

The Human Rights Effects of International Monetary Fund Structural Adjustment Programs, 1981-2003¹

M. Rodwan Abouharb
Department of Political Science,
240 Stubbs Hall
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge LA 70803
roda@lsu.edu

&

David L. Cingranelli,
Department of Political Science,
Binghamton University,
PO Box 6000,
Binghamton, NY 13902-6000
davidc@binghamton.edu

Abstract

Using a global, comparative analysis for the 1981-2003 period, we examined the effects of IMF structural adjustment programs (SAPs) on government respect for citizens' personal security rights to freedom from torture, political imprisonment, extra-judicial killing and disappearances in 131 developing countries. A two-stage selection model was used to account for IMF loan selection criteria when estimating the human rights consequences of SAPs. Countries that have been implementing IMF SAPs the longest used the most amount of torture against their citizens. The findings presented here are generally consistent with our earlier research examining the human rights impacts of the World Bank SAPs (2005) and the joint impact of World Bank and IMF SAPs (2007) for the same period.

¹ This research was supported by a grant (No.SES-0318273) from the Political Science Division of NSF.

Since 1980, the directors of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have promoted a shift in power from the state to the market. The IFIs have financed structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in developing countries to achieve that goal. Structural Adjustment Agreements (SAAs) call upon recipient governments to liberalize and privatize economies in the context of strict budget discipline. Adjustment lending facilitates economic integration – the hallmark of globalization – on terms that are advantageous to corporate and finance capital. The policy conditions associated with adjustment loans have accelerated transnational corporate penetration and expansion of markets in developing countries and lowered risks of portfolio investment and foreign direct investment. The role of the state has been reshaped to serve market liberalization, as governments have downsized, decentralized, and privatized (or “contracted out”) their functions. Such measures were intended to jump start economic growth and free up resources for debt service. However, in most countries, public investment in critical areas (health care, education, infrastructure) foundered, growth rates were disappointing and debts mounted to unsustainable levels (Pettifor 2001).

This paper explores the relationship between IMF-negotiated SAPs and respect for human rights. Importantly, as governments in developing countries implemented IMF financed SAPs respect for human rights diminished. More specifically, based on an analysis of outcomes in developing countries between 1981-2003, we show that, on average, governments under IMF SAPs the longest were more likely to torture and their citizens. An analysis of the selection biases of the IMF during this period indicated that the IMF tended to negotiate SAAs with countries that would have had better torture records if they had never implemented IMF SAPs.

The findings of this study are important, in part, for practical policy reasons: undermining government respect for human rights makes it less likely that IMF loans will lead to higher rates of economic growth for loan recipients. Previous research has shown that SAPs have not been successful in stimulating economic growth in developing and transition countries. There is mounting evidence that national economies grow fastest when citizens can exercise their human rights (Kaufman 2004). Therefore, if SAPs undermine government efforts to protect human rights, they also undermine IMF

efforts to promote economic growth. Indeed, the World Bank now acknowledges its responsibilities for advancing human rights. As former World Bank President Wolfensohn said in his statement to the Bank's Development Committee, "There is, moreover, widespread recognition of the strong link between human rights and development...The Bank is currently reviewing its role with a view to making a more explicit link between human rights and our work, while at the same time remaining fully in compliance with our Articles of Agreement" (World Bank 2005). Former World Bank President Wolfowitz also expressed his commitment to this endeavor most recently by emphasizing the role of respect for women's rights in development (World Bank 2005).

However, the IMF has been less willing to make similar commitments. An Assistant Director in the IMF's Office in Europe, contended that human rights advocates should not expect the international financial institutions (IFIs) to impose human rights-related policy conditions on their member countries, because the IFIs do not have the expertise required to make judgments about human rights practices and nothing prevents developing country governments under structural adjustment from incorporating human rights into their poverty reduction agreements (Leite 2001). Responding to criticism that the IMF was ignoring the human rights consequences of its activities, another IMF spokesperson declared that it was not obligated to promote human rights around the world. Speaking before the United Nations Subcommittee for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, he said that the Fund, in a strict sense, does not have a mandate to promote human rights. He also stressed that the IMF is not "bound by various human rights declarations and conventions" (Capdevila 2001). Several members of the UN Subcommittee expressed their disappointment. Yozo Yokota, of Japan, noted that human rights are "peremptory norms" that cannot be ignored in agreements between states or in the operations of international financial institutions (Capdevila 2001).

Besides these practical policy implications of our study, the findings contribute to theory building in two ways. Most important, in the next section of the paper, we explain why structural adjustment leads to reduced government respect for personal security rights. Second, we contribute to the effort to build a comprehensive theory that will explain variations in government respect for human rights around the

world by showing the important effect the activities of this international financial regime can have on respect for human rights.

