

Determinants of the Election of Non-Permanent Members to the United Nations Security Council An Empirical Analysis*

Jan Schmitz & Johannes Schwarze[†]

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Abstract

What criteria are likely to determine elections of non-permanent members into the United Nations Security Council? In a three-part panel-data regression analysis we test for above average values in three fields of state behavior: (1) variables, which account for state power; (2) variables that reflect the state in the sphere of the UN system; and (3) variables that represent the state outside the UN system. Our results show strong effects for variables outside the UN system.

UNSC membership is highly attractive. Candidate states compete for the votes of the General Assembly (all UN states). In order to interpret the results we turn to reputation theories of international relation literature, since it is reasonable to assume that states with a better reputation might be preferred in the elections. We differentiate three approaches: Goldsmith and Posner (1999, 2005) question the existence of reputation, claiming that most of interactions between states can be explained by power relations (1). Downs and Jones (2002) argue for compartmentalized reputation (2). Guzman (2008) defends the existence of an overall reputation (3). In this context, our results support the idea of an overall reputation for states and that states are well advised to keep this reputation in mind when candidating for a seat.

JEL-Classification: A12, C33, C87, D03, F50, K10, K33, F13, F53, F59

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[†]*Graduate School in Law and Economics*, University of Hamburg, Germany; contact: jan.schmitz@ile-graduateschool.de; johannes.schwarze@ile-graduateschool.de.

1 Introduction

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can be regarded as the most powerful organ of the international community. The UNSC provides a forum in which national representatives can come together to define common ground through their decisions.¹ It gains further significance in times where problems can no longer be addressed on an only national level but require global solutions. Membership in this council is very attractive, and the competition for non-permanent seats is increasing: While past candidatures used to be more subject to diplomatic arrangements (Malone, 2000), today more states candidate for the limited number of available seats. For example, for the election on October 13, 2011, Azerbaijan, Hungary, and Slovenia have all signaled to run for the single seat available for Eastern European countries; Mauritania and Morocco announced to be candidating for the single African seat; and Japan and Pakistan intend to run for the single Asian seat. But what drives the election outcome? In this article, we aim to enrich the understanding of which criteria of state behavior might have an impact. Our empirical analysis consists of three parts: First, we test for the determinants that drive the election. Second, we identify whether above-average values increase the probability for a country to win. Third, we will apply a negative binomial regression with country fixed effects on a dyadic version of our data set to compare countries that are elected with those that fail to win a seat on the council. ***Please note that this regression is not yet included in the paper but will be finished by the day of the workshop.*** We do so by using variables from three fields of state behavior: (1) those, which account for state power; (2) those that reflect the state in the sphere of the UN system; and (3) those variables that represent the state outside the UN system. Our results show strong effects for variables outside the UN system. Obviously, behind-the-scenes agreements persist in politics on the world level where direct democratic legitimation is absent and candidate procedures remain nontransparent. Still, both national and international attention concentrate on council members and membership candidates. This gives support to the assumption that reputational concerns might

¹ The Economist reports in this context, that the council has just recently shown "remarkable unity" with regards to "condemning and isolating the Libyan regime" (<http://www.economist.com/node/18277151/print>, Sept. 29, 2011).

play a role for candidate states. Reputation remains a hardly quantifiable concept and conclusions from empirical measures must be drawn with caution. However, the theoretical debate about reputation as an informal organizing mechanism on the international stage is a very important and controversially discussed topic, that empirical support is necessary.

Our analysis is organized as follows: We first outline the attractiveness on non-permanent membership in the UNSC. Second, we discuss important research that significantly advanced the theoretical understanding of reputation on the international stage or already tried to measure this reputation empirically. Third, we present our empirical analysis. Finally, we conclude our results.

2 Attractiveness of non-permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council

Established after the second World War in 1946, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the most powerful of the principal organs of the United Nations (UN). According to chapter V, art. 23-32, of the UN Charter, the UNSC is charged with the *maintenance of international peace and security*. Its powers are exercised through United Nations Security Council resolutions. They include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the establishment of international sanctions, and the authorization of military action (see, chapter VII, in particular art. 41 and 43, UN Charter). The Security Council consists of fifteen members of the United Nations. Five members are permanent: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Ten non-permanent members are elected by the General Assembly by secret ballot. Note that the United Nations General Assembly is one of the five principal organs of the United Nations and the *only one* in which all member nations have equal representation. Every year, five non-permanent members are elected for two year terms.² Direct re-election of a non-permanent member is not possible. Criteria for the non-permanent membership are "in the first instance to the contribution of members of the United Nations

² Since January 1966, the UNSC has ten non-permanent members. From 1946-1964, it consisted of only 11 members, six of which were non-permanent.

to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution” (art. 23, UN Charter).

Elections are held within UN Regional Groups. Table 1 shows an overview of the five groups, the number of states in the groups, the number of permanent seats, as well as the number of non-permanent seats of each group.

Group	Abbrev.	States	Seats	
			Permanent	Non-permanent
Western European and Others Group	WEOG	28	3	2
Group of Latin American Countries	GRULAC	33	0	2
African Group	AFG	54	0	3
Asian Group	ASG	53	1	2
Eastern European Group	EEG	23	1	1

Table 1: UN Regional Groups and number of UNSC-seats

UNSC membership is very attractive. Malone (2000) observes three reasons for intense jockeying for seats. First, UNSC seats provide *international prestige*. Since the UNSC “may decide on enforcement measures, economic sanctions (such as trade embargoes) or collective military action,”³ it can be understood as the most powerful organ of the UN. States that significantly contribute to the UN can more effectively influence the decisions on where to invest their assets as UNSC members (in order to avoid “taxation without representation”). On the contrary, a defeat in the election is likely to result in negative publicity for the state representatives at home. Countries with a strong interest in UN peacekeeping and security can better pursue these interests as UNSC members. Second, Malone highlights states’ *positioning* in disputes before the council. According to article 27:3, UN charter, a state that is a “party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.” In practice, however, the definition of *dispute* has been hotly debated. Moreover, council members can better influence council debates than nonmembers. Third, states may effectively pursue *broader objectives*. Although direct effects on the realization of states’ objectives through council membership are hard to quantify, the council is definitely an attractive forum for a variety of topics. Bringing up certain issue areas or taking active part in council discussions might well affect their outcome.

³ See the official UNSC site under http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html.

Malone mentions Canada's pursuit of its human rights interest as an example (see Malone 2000, and also Malone 1997).

But to what extent is membership attractive to less powerful countries, especially for developing countries? O'Neill (1996) highlights the high voting power of permanent UNSC members. However, "power itself is not the goal." Rather, the council provides prestige and access to information for all council members. Kuziemko and Werker (2006) and Dreher et al. (2009b,a, 2010) provide illuminating empirical findings on this question. Kuziemko and Werker (2006) Find that developing countries receive 59 percent more development aid from the US while inheriting a seat on the council. Further, regarding the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Dreher et al. (2009b) scrutinize for 197 countries using panel data over the period from 1951 to 2004: Not only participation in IMF programs increases through UNSC membership, it also reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. The authors conclude that "IMF loans seem to be a mechanism by which the major shareholders of the Fund can win favor with voting members of the Security Council." In a second article, Dreher et al. (2010) analyze the level of conditionality attached to (a maximum of) 314 IMF arrangements using panel data with 101 countries over the period from 1992 to 2008. They find that council members receive about 30 percent fewer conditions attached to the loans that they receive from the IMF. The authors conclude "that conditionality is softer for these countries because the major shareholders of the IMF desire influence over the Security Council." Second, with respect to the World Bank Dreher et al. (2009a) investigate panel data for 157 countries over the period 1970-2004: Council membership increases the number of World Bank projects a country receives, though it does not affect the size of World Bank loans. In addition to immaterial prestige, council membership apparently materializes in monetary benefits for less developed countries. Thus, membership in the UNSC pays off.

