

**The Role and Effect of IGO Staff
in the Design of Intergovernmental Organizations**

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ABSTRACT

In much international relations scholarship, the creation and form of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) is explained by looking to states, which are presumed to be the primary actors in demanding and fashioning IGOs. Yet around *two-thirds* of today's intergovernmental organizations were created not by states alone, but with the participation of personnel from pre-existing IGOs. What, if anything, are the consequences of IGO staff involvement in the institutional design arena? Uniting and building upon the literatures on institutional design and international bureaucracy, I derive a hypothesis with crucial policy and theoretical implications: *the greater the extent to which IGO staff set the institutional design agenda to which states react, the more insulated the resulting institution will be from mechanisms of state control*. Agenda-setting involves shifting the status quo to which states refer when negotiating with IGO staff over whether to create new intergovernmental organizations and how such organizations will look. Insulation entails dampening the stringency of mechanisms, such as veto power or budget control, by which states endeavor to steer, monitor, or reverse organizational activities – it constitutes a facilitating objective that aids IGO employees' ultimate pursuit of material security, legitimacy, and policy advancement. The more that IGO staff determine the institutional design agenda, the better able they are to present states with a *fait accompli* that advances their own objectives by loosening mechanisms of state control.

Statistical analyses of a new and original dataset support the hypothesis. The bottom line is that the personnel of intergovernmental organizations can and do exert a tangible impact on states via their participation in the institutional design arena. From a practical standpoint, this raises policy concerns about the elevated amount of resources that states would need to expend to influence organizational activities. From a theoretical standpoint, this speaks to ongoing debates concerning IGO independence and democratic deficits in the international realm, elucidates important links between work on institutional design and work on international bureaucracy, enriches our vision of state-IGO relationships in terms of principal-agent frameworks, and enhances our understanding of when and how non-state actors play key roles in institutional design.

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I. Overview of the Puzzle and the Argument

International relations scholars have spent decades focusing attention on intergovernmental organizations, in order to explain why IGOs are created, and why IGOs possess the forms that they do. Received work employs a variety of frameworks. Yet many explanations reduce to a simple idea: the creation and form of intergovernmental organizations is most fruitfully understood by looking to states, which are the primary actors in demanding and fashioning IGOs.

The real world, however, is not so simple. Sometimes states do call for and launch new IGOs on their own – but more often than not, they don't. Over the past several decades, the number of intergovernmental organizations created with involvement by staff of pre-existing IGOs has skyrocketed. The vast majority – around *two-thirds* – of today's intergovernmental organizations were created not by states alone, but with the participation of personnel from extant IGOs.¹ Scores of prominent intergovernmental organizations were crafted in this way: the International Energy Agency (IEA), Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Global Program on Money Laundering (GPML), and many more.

A Puzzling and Under-Explored Phenomenon

Participation by IGO staff in institutional design now is the norm rather than the exception. It is too complex and varied to be explained away blithely as delegation by states.² The resultant bodies, moreover, cannot be dismissed out of hand as trivial, for they address a wide variety of important topics, encompass strong and weak states alike, and operate in every corner of the globe.

Received theories, as currently conceived, do not anticipate this. What is more, employees of intergovernmental organizations tend to *fuel* the misconception of a state-monopolized process, by downplaying rather than boasting of their own role. As one 25-year veteran of the United Nations secretariat, now safely retired, points out:

Creating regimes is the oldest function by international secretariats, and the most invisible... If you look at the podium of any international negotiation, you will see an international bureaucrat, usually behind a placard with an administrative title like secretary or director or assistant secretary-general or chief. The secretariat officials will mostly be taking notes or handing pieces of paper to the chairperson – a representative of a member state. *Behind the scenes, and long before the negotiations between states takes place, the secretariat influences the result. If it does its work well, it remains unnoticed.*³

¹ Shanks et al. 1996, 599.

² As discussed in more detail later, “created with involvement by staff of pre-existing IGOs” encompasses the following activities: 1) IGO staff provided secretariat services and/or information to states undertaking institutional design, 2) IGO staff participated in a moderate capacity, either by initiating conferences or by directly participating in design negotiations at the invitation of states, 3) IGO staff initiated comprehensive institutional design proposals to be presented to states, or 4) IGO staff set up a new body, with limited or no input from states. Note that these activities range from quite modest involvement (providing informational services to states) to quite proactive involvement (setting up bodies with little input from states) – such variation is examined both theoretically and empirically in subsequent sections.

³ Mathiason 2007, 87-88, emphasis added.

Some may find this assertion quite startling. After all, even scholars who highlight the ability of IGO staff to have an impact in the international realm have overlooked institutional design as an arena in which they actually do so.

Thus, an intriguing puzzle lies unaddressed. States are capable of carrying out institutional design on their own – they have done so in the past and sometimes do so even today.⁴ The institutional design process constitutes a key occasion in which states attempt to implement mechanisms to promote the new body's enduring responsiveness to member state interests. Given institutions' well-known tendency toward path-dependency, the design stage takes on even greater significance. So what, if anything, are the consequences of IGO staff involvement in the institutional design arena? And if any consequences worth noting indeed exist, how have IGO personnel seemingly gained ground in the institutional design arena in the first place?

Previewing the Argument

The second question remains more academic than pressing if there is little difference between institutional designs developed by states alone and those developed with the participation of IGO staff. Therefore, while a companion piece addresses the second question in detail, here I focus on the first portion of the puzzle. To do so, I draw on two seemingly distinct bodies of work: that on institutional design, and that on international bureaucracy. Uniting and building upon these literatures, I derive a prediction with crucial policy and theoretical implications: *the greater the extent to which IGO staff set the institutional design agenda to which states react, the more insulated the resulting institution will be from mechanisms of state control*. Agenda-setting involves shifting the status quo to which states refer when negotiating with IGO staff over whether to create new intergovernmental organizations and how such organizations will look. Insulation entails dampening the stringency of mechanisms, such as veto power or budget control, by which states endeavor to steer, monitor, or reverse organizational activities.⁵ The more that IGO staff determine the institutional design agenda, the better able they are to present states with a *fait accompli* that advances their own objectives by loosening mechanisms of state control.

The literature on institutional design and the literature on international bureaucracy actually have much to say to one another – something that has been missed in the past yet provides rich ground for further research. Insights into the characteristics and actions of institutional design participants apply not only to states, but also to IGO staff. Meanwhile, insights into the impact of the international bureaucracy apply not only to arenas in which IGO staff are left largely to their own devices, but also to the institutional design arena, which generally has been presumed to be monopolized by states. Accepting that ultimate objectives of IGO personnel include material security, legitimacy, and advancement of policies they deem fitting, then insulation from state control can aid employees' pursuit of these objectives and itself constitute a facilitating goal.

⁴ Feld et al. 1988.

⁵ Agenda-setting and insulation from state control are distinct concepts, and it is not the case that the staff of extant IGOs merely replicate their own characteristics in new institutional designs. Consider, for example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the offshoot that its staff helped to create: the International Energy Agency (IEA). While decision-making in the OECD requires unanimity among member states (i.e., stringent state control, with an effective veto wielded by every state), decision-making in the IEA follows majority voting rules and consequently is more insulated from state control than is its antecedent.

Regardless of whether staff themselves originated the notion of creating a new body, they can better pursue their ultimate and facilitating objectives by participating in institutional design than by not participating. Once involved, they often face reasons to push for designs that are more insulated from state control than what states would produce on their own.⁶ States can perceive and attempt to counteract this, resulting in an institutional design that is not as insulated as IGO personnel would produce on their own, either. But in the end, the design is the outcome of a bargaining process – one in which states may face important disadvantages.⁷ For one thing, IGO staff accrue not only expertise in a given policy area, but also insights into the weaknesses, uncertainty, and exploitable differences among states. Furthermore, states' attention is divided among numerous matters, but IGO staff pay special attention to institutional design: because their own fortunes hinge in part on the activities of other bodies within their organizational family, IGO staff are likely to see institutional design as an existential struggle in which they must bargain hard. Involvement in institutional design provides IGO staff with more direct – and likely lasting – means for increasing insulation from state control in new bodies within their organizational family.

Essential, for making sense of the institutional design arena, is recognition of the web of interconnections within the international bureaucracy. Far from being developed in a vacuum, new bodies are reconciled with existing ones through a complex hybrid system of nesting or other linkages.⁸ The bodies under discussion are *not* mere departments or other subsidiaries of pre-existing organizations. They are bodies that stand on their own yet maintain relationships with bodies whose employees participated in the institutional design process. For instance, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has its own secretariat, but that secretariat shares physical facilities with personnel of the World Meteorological Organization. The International Energy Agency has its own executive-director, who reports directly to IEA member states but is nominated by the Secretary-General of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe undertakes its own activities but is required to file periodic reports on those activities with the UN Economic and Social Council.

Previewing the Findings and Implications

The greater the extent to which IGO staff set the institutional design agenda, the more insulated from state control the resulting institution will be. To investigate this hypothesis without sacrificing either depth or generalizability, I employ a complementary approach of qualitative and quantitative methods. In a companion piece, I undertake detailed case studies of the origins of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the United Nations Development Program, and the International Energy Agency. Here, I construct and statistically analyze a new and original dataset, consisting of 180 randomly sampled intergovernmental organizations – this accounts for numerous other factors and offers more generalizable insights.

⁶ As further discussed in the theoretical section, this is a general tendency – but it does not mean that IGO staff will strive to cut all ties to states or will seek insulation from state control in all cases.

⁷ As a convention to facilitate theoretical tractability, international relations scholarship employs the simplifying assumption of unitary actors: individuals comprising a state are thought to be united by their existential interest in the survival and prosperity of that state. In the same vein, I employ this convention for the individuals comprising an IGO's staff. I recognize the reality that individuals within states and within IGO staff may disagree, and that individuals may possess simultaneous interests in state and IGO survival/prosperity. In case studies in a companion piece, I relax the unitary actor convention and explore the consequences.

⁸ Aggarwal 1998, 1.

Throughout the empirics, I take seriously – yet ultimately reject – concerns that: 1) states nevertheless account for the entire process, because they sideline IGO staff or explicitly delegate institutional design responsibilities to them, or 2) the conditions under which IGO staff participate in institutional design are fundamentally different and less “important” than the conditions under which states design alone. Both statistical analyses and case studies indicate that participation by IGO staff in institutional design cannot be dismissed blithely as unimportant, or as state-driven. Moreover, both methods produce evidence supporting the hypothesized relationship between institutional design agenda-setting by IGO staff and new bodies’ insulation from state control.

The bottom line is that the personnel of intergovernmental organizations can and do exert a tangible impact on states via their participation in the institutional design arena. This has significant implications for international relations scholarship and for public policy. From a policy standpoint, the phenomenon raises practical concerns about the elevated amount of resources that states would need to expend to steer, monitor, or reverse organizational activities. From a theoretical standpoint, the phenomenon speaks to ongoing debates concerning IGO independence and democratic deficits in the international realm, elucidates important links between work on institutional design and work on international bureaucracy, enriches our vision of state-IGO relationships in terms of principal-agent frameworks, and enhances our understanding of when and how non-state actors play key roles in institutional design.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents the theoretical framework. I lay the theoretical foundations by drawing on the existing literatures on the characteristics and actions of institutional design participants, and the characteristics and actions of the international bureaucracy. Then I unite these two strands, deriving predictions of how IGO employees may act in institutional design and how those actions may be manifested in the bodies that they participate in creating. Section III employs large-n statistical analyses and an original dataset to demonstrate that, even after controlling for multiple other factors, the greater the extent to which the employees of a pre-existing IGO set the institutional design agenda, the more insulated the new body tends to be. The impact of IGO personnel participation in institutional design holds across multiple operationalizations of insulation, is both statistically and substantively significant, and is robust to multiple alternative specifications. Section IV discusses the findings, delves into their policy and theoretical implications, then concludes.

II. Theoretical Framework

Our world has shifted from one in which states monopolize the creation of intergovernmental organizations, to one in which IGO staff themselves often are extensively involved. Little in received international relations scholarship predicts this shift. As one observer evocatively points out, many scholars see the international system as a billiard table in which states are differently sized billiard balls, bouncing off one another. Such an image conceives of no place for the personnel of intergovernmental organizations, “unless perhaps they are part of the felt on the table, or perhaps the chalk used to prepare the cue.”⁹ Even scholars who do highlight the ability of IGO staff to have an impact in the international realm have overlooked institutional design as an arena in which they actually do so.

I seek to rectify this, positing that the staff of intergovernmental organizations pursue their own objectives and have a significant, tangible effect on institutional design. Highlighting and drawing on hitherto unexplored synergies between the literature on institutional design and

⁹ Matthiason 2007, 10.

the literature on international bureaucracy, I explain why one should expect differences between institutional designs developed by states alone and those developed with the participation of IGO staff. Specifically, I argue that *the greater the extent to which IGO staff set the institutional design agenda to which states react, the more insulated the resulting institution will be from mechanisms of state control.*

Once the seemingly distinct bodies of work on institutional design and on international bureaucracy are linked, they point to theoretical expectations about the behavior and impact of IGO staff in the institutional design arena. As explored in detail in the following pages, the extant literature on institutional design contributes to my argument with the following insights:

- Participants in institutional design behave instrumentally, crafting institutions in ways anticipated to advance their own objectives.
- In order to craft institutions in ways anticipated to advance their own objectives, participants in institutional design wrangle to implement mechanisms to promote the institution's enduring responsiveness to its designers.
- The greater the opportunities for a particular designer to implement mechanisms to promote the institution's enduring responsiveness to designers, the more those mechanisms will promote responsiveness to that particular designer.

Meanwhile, the extant literature on international bureaucracy contributes to my argument with insights of its own:

- IGO staff are actors who are incompletely controlled by states and who possess objectives of their own.
- Insulation from state control constitutes a facilitating objective that aids the pursuit of material security, legitimacy, and policy advancement by IGO staff.
- IGO staff can better pursue their objectives by participating in institutional design than by not participating.

Both bodies of work can benefit by exploring their own expansiveness. Work on institutional design presents crucial elucidation of the ways that design outcomes vary in conjunction with the characteristics and actions of those who participate in the design process – but it generally focuses on states as the key participants, overlooking the fact that IGO staff are both frequently and extensively involved in this arena as well. Work on international bureaucracy provides essential illumination of the characteristics and actions that enable IGO staff to have an impact in the international realm – but it overlooks institutional design as an arena in which this impact can be felt. Scholars in both bodies of work face an even richer research agenda by probing these synergies.

The under-explored phenomenon of IGO staff participation in institutional design forges a crucial and fruitful link between those who wish to understand institutional design and those who wish to understand the impact of IGO staff in the international realm. By wedding these two bodies of theoretical work, as well as recognizing the empirical fact that IGO staff do

participate in institutional design, I derive two important points. First, what we know about the behavior of participants in institutional design applies not only to states (as generally presumed) but also to the personnel of pre-existing intergovernmental organizations. Second, what we know about the impact of the international bureaucracy applies not only to arenas in which IGO staff are left largely to their own devices, but also to the institutional design arena, which generally has been presumed to be monopolized by states. From this, an important hypothesis follows: the greater the extent to which IGO staff set the institutional design agenda to which states react, the more insulated the resulting institution will be from mechanisms of state control. To see this, consider each piece – institutional design insights, the empirical reality of IGO staff participation, international bureaucracy insights, and the hypothesis – in turn.