Theory

Promoting a shift in power from the state to the market, has had both direct and indirect negative effects on government respect for human rights around the world. The policy directly worsens government human rights practices, because a substantial involvement of government in society is essential for the protection of all human rights (Donnelly 2003). The protection of personal security rights, for example, requires government expenditures for properly training and monitoring the activities of police and soldiers. It requires expenditures for educating judges and for maintaining an adequate system of justice, so even police and soldiers are not above the law. From a principal-agent theoretical perspective, reducing the size of government reduces the ability of principals (government leaders) to constrain the discretion of agents (police and soldiers). More administrative discretion is likely to lead to greater abuse of personal security rights (Policzer 2004). Also, in practice, the acceptance of structural adjustment conditions by less developed countries causes the adoption of new policies and practices. These new policies are designed to produce substantial behavioral changes in the affected populations. Evidence from literature about human learning suggests that people have a natural tendency to resist making substantial changes in their previous behavior (Davidson 2002). One of the tools government may use to overcome such resistance is coercion.

Some have argued, to the contrary, that a weak state is necessary for the protection of personal security rights. According to this view, a relatively limited government is fundamental to all human freedoms. Limited government reduces barriers to the functioning of the free market, allowing human beings to pursue their own interests in their own ways and allowing them to pursue opportunities that are likely to be lost if human freedom is restricted (Friedman 1962; Hayek 1984). With regard to personal security rights, in particular, Cranston (1964) has argued that respect for these rights only requires forbearance on the part of the state. These direct effects are the only ones examined in this paper.

However, the implementation of SAPs exerts other important effects such as creating or exacerbating civil conflict that also may worsen human rights protections. Policy changes implicitly or explicitly required in SAPs have hurt the poorest people in developing societies the most. Compliance with structural adjustment conditions causes governments to lessen respect for the economic and social rights of their citizens, including the rights to decent jobs, education, health care, and housing. There is a large body of research showing that implementation of a SAA has negative effects on government respect for economic human rights (Chipeta 1993; Fields 2003; Handa and King 1997; Sowa 1993; Meyer 1998; World Bank 1992; Zack-Williams 2000). Some studies have emphasized the disproportionate negative economic human rights consequences for women (Buchmann 1996; Commonwealth Secretariat 1989; Elson 1990; Sadasivam 1997), for public sector employees and low-wage workers (Daddieh 1995). The poor and those in the public sector have seen their wages fall in real terms (Daddieh 1995; Munck 1994), while at the same time they have faced increased living costs due to the removal of price controls and subsidies for essential commodities (Zack-Williams 2000). The implementation of SAPs also has worsened the relative position of the poorest by increasing income inequality (Daddieh 1995; Friedman 2000; Handa and King 1997). This problem is compounded, because pressures from the World Bank and IMF to create a more business friendly climate have encouraged the leaders of developing countries to reduce protections of workers from exploitation by employers. The poor, organized labor, and other civil society groups protest these outcomes (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007).² Governments respond to challenges to their authority by murdering, imprisoning, torturing, and killing their citizens (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007).

There are several other indirect paths from SAPs to repression discussed in the literature. The SAPs negotiated by the IMF principally with the executive branch of developing and transitioning countries may be undermining democratic systems (Fields 2003; Haggard 1995; Stiglitz 2002), may be

² However, it is important to distinguish incremental economic liberalization that results from a societal choice without undue external interference and pressure from the kind of rapid economic liberalization required by SAA conditionality. Economic liberalization that is not required by the conditions found within a SAA may not affect or

increasing the level of corruption in loan recipient countries (Alexander 2006), and may lead to lower rates of economic growth (Przeworski and Vreeland. 2000; Vreeland 2003). Less democracy and lower levels of economic development have been shown to be associated with reduced respect for human rights (e.g., Mitchell and McCormack 1988; Poe, Tate and Keith 1994; Poe and Tate 1999; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006, 2007). Increased corruption also may lead to more violations of human rights, since the existence of corruption makes it more difficult for politicians (principals) to control the discretion of police and soldiers (agents).

Previous Research on SAPs and Human Rights

Sen (1999) contended that increasing people's ability to exercise their fundamental human rights was critical, in an instrumental way, to the promotion of economic growth. At the time Sen wrote his book, there already were suspicions that structural adjustment policies were not producing economic growth in most developing countries. Moreover, in the few cases where economic growth had occurred, it was not at the same time alleviating poverty. Some studies even have argued that implementation of structural adjustment conditions actually has a negative effect on economic growth (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2003). To be sure, there is some debate as other work has found the opposite effect (Dreher 2006).

