

# The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council

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**Abstract** The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks – election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. Involvement in warfare lowers election probability, but there is little evidence that the level of economic development or foreign aid predict election.

**Keywords:** United Nations, Security Council, turn-taking norm, elections

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## 1. Introduction

Endowed with the legal power to authorize whatever foreign policies it deems necessary to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council has become the preeminent organ of the United Nations (UN). It has the legal authority to suspend economic and diplomatic relations between countries, impose blockades, and authorize the use of armed force (see Hurd, 2007; Chapman, 2011; Chapman and Reiter, 2004; Voeten, 2001). The body includes 15 members: the five ever-present Permanent Members, and the ten Non-Permanent Members (NPMs), who must win election to serve limited two-year terms.

Our study seeks to explain which countries win election to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as NPMs. Note that at least four NPMs must vote in favor of a resolution for it to pass, giving these members a central role on the world stage. The President of the Security Council – a position that rotates among the members – has influence over the agenda and the order of voting (Bailey and Daws, 1998: 130-131). Most importantly, the UNSC votes by open ballot so that the voice of an elected member has a global reach on central matters of world security. Accordingly, some countries appear willing to bribe and reward NPMs. For instance, the United States increases direct foreign aid by more than 50 percent when a country serves on the UNSC (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006). Also, NPMs become more likely to receive World Bank project loans and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans with relatively soft conditionality (Dreher *et al.*, 2009a, 2009b, 2010). Asian NPMs see their loans from the Asian Development Bank rise around 30 percent (Lim and Vreeland, forthcoming).

Understanding which countries receive these rewards can serve to inform longstanding economic questions over the allocation and effects of foreign aid and IMF/World Bank loans (see, e.g., Easterly, 2001; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). Does the UNSC election process direct these funds towards countries with particular characteristics? Kuziemko and Werker, following Malone (2000), assert that “Service on the Council is by no means random” (2006: 909). Yet, to our knowledge, no established study presents the systematic determinants of election to the Security Council.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The only published study focuses exclusively on the selection of Western European countries to various UN committees (Scharioth, 2010). Two working papers on the broader selection of members to the UNSC that have been presented at conferences since we first presented the preliminary results of this paper in 2006 include Iwanami (2012) and Schmitz and Schwarze (2012). In contrast, good qualitative studies on the selection of UNSC members have been published, such as Malone (2000).

The power to elect the NPMs formally rests in the hands of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which includes delegates from all recognized UN member countries. Usually, however, the UNGA vote serves as a mere ratification of decisions made by regional caucuses, which play a privileged role in the nomination process. The determinants of UNSC election may therefore differ across regions. Only when there remains disagreement at the regional level does the UNGA vote become meaningful. On these occasions, the interplay of two separate sets of preferences – those at the regional level, and those at the global level (the UNGA) – determine election to the UNSC.

What shapes these preferences? To choose NPMs, the UN Charter calls on government representatives to consider “the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization.” In practice, however, matters are more complex. A detailed set of procedural rules and at least two unwritten gentlemen’s agreements also shape the UNSC election procedure. Moreover, UN Ambassadors appear to consider factors beyond contributions to peacekeeping: political affiliations, economic strength, and foreign aid may all play a role. For instance, Iceland’s sudden financial collapse in 2008 seemingly derailed what had previously looked a secure candidacy, while US support for the candidature of Guatemala appeared important in stymieing the rival candidacy of Venezuela in 2006. Cases such as these might just represent idiosyncrasies, but they may also be part of a regular pattern. How then should one go about investigating the systematic determinants of UNSC election?

To investigate discrete choice settings, scholars often employ the conditional (fixed effects) logit model in which a *single* decision-maker chooses a *single* option according to utility maximization (see McFadden, 1973). The UNSC election process differs from this model in at least two respects. First, as discussed above, up to two different sets of preferences can be in play: the regional and the global. Second, in some election years the UNGA regularly elects two candidates from one region, not a single candidate. We therefore develop a multiple-discrete choice model that extends the conditional logit model to allow, in a simple way, for the separate identification of two intermingling sets of preferences, and for the number of choices from the set of alternatives to vary (from zero to two).

Our empirical analysis of election to the UNSC considers five broad theoretical perspectives: (i) Does the UNGA follow a norm of choosing countries committed to peace, as directed by the UN Charter? (ii) Does the receipt of foreign aid predict UNSC election? (iii) Is election driven by international power or close relationships with powerful countries? (iv) Do cultural

traits play a role? (v) Do governments practice a turn-taking norm of sharing seats by rotating through the eligible candidates? The last hypothesis derives from the common misconception that membership on the UNSC “rotates” through the UN membership. Formally, membership does not rotate, but in practice the regional groups and the UNGA might follow such a norm.

Analyzing data on UNSC elections between 1970 and 2005, we find evidence of some commitment to peace from every region and from the UNGA. Each region shows evidence that countries engaged in international war are less likely to receive regional endorsement. Such countries are also consistently less likely to prevail when seats are contested in the UNGA. We also observe large negative effects for countries engaged in civil war in Asia and Eastern Europe, and there is a positive link between troop contributions to UN peacekeeping missions and election probability for Asia, Latin America and Western Europe.

As for international power, all regions and the UNGA exhibit some evidence of a preference for populous countries. We find weaker evidence that richer countries, measured by gross national income (GNI) per capita, enjoy an advantage in Asia and Latin America. We find only patchy, and somewhat mixed, evidence that foreign aid determines election.

Culture appears to hold occasional influence within regions. Countries that share a common political ideology with their region are more likely to be elected in some regions, but not in others. There are also mixed effects for countries with a history of colonialism. A British colonial legacy helps in Asia and the GRULAC, while a French colonial legacy may have helped at the UNGA level during the Cold War – since then the French colonial legacy hurts. Attitudes to corruption are also mixed: it pays in the GRULAC, but not in the WEOG. The UNGA has switched either side of the Cold War from favoring corrupt countries, to shunning them. Aside from the common role of population, involvement in an international conflict, and a norm of taking turns, our results suggest the presence of significant heterogeneity in the determinants of UNSC election across regions. Therefore, while culture and history do not seem to matter for UNSC election within regions, they may nevertheless drive differences across regions.

The data analysis does reveal a “turn-taking” norm in the regional selection process. A country whose turn arrives is more likely to receive regional nomination, which accords with the common “rotation” perception. As seems reasonable, however, the turn-taking rights that influence selection at the regional level do not seem to influence UNGA voting over contested seats.

The results of this study contribute to a number of literatures. First, it relates to the ongoing discussion of UN reform, and reform of the UNSC in particular (Franck, 2003; O'Neill, 1996; Hosli *et al.*, 2011). This debate centers on the question of representation but strangely lacks a systematic understanding of the current determinants of UNSC membership. Our findings may help to mitigate this difficulty by clarifying whom the election practices advantage. With an understanding that the two main determinants center on a tendency to choose populous countries and to respect an egalitarian norm of turn-taking, we can recast the debate as connected to a central theme in democratic theory: majoritarian principals versus minority rights.

Our analysis also relates to the wider literature on whether the selection of leaders is fair in the sense that it can be explained solely by the quality of the candidates (e.g., Hamermesh and Schmidt, 2003; Diamond and Toth, 2007). Although “quality” is not easily defined in the context of UNSC membership, we include in our analysis certain country characteristics that seem unrelated to quality, such as religion (the proportion of the population that is Muslim) and voting patterns in the UNGA (how often a country votes with the United States/Russia), and thereby provide an implicit test of the “fairness” of the election process. As we find that these factors do not have systematic effects, reformers can focus on the influences that do appear to matter and judge as to whether populous countries deserve to win election more often or if everyone should have a turn – the two patterns that the data analysis does support.

Our study further contributes to the related literature on the selection of political leaders more generally. For instance, Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) find that democracies select better educated leaders as compared to autocracies. A link between democracy and UNSC membership might therefore arise if better-educated leaders are better-able to negotiate for UNSC membership. To explore this, we consider whether democracy indeed predicts UNSC membership – we find, however, that it does not.

Finally, we offer a generic econometric model of elections where there is a nomination process at one level and an endorsement vote at another. In our case, the levels are regional and global, and the model has applicability to a wide range of selection processes including the selection of membership in other UN bodies and other international organizations.

Scholars may further employ the model to analyze the selection of leaders within federalist systems or within countries with primary rounds of voting at different district-levels.<sup>2</sup>

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the UNSC election process, and Section 3 presents various hypotheses about the determinants of election to the UNSC. In Section 4 we formally develop the econometric model, providing a likelihood equation for UNSC election, and we discuss other details of our methodology. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes with a summary discussion of the implications of our main findings.

## 2. The election process

The UNSC election process for NPMs follows certain rules and agreements.<sup>3</sup> The ten NPM seats are divided among five regional caucusing groups: one country from Eastern Europe (EE); two from the Western European and Others Group (WEOG); two from the Latin America and Caribbean Group (GRULAC – *el Grupo Latinoamericano y Caribeño*); and five from Africa and Asia.<sup>4</sup> An unwritten, but unbroken, gentlemen’s agreement divides the five seats for Africa and Asia into three seats for Africa and two seats for Asia. Around 1968, a further unrecorded agreement between Africa and Asia reserved one of their five seats for an Arab state with the regions taking turns every two years to provide a suitable candidate (Security Council Report, 2011: 7). This seat is often called the “Arab swing seat.” We control for this institutional arrangement in the empirical analysis.

The UNGA conducts staggered elections for five seats each autumn. Terms begin in January the following year.<sup>5</sup> To be eligible for election as a NPM, a country must, first, belong to one of the five caucusing groups. At present, one UN member (Kiribati) is ineligible on these grounds, and prior to 2000, when it gained temporary membership in the WEOG, so too was Israel (Security Council Report, 2011: 6). Second, NPMs in the final year of their term cannot run for immediate re-election (UN Charter 23(2)). The Permanent Members of the UNSC –

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<sup>2</sup> Recent contributions in this area with relevance to our approach include Glasgow *et al.* (forthcoming) and Golder *et al.* (forthcoming).

<sup>3</sup> Much of the background for this section can also be found on the web site of the Security Council Report, an independent non-profit organization affiliated with Columbia University: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org>. We also draw on Luck (2006).

<sup>4</sup> Before 1966, there were only six elected members of the UNSC. Composition was typically: two Latin American countries; one Middle Eastern country; one East European country; and two from the British Commonwealth countries. See Daws (1999) for an account of the development of the UN regional groups.