Insights from Work on Institutional Design

Received work on institutional design points out that *participants in institutional design behave instrumentally, crafting institutions in ways anticipated to advance their own objectives*.¹⁰ Whether solutions are sought to avoid armed conflict, facilitate trade flows, or quell the spread of disease, the underlying logic of the process is similar. That is, the emergence of international institutions in general – and intergovernmental organizations in particular – stems from “rational, purposive interactions among states and other international actors to solve specific problems.”¹¹

As used here, the notion of instrumentality simply indicates that in the design arena, actors consider alternative institutional forms, in terms of which forms could be expected to facilitate actors’ goals. This is a relatively “thin” conception of rationality, in that it involves few presumptions about the context in which actors are operating. For example, it allows for the possibilities that participants in institutional design face incomplete information, are uncertain about means-ends relationships, possess objectives that conflict with other participants, compromise in the face of different objectives, or consider objectives over different timeframes. It also allows for the possibilities that unintended consequences emerge, objectives do not end up being facilitated as envisioned, or institutions change later.¹²

Work on institutional design also indicates that *participants in institutional design wrangle to implement mechanisms to promote the institution’s enduring responsiveness to its designers, in order to craft institutions in ways anticipated to advance their own objectives*.¹³ Absent a particular empirical context, delineating an exact *a priori* specification and ordering of actors’ objectives in institutional design is a largely impossible task – as other scholars have noted.¹⁴ Rankings of specific objectives differ across actors and even vary for a given actor at different points in time. In fact, actors themselves are keenly aware of this fact, and this is why they bargain over institutional design.

Scholarship applying principal-agent concepts to institutional design echoes this notion. Once a principal has decided to entrust tasks to an agent, the principal still must address key design questions concerning the nature of the delegated authority and the nature of the principal’s mechanisms of control.¹⁵ The latter, in particular, are pivotal in encouraging the

¹⁰ Weimer 1995; Goodin 1996; Aggarwal 1998; Nurmi 1998.

¹¹ Koremenos et al. 2001, 762.

¹² For useful warnings regarding the ways in which the concept of institutional design – particularly the “rational” variety – can be misunderstood or misused, see Pierson 2000; Wendt 2001; Duffield 2003.

¹³ Koremenos et al. 2001, 762.

¹⁴ Aggarwal 1998, 10-11.

¹⁵ Hawkins et al. 2006, 11.

agent's longer-term responsiveness to its principal.

Built-in mechanisms for promoting continued institutional responsiveness allows for different orderings of specific objectives, particularly over time. For states, the installation of institutionalized channels of influence constitutes an important facilitating objective: it aids states in pursuing their ultimate objectives over the longer term, even as those ultimate objectives change. In addition, it privileges the actors involved in the “ground floor,” the design process itself. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) provides a stark and well known example. Designed predominantly by the five large states that emerged victorious from the second world war, the UNSC institutionalizes a permanent seat and veto power for France while offering no special advantages for Germany. Thus, while France's specific objectives likely have changed numerous times in the decades since World War II, its institutionalized influence in this crucial United Nations body has remained consistent. Institutional elements, once in place, cannot necessarily be altered easily. As one observer succinctly summarizes: “Initial agency design makes possible certain paths and rules out others. Founding moments loom large.”¹⁶ The impact of institutional design extends well into the future.

Cognizant of this, participants in institutional design wrangle to implement mechanisms by which they can steer, monitor, or reverse organizational activities. By doing so, they attempt to ensure that the new body will remain responsive to its designers over time. Given the prevalence of state-centric views of the international realm, much of the received literature presumes that states are the sole – or at least, the most important – participants in the design of new intergovernmental organizations. As one set of scholars summarizes, “states use international institutions to further their own goals, and they design institutions accordingly.”¹⁷ This is a potentially problematic over-simplification, as I emphasize below. Nevertheless, much of what we know about the control mechanisms implemented by participants in institutional design is framed in the shorthand of mechanisms of *state* control. Although they may be able to employ behind-the-scenes informal channels to exert influence within institutions, designers often hedge their bets by implementing more-formal channels, such as management of resources, institutional oversight, and/or decision-making practices.¹⁸

Management of resources – financial or human – is a key mechanism of state control. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for instance, is funded directly and solely by its member states. Moreover, because each state's contribution is calculated with regard to the size of its economy, the United States alone possesses leverage over approximately 25 percent of the budget.¹⁹ In other organizations, however, states do not monopolize financing. Rather, funds may come from fellow IGOs, or even from non-state/non-

¹⁶ Zegart 1999, 7.

¹⁷ Koremenos et al. 2001a, 762. Note, however, that these authors acknowledge that the actors involved in creating new IGOs may be non-states (see page 763). Yet they join other veins of work in assuming that states are the *key* actors in institutional design.

¹⁸ For an overview of the formal and informal channels used by states and other actors to exert influence within intergovernmental organizations, see Cox and Jacobson 1974. The four general channels emphasized by the authors (i.e., controlling resources, blocking actions, initiating actions, and brokering deals) are similar to the management of resources, institutional oversight, and decision-making practices that I discuss here. I readily acknowledge that states may attempt to control IGOs by less formal means, and that IGO staff may seek insulation from these less-formal mechanisms as well. Because the received literature pays little attention to the role of IGO personnel in institutional design, however, I begin by demonstrating that their involvement is having an impact even on states' common, formal mechanisms of control. Less-formal mechanisms remain an avenue for further research.

¹⁹ “Budget.” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development website.

http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761854_1_1_1_1_1,00.html. Accessed June 5, 2009.

IGO sources such as non-governmental organizations, business interests, or private individuals. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, for example, prepares its own budget proposal, which it submits to a fellow institution, the Organization of American States (OAS) – the OAS may accept or reject the Court’s proposal, but may not amend it.²⁰

In addition to financial resources, an institution’s human resources may provide inroads for control by those who participated in the body’s creation. The President of the World Bank has always been an American citizen, nominated by the U.S. government.²¹ The Executive-Director of the World Food Program, in contrast, can hail from any state and is jointly appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization, after consultations with the FAO board.²² The more that an IGO’s financial and human resources are susceptible to the whims of its member states, the more easily states can mete out guidance, rewards, and sanctions to the organization’s employees.

States can exert control via *institutional oversight* as well. In some IGOs, member-states meet quite frequently and at a high level to oversee organizational activities. In the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), for example, Russia and other former Soviet republics meet four times per year at the heads-of-government level, as well as twice per year at the heads-of-state level.²³ In other intergovernmental organizations, states meet less frequently – and when they do, their representatives might not be government officials at all. The statutes of the International Hydrological Program (IHP), for instance, merely requests that states choose hydrology “experts” as their representatives – at the 2008 meeting of the IHP Council, nearly half of the states were represented by individuals from universities.²⁴ Moreover, although the IHP’s full membership mirrors that of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the IHP Council consists of only 36 member states at a time, and the representatives of those 36 states meet only once every two years.²⁵ The more stringently and directly that states participate in institutional oversight, the more easily they can monitor and rein in the actions of IGO staff.

Decision-making practices constitute another important mechanism of state control. Some IGOs possess only one decision-making body, which in some cases does not even consist of the entire membership. In the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), for instance, the Board of Trustees is composed of approximately 20 states, selected on a rotating basis by the UN Secretary-General in consultation with the President of the UN General Assembly and the President of ECOSOC.²⁶ To stand, therefore, secretariat activities need the acquiescence of only a handful of the member-states. In other intergovernmental organizations, decisions filter through multiple bodies, consisting of the full state membership as well as a subset of states – thus, there are more eyes on secretariat activities. For example, quotidian decisions for the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the

²⁰ Yearbook of International Organizations Online, 2007-2008. Accessed March 25, 2009.

²¹ “About Us.” International Bank for Reconstruction and Development website. <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20040580~menuPK:1696997~pagePK:51123644~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.html>. Accessed March 24, 2009.

²² “Corporate Information.” World Food Program website. <http://www.wfp.org/about/corporate-information>. Accessed April 29, 2009.

²³ Yearbook of International Organizations Online, 2007-2008. Accessed May 6, 2009.

²⁴ International Hydrological Program website. <http://www.unesco.org/water/ihp/council/18th/>. Accessed June 15, 2009.

²⁵ Yearbook of International Organizations Online, 2007-2008. Accessed June 15, 2009.

²⁶ Yearbook of International Organizations Online, 2007-2008. Accessed July 9, 2008.

Caribbean (OPANAL) are managed by a Council, which consists of just five member states at a time. The OPANAL General Conference, which consists of all member states, keeps tabs on Council and secretariat activities, as well as retaining responsibility for major decisions.²⁷

Veto power, too, can be a dramatic curb on IGO activities. For example, each of the members of the Andean Community possesses the unilateral ability to block decisions and resolutions, both of which must be adopted by consensus.²⁸ In the United Nations Security Council, any one of the five permanent member states can single-handedly veto a Council resolution. In other organizations, veto power by a minority of states exists in more subtle ways: weighted voting schemes permit some states to “count” more than others, while ever-higher supermajority requirements allow blocking by an ever-smaller number of states. In contrast, organizations governed by one-country-one-vote, simple-majority practices (e.g., UNECE, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) are capable of making decisions even if a substantial number of member states dissent.

As the examples make clear, intergovernmental organizations vary markedly in their insulation from states’ management of resources, institutional oversight, or decision-making practices. Students of American politics have noted analogous variation among domestic agencies as well, and have traced it back to the actors involved in the institutional design process. For instance, Congress attempts to insulate the U.S. bureaucracy from presidential influence by fashioning new administrative agencies in which the president has less say over factors such as financing and personnel.²⁹ This is designed to impose costs on the executive branch, by increasing the resources that a president would need to expend in order to steer, monitor, or reverse agency activities. Not surprisingly, then, presidents generally seek greater control for themselves and oppose the legislature’s insulation attempts. When Congress is not involved, executives tend to create agencies that are less insulated from their own control.

I raise the possibility that an interplay somewhat similar to that between Congress and U.S. presidents exists in the international realm between states and IGO personnel. Variation in intergovernmental organizations’ insulation from mechanisms of state control is not wholly random. While mechanisms of state control may evolve over time – whether because of deliberate maneuverings by IGO staff or simply because states pursue control less vigorously as years pass³⁰ – some differences likely stem from design. Indeed, as other scholars have pointed out, international institutions in general (and intergovernmental organizations in particular) “are the result of rational, purposive interactions among states and other international actors to solve specific problems.”³¹

Insulation from mechanisms of state control is a crucial organizational characteristic. The extent of an IGO’s delegated authority matters little if states can easily intervene. Insulation from state control is costly for states: it increases the amount of resources that states would need to expend to steer, monitor, or reverse IGO activities. What is more, once it exists, states face difficulty in restricting the tasks to which it can be applied. Even when states themselves implement insulation so that an IGO can better pursue a particular task, an organization that has been buffered from state intervention for one task also acquires “air cover” for pursuing other

²⁷ Yearbook of International Organizations Online, 2007-2008. Accessed June 9, 2009.

²⁸ Yearbook of International Organizations Online, 2007-2008. Accessed June 10, 2009.

²⁹ Howell and Lewis 2002; Lewis 2003.

³⁰ See, for example, Cox 1969; Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004; Wendt 2001; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Stiglitz 2003; Barnett and Coleman 2005; Hawkins et al. 2006; Hawkins and Jacoby 2006; Pollack 2006.

³¹ Koremenos et al. 2001a, 762.

initiatives, for which states may find insulation unnecessary or even unwelcome.³²

In fact, work on institutional design presents a recurring theme: *the greater the opportunities for a particular designer to implement mechanisms to promote the institution's enduring responsiveness to designers, the more those mechanisms will promote responsiveness to that particular designer.* Actors who did not participate on the “ground floor” but later become involved with an institution frequently find that the institution was not set up to be responsive to their specific objectives. That is, the body is somewhat insulated from their influence. Yet non-participants are not the only ones for whom this may be true. Institutional design entails a bargaining arena in which some participants face more favorable opportunities than others to convert their design visions into reality.

Again, the origins of the United Nations Security Council offer a conspicuous illustration. In April 1945, the United States hosted a multilateral conference in San Francisco, bringing together representatives of approximately 50 national governments to deliberate the creation of a new, all-purpose organization called the “United Nations.” Yet the initial outline of this institution did not take shape at the conference – it had been sketched out years before, by the U.S. Department of State, with the encouragement of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Furthermore, as one of the key victors emerging from the waning days of World War II, the United States possessed not only the motivation but also the wherewithal to set the institutional design agenda and transform much of this sketch into reality. Thus, it is unsurprising that privileged spots in the Security Council guarantee the enduring responsiveness of this institution to the U.S. itself and to four states that the U.S. perceived at the time to be key allies. Fifty states participated in the design negotiations, but only five obtained permanent seats at the most important table.

The Reality: IGO Staff as Institutional Design Participants

In fact, it is outcomes such as this that provide real-world credence to the alluring shorthand of viewing intergovernmental organizations as epiphenomenal, as mere reflections of the distribution of power among states in the international system. The reality, however, is much more complex. Designs of modern-day institutions rarely come out of the sort of inter-state deliberations typifying the San Francisco conference. State monopolization of institutional design is not the rule – it has become the exception. The majority of the intergovernmental organizations that exist today were created not by states alone, but with the participation of staff members of pre-existing IGOs.³³ These hundreds of organizations operate in every corner of the globe, addressing a remarkable range of topics: from agricultural research to energy supplies, from money-laundering to environmental protection. The issues covered are diverse – and often, politically sensitive.

Examples abound. With input from staff of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), states introduced the International Energy Agency (IEA) to alleviate threats to energy supplies. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) sponsored the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) to tackle the spread of a deadly disease. The

³² One might suggest that states, if they deem this by-product objectionable, can simply roll back the ways in which the intergovernmental organization is shielded from their intervention. Yet not so surprisingly, exerting control generally *requires* mechanisms of control. Even insulation flowing directly from purposive actions by states rather than IGOs is difficult to roll back, for if it were easily reversible it would not have provided the credibility, etc., needed for the IGO's mission in the first place.

³³ Jacobson 1984; Jacobson et al. 1986; Shanks et al. 1996; Pevehouse et al. 2004.

United States government negotiated with employees of the UN Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorology Organization (WMO) to craft the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as a response to global warming. The Council of Europe designed the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) to support eastern bloc countries in their transitions from communism. Based to a great extent on proposals from the UN secretariat, ECOSOC and the United Nations General Assembly authorized the establishment of the UN Development Program (UNDP) to distribute development aid and advice to the world's poor countries. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) founded the Global Program on Money Laundering (GPML) to fight the financing of terrorism. In short, hundreds of intergovernmental organizations created with IGO involvement exist, and they do not simply operate on the margins of the international realm, dealing with non-essential tasks in unimportant regions.

New international bodies have been brought about with a range of participation by employees of intergovernmental organizations. In some cases, pre-existing intergovernmental organizations offer a forum in which states can bargain over design, and IGO staff provide secretariat services and information to facilitate such bargaining. In other cases, IGO staff initiate conferences, convening states in order to encourage an institutional response to an issue they see as a problem. And in yet other cases, IGO staff take a particularly active role, directly participating in design negotiations or even campaigning for comprehensive proposals of their own. Indeed, as one observer points out, "because secretariats are formally supposed to *respond* to governmental requests rather than lead them, secretariats are not often the *visible* provocateurs of regime creation."³⁴ It can and does occur, however – and in-depth investigations of the process may reveal IGO staff proactivity that otherwise would remain obscured.

Insights from Work on International Bureaucracy

IGO staff participation in institutional design is widespread. This would matter little, however, if the employees of intergovernmental organizations act no differently than states themselves. But as a growing body of theoretical and empirical work points out, IGO staff are bureaucrats whose objectives in general – and with respect to states' control mechanisms in particular – do not mirror perfectly those of states themselves.³⁵

In short, the international bureaucracy literature indicates that *IGO staff are actors who are incompletely controlled by states and who possess objectives of their own*. An observation made by a student of American bureaucracy applies to the personnel of intergovernmental organizations as well: "[They] have interests of their own and some powerful weapons to pursue them. Whether this means ensuring their organization's survival, maintaining professional norms, or advancing certain policy goals, agencies often behave in ways that [politicians] never intended... bureaucrats possess the interests, information, and expertise to make life difficult for elected officials."³⁶

Recent scholarship, applying principal-agent (P-A) notions to the international realm, makes this point particularly clear. Characterizing intergovernmental organizations as agents

³⁴ Matthiason 2007, 95 (emphasis added).