Research seeking to untangle the causal relationship between respect for personal security rights and economic development is in its early stages. The most comprehensive and methodologically sophisticated study on this topic explored the links among respect for human rights, the quality of governance, and the rate of economic growth (Kaufman 2004). Three possible explanations for the strong positive correlation between average per capita incomes and respect for physical integrity and democratic rights were suggested (Kaufman 2004). More respect for these human rights may exert a powerful causal effect on per capita incomes. Alternatively, higher incomes may lead to improvements in respect for

may actually reduce civil conflict in societies. For example, Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch (2003) examine the impact of economic liberalization and find no discernable impact on the probability of civil conflict.

physical integrity and democratic rights. As a final possibility, he speculated that the relationship might be spurious. In other words, there might be another factor that makes countries richer and causes them to have more respect for physical integrity and democratic rights. His statistical tests indicated that more respect for physical integrity and democratic rights *caused* higher level of respect for economic and social rights. An earlier study also found support for the hypothesis that more respect for democratic human rights led to higher levels of effectiveness of World Bank development projects around the world (Isham, Kaufman, and Pritchett 1997).

In addition to the comprehensive critiques of structural adjustment such as the one offered by Stiglitz (2002), there have been many studies of one, two or a few countries that have described the consequences of SAPs on those countries (e.g., Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN) 2004). Not many of these case studies focus explicitly on the human rights effects of structural adjustment, but most of them describe hardships that structural adjustment conditions caused for the poorest people. There are many web sites maintained by human rights non-governmental organizations that also detail the harmful effects of structural adjustment policies on the least well off in developing countries. Work by David Pion-Berlin (1983; 1984; 1989; 1997; 2001) explains the linkages between SAPs and repression of human rights in Argentina and Peru. His work led us to expect that governments seeking to make major economic changes that hurt the poorest members of society would be likely to resort to coercion including the violation of human rights.

Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) and Vreeland (2002, 2003) developed the most persuasive scientific case showing the negative economic impacts of structural adjustment. They concluded that SAPs produced less growth in developing countries than would have occurred without any IMF intervention. Vreeland noted that structural adjustment did the most damage to the least well-off in society. It usually reduced the size of the “economic pie” to be distributed, and resulted in a more unequal distribution of the pie itself (Vreeland 2002). This work is also important, because few previous studies of the effects of structural adjustment policies had controlled for the effects of selection. Perhaps the countries the IMF had worked with had failed because they were intrinsically difficult cases. We needed

to determine the counter-factual -- namely, what would have happened to developing countries if the IMF had never intervened. In their research, they used estimation methods that corrected for the effects of selection.

Estimating the human rights effects of structural adjustment requires the use of a two-stage econometric model. As explained by Achen (1986), Heckman (1988), Przeworski and Vreeland (2000), and Vreeland (2002; 2003) issues of endogeneity, selection, and randomization must be accounted for when assessing the impact of any public policy. One needs to disentangle the impacts of the policy from any prior attributes that may also have an impact (Collier 1991). Were the negative effects of IMF SAPs on government respect for personal security rights practices found in previous research the result of the economic difficulties that made the loan recipient country a good candidate for a SAA in the first place or were they the consequence of the SAP itself? Single-stage models cannot provide an answer to that question. The preferences of the IMF to work with some countries and the fact that some types of countries are more likely to seek assistance mean that a non-random sample of all potential loan recipients enter into these agreements. The few previous scientific studies of the impacts of IMF SAPs agreed that they had worsened government respect for personal security rights (Franklin 1997; Keith and Poe 2000; McLaren 1988). However, only two (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007) controlled for selection, and neither of those studies examined the independent, isolated effects of IMF SAPs. Abouharb and Cingranelli (2006) showed that, other things being equal, the longer a government had participated in World Bank SAPs or SAPs originating from *either* the World Bank or IMF (2007), the worse its respect for most personal security rights.

Camp Keith and Poe (2000) also hypothesized that the very act of negotiating or entering into a loan with the IMF would have a temporary negative impact on the human rights practices of loan recipients. Their findings provided no statistically significant evidence for a “negotiations effect.” There also is a specific reason to expect that negotiating a SAA from the International Monetary Fund would have at least a temporary positive impact on the human rights practices of loan recipient governments. The U.S. International Financial Assistance Act in 1977 requires U.S. government representatives on the

decision making boards of the International Monetary Fund to use their voices and votes to advance the cause of human rights in loan recipient countries. The size of U.S. contributions to the Fund gives it a strong voice in loan negotiations (Banks et al. 2003). Thus, one would expect the International Monetary Fund to make SAAs with countries that have good human rights practices. Abouharb and Cingranelli (2006) found that negotiating a SAL with the World Bank had a temporary positive impact on the human rights practices of loan recipient governments

We began this study, then, accepting the following premises. First, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, as specialized agencies of the United Nations, have a responsibility to promote respect for human rights by governments around the world. Second, the SAPs that have been jointly promulgated by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank since about 1980 have not been successful in stimulating economic growth in most developing countries. Third, a relatively high level of respect for some human rights, including personal security rights, is a necessary precondition for economic development. Finally, one must control for selection in order to estimate the human rights effects of Structural Adjustment Programs.