Due to the high attractiveness of council membership, states have a strong interest to increase the possibility to be elected. This might also include improving their reputation. Since the election is held by secret ballot, we can assume some competition in the system. However, it is important to highlight that UNSC elections cannot be compared with, say, national governmental elections. Member states place their candidature strategically. For example, Switzerland is a

candidate for 2013/14 but decided in January 2011 to candidate for 2023/24, a period for which no other members candidate so far.⁴ Also, through unobservable diplomatic negotiations some countries might pace their way into the council more than others. Moreover, the council represents itself diplomatic relations. Within their groups, members pay attention that countries have their turn. Such less transparent rotating systems prevail especially in Africa and Asia, but also Eastern Europe.⁵ These less competitive electoral systems complicate our empirical analysis in that sometimes candidates might win an election simply because they are next in line. However, the election for GRULAC is known to be rather competitive, which is even more true for WEOG. Thus, we have to concentrate our analysis on these groups. Moreover, general public attention on candidate states is high. This pressure might already their reputational concerns. In the next section we discuss reputation and its perception in international relations literature.

3 Reputation in International Relations Literature

According to the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English by Hornby et al. (1963) "reputation [is] the general opinion about the character, qualities etc. of somebody or something." Economists determine reputation in a similar way. Weigelt and Camerer (1988), for instance, define reputation to be a set of attributes ascribed to an actor, inferred from the actor's past perceived behavior; this reputation, however, is solely "a probability distribution over the range of [an agent's] possible types", and not inevitably her true type.

Some scholars hold that international law becomes increasingly informal. Informal organizing principles become increasingly important in the complexity of a modern and globalized world. Developing effective formal monitoring and enforcement mechanisms involves high transaction costs, especially if more participants

⁴ See the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs on <http://www.admin.ch/aktuell/00089/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=37154>, September 15, 2011.

⁵ See Malone 2000 and the World Federalist Movement - Institute for Global Policy (WFM-IGP) on <http://www.unelections.org/?q=node/33>, September 15, 2011.

have to agree. Voigt (2011) argues that transaction costs are considerably lower regarding the development and implementation of informal law. Reputation as an informal mechanism would function without these costs. Guzman (2008) favors reputation in particular since it does not incur the same costs as retaliation or reciprocity. Scrutinizing states, firms, and activists internationally, Abbott and Snidal (2000) find that softer forms of legalization are often preferred because of their "significant advantages, including that it is easier to achieve, provides strategies for dealing with uncertainty, infringes less on sovereignty, and facilitates compromise among differentiated actors." They argue that informal law provides higher flexibility especially with regard to an uncertain future. Once rules are formally fixed, changing these rules might become a challenging task. Note, however, that this idea has a longer tradition. Lipson (1991) already found, that "the prevalence of such informal devices thus reveals not only the possibilities of international cooperation but also the practical obstacles and the institutional limits to endogenous enforcement."⁶

Important contributions to reputation in the field of international law (IL) originate from Keohane and Axelrod⁷, examining the possibilities of cooperation under anarchy with game theory, or from Milgrom et al. (1990) studying international commercial organizations. Some legal scholars understand law compliance as the norm (Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Henkin, 1979), while economic analysis is increasingly applied (Trachtman, 2008; Dunoff and Trachtman, 1999). Goldsmith and Posner (1999, 2005) provide a comprehensive analysis of the two fields of international law: Customary International Law (CIL) and treaties.⁸ According to rational choice theory, originating from the realist approach of political science, states pursue stable preferences when maximizing their utility. What is usually perceived as compliance with international law can, according to Goldsmith and Posner (1999), actually be explained through the four "behavioral regularities":

⁶ For a more profound analysis comparing the positions of legal positivists, rationalists, and constructivists on whether informal and formal law complements or antagonize each other see Shaffer and Pollack (2010).

⁷ See Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985.

⁸ While CIL is regarded as a superior set of rules, treaties organize international relations like bi- or multilateral contracts. The law of treaties is based on the principle *pacta sunt servanda*. That implies that treaties are complied as stated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Art. 26 (United Nations, 1969).

coincidence of interest⁹, coercion¹⁰, true cooperation¹¹, and coordination.¹² Except for true cooperation, Goldsmith and Posner (1999) find it "hard to see why reputation would play an important role in explaining compliance with [Customary International Law] norms", for it is only with tit-for-tat and related strategies that reputation provides valuable information. Downs and Jones (2002) focusing in their analysis solely on reputation believe "that the actual effects of reputation are both weaker and more complicated than the standard view of reputation suggests." First, reputation affects states of different power differently: While strong states defecting against weak states seem to suffer no negative reputation effect, weak states violating agreements with strong states face "quite large" reputation consequences. Second, it is reasonable to assume multiple or segmented reputations in different political and economic fields for the majority of states. New states are the exception for they lack a history of behavior. In consequence, not every action translates into reputation. A variety of violations of international law remain without significant effects, since the violated rule is not correspondingly valued by the other state (or states). Guzman (2002a,b, 2006, 2008), on the contrary, is optimistic about reputation, which he considers to be the key element on the international stage. Due to the absence of a supranational power that can enforce treaties, states have to rely on the mechanisms of reciprocity, retaliation and reputation. Guzman argues that since reciprocity and particularly retaliation are costly, reputation is the most credible mechanism that obliges states to comply with international law. Comparably to Guzman, Chayes and Chayes (1993) hold that coercive enforcement is costly, hard to mobilize and therefore poses no

⁹ Coincidentally the individual interests of all involved states match.

¹⁰ A single powerful state or group of states with mutual interests can force or credibly threaten to force weaker states to a behavior different to their natural behavior (i.e. behavior without this force or threat). Note in this context also the elaborated economic and relation-based concept of power by Dahl (1957) as the power to influence another agent's behavior. Harsanyi (1976) summarizes Dahl's five main conclusions regarding power: (1) the base, i.e. the resources, (2) the means, i.e. the specific actions, (3) the scope, i.e. the set of the means, (4) the amount, i.e. the increase in the probability that the means have the desired effect, and (5) the extension, i.e. the power over a certain set of individuals.

¹¹ Bilateral iterated prisoner's dilemma, where high long term payoffs are more attractive than cheating in the short term.

¹² Refers to bilateral payoff matrices offering higher payoffs through coordination; states are indifferent to their strategies but the payoffs depend on the other state's strategy in that if they do not coordinate, payoffs are lower.

credible threat to be a reliable enforcement tool. Instead, the authors propose a "managerial model of treaty compliance" based on a continuing dialogue to elaborate norms, and apply and resolve violations against these norms.¹³ Downs et al. (1996) on the contrary hold that states only engage in international law if this does not conflict with already existing strategies in choosing from a given set of possible agreements; consequently, higher compliance with international law does not necessarily translate into higher cooperative behavior and therefore reputation should play a minor role in international regulatory relations.