³⁵ See, for example, Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004; Barnett and Coleman 2005; Hawkins et al, 2006; Wade and Jacoby 2006. I loosely characterize this body of work as examining "international bureaucracy," for this is a common underlying theme in research done by people interested in principal-agent models, constructivism, organizational ecology, international civil service, IGO independence, and so on.

³⁶ Zegart 1999, 16.

explicitly casts IGO staff as strategic actors rather than mere automatons of state-principals.³⁷ States, like other principals, can anticipate and attempt to mitigate their agents' pursuit of self-interested objectives. Yet try as they might, principals cannot perfectly control their agents – those who desire complete control carry out the task themselves. Agents are opportunistic, or “self-interest seeking with guile.”³⁸ They may leverage information (e.g., technical expertise, or knowledge of their own objectives) not fully known by their principals. They may benefit from chance and complexity, which hinder principals in tracing back outcomes to specific agent actions. Agent opportunism is, as one set of scholars summarizes, “ubiquitous.”³⁹

Institutional design constitutes a key, yet overlooked, arena in which the employees of intergovernmental organizations may be pursuing their own objectives.⁴⁰ But while P-A theory provides a basis for expecting the objectives of the employees of intergovernmental organizations to differ from those of member states, it offers less insight into what those objectives tend to be. Indeed, as other scholars point out, “Principal-agent approaches acknowledge that international organizations are purposeful actors that presumably might pursue internal reorganization and initiate their expansion into new areas, but because they lack any explanation of [IGO staff] interests, they cannot say what changes [IGO staff] will pursue and why.”⁴¹

In order to understand what IGO personnel stand to gain by participating in the design of new bodies, and how institutional design might systematically differ as a result, it is necessary to understand what they “want.” Building upon recent scholarship, I posit that the ultimate objectives of IGO staff include material security, legitimacy, and advancement of policies they deem fitting. Insulation from state control can aid their pursuit of these objectives, and therefore insulation itself constitutes a facilitating goal.⁴² Consider each of these objectives in turn.

Material security is critical for the international bureaucracy. To survive and operate, intergovernmental organizations need funding to pay for personnel, facilities, programs, and the like. Moreover, because these needs are ongoing, IGO staff likely pay attention to the mix of sources from which funding is drawn. This is because the source of the funding often determines how it must be handled. Unspent funding from state sources, for instance, frequently is not permitted be carried over from one budget period to the next – instead, organizations are to return the funds to member states as credits on their next contribution.⁴³ Furthermore, lack of diversification ushers in reliance on a handful of sources, whose fickleness can trigger serious disturbances in organizational activities.

In fact, from states' perspective, such insecurity often constitutes an instrumental design feature and an important mechanism of state control. The United States, for instance, deliberately has withheld its promised contributions from a host of IGOs – the United Nations,

³⁷ Nielson and Tierney 2003; Cortell and Peterson 2006; Hawkins et al. 2006; Hawkins and Jacoby 2006; Lyne et al. 2006; Milner 2006; Martin 2006; Pollack 2006; Thompson 2006.

³⁸ Williamson 1985, 30.

³⁹ Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 5.

⁴⁰ Indeed, students of American politics have identified institutional design as a context in which domestic bureaucrats strive to protect and advance their own objectives. For example, Zegart (1999) offers the following summary of the behavior of U.S. bureaucrats and politicians in the institutional design negotiations producing the National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, and Joint Chiefs of Staff: “The War and Navy departments, the intelligence bureaucracy, and the Congress were all too busy guarding their *own interests* to worry about national ones” (8, 10, emphasis added).

⁴¹ Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 158.

⁴² Barnett and Coleman 2005, 597-598.

⁴³ Matthiason 2007, 231.

UNESCO, the International Labor Organization, the UN Human Rights Council, and others – and threatened to do so for many more. This is a conscious and overt tactic to upset the activities of organizations that somehow displease the U.S., and it is most disruptive for those whose funding sources are relatively undiversified. The United States, moreover, is not the only state that employs this tactic. Indeed, as one observer sums up, many intergovernmental organizations “either live in a constant cash-flow crisis or in the shadow of an imminent one.”⁴⁴

IGO personnel face incentives to reduce material insecurity, for it threatens their own individual futures as well as that of their organization as a whole.⁴⁵ One important way of enhancing material security is by broadening, if possible, the pool from which funding is sought. This does not necessarily entail replacing states as funding sources – in fact, the ideal scenario, from the point of view of IGO staff, may be retaining states but also cultivating access to additional sources, with the aim of increasing both the absolute size and the variety of the potential resource pool.

In addition to material security, international bureaucrats seek *legitimacy*.⁴⁶ Perceptions of legitimacy are crucial, because personnel of intergovernmental organizations often must rely on moral suasion rather than brute force to elicit compliance and enforcement from states and other entities.⁴⁷ Such perceptions stem from a variety of sources, including their ability to act justly and honestly, to base policies on desirable norms and values, to form governance structures in accordance with the law, or to represent different societal groups in a fair way.⁴⁸ To cultivate legitimacy, the employees of IGOs strive to distinguish themselves from their presumably self-serving member-states. They claim to pursue the collective welfare of their international membership – and frequently trumpet their ostensibly neutral and technocratic methods of doing so.⁴⁹

The more stringently and obviously an IGO is controlled by member states, however, the less convincing these efforts become. It is difficult to claim to work for the collective good, for example, if a minority of the membership possesses veto power over organizational activities. Like state monopolization of an organization’s access to material resources, decision-making practices also constitute a mechanism by which states exert control within an IGO but also put at risk staffs’ pursuit of particular organizational goals, such as legitimacy. Were staff to have input into institutional design, therefore, it is reasonable to suspect that decision-making structures would look somewhat different – not necessarily eradicating states’ influence, but dampening it.

IGO employees also strive for the *advancement of policies that they deem fitting*. As one set of international relations scholars puts it:

They are the missionaries of our time. Armed with a notion of progress, an idea of how to create the better life, and some understanding of the conversion process, many IO staff have as their stated purpose to shape state action by establishing best practices and by articulating and transmitting norms that define what constitutes acceptable and legitimate

⁴⁴ Matthiason 2007, 231.

⁴⁵ Pfeffer and Salancik 2003.

⁴⁶ Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995, 574).

⁴⁷ Hurd 1999; Karns and Mingst 2004.

⁴⁸ Junne 2001, 191.

⁴⁹ Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 23.

state behavior... Solutions that involve regulation, arbitration, and intervention by rational-legal authorities (themselves or other organizations) appear sensible, rational, and good to IOs and so disproportionately emerge from IO activity.⁵⁰

Indeed, the “zealots” and “policy-motivated agents”⁵¹ that intrigue students of American politics exist among IGO personnel as well.

Often drawn by their acclimation to certain professionalized environments and/or concern for certain issues, IGO employees self-select into particular bodies. The World Health Organization attracts physicians, while the World Bank attracts economists, for example. Individuals troubled by the plight of refugees gravitate towards the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, while those troubled by environmental degradation gravitate towards the UN Environment Program. Even in IGOs promoting international cooperation across multiple issue areas (e.g., the European Union), employees often share a commitment to addressing varied policy problems with multilateral solutions.

For instance, in internal surveys personnel within the United Nations’ organizational family repeatedly indicate that the motivation for their work is “the mission of the organization.”⁵² This is not to say that employees of the UN or other organizations are always unified in their specific policy prescriptions – but they are united by an interest in seeing their chosen issues taken seriously on the world stage, and they select into organizations accordingly. The policy prescriptions that IGO staff deem fitting, moreover, often flow from policy proactiveness and a rational-legal worldview not necessarily shared by the world as a whole. States may – and often do – try to thwart policies advocated by IGO staff.

Work on international bureaucracy points out that *insulation from state control constitutes a facilitating objective that aids the pursuit of material security, legitimacy, and policy advancement by IGO staff.*⁵³ States use insecurity as a form of leverage over intergovernmental organizations, face a fundamental tension between their interest in bolstering organizational legitimacy and their inclination to exert political pressure, and do not always agree with IGO employees’ notions of apt policies. If states dominate IGO access to material resources, they are able to manipulate supplies and disrupt organizational activities. If states wield overt power via vetoes or decision-making bodies, they undermine the efforts of IGO employees to free themselves from political entanglements and portray themselves as neutral technocrats working for the common good. If states hold frequent and high-level meetings to monitor organizational activities, IGO staff face impediments to addressing their chosen issues as they see fit. Since stringent mechanisms of state control can stand in the way of employees’ ultimate objectives, *insulation from state control* emerges as a facilitating consideration.

A parallel exists. Mechanisms of state control – such as management of resources, institutional oversight, and decision-making practices – institutionalize states’ channels of influence within an organizational structure, thereby aiding states’ pursuit of ultimate objectives that may change over time. Insulation from such mechanisms buffers IGO staff from states’ attempts to steer, monitor, or reverse organizational activities, thereby aiding employees’ pursuit of things like material security, legitimacy, and policy advancement. In the same way that control constitutes a facilitating objective for states, insulation from state control constitutes a

⁵⁰ Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 33, 34.

⁵¹ Downs 1967; Gailmard and Patty 2007.

⁵² Mathiason 2007, 83.

⁵³ Barnett and Coleman 2005, 598.

facilitating objective for IGO employees. Though converse concepts, control and insulation offer attractive flexibility for states and IGO staff, respectively.

It is important to emphasize two points about the pursuit of insulation from state control. First, it is a *general* tendency. That is, it holds in the aggregate but encompasses the possibility of individual exceptions. Second, it does not mean that staff of intergovernmental organizations, having assumed roles in institutional design, will strive to cut *all* ties to states. Extreme insulation, in fact, may be counter-productive for the pursuit of IGO employees' objectives. The survival, legitimacy, and policy advancement of IGO personnel generally relies to some extent on maintaining at least modest linkages to states, for states are hesitant to join or entrust tasks to bodies that they cannot pressure to at least some degree.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, IGO staff do face reasons to maneuver for somewhat greater insulation from mechanisms of state control – many of which stem from the institutional design stage.

Few scholars have considered what the implications of this would be in the arena of institutional design itself. However, many do note that the personnel of intergovernmental organizations not only face reasons to strive for greater insulation from state control – they actually *do* so. Although well-known tendencies toward institutional stickiness make it difficult for IGO staff to alter what has been implemented in the design stage, they nevertheless try and sometimes succeed. They can attempt to minimize or escape states' control mechanisms and manipulation by, for example, diversifying their sources of revenue or information.⁵⁵ Executive heads can articulate ideological agendas and build coalitions.⁵⁶ IGO staff can interpret states' rules differently after delegation than before, adopt additional masters, or encourage access by non-governmental organizations and other outside parties.⁵⁷ They can lobby, co-opt competitors, or launch campaigns to bring states' preferences closer to their own.⁵⁸ They can take advantage of uncertainty or disagreements among states, and they can exert internal pressure on states by allying with domestic interest groups.⁵⁹

There is little basis for presuming that insulation-seeking behavior observed in general circumstances would for some reason be absent in the particular circumstances of institutional design. On the contrary, there is reason to believe that such behavior would be quite common. Participants in institutional design wrangle to implement mechanisms to promote the institution's enduring responsiveness to its designers, and this interplay often produces mechanisms that promote greater responsiveness to some designers than to others. IGO staff, like other participants in institutional design, seek to install channels by which they themselves can exert influence in the new body – and those channels may conflict with states' endeavors to do the same. For example, if states monopolize the new body's funding sources, IGO staff cannot.

In what way, then, do IGO staff stand to gain by participating in the design of new bodies? How does being involved in institutional design tie to IGO employees' pursuit of material security, legitimacy, and policy advancement? To make sense of the institutional design arena, it is crucial that one recognizes the web of interconnections among intergovernmental organizations. New bodies are not developed in a vacuum, but instead must be reconciled with pre-existing bodies.⁶⁰ While they stand on their own, they rarely stand *alone*. Rather, new

⁵⁴ Abbott and Snidal 1998; Ikenberry 2001; Hawkins and Jacoby 2006.

⁵⁵ Barnett and Coleman 2005, 598.

⁵⁶ Haas 1964; Cox 1969.

⁵⁷ Hawkins and Jacoby 2006.

⁵⁸ Hurd 1999; Barnett and Coleman 2005.

⁵⁹ Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 27-28.

⁶⁰ Aggarwal 1998, 1.

bodies are often nested within extant organizational families, or at least are set up with linkages to other bodies operating in similar issue areas, geographic regions, and so on. Those designed with the involvement of personnel from pre-existing organizations generally maintain relationships with those bodies. The pre-existing organization may share physical facilities with the new IGO, have input into the nomination of its director, consider periodic reports on its activities, etc. An observation made by a student of domestic foreign policy agencies can apply to intergovernmental organizations as well: with “asset co-specialization,” one body’s activities can hinge, in part, on the activities of another.⁶¹

Consequently, *IGO staff can better pursue their objectives by participating in institutional design than by not participating.* Just as IGO staff maneuver for greater insulation from state control within their own organization, there is reason for them to push to loosen mechanisms of state control in the design of bodies linked to their organizational family. In other words, just as loosened mechanisms of state control can facilitate IGO employees’ pursuit of material security, legitimacy, and policy advancement within their immediate organization, the insulation of the components of the wider organizational family matters as well. Regardless of whether they themselves originated the notion of creating a new body, IGO staff have a stake in institutions with which they will work, and they possess an interest in having input in the design process.

This is easiest to see when the impetus for IGO staff to participate in institutional design is *proactive* – in other words, when it is the personnel of an extant organization who are pushing for the creation of a new body linked to their organizational family. For a variety of reasons, IGO personnel may find the creation of a new intergovernmental organization attractive. Unlike rearranging or renaming departments internally, establishing a bona fide organization often entails hiring additional employees and garnering additional funding, thereby enlarging rather than merely reshuffling the overall pool of resources within an organizational family. For issues requiring the expertise of multiple existent IGOs, attempting to corral tasks in-house within just one of the relevant organizations may be unworkable and lack legitimacy. For IGO staff whose notions of fitting policies differ from those of member states, the creation of a new organization offers the promise of relocating the pursuit of such policies to a body dedicated to the topic, more buffered from state intervention, and possibly encompassing a different mix of states.

Pushing for greater insulation from state control can facilitate IGO employees’ pursuit of material security, legitimacy, and policy advancement. In light of the institutional web in which they operate, they likely push for greater insulation not only in their immediate organization but also in their wider organizational family. Even when the impetus for IGO staff to participate in institutional design is more *protective* in nature, similar logic applies. States themselves, rather than IGO staff, can determine that the creation of a new body is warranted. Personnel of bodies already operating in a specific issue area, geographic region, etc. pay particularly close attention to such developments. At the very least, they will need to operate in a context populated by this new body. In fact, their fortunes may be tied even more explicitly, for new bodies often become linked with pre-existing ones. Their own futures are more assured if the new body is a complement rather than a competitor for tasks and resources. Moreover, like any bureaucratic entity they stand to benefit by gaining influence over an enlarged pool of tasks and resources, and by dampening opportunities for interference by other actors. Even if they did not initiate the process themselves, the personnel of pre-existing IGOs have an interest in having input into institutional design and somewhat loosening state control within bodies connected to the wider

⁶¹ Zegart 1999, 37.

organizational family.

To sum up: IGO staff face reasons to maneuver for greater insulation from state control, because it can facilitate their pursuit of material security, legitimacy, and policy advancement. States' mechanisms of control often stem from the institutional design stage itself, and previous scholarship demonstrates that IGO staff can strive over time to alter what has been implemented. Involvement in the institutional design process itself, however, provides IGO staff with more direct – and likely lasting – means for increasing insulation from state control in new bodies within their organizational family.