HYPOTHESES

There is a substantial literature explaining IMF selection practices. Space limitations prohibit a full review here.³ The findings of that research suggest that economic, political, conflict, and human rights factors help determine the probability of receiving a SAA and also impact subsequent human rights practices. Governments are more likely to enter into a SAA if they have greater economic difficulty, greater respect for the human rights of their citizens, an alliance with the United States, larger populations, negotiated before the end of the Cold War, more authoritarian political institutions, lower levels of domestic unrest, lower levels of interstate conflict, or a previous colonial/dependent relationship with the US, the UK or France.

³ Thorough reviews of studies examining the selection biases of the IMF can be found in Vreeland (2003) and Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007). See also Dreher and Jensen (2007).

Previous research also supports the following second-stage hypotheses concerning the human rights effects of SAPs:

H10: The level of respect for personal security rights increases during the year a SAP is negotiated (the negotiation hypothesis).

H11: The level of respect for personal security rights decreases the longer SAPs are implemented (the implementation hypothesis).

RESEARCH DESIGN

This study uses a cross-national, annual time-series dataset comprised of 131 developing countries, with a population of at least 500,000 in 1981, which were in existence for the entire period under examination. Thus we exclude OECD nations, and countries that became independent during this period. Our rationale is to provide the best case scenario for defenders of the Fund who argue that the benefits of structural adjustment are cumulative and long term. We take them at their word. Our structural adjustment implementation measure discussed in more detail later is thus a running count of the time countries have spent under structural adjustment for the entire period. The data spans the time period from 1981 to 2003. This approach makes our findings directly comparable to other work (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007) where we examine the joint effects of World Bank and IMF structural adjustment agreements. We discuss this in the conclusions. During this period, the International Monetary Fund awarded a total of 465 SAAs to countries in our sample. The unit of analysis is the country year. At the human rights impact stage we investigate whether entering into a SAA with the International Monetary Fund in a particular year or the implementation of those loan conditions in subsequent years have an impact on the probability of torture, political imprisonment, extra-judicial killing and disappearances in loan recipient countries.

Variables

Entering into a Structural Adjustment Agreement

Entering into an International Monetary Fund SAA is both a dependent variable in the first stage of the analysis and an independent variable in the second stage. It is a dichotomous measure that indicates whether a country received an International Monetary Fund SAA or not in a particular year. It is coded “1” in the year(s) an agreement was made and “0” for all other years. The authors gathered the information necessary to construct both measures describing entering into and implementing structural adjustment from Vreeland (2003) and updated his measure reading the IMF Annual Reports.

Implementation of a Structural Adjustment Agreement

The measure of implementation of an International Monetary Fund SAA, an independent variable in the second stage, was generated by the authors. Proponents of structural adjustment argue that these programs enact the necessary reforms to generate high-quality economic growth. If this is true then those countries that have restructured their economies the most should have fared the best. Their economies will have removed more of the barriers to economic growth than those that restructured little. From this perspective the approach taken is a conservative one that provides a best-case scenario for defenders of these programs, especially since many of the neoliberal defenders of structural adjustment argue that the first few years a country undertakes these programs will necessitate difficult choices which mean things will be tough for a while (Rogoff 2003). However, after this period of adjustment the economy will benefit and economic growth will be generated. The expectation is that the greater the periods of time these countries have been liberalizing their economies the more beneficial will be the outcome of structural adjustment.

Since most adjustment packages last for three years and research has determined that on average it takes eighteen months for implementation to affect the economy, the results of the adjustment process should appear in years two, three, and four of the loan period (Jayarajah et al. 1996). For this reason, years two, three and four after loan receipt were coded as “one” and otherwise as “zero.” To assess the cumulative effects of structural adjustment we generated a running count of the numbers of years under

IMF structural adjustment countries have spent during the period 1981-2003. Thus the number can range from 0-22. A value of '22' indicates that a country has been under structural adjustment for the entire period. The assumption used is that the longer a country has been under structural adjustment, the more structural adjustment provisions have been implemented. This assumption is one followed by other work on this topic (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2003). The limitation of this measurement strategy ignores the argument that many developing countries have not implemented the conditions associated with their SAPs (Dollar and Svensson 2000; Van de Walle 2001; Eiras 2003). Research sponsored by the Heritage Foundation showed that the countries that received the most funds from the World Bank and IMF still had not fully liberalized their economies (Eiras 2003). The study also shows that 22 countries with more liberal economies had higher per capita incomes (Eiras 2003). There are good reasons to doubt these claims. Countries with the highest per capita incomes such as the United States or Finland are not the most liberalized. They retain a substantial role for the state in their economies.

An ideal test of the main hypothesis of this study would measure the degree to which the provisions of SAAs were implemented for each country year of the study. That would require that the investigator know the provisions of each structural adjustment for each country for each year. It would also require that the investigator know which of those provisions were implemented and to what extent for each year. This might be possible for single-country studies or even a study of a few countries, but it would require tremendous resources to collect such information for all developing countries annually for a long time period.