With respect to commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs Simmons (2000) provides an insightful empirical analysis. She objects the realist opinion that international legal rules do not affect governments' interests in compliant behavior. She finds instead that international legal commitment can credibly tie states to a particular policy in that this commitment "raises expectations about behavior that, once made, are reputationally costly for governments to violate." Further, she finds that compliance behavior clusters across regions. Standards of regional behavior apparently have a considerable reputational influence. In particular, the "domestic political variables tell an interesting story with respect to regime characteristics. First, the evidence is strong that states must have the bureaucratic capacity to renege on their commitments. The strong positive relationship between bureaucratic quality and restrictions implies that these choices are more likely to be made when the capacity exists to implement them. Second, trade dependence has virtually no effect on these results. Third, in contrast with theories of international behavior that concentrate on the law-consciousness of democracies, the evidence here suggests that democracy contributes little or nothing when other factors are held constant, but a strong domestic commitment to the rule of law contributes positively to compliance."

Smith (1991) proposes to build such obligations between states as they aim "to create evolving commitments that adapt to uncertain or unpredictable circumstances" in a "dynamic" way. To understand these agreements, Smith employs appreciation of international regimes, relational contracts and reciprocity instead of traditional international law models and concludes three hypotheses: "First,

¹³ Note in this strand also the empirical contributions on reputation and debt of Tomz (2007) and Tomz and Wright (2007).

the character of the evolving relationship between the parties, which results from practice and experience under the agreement, influences the viability of these obligations. Second, the evolution of dynamic obligations will be more easily accepted by the parties to international agreements when those parties share expectations and conventions that result from a larger collective regime. Finally, reciprocal behavior among the parties increases the probability of continued compliance with dynamic obligations.” Surprisingly, with reference to the realist claim that law has to be enforced to be effective, Smith finds that flexible formal and informal relational organization in interstate arms control can lead to higher compliance and goal achievement than organizing in fixed and purely legal terms.

As we have shown above, the theoretical understanding of reputation on the international stage varies. Our empirical analysis regarding elections to the UNSC can contribute to this debate. In the following section we introduce our empirical approach that captures three empirically measurable areas that might be relevant for elections into the council and in which states might be concerned about reputational effects.

4 Econometric Setting

To identify the determinants of the election to the UNSC we apply a three-part analysis. Our binary dependent variable is a successful candidature, that is being elected to the UNSC when contesting. Election outcomes can be found in the official records of the plenary meetings of the United Nations General Assembly. First, we run a panel OLS regression with country fixed effects and cluster-robust standard errors. Second, we run a panel OLS with country fixed effects on deviations from the average in a certain year within the diverse groups of the UN. That is, we compute the deviations from the mean (e. g. contributions to the UN financing system) for a certain state in a given year and apply a panel level OLS model to this data. We do so to identify whether and to what extent countries showing above-average values are more likely to get elected to the UNSC. Third, we will apply a negative binomial regression with country fixed effects on a dyadic version of our data set to compare countries that are elected with those that fail to win a seat on the council. *Please note that this regression is not yet*

included in the paper but will be finished by the day of the workshop.

We have reason to believe that error terms are not independent for the individual countries of our observations. Therefore, we estimate the first two models by OLS but use the linearization estimates of variance according to Huber (1967) and White (1980). Particularly, we use cluster-robust standard errors to allow observations to be correlated over time but independent between countries. These variance estimates are robust in the sense of providing correct coverage rates to much more than panel-level heteroskedasticity. In particular, they are robust to any type of correlation within the observations of each country. We use OLS to obtain unbiased estimators and to be able to directly interpret the estimation results.¹⁴

We can strongly reject the Breusch-Pagan test for random effects. However, we also have to reject the Hausman test for fixed effects. Nevertheless, we assume that countries have individual idiosyncratic effects that affect the election outcome and remains constant over time (e.g. an individual base reputation). To control for this we include fixed effects in our model. We apply the same regression for Western Europe and Others Group as well as for the Group of Latin American Countries.

4.1 Model 1 – The Basic Model

4.1.1 Specifications of Model 1

Our basic model aims to identify the determinants of the election to the UNSC. We link our analysis to the reputation theories from international law, international relations and law and economics. These theories favor, as depicted above, either no reputation but power Goldsmith and Posner (1999, 2005), an compartmentalized reputation Downs and Jones (2002) or an overall reputation (Guzman, 2008). We associate our basic model whilst identifying variables that are power related (Power), directly related to the UN (UN), and variables that are not linked to the UN (OutsideUN).

¹⁴ See Heckman and Snyder Jr. (1997) for a discussion of efficiency by applying OLS for models with binary dependent variables.

$$Y_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Power_{i,t} + \beta_2 UN_{i,t} + \beta_3 OutsideUN_{i,t} + \beta_4 Controls_{i,t} + \alpha_i + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

We include two variables for power: First, we use GDP per capita at purchasing power parity as a general measure of (economic) power.¹⁵ Second, we include population size in the population variable.¹⁶ We herewith control for the possibility that countries with greater populations would be elected more frequently than others to the council. It might be, that a greater population might demand for more representation in the UN system.

Variables that are directly related to the UN system are the scale of assessment as it represents the percentage of financial mandatory contributions to the UN. These contributions are related to the country's wealth (see Huefner, 2006, 67-77). We see financial mandatory contributions as an effective signal of willingness to contribute to the UN. These assessments are related to the net contributions to the UN and therefore easily observable as the percentage of contributions is communicated to the General Assembly. Major contributors to the UN might claim representation in the council in order to decide on how their contributions are spent (Malone, 2000). Also, a country can forward its particular interests by elevating the less transparent voluntary contributions (VC) to the UN financing system.¹⁷ Increasing its personnel contributions to UN Security Council Missions

¹⁵ GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is the gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity measured in million US\$. We obtain the data on GDP from which are statistical reports from World Bank data sets on <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD>, July 31, 2011.

¹⁶ Population data, in units of 1,000, is taken from World Bank data sets on <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>, July 31, 2011.

¹⁷We gather the data from the following United Nations General Assembly statistical reports on the Budgetary and financial situation of the organizations of the United Nations system:

- The third report from 1994: A/49/588 for the years 1991-1993,
- the fourth report from 1996: A/51/505 for the years 1994-1995,
- the fifth report from 1998: A/53/647 for the years 1996-1997,
- the sixth report from 2000: A/55/525 for the years 1998-1999,
- the seventh report from 2002: A/57/265 for the years 2000-2001,
- the eleventh report from 2010: A/65/187 for the years 2001-2009.

per capita,¹⁸ a candidate state might also try to influence the UN by showing that it is generous to the UN. Contributions are openly communicated in the UN. Using these variables, we test whether states are concerned about the image, that is created in the exact same field as the election.

Variables that are neither directly linked to the election nor represent state power are represented by *OutsideUN* in equation (1). We test whether voting states are concerned about strengths and weaknesses in other political fields than power and/or UN related areas.

Since international trade is of highest importance as it is the fundamental material interaction between states and since wealth diffuses through trade to remote parts of the world, we use the openness to trade variable as a mean to measure countries' willingness to cut down their trade barriers. The variable consists of exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP and is measured at current prices in US\$ and is obtained from the QOG dataset (Teorell et al., 2011). We further use an index for trade freedom from the Heritage Foundation, that consists of the trade-weighted average tariff rate and non-tariff barriers (Teorell et al., 2011).

In order to test for a state's embeddedness in the world community, we utilize the index of political globalization which is part of the KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher et al., 2008). We extract contributions to the UN peacekeeping troops, for which we account explicitly. The index consists of the number of memberships in international organizations, the number of treaties, and the number of embassies a state holds.