The impetus to strive to be involved in the creation of new bodies may be proactive or protective in nature. Yet in either variant, IGO employees' behavior is similar. As one former United Nations bureaucrat points out: “[The assumption that] regimes are created and maintained by states... is not a correct assumption; much of the regime-creation process is facilitated in a very substantive and important way by secretariats who, rather than acting like a concierge, are more like managers at a hotel, still concerned with the comfort of guests but also with turning a profit.”⁶²

In the arena of institutional design, as elsewhere, the personnel of intergovernmental organizations possess and pursue their own objectives. By joining in institutional design negotiations, IGO staff can push for designs that *loosen* mechanisms of state control. Such loosening provides greater breathing room for the new organization to diversify its sources of funding, legitimize itself as a neutral party buffered from political pressures, and advance policies with less interference by states. In essence, the original “body” can endeavor to design “arms” that are more insulated from state control. This is facilitated by the fact that the latter almost always retain some sort of ties to the former.

Bringing It All Together

In summary, work on institutional design offers the following relevant insights: 1) participants in institutional design behave instrumentally, crafting institutions in ways anticipated to advance their own objectives; 2) to do so, they wrangle to implement mechanisms to promote the institution's enduring responsiveness to its designers, and 3) the greater the opportunities for a particular designer to do this, the more those mechanisms will promote responsiveness to that particular designer. Work on international bureaucracy provides additional relevant insights: 1) IGO staff are actors who are incompletely controlled by states and who possess objectives of their own; 2) insulation from state control constitutes a facilitating objective that aids IGO staffs' pursuit of material security, legitimacy, and policy advancement; and 3) IGO staff can better pursue their objectives by participating in institutional design than by not participating.

Taken together, these postulates lead to important, related points. First, what we know about the behavior of participants in institutional design applies not only to states (as generally presumed) but also to the personnel of pre-existing intergovernmental organizations. Second, what we know about the behavior of personnel of intergovernmental organizations in general also applies to the arena of institutional design in particular.

We see that IGO staff are incompletely controlled by states, and they possess objectives of their own – with insulation from state control as a facilitating objective that aids their pursuit of other objectives, such as material security, legitimacy, and policy advancement. We see that IGO staff can better pursue their objectives by participating in institutional design than by not participating – and they commonly do, in fact, participate. We see that, like other participants,

⁶² Matthaison 2007, 15.

IGO staff behave instrumentally, crafting institutions in ways anticipated to advance their own objectives – and to do so, they wrangle to implement mechanisms (such as insulation from state control) to promote the institution’s enduring responsiveness to IGO staff themselves. And the greater the opportunities for them to do this, the more those mechanisms in fact will promote the institution’s enduring responsiveness to IGO staff themselves.

Facing states, how do IGO staff manage to have any influence at the institutional design table? A companion paper addresses this question in detail, but a few points are worth noting here as well. One well-known source of bureaucratic influence is the command of expertise and information. As agents, IGO staff accrue specialized knowledge so that their state-principals do not have to – this gives them an informational edge. As Max Weber’s classic work points out, “The ‘political master’ finds himself in the position of the ‘dilettante’ who stands opposite the ‘expert.’”⁶³ Such experts are not only well-versed in a particular policy issue and into the activities of their own organizational family, but they also possess insights into the strengths, weaknesses, uncertainty, and internal workings of the states comprising their composite principal. States can overcome the informational advantages of IGO personnel, but only by cutting into their gains from working with agents in the first place. Thus, states may defer to the design recommendations of “expert” IGO staff, even when states themselves did not solicit such input.

Work on the role of domestic agencies in institutional design points to a second source of bureaucratic influence within this arena: high motivation. Consider the following insights into the dynamics surrounding negotiations among presidents and domestic bureaucrats to create new bodies:

[B]ureaucrats care most of all. While presidents fight hard to design agencies in certain ways, bureaucrats fight for their lives. Agencies are more willing than other political players to stick to their guns, to battle until the bitter end over questions of agency capabilities and jurisdiction. With this willingness comes power. Presidents, after all, have full agendas and limited time. If faced with intense bureaucratic opposition, they will almost always settle for something rather than nothing, for partial reforms and compromises instead of their ideal agency design. Bureaucrats know this. They know that holding out forces presidents to make concessions. And they are right.⁶⁴

A similar interplay exists between states and IGO staff on the international stage. Rather than emerging in a vacuum, new bodies must be situated within a complex web of pre-existing intergovernmental organizations, whose employees have a stake in institutions with which they will work. Whether for protective or proactive reasons, the personnel of extant intergovernmental organizations possess an interest in having input in the design process. For these bureaucrats, the stakes are relatively high: their own activities hinge, in part, on the activities of other bodies within their organizational family. Thus, IGO staff are willing to bargain hard in the institutional design arena, and such willingness provides leverage vis-à-vis states whose attention is allocated among numerous other matters.

Institutional Design Agenda-Setting by IGO Staff

While IGO staff tend to push for more-insulated designs, their ultimate success likely

⁶³ Weber 1946, 232.

⁶⁴ Zegart 1999, 50.

hinges on their centrality in the institutional design process. In predicting how institutional designs would differ as a result of the participation of IGO staff in the institutional design process, an important part of the explanation stems from the nature of the role played by IGO staff. Specifically, I highlight IGO employees' ability to shift the status quo to which states refer when deciding whether to create new intergovernmental organizations and choosing how such organizations will look. I hypothesize that:

The greater the extent to which IGO staff set the institutional design agenda to which states react, the more insulated from state control the new body will be.

That is, if IGO employees play only a supporting role vis-à-vis states, states maintain agenda-setting power and will be in a stronger bargaining position to resist maneuvers for greater insulation. Yet if IGO staff play a more proactive role, they are better able to set the design agenda themselves, forcing states into a weaker and more reactive bargaining position.

Indeed, as discussed above, the form of IGO staff participation in institutional design varies. That is, in some situations IGO personnel react to agendas set by states, while in others they set agendas to which states react. The more the situation is tilted toward the latter scenario, the better able are IGO staff to present states with a *fait accompli* that advances their own objectives by loosening mechanisms of state control. An integral component of agenda-setting is the opportunity to shape another actor's point of reference, which in turn affects how the actor evaluates its alternatives and whether those alternatives appear to be superior to the status quo.⁶⁵

The staff of existing intergovernmental organizations can shift, to varying extents, the institutional status quo for states. They can impel international discussions of issues that states did not perceive, tried to ignore, or wanted to address in a non-multilateral fashion. They can promulgate their own vision of the form an appropriate multilateral and institutional response ought to take. They can even try to make that vision a reality by designing and launching international institutions themselves. These moves shift the status quo to which states refer when deciding *whether* to create new intergovernmental organizations and choosing *how* such organizations will look. The more that IGO staff lay down the institutional design agenda for states, the more they shift the status quo to which states react.

The extent to which IGO staff actually shift the status quo varies. If states utilize an existing intergovernmental organization merely as a forum for discussing their own ideas about the necessity and possible form of a new body, then IGO employees encounter limited opportunities for agenda-setting and, consequently, for exerting a significant impact on institutional design. Certainly, in providing secretariat services for states' negotiations, staff can influence the nature of the information that states receive, and they may be able to suggest institutional design features more in line with their own objectives. For the most part, however, they occupy a reactive position, responding to an agenda in which (at least some) states already perceive a need for a new body and have ideas of how that body should look. States themselves have introduced a world in which a particular issue is deemed discussion-worthy *and* important

⁶⁵ Scholars recognize the importance of agenda-setting, and recent work calls attention to the importance of the status quo for understanding why states join international institutions. Specifically, by setting up international institutions themselves, powerful states may be able to shift the status quo to which weaker states refer when choosing whether or not to participate in an international institution. That is, a weaker state may wish that the institution did not exist, but it cannot return to such a world. Instead, it can choose only between joining the institution or remaining outside of it (Gruber 2001). My point is related, but different, as outlined above.

enough to warrant the creation of a dedicated new institution. With this as the status quo, the impact of IGO staff on the final form of a new body – in particular, the new body’s insulation from state control – is likely to be modest.

IGO staff are not always in a reactive position, however. Rather than waiting for states to perceive a particular issue as discussion-worthy, employees of an existing intergovernmental organization can make the case themselves. It is not uncommon for them to organize conferences to focus states’ attention on specific topics that they perceive as a problem in need of a multilateral solution. As one former employee of the United Nations notes:

Secretariats often encourage the convening of conferences under the hypothesis that a conference or summit meeting can be the excuse for its preparations. The calling of a conference or summit tends to focus attention on an issue, and the need for an outcome document provides the incentives to define the parameters that need to be negotiated to establish a new regime or modify an existing one... In structuring preparatory activities for the conferences the secretariats can have considerable influence on the result by organizing expert groups (and helping select their members), preparing their own analyses, and facilitating the negotiations of final documents.⁶⁶

It may be that states were unaware of or lacked information about a problem. Or, it may be that states were cognizant of the problem but faced incentives to ignore it or address it via non-multilateral channels. Either way, it is within the power of IGO employees to usher in a world in which a particular issue sits squarely on the agenda for international discussion.

What is more, in impelling states to discuss an issue on the international stage, the staff of intergovernmental organizations frequently delineate their own notions of an appropriate multilateral and institutional solution – and as explained above, there are reasons for IGO employees to offer design proposals that are relatively insulated from state control. This places states in a more reactive position: the status quo in which the issue is not being discussed no longer exists, nor does the status quo in which there is no clear vision for the form of an appropriate institutional solution. With this as the context for institutional design negotiations, the impact of IGO staff on the final form of a new body – in particular, the new body’s insulation from state control – is likely to be significant.

IGO employees themselves can portray a particular issue as both discussion-worthy *and* important enough to warrant the creation of a dedicated new institution. At times, they are even more proactive. Not only can they focus states’ attention on particular issues, or delineate their own notions of an appropriate multilateral and institutional solution – they also can attempt to set up a multilateral and institutional solution of their own. This constitutes an extreme form of setting the agenda and shifting the status quo for states. States’ choice, then, consists of permitting the new status quo to stand, or maneuvering to bring about an intergovernmental organization that is more to their liking. Although they might strongly wish to do so, states cannot return to a world in which the issue is not being discussed, *and* they cannot return to a world in which the issue is not being addressed by an international institution.

When IGO staff seize the initiative to such an extent, their impact on the final form of a new body – in particular, the new body’s insulation from state control – is likely to be considerable. In sum, then, the greater the agenda-setting by IGO staff, the more insulated from state control the new body will be. The next section probes this hypothesis.

⁶⁶ Matthiason 2007, 97.

III. Quantitative Analyses: A New and Original Dataset

To systematically test my prediction about the relationship between agenda-setting by IGO staff and the level of insulation from state control in resultant design, I constructed a new and original dataset. The dataset covers 180 intergovernmental organizations, randomly selected from the universe of existing IGOs as determined by the Union of International Associations (UIA) in its 2007-2008 online version of the *Yearbook of International Organizations* (YIO). The appendix provides detailed information about the dataset and its construction, and Table 1 lists all 180 intergovernmental organizations included in the random sample.

[TABLE 1]

The Dependent Variables: Mechanisms of State Control

The operationalization of state control is closely linked to the theoretical framework. Recall that participants in institutional design wrangle to implement mechanisms by which they can steer, monitor, or reverse organizational activities. States, in particular, often attempt to guarantee long-term influence through formal channels such as management of resources, institutional oversight, and/or decision-making practices. Therefore, I employ multiple dependent variables, in order to capture these various theoretical channels and offer a more comprehensive empirical evaluation of my argument.

Specifically, mechanisms of state control are captured according to the practices in place of as 2008, in four alternative ways: 1) *State Financing*, the extent to which states monopolize an IGO's financing, 2) *Oversight Meetings*, the number of times an IGO's full state membership meets to oversee organizational activities, 3) *Unilateral Vetoes*, whether any state possesses unilateral veto power within an IGO, and 4) *Government Representatives*, the extent to which states' representatives to an IGO hail from official government positions. *State Financing* gets at states' management of resources, *Oversight Meetings* gets at states' institutional oversight, *Unilateral Vetoes* gets at states decision-making practices, and *Government Representatives* gets at all three theoretical channels. All four operationalizations are coded so that higher values indicate state control, while lower values indicate insulation from state control. Table 2 lists summary statistics for the dependent variables, as well as all other variables in the analyses.

[TABLE 2]

The first operationalization, *State Financing*, takes on the following values: 2 if the intergovernmental organization has access to material resources from state sources only, 1 if from state sources but also from IGO sources and/or other sources, and 0 if from other sources only. "Other" refers to non-state, non-IGO sources: private entities, non-governmental organizations, interest earnings, fees for services rendered, and so on. The ordering captures the extent to which states monopolize an organization's material resources, for states exert direct control over their own contributions, indirect control over the contributions of intergovernmental organizations, and little control over contributions from other sources. Thus, state control is highest (and insulation is lowest) if states monopolize funding. State control is lowest (and insulation is highest) if non-state, non-IGO sources do.

The second operationalization, *Oversight Meetings*, measures the number of times an IGO's full state membership meets to oversee organizational activities within a given time period. At one extreme lie organizations, such as the Council of Europe, with delegates-in-residence who meet on a weekly basis. Yet other intergovernmental organizations, such as the World Food Program, are overseen only by a subset of the membership, and therefore the full membership never meets. The largest time span observed in the random sample is five years

between meetings of the full membership, so I use a five-year period for the count. Thus, *Oversight Meetings* ranges from a high of 240 meetings within five years (for bodies in which states' representatives meet weekly) to a low of 0 meetings within five years (for bodies whose full membership never meets). The higher the number of oversight meetings, the greater the opportunities for states to monitor, steer, or reverse organizational activities. That is, state control is highest (and insulation is lowest) if the full state membership convenes often for oversight meetings. Conversely, state control is lowest (and insulation is highest) if the full state membership rarely or never convenes for oversight meetings.

The third operationalization, *Unilateral Vetoes*, is a binary variable indicating whether an organization's decision-making rules permit states to wield unilateral vetoes. A value of 1 indicates that states make decisions according to unanimity, weighted voting, super-majority, or other rules that allow a single member to block an initiative. A value of 0 indicates states' inability to formally and unilaterally thwart a proposal within an intergovernmental organization. States are presumed to exert more direct control over an IGO if proposals can be blocked even by a single member. Thus, an organization's insulation from state control may be higher if states do not possess any unilateral vetoes than if they do.⁶⁷

For the fourth operationalization, *Government Representatives*, higher values indicate more stringent state control via the representatives states send to an IGO to make decisions on their behalf. It is coded as follows: 3 if all of the state representatives to the decision-making body are active government officials; 2 if a majority (but less than all) are active government officials; 1 if a minority (but more than none) are active government officials; 0 if none are active government officials. States exert more direct control through representatives that are active government officials (e.g., Secretary of State or Deputy-Minister of Agriculture), but less direct control through representatives who are not (e.g., representatives from educational institutions, corporations, or other private enterprises). Thus, state control is highest (and insulation is lowest) if active government officials monopolize governing bodies. State control is lowest (and insulation is highest) if non-government representatives do.

The Key Explanatory Variable: IGO Agenda-Setting

The key explanatory variable is *IGO Agenda-Setting*, an ordered variable indicating the extent to which employees of an existing IGO set the institutional design agenda to which states reacted. Higher values of *IGO Agenda-Setting* indicate more proactive institutional-design involvement by the staff of a pre-existing IGO. Specifically, for each intergovernmental organization in the sample, the variable takes on the following values: 0 if it was launched by states alone; 1 if it was created through inter-state negotiations for which IGO staff provided administrative services; 2 if it was designed largely by states, but with moderate input by IGO staff (e.g., staff participated in the negotiations at states' invitation, or staff organized a conference that brought attention to the issue); 3 if it was based on designs proposed by IGO staff and revised by states; and 4 if it was set up by IGO staff, with limited or no input from states. The involvement of pre-existing IGOs in institutional design is now the norm, not the exception: only about 35 percent of the randomly sampled organizations were launched by states alone.⁶⁸

The operationalization of *IGO Agenda-Setting* mirrors the theoretical framework, for it captures the potential for IGO staff to shift the status quo to which states react. For starters: by

⁶⁷ This variable must be considered with caution, as discussed in the appendix.