<sup>5</sup> The term of the single Eastern European representative begins in even years. The two representatives of the WEOG group begin their terms in odd years. The terms for the two representatives of the GRULAC are staggered; the UNGA elects one each year. The Asia group’s two seats are similarly staggered. The three seats filled by the Africa group are also staggered with two terms beginning in even years and one term beginning in odd years. The term of the Arab representative (shared between Asia and Africa) begins in even years.

China, France, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, and the United States – cannot be elected as NPMs.

Countries may declare candidacy by notifying the Chairman of their caucusing group.<sup>6</sup> Before voting begins in the UNGA, the Chairman of each group is invited to announce the countries that have declared candidacy (the Chairman's list).<sup>7</sup> Despite this apparent ease of candidacy, in practice, few countries make the Chairman's list. Although details of the negotiations at the regional level are scarce, there appears to be a preference for the choice of NPMs to be kept "in house," insofar as is possible. The vote in the UNGA is, as a result, usually sidelined by caucusing groups offering a "clean slate," whereby the Chairman announces only as many candidatures as seats available. Contested elections, when the Chairman announces more candidatures than seats available, appear to occur when efforts at agreement at the regional level have failed.<sup>8</sup>

Africa appears to have the most disciplined rules for selecting candidates.<sup>9</sup> It operates a system of turn-taking within sub-regional groups, which should, in theory, ensure that all countries in Africa eventually serve on the Security Council.<sup>10</sup> Even here, however, the situation is more complex than might first appear. According to Security Council Report (2011: 6) there are at least three complications. First, countries that can claim to straddle more than one geographic region have chosen to shift from one group to another. Second, challengers can emerge within the same sub-regional grouping, upsetting the rotation.<sup>11</sup> Last, within a subgroup, some members may choose to run more often, while others choose, or are persuaded, to run less frequently or not at all.

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<sup>6</sup> We know from the UNGA minutes that the group Chairmen stand up in sequence before the vote and announce the group candidacies. The Chairman position rotates among the region members, and terms last one month. See various issues of the *Journal of the United Nations* for details on specific elections (<http://www.un.org/en/documents/journal.asp>, accessed 5 April 2012).

<sup>7</sup> Sometimes countries announce their intention to run years in advance. Other times they do so much later, even in the midst of the elections themselves. The timing of such announcements appears idiosyncratic and data are, unfortunately, not kept.

<sup>8</sup> For the 36 election-years (1970-2005) we analyze, the WEOG is the most competitive group, with nine contested elections, and EE is the least competitive, with just five. As we detail further in footnote 18, we define an election as "contested" if an additional candidate receives ten votes or more. Using this threshold, there are a total of 35 "contested" elections out of 180 total elections, or 19 percent.

<sup>9</sup> Africa is the only region for which we have found explicit rules, codified by the African Union in their "Rules of Procedure of the Ministerial Committee on Candidatures – Doc. EX.CL/213 (VIII)." See African Union (2006: 8).

<sup>10</sup> North Africa and Central Africa rotate one seat every two years; Western Africa has one seat every two years; and Eastern Africa and Southern Africa rotate one seat every two years. See Security Council Report (2011: 6).

<sup>11</sup> According to Security Council Report (2009: 6), such queue-jumping occurred three times in the sample period: Nigeria queue-jumped Niger in 1977, and Guinea-Bissau in 1993, and Ghana queue-jumped Liberia in 1985.

To win election, a country must receive at least two-thirds of the votes in the UNGA (UN Charter 18(2)). When no candidate meets this threshold, the UNGA holds runoff elections. On rare occasions, there are many rounds, and no country can garner the required two-thirds majority; compromise candidates have emerged in these instances. In theory, members of the UNGA face no requirement to vote for “Chairman’s list” countries, though in practice, they seldom do otherwise (save for isolated protest votes). Therefore, to date, after a Chairman has announced a “clean slate,” the UNGA has always ratified the regional selection.

### **3. Hypotheses**

Who wins election to the UNSC? No published study has addressed the question of UNSC election using quantitative methods. In the next section, we offer the main contribution of our paper: a multiple-discrete choice model to examine the joint determinants of UNSC election at the regional and global levels. First, however, we draw on the broad literature in international relations and on qualitative accounts of UNSC election to develop the testable hypotheses that we apply to our statistical model.

We begin with the UN Charter, which asks members of the UNGA to elect UNSC members on the basis of their contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security. We thus propose to test the impact of the contributions that countries make to UN peacekeeping missions, measured as the log of the number of troops supplied. We also include indicator variables of whether a country is involved in an international military dispute or a civil war. We further test for an effect of democracy, which is linked to the idea of peace in the sense that it is associated with a commitment to openness and the principles of justice.<sup>12</sup>

Two further hypotheses reflect ideas coming from the political economy literature. A growing literature shows that countries receive perks from UNSC membership, including US foreign aid (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010), World Bank projects (Dreher *et al.*, 2009a), and IMF loans with comparatively soft conditionality (Dreher *et al.*, 2009b, 2010). If these same perks that result from UNSC membership were also found to predict UNSC membership, this would point to the presence of development cycles whereby countries that gain election receive perks that, in turn, increase their prospects of future election. Countries outside of this cycle would, however, lose out. To test this

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<sup>12</sup> On the association of democracy with openness, see Hollyer *et al.* (2011). On the association with justice see Dowding *et al.* (2004). On the general proclivity of democracies to peace, see Russett and Oneal (2001). For a contrasting view, see Ferejohn and Rosenbluth (2008).



possibility, we consider whether the annual shares of US grants and US loans, IMF program participation, and the number of new World Bank projects, predict election to the UNSC.<sup>13</sup>

If countries expect perks from membership on the UNSC, then perhaps more heavily indebted governments push harder to be elected. Or causality may run the other way: perhaps when governments anticipate that they will be elected to the UNSC, they allow their countries to go deeper into debt, anticipating a bail-out on the horizon. Either way, levels of indebtedness may predict UNSC membership. We test this hypothesis using the log of debt service as a percentage of gross national income.

If UNSC membership is valuable, heavily indebted countries may well desire membership, but they may not be in a strong position to win. Stiff competition for UNSC seats may lead the most powerful countries to win election most often. Having worked with the Canadian government in their successful 1998 election bid, Malone (2000) notes the importance of campaign funds. Canada, for example, apparently spent \$1.3 million. Scharioth (2010) argues that “realist” variables measuring a country’s power predict election to a wide range of UN committees, at least for the WEOG. To test the impact of a country’s strength, we consider three measures: population size (logged), per capita income (logged, measured in constant US\$), and territorial size (logged).<sup>14</sup>

A government’s connections to powerful countries might also affect its country’s election prospects. We measure international connections in four ways. First, we include two variables to capture how frequently each country votes in the UNGA with the United States and USSR/Russia, respectively. Second, we include an indicator for countries with “pariah” status in the eyes of one or more of the major powers, and hence subject to US and/or UN sanctions, as defined by Morgan et al. (2006). Third, we test whether membership of various political groupings that operate within the UN – the Group of 77 (G77), Non-Aligned

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<sup>13</sup> IMF programs themselves come in cycles (Conway, 2007). Omitting participation in IMF programs might thus bias our results in favor of finding a turn-taking norm. A substantial literature argues that IMF and World Bank loans might be given for political-economic reasons rather than need (e.g., Copelovitch, 2009; Fleck and Kilby, 2006; Kaja and Werker, 2010; Kilby, 2009, forthcoming; Reynaud and Vauday, 2009; Stone, 2002, 2004). As for bilateral foreign aid, we limit our attention to the US role for two reasons: (1) its prominent place – both in quantitative magnitude and in the literature, (2) parsimony. If we include foreign aid from all potential countries, degrees of freedom become low in certain regions. Preliminary analyses of foreign aid patterns from other OECD countries did not reveal any statistically significant correlation with UNSC election. We suggest that more in depth analyses – for example Japan’s use of foreign aid to win favor – be explored in country- or region-specific studies.

<sup>14</sup> We use estimates of GNI/capita, as opposed to the more common GDP/capita, as it is the measure of income used by the UN in the computation of member state contributions to the General and Peacekeeping budgets. We also follow the UN’s methodology in using US\$ exchange rate estimates of GNI. These, we argue, are more appropriate than PPP estimates in this context, as what is more relevant is international, rather than domestic, purchasing power.

Movement (NAM), Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and JUSCANZ (a subset of the WEOG including Japan, United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) – predicts UNSC election.<sup>15</sup> Last, membership in other non-UN groupings may also be important, so we allow for an effect of membership of the European Union (EU) and NATO.

Cultural affinity may also matter. Variables we use to test the influence of culture include the percentage of the country that is Muslim or, alternatively, Catholic. We also test if a history of British or French colonization plays a role. Beyond religious and historical affinities, we test the importance of political affinity within the region, measuring the percentage of the region with which the chief executive shares the same broad political ideology (either left, center, right, or non-ideological). We also consider another variable that may be related to culture: the level of corruption associated with a country. On the one hand, perceived corruption may hurt if regions and the UNGA disdain such countries. On the other, corruption may help if such countries willingly disregard norms of turn-taking, jumping the queue while paying whatever bribes necessary to win support.

Finally, behavioral norms that have evolved within the decision-making process may also play a role. One such norm, which is widely observed in human evolution, as well as in a wide range of other species, is that of turn-taking (Colman and Browning, 2009; Franz *et al.*, 2011). In the context of the UNSC election process, the turn-taking norm implies that membership on the UNSC should rotate among the members of each caucusing group. This turn-taking norm relates to the egalitarian norm, which features importantly in the literature on distributive justice (e.g., Rawls, 1971; Deutsch, 1985), and is consistent with recent models of inequity-aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000).

The Africa group explicitly claims to operate according to the turn-taking norm, but whether some degree of turn-taking occurs among the remaining regions is less clear. To test the possibility that a region practices the turn-taking norm, we construct a variable, “turn-taking,” which is calculated as the number of years a country has waited to serve on the UNSC divided by the number of countries currently eligible for election.<sup>16</sup> If the turn-taking norm holds, this variable should be positively correlated with election.

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<sup>15</sup> Because of substantial overlap in membership between G77 and NAM, indicator variables for membership of each cannot be included in the same regression equation. Instead we create three separate indicator variables: one for countries that are members of both groupings, and one for countries that are members only of NAM or only of G77, respectively.

