die Grünen,” 28 percent said that foreign aid spending was a priority for their party, while 27 percent of respondents linked to “Die Linke” said that foreign aid was a priority issue. Among respondents identifying with parties of the right we find fewer people stating that foreign aid is a priority issue for their party. Of respondents who identify with the Alternative für Deutschland only 13 percent think that foreign aid is a priority issue, while for the FDP the percentage of respondents is 11 percent. Concerning the two governing parties of the center, CDU/CSU and SPD: for respondents who identified with the SPD 18 percent believed that foreign aid was a priority issue in the run-up to the elections, while among respondents who identified with the CDU/CSU 20 percent suggested that it was a priority for their party. These data substantiate our claim that left-leaning members of the public are more likely to think of foreign aid as a priority issue for their party than right-leaning members of the public.

Table E2. Answers to Question “Do you think that foreign aid spending is a priority for the political party with which you identify?”

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Don't Know (%)
Die Grünen	28	45	26
Die Linke	27	46	26
SPD	18	55	27
CDU/CSU	20	53	28
FDP	11	69	20
AfD	13	63	24

Finally, we ask respondents about the importance of foreign aid for their decision to support parties: “Which of the following statements comes closest to how you feel: A political party’s position on foreign aid is (INSERT ANSWER OPTION) to whether I support the party.” The answer choices included “very important,” “important,” “neither important nor unimportant,” “unimportant,” “not at all important,” and “don’t know.” On average, 27 percent of respondents finds foreign aid to be very important or important for whether they support the political party, while 32 percent say that the topic was neither important nor unimportant. 20 percent of respondents said that foreign aid was unimportant or not at all important for their decision to support the party. 20 percent indicated that they did not know.

In Table E3 below, we focus reporting on the six parties. Of people who identified with “Die Grünen,” 47 percent said that the party position on foreign aid was either very important or important in their decision to support the party. For respondents who identify with “Die Linke” 40 percent said that the party’s position on foreign aid was either very important or important in their decision to support the party a priority issue. Among respondents identifying with parties of the right we find fewer people stating that foreign aid positions matter for party support. Of respondents who identify with the Alternative für Deutschland 20 percent think that a foreign aid position is very important or important for deciding whether to support the party. For the FDP the percentage of respondents is slightly higher at 22 percent. Concerning the two governing parties of the center, CDU/CSU and SPD: for respondents who identified with the SPD 33 percent believed that a party position on foreign aid was very important or important for their decision to support the party, while that percentage of respondents was at 31 percent for respondents identifying with the CDU/CSU. This difference in answers across political parties suggest that for members of the public who identify with parties of the left, foreign aid positions are more important in their decision to support the party than for members of the public who support parties of the right. The implications for party leadership would be that, in light of these differences, parties of the left feel more pressure to implement their proposed policies than their conservative counterparts.

Table E3. Answers to Question Which of the following statements comes closest to how you feel: A political party’s position on foreign aid is (INSERT ANSWER OPTION) to whether I support the party.”

	Very important (%)	Important (%)	Neither important, nor unimportant (%)	Unimportant (%)	Not at all important (%)	Don't Know (%)
Die Grünen	8	39	33	6	4	11
Die Linke	7	33	36	8	6	10
SPD	4	29	37	8	8	14
CDU/CSU	4	25	36	13	9	12
FDP	3	19	41	16	13	9

AfD	6	14	28	16	21	14
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