In his study of structural adjustment in Africa, Van de Walle (2001) illustrated the difficulty of assessing the degree of implementation even for a region. He identified several different common provisions in SAPs, which he divided into two main categories –stabilization and adjustment. Ten economic policies were classified as being part of each main category. He then evaluated the degree to which each of the ten policies had been implemented, on average, for all countries in Africa between 1979–1999 (Van de Walle 2001: 90). He did not attempt to do this for each country in the region for each year of his study. Except for civil service reform, where he rated the degree of implementation as “poor,”

he concluded that every policy had been implemented to some extent even in Africa, where the average quality of governance is poor. The question then becomes “how much implementation is required before we agree that the agreement was implemented?” Killick (1996) has conducted the most thorough and comprehensive studies of implementation of SAPs. He defined a structural adjustment program as incomplete if a country had implemented less than 81 percent of its program conditions. He surveyed 305 IMF agreements in less developed countries, and found that 53 percent had not been completed during the loan period. Though both Van de Walle and Killick criticize developing countries for not fully implementing the provisions of their SAPs, both provide ample evidence that the governments of most less developed countries implement many, if not most, of the provisions of their agreements.

Human Rights Practices of Governments

The human rights practices of governments are the dependent variables in the second stage. Four personal security rights from the CIRI human rights dataset (Cingranelli and Richards 2004) were used as dependent variables--extra-judicial killings, disappearances, political imprisonment, and torture. The sources of information used to develop this dataset were the annual *US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* and Amnesty International annual reports. Each of the four physical integrity variables was coded on a three-part scale where 0=frequent violations of the right (50 or more), 1=some violations (1-49), and 2=no violations. The correlations among the four personal security rights during the 1981-2003 period ranged from .35 between political imprisonment and extra-judicial killing to .56 between disappearances and extra-judicial killing in our sample.

Tables 1 and 2 provide a summary of the operationalization of the independent variables used in the first and second stages of the analysis.

--Insert Table 1 and Table 2 About Here--

A logit analysis was used in the first model to estimate when countries enter into an IMF structural adjustment agreement and an ordered logit model was in the second model to test the impact of receipt and implementation on government respect for each personal security rights¹. The analyses were

linked through the use of predicted probabilities from the first model estimating entering into an IMF agreement and were included in the model estimating the impact of receipt and implementation on government respect for personal security rights. This variable is labelled ‘IMF selection effects’ and its purpose is to control for the fact that a non-random sample of countries, often poor and in economic distress, which other work has found are more likely to be repressors of human rights, are likely to enter into these agreements.

RESULTS

Entering into a Structural Adjustment Agreement

The first-stage results in Table 3 display the factors that affected the probability of a country entering into an IMF structural adjustment agreement over the period between 1981 and 2003. The results provide considerable evidence about the importance of economic as well as human rights and international and domestic political factors.

We see that countries which are poor, measured by GDP per capita, in economic decline, measured by change in GDP per capita, have low levels of foreign currency reserves, and over-valued exchange rates are more likely to enter into SAAs, significant at the .05 level of confidence or higher². The IMF also favours countries which have higher levels of respect for personal security rights, significant at the .01 level of confidence. The end of the Cold War with increased numbers of countries eligible for IMF SAPs appears to have made competition for financial assistance greater, reducing the likelihood of receiving a structural adjustment agreement from the International Monetary Fund. At the domestic political level there is some support for the argument that sovereignty costs play a significant role indicated by the number of countries under an IMF structural adjustment agreement. These costs drop as the number of countries under structural adjustment increases (Vreeland 2003), heightening the probability that other countries enter into SAAs, significant at the .01 level of confidence. There is also some support that countries which have dependent relationships with key backers of the IMF are treated

differently, those that had a French colonial past are more likely to receive SAAs from the IMF over this period, at the .05 level of confidence.

The Impact of SAPs on Government Respect for Personal security rights

Four separate models were run. In Table 4 we show that IMF SAPs had a significant negative impact on the level of government respect of the freedom from torture at the .01 level of confidence³. We find no evidence of a negotiations effect found by Camp Keith and Poe (2000). The control variables behave as one would have expected given the results of previous research. Wealth, measured by GDP per capita, and economic growth, measured by percentage change in GDP, and higher levels of democracy and British colonial experience, had a positive impact on government respect for freedom from torture, significant at the .05 level of confidence or higher. Likewise more populous countries and those involved in civil conflict worsened levels of government respect of freedom from torture significant at .001 level of confidence. The impact of IMF selection effects indicates that the IMF tends to enter into SAAs with countries that have greater respect for human rights, significant at the .001 level of confidence. Thus work that does not account for these underlying selection criteria will tend to overestimate any positive effects and underestimate any negative effects of SAPs on government respect for human rights.

Two findings were contrary to our expectations. Interstate conflict was associated with lower levels of torture, and higher levels of respect for economic and social rights was associated with higher levels of torture. Both relationships were significant at the .05 levels of confidence. We speculate that interstate conflict may be associated with fewer human rights violations as a supportive population ‘rallies round the flag’ lessening the need for government to use coercive control. Concerning the respect for economic and social rights findings it may be that a threshold has to be crossed before these improvements lessen the need for governments to use other forms of coercive control. Both deserve further investigation.