<sup>16</sup> Using the empirical model, which we present in the next section, we tested several possible measures of a turn-taking norm against a benchmark of perfect turn-taking. In a given year, let  $t_i$  denote the number of years

Thus, we consider five broad perspectives: (i) a commitment to peace, (ii) a foreign aid story, (iii) a realist international relations perspective, (iv) a cultural approach, and (v) a turn-taking norm. Table 2 summarizes our hypotheses and the variables we use to test them along with their sources.

## 4. Econometric Model and Methodology

### 4.1 Preliminaries

Let the set of members of the UNGA in year  $t$  be decomposed into the set of member countries with permanent member status ( $PM$ ) and the set of all other “ordinary” member countries. Let  $J = \{AF, AS, EE, GRULAC, WEOG\}$  be the set of caucusing groups (regions), and let the set of ordinary member countries belonging to region  $j$  in year  $t$  be denoted  $R_{jt}$ , where  $t \in \{0, \dots, T\}$ . Let  $R_j = \cup_t R_{jt}$  denote the set of all past and present members of caucusing group  $j$ , and let  $C_{ij}$  be the  $i^{\text{th}}$  country within  $R_j$ . The set of ordinary member countries belonging to a caucusing group in year  $t$  (a necessary condition to serve as a NPM in year  $t + 1$ ) is therefore  $R_t = \cup_j R_{jt}$ .

Let  $NPM_t$  denote the set of NPMs on the UNSC in year  $t$ , then the UNSC in a given year,  $t$ , is defined by

$$UNSC_t = NPM_t \cup PM.$$

It is helpful to partition  $R_t$  to reflect different categories of eligibility. In any given year a set of ordinary member countries – NPMs in the first year of their terms – gain automatic membership of the UNSC in the following year ( $A_t$ ):

$$A_t = NPM_t / NPM_{t-1}.$$

A second set of ordinary member countries, those that are in the final year of their term on the UNSC, are ineligible for election to the UNSC in the following year ( $I_t$ ):

$$I_t = NPM_t \cap NPM_{t-1}.$$

The remaining ordinary member countries are eligible for election to the UNSC in the following year ( $E_t$ ):

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since  $C_{ij}$  was last elected to the UNSC (or since it entered the UN, if no such instance),  $\bar{t}$  denote the mean of  $t_i$  and  $\eta$  denote the number of countries, excluding  $C_{ij}$ , eligible for election. The measures we considered were: (1)  $t_i$ ; (2)  $t_i / \eta$ ; (3)  $t_i - \eta$ ; (4)  $\mathbf{1}_{\{t_i > \bar{t}\}}$ ; and (5)  $(t_i - \bar{t})\mathbf{1}_{\{t_i > \bar{t}\}}$ , where  $\mathbf{1}_{\{A\}}$  is the function taking the value 1 if condition  $A$  is true and 0 otherwise. We found the second of these measures to be best suited for capturing turn-taking effects.

$$E_t = R_t / NPM_t.$$

Each of the sets  $\{A_t, E_t, I_t, NPM_t\}$  can, in turn, be partitioned by region to give the sets  $\{A_{jt}, E_{jt}, I_{jt}, NPM_{jt}\}$ . Last, the historical data on non-permanent membership of the UNSC is summarized by the indicator variable  $d_{ijt}$ , where:<sup>17</sup>

$$d_{ijt} = \begin{cases} 0 & C_{ij} \notin NPM_t; \\ 1 & C_{ij} \in NPM_t. \end{cases}$$

## 4.2 Preferences

Denote the utility to the members of region  $j$  from electing country  $i$  in period  $t$  to the UNSC (to serve in periods  $t + 1$  and  $t + 2$ ) as  $u_{ijt} = \beta_j \mathbf{x}_{ijt}$ , where  $\mathbf{x}_{ijt}$  contains the characteristics of  $C_{ij}$  in year  $t$  and  $\beta_j$  contains the preference weights of region  $j$ . Similarly, denote by  $u_{it}^{GA} = \beta^{GA} \mathbf{x}_{ijt}$  the utility to the members of the UNGA of electing country  $i$  in period  $t$ .

Election to the UNSC can be conceived as a two-stage process. In the first stage, the regional groups make nominations, resulting in the Chairman of each region announcing to the UNGA a set of candidate countries  $N_{jt} \subseteq E_{jt}$  for election to the UNSC. In the second stage, the UNGA votes. As discussed in Section 2, because members of the UNGA almost always choose to vote for members of  $N_{jt}$ , the vote in the second-stage can be viewed as taking place over these countries only.

One approach to estimation is to model this two-stage process explicitly. The resulting likelihood function is complex, however, and often fails to converge in estimations that include more than a few variables. We therefore employ a simpler representation that builds directly on the observation that election to the UNSC involves the interplay of two separate sets of preferences: those of the caucusing group (which shape the nominations) and those of the UNGA (which votes over nominated candidates). We therefore model UNSC election as arising from a composite latent utility function,  $U$ , of electing  $C_{ij}$  at time  $t$ , given by

$$U_{ijt} = \alpha_{jt} u_{it}^{GA} + (1 - \alpha_{jt}) u_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}, \quad (1)$$

which is a weighted average of the underlying regional and UNGA preferences, plus a stochastic component  $\varepsilon_{ijt}$ . The parameter  $\alpha_{jt} \in [0,1]$  measures the weight attributable to the preferences of the UNGA, and may vary by region and year. In particular, we relate  $\alpha_{jt}$  to the size of  $N_{jt}$ . If  $|N_{jt}|$  equals the number of eligible seats,  $n_{jt}$ , the UNGA merely “rubber stamps”

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<sup>17</sup> UNSC membership data are found on its official Web site (<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc>).

the clean slate of nominations from the caucusing group, and its preferences play no role ( $\alpha_{jt} = 0$ ). At the other end of the spectrum, if  $|N_{jt}| = |E_{jt}|$  (every eligible member of a region is nominated to the UNGA), then the regional preferences play no direct role, thus  $\alpha_{jt} = 1$ . We assume that  $\alpha_{jt}$  adjusts linearly between these two extremes, such that:<sup>18</sup>

$$\alpha_{jt} = \frac{|N_{jt}| - n_{jt}}{|E_{jt}| - n_{jt}}.$$

### 4.3 Election Probabilities

We view the elections to the UNSC as choosing, for each region,  $n_{jt} \in \{0,1,2\}$  countries from the set of eligible countries according to the utility function  $U_{ijt}$ , where  $n_{jt} = |NPM_{jt}| - |A_{jt}|$ . This setting extends the well-known choice model of McFadden (1973) in two important respects. First, the set of alternatives is time varying. This occurs because (i) countries move between the sets  $(A_{jt}, E_{jt}, I_{jt})$  from year-to-year as a result of the realizations of  $d_{ijt}$ ; and (ii) entry and exit from  $R_t$ , principally as new members join the UN and others leave.<sup>19</sup> Second, the number of members to be chosen from  $E_{jt}$  is also time-variant, and need not be unity.

The tractability of McFadden's model is lost when, as in the UNSC, more than a single alternative is chosen simultaneously. To retain tractability, we therefore model election by the UNGA as a sequential process, in which countries are elected one-by-one. This methodology develops that of Manski and Sherman (1980), who use a multiple-discrete choice model to examine household car purchases. Whereas a family may buy two of the same car, however, a country cannot have dual membership of the UNSC in any year, so we must explicitly rule out this possibility. Formally, in each of  $n_{jt}$  rounds, there is a new realization of  $\varepsilon$  and a single country from  $E_{jt}$  is elected according to utility maximization ( $d_{ij} = 1 \Leftrightarrow U_{ij} > U_{kj} \forall k \neq i$ ). In the case when  $n_{jt} = 2$ , if the same country is elected in both rounds, the result is annulled and the whole process repeated until two distinct countries are selected.

If we assume, following Manski and Sherman (1980), that the  $\varepsilon_{ijt}$  in equation (1) are

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<sup>18</sup> We compute  $\alpha_{jt}$  using Costa Rica (2005), which contains full UNGA voting records for all UNSC elections prior to 2004. Voting records for 2004 onwards are taken directly from the relevant UNGA minutes. Costa Rica (2005) does not explicitly identify the "Chairman's list" countries. In the overwhelming majority of elections the patterns of voting in the UNGA clearly identify the "Chairman's list" countries (who garner large numbers of votes) from countries who are merely recipients of votes cast in protest or error (who garner only one or two votes). In a small number of cases the voting patterns identify the "Chairman's list" countries less clearly, as a country garners an intermediate number of votes between five and fifteen. In these cases we identify the set of "Chairman's list" countries as those that received ten or more votes. Our main results are, however, robust to any choice of threshold between three and twenty votes.

<sup>19</sup> In the sample period 69 countries joined the UN, and five (Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Yemen Arab Republic, West Germany and Yugoslavia) left. Table 1 provides further details.

independent across regions and time and have identical type-1 extreme value distributions, we then have that:<sup>20</sup>

$$\Pr(d_{ij,t+1} = 1 | C_{ij} \in A_{jt}) = 1; \quad (2)$$

$$\Pr(d_{ij,t+1} = 1 | C_{ij} \in I_{jt}) = 0; \quad (3)$$

$$p_{ijt}^0 \equiv \Pr(d_{ij,t+1} = 1 | C_{ij} \in E_{jt}, n_{jt} = 0) = 0; \quad (4)$$

$$p_{ijt}^1 \equiv \Pr(d_{ij,t+1} = 1 | C_{ij} \in E_{jt}, n_{jt} = 1) = \frac{\exp(\alpha_{jt} u_{it}^{GA} + (1 - \alpha_{jt}) u_{ijt})}{\sum_{k \in E_{jt}} \exp(\alpha_{jt} u_{kt}^{GA} + (1 - \alpha_{jt}) u_{kjt})}; \quad (5)$$

$$p_{ijt}^2 \equiv \Pr(d_{ij,t+1} = 1 | C_{ij} \in E_{jt}, n_{jt} = 2) = \frac{2p_{ijt}^1(1 - p_{ijt}^1)}{1 - \sum_{k \in E_{jt}} (p_{kjt}^1)^2}. \quad (6)$$

When only one seat is contested in a region, the distributional assumptions on  $\varepsilon_{ijt}$  imply that the probability in equation (5) of a single country being elected to the UNSC from  $E_{jt}$  follows the conditional logit form.<sup>21</sup> We then use  $p_{ijt}^1$  to form equation (6) as the binomial probability of observing a distinct country pair containing  $C_{ij}$ , where the denominator corrects for the impossibility of a single country obtaining dual membership. Note that, by construction,  $\sum_{k \in E_{jt}} p_{kjt}^{n_{jt}} = n_{jt}$ . Equations (2)-(4) require no further explanation.