⁶⁸ This echoes patterns identified in previous research (Jacobson et al. 1986; Shanks et al. 1996).

offering informational services or organizing conferences, IGO staff can usher in a world in which an issue is being discussed in the international realm. Or, even more proactively: by offering design proposals or even launching new bodies themselves, IGO staff can usher in a world in which there is a clear vision of an international institutional design. States – though they might strongly wish to do so – cannot return to a world in which the issue is not being discussed, or they cannot return to a world in which the issue is not being addressed by an international institution. According to the theoretical framework, the greater the agenda-setting by IGO staff, the *looser* the mechanisms of state control in the new body. Thus in models with various mechanisms of state control as the dependent variables, I expect the coefficient of the key explanatory variable *IGO Agenda-Setting* to be negatively signed and statistically significant, after controlling for other factors.⁶⁹

Evaluating Concerns

I carefully consider, explicitly probe, and ultimately dismiss two concerns. The first is to suspect that states nevertheless account for the entire process. In terms of sheer frequency, it is impossible to deny that overt state monopolization of institutional design is the exception, *not* the rule. Yet perhaps states are only using pre-existing organizations as convenient venues for their own negotiations, thereby sidelining IGO employees. Or, perhaps IGO staff indeed are designing new institutions, but that is only because states demanded these new bodies and nudged closely controlled personnel of existing organizations to take on institutional design tasks on states' behalf. If this is true, then considering IGOs to be the products of states' demands and states' designs remains wholly appropriate.

In a companion piece, case study evidence challenges the notion that states account for the entire process due to sidelining or delegation: the origins of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, for instance, shows how ostensible state “authorization” of IGO staff involvement in institutional design may in fact be post-hoc acquiescence to a role that IGO staff have already taken. Nevertheless I treat this state-centric possibility seriously, and I explicitly allow for it in the quantitative analyses. If it were true that the involvement of IGO staff is actually quite marginalized by states, which merely utilize pre-existing organizations as convenient venues for their own negotiations, then one would expect little systematic difference in the designs of organizations that states create completely on their own and those that states create within the “handy auspices” of extant organizations. Furthermore, if it were true that states demanded these new bodies and nudged closely controlled personnel of existing organizations to take on institutional design tasks on states' behalf, then, again, one would expect little systematic difference in the designs. Yet neither proposition holds, as shown in the quantitative analyses.

A second type of concern is to acknowledge that states do not account for the entire process, but to conjecture that this does not matter. Perhaps the conditions under which IGO staff participate in institutional design are fundamentally different and less “important” than the conditions under which states design alone. It is possible that participation by IGO personnel occurs only in trivial issue areas, in peripheral parts of the world, or in circumstances that attract minimal attention from states in general and/or great powers in particular. Framed in more general terms: if the conditions under which IGO staff participate in institutional design are

⁶⁹ The results of ordered probit models, with *IGO Agenda-Setting* as the sole explanatory variable for the four operationalizations of state control, are in line my prediction. For all four models, the coefficients are negatively signed – and with only exception, those coefficients are statistically significant at the five-percent level.

fundamentally different from the conditions under which states design alone, then it is possible that differences in the resulting designs stem largely from such conditions, rather than from the participation of IGO staff per se. Thus, considering IGOs to be the products of states' demands and states' designs may be unsuitable for making sense of the broader universe of intergovernmental organizations, but it would remain a useful simplification for understanding those bodies that are in some sense "important."

A companion piece examines how IGO staff have gained ground in the institutional design arena and probes the conditions under which they are most extensively or frequently involved. But here, it is worth noting that the conditions under which IGO personnel participate in institutional design do not seem to differ much from the conditions under which states design alone. Elsewhere, case study evidence illustrates that IGO staff can play pivotal roles even in institutional design contexts dealing with sensitive issues, affecting all parts of the world, and commanding notice from powerful states. Moreover, in the quantitative analyses that follow, I include control variables such as whether the randomly sampled organization deals with security issues, focuses on more-developed areas populated by states of relatively strong capacity, was created without the involvement of any great powers, is considered a "non-conventional" body, and so on.

In addition, I run models to investigate factors that may predict conditions under which IGO staff participate in institutional design. Whether examined in terms of issue area, geographic focus, or involvement by great-power states, there is not much evidence that the conditions under which IGO staff participate in institutional design are vastly different from the conditions under which states design alone.⁷⁰ Consider Table 3.

[TABLE 3]

Columns 2 and 4 display the results of models with *IGO Agenda-Setting* as the dependent variable. I also collapse this measure of agenda-setting into a dichotomous alternative, *IGO Involvement*, which is set equal to 0 if *IGO Agenda-Setting* equals zero and equal to 1 if *IGO Agenda-Setting* is greater than zero. In other words, *IGO Involvement* indicates whether the personnel of an existing intergovernmental organization participated in any capacity in institutional design. Columns 1 and 3 display the results of models using this simpler dependent variable. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

In Columns 1 and 2, the factor that appears to be the most important predictor is whether the body encompasses political issues. If the new body would deal with such issues, personnel of pre-existing intergovernmental organizations are unlikely to participate in institutional design – and even if they do participate, they are unlikely to set the design agenda to a great extent. This makes sense, since political issues likely pertain to state survival more immediately than do economic or social ones, and therefore states may work energetically to prevent IGO staff from participating in the design of institutions that touch on such issues. Except for *Global Focus* and *USA Involved*, none of the other variables in these two models indicate any systematic differences between the conditions under which IGO staff participate or do not participate in institutional design.⁷¹ Even *Global Focus* and *USA Involved*, moreover, are statistically

⁷⁰ Note that most of the categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, a given observation may encompass both economic and social issues – the work of the Food and Agriculture Organization, for instance, touches on economic issues such as agriculture, as well as social issues such as poverty. Likewise, a given observation may focus on more than one region – the Ibero-American Social Security Organization, for example, focuses on Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking states in Europe and in the Americas.

⁷¹ The scarcity of statistically significant coefficients is not driven by multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. Side-by-side comparisons (of the 65 bodies created by states alone, versus the 115 created with the

significant only at the 10-percent level, and that significance does not hold across all four models.

Columns 3 and 4 drill down into more detailed types of political issues: a) crime/terrorism/border security, b) decolonization, c) governance/administration, d) law/arbitration, e) security/military/defense, f) energy, g) outer space/aerospace, and h) a mandate to promote general cooperation (in political issues but also in economic and social ones). This more-detailed probe reveals that IGO staff might participate in the design of bodies dealing with political issues such as governance or energy. However, they are unlikely to participate in the design of bodies touching on issues of national security or the design of bodies possessing a mandate to promote general cooperation. States, designing on their own, created security bodies such as the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) and omnibus bodies such as the United Nations (UN). In general, IGO personnel are not involved in creating such bodies.⁷²

Yet the vast majority of organizations do not fall into such categories. Only 9 percent of the randomly sampled organizations focus on security issues, and only 12 percent possess a mandate to promote general cooperation. Whether examined in terms of issue area, geographic focus, or involvement by great-power states, there is little basis for dismissing as “unimportant” the many bodies created with participation by the personnel of pre-existing intergovernmental organizations. With few – and relatively rare – exceptions, the conditions under which IGO staff participate in institutional design are not much different from the conditions under which states design alone. The two factors that do seem to predict differences are incorporated in subsequent robustness checks.⁷³

Control Variables

According to received theory, several other factors may matter for insulation from mechanisms of state control: the passage of time, the issue area and nature of the task involved,

involvement of staff from pre-existing organizations) consider only one factor at a time rather than holding all other factors constant as in Table 3. Yet like the models in Table 3, chi-squared tests (not shown here, to conserve space) uncover little difference between the conditions under which states monopolize institutional design and the conditions under which IGO staff participate.

⁷² In recent times, states themselves rarely create such bodies either. In particular, many of the omnibus organizations that do exist (e.g., the United Nations, the League of American States, or the Organization of American States) date from the first half of the 20th century. The quantitative analyses include the variable *Organization Age*, which indirectly controls for the year of creation.

⁷³ Note that a traditional selection model (e.g., a Heckman model) is inapplicable here, since the characteristics of state control mechanisms are observed for organizations designed by states alone *and* for organizations designed with the participation of IGO staff. Linked models (with one model predicting participation by IGO staff, and another model using IGO staff participation to predict insulation from state control) are also unsuitable. Factors enabling IGO staff to become involved and agenda-set in the institutional design process likely are similar to factors enabling IGO staff to bring about relatively insulated designs. Absent an elusive instrumental variable, one that is both theoretically driven and empirically strong, it is not clear what would provide identification. Therefore, I use a different approach to address the issue. As a subsequent robustness check, I exclude from the data the 16 organizations focusing on security issues and the 21 organizations possessing a mandate to promote general cooperation. Then I re-run the models on this subset of the data, in order to examine the possibility that differences in institutional design are driven by the *conditions* under which IGO staff participate in the design process, rather than from the participation of IGO staff per se. By doing so, like is compared to like: in the observations that remain, there is a similar “propensity” for IGO staff to have participated in the design process, and therefore one can probe whether actual participation indeed has the expected impact on insulation from mechanisms of state control. It does.

and attributes of the group of states involved. To allow for the possibility that organizations become more insulated (whether purposefully or not) over time, the analysis includes the variable *Organization Age*, which indicates the number of years that have passed since an organization was created. Issue area, too, may help to explain variation in insulation across intergovernmental organizations. Because security-related issues pertain to state survival more immediately than do economic or social ones,⁷⁴ states may be most willing to expend resources to retain control within IGOs that deal with such “high politics” issues. Or, matters requiring extensive technical or scientific expertise may entail informational asymmetries that place IGO staff in an advantageous position vis-à-vis states (in particular, weaker ones) that lack the resources necessary for acquiring similar specialized knowledge in order to steer, monitor, or reverse organizational activities. To capture these two possibilities, the analysis incorporates two binary variables. The first, *National Security Issues*, equals 1 if an intergovernmental organization deals with matters pertaining to national security, such as military training, collective defense, weaponry, and so on. The second variable, *Technical or Scientific Uncertainty*, equals 1 if an intergovernmental organization focuses on matters requiring expertise in an area in which technical or scientific knowledge remains under development.

The attributes of the states involved also constitute an important potential explanation for insulation from mechanisms of state control. Wealthy and comparatively like-minded states may find it relatively easy to install and employ strong mechanisms of state control within intergovernmental organizations. The binary variable *Developed-Areas Focus* controls for this possibility. Meanwhile, larger and more-heterogeneous groups, or groups involving lower-capacity states, encounter a more complex environment. When a group of states undertakes institutional design without the involvement of any great powers, limitations in leadership and capabilities make the maintenance of stringent state control more difficult. What is more, as the number and heterogeneity of the states involved in institutional design intensify, the negotiating environment becomes more challenging, hindering states’ ability to design and preserve mechanisms of state control within intergovernmental organizations.⁷⁵

To account for such complexities within the group of states involved in institutional design, the analyses incorporate three additional controls. *Number of States Negotiating* is a continuous variable capturing the size of the group of states involved in institutional design negotiations. *No Great Powers Negotiating* is a binary variable equal to 1 if the group of states involved in institutional design negotiations did not include any states that were great powers at the time. *Global Focus* is a binary variable equal to 1 if an intergovernmental organization was set up by and serves states from all over the world, rather than focusing on a specific region.

Results: The Impact of IGO Agenda-Setting

The statistical analyses employ probit models with the binary dependent variable *Unilateral Vetoes*. Ordered probit models are used with the ordered dependent variables *State Financing* and *Government Representatives*. Negative binomial models are used with the count dependent variable *Oversight Meetings*. All models are run with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Table 4 displays the results.

[TABLE 4]

Agenda-setting by IGO staff in the institutional design process clearly matters for the resulting body’s insulation from state control. For all four dependent variables, the greater the

⁷⁴ Lipson 1984.

⁷⁵ Koremenos et al. 2001a; Lyne et al. 2006.

extent to which IGO staff set the institutional design agenda for states, the less stringent are the mechanisms of state control. With other factors held constant, *IGO Agenda-Setting* is negatively signed and statistically significant at standard levels.

Across all four models, several of the control variables again are consistently related to an organization's insulation from state control: *Organization Age*, *National Security Issues*, *Technical or Scientific Uncertainty*, *Developed-Area Focus*, *No Great Powers Negotiating*, and *Global Focus*. Insulation from state control tends to be present in organizations created by and serving states from all regions of the world, in organizations in which no great powers participated in institutional design negotiations, in organizations focusing on issues requiring expertise in an area in which technical or scientific knowledge remains under development, and in older organizations. In contrast, mechanisms of state control tend to be strictest for those catering to developed states or dealing with national security issues. Not all of these variables are significant at standard levels for all versions of the dependent variables, however. *Number of States Negotiating* is negatively related to *Oversight Meetings*.

Insulation from state control intensifies – in other words, mechanisms of state control loosen – with the extent to which IGO staff set an institutional design agenda for states. Simulations using Clarify software give a more concrete depiction of this relationship. The estimated probabilities, shown in Table 5, were calculated at each value of *IGO Agenda-Setting*, with all other variables held at their mean values. Each estimate is statistically significant at the one-percent level.

[TABLE 5]

The pattern is clear across all four operationalizations of state control. The more that the institutional design agenda is set by staff of pre-existing institutions, the more the resulting body is insulated from state control. The more that states, on the other hand, dominate the agenda, the more stringent the mechanisms of state control that are implemented in the new body.

As agenda-setting by IGO staff becomes more extreme, the probability that the body's financing solely comes from non-state, non-IGO sources increases from 6 to 47 percent. The probability that the full state membership never convenes to oversee organizational activities jumps from 7 to 19 percent. The probability that no states possess unilateral vetoes soars from 46 to 83 percent. The probability that no representatives hail from government posts shoots up from 3 to 28 percent.

Conversely, the less that IGO staff determine the reference point to which states react – that is, the more that states themselves dictate the institutional design agenda – the less insulated from state control the resulting body tends to be. The probability that the body's financing comes from states alone rockets from 7 to 49 percent. The probability that states' oversight meetings occur twice per year rises from 2 to 4 percent. The probability that at least one state possesses a unilateral veto grows from 17 to 54 percent. The probability that all state delegates are government officials swells from 32 to 75 percent.

Robustness Checks

Across the models, the coefficient on *IGO Agenda-Setting* are negatively signed and both statistically and substantively significant. To probe the robustness of these key findings, I undertake several further checks. Specifically, I rerun the four models, using six sets of additional control variables.⁷⁶ Overall, the sign and statistical significance of the explanatory

⁷⁶ To conserve space, the detailed results of the 24 models are not shown here. However, the additional variables' signs, statistical significance, and impact on the main results are discussed below.

variable remain largely unchanged, as shown in Table 6.

[TABLE 6]

First, I exclude from the data the 16 organizations focusing on security issues and the 21 organizations possessing a mandate to promote general cooperation, in light of the earlier finding that IGO staff are unlikely to be involved in the design of such bodies. The models are then run on this subset of the data, in order to examine the possibility that differences in institutional design are driven by the *conditions* under which IGO staff participate in the design process, rather than from the participation of IGO staff per se. By doing so, like is compared to like: in the observations that remain, there is a similar “propensity” for IGO staff to have participated in the design process, and therefore one can probe whether actual participation indeed has the expected impact on insulation from mechanisms of state control. It does. Across the board, the participation of IGO staff in institutional design remains systematically associated with loosened mechanisms of state control.