We also test for inward FDI flows measured in in millions of current US\$ per capita¹⁹ a country receives to mimic for trustworthiness and economic attractiveness of a state for the private sector. All variables are summarized in figure 2.

As further controls for robustness checks, we include subgroup specific variables for the GRULAC, namely total inflows of official development assistance received.²⁰

Mandatory contributions (scale of assessment) are measured in the percentage that the respective country contributes to the UN budget. Voluntary contributions are measured in units of 1,000 US\$. Huefner (2006, 15-26) critically discusses the quality of this data.

¹⁸ We were able to take the data from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the UN, measured in units of 1,000 US\$, from the KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher et al., 2008) thanks to the friendly support of professor Axel Dreher.

¹⁹ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org>, July 31, 2011.

²⁰ Data on total inflows of official development assistance, measured in millions of US\$ is

Testing for	Variable	Abbreviation
Power	GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$)	GDPpcPPP
	Population size	Pop
UN	Mandatory Contributions (Scale of Assessment)	SoA
	Voluntary Contributions	VolCon
	UN Peacekeeping Contributions per capita	UN_PK
Outside UN	Heritage Foundation Trade Freedom Index	TFree
	Trade Openness	TOpen
	Inward FDI-flow in current units per capita	InFDI_fl_CUpc
	Political Globalization (KOF)	PolGlob
	Quality of Government	QoG_Index
	Total Received Development Aid	TotODA_fl_tot_pc
Control	Political Stability	PolStab

Table 2: List of variables

Due to a high correlation between voluntary contributions and scale of assessment (see pairwise correlation matrix (1) in the appendix) we use the logarithm of scale of assessment ($\ln\text{SoA}$) to tackle the mandatory contributions. Table 3 presents regression results of the full model for the whole UN, WEOG and Grulac.

INSERT TABLE 3 HERE

4.1.2 Discussion of the Results of Model 1

We focus throughout the interpretation of our results on the WEOG and GRULAC, since these two groups are known to have the most competitive elections (Malone, 2000). For the African, Asian, and Eastern European groups, less transparent rotating systems prevail, so we cannot guarantee to be free of omitted-variable bias. Therefore, we have to be careful about the validity of the results for these groups. Due to the limited number of observations we focus throughout our analysis on robustness rather than significance of effects.

With regards to the question whether power drives the election outcome we find for: GDP per capita at purchasing power parity and population only very weak and inconsistent effects. We cannot support the hypothesis that wealthier

obtained from the UNCTADTSTAD website on <http://unctadstat.unctad.org>, July 31, 2011.

countries are more likely to be elected to the council. We also reject the hypothesis that population size matters for the election.

With regards to the factors directly linked to the UN system we find that a percentage change in the scale of assessment shows throughout all groups robust negative but insignificant effects. Therefore, we reject the hypothesis that states can make use of mandatory contributions to increase their attractiveness of being voted into the council. If at all, higher contributors are rather unlikely to win the election. For voluntary contributions (VC) to the UN financing system and personnel contributed to U.N. Security Council Missions per capita we find small robust negative effects for the UN and Western Europe (significant), while for GRULAC the effect is positive (though not significant). We conclude that economically weaker states like GRULAC can positively influence the election by contributing voluntarily. The results are still surprising since peacekeeping is one of the official key issues of the council according to the UN Charter. Voluntary contributions and contributions to UN peacekeeping would have been an ideal way to communicate to members of the UN that a state strongly supports the purpose of this organization. However, voluntary contributions are linked to the organs of the UN and are thus a mean to pursue special interest. Therefore, these contributions might not always be in favor of all the members of the General Assembly. For UN peacekeeping contributions, effects are low in general and even for WEOG. This implies that Western European states might substitute their peacekeeping duties through monetary transfers.

We find support for our OutsideUN variables. Trade freedom has a strong robust effect for WEOG, and otherwise robust and negative effects. The openness to trade variable shows a positive effect for all UN and WEOG (significant) but a small negative effect for GRULAC. From a reputation perspective, this variable is likely to affect the election outcome in a world dedicated to free trade. More trade freedom and openness increases the chances of winning. We cannot yet explain the negative effect for Latin American countries. We control for corruption (quality of government) and find – not surprisingly – that less corrupt countries have higher probabilities of winning a seat. Again, this does not hold for GRULAC. These results also follow from our heterogeneity argument that also less performing countries are elected to the council. Political globalization shows positive effects

although the direction varies throughout groups. We interpret these results as follows: The developed countries are well embedded in the global community, while developing and emerging countries from Africa and Eastern Europe can significantly increase their probability of winning by improving their connectivity with other states. We conclude, that we cannot reject the hypothesis that diplomatic relations significantly impact the election outcome. This would strongly support the argument for an overall reputation: Increased interaction between states helps building trust relations that pay off in the election to the security council.

In the following, we report our robustness checks, which are organized as follows: We first test for power, then for UN variables, and finally for outside UN variables. A second step combines these regressions. Column 7 of the tables represents the full model. The F-Statistics are weakly in favor for the outside UN variables. This phenomenon is supported by the F-Test on the goodness of fit. The F-statistic for including all variables instead of power is 95.09. From the UN to the Full model 86.709051. But from the outside UN variables to the full model only 2.1818748. The relatively low predictable strength of the power variables is indicated by a rejection of their joint significance with the full model (F-Statistic UN+OutUN to full model 0.9). Although, the F-statistics indicate that the decision who is to be elected to the UNSC is an overall political decision that is not affected by the power of a state nor the directly observable efforts to maintain and improve the UN system by means of mandatory or voluntary financial contributions as well as by means of supporting peacekeeping operations, we like to present the full model as an general overview. Further, as results for these variables are robust for we preserve the results in the main model.

However, we obtain relatively low R^2 . This may be due to the fact that we cannot control for unobserved personal linkages between ambassadors of the General Assembly. Therefore, we are unable to explain possible collusive behavior or probable bribery. Further, we cannot observe states' idiosyncratic efforts that are meant to directly influence the ambassadors. For example, in the summer of 1998 candidate Greece hosted two cruises in the Mediterranean sea for permanent representatives of the UN and their spouses (Malone, 2000). Nevertheless, a hint that bribery does not significantly influence the ambassadors of the General Assembly is the fact that despite Greece's invitation, Canada won the election. Regard-

less of the low R^2 we find significant effects for variables that are not directly linked to the UN, which implies that getting a seat on the council does not only depend on causes directly related to the UN. Therefore, we are convinced that our econometric model best reflects the variables that affect the election to the UNSC. Moreover, as depicted above we control for corruption, since corrupt states might also employ more corrupt representatives at the UN. This might materialize in, e.g., trading of votes and the like. We assume that our control for corruption estimate captures these effects. Table 4 shows robustness checks for the whole UN.

INSERT TABLE 4 HERE

Table 5 shows robustness checks for Western Europe and other States. The F-Statistics as well as the F-Tests on joint significance for WEOG indicate the same conclusions as for the whole UN. Introducing all variables when starting from the power model gives high F-Statistics (11.033714). Also when the restricted model contains only UN variables (11.246527). Further, comparing the model in column 6 (OutUn+UN) to the model in column 7 (full model) we obtain an insignificant F-Statistic of 0.19. Therefore, and due to the fact, we can convincingly neglect the fact that GDP per capita (PPP) and population (our power measures) influence the election to the UNSC in developed countries. Further, we find that coefficients for these variables are not robust. To better compare the models and due to robustness of the other variables, we conserve these variables in the full model for WEOG and present them in the main table. Further, we like to point out that the comparably high R^2 of the WEOG regressions, indicates the higher competitiveness of the election system in developed states. We conclude, that here, less than in other groups is obscure, and we can explain most of the determinants of the elections to the UNSC.