Using equations (1)-(6) the likelihood of having observed a given  $NPM_{jt}$  is therefore

$$L_{jt}^{n_{jt}} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } n_{jt} = 0; \\ p_{ijt}^1 & \text{if } n_{jt} = 1; \\ \frac{2 \prod_{k \in NPM_{jt}} p_{kjt}^1}{1 - \sum_{k \in E_{jt}} (p_{kjt}^1)^2} & \text{if } n_{jt} = 2; \end{cases}$$

<sup>20</sup> Elections are not independent across time, however. Each year's election depends on the outcome of the previous year's election in a recursive manner, owing to the evolution of  $E_{jt}$ .

<sup>21</sup> Although these distributional assumptions are strong, we note their necessity for retaining the conditional logit form. Also, when estimating the final likelihood in equation (7), we can allow for the possibility of within-group clustering. Because we model the probability of choosing  $C_{ij}$  in year  $t$  as conditional on the number of eligible countries in year  $t$ , our model, like the original conditional logit, implicitly addresses fixed effects for year. For an approach that relaxes our distributional assumptions at some conceptual and computational cost see Hendel (1999).

where  $L_{jt}^2$  uses the relevant multinomial distribution to compute the joint probability of having observed a given country pair. The likelihood function for having observed  $\{NPM_t: t \in \{1, \dots, T\}\}$  is then

$$\log L = \sum_{j \in J} \sum_{t=1}^T \log L_{jt}^{n_{jt}}. \quad (7)$$

#### **4.4 Imputation**

The Appendix summarizes the descriptive statistics of our data. While each individual variable is well-populated, when taken together as a group, a significant number of country-years have observations missing for at least one variable (2,396 of 5,342). Dropping incomplete country-years is problematic for both theoretical and practical reasons. From a theoretical perspective, as the probability of election in equations (5,6) are functions of the characteristics of every member of the eligible set, artificially excluding a country-year biases the estimates for the remaining countries in that year. From a practical perspective, the sample size becomes unduly small for some regions, thereby leading to a failure of model convergence.

We therefore employ multiple imputation techniques (ten imputations).<sup>22</sup> Of the variables that contain missing values, those that are continuous are each imputed using a truncated regression (to reflect, e.g., non-negativity constraints) that includes as independent variables all those that are fully observed. IMF program participation (the only binary variable to have missing observations) is similarly imputed, but with a logistic regression. In the large majority of cases we need only impute at most one observation per country-year, so only a small proportion (around 6 percent) of the data points that enter the regression analysis are imputed.

#### **4.5 Preference change**

Preferences, both regional and global, may change over time. In particular, Kim and Russett (1996) present evidence of a shift in preferences around the end of the Cold War: voting patterns in the UNGA shifted from an East-West orientation towards a North-South orientation.<sup>23</sup> Accordingly, we consider two distinct time periods – during and after the Cold War. We report separate estimates for these two periods for variables where the effects for

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<sup>22</sup> The variables that contain missing values are: United States/Russia voting in the UNGA; regional share of US loans/grants; debt service; shared regional ideology; control of corruption; and IMF program participation.

<sup>23</sup> Although Voeten's (2000) analysis suggests much subtler changes between the two periods.

each period differ. Specifically, we split each variable into two, recoding one of them as 0 for all observations in the post-Cold War period and recoding the other as 0 for all observations during the Cold War. We keep only those “split” variables where the different effects for the Cold War and post-Cold War periods are statistically significant at the five percent level.

#### ***4.6 Country-specific effects***

We would like to control for country-specific effects, as outlying countries that exhibit an idiosyncratic effect might drive some results, and obscure others. A complication is that a country-specific effect, if present at all, may exist at either the regional or global (UNGA) level, or at both levels. We therefore test separately for country-specific effects at the regional and global levels.

To allow for a regional and a global country-specific effect for each of the 190 countries (past and present) in the set  $R_j$ , a priori, requires the inclusion of 380 country indicator variables, which exhausts the degrees of freedom for certain regions in the earlier years, and prevents estimation of the model. Instead, we test for these effects. To test for a regional country-specific effect, the likelihood of a model that includes both a country indicator in the appropriate region and in the UNGA (the encompassing model) is compared to the likelihood of a model that includes a country indicator only in the UNGA (the nested model). We employ the likelihood ratio test of Meng and Rubin (1992), which allows for multiply imputed data. This test is performed for each country individually at the ten percent significance level. To further test for a global country-specific effect we repeat the above procedure, but the nested model instead excludes the country indicator in the UNGA.

It is possible, however, that the regional and global country-specific effects are individually insignificant, but jointly significant, or are individually significant, but jointly insignificant. To test for these cases, we further compare the likelihood of the encompassing model with a nested model that excludes the country indicator in both the relevant region and the UNGA.

### **5. Results**

We present two sets of results. The first set (Table 3a) comes from estimating the likelihood function in equation (7) for UNSC elections between 1970 and 2005, using the full set of controls we consider. We drop explanatory variables from groups where, in the case of continuous variables, they exhibit no within-group variance, or in the case of indicator variables, where they are active for fewer than three countries in a group, and therefore become difficult to distinguish from a country-specific effect. To match the timing of the



election process, we lag the independent variables by one year relative to UNSC membership. We report robust standard errors, adjusted for the imputed data, and clustered on region  $\times$  year, thereby allowing for within-region and within-year correlation, respectively, and heteroskedasticity. We control for the operation of the Arab swing seat by the inclusion of an indicator for Arab countries eligible for election to the seat in a given year (see Table 2).

Different model specifications arise according to whether preference shifts are tested for before or after testing for country-specific effects. We therefore perform these two tests iteratively until an “equilibrium” model is reached in which the identified preference shifts are consistent with the identified country-specific effects, and the reverse also holds.

The method described in Section 4.6 allows a regional country-specific effect for 28 countries, and a global country-specific effect for 15 countries.<sup>24</sup> We include indicator variables for these countries in the full model of Table 3a, though, for reasons of space, we do not report their effects in the Table.<sup>25</sup> Among the countries our method identifies as a possible outlier is Nigeria, an African country known to have succeeded with an overt policy of queue-jumping (Security Council Report, 2009: 6). Saudi Arabia and Panama are also identified, which is consistent with Schwartzberg (2003) and Zacher (2004), who highlight that Saudi Arabia has never served on the UNSC, or even gained a regional nomination, while Panama has been a member of UNSC unusually often – it served three terms on the UNSC in the sample period (only Brazil and Argentina served more). Last, Mexico is also identified: participation in the UNSC elections of 2001 marked the end of two decades in which it had adopted a policy of not seeking election to the UNSC (Malone, 2000: note 7).<sup>26</sup>

Table 3b presents the results from a reduced model obtained from the findings in Table 3a. We employ a general-to-specific algorithm that, at each iteration, removes the variable with the lowest t-statistic from the model, until all remaining variables are statistically significant

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<sup>24</sup> The regional country-specific effects we allow for are (by region), Africa: Benin, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa, Zimbabwe; Asia: India, Japan, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia; EE: Bulgaria; the GRULAC: Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama; the WEOG: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Greece, Spain, Switzerland. We allow for a global country-specific effect for Australia, Austria, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Madagascar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and West Germany.

<sup>25</sup> These are available in the replication materials.

<sup>26</sup> For more on the Mexican case, see, for example, Serrano and Kenny (2006: 298-314). We are grateful to Diego Dewar for this suggestion.

at the ten percent level. The reduced model retains 33 of the 43 country-specific effects allowed for in the full model.<sup>27</sup>

Before discussing the results, we stress special caution in interpreting the results for Eastern Europe and the UNGA because of the limited number of observations that they include. The EE group contains the fewest countries and the most imputed data, while only 35 out of the 180 elections in our sample are contested in the UNGA.<sup>28</sup>

Turning to the results, we hypothesize above that a country's commitment to peace should influence UNSC membership because of the explicit guidelines in the UN Charter. We find evidence to support this conjecture, albeit in somewhat different guises in each region. Clear evidence of a commitment to peace comes from the international war indicator included in Africa, Asia and the UNGA. Table 3b shows that, for Africa and Asia, involvement in an international conflict significantly reduces a country's chances of sitting on the UNSC, and that this effect is statistically significant at the one percent confidence level. The implied marginal effects of the model in Table 3a suggest, for instance, that participation in an international war reduces the probability of election by around 0.01 in Africa – during-Cold War.<sup>29</sup> This may seem small, but recall that the average election probability in Africa is only  $3/53 \approx 0.06$ . Hence, involvement in international conflict cuts this probability by around one-sixth. This effect, however, seems to have changed over time. In Africa, involvement in international war ceases to influence UNSC election after the Cold War. In Asia, we see the opposite effect: Table 3b shows that the distaste for war has developed more recently. Both sets of results indicate that the norm against choosing countries at war exists not only in the regions but also in the UNGA – throughout both time periods.

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<sup>27</sup> The regional country-specific effects retained in the reduced model are (by region), Africa: Benin, Central African Republic, Chad, Guinea, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa, Zimbabwe; Asia: India, Japan, Nepal, Philippines, Saudi Arabia; the GRULAC: Costa Rica, Panama; the WEOG: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland. It retains a global country-specific effect for Australia, Austria, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Madagascar, Nigeria, Panama, Romania, Slovakia, and West Germany. The results for these are available in the replication materials.

<sup>28</sup> The estimates for the UNGA in Tables 3a-b seem of a different order of magnitude compared to the estimates for the regional groups. This can be explained with reference to equation (1), which weights UNGA preferences by  $\alpha_{jt}$ , and group preferences by  $(1 - \alpha_{jt})$  in the composite utility function. Even for election years with non-zero values of  $\alpha_{jt}$ , its value is typically close to zero;  $E(\alpha_{jt} | \alpha_{jt} \neq 0) = 0.038$ , so the apparently large UNGA effects we estimate are offset by the very low weight UNGA preferences receive in the composite preference.

<sup>29</sup> We calculate elasticity and marginal effect estimates for 2006, the final year of our sample, using equation (5). We evaluate these using the `mi predict` command in Stata 12, at the group-specific means  $\bar{x}_{jt}$ . Different estimates apply to “clean slate” and “contested” elections. The former are evaluated at  $\alpha_{jt} = 0$ , and the latter at  $E_j(\alpha_{jt} | \alpha_{jt} \neq 0)$ . We find negligible differences between these estimates, however, so we do not report each separately. Estimates also vary according to  $n_{jt}$ : we report estimates for  $n_{jt} = 1$ , but in group-years with  $n_{jt} = 2$ , a different estimate based on equation (6) does apply in practice. Last, the estimates vary across years due to the evolution of the eligible set. We have evaluated the estimates for 2006 under different assumed eligibility conditions, and find this source of variation to be of minor proportions.