Second, I use indicator variables to control for the time period in which an institution was created.⁷⁷ Since many perceptions about institutional design stem from examinations of prominent organizations – such as the United Nations or the Bretton Woods institutions – created in the immediate post-World War II period, I use the period between 1945 and 1949 as the reference category and examine whether institutions created in other time periods display systemic differences. Only *Created in the 1980s* is ever statistically significant at standards levels – but not across all operationalizations of state control. Its coefficient is negative and significant only in terms of *State Financing*, indicating that funding sources are less monopolized by states in IGOs created during the 1980s, relative to IGOs created in the immediate postwar era.

Third, I use indicator variables to control for participation by the five IGOs whose employees are most frequently involved in institutional design. These are the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Organization of American States (OAS), United Nations (UN), and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Many of these additional controls are negatively signed but statistically insignificant at standard levels.

Fourth, I include an indicator variable for the two types of intergovernmental organizations that the *Yearbook of International Organizations* classifies as “non-conventional.” “Emanations” (Type E-g) and “organizations of special forms” (Type F-g) are the most common types of organizations but are sometimes omitted from other datasets of intergovernmental organizations. The coefficient on this control variable is generally negative, and it is statistically significant at standard levels in about half of the cases.

Fifth, to control for regional idiosyncrasies, I include indicator variables for the major regions of the world: Africa, the Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. In organizations designed by and serving states in Africa or the Middle East, states are more likely to be represented by government officials. In organizations designed by and serving states in Europe, states hold more meetings at which the full membership oversees organizational activities. None of the other regional controls is statistically significant.

Sixth, I add indicator variables for the involvement of specific great powers in institutional design negotiations: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The coefficients on these additional variables are almost always positive, supporting the

⁷⁷ Due to collinearity, this involves replacing the variable *Organization Age* and thereby allowing for the possibility that the relationship between time and institutional characteristics is not constant.

intuition that great powers impede organizations' insulation from state control. In other words, states' control mechanisms tend to be quite stringent when great powers participate in the design process. Only a few of the controls for great powers exhibit statistical significance at standard levels, however.⁷⁸

As synthesized in Table 6, these six robustness checks have no impact on the sign of the coefficient, and the coefficient maintains its statistical significance at standard levels in 19 of the 24 checks. Loss of statistical significance is concentrated in the models that operationalize a body's insulation as the presence of unilateral vetoes. The other operationalizations of insulation are less affected.

IV. Discussion of Findings and Implications

The theoretical framework yields predictions about the impact of IGO staff within the arena of institutional design. Regardless of whether staff themselves originated the notion of creating a new body, they can better pursue their objectives by participating in institutional design than by not participating. Once involved, there are reasons for IGO personnel to push for designs that are more insulated from state control than what states would produce on their own. The greater the role that IGO staff play in institutional design – especially, in terms of agenda-setting – the greater the insulation from state control in the resulting institution. The bottom line is that the personnel of intergovernmental organizations can and do exert a tangible impact on states via their participation in the institutional design arena. Large-n statistical analyses support the hypothesis, demonstrating that the impact of IGO staff exists across a variety of observations while controlling for numerous other factors.

Findings

Large-n statistical analyses show that the greater the extent to which IGO staff set the institutional design agenda to which states react, the greater the insulation from state control in the resulting institution. This is true even after accounting for the passage of time, the issue area and nature of the task involved, as well as the attributes of the group of states involved. The effect is statistically significant in all four models. Specifically, it holds regardless of whether mechanisms of state control are operationalized in terms of states' management of resources (*State Financing*), states' institutional oversight (*Oversight Meetings*), states' decision-making practices (*Unilateral Vetoes*), or all three (*Government Representatives*). Moreover, the findings are generally robust to numerous alternative specifications, including controls for the time period of creation, the particular IGOs or great powers involved, the regions of focus, and whether the body is of a non-conventional form.

In addition, the analyses reveal that there is little justification for dismissing as “unimportant” the many bodies created with participation by the personnel of pre-existing intergovernmental organizations. By and large, the conditions under which IGO staff participate in institutional design are not much different from the conditions under which states design alone. What is more, the main findings persist even when the models are re-run on a subset of the data, excluding security and omnibus organizations in order to more explicitly compare like to like.

Even more important, the effect of IGO participation is significant in substantive terms as well. Recall the Clarify estimations in Table 5, which consider the key explanatory variable *IGO*

⁷⁸ A notable exception to the great-power pattern is China, whose involvement predicts greater insulation from state control, although the effect is never statistically significant.

Agenda-Setting at various values while the other independent variables are held constant at their mean values. Clearly, a relationship exists. Common mechanisms of state control – such as veto power over organizational activities, monopolization of funding sources, institutional oversight, and using government officials as delegates – systematically encounter more obstructions in bodies created with the participation of employees of pre-existing intergovernmental organizations.

Policy Implications

By making design proposals and sometimes even setting the institutional design agenda themselves, IGO staff are having a real-world impact – an impact to which policymakers must direct attention. IGO involvement in institutional design can be costly for states, even the most powerful ones. For one thing, it can yield new bodies not initially demanded by states – regardless of whether creation was states’ idea, however, these are bodies on which states must expend resources to oversee. What is more, I find that common mechanisms of state control systematically encounter greater obstructions in bodies that were created with IGO involvement. Insulation increases the amount of resources that states would need to expend to steer, monitor, or reverse IGO activities – and states are not always amenable to paying the necessary costs. In short, IGO employees’ participation in institutional design tends to raise the costs of state control in the resulting bodies and even can bring to fruition bodies that states initially opposed.

Whether this serves the interests of the public, domestically or internationally, constitutes an important line of inquiry for policymakers. On the one hand, IGO staff may possess superior expertise and neutrality to work on behalf of the collective good in the institutional design arena. On the other hand, IGO staff may be susceptible to the same self-serving bureaucratic behavior that has been found to plague agency design in the domestic realm.⁷⁹

In considering the extent to which public interests are well served by the current state of affairs, policymakers must be cognizant that insulation from state control entails tradeoffs for states. An individual state, for instance, may find insulation useful at some times but quite irritating at others. An intergovernmental organization under close state control may be incentivized to work on states’ behalf but too tightly constrained to do so. One with greater insulation from state control, on the other hand, may be better able but less inclined to do so. While an IGO may be susceptible to being captured by its most powerful members if insulation from state control is relatively low, its staff may be even better able to pursue their own objectives if insulation is relatively high.

Once insulation from state control exists, it may be challenging to roll back, and states face difficulty in restricting the tasks to which it can be applied. An organization that is buffered from state intervention acquires “air cover” that can be utilized in a variety of endeavors. This is not always a bad thing, but in some circumstances, policymakers from particular states may see it that way. For instance, IGO staff may be able to leverage existing insulation from state control in order to maneuver for even greater insulation – not only for new bodies within their own families (as I explore in depth), but also for themselves. This constitutes a cycle of which

⁷⁹ For example, in explaining why U.S. agencies in the crucial area of national security are “flawed by design,” Zegart (1999) asserts: “[N]ational security organizations are not rationally designed to serve the *national interest* – and for perfectly rational reasons... Other than [the president], nobody in the executive or legislative branches sat around thinking about ideal or optimal agency organizations. The War and Navy departments, the intelligence bureaucracy, and the Congress were all too busy guarding their *own interests* to worry about national ones.” (8, 10, emphasis added)

policymakers must be aware.

Theoretical Implications

My work yields theoretical implications in addition to policy ones. In constructing the theoretical framework, I emphasize hitherto unexplored links between two important bodies of work: that on institutional design, and that on international bureaucracy. The first elucidates how design outcomes vary in conjunction with the characteristics and actions of those who participate in the design process. The second illuminates the characteristics and actions that enable IGO staff to have an impact in the international realm. By highlighting the frequent and extensive involvement of IGO staff in institutional design, I demonstrate that each seemingly distinct body of work actually offers crucial insights for the other. Institutional design, though long-presumed to be monopolized by states, is in fact an arena in which the international bureaucracy has an important and tangible impact. An even richer research agenda lies ahead for both bodies of work, for both can benefit by exploring their own expansiveness.

Recognizing the role and impact of IGO staff in institutional design generates hefty implications for scholarship in international relations. It weighs in, both theoretically and empirically, on persistent debates surrounding the possibility intergovernmental organizations being “independent” of states. It reveals complex interactions among states and IGOs – interactions that enrich recent endeavors to apply principal-agent notions to the international realm and speak to concerns about democratic deficits in the international realm. And it enhances our understanding of the institutional design arena, challenging conventional views that intergovernmental organizations exist because states demanded them and look as they do because states crafted them that way.

Institutional design is an arena in which the employees of intergovernmental organizations not only are pursuing their own objectives, but also are having a tangible impact on states. Specifically, by promoting design suggestions and sometimes even initiating the design process themselves, IGO staff can help to bring about new institutions that states – even powerful ones – initially opposed and can less easily control. A clear pattern emerges: common mechanisms of state control systematically encounter greater obstructions in bodies that were created with the participation of IGO personnel. This provides a concrete response to the enduring debate of whether, when, and how non-state entities may be important actors in their own right on the world stage. In addition, this indicates the insufficiency of looking to states *alone* to make sense of institutional design, for the arena encompasses maneuvering and bargaining among states and IGO staff, not just among states.

The findings also deepen our theoretical understanding of relationships among states and IGOs. Only recently, international relations scholars have begun to characterize relationships between states and IGOs in terms of delegation, with the former as principals and the latter authorized as their agents. This nascent but growing body of work has generated valuable insights. But it nevertheless misses a crucial point: the international realm is not so straightforward. Describing states as principals and IGOs as agents over-simplifies a much richer environment. Either directly or indirectly, intergovernmental organizations *are* agents of states – but they also may be agents of IGOs, and sometime they act as principals themselves. Thus, they are in pivotal position, with the potential to push “up” against state principals as well as “down” against agents of their own.

The richness of the principal-agent context hints at implications for a different vein of theoretical work: whether or not democratic deficits exist among intergovernmental

organizations.⁸⁰ Institutional design participation by IGO employees is widespread and in some cases quite intensive – but whether this participation reflects democratic principles remains an open question. By drawing attention to the role and impact of IGO staff in institutional design, I highlight additional information that scholars need to consider. Circumstances in the contemporary international system are more complex than previously recognized. For one thing, a body’s insulation from state control is not necessarily the product of states alone. Intergovernmental organizations also participate often in the design of institutions and mechanisms of control. Furthermore, delegation chains do not necessarily terminate at the link between governments and IGOs. Yes, a chain may extend from voters to elected politicians to intergovernmental organizations – but IGOs, too, are bequeathing tasks to other bodies. These two facts are relevant to theoretical discussions concerning democratic deficits in the international realm. By continuing to overlook the role and impact of IGO staff on the institutional design process, observers may be granting intergovernmental organizations with invisibility to avoid scrutiny and accountability.⁸¹

Received scholarship frequently portrays intergovernmental organizations as products of state demands and state designs. Yet investigating today’s population of intergovernmental organizations shows that this widely held premise jibes poorly with reality. Acknowledging the prominent role that IGO staff can – and do – play in institutional design calls into question much of what we think we know about intergovernmental organizations.⁸² Do they really exist because states demanded them? Do they really look as they do because states designed them that way?

These questions are not going away. In fact, they are likely to grow ever more pertinent. While traditional state-created IGOs remain a “relatively stable core” of the universe of active intergovernmental organizations, the number of institutions launched with the aid of IGO employees has exploded in the past several decades, constituting a “rapidly enlarging periphery.”⁸³ If this number continues to rise, traditional state-centric explanations may become less and less relevant for understanding the international realm.

⁸⁰ Tsebelis 1997; Majone 1998; Nye 2001; Moravcsik 2004.

⁸¹ Matthiason 2007, xii.

⁸² Students of American politics, too, have tended to overlook the possibility that bureaucrats themselves may play roles in the creation of new agencies (for an exception, see Zegart 1999). Thus, this may be an area for further exploration outside of international relations as well.

⁸³ Shanks et al. 1996, 600.

APPENDIX

Overview of the Dataset and Its Construction

Information Sources

The 2007-2008 online edition of the *Yearbook of International Organizations* (YIO) served as the primary data source for constructing the dataset. For each IGO, the *Yearbook* includes information on its creation year, manner of founding, headquarters location, oversight structure, decision-making structure, sources of financing, state membership, and issue area. Where YIO information was missing or unclear, I consulted supplementary data sources. Primary supplements included the individual websites of the intergovernmental organizations, the Register of United Nations Bodies, the United Nations Bibliographic Information System, and the United Nations Treaty Series. The unit of analysis is a randomly selected IGO in the year 2008.⁸⁴

The dataset covers 180 intergovernmental organizations, randomly selected from the universe of existing IGOs as determined by the Union of International Associations (UIA), the publisher of the YIO.⁸⁵ This universe consists of the 1,780 organizations satisfying the following two criteria. First, the organization must be intergovernmental (i.e., Type 2 equal to g). The YIO classifies an organization as intergovernmental “if it is established by signature of an agreement engendering obligations between governments, whether or not that agreement is eventually published.” Second, the organization must be international (i.e., Type 1 equal to A, B, C, D, E, or F). This encompasses “conventional” IGOs: Type A (“federations of international organizations”), Type B (“universal membership organizations”), Type C (“intercontinental membership organizations”), and Type D (“regionally oriented membership organizations”). This also encompasses “non-conventional” IGOs: Type E (“organizations emanating from persons, places, or bodies” – e.g., the United Nations Development Program) and Type F (“organizations of special forms” – e.g., the World Bank). This universe *does not* include bodies deemed by the UIA to be subsidiary or internal bodies (i.e., Type 2 equal to k) – such as the ASEAN Committee on Education. Note that the IGOs included in the International Correlates of War (ICOW) datasets are only a *subset* of the YIO universe: for example, many “emanations” are excluded from ICOW on the presumption that these IGOs are not fully independent of other IGOs. To permit later robustness checks, my dataset includes a dummy variable indicating IGOs classified as Type E-g or F-g.

To check coding replicability, I coded each of the 180 IGOs at two different points in time, in a different random order each time. For about 90 percent of the sample, this produced no differences in coding. For the less than 10 percent in which at least one difference was produced, most were due to the second-round attainment of previously unavailable information from the IGO’s website.

Notes on the Dependent Variables: Mechanisms of State Control

⁸⁴ The control mechanisms examined here are often delineated formally in an organization’s charter or statutes. Because subsequent changes to such documents generally require approval by a super-majority of member states, these control mechanisms are relatively stable over time.

⁸⁵ Yearbook of International Organizations. “Types of International Organizations.” Available at: <http://www.uia.be/node/163992>.

I operationalize the dependent variable, mechanisms of state control, in four alternative ways in order to capture the multifaceted nature of the concept. If I were to try to aggregate these four operationalizations into a single proxy, at least two challenges loom. First, it is not clear whether each should be assigned equal weight, or whether some are more “important” than others. Second, missing data would become a severe problem, since only about 50 of the 180 sampled IGOs have values for all four operationalizations of state control. By employing multiple versions of the concept, therefore, I reduce missing data issues and allow readers to make their own assessments about whether some varieties of insulation are more important than others. All four operationalizations are coded so that higher values indicate state control, while lower values indicate insulation from state control. The findings are similar regardless of whether state control is operationalized in terms of *State Financing*, *Oversight Meetings*, *Unilateral Vetoes*, or *Government Representatives*.

1) *State Financing*

The first operationalization, *State Financing*, takes on the following values: 2 if the intergovernmental organization has access to material resources from state sources only, 1 if from state sources but also from IGO sources and/or other sources, and 0 if from other sources (i.e., non-state, non-IGO sources) only. I employ an ordered variable, because coding material resources in terms of the *percentage* supplied by various sources would be hindered by non-random missing data problems. The YIO lists financing sources for most IGOs but tends to break this down by percentages only for the largest, most prominent organizations. A similar issue with non-random missing data arises if one turns to supplementary sources, including the organizations’ own websites: it is large, prominent organizations that tend to post detailed annual reports on their websites.