INSERT TABLE 5 HERE

In table 6 we present robustness checks for the Group of Latin American Countries. We obtain very weak F-Statistics for our UN measures as well as for the

conjoint regression with the power measures. However, by testing for joint significance, we obtain better F-Statistics than for the other groups for power and UN variables. Restricting to OutUN_n+UN to the full model gives an F-Statistic of 2.7. However, most explanatory power lies in the outside UN variables. Restricting the model to only outside variables (column 3) and comparing to the full model gives an F-Statistic of only 2.43. We conclude that the UN variables have more explanatory power for the Latin American countries than for Western Europe.

INSERT TABLE 6 HERE

4.2 Model 2 – Deviations from the Average

4.2.1 Specifications of Model 2

We constructed the second model in order to identify whether being one unit better than the average country influences the election outcome. The results are similar to those of the first model and highlight our findings from this part. In order to, on the one hand get a better grip on the determinants of the election, and on the other hand make inferences about possible reputations of states that are elected, we introduce a simple regression model that captures the effects of out performers in certain fields. With this regression we can observe whether and to what extent being better or worse than the average countries within a group in each year drives the election. From this we can make first inferences on states for having a reputation of being better than at least the other states on average. This model provides us with slightly more information of how the performance of states in different areas affects the election outcome.

We hereby stick to the general model and procedure and use a panel OLS regression with country fixed effects and cluster-robust standard errors. Alas, we computed the averages of variables within the WEOG and GRULAC for each year and identified the deviations from these averages. In doing so, we encountered various problems due to a high correlation of deviations from the mean.

$$Y_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DevPower_{i,t} + \beta_2 DevUN_{i,t} + \beta_3 DevOutsideUN_{i,t} + \beta_4 Controls_{i,t} + \alpha_i + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (2)$$

For Western Europe and Others the deviation of population as well as total population is highly correlated with the deviation of voluntary contributions. The deviation of the adjusted political globalization index is highly correlated to the deviation of scale of assessment (see pairwise correlation matrix (2) in the appendix). We therefore decided to drop population from the regression and substitute the index of political globalization with two uncorrelated components of that index. Namely the number of treaties a country has signed and the number of international organizations a state is member to. Moreover, we take the deviations from the mean of these variables.

For GRULAC the correlations amongst the variables is even higher (see pairwise correlation matrix (3) in the appendix). The deviation of GDP PC (PPP) is highly correlated to the adjusted political globalization index. We substitute here again with the membership to international organizations and the number of treaties (i. e. their deviations from the mean in every year). We are aware that by doing this we lose control over the impact of the fact that a country has more embassies than the average country in its group. However, installing embassies in a foreign country is very costly and therefore more developed states might have an advantage over less developed or emerging states. This is less the case for treaties or international organizations. Further, the logarithm of the deviations of scale of assessment is highly correlated with international organizations and openness to trade. We therefore use the deviations from the absolute values of scale of assessments. Population is also correlated to GDP PC (PPP), so we decided to drop population in this model as well. Table 7 depicts the results for WEOG and GRULAC when running the full model.

INSERT TABLE 7 HERE

Table 8 shows the robustness checks for the Western Europe and others Group. Except for the full model and the regressions for the deviations from UN and de-

viations from outside UN variables we obtain very weak F-Statistics. For these two regressions we also obtain the highest R^2 . Further, we can state that including the power measure does not improve the model (F-Test: 0.44). Also, we find, that most of the results can be explained by the outside UN variables and little by power and UN variables. The F-Test for joint significance does not show improvements to the unrestricted model, when the restricted model are the outside variables (F- value of 2.02).

INSERT TABLE 8 HERE

Table 9 summarizes the robustness checks for the Latin American countries. We observe unsatisfactory F-Statistics, when the UN variables are not included into the regressions. this mirrors our findings from the first model, where states are more likely to be elected when contributing to the causes of the UN. This result is supported by the joint F-test for improving the model, when adding the UN Variables to deviations from power and outside variables (F-statistic of 6.51). By letting dPower be the restricted model and comparing it to the full model we find that being more powerful than others does not improve the overall model fit. However, adding the outside variables to the UN variables does improve the model fit and therefore the capacity of predicting the determinants of election (F-Statistic: 10.07).

INSERT TABLE 9 HERE

4.2.2 Discussion of the Results of Model 2

Basically, the second model replicates the first model's result's which here become slightly stronger and therefore support our first simple model. The full model does not show the best F-Statistics. The results are not significant but robust. However, the results for possible "out performers", states that show a stronger performance with regards to the variables that might be regarded as more desirably from the international community, vary slightly from these of the basic model.

In short, with regard to WEOG, we focus on robustness: The GDP measure now shows a robust and negative but still small effect on the election. The variable

for mandatory contributions (scale of assessment) has here a strong positive effect that is not robust. Regarding voluntary contributions, we conform the robust and very small negative impact from the basic model. Contributing more than others does not increase the probability to win the election. Peacekeeping contributions show no robust effects.

Our trade measures confirm the first model's results: Our trade freedom variable shows a robust, positive effect, that is lower than in the basic model; while trade openness shows a robust, not significant but stronger effect than in the basic model.

Membership in international organizations here shows a robust negative effect, so engaging in more international organizations than other states does not seem to increase the likelihood of winning the election. However, the effect for our treaty measure is positive and robust. This can be interpreted in that hands tying seems to affect the chances of winning a seat positively.

While Foreign Direct Investment shows now a robust and very small negative effect, the positive effect of our quality of government variable is even higher than in our basic model.

With regard to GRULAC, we find a robust weak effect for GDP that confirms the basic model. The effect for mandatory contributions is negative and significant in the full model but not robust. Voluntary contributions, however, show a robust, positive and higher impact than basic model. Peacekeeping now shows a robust negative effect.

The positive effect for Foreign Direct Investment confirms the first model. The negative effects for our trade measures as well as our measure for governmental quality are equally supported.

Development aid shows a stronger, weakly significant effect than in the basic model. While the membership in international organizations confirms the first model's positive effect for political globalization, our treaty measure now shows a negative effect.

To sum up, the results of the second model predominantly support the first model's findings with only small variations. It will be insightful to see whether the third, dyadic model, shows similar support.

5 Concluding Remarks and Discussion

Before we conclude our contribution, we have to highlight its limitations. International relations are highly complex and equally in-transparent. We cannot guarantee that unmeasurable diplomatic agreements influence the election outcome.

We cannot support the hypothesis that *power* dominates the election to the council. Effects were very weak positive or even negative, and insignificant. With our *inside-UN*-variables we tested for behavior that happens directly in the sphere of the UN. Here, the most direct variables that communicate good will to the UN, supporting the organization through voluntary contributions did reveal significant effects: For developed WEOG the effects were negative, while positive for emerging GRULAC. However, we identified that contributing to mandatory UN financing even affects the election outcome negatively. Interestingly, the effects we found to influence the elections were our *outside-UN*-variables. In particular, trade openness and fewer trade barriers seem to influence the election outcome positively for developed WEOG. On the other hand, for GRULAC we find the results to be negative. WEOG is already a big donator to the UN, increasing contributions does not help win the election – but in trade, developed Western Europe convinces as a good example. On the other hand, low contributing GRULAC countries can signal their willingness to support the UN by increasing voluntarily. Moreover we find, that international interrelatedness strongly drives the election outcome.