--Tables 3 and 4 About Here--

Model Predictions

Table 5 presents an analysis of the substantive impact of IMF structural adjustment implementation on government respect for freedom from torture. The story told by these probabilities is that countries which have spent the longest periods under IMF structural adjustment are more likely to engage in high levels of torture of their citizens. Governments, which have been under IMF structural adjustment the longest are 35 percent more likely to become the worst violators (50+ violations per year) of the right not to be tortured in comparison to those that have never been under these programs. We examine in more detail below the impact of differing periods under IMF structural adjustment on the probabilities that governments never torture their citizens, (column I), that they sometimes torture their citizens, (column II), and that they engage in extensive torture, (column III). These predictions hold all the other variables in the analysis at their mean or modal values and control for the effects of IMF selection.

In column I we see that the probability a government never tortures any of its citizens is quite low, with a baseline probability of only .048. This concurs with other evidence that torture is the most common repression choice used by governments (Cingranelli and Richards 1999). The probability that governments never torture their citizens progressively drops as the time spent under structural adjustment increases, shifting to .044 for those under for the mean period (almost three and a half years), to .039 for those under one standard deviation above the mean (just over eight years), dropping to .028 for those under the highest number (22 years). In column II we see that the probability governments' sometimes torture their citizens has a much higher baseline probability of .55. As governments increase their exposure to structural adjustment the likelihood that governments sometimes torture their citizens also progressively drop to .53 for those under for the mean period (almost three and a half years), to .51 for those under one standard deviation above the mean (just over eight years), dropping to .43 for those under the highest number (22 years). In column III we see that the probability governments' engage in high levels of torture of their citizens has a lower baseline probability of .40. As governments increase their exposure to structural adjustment the probability of high levels of torture increases to .42 for those under

for the mean period (almost three and a half years), to .45 for those under one standard deviation above the mean (just over eight years), and .54 for those under the for the longest (22 years).

Test of Robustness

A widely used alternative measure of government respect for personal security rights is the Political Terror Scale (PTS). This is a five point ordinal scale (Gibney and Dalton 1996). The negative effects of IMF structural adjustment on human rights practices was also found using the PTS as a measure of overall respect for personal security rights. We inverted the PTS scale for ease of presentation. Using our inverted measure the PTS scale runs from 1 through 5 where 1 indicates the worst human rights conditions and five indicates the best⁴. Using the PTS measure we find support for a positive negotiations effect on respect for personal integrity rights also found by Abouharb and Cingranelli (2006), significant at the .05 level of confidence. We surmise that these improvements during the year of negotiation were part of an effort to impress IMF officials, who in our first stage models appear to weigh the personal security rights situation in their selection decisions. The results also indicated that the longer countries have spent implementing IMF SAPs the worse human rights conditions are using the PTS measure, significant at the .06 level of confidence.

DISCUSSION

The stage-one findings demonstrated that, besides economic distress, a variety of non-economic factors, not previously examined, also increased the likelihood of entering into a SAA with the International Monetary Fund. Governments with better records of respect for personal security rights were more likely to enter into an agreement with the International Monetary Fund. These findings suggest that the Fund is concerned about the human rights practices of potential loan recipient governments. They are consistent with the “governance matters” initiative of the Fund in recent years (Kaufman et al. 2003) and with the 1977 US International Financial Assistance Act requiring the US representatives on the Board of the Fund to use their votes and voices to advance human rights in loan recipient countries.

The evidence at the human rights impact stage is quite different. The most important substantive finding of this study is that implementing an SAA from the International Monetary Fund has worsened government respect for freedom from torture. This finding is generally consistent with the findings of previous comparative and case study research on the human rights effects of IMF SAPs. It supports one of the main hypotheses in our research—that the probability of personal security rights violations increase the longer governments have been implementing SAPs. It is stronger, but generally supportive of the finding reported by Camp Keith and Poe (2000).

These findings have theoretical, empirical and substantive policy implications. They contribute to efforts to build a theory of repression by providing additional evidence that transnational forces such as globalization and transnational actors including international financial institutions affect the human rights practices of governments. In contrast, previous studies have focused mainly on state-level characteristics such as their wealth or level of democracy. The results of this study suggest that greater attention should be given to transnational causal forces in developing theories that explain the human rights practices of governments. The results of this study provide evidence supporting the critical theory argument that rapid, externally imposed economic liberalization does not stimulate economic development and worsens government human rights practices.