State Financing’s intermediate category encompasses several different funding compositions. To parse these out, I also ran the models with a richer, six-category version of this dependent variable, taking on the following values: 6 if the intergovernmental organization has access to material resources from state sources only, 5 if from state and IGO sources, 4 if from state and IGO and other sources, 3 if from state and other sources, 2 if from IGO sources only, 1 if from IGO and other sources, and 0 if from other sources only. The logic underlying the ordering is that states exert direct control over their own contributions, indirect control over the contributions of intergovernmental organizations, and little control over contributions from other sources. State control is progressively diluted, therefore, by access to funding from IGO sources and from non-state/non-IGO sources. Employing the six-category version produces no differences in the main results.

2) *Oversight Meetings*

The second operationalization, *Oversight Meetings*, measures the number of times an IGO’s member-states meet to oversee organizational activities within a given time period. Some intergovernmental organizations are overseen only by the full membership, others are overseen only by a subset of the membership, and yet others are overseen by bodies of both types. If both types of body exist, the subset-body generally reports to the full-body. Therefore, the number of oversight meetings is coded according to the meetings of the *full* membership. The largest time span observed in the random sample is five years between meetings of the full membership, so I use a five-year period for the count. Thus, *Oversight Meetings* ranges from a high of 240 meetings within five years (for bodies in which states’ representatives meet weekly) to a low of 0

meetings within five years (for bodies whose full membership never meets). The random sample contains four bodies in which the full membership never meets.

3) *Unilateral Vetoes*

The third operationalization, *Unilateral Vetoes*, is a binary variable indicating whether an organization's decision-making rules permit states to wield unilateral vetoes. A value of 1 indicates that states make decisions according to unanimity, weighted voting, super-majority, or other rules that allow a single member to block an initiative. A value of 0 indicates states' inability to formally and unilaterally thwart a proposal within an intergovernmental organization.

This variable must be considered with caution, for two reasons. First, there are issues with missing data. The *Yearbook of International Organizations* does not consistently specify voting rules. Organizations for which YIO does provide details are generally large, prominent ones. The same issue is encountered when one examines supplementary sources. When one turns to organizations' official charters, it is common to find that decision rules are not specified – rather, sub-bodies themselves are often charged with settling on their own rules and procedures, which are not necessarily made transparent with descriptions on organizational websites and elsewhere.

The second issue is that, although decision-making rules constitute a widely used shortcut for thinking about the extent of state control over an IGO, it is not clear that vetoes, weighting schemes, super-majority voting, and the like *always* ensure more stringent state control. Suppose, for example, that a proposal under consideration by states would expand the tasks and resources entrusted to the staff of a particular IGO. Then, the presence of a unilateral veto means that even a single state could thwart attempts to *reward* organizational activities. But suppose, in contrast, that a proposal under consideration by states would sanction IGO staff for doing something that displeased states. Then, the presence of a unilateral veto means that even a single state could thwart attempts to *sanction* organizational activities. Due to the prevalence of decision-making rules in discussions of state control, I include an operationalization here – but I urge caution in its use.

4) *Government Representatives*

Some intergovernmental organizations possess multiple decision-making bodies. Different IGOs handle multiple bodies in different ways, but perhaps the most common scenario consists of meetings of the full membership (e.g., Conferences of the Parties), which are supplemented by a higher number of meetings of a subset of the membership (e.g., Meetings of the Executive Board). Because the representatives to smaller supervisory bodies tend to report to the larger supervisory bodies and often serve as the representatives within the larger body as well, IGOs are coded according to the latter.

For the fourth operationalization, *Government Representatives*, higher values indicate more stringent state control via the representatives states send to an IGO to make decisions on their behalf. It is coded as follows: 3 if all of the state representatives to the decision-making body are active government officials; 2 if a majority (but less than all) are active government officials; 1 if a minority (but more than none) are active government officials; 0 if none are active government officials.

Identifying the “all” or “none” categories of the variable *Government Representatives* is straightforward, since stipulations requiring or prohibiting representation by active government officials frequently are laid out in the organization's charter or other documents. The judges

sitting on the International Court of Justice (ICJ), for example, are explicitly prohibited from exercising any political or administrative functions for governments and cannot engage in any other occupation while serving in the Court. Delegates to the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), in contrast, are to be active government officials, explicitly convening at the ministerial level.

Precise *mixtures* of active government officials with other representatives is rarely stipulated formally, however, and therefore fluctuate somewhat from year to year. (The specification of equal-thirds for government officials/organized labor/corporate groups in the International Labor Organization, for example, is the exception rather than the rule.) For an organization without formal stipulations regarding the mix of representation, therefore, I consulted the organization's latest annual reports and/or meeting minutes to ascertain whether a majority or minority of states' representatives hailed from official government positions. While the exact *percentage* fluctuates somewhat from year to year, the majority/minority distinction is generally stable. Using the latter, therefore, provides a more generalizable snapshot and avoids overstating the level of precision available in the data.

Notes on the Key Explanatory Variable: IGO Agenda-Setting

The *Yearbook of International Organizations* provides brief narratives of the manner in which organizations were created, and these narratives generally indicate whether states designed alone, or whether/how the staff of pre-existing IGOs participated in the process. For example, the entry for the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases reads: "Founded 1985, by World Meteorological Organization, International Council for Science, and United Nations Environment Programme, to ensure adequate follow-up of the recommendations of the *International Conference on the Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and Other Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variations and Associated Impacts*, held in Oct 1981." In contrast, the entry for the International Monetary Fund reads: "Founded 22 July 1944, Bretton Woods NH (USA), by representatives of 45 countries who negotiated the details of the Articles of Agreement/Charter. The charter was presented to the governments of these countries for ratification." Information from the YIO was supplemented with additional data sources, such as the Register of United Nations Bodies.

The key explanatory variable is *IGO Agenda-Setting*, an ordered variable indicating the extent to which employees of an existing IGO set the institutional design agenda to which states reacted. Higher values of *IGO Agenda-Setting* indicate more proactive institutional-design involvement by the staff of a pre-existing IGO. Specifically, for each intergovernmental organization in the sample, the variable takes on the following values: 0 if it was launched by states alone; 1 if it was created through inter-state negotiations for which IGO staff provided administrative services; 2 if it was designed largely by states, but with moderate input by IGO staff (e.g., staff participated in the negotiations at states' invitation, or staff organized a conference that brought attention to the issue); 3 if it was based on designs proposed by IGO staff and revised by states; and 4 if it was set up by IGO staff, with limited or no input from states.

If one could apply process-tracing in detailed case studies of every observation, one could tease out the precise nature of agenda-setting by IGO staff. Such an approach is not possible on a large-n scale, however. For some observations, the *Yearbook of International Organizations* and supplementary sources indicate IGO involvement in institutional design but do not provide enough detail to determine its intensity in terms of agenda-setting.

In such circumstances, to avoid overstating the extent to which IGO staff established an institutional design agenda to which states reacted, *IGO Agenda-Setting* is set equal to one. The variable receives a higher value only if the sources provide specific evidence of more intensive participation by IGO staff. Thus, *IGO Agenda-Setting* is coded conservatively – unsurprisingly, due to the tendency of IGO employees to fuel state-centric understandings of institutional design, by downplaying rather than calling attention to the role of secretariat staff.⁸⁶ This likely understates IGO agenda-setting, thereby making it more challenging to find evidence in support of my argument.

Staff from a handful of intergovernmental organizations are involved particularly frequently in institutional design. About two-thirds of the sample was created with the involvement of staff from pre-existing IGOs. Of these, more than one in three was created with participation by employees from at least one of the following five organizations: 1) Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 2) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 3) Organization of American States (OAS), 4) United Nations (UN), and 5) United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In the sample, employees of the United Nations are the most frequent participants in institutional design.

Notes on the Control Variables

I incorporate control variables to capture several other factors that, according to received theory, may matter for insulation from mechanisms of state control: the passage of time, the issue area and nature of the task involved, and attributes of the group of states involved. Personnel within IGOs possess numerous tactics for altering rather than accepting the environment presented by states.⁸⁷ In general, such approaches take time – time for intergovernmental organizations to learn and execute, and time for states to grow accustomed to rather than rein in such activities. Even absent purposive action by personnel, insulation may change naturally if states pay less stringent attention to preventing insulation as years pass. To allow for the possibility that organizations become more insulated (whether purposefully or not) over time, the analysis includes the variable *Organization Age*, which indicates the number of years that have passed since an organization was created.

Thus, this variable also captures when the body was created, thereby allowing for the possibility that, for example, IGOs created in recent decades differ, in terms of insulation from state control, from IGOs created in the early-postwar period. Most of the sampled IGOs date from the second half of the 20th century, rather than from other time periods. A little more than 10 percent were created prior to 1949, while a similar portion was created between 2000 and 2008. Most of the intergovernmental organizations, about 75 percent, came into existence between 1950 and 1999. In fact, like previous work,⁸⁸ my dataset reveals that the participation of IGO staff in institutional design was not common in the early post-war years, but over the past several decades it has been consistently prevalent. I also ran all models with logged versions of the variables *Organization Age* and *Number of States Negotiating* to address skewness – this has no impact on the main results.

The issue area covered also may help to explain variation in insulation across intergovernmental organizations. Maintaining control within IGOs necessitates conscientious

⁸⁶ Mathiason 2007.

⁸⁷ Cox 1969; Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Stiglitz 2003; Barnett and Coleman 2005; Hawkins and Jacoby 2006; Pollack 2006.

⁸⁸ Jacobson et al. 1986; Shanks et al. 1996.

oversight and nimble reactions by states. But such conscientiousness and nimbleness consume states' resources and gains from the division of labor. Because security-related issues pertain to state survival more immediately than do economic or social ones,⁸⁹ states may be most willing to expend resources to retain control within IGOs that deal with such "high politics" issues. States may be reluctant to utilize intergovernmental organizations extensively in matters related to national security – and when they do, states may strive more forcefully against insulation, attempting to ensure that these matters are under their direct control.

Technical or scientific uncertainty surrounding the issue area may be important as well. Matters requiring extensive technical or scientific expertise often entail informational asymmetries in which the employees of an intergovernmental organization accumulate specialized knowledge. This may place IGO staff in an advantageous position vis-à-vis states (in particular, weaker ones) that lack the resources necessary for acquiring similar specialized knowledge in order to steer, monitor, or reverse organizational activities. Even for states possessing the capacity to acquire expertise on par with IGO staff, the costs involved may be prohibitive. If, in addition, uncertainty surrounds the technical or scientific issue, there is even less incentive for states to expend the resources needed to ensure state control over the IGO.

To capture these two possibilities, the analysis incorporates two binary variables. The first, *National Security Issues*, equals 1 if an intergovernmental organization deals with matters pertaining to national security, such as military training, collective defense, weaponry, and so on. This applies, for instance, to the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). The coding includes IGOs – the Western European Union (WEU), for example – dealing with other issue areas in addition to ones touching upon national security. The second variable, *Technical or Scientific Uncertainty*, equals 1 if an intergovernmental organization focuses on matters requiring expertise in an area in which technical or scientific knowledge remains under development. This is the case, for instance, for the Regional African Satellite Communications Organization (RASCOM), an organization seeking to develop satellite and telecommunications technology.

The attributes of the states involved also constitute an important potential explanation for insulation from mechanisms of state control. In the initial bargaining context, and subsequently as well, a small group of relatively homogeneous and high-capacity states may be able to act in one accord, agreeing on and maintaining mechanisms that impede IGO insulation and enhance direct control by states. For example, intergovernmental organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) cater to a select assemblage of industrialized – and largely Western and capitalist – democratic countries. Such wealthy and comparatively like-minded states may find it relatively easy to install and employ strong mechanisms of state control within intergovernmental organizations. The binary variable *Developed-Areas Focus* controls for this possibility.

Relatively small and homogeneous groups of high-capacity states may be well equipped to establish and maintain their control over intergovernmental organizations. Yet larger and more-heterogeneous groups, or groups involving lower-capacity states, encounter a more complex environment. When great powers participate in institutional design, they often emerge as natural leaders in the group and possess incentives and wherewithal to keep intergovernmental organizations under stringent state control. But when a group of states undertakes institutional design without the involvement of any great powers, limitations in leadership and capabilities make the maintenance of stringent state control more difficult. What is more, as the number and heterogeneity of the states involved in institutional design intensify, the negotiating environment

⁸⁹ Lipson 1984.

becomes more complicated.⁹⁰ More parties weigh in, and consensus is less likely. This can hinder states' ability to design and preserve mechanisms of state control within intergovernmental organizations.

To account for such complexities within the group of states involved in institutional design, the analyses incorporate three additional controls. *Number of States Negotiating* is a continuous variable capturing the size of the group of states involved in institutional design negotiations. *No Great Powers Negotiating* is a binary variable equal to 1 if the group of states involved in institutional design negotiations did not include any states that were great powers at the time.⁹¹ *Global Focus* is a binary variable equal to 1 if an intergovernmental organization was set up by and serves states from all over the world, rather than focusing on a specific region.

For most intergovernmental organizations, the YIO lacks information on the number and names of states involved in the institutional design process. Therefore, I use an IGO's initial membership as a proxy. While this omits states that participated in the negotiations but did not immediately join the organization, this captures the vast majority of the participants in the institutional design process and is a substantial improvement over the missing data from the YIO. A little less than 20 percent of the data remains missing. I also ran all models with logged versions of the variables *Number of States Negotiating* and *Organization Age* to address skewness – this has no impact on the main results.

⁹⁰ Koremenos et al. 2001a; Lyne et al. 2006.

⁹¹ “Great-power states” are defined according to the “International Correlates of War – Major Powers”: Austria-Hungary (1816-1918), China (1950 to present), France (1816-1940, 1945 to present), Germany (1816-1918, 1925-1945, 1991 to present), Italy (1860-1943), Japan (1895-1945, 1991-present), Russia (1816-1917, 1922 to present), United Kingdom (1815-present), United States (1898-present). Available at: PaulHensel.org/dataintl.html.

