Institutional Authority and Security Cooperation within Regional Economic Organizations

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Abstract:

The proliferation of regional economic organizations (REOs) is a prominent feature of the contemporary international environment. Many of these organizations aspire to promote regional peace and stability. Some strive to promote these goals only through economic cooperation, while others have expanded their mandate to include mechanisms that address security concerns more directly. A glance at the security components of such organizations indicates that their purpose and design are very diverse. This paper sheds light on the sources of this poorly understood phenomenon. Specifically, it argues that organizations that enjoy greater institutional delegation are in a better position to expand their mandate into the security realm and to have more far-reaching agreements in this issue-area. It then develops a metric that gauges the degree of security cooperation within REOs and presents a new data set of numerous organizations on this institutional aspect. Employing this data in a rigorous statistical analysis and controlling for a host of alternative explanations, it demonstrates that, indeed, REOs with greater institutional authority embrace deeper security cooperation.

The proliferation of regional economic organizations (REOs) is one of the most prominent features of the contemporary international environment. Many of these REOs aspire to promote regional peace and stability. Indeed, their rising prominence is accompanied by a widespread perception that they are indispensable in reducing frictions between their members. Their vision on how to promote regional security and the instruments crafted to achieve this goal are remarkably diverse, however. REOs such as SAARC and SACU are essentially designed to tackle economic affairs.[1] Presumably, their member-states believe that cooperation on trade and development will produce economic benefits, familiarity, and mutual-trust, thereby preventing or mediating armed conflict. ECOWAS, the EU, UNASUR, and their likes, on the other hand, have been gradually expanding their mandate to include agreements and mechanisms that address security concerns more directly. As a result, the combination of economic and security arrangements under the roof of one organization has become rather common.

A glance at the security components of REOs indicates that they are very different in terms of purpose and design: some REOs have established regular meetings among military personnel or relevant decision-makers, others have developed mechanisms of early-warning and conflict prevention, and still others have agreed on the development of a set of multinational armed forces capable of conducting peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Despite the rising significance of this development, embedded security structures within existing REOs have attracted only scant scholarly attention. The potential sources and consequences of this trend are therefore poorly understood.

[1] For the full name of these and other REOs mentioned in the paper, see Appendix.

The goal of this paper is to bridge the gap in our understanding of the creation of regional security cooperation within REOs. Specifically, it aspires to account for variation in the *presence* and *design* of security sub-structures incorporated into these economic institutions. We argue that one important source of this variation (albeit not the only one) is the organization's institutional authority. That is, members of REOs that their bodies enjoy greater delegation will make the most of these institutions by adapting their competences, knowledge, and experience to new tasks irrespective of the external opportunities and constraints that they face. REOs with little delegated powers, on the other hand, will not offer much advantage in this respect. Under these conditions, member-states will turn elsewhere to tackle their security challenges.

We employ an original data set that includes a coding of security arrangements in twenty-eight REOs to evaluate these expectations. Upon elaborating on and presenting the coding scheme and data, we turn to a multivariate statistical analysis. In it, we consider several potentially confounding factors, such as potential or actual conflict, the prior existence of security organizations, the regional balance of power, and regional amity. The empirical findings provide strong support for the notion that greater institutional authority is associated with deeper security cooperation within REOs. This result withstands the inclusion of various alternative explanations and is robust to different model specifications.

This paper contributes to extant research in several manners. First, it emphasizes that economic and security institutionalized cooperation can go hand in hand. Security scholars interested in international organizations (IOs) have predominantly focused on alliance creation and duration as well as IO effectiveness in conducting peace operations.

Scholars of international political economy focusing on multilateral cooperation have rather emphasized economic interdependence, commitments to economic reforms, and regional integration. This artificial bifurcation of the literature has provided an incomplete, and perhaps distorted, picture of regional cooperation around the world (Mansfield and Solingen 2010). Second, this paper demonstrates that REOs embed other policy domains to different degrees in their institutional structures. This observation advances the research on institutional design, which predominantly focuses on the creation of IOs at the expense of their evolution and change. We thus join a small number of studies that shifts the attention to institutional change (Jupille at al. 2013) and design "in context" (Copelovitch and Putnam 2014). Finally, by assessing the relative causal weight of external and internal opportunities and constraints to international cooperation, we provide empirical evidence for the new research program on international delegation and authority (Hawkins et al. 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2015).

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly reviews extant research related to the puzzle addressed in this paper and then develops the theoretical framework. The third section presents the research design with particular emphasis on the definition, measurement and coding of security cooperation within REOs. It also elaborates on the conceptualization of the main independent variable and control variables. The fourth section presents and discusses the results of the statistical analysis. The final section concludes.

Theorizing the Sources of Security Cooperation within REOs

REOs vary in the degree to which they take on security functions. We argue that this variance can be explained by focusing primarily on their institutional characteristics,

mainly the extent to which member-states delegate authority to these organizations. Before turning to our theoretical framework, we succinctly examine the large body of existing literature related to the nexus of regional integration, security, and organizations. The main conclusion from this overview is that the different strings of extant research have much to say about why IOs have been created, maintained and what their impact on multilateral policy is. They are often silent, however, about how changes in institutional design – in particular in terms of scope expansion – have come about. They also pay scant attention to differences in the mixture of different issue-areas within the same regional organization as well as to the manners by which delegation affects their development over time.