These research results were yielded by a research design that incorporated a number of empirical advances over previous research on the human rights impacts of SAPs. This is the first large scale comparative study to examine the human rights impacts of International Monetary Fund structural adjustment loans, and the time period examined in this work (1981-2003) nearly triples the time period examined in any other study of the human rights effects of IMF structural adjustment. It is also one of the few studies that disaggregate the analysis of government respect for personal security rights. Perhaps, most important, the relationship between structural adjustment and respect for personal security rights was re-conceptualized to recognize that some of the factors which affect the likelihood of entering into a SAA also affect government human rights practices. This re-conceptualization led to the use of a two-stage equation model to correct for the International Monetary Fund's selection criteria when estimating

the human rights consequences of structural adjustment. The results provided strong support for most of the findings of the case study literature and for the critical theoretical perspective that form the foundation of most of that work.

The finding of no relationship between interstate conflict and the four measures of personal security rights used in the present analysis was surprising. Previous research theorized that regimes threatened internally or externally would tend to respond with increased repression. Our results indicate that domestic threats are associated with higher levels of government repression, while external threats are not. The specification of the true relationship between interstate conflict and repression of personal security rights merits further theoretical and empirical examination.

When coupled with the body of research showing that SAPs do not stimulate economic growth (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2003), the findings presented here cast serious doubt upon the wisdom of insisting upon rapid neo-liberal structural adjustment as a condition for providing loans. Future research on the human rights effects of structural adjustment should examine the consequences for other types of human rights such as worker rights and women's rights. Future work also should focus on developing improved measures of structural adjustment loan implementation. New measures would allow for a closer examination of the effects of the speed and types of economic liberalization on domestic conflict and on government respect for human rights. Economic liberalization may not have inevitable negative consequences for the human rights practices of governments. However, the results of this research demonstrate that the rapid, externally imposed economic liberalization of the type insisted upon by the International Monetary Fund has led to increased government violations of personal security rights.

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TABLE 1. Operationalization of First-Stage Equation Variables

Dependent Variable	Indicator	Source
Entering into a International Monetary Fund SAA	Dichotomous “1” If SAA Received; “0” If Not	Vreeland (2003) updated by authors using IMF Annual Report
Independent Variables		
Economic		
GDP Per Capita Change	Percentage Change in GDP Per Capita Current U.S. \$ Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)	World Bank: World Development Indicators CD-Rom (WDI)
Foreign Currency Reserves	Average Government Foreign Reserves to reflect Monthly Imports	World Bank: WDI
Exchange Rate Value	Average Annual Official Exchange Rate Local Currency Unit per US \$	World Bank: WDI
GDP Per Capita	GDP Per Capita Current U.S. \$ (PPP)	World Bank: WDI
International Trade	Trade as a Percentage of GDP	World Bank: WDI
Political		
Alliance With the United States	Correlates of War (COW) Alliance Measure	COW Alliance Dataset
Democracy	Democracy-Autocracy Measure	POLITY IV Dataset
Military Regimes	Type of Regime: Civilian or Military	Banks (2002) updated using Freedom House Reports
Population Size	Logged Midyear Country Population	U.S. Census: International Data Base
Cold War	Dichotomous, “0” before 1991; “1” if 1991 or Later	Banks et al. (2003)
Conflict Proneness		
Interstate Conflict	Ordinal Level of International Conflict (0-3 measure)	Strand et. al (2002)
Domestic Conflict	Ordinal Level of Civil Conflict (0-3 measure)	Strand et. al (2002)
Human Rights		
Respect for Human Rights	Mokken Scale: Killing, Disappearances, Torture, Imprisonment	Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) (2004)
Respect for Workers Rights	0=Not protected by Govt. 1= Somewhat protected Govt. 2=Protected by Govt.	CIRI (2004)
Temporal Dependence		
Cubic Splines	Beck et. al (1998) BTSCS Method	

TABLE 2. Operationalization of Second-Stage Equation Variables

Dependent Variable	Indicator	Source
Disappearances	0=Frequent (50+) 1=Occasional(1-49 instances) 2=None	Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) (2004)
Killings	0=Frequent (50+) 1=Occasional(1-49 instances) 2=None	CIRI (2004)
Torture	0=Frequent (50+) 1=Occasional(1-49 instances) 2=None	CIRI (2004)
Political Imprisonment	0=Frequent (50+) 1=Occasional(1-49 instances) 2=None	CIRI (2004)
Independent Variables		
Implementation of IMF Structural Adjustment Agreement	Running count of number of years under IMF conditionality. Each year of loan period coded “1” & 0 otherwise.	Vreeland (2003) updated by authors using IMF Annual Report
Entering into IMFund Structural Adjustment Agreement	Dichotomous coded “1”for the year a government entered into an IMF structural adjustment agreement & 0 otherwise.	Vreeland (2003) updated by authors using IMF Annual Report
Control Variables		
Economic		
GDP Per Capita	GDP Per Capita Current U.S. \$ (PPP)	World Bank: World Development Indicators CD-Rom (WDI)
GDP Per Capita Change	Percentage Change in GDP Per Capita Current U.S. \$ (PPP)	World Bank: WDI
Political		
Democracy	Democracy	POLITY IV Dataset
Military Regime	Type of Regime: Civilian or Military	Banks (2002) updated using Freedom House Reports
Population Size	Logged Midyear Country Population	U.S. Census: International Data Base
Population Change	Percentage Change in yearly Population (Constructed)	U.S. Census: International Data Base
UK Dependent/Colonial Experience	The decision rule of the most recent possessor is used to identify the relationships under examination.	Issues COW Colonial History Dataset
Conflict Proneness		
Interstate Conflict	Ordinal Level of International Conflict (0-3 measure)	Strand et. al (2002)
Domestic Conflict	Ordinal Level of Civil Conflict (0-3 measure)	Strand et. al (2002)
Temporal Dependence		
Lagged Dependent Variable	Disappearances, Killings, Torture, Political Imprisonment lagged 1 year	