Table 1: Randomly Selected Intergovernmental Organizations in the Dataset

Action Plan for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Sustainable Development of the Mediterranean (MAP)
African Development Bank (ADB)
African Economic Community (AEC)
African Information Society Initiative (AISII)
African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA)
African Telecommunications Union (ATU)
Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation (AITIC)
Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL)
Allied Command Transformation (ACT)
Amazonian Parliament
Andean Community
Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures (ALF)
Arab Industrial Development and Mining Organization (AIDMO)
Arab Investment Company (TAIC)
ASEAN Central Bank Governors Forum (ACBGF)
Asia and Pacific Commission on Agricultural Statistics (APCAS)
Asia Pacific Fishery Commission (APFIC)
Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO)
Association of Agricultural Research Institutions in the Near East and North Africa (AARINENA)
AVRDC - The World Vegetable Center
Baltic Council
Baltic Sea Region Energy Cooperation (BASREC)
Berne Club
BioNET INTERNATIONAL Consultative Group (BICG)
Black Sea Action Plan (BSAP)
Board of Governors of the European Schools
Budapest Union for the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure (Budapest Union)
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
Caribbean Environment Programme (CEP)
Caribbean Festival of Creative Arts (CARIFESTA)
Caribbean Information System for the Agricultural Sciences (CAGRIS)
Caspian Environment Programme (CEP)
Central American Corporation for Air Navigation Services (COCESNA)
Central American Council on Housing and Human Settlements (CCVAH)
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CST)
Commission for Inland Fisheries of Latin America (COPESCAL)
Commission for the Scientific and Technological Development of Central America and Panama (CTCAP)
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CMW)
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM)
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
Commonwealth Youth Programme (CYP)
Conference des ministres de la jeunesse et des sports des pays d'expression française (CONFESJES)
Conference of the European Regional Legislative Parliaments (CALRE)

Conferencia de las Fuerzas Armadas de Centroamerica (CFAC)
Consultative Committee on Industrial Change (CCMI)
Cospas-Sarsat
Council of Arab Ministers for Social Affairs
Council of Arab Ministers for Youth and Sports
Council of Europe (CE)
Council of Legal Education (CLE)
Council of Regional Organizations in the Pacific (CROP)
Court of Justice of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA Court of Justice)
ECA Subregional Office for Eastern Africa (SRO-EA Kigali)
Environmental Crime Prevention Programme (ECP)
Euro-Mediterranean Legal Metrology Forum (EMLMF)
European Commission
European Environment Information and Observation Network (EIONET)
European Forestry Commission (EFC)
European Health Committee (CDSP)
European Network on Teacher Education Policies (ENTEP)
European Nuclear Energy Tribunal (ENET)
European Sub-Regional Aviation Security Training Centre (AVSEC)
European Youth Foundation (EYF)
FAO/WHO Coordinating Committee for the Near East (CCNE)
Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
Galileo Satellite Navigation Project
Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS)
Group of Eight (G8)
Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO)
Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC)
Ibero-American Social Security Organization (OISS)
Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)
Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality (IANWGE)
Inter-American Center for Crafts and Popular Arts
Inter-American Center for Development and Environmental and Territorial Research (CIDIAT)
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
Inter-American Committee on Social Development (CIDES)
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (CIDH)
Inter-American Defense Board (IADB)
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
Intergovernmental Committee for the Application of the International Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas and Degrees in Higher Education in the Arab and European States bordering on the Mediterranean
Intergovernmental Coordination Group for the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System (ICG IOTWS)
Intergovernmental Organization for Marketing Information and Technical Advisory Services for Fishery Products in the Asia and Pacific Region (INFOFISH)
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IRDB)
International Centre for Promotion of Enterprises (ICPE)
International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR)
International Commission of the Schelde River (ICS)
International Commissions for the Protection of the Moselle and Saar (ICPMS)
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)

International Court of Justice (ICJ)
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
International E-Road Network
International Energy Agency (IEA)
International Hydrological Programme (IHP)
International Seabed Authority (ISBA)
International Tropical Fruits Network (TFNet)
Internet Governance Forum (IGF)
Joint Force Command South (JFC Naples)
Joint ILO/WHO Committee on Health of Seafarers
League of Arab States (LAS)
Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA)
Mekong-Ganga Cooperation Scheme (MGC)
Ministerial Conference on the Protection of Forests in Europe (MCPFE)
Multilateral Organizations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN)
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)
NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force Command (NAEW&C FC)
Near East Forestry Commission (NEFC)
Network of Aquaculture Centres in Asia-Pacific (NACA)
Niger Basin Authority (ABN)
Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
Nordic Committee for Nuclear Safety Research (NKS)
Nordic Contact Agency for Agricultural and Forestry Affairs (NKJS)
Nordic Council (NC)
Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM)
Nordic Film and Television Fund (NFTF)
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
Office of the Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories (UNSCO)
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)
Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)
Pan American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH)
Parliamentary Commission of the Central European Initiative
Permanent Committee on Cadastre in the European Union (PCC)
Programme on Institutional Management in Higher Education (IMHE)
Regional African Satellite Communications Organization (RASCOM)
Regional Centre on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development for the Near East (CARDNE)
Regional Centre on Urban Water Management, Teheran (RCUWM)
Regional Information System (SIRI)
Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Information and Training Centre - Wider Caribbean (REMPEITC-Carib)
Regional Maritime Academy, Accra (RMA)
Regional Network for the Chemistry of Natural Products in Southeast Asia
SAARC Network of Researchers on Global Financial and Economic Issues
SADC Electoral Commissions Forum (SADC-ECF)
SECI Regional Centre for Combating Trans-Border Crime (SECI Center Bucharest)
Secretariat of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (UNEP/CMS)
Sistema Regional de Informacion sobre Formacion Profesional (SIRFO)

Six Countries Programme (6CP)
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
South Centre
South-South Cooperation WIDE (SSC WIDE)
Southern Africa Postal Operators Association (SAPOA)
Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation (COMCEC)
Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR)
Standing Committee on Commonwealth Forestry
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
Trade and Investment Council
Trans-European North-South Motorway Project (TEM)
Transit Transport Coordination Authority of the Northern Corridor (TTCA)
UNESCO Regional Office for Education in the Arab States (UNEDBAS)
United Nations (UN)
United Nations African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFRI)
United Nations Civilian Police Force (UNCIVPOL)
United Nations Committee on Negotiations with Intergovernmental Agencies
United Nations Development Group (UNDG)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP)
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MUNOC)
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
United Nations Programme on Space Applications (PSA)
United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
United Nations Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Special Committee of Twenty Four)
United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS)
United Nations Statistical Commission
UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education (IUNRWA/UNESCO IE)
Venice European Centre for the Trades and Professions of the Conservation of Architectural Heritage
Visegrád Group
West-Nordic Foundation (Vestnordenfonden)
Western European Union (WEU)
World Food Programme (WFP)
World Health Organization (WHO)
YOUTH Community Action Programme
ZEP-RE - PTA Reinsurance Company

Table 2: Summary Statistics for All Variables

	OBS	MEAN	SD	MIN	MAX
Dependent Variables					
<i>State Financing</i>	133	1.23	0.65	0	2
<i>Oversight Meetings</i>	134	13.26	36.77	0	240
<i>Unilateral Vetoes</i>	84	0.44	0.50	0	1
<i>Government Representatives</i>	117	2.36	0.99	0	3
Key Explanatory Variable					
<i>IGO Agenda-Setting</i>	180	0.92	0.94	0	4
Other Variables (in alphabetical order)					
<i>China Involved</i>	163	0.05	0.22	0	1
<i>Created before 1945</i>	175	0.03	0.17	0	1
<i>Created between 1945 and 1949</i>	175	0.10	0.30	0	1
<i>Created in the 1950s</i>	175	0.07	0.25	0	1
<i>Created in the 1960s</i>	175	0.14	0.34	0	1
<i>Created in the 1970s</i>	175	0.18	0.38	0	1
<i>Created in the 1980s</i>	175	0.12	0.33	0	1
<i>Created in the 1990s</i>	175	0.25	0.43	0	1
<i>Created in the 2000s</i>	175	0.13	0.33	0	1
<i>Crime/terrorism/border security</i>	180	0.04	0.19	0	1
<i>Decolonization</i>	180	0.01	0.07	0	1
<i>Developed-Area Focus</i>	180	0.05	0.22	0	1
<i>ECOSOC Involved</i>	180	0.03	0.18	0	1
<i>Encompasses Social Issues</i>	180	0.66	0.32	0	1
<i>Encompasses Economic Issues</i>	180	0.59	0.49	0	1
<i>Encompasses Political Issues</i>	180	0.37	0.48	0	1
<i>Energy</i>	180	0.04	0.19	0	1
<i>FAO Involved</i>	180	0.06	0.24	0	1
<i>Focus on Africa</i>	180	0.12	0.33	0	1
<i>Focus on Americas</i>	180	0.16	0.36	0	1
<i>Focus on Asia-Pacific</i>	180	0.08	0.27	0	1
<i>Focus on Europe</i>	180	0.24	0.43	0	1
<i>Focus on Middle East</i>	180	0.08	0.28	0	1
<i>France Involved</i>	160	0.32	0.47	0	1
<i>Global Focus</i>	180	0.14	0.35	0	1
<i>Governance/administration</i>	180	0.06	0.24	0	1
<i>IGO Involvement</i>	180	0.64	0.48	0	1
<i>Law/arbitration</i>	180	0.04	0.21	0	1
<i>Less-Developed Area Focus</i>	180	0.08	0.27	0	1
<i>Log of Number of States Negotiating</i>	142	2.43	0.90	0.69	5.11
<i>Log of Organization Age</i>	175	3.16	0.81	0.69	4.66
<i>Mandate of General Cooperation</i>	180	0.12	0.32	0	1
<i>National Security Focus</i>	180	0.09	0.29	0	1

<i>No Great Powers Negotiating</i>	155	0.49	0.50	0	1
<i>Non-Conventional Body</i>	180	0.86	0.34	0	1
<i>Number of States Negotiating</i>	145	17.78	24.21	3	166
<i>OAS Involved</i>	180	0.04	0.21	0	1
<i>Organization Age</i>	175	30.91	20.03	2	106
<i>Outer space/aerospace</i>	180	0.01	0.11	0	1
<i>Russia Involved</i>	161	0.13	0.34	0	1
<i>Security/military/defense</i>	180	0.09	0.29	0	1
<i>Technical or Scientific Uncertainty</i>	180	0.09	0.29	0	1
<i>UN Involved</i>	180	0.06	0.23	0	1
<i>UNESCO Involved</i>	180	0.03	0.18	0	1
<i>UK Involved</i>	160	0.29	0.46	0	1
<i>USA Involved</i>	161	0.27	0.44	0	1

OBS = number of observations, SD = standard deviation, MIN = minimum value, MAX = maximum value

Table 3: Predicting IGO Involvement or IGO Agenda-Setting

	<i>IGO Involvement</i>	<i>IGO Agenda-Setting</i>	<i>IGO Involvement</i>	<i>IGO Agenda-Setting</i>
<i>Encompasses Social Issues</i>	-0.140 (0.256)	-0.285 (0.221)	0.020 (0.318)	-0.199 (0.259)
<i>Encompasses Economic Issues</i>	-0.336 (0.260)	-0.057 (0.225)	-0.367 (0.345)	-0.062 (0.281)
<i>Encompasses Political Issues</i>	-0.652*** (0.250)	-0.623*** (0.230)	---	---
<i>Crime/terrorism/border security</i>	---	---	---	0.395 (0.411)
<i>Decolonization</i>	---	---	---	0.442 (0.600)
<i>Governance/administration</i>	---	---	-1.005 (0.809)	-0.692 (0.458)
<i>Law/arbitration</i>	---	---	-0.305 (0.578)	-0.138 (0.680)
<i>Security/military/defense</i>	---	---	-1.168** (0.492)	-1.206*** (0.386)
<i>Energy #</i>	---	---	0.950 (0.774)	0.474 (0.510)
<i>Outer space/aerospace #</i>	---	---	---	0.679 (0.508)
<i>Mandate of General Cooperation Δ</i>	---	---	-1.196*** (0.386)	-1.092*** (0.380)
<i>Global Focus</i>	-1.115* (0.580)	-0.581 (0.358)	-1.299* (0.683)	-0.761* (0.428)
<i>Focus on Africa</i>	-0.823 (0.562)	-0.448 (0.443)	-1.102* (0.645)	-0.682 (0.485)
<i>Focus on Americas</i>	-0.568 (0.541)	-0.004 (0.398)	-0.747 (0.603)	-0.195 (0.403)
<i>Focus on Asia-Pacific</i>	-0.178 (0.569)	0.290 (0.430)	-0.243 (0.651)	0.212 (0.483)
<i>Focus on Europe</i>	0.143 (0.480)	0.115 (0.333)	-0.077 (0.541)	-0.108 (0.388)
<i>Focus on Middle East</i>	-0.176 (0.603)	0.070 (0.420)	-0.457 (0.697)	-0.099 (0.476)
<i>Developed-Area Focus</i>	-0.459 (0.720)	-0.399 (0.539)	-1.210 (0.864)	-1.093* (0.631)
<i>Less-Developed Area Focus</i>	-0.304 (0.656)	0.021 (0.606)	-0.140 (0.739)	0.210 (0.657)
<i>Number of States Negotiating</i>	0.008 (0.011)	0.001 (0.006)	0.006 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.007)
<i>No Great Powers Negotiating</i>	0.739 (0.491)	0.171 (0.372)	1.006* (0.529)	0.264 (0.389)
<i>China Involved</i>	---	0.674 (0.469)	---	0.621 (0.546)
<i>France Involved</i>	0.090 (0.404)	0.124 (0.338)	0.243 (0.423)	0.270 (0.366)
<i>Russia Involved</i>	0.061 (0.466)	0.215 (0.368)	-0.085 (0.482)	0.100 (0.410)
<i>UK Involved</i>	0.339 (0.391)	-0.035 (0.324)	0.340 (0.415)	-0.069 (0.351)
<i>USA Involved</i>	0.718* (0.385)	0.240 (0.255)	0.907** (0.402)	0.375 (0.266)
Constant	0.272 (0.610)	---	0.215 (0.690)	---
Observations	136	144	131	144
Model Type	Probit	Ordered Probit	Probit	Ordered Probit

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

also encompasses economic issues. Δ encompasses political, economic, and social issues simultaneously

These variables drop out due to multicollinearity: *Crime/terrorism/border security*, *Decolonization*, *Outer space/aerospace*, and *China Involved*

Table 4: Impact of IGO Agenda-Setting on the Design of Mechanisms of State Control

	<i>State Financing</i>	<i>Oversight Meetings</i>	<i>Unilateral Veto</i>	<i>Government Representatives</i>
<i>IGO Agenda-Setting</i>	-0.376*** (0.088)	-0.257** (0.121)	-0.318* (0.178)	-0.291** (0.150)
<i>Organization Age</i>	-0.005 (0.006)	0.007 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.006)
<i>National Security Issues</i>	0.946** (0.468)	1.119** (0.535)	0.047 (0.595)	0.781 (0.567)
<i>Technical or Scientific Uncertainty</i>	-0.760 (0.515)	-0.239* (0.361)	-0.308 (0.601)	-0.783** (0.364)
<i>Developed-Area Focus</i>	0.440 (0.496)	0.572 (0.602)	1.038* (0.624)	0.207 (0.455)
<i>Number of States Negotiating</i>	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.027*** (0.006)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.004 (0.005)
<i>No Great Powers Negotiating</i>	-0.084 (0.242)	-0.696*** (0.274)	-0.127 (0.334)	-0.054 (0.284)
<i>Global Focus</i>	-0.275 (0.343)	-0.336 (0.317)	-0.679 (0.468)	-0.891** (0.455)
Constant	---	2.891*** (0.321)	0.729 (0.460)	---
Observations	111	119	77	105
Model Type	Ordered Probit	Negative Binomial	Probit	Ordered Probit

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 5: IGO Agenda-Setting and Probabilities of Insulation from State Control


Probability that:	IGO Agenda-Setting				
	NONE				EXTENSIVE
					
Insulation from Mechanisms of State Control					
Financing is from non-state/non-IGO sources only	6%	11%	20%	33%	47%
States meet 0 times in five years for oversight	7%	9%	11%	15%	19%
No states possess a unilateral veto	46%	58%	69%	77%	83%
No state delegates are government officials	3%	6%	11%	18%	28%
Stringent Mechanisms of State Control					
Financing is from states only	49%	35%	22%	13%	7%
States meet 10 times in five years for oversight	4%	4%	3%	3%	2%
At least one state possesses a unilateral veto	54%	42%	31%	23%	17%
All state delegates are government officials	75%	65%	53%	42%	32%

Table 6: Robustness of Sign and Significance of the Key Explanatory Variable

	<i>State Financing</i>	<i>Oversight Meetings</i>	<i>Unilateral Vetoes</i>	<i>Government Representatives</i>
<i>IGO Agenda-Setting</i>				
Excluded IGOs dealing with national security issues or possessing mandate for general cooperation	⊖	⊖	-	-
Added controls for specific decade of creation	⊖	⊖	⊖	⊖
Added controls for specific IGOs involved	⊖	-	-	⊖
Added control for non-conventional IGOs	⊖	⊖	⊖	⊖
Added controls for specific region involved	⊖	⊖	-	⊖
Added controls for specific powers involved	⊖	-	⊖	⊖

⊖ indicates that coefficient on key explanatory variable is negative and statistically significant at standard levels; - indicates that coefficient is negative but not significant

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