Domestic conflict also impacts a country's chances of election. Table 3b shows that in Africa, Asia, and EE, ongoing civil unrest decreases a country's chances of receiving a regional nomination. These findings continue to hold in the presence of the full set of controls in Table 3a. Interestingly, however, the UNGA does not appear to shun countries in civil war. To the contrary, during the sample period it three times elected such countries in contested elections: Nicaragua in 1982, Peru in 1983, and Rwanda in 1993. These cases help to constitute a statistically significant positive effect of civil war for the UNGA decision.

We also detect a role for peacekeeping troop contributions, although not in every region. Specifically, Table 3b shows that in Asia, the GRULAC and the WEOG, the more troops a country contributes, the more likely it is to gain UNSC membership. In Table 3b, the effect in Asia and in the WEOG is significant at the one percent level, but only at the 10 percent level in the GRULAC. A one percent increase in troop contributions produces a range of effects across regime from a 1.1 percent rise in election probability in WEOG, down to a 0.22 percent rise in the GRULAC. We find no evidence of a role for troop contributions in Africa or EE. The UNGA, if anything, also favors countries with higher troop contributions, but the effect is not statistically significant in Table 3a and is dropped from the model in Table 3b.

In the WEOG, both sets of results indicate that democratic countries were more likely to be elected in the Cold War era (all countries in the WEOG are coded as democratic in the post-Cold War era). The only authoritarian regime ever elected to represent the WEOG was Spain in 1968. The dictatorships in Portugal and Greece never won election. Since democratizing, Spain has been elected three times, and Portugal and Greece have each been elected twice.

With respect to foreign aid, we find only weak evidence that it plays a role, and not always in a consistent direction. In both sets of results, IMF program participation plays a role only in Asia, where it is negatively associated with UNSC election. The IMF has become supremely unpopular in Asia since the East Asian Financial Crisis, so Asian support may genuinely decline for governments cooperating with the institution. Alternatively, IMF program participation might indicate political or economic weakness, reducing the incentives to apply, and the probability to receive, temporary UNSC membership. New World Bank projects are positively associated with receiving a regional nomination in Africa and Asia in both sets of results. Yet this result is not robust. For example, it does not hold for either region in specifications where we do not include indicator variables for country outliers. Nor does it hold when we do not include the Pariah state variable – or if we employ an alternative coding of the pariah state variable. Moreover, Table 3b shows that countries with more newly

approved World Bank projects are actually less likely to be elected by the UNGA. This latter finding disappears in the presence of additional controls in Table 3a, however. US grants and loans play a role only in Africa (Table 3b), where both associate negatively with UNSC election.

Of interest, more heavily indebted countries are more likely to be elected in Africa and the GRULAC. As debt service contains the most imputed values of our variables, it is sensible to be cautious in interpreting these results. Indeed, the result for Africa holds only in the reduced specification (Table 3b), not in the presence of the control variables. Still, given the turn-taking norm in these regions, governments may have a good idea of when they will get their chance to serve on the UNSC, and thus pursue lax macroeconomic policies in anticipation of the windfall in foreign aid that UNSC membership brings.

Turning to the role of international power, the statistical significance of one of our measures holds across all regions: the more populous a country, the more likely it is to take a seat on the UNSC. In Table 3b the statistical significance of the effect holds at least at the five percent level in all five regional groups (although only during the post-Cold War period for EE and the GRULAC). The coefficient estimates in Table 3b imply that a one percent increase in population generates an increase in election probability of between 0.51 percent (Africa) and 3.9 percent (Asia during Cold War). The population effect weakens somewhat in the presence of additional controls in Table 3a, and disappears entirely in EE. The additional controls in Table 3a, however, do not have effects robust to the reduction algorithm we employ. Interestingly, we find no evidence that the UNGA takes population into account in its voting decisions.

In light of the significance of population, one might expect the statistical significance of a country's level of economic development. Only in Asia and the GRULAC, however, do we see a robust effect (significant at the one percent confidence level in Table 3b): richer countries in these regions are more likely to gain representation on the UNSC. Larger countries are more likely to obtain a regional nomination in Africa and the GRULAC in Table 3b, but a weak result to the reverse holds in the WEOG. The UNGA does not appear to take territorial size into account in its election decisions.

As for political connections to powerful countries, we see evidence in both sets of results for the WEOG that countries voting with the United States in the UNGA may actually be less likely to gain group nomination. A further finding for WEOG, though only in Table 3b, is

that voting with the Soviet Union/Russia is also associated with a lower probability of election. In contrast, voting with the Soviet Union/Russia is associated with a higher probability of election in Africa and the GRULAC. Interestingly, in Table 3b, voting with the Soviet Union/Russia is associated with a large positive effect in the UNGA, significant at the one percent level. The finding suggests a strong Soviet influence within the UNGA. The finding fails to hold in the presence of further controls in Table 3a.

The “Pariah state” indicator for countries subject to US and/or UN sanctions shows evidence of a change in preferences over time. During the Cold War, sanctioned countries were largely unable to obtain a regional nomination, as indicated by the strong negative findings in Africa, Asia and the GRULAC in both sets of results. Since the Cold War, however, Table 3b indicates that sanctions do not predict UNSC election. For, in this period, Cuba in 1989, Nigeria in 1993, Indonesia in 1994, Sudan in 2000, and Syria in 2001 all obtained a regional nomination. Cuba, Indonesia and Syria went on to win election in “clean slate” votes in the UNGA, Nigeria triumphed in a contested vote, and Sudan lost in a competitive vote. The success of Cuba explains the isolated positive finding for Pariah in the GRULAC post-Cold War.

We also investigate whether membership in particular political groupings influences election to the UNSC. We find evidence that such membership matters in some regions and in the UNGA, although the effects go in different directions. In Table 3b, we see that membership in the G77 – but not in the NAM – has a negative effect in Asia, but a positive effect in the GRULAC. In the GRULAC dual membership in NAM and G77 also positively predicts regional nomination in Table 3b. Such dual membership is negatively associated, however, with the probability of winning a contested vote in the UNGA. Sole membership in NAM (and not in the G77) is included only in the UNGA and is coded 1 for only five countries – Belarus, Cyprus, Malta, Tanzania and Yemen. The large negative effect of this variable in the UNGA (post-Cold War) appears to be an artifact of the data: Only Belarus was involved in competitive elections in this period, losing first in 1993, and again in 2001. No statistically significant effects from OIC membership are found in Table 3a, and it is, unsurprisingly, dropped from the model in Table 3b. Membership in JUSCANZ is unrelated to the regional nomination process in the WEOG in Table 3b, but does appear to positively influence the UNGA. As for groupings external to the UN, EU membership appears to raise a country’s probability of receiving a regional nomination, both for those EU members in EE, and for those in the WEOG. NATO membership, however, has no effect on regional nomination

probability for members of the WEOG, but a pronounced negative effect for members of EE. The UNGA, however, shows no preference for membership in these groupings.

Do cultural traits of a country influence its election prospects? In both sets of results we find evidence that countries with a history of British colonialism experience a greater probability of election in Asia and the GRULAC, but the effect does not hold for Africa, the WEOG, or the UNGA. We test for an effect of French colonial heritage in Africa and the UNGA. We find no statistically significant result for Africa. For the UNGA, we detect a marginally significant positive effect for the Cold War period, when former French colonies may have had an advantage in UNGA elections. Yet, we find a strong negative effect of French colonialism for the UNGA during the post-Cold War period (in both sets of results): no former French colony has triumphed in a competitive election since the end of the Cold War.<sup>30</sup> A common political ideology is seen in Table 3b to be associated with an increased probability of election for EE and GRULAC. The finding survives the presence of further controls for the GRULAC but not for EE. We find no evidence of an effect of shared political ideology for the UNGA, which contrasts with Potrafke's (2009) finding that government ideology affects a country's UNGA voting behavior.

We also consider religion, in particular the proportion of the country's population that is Muslim or, alternatively, Catholic. There are three findings regarding Muslim countries. The first, present in both sets of results, is that in the GRULAC Muslim countries are less likely to be elected to the UNSC in the post-Cold War era. Note that this finding may just be an artifact of the data, however, and not evidence of a real bias against Muslim countries in the GRULAC region. After all, there are only three countries coded as having a significant Muslim population (Suriname: 19.6 percent, Guyana 9.0 percent, and Trinidad and Tobago 5.9 percent). Both Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago served on the UNSC during the Cold-War era, but none have served in the post-Cold War era.

The second finding, present only in Table 3a and robust to reduction, is that in the WEOG Muslim countries are less likely to be elected to the UNSC. Here the effect appears driven by one country, Turkey, which never won election to the UNSC during the sample period, but served three earlier terms representing Asia and one subsequent term representing the WEOG. The final finding, present only in Table 3b, is that Muslim countries are less likely to

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<sup>30</sup> Given that UNSC membership is consequential for foreign aid, membership is a transmission channel by which colonial history can affect current development. See Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009), Iyer (2010) and Bruhn and Gallego (2012) for recent analyses.

be selected to represent EE. Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia are the only countries in EE coded as having a significant Muslim population; none of them have ever won election to the UNSC. As for the Catholic variable, a higher proportion of Catholics among the population is associated with a lower probability of election in Asia – but no other region (the finding holds in both Tables 3a and 3b).

The regions appear to have heterogeneous preferences over corruption. In Table 3b we find no role for corruption in Africa, Asia, or EE. In the GRULAC, however, corruption pays: we find a negative effect on a country's chances of becoming a UNSC member (significant at the ten percent level in Table 3b). On the other hand, corruption does not pay in the WEOG, where control of corruption is positively associated with UNSC election in Table 3b. The relationship of the UNGA with corrupt countries appears to have changed over time. During the Cold War, the UNGA appears to have been susceptible to choosing corrupt countries: control of corruption associates negatively with UNSC election by the UNGA. In the post-Cold War period, however, Table 3b indicates that the UNGA has tended to shun more corrupt countries.