Interpreting the results referring to state reputation we try to tackle a concept that in itself is very difficult to quantify. Reputation is entirely immaterial and despite of the possible existence of a coherent social reality among states, reputation remains predominantly subjective.

However, progressive globalization and the resulting complexity of international relations demand manageable principles of organization. Reputation, the image an agent communicates to others, promises to reduce complexity and to ease interaction. The election of non-permanent members to the UNSC represents a relatively competitive democratic international procedure. We have to focus our interpretation on WEOG and GRULAC, since we can assume more competitive election processes for these groups. Our results support the theory of Guzman

(2008) for an overall reputation. Of course, only with the variables we considered. At least, we can support his idea that policy fields that are not directly related to an issue area are of vital importance insofar as they seem to play a crucial role in international relations. A good reputation in fields that concern all nation states (e.g. trade) positively influences the outcome in other areas. However, we cannot directly observe states efforts when running for a seat. Nevertheless we convincingly identified the variables that positively affect the probability of winning the election.

We interpret the results in an optimistic way. Globalization increases interrelatedness and interdependence among individuals and states. As a consequence, simple organizing principles are useful to coordinate state interaction. Reputation might be such an organizing mechanism. In order to realize goals such as being elected into the UNSC, also states should be concerned about their image on the international stage.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	UN	WEOG	GRULAC
GDPpcPPP	-0.00000196 (0.00000323)	0.00000251 (0.00000858)	-0.00000674 (0.0000116)
Pop	8.62e-10 (8.52e-10)	1.16e-08 (2.52e-08)	-9.41e-08 (8.44e-08)
lnSoA	-0.0170 (0.0123)	-0.0170 (0.278)	-0.0437 (0.0664)
VolCon	-0.000000367 (0.000000279)	-0.00000135** (0.000000532)	0.00000124* (0.000000615)
UN_PK	-0.000780 (0.000881)	-0.00108 (0.00799)	0.000182 (0.000581)
TFree	-0.000206 (0.000588)	0.00557 (0.00507)	-0.000627 (0.00266)
TOpen	0.000155 (0.000753)	0.00831* (0.00472)	-0.000339 (0.00167)
lnFDI.fl_CUpc	0.0000251** (0.00000958)	0.0000123 (0.0000112)	0.000140 (0.000406)
PolGlob	0.00242** (0.00104)	0.00746 (0.00533)	0.00568 (0.00361)
QoG_Indx	0.155 (0.164)	0.360 (0.402)	-0.208 (0.557)
TotODA.fl_tot_pc			-0.00000185** (0.000000830)
PolStab	0.0163 (0.0206)	-0.0738 (0.119)	0.0428 (0.0683)
Constant	-0.232 (0.152)	-1.897* (1.005)	0.806 (1.104)
Observations	699	129	139
rss	23.15	6.634	5.313
F	2.158	4.870	481.2
r2	0.0278	0.149	0.0892

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Regression results for all UN, WEOG, and GRULAC

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	POWER	UN	OutUN	Power+UN	Power+OutUN	UN+OutUN	Full Model
GDPpcPPP	-0.0000226* (0.00000116)			-0.00000576 (0.00000134)	-0.00000388 (0.00000254)		-0.0000196 (0.00000323)
Pop	7.03e-10 (7.09e-10)			6.10e-10 (5.63e-10)	7.80e-10 (8.44e-10)		8.62e-10 (8.52e-10)
lnSoA		-0.00686 (0.00498)		-0.00734 (0.00533)		-0.0167 (0.0123)	-0.0170 (0.0123)
VolCon		-0.00000345*** (0.000000117)		-0.00000339*** (0.000000125)		-0.00000402 (0.000000261)	-0.00000367 (0.000000279)
UN_PK		-0.000441 (0.000486)		-0.000501 (0.000488)		-0.000580 (0.000839)	-0.000780 (0.000881)
TFree							
TOpen							
lnFDI.fl_CUpc							
PolGlob							
QoG_Indx							
PolStab							
Constant							
Observations	1795	1640	756	1530	738	717	699
rss	48.74	43.57	23.51	43.49	23.41	23.21	23.15
F	1.750	2.803	2.499	2.035	2.625	1.991	2.158
r2	0.00267	0.00875	0.0158	0.00915	0.0190	0.0262	0.0278

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Robustness checks for the whole UN

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Power	UN	OutUN	Power+UN	Power+OutUN	UN+OutUN	Full Model
GDPpcPPP	-0.00000296 (0.00000234)			0.00000352 (0.00000387)	-0.00000616** (0.00000238)		0.00000251 (0.00000858)
Pop	-4.46e-09 (7.14e-09)			7.82e-09 (1.40e-08)	-3.22e-09 (2.06e-08)		1.16e-08 (2.52e-08)
lnSoA		-0.141 (0.154)		-0.281 (0.267)		-0.00541 (0.223)	-0.0170 (0.278)
VolCon		-0.00000574*** (0.000000171)		-0.00000720*** (0.000000250)		-0.00000122*** (0.000000376)	-0.00000135*** (0.000000532)
UN_PK		-0.00247 (0.00467)		-0.00146 (0.00457)		-0.00263 (0.00715)	-0.00108 (0.00799)
TFree			0.00161 (0.00306)		0.00288 (0.00380)	0.00479 (0.00385)	0.00557 (0.00507)
TOpen			0.00740* (0.00399)		0.00869** (0.00376)	0.00902** (0.00416)	0.00831* (0.00472)
lnFDLfl_CUpc			0.0000143 (0.0000107)		0.0000131 (0.0000108)	0.0000117 (0.0000108)	0.0000123 (0.0000112)
PolGlob			0.00710 (0.00554)		0.00667 (0.00590)	0.00774 (0.00597)	0.00746 (0.00533)
QoG_Indx			0.586 (0.441)		0.396 (0.409)	0.293 (0.428)	0.360 (0.402)
PolStab	0.102 (0.0712)	-0.0124 (0.0704)	0.0708 (0.106)	-0.0379 (0.0868)	0.0758 (0.108)	-0.0465 (0.0858)	-0.0738 (0.119)
Constant	0.150 (0.128)	0.00356 (0.163)	-1.555** (0.696)	-0.205 (0.334)	-1.358 (1.040)	-1.530** (0.666)	-1.897* (1.005)
Observations	240	242	133	216	133	129	129
rss	11.60	11.06	7.228	10.95	7.161	6.655	6.634
F	2.047	3.813	2.309	2.778	10.19	5.998	4.870
r2	0.0180	0.0547	0.0733	0.0638	0.0819	0.147	0.149