Table 3: Logit Equation: Entering into a Structural Adjustment Agreement with IMF 1981-2003, All Developing Countries

<u>Entering into a SAA Agreement with IMF</u>	Coefficient	Robust St. Error
Economic Variables		
Percentage Change in GDP Per Capita	-.031*	.014
Average Foreign Currency Reserves	-0.079*	0.035
Exchange Rate Value	1.18e-06***	1.99e-07
GDP Per Capita	-0.0001**	0.00006
Extent of International Trade	-0.004	0.003
Human Rights		
Level of Respect: Personal security rights	.102**	0.043
Level of Respect: Workers Rights	-.034	0.111
International Political Variables		
Alliance with United States	.246	0.156
Log of Population	0.072	0.065
Cold War	-0.968***	0.21
Domestic Political Variables		
Level of Democracy	0.021	0.025
Military Regime	-0.129	.228
French Dependent/Colonial Experience	0.402*	0.183
UK Dependent/Colonial Experience	-0.258	0.158
USA Dependent/Colonial Experience	0.333	0.231
Number of Countries Under IMF Structural Adjustment	.032**	.012
Conflict Proneness Variables		
Domestic Unrest	0.007	0.082
Interstate Conflict	-0.356	0.251
Control Variables		
Number of Years Since Previous SAL	0.37*	0.16
Number of Years Since Previous SAL ²	0.123*	0.075
Constant	-4.763***	1.43
N	1891	(Pseudo R ²).10

P>|z .05*, .01**, .001*** One Tailed Test (Splines to Control for Temporal Dependence)

Table 4: Ordered Logit Model of the Impact of IMF SAA Negotiation & Implementation on Freedom from Torture, 1981-2003, All Developing Countries

<u>Respect for Human Rights</u>	Ordered Logit Torture Coefficient	Robust Standard Error
Implementation of IMF SAA	-.026**	.011
Entering into IMF SAA	.016	.153
Control Variables		
GDP Per Capita	.0001***	.00003
Percentage Change in GDP Per Capita	0.046***	.011
Democracy	0.052**	.021
Military Regime	0.689	0.2
Log Population	-0.337***	.067
International Trade	0.003	0.002
Interstate Conflict	0.42*	0.217
Civil Conflict	-0.367***	.074
Respect for Economic and Social Rights	-.012*	.006
UK Dependent/Colonial Experience	0.307*	.164
IMF Selection Effects	5.44***	.763
Lagged Dependent Variable	1.576***	.117
N	1812	
Pseudo R2	.27	

P > |z| .05*, .01**, .001*** One Tailed Test

Table 5 Selection Corrected Predictions: The Impact of Structural Adjustment Implementation on the Probability of Torture 1981-2003, All Developing Countries

Independent Variable	Column I Torture 0 violations	Column II Torture 1-49 violations	Column IV Torture 50+ violations
Lowest number of years under Structural Adjustment (0 years)	.048	.55	.40
Mean number of years under Structural Adjustment (3.4 years)	.044	.53	.42
One standard deviation above mean number of years under Structural Adjustment (about 8.2 years)	.039	.51	.45
Highest number of years under Structural Adjustment (22 years)	.028	.43	.54

ENDNOTES

¹ The logit model in the first stage allows us to incorporate cubic splines into the analysis which controls for issues of temporal dependence and reduces the probability of creating biased parameter estimates which is a potential consequence of lagging the dependent variable (Gujarati 1995).

² Some work has argued about the importance of debt leading countries to enter into structural adjustment agreements; an alternate first stage equation including debt as a proportion of GNP was included. The result was significant, higher levels of debt increased the probability of entering into a SAA, however we dropped 656 cases about 26 percent of our total number of cases, when we included this measure, because of the limited availability we chose not to include it in our analysis presented in Table 3.

³ IMF structural adjustment agreements had no significant effect on the other personal security rights used in this study. Space limitations prevent display of these results but they can be obtained on request.

⁴ The PTS measure was created using the State Department component score and added in the Amnesty score for any cases that were missing. Space limitations prevent presentation here but can be obtained on request. The data is available from <http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/images/Colloquium/faculty-staff/gibney.html>