Finally, we find widespread evidence of the operation of a turn-taking norm – not only in Africa: the longer a country has been waiting to appear on the Council the higher the probability of receiving the endorsement of the regional caucus. Table 3a shows the importance of the effect at the five percent significance level or stronger in the presence of our control variables and Table 3b shows the significance level strengthens to the one percent confidence level in the reduced model. The estimates in Table 3b imply a range of substantive effects across regions: a one percent increase in waiting time increases election probability by 8.2 percent in Asia and 6.1 percent in the WEOG (post-Cold War), down to an increase of just 1.6 percent in EE. The common misperception that membership on the UNSC rotates therefore finds some support in the electoral patterns at the regional level. As might be expected, the UNGA does not appear influenced by the turn-taking rights that apply within the regions.

## **6. Conclusion**

The Security Council is the preeminent organ of the United Nations. Membership confers significant international influence and also economic benefits. We set out to consider the characteristics of countries toward which the UNSC election process diverts these economic

benefits towards. To that end, we considered five different perspectives as to the determinants of election to the UNSC.

As candidature decisions at the regional level follow no codified rules (with the exception of Africa), and governments keep their negotiations behind closed doors, many factors likely remain unobserved. It is thus appropriate to treat our results with caution. Nevertheless, if election to the UNSC were entirely random, we would not expect the types of systematic relationships we report in Section 5.

Our results suggest that the regional nomination process tends to allocate membership, and its associated economic benefits, according to a compromise between a norm to elect more populous countries and a norm for each country to receive a turn. Mediating this central compromise are a norm against nominating countries involved in civil or international war (as prescribed by the UN Charter) and norm in favor of countries that contribute more personnel to UN peacekeeping missions (in Africa, Asia, and the WEOG). During the Cold War, the regions of Africa, Asia, and the GRULAC may have followed a norm against nominating pariah countries whose presence on the UNSC would have upset one or more of the permanent members. If so, the norm seems to have weakened or disappeared in the post-Cold War era.

The UNGA has the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the UNSC election process rather infrequently. When it has a say, it reinforces the regional nomination norms of directing membership away from countries involved in international conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, the UNGA has also systematically directed membership away from countries perceived as having high levels of corruption. In contrast to the regional groups, however, the UNGA decisions do not appear influenced by regional turn-taking norms or by the size of a country's population.

Perhaps surprisingly, after controlling for other influences, we find little evidence that the level of economic development influences election probability. There is also a lack of consistent evidence for a role of foreign aid, and only occasional evidence for cultural influences.

These findings speak to a number of literatures. For instance, our findings that the GRULAC tends to select countries that fail to control corruption, while the UNGA has shifted away from electing such countries, informs the debate over whether corrupt governments receive more or less foreign aid (e.g., Alesina and Weder, 2002). Our finding that countries involved



in civil or international conflict sacrifice foreign aid through fewer appearances on the UNSC suggests an additional cost of conflict that is yet to be considered in the literature that seeks to measure such costs (e.g., Bozzoli *et al.*, 2011). Last, our finding that preferences over election to the UNSC exhibit heterogeneity across regions may prove useful, as a case study, to scholars interested in the evolution of norms (e.g., Binmore and Samuelson, 1994; Bendor, 2001). Because Security Council participation is consequential for different types of foreign aid, a heterogeneous election process implies that UNSC membership may serve as an instrument that such scholars can use as a measure of international political importance. UNSC membership should prove most useful if population size and the turn-taking norm are exogenous to the outcome variable of interest.<sup>31</sup>

As no published empirical analysis of the determinants of UNSC election currently exists, we note that our study represents a first step and offer the following suggestions for future research. As an extension to our analysis, researchers may seek to augment country-level data with personal-level data on UN Ambassadors. Malone (2000), citing Dutch officials, notes that up to a quarter of UN representatives vote without instructions from their capitals. The personal characteristics and interactions of the individuals on the New York scene may therefore play a role in some elections. While we suspect that this avenue of research would prove fruitful, we note that it would involve intensive and detailed data collection.

As for reform of the UNSC, we propose considering what currently determines representation: Election depends partly on a random draw of idiosyncratic factors, partly on how populous a country is, and partly on a norm of giving everyone a turn. Those who feel that big, powerful countries should serve on the UNSC more often – perhaps because they play a crucial role in global politics – should try to undermine the regional nomination process and push for more contested elections at the UNGA level. After all, we find no evidence of a turn-taking norm when the UNGA decides contested elections. Allowing for reelection, for example, would enable big countries to run for election more often.

Other reformers, who may feel that every country should have its turn on the world stage, should favor endowing the regional groups with the power to elect their own representatives. For, all of the regions follow the turn-taking norm to some extent. Alternatively, one could

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<sup>31</sup> We stress here that turn-taking is likely an exogenous source of variation that scholars can use, and it has a statistically significant effect for the 81 percent of the sample, where regions make the decision. Turn-taking, however, does not hold for the UNGA, so scholars may wish to flag the contested elections (19 percent of the sample) as factors such as corruption, international war, and voting with the Soviet Union/Russia appear to play a role. See, for example, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) and Dreher *et al.* (forthcoming) for recent studies using UNSC membership as an instrument.

ensure turn-taking if election relied on an actual rotation across all UN members. We suspect that interests on both sides – in favor of large countries and in favor of taking turns – counterbalance each other so that the status quo is likely to prevail.

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**Table 1: UNSC Membership (terms held between 1971- 2006)**

Africa		Asia		EE		GRULAC		WEOG	
Algeria	2	Japan	7	Romania	3	Argentina	5	Italy	4
Benin	2	India	4	Bulgaria	2	Brazil	4	Canada	3
Cameroon	2	Pakistan	4	Poland	2	Panama	3	Spain	3
Congo	2	Bangladesh	2	Ukraine <sup>6</sup>	2	Peru	3	Australia	2
Democratic Rep. of the Congo	2	Indonesia	2	Yugoslavia <sup>4</sup>	2	Venezuela	3	Austria	2
Egypt	2	Malaysia	2	Belarus <sup>6</sup>	1	Chile	2	Belgium	2
Gabon	2	Philippines	2	Czechoslovakia <sup>3</sup>	1	Colombia	2	Denmark	2
Ghana	2	Bahrain	1	Czech Republic <sup>3</sup>	1	Costa Rica	2	Germany <sup>5</sup>	2
Guinea	2	Iraq	1	East Germany <sup>5</sup>	1	Guyana	2	Ireland	2
Kenya	2	Jordan	1	Hungary	1	Jamaica	2	Netherlands	2
Mauritius	2	Kuwait	1	Slovakia <sup>3</sup>	1	Mexico	2	Norway	2
Nigeria	2	Nepal	1	Slovenia <sup>4</sup>	1	Bolivia	1	Portugal	2
Tunisia	2	Oman	1	Albania	0	Cuba	1	Sweden	2
United Rep. of Tanzania	2	Qatar	1	Armenia	0	Ecuador	1	West Germany <sup>5</sup>	2
Zambia	2	Rep. of Korea	1	Azerbaijan	0	Honduras	1	Finland	1
Zimbabwe	2	Singapore	1	Bosnia & Herzegovina <sup>4</sup>	0	Nicaragua	1	Greece	1
Angola	1	Syrian Arab Rep.	1	Croatia <sup>4</sup>	0	Trinidad & Tobago	1	Malta	1
Botswana	1	Thailand	1	Estonia	0	Antigua & Barbuda	0	New Zealand	1
Burkina Faso	1	United Arab Emirates	1	Georgia	0	Barbados	0	Andorra	0
Cape Verde	1	Yemen <sup>1</sup>	1	Latvia	0	Bahamas	0	Iceland	0
Cote d'Ivoire	1	Afghanistan	0	Lithuania	0	Belize	0	Israel <sup>7</sup>	0
Djibouti	1	Bhutan	0	Rep. of Moldova	0	Dominica	0	Liechtenstein	0
Ethiopia <sup>2</sup>	1	Brunei	0	Serbia & Montenegro <sup>4</sup>	0	Dominican Rep.	0	Luxembourg	0
Gambia	1	Cambodia	0	TFYR Macedonia <sup>4</sup>	0	El Salvador	0	Monaco	0
Guinea-Bissau	1	Cyprus	0			Grenada	0	San Marino	0
Libya	1	DPR Korea	0			Guatemala	0	Switzerland	0
Mali	1	Fiji	0			Haiti	0	Turkey	0
Madagascar	1	Iran	0			Paraguay	0		
Mauritania	1	Kazakhstan	0			St Lucia	0		
Morocco	1	Kyrgyzstan	0			St Vincent & the Grenadines	0		
Namibia	1	Laos	0			St Kitts & Nevis	0		
Niger	1	Lebanon	0			Suriname	0		
Rwanda	1	Marshall Islands	0			Uruguay	0		
Senegal	1	Maldives	0						
Somalia	1	Micronesia	0						
Sudan	1	Mongolia	0						
Togo	1	Myanmar	0						
Uganda	1	Nauru	0						
Burundi	0	Palau	0						
Central African Rep.	0	Papua New Guinea	0						
Chad	0	Saudi Arabia	0						
Comoros	0	Samoa	0						
Equatorial Guinea	0	Solomon Islands	0						
Eritrea <sup>2</sup>	0	Sri Lanka	0						
Lesotho	0	Tajikistan	0						
Liberia	0	Timor L'este	0						
Malawi	0	Tonga	0						
Mozambique	0	Tuvalu	0						
Sao Tome & Principe	0	Turkmenistan	0						
Seychelles	0	Uzbekistan	0						
Sierra Leone	0	Vanuatu	0						
South Africa	0	Vietnam	0						
Swaziland	0	Yemen Arab Rep. <sup>1</sup>	0						

<sup>1</sup> Yemen and Yemen Arab Republic were both members of the UN until 1990 when they united, represented on the UN by the single member Yemen.

<sup>2</sup> Eritrea was part of Ethiopia until around 1991. Eritrea officially joined the UN as a separate member in 1993 and Ethiopia retained its membership of the UNGA.

<sup>3</sup> Czechoslovakia dissolved in 1992. The Czech Republic and Slovakia subsequently joined as separate members in 1993.

<sup>4</sup> Yugoslavia dissolved in 1992, being replaced by separate membership for Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, TFYR Macedonia and Serbia & Montenegro.

<sup>5</sup> East Germany was a UNGA member in the EE group and West Germany a member in the WEOG. Effective from 1990 they were represented as a single member in the WEOG.

<sup>6</sup> Although only gaining full independence in 1991, Ukraine and Belarus were founding members of the UN, having separate membership from the USSR. According to Noguee (2004), this arrangement was agreed between the UK, USA and USSR at the Yalta Convention in 1945, so as to give the USSR three votes in the UNGA.

<sup>7</sup> Israel joined the UN in 1949 but only became a temporary member of the WEOG, and thus eligible for election to the UNSC, in 2000.