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Robustness checks for WEOG

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Power	UN	OutUN	Power+UN	Power+OutUN	UN+OutUN	Full Model
GDPpcPPP	-0.00000251 (0.00000277)			0.00000380 (0.00000314)	-0.00000692 (0.00000908)		-0.00000674 (0.0000116)
Pop	1.00e-08*** (3.55e-09)			3.49e-09 (9.94e-09)	-1.17e-08 (2.08e-08)		-9.41e-08 (8.44e-08)
lnSoA		0.0181 (0.0210)		0.0183 (0.0212)		-0.0771 (0.0645)	-0.0437 (0.0664)
VolCon		6.72e-09 (0.000000247)		-7.96e-08 (0.000000464)		0.000000826 (0.000000486)	0.00000124* (0.000000615)
UN_PK		-0.0000824 (0.0000116)		-0.0000574 (0.0000214)		0.000363 (0.000741)	0.000182 (0.000581)
TFree			0.000110 (0.00245)		-0.0000435 (0.00247)	-0.000123 (0.00268)	-0.000627 (0.00266)
TOpen			-0.000624 (0.00148)		-0.000236 (0.00138)	-0.00160 (0.00181)	-0.000339 (0.00167)
lnFDLfl_CUpc			0.000112 (0.000262)		0.000234 (0.000467)	0.0000901 (0.000241)	0.000140 (0.000406)
PolGlob			0.000945 (0.00172)		0.00199* (0.00115)	0.000414 (0.00267)	0.00568 (0.00361)
QoG_Indx			-0.0126 (0.350)		-0.0852 (0.369)	0.119 (0.511)	-0.208 (0.557)
TotODA_fl_tot_pc			-0.00000267*** (0.000000593)		-0.00000246*** (0.000000789)	-0.00000211** (0.000000806)	-0.00000185*** (0.000000830)
PolStab	0.0172 (0.0333)	0.00104 (0.0317)	0.0252 (0.0431)	0.000939 (0.0320)	0.0271 (0.0451)	0.0461 (0.0587)	0.0428 (0.0683)
Constant	-0.125 (0.0759)	0.108 (0.0890)	0.0434 (0.466)	0.0485 (0.161)	0.172 (0.536)	-0.241 (0.542)	0.806 (1.104)
Observations	324	312	156	283	149	146	139
rss	9.289	8.560	5.820	8.551	5.787	5.536	5.313
F	5.493	0.279	132.5	0.227	439.4	92.82	481.2
r2	0.0137	0.00180	0.00934	0.00285	0.0151	0.0510	0.0892

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: Robustness checks for GRULAC

	(1)	(2)
	GRULAC	WEOG
d.GDPpcPPPy	-0.00000848 (0.00000611)	-0.0000108 (0.0000147)
d.SoA	-0.424*** (0.105)	
d.lnSoA		0.320 (0.234)
d.Volcon	0.00000161*** (0.000000500)	-0.000000866 (0.000000601)
d.UN_PK	-0.000638 (0.000473)	-0.00138 (0.00674)
d.TFree	-0.0000126 (0.00244)	0.00452 (0.00482)
d.TOpen	-0.00109 (0.00173)	0.0102 (0.00650)
d.InFDI.fl.CUpC	0.000243 (0.000195)	-0.00000803 (0.00000893)
d.IntOrga	0.0108 (0.00764)	-0.0153 (0.00955)
d.Ttreaty	-0.00272 (0.00289)	0.00631 (0.00412)
d.QoG.Indx	-0.495 (0.445)	0.411 (0.477)
d.TotODA.fl.tot.pc	-0.000511* (0.000264)	
PolStab	-0.00173 (0.0688)	0.0375 (0.144)
Constant	0.0581** (0.0246)	-0.300 (0.200)
Observations	142	129
rss	4.928	6.768
F	11.23	6.169
r2	0.155	0.132

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Regressions: Deviations from the Mean for GRULAC and WEOG

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	dPower	dUN	dOutUN	dPower+dUN	dPower+dOutUN	dOutUN+dUN	Full Model
d_GDPpcPPP	-0.00000313 (0.00000281)			-0.00000581 (0.00000287)	-0.0000120 (0.0000138)		-0.0000108 (0.0000147)
d_lnSoA		-0.167 (0.190)		-0.214 (0.264)		0.257 (0.217)	0.320 (0.234)
d_Volcon		-0.00000426* (0.000000218)		-0.000000441* (0.000000232)		-0.000000985 (0.000000600)	-0.000000866 (0.000000601)
d_UN_PK		-0.00196 (0.00549)		-0.00208 (0.00546)		0.000305 (0.00745)	-0.00138 (0.00674)
d_TFree			-0.000103 (0.00313)		0.00208 (0.00328)	0.00308 (0.00409)	0.00452 (0.00482)
d_TOpen			0.00962* (0.00465)		0.00843* (0.00532)	0.0109 (0.00635)	0.0102 (0.00650)
d_IntOrga			-0.0146 (0.00934)		-0.0123 (0.00922)	-0.0158 (0.0101)	-0.0153 (0.00955)
d_Ttreaty			0.00381 (0.00365)		0.00425 (0.00367)	0.00594 (0.00406)	0.00631 (0.00412)
d_InFDLfl_CUpc			-0.00000645 (0.00000814)		-0.00000631 (0.00000812)	-0.00000832 (0.00000872)	-0.00000803 (0.00000893)
d_QoG_Indx			0.225 (0.535)		0.310 (0.538)	0.318 (0.473)	0.411 (0.477)
PolStab	0.135* (0.0748)	0.0877 (0.0746)	0.118 (0.130)	0.0964 (0.0800)	0.110 (0.131)	0.0380 (0.147)	0.0375 (0.144)
Constant	-0.0600 (0.0633)	-0.0866 (0.0769)	-0.0217 (0.0846)	0.0318 (0.118)	-0.0479 (0.1000)	-0.244 (0.173)	-0.300 (0.200)
Observations	240	242	133	216	133	129	129
rss	11.67	11.33	7.232	11.29	7.187	6.794	6.768
F	1.707	1.521	1.199	1.299	1.607	9.813	6.169
r2	0.0115	0.0315	0.0729	0.0346	0.0785	0.129	0.132

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 8: Robustness checks for WEOG (2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	dPower	dUN	dOutUN	dPower+dUN	dPower+dOutUN	dOutUN+dUN	Full Model
d_GDPpcPPP	0.00000246 (0.00000288)			-0.00000278 (0.00000261)	-0.00000481 (0.00000617)		-0.00000848 (0.00000611)
d_SoA		0.326*** (0.0665)		0.328*** (0.0678)		-0.419*** (0.0988)	-0.424*** (0.105)
d_Volcon		0.000000373** (0.000000182)		0.000000383* (0.000000190)		0.00000157*** (0.000000490)	0.00000161*** (0.000000500)
d_UN_PK		-0.0000931 (0.000263)		-0.000107 (0.000336)		-0.000201 (0.000472)	-0.000638 (0.000473)
d_TFree			0.000257 (0.00230)		0.000386 (0.00252)		-0.000126 (0.00244)
d_TOpen			-0.000481 (0.00157)		-0.000478 (0.00161)		-0.00109 (0.00173)
d_InFDIfl_CUpc			0.0000878 (0.000146)		0.000102 (0.000170)		0.000243 (0.000195)
d_InvOrga			0.00630 (0.00695)		0.00600 (0.00735)		0.0108 (0.00764)
d_Treaty			0.00243 (0.00275)		0.00258 (0.00320)		-0.00272 (0.00289)
d_QoG_Indx			-0.272 (0.306)		-0.297 (0.327)		-0.495 (0.445)
d_TotODA_fl_tot_pc			-0.000294* (0.000141)		-0.000301* (0.000147)		-0.000511* (0.000264)
PolStab	0.0205 (0.0395)	0.0100 (0.0297)	-0.0114 (0.0542)	0.00979 (0.0312)	-0.0117 (0.0562)	-0.00654 (0.0658)	-0.00173 (0.0688)
Constant	0.0352*** (0.00227)	0.0284*** (0.000741)	0.0913** (0.0370)	0.0270*** (0.00173)	0.0879** (0.0353)	0.0521* (0.0261)	0.0581** (0.0246)
Observations	324	316	156	287	149	149	142
rss	9.410	7.982	5.676	7.978	5.668	4.953	4.928
F	0.244	11.80	1.533	11.14	1.316	10.94	11.23
r2	0.000841	0.0691	0.0339	0.0696	0.0352	0.151	0.155

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 9: Robustness checks for GRULAC (2)

6 Appendix

Pairwise Corr (1)	GDPpcPPP	Pop	lnSoA	VolCon	UN_PK	lnTFree	TOpen	lnFDLfl_CUpc	lnPolGlob	QoG_Index	TotODA_fl_tot_pc	PolStab
GDPpcPPP	1.0000											
Pop	-0.0432	1.0000										
lnSoA	0.5330	0.2815	1.0000									
VolCon	0.3746	0.1528	0.4277	1.0000								
UN_PK	0.1095	-0.0335	0.0200	0.0027	1.0000							
lnTFree	0.3852	-0.1462	0.2667	0.1382	0.0120	1.0000						
TOpen	0.2635	-0.1922	-0.1591	-0.1390	0.0486	0.1738	1.0000					
lnFDLfl_CUpc	0.2163	-0.0173	0.0363	0.0068	-0.0073	0.0506	0.1676	1.0000				
lnPolGlob	0.2995	0.1898	0.5407	0.2385	0.1806	0.2345	-0.1621	0.0232	1.0000			
QoG_Index	0.1982	-0.0069	0.1329	0.0280	0.1145	0.0807	0.0953	0.0824	0.0999	1.0000		
TotODA_fl_tot_pc	-0.0009	-0.0082	0.0012	-0.0019	-0.0009	0.0302	-0.0058	0.0024	0.0137	-0.0138	1.0000	
PolStab	0.5503	-0.1143	0.2025	0.1390	0.1250	0.3295	0.3277	0.1204	-0.0333	0.1692	0.0178	1.0000

Table 10: Pairwise correlation matrix (1)

Pairwise Corr (2)	d_GDPpcPPP	d_Pop	Pop	d_InSoA	d_VolCon	d_UNPK	d_TFree
d_GDPpcPPP	1.0000						
d_Pop	0.0905	1.0000					
Pop	0.0905	0.9998	1.0000				
d_InSoA	-0.0241	0.5420	0.5428	1.0000			
d_VolCon	0.2442	0.8143	0.8142	0.4911	1.0000		
d_UNPK	0.0195	-0.1106	-0.1105	0.0312	-0.0157	1.0000	
d_TFree	0.0133	0.0972	0.0972	0.1945	0.0124	-0.0315	1.0000
d_TOpen	0.4528	-0.3602	-0.3602	-0.2793	-0.2264	0.0927	-0.2020
d_InFDI_f_CUpc	0.3216	-0.0736	-0.0736	-0.1653	-0.0512	-0.0529	-0.0134
d_PolGlob	-0.0728	0.2553	0.2549	0.8325	0.2674	0.2788	0.2735
d_IntOrga	-0.0803	-0.0736	0.3274	0.1866	0.3419	0.1866	0.1665
d_Treaty	0.5575	0.2538	-0.1671	-0.1671	0.3051	0.0381	0.2142
d_QoG_Indx	-0.0069	-0.3270	-0.3267	0.1381	-0.1678	0.1763	-0.1858
PolStab	-0.1143	0.2025	-0.1143	-0.3303	-0.0825	0.1390	-0.1696

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Pairwise Corr (2)	d_TOpen	d_InFDI_f_CUpc	d_PolGlob	d_IntOrga	d_Treaty	d_QoGIndex	PolStab
d_GDPpcPPP							
d_Pop							
d_InSoA							
d_VolCon							
d_UNPK							
d_TFree							
d_TOpen	1.0000						
d_InFDI_f_CUpc	0.4042	1.0000					
d_PolGlob	-0.0623	-0.2027	1.0000				
d_IntOrga	-0.0406	-0.1439	0.6243	1.0000			
d_Treaty	0.0663	0.1538	0.9307	0.5384	1.0000		
d_QoG_Indx	0.2033	0.0205	0.2163	0.2320	0.0008	1.0000	
PolStab	0.3129	0.1180	0.2038	-0.2060	0.0526	-0.0399	1.0000

Table 11: Pairwise correlation matrix (2) [separated]

Pairwise Corr (3)	d_GDPpcPPP	d_Pop	Pop	d_InSoA	d_SoA	d_VolCon	d_UN_PK	d_TFree
d_GDPpcPPP	1.0000							
d_Pop	0.0522	1.0000						
Pop	0.0522	0.9990	1.0000					
d_InSoA	0.1520	0.7228	0.7221	1.0000				
d_SoA	0.1215	0.8981	0.8972	0.7344	1.0000			
d_VolCon	-0.0189	0.5603	0.5600	0.4426	0.4310	1.0000		
d_UN_PK	0.5334	-0.0628	-0.0627	-0.0415	-0.0613	-0.0444	1.0000	
d_TFree	-0.0220	0.0075	0.0075	0.1646	-0.0071	-0.0112	-0.0327	1.0000
d_TOpen	0.1248	-0.4804	0.4799	-0.6265	-0.4174	-0.2691	0.0793	-0.2322
d_InFDI_fl_CUpc	0.3360	-0.1698	-0.1696	-0.2415	0.1133	-0.1792	-0.0558	-0.3357
d_PolGlob	0.0345	0.5028	0.5023	0.7552	0.4660	0.3806	0.1428	0.3508
d_IntOrga	0.0070	0.6038	0.6034	0.8122	0.5959	0.4297	0.0361	0.2963
d_Treaty	-0.0905	0.2340	0.2338	0.4290	0.2350	0.1820	-0.0538	-0.3143
d_QoG_Index	0.3048	-0.1868	-0.1867	-0.0454	-0.1620	-0.0394	0.2755	-0.1519
PolStab	0.5152	-0.2301	-0.1143	0.3076	-0.1257	-0.1205	0.2918	-0.0412
d_TotODA_fl_tot_pc	-0.4164	0.1483	0.1481	0.0638	0.0300	0.0963	-0.1106	0.0723

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Pairwise Corr (3)	d_TOpen	d_InFDI_fl_CUpc	d_PolGlob	d_IntOrga	d_Treaty	d_QoG_Index	PolStab	d_TotODA_fl_tot_pc
d_GDPpcPPP								
d_Pop								
Pop								
d_InSoA								
d_SoA								
d_VolCon								
d_UN_PK								
d_TFree								
d_TOpen	1.0000							
d_InFDI_fl_CUpc	0.2867	1.0000						
d_PolGlob	-0.6532	-0.4290	1.0000					
d_IntOrga	-0.6286	-0.4042	0.8710	1.0000				
d_Treaty	-0.3115	0.1047	0.3709	0.3131	1.0000			
d_QoG_Index	0.4087	-0.0003	0.0358	-0.0848	-0.0231	1.0000		
PolStab	0.4255	0.4855	-0.3871	-0.4299	-0.0086	0.4109	1.0000	
d_TotODA_fl_tot_pc	-0.3777	-0.3186	0.2915	0.2628	0.1639	0.1849	-0.5576	1.0000

Table 12: Pairwise correlation matrix (3) [separated]

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