**Table 2: Potential determinants of UNSC election***Do governments practice a turn-taking norm, rotating membership through eligible candidates?*

Turn-taking norm	Number of years since most recently becoming eligible for election to the UNSC divided by number of other countries eligible (author calculations).
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*Does foreign aid determine election?*

IMF program participation	Indicator coded 1 if a country participated in an IMF program during any part of the year, 0 otherwise (Vreeland, 2007).
New World Bank projects	Number of new World Bank projects starting during the year (Dreher <i>et al.</i> , 2009a).
Regional share of US loans	Annual share of (gross) US loans going to the country (OECD, 2006).
Regional share of US grants	Annual share of US grants going to the country (OECD, 2006).
Debt service	Debt service as a percentage of gross national income (World Bank).

*Is election driven by international power or relationships with powerful countries?*

Population (log)	Log of population (UN Statistics Division).
GNI per capita (log)	Log of real GNI per capita in \$US (UN Statistics Division).
Territory (log)	Log of territorial size in square kilometers (CIA Factbook).
Pariah state	Indicator coded 1 if a country is subject to UN/US sanctions (Morgan <i>et al.</i> , 2006).
US voting in UNGA	Voting in line with the United States at the UNGA – % all votes the same; abstain = 0.5 (Voeten and Merdzanovic, 2008; coded as in Dreher and Sturm, 2012).
USSR/Russia voting in UNGA	Voting in line with the Soviet Union/Russia at the UNGA – % all votes the same; abstain = 0.5 (Voeten and Merdzanovic, 2008; coded as in Dreher and Sturm, 2012).
OIC	Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of OIC, 0 otherwise ( <a href="http://www.oic-oci.org/">http://www.oic-oci.org/</a> ).
JUSCANZ	Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of JUSCANZ, 0 otherwise ( <a href="http://www.eyeontheun.org/view.asp?p=55&amp;l=11">http://www.eyeontheun.org/view.asp?p=55&amp;l=11</a> ).
G77 only	Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of the G77 and not a member of NAM, 0 otherwise ( <a href="http://www.g77.org/">http://www.g77.org/</a> ).
NAM only	Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of NAM and not a member of the G77, 0 otherwise ( <a href="http://www.nam.gov.za/">http://www.nam.gov.za/</a> ).
G77 and NAM	Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of the G77 and NAM, 0 otherwise.
EU	Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of EU, 0 otherwise ( <a href="http://www.europa.eu/">http://www.europa.eu/</a> ).
NATO	Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of NATO, 0 otherwise ( <a href="http://www.nato.int/">http://www.nato.int/</a> ).

*Do governments follow a norm of choosing countries committed to peace?*

Civil war	Indicator coded 1 if a country is engaged in a civil war, 0 otherwise (Fearon <i>et al.</i> , 2007).
International war	Indicator coded 1 if a country is engaged in an international war, 0 otherwise (Ghosn <i>et al.</i> , 2004).
Peacekeeping troops (log)	Log (plus 1) of the average monthly military manpower supplied to UN peacekeeping operations per year (Heldt, 2008).
Democracy indicator	Indicator coded 1 if contested elections fill the executive and legislative branches of government, 0 otherwise (Cheibub <i>et al.</i> , 2010).
Control of corruption	Score indicating perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain (Kaufmann <i>et al.</i> , 2011).

*Do shared cultural traits play a role?*

% Muslim	Muslims as a proportion of the total population, time invariant (Przeworski <i>et al.</i> , 2000).
% Catholic	Catholics as a proportion of the total population, time invariant (Przeworski <i>et al.</i> , 2000).
Shared regional ideology	Proportion of the chief executives in the region sharing the same political ideology – left, center, right (Beck <i>et al.</i> , 1999).
Former British colony	Indicator coded 1 if a country is a former British colony, 0 otherwise (Przeworski <i>et al.</i> , 2000).
Former French colony	Indicator coded 1 if a country is a former French colony, 0 otherwise (Przeworski <i>et al.</i> , 2000).

*Controls*

Arab seat	Indicator for Arab countries eligible for election to the Arab swing seat (coded 1 for Arab countries in Africa every fourth year beginning 1972; 1 for Arab countries in Asia every fourth year beginning 1970; 0 otherwise).
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**Table 3a: Full model**

Variables	Africa		Asia		EE		GRULAC		WEOG		UNGA	
	≤ 1989	> 1989	≤ 1989	> 1989	≤ 1989	> 1989	≤ 1989	> 1989	≤ 1989	> 1989	≤ 1989	> 1989
Turn-taking norm	5.83 <sup>***</sup> (1.10)		8.62 <sup>***</sup> (2.24)		2.00 <sup>**</sup> (0.95)		1.95 <sup>**</sup> (0.83)		10.96 <sup>***</sup> (2.70)		3.24 (17.73)	
GNI per capita (log)	0.35 (0.27)		1.00 (0.63)		-0.48 (1.26)		1.31 <sup>**</sup> (0.60)		1.89 (3.24)		-17.02 (17.49)	
Population (log)	0.50 <sup>**</sup> (0.23)		5.54 <sup>***</sup> (1.35)	4.42 <sup>***</sup> (1.05)	-0.55 (2.10)	2.45 (2.32)	0.79 (0.58)	1.27 <sup>***</sup> (0.44)	7.26 <sup>***</sup> (2.35)		-2.14 (12.32)	
Territory (log)	0.27 <sup>*</sup> (0.15)		-0.38 (0.30)		1.47 (3.08)		0.57 (0.44)		-1.62 <sup>*</sup> (0.93)		-9.15 (9.78)	
USA voting in the UNGA	0.32 (5.73)		-0.81 (7.49)		4.93 (9.18)		-1.60 (7.04)		-62.65 <sup>***</sup> (22.97)		131.84 (311.09)	
Russia voting in the UNGA	6.00 (5.74)		2.49 (8.06)		-5.96 (12.13)		9.00 (6.39)		-29.41 (22.25)		401.14 (325.86)	
Pariah State	-14.17 <sup>***</sup> (1.42)	-0.67 (1.05)	-16.06 <sup>***</sup> (2.75)	0.99 (1.42)	—		-17.05 <sup>***</sup> (1.53)	4.37 <sup>**</sup> (2.01)	—		-44.03 (37.86)	47.78 (52.59)
IMF program participation	0.55 (0.54)		-1.36 <sup>*</sup> (0.79)		2.33 (1.86)		0.31 (0.56)		4.37 (2.69)		-18.13 (24.54)	
New World Bank projects	0.26 <sup>**</sup> (0.11)		0.26 <sup>**</sup> (0.12)		0.10 (0.49)		-0.02 (0.08)		-0.59 (2.08)		-7.26 (4.74)	
Regional share of US loans	-4.05 (3.14)		-2.03 (4.07)		-5.61 (11.77)		0.26 (2.54)		-5.71 (24.72)	—	-209.25 (131.43)	
Regional share of US grants	-3.78 (6.27)	-18.10 <sup>*</sup> (9.55)	0.10 (4.83)		-1.50 (10.19)		-4.42 (7.06)		-27.22 (34.80)		178.67 (193.69)	
Debt service (% GNI)	0.41 (0.41)		0.29 (0.52)		-0.64 (1.58)		1.12 <sup>**</sup> (0.57)		-0.30 (1.52)		4.11 (18.44)	
OIC	0.21 (0.89)		4.07 (3.06)		—		—		—		15.55 (63.56)	
JUSCANZ	—		—		—		—		4.90 (3.33)		33.15 (39.90)	
EU	—		—		—	38.63 <sup>***</sup> (4.86)	—		4.97 <sup>***</sup> (1.89)		-88.52 <sup>**</sup> (40.16)	
NATO	—		—		—	-18.95 <sup>***</sup> (3.76)	—		0.16 (2.38)		4.98 (31.30)	
G77 and NAM	—		1.12 (2.16)		—		11.18 <sup>***</sup> (3.34)		—		-117.40 <sup>*</sup> (69.51)	-347.10 <sup>***</sup> (113.95)
G77 only, not in NAM	—		-8.75 <sup>**</sup> (4.07)		—		9.27 <sup>***</sup> (3.35)		—		-263.07 <sup>**</sup> (120.33)	
NAM only, not in G77	—		—		—		—		—		-160.29 <sup>*</sup> (89.74)	-939.19 <sup>***</sup> (154.82)
Peacekeeping troops (log)	0.19 (0.12)		0.39 <sup>***</sup> (0.13)		0.31 (0.59)		0.33 <sup>**</sup> (0.16)		1.26 <sup>***</sup> (0.41)		5.99 (4.91)	
Democracy	-0.24 (0.68)		0.94 (1.48)	-1.46 (1.56)	—	-1.56 (2.27)		-0.45 (0.54)	18.74 <sup>**</sup> (8.06)	—	-6.17 (21.92)	
Former British colony	0.33 (0.68)		6.70 <sup>***</sup> (2.58)		—		4.29 <sup>***</sup> (1.64)		5.26 (5.63)		-0.27 (34.76)	
Former French colony	0.91 (0.62)		—		—		—		—		57.03 (62.69)	-840.13 <sup>***</sup> (74.26)
Civil war	-1.63 <sup>**</sup> (0.83)		-25.30 <sup>***</sup> (5.13)		—	-21.72 <sup>***</sup> (5.85)		-0.22 (0.85)	—		79.21 <sup>**</sup> (33.34)	
International war	-16.17 <sup>***</sup> (1.45)	1.03 (1.31)	0.89 (1.35)	-16.79 <sup>***</sup> (1.93)	—		—		—		-510.81 <sup>***</sup> (162.28)	-784.75 <sup>***</sup> (174.55)
Muslim (%)	-0.46 (0.92)		-4.35 (3.82)		-9.37 (7.17)		13.36 (16.37)	-223.38 <sup>***</sup> (35.78)	-448.74 <sup>**</sup> (195.83)		43.06 (91.60)	-45.26 (98.47)
Catholic (%)	0.42 (1.16)		-110.67 <sup>***</sup> (42.09)		2.33 (3.60)		3.21 (2.99)		-1.89 (4.43)		53.49 (34.70)	
Shared regional ideology	0.43 (1.17)		0.91 (3.97)		2.50 (2.82)		2.89 <sup>*</sup> (1.57)		4.30 (6.40)		40.90 (67.27)	
Control of corruption	-0.38 (0.41)		-0.09 (1.46)		0.82 (2.63)		-0.70 (0.44)		2.87 (2.34)		-42.96 <sup>**</sup> (20.66)	22.41 (24.01)
Arab seat	2.26 <sup>***</sup> (0.49)		28.78 <sup>***</sup> (4.08)		—		—		—		0.43 (60.61)	

Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on region × year. \* significant at 10%, \*\* significant at 5%, \*\*\* significant at 1%.



**Table 3b: Reduced model (general-to-specific)**

Variables	Africa		Asia		EE		GRULAC		WEOG		UNGA	
	≤ 1989	> 1989	≤ 1989	> 1989	≤ 1989	> 1989	≤ 1989	> 1989	≤ 1989	> 1989	≤ 1989	> 1989
Turn-taking norm	4.91 <sup>***</sup> (0.72)		6.90 <sup>***</sup> (1.50)		0.69 <sup>***</sup> (0.21)		1.75 <sup>***</sup> (0.66)		6.80 <sup>***</sup> (1.02)			—
GNI per capita (log)	—		0.87 <sup>***</sup> (0.26)		—		1.07 <sup>***</sup> (0.36)		—			—
Population (log)	0.51 <sup>***</sup> (0.18)		3.90 <sup>***</sup> (0.81)	3.07 <sup>***</sup> (0.63)	—	1.59 <sup>***</sup> (0.34)	—	0.68 <sup>**</sup> (0.27)	4.02 <sup>***</sup> (0.66)			—
Territory (log)	0.25 <sup>**</sup> (0.13)		—		—		0.94 <sup>***</sup> (0.28)		-0.66 <sup>*</sup> (0.35)			—
USA voting in the UNGA	—		—		—		—		-49.54 <sup>***</sup> (13.92)			—
Russia voting in the UNGA	5.79 <sup>*</sup> (3.46)		—		—		10.17 <sup>**</sup> (4.50)		-35.13 <sup>**</sup> (13.97)		409.83 <sup>***</sup> (95.93)	
Pariah State	-16.44 <sup>***</sup> (0.98)	—	-16.82 <sup>***</sup> (1.63)	—	—		-18.52 <sup>***</sup> (1.04)	3.59 <sup>***</sup> (1.25)	—			—
IMF program participation	—		-1.19 <sup>**</sup> (0.56)		—		—		—			—
New World Bank projects	0.21 <sup>**</sup> (0.10)		0.26 <sup>**</sup> (0.10)		—		—		—			-5.86 <sup>**</sup> (2.70)
Regional share of US loans	-5.61 <sup>*</sup> (2.88)		—		—		—		—			-133.35 <sup>*</sup> (75.20)
Regional share of US grants	—	-11.93 <sup>**</sup> (5.39)	—		—		—		—			—
Debt service (% GNI)	0.81 <sup>***</sup> (0.29)		—		—		0.92 <sup>*</sup> (0.48)		—			—
JUSCANZ	—		—		—		—		—			72.18 <sup>***</sup> (11.29)
EU	—		—		—	40.36 <sup>***</sup> (2.43)	—		2.64 <sup>***</sup> (0.80)			—
NATO	—		—		—	-21.29 <sup>***</sup> (1.79)	—		—			—
G77 and NAM	—		—		—		4.61 <sup>***</sup> (1.15)		—			-78.47 <sup>**</sup> (36.46)
G77 only, not in NAM	—		-14.02 <sup>***</sup> (1.87)		—		3.10 <sup>***</sup> (1.07)		—			—
NAM only, not in G77	—		—		—		—		—			-698.66 <sup>***</sup> (65.53)
Peacekeeping troops (log)	—		0.35 <sup>***</sup> (0.10)		—		0.22 <sup>*</sup> (0.12)		1.06 <sup>***</sup> (0.22)			—
Democracy	—		—	-1.80 <sup>**</sup> (0.84)	—		—		22.25 <sup>***</sup> (3.27)	—		—
Former British colony	—		5.13 <sup>***</sup> (1.09)		—		1.87 <sup>***</sup> (0.68)		—			—
Former French colony	—		—		—		—		—			-941.07 <sup>***</sup> (129.72)
Civil war	-2.11 <sup>**</sup> (0.85)		-25.22 <sup>***</sup> (2.62)		—	-20.89 <sup>***</sup> (2.40)	—		—			53.44 <sup>**</sup> (22.06)
International war	-17.78 <sup>***</sup> (0.98)	—	—	-17.28 <sup>***</sup> (1.65)	—		—		—			-482.90 <sup>***</sup> (73.87)
Muslim (%)	—		—		—	-4.97 <sup>***</sup> (1.27)	—	-214.30 <sup>***</sup> (28.02)	-265.63 <sup>***</sup> (72.89)			—
Catholic (%)	—		-84.34 <sup>***</sup> (27.15)		—		—		—			—
Shared regional ideology	—		—		—	1.73 <sup>**</sup> (0.84)	—	3.07 <sup>**</sup> (1.39)	—			—
Control of corruption	—		—		—		—	-0.72 <sup>*</sup> (0.42)	1.97 <sup>**</sup> (0.90)		-37.99 <sup>***</sup> (10.17)	18.27 <sup>*</sup> (10.67)
Arab seat	1.88 <sup>***</sup> (0.25)		25.66 <sup>***</sup> (2.42)		—		—		—			—

Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on region × year. \* significant at 10%, \*\* significant at 5%, \*\*\* significant at 1%.

## Appendix: Descriptive Statistics (by region)

Variable	N (5771 max.)	Africa (n = 1823 max.)	Asia (n = 1519 max.)	EE (n = 516 max.)	GRULAC (n = 1123 max.)	WEOG (n = 790 max.)	UNGA* (n = 1204 max.)
Turn-taking norm	5342	0.507 (0.355)	0.826 (0.424)	2.031 (1.396)	0.951 (0.630)	1.002 (0.870)	0.878 (0.761)
GNI per capita (log)	5771	6.133 (1.017)	7.003 (1.572)	7.582 (0.791)	7.436 (0.937)	9.387 (0.964)	7.269 (1.560)
Population (log)	5771	15.368 (1.556)	15.424 (2.344)	15.954 (0.991)	14.787 (2.087)	15.381 (2.063)	15.265 (1.910)
Territory (log)	5771	12.143 (2.062)	11.326 (2.576)	11.511 (0.916)	10.998 (2.852)	11.306 (3.044)	11.518 (2.495)
USA voting in UNGA	5596	0.366 (0.121)	0.368 (0.136)	0.442 (0.115)	0.390 (0.127)	0.550 (0.103)	0.411 (0.136)
Russia voting in UNGA	5596	0.755 (0.108)	0.755 (0.110)	0.782 (0.102)	0.743 (0.105)	0.664 (0.103)	0.743 (0.105)
Pariah state	5771	0.037 (0.190)	0.072 (0.259)	0.010 (0.098)	0.045 (0.208)	0.003 (0.050)	0.036 (0.186)
IMF program participation	5551	0.417 (0.493)	0.189 (0.392)	0.405 (0.491)	0.399 (0.490)	0.042 (0.201)	0.322 (0.467)
New World Bank projects	5771	1.754 (1.852)	1.735 (3.012)	1.525 (2.051)	1.653 (2.418)	0.280 (1.054)	1.566 (2.289)
Regional share of US loans	4485	0.020 (0.094)	0.023 (0.068)	0.054 (0.161)	0.032 (0.085)	0.050 (0.214)	0.028 (0.100)
Regional share of US grants	4882	0.020 (0.059)	0.023 (0.055)	0.050 (0.105)	0.032 (0.054)	0.047 (0.205)	0.030 (0.101)
Debt service (% GNI)	3269	1.497 (0.710)	1.435 (0.701)	1.543 (0.877)	1.814 (0.623)	1.639 (0.659)	1.642 (0.722)
OIC	5771	0.447 (0.497)	0.467 (0.499)	0.056 (0.231)	0.016 (0.126)	0.046 (0.209)	0.269 (0.444)
JUSCANZ	5771	0.000 (0.000)	0.034 (0.182)	0.000 (0.000)	0.032 (0.176)	0.338 (0.473)	0.067 (0.251)
EU	5771	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.036)	0.031 (0.174)	0.000 (0.000)	0.434 (0.496)	0.076 (0.264)
NATO	5736	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.069 (0.253)	0.000 (0.000)	0.576 (0.494)	0.101 (0.301)
G77 and NAM	5771	0.980 (0.139)	0.789 (0.408)	0.000 (0.000)	0.649 (0.477)	0.000 (0.000)	0.636 (0.481)
G77 only, not in NAM	5771	0.000 (0.000)	0.103 (0.304)	0.029 (0.168)	0.319 (0.466)	0.000 (0.000)	0.089 (0.285)
NAM only, not in G77	5771	0.020 (0.139)	0.036 (0.187)	0.070 (0.255)	0.000 (0.000)	0.046 (0.209)	0.027 (0.163)
Peacekeeping troops (log)	5732	0.933 (2.005)	0.972 (2.220)	1.540 (2.334)	0.671 (1.534)	3.371 (2.780)	1.274 (2.319)
Democracy	5732	0.155 (0.362)	0.259 (0.438)	0.463 (0.499)	0.714 (0.452)	0.975 (0.158)	0.459 (0.499)
Former British colony	5739	0.309 (0.462)	0.496 (0.500)	0.000 (0.000)	0.326 (0.469)	0.100 (0.301)	0.294 (0.456)
Former French colony	5771	0.336 (0.472)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.113 (0.317)
Civil war	5771	0.116 (0.321)	0.107 (0.310)	0.025 (0.157)	0.098 (0.297)	0.000 (0.000)	0.091 (0.287)
International war	5729	0.031 (0.174)	0.058 (0.234)	0.012 (0.108)	0.003 (0.052)	0.013 (0.112)	0.023 (0.149)
Muslim (%)	5734	0.359 (0.388)	0.453 (0.433)	0.114 (0.237)	0.010 (0.037)	0.052 (0.207)	0.238 (0.368)
Catholic (%)	5734	0.220 (0.268)	0.096 (0.230)	0.487 (0.284)	0.657 (0.325)	0.529 (0.412)	0.360 (0.369)
Shared regional ideology	4725	0.127 (0.164)	0.079 (0.101)	0.414 (0.400)	0.291 (0.188)	0.375 (0.148)	0.187 (0.182)
Control of corruption	5360	-0.560 (0.627)	-0.213 (0.801)	-0.305 (0.693)	-0.073 (0.773)	1.596 (0.759)	0.001 (1.033)
Arab seat	5771	0.048 (0.213)	0.068 (0.251)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.025 (0.156)

\* UNGA statistics are reported for elections that involve a contested vote in the UNGA.