Much of the early research on REOs followed the neofunctionalist tradition and focused almost exclusively on spillover dynamics within the economic and social policy realm, overlooking economic and security linkages (Haas 1958; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; cf. Nye 1971). More recent works examine the effect of IOs and REOs on militarized conflict but emphasize the broad level of institutionalization or variation in the economic scope and structure of these arrangements without paying attention to embedded security structures (Aydin 2010; Bearce and Omori 2005; Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004; Hansen, Mitchell, and Nemeth 2008). Additional studies in this vein have focused on economic agreements, whether or not embedded in an IO, and their possible impact on the likelihood of inter-state disputes (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000; Mitchell and Zawahri 2015).

Many studies on security organizations, on the other hand, has focused on the creation or persistence of such organizations instead of their development. No matter the

theoretical and methodological outlook, scholars have emphasized different reasons as to why alliances and security structures endure despite exogenous shocks (Barnett 1996; Bennett 1997; Mattes 2012; Leeds and Savun 2007). A number of pioneering studies have conducted extensive empirical analyses of the effect of IOs on inter-or intrastate militarized disputes (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004; Russett and Oneal 2001; Lundgren 2014), treating these organizations as homogenous "black boxes." Tavares (2009) and Kirchner & Domínguez (2011) have focused on the ability of IOs to shape regional politics but examine only organizations that have a security component, some of which exclude economic cooperation all together.

Only a handful of studies have begun to explore security aspects of REOs in a systematic manner. Bearce (2003) argues that commercial institutions with security sub-structures mitigate violent conflict and finds support for this conjecture in two case studies. Similarly, Powers (2004, 2006) finds that African REOs that include an alliance reduce militarized disputes. These studies are silent, however, on the conditions under which governments choose to interweave economic and security elements in one organization and do not account for the variation in the nature of security arrangements.

While none of the studies mentioned herein touches on the issue at hand directly, many of them serve as a useful springboard for the development of the theoretical framework, discussed next. Our point of departure is that in setting up IOs, states negotiate, fight over and decide upon an institutional design (Koremenos et al. 2001) not only at the time of their creation but also throughout their existence. Two key design features over which governments bargain are how far-reaching the institutional scope (sometimes labeled mandate) and depth (how many functions and powers to delegate to

IO bodies) should be. This requires states to consider several matters: what issue areas should be tackled multilaterally and which ones ought to be addressed unilaterally or by other multilateral fora? How many resources should be devoted to the IO once the scope has been decided upon? Should the IO only have a small secretariat, how many experts should be allocated to the task of suggesting and supporting multilateral policy-making and what kind of hardware should be pooled or delegated? In other words, how far the breadth and depth of multilateral cooperation should go?

These matters do not lose their relevance over the life of the organization and as circumstances change. When member-states decide to modify the mandate of an IO, they have to reconsider its scope, structure, and authority (Jupille et al. 2013). In the context of this study, members have to determine the degree to which the REO should take on various security functions and responsibilities. The menu for choice may include, for example, the exchange of military information, the exchange of military and civilian personnel, the development of institutional mechanisms to manage the pooling or sharing of military hardware, and the conduct peace operations.

This is not a forgone conclusion, of course. In instances of increased cooperation and coordination problems that call for security structures, neighboring states can use existing security organizations or establish a brand new security organization to deal with such problems. Why embed them in existing REOs, then? We argue that, all else equal, member-states interested in strengthening their regional security cooperation will take into consideration the presence and authority of their existing institutions. In particular, using strong institutional capacities already in place as a springboard for new collaborative efforts in a different policy domain can reduce sunk and transaction costs

involved in setting up these initiatives as well as build on previous confidence-building frameworks (Aggarwal 1998; Mattli 1999; Jupille et al. 2013). Scope expansion is more likely when states can take advantage of their previous investment in building institutional capacity. In other words, delegated authority and general assets are more likely to serve as focal points for the coordination of new policy areas.

Crucially, the ability of the REO to support security cooperation depends on the authority vested in it. As Wallander (2000) points out, IOs can adapt their institutional structure to new activities within their policy domain, should they possess general assets. General assets pertain to institutional capacity that includes decision-making procedures, experienced bureaucracy, and norms that allow member-states to resolve their differences amicably (Abbott and Snidal 1998). Furthermore, these more general assets render an organization valuable to its members, even when circumstances change (Wallander 2000). IOs and REOs vary a great deal on the general assets they hold. To specify general assets, we anchor our analysis on recent insights gained in the institutionalist literature that focuses on delegation and authority (Marks et al. 2015; Zürn et al. 2012). In some organizations, member-states created several powerful and independent bodies, which in turn developed an impressive institutional capacity. These organizational bodies (e.g. secretariats or assemblies) are primarily composed of non-member state technocrats and have some authority over agenda-setting or decision-making. In others, member-states pool and delegate only little authority to the organization, thus providing it with very limited value-added (Gray 2014; Hooghe and Marks 2015).

The existence of delegated authority and general assets, we argue, does not only facilitate the transformation of organizational activities *within a policy domain* but also

scope expansion under the same organizational umbrella. Given that general assets are not necessarily bound to any particular policy domain but encompass broader norms and rules as well as organizational capacities that have proven useful to member states over time, it seems reasonable to expect that member-states will prefer to expand the scope of those organizations that have already accumulated more general assets. This is particularly important for scope expansion into the security policy domain; a policy domain that can be associated with high sovereignty concerns.

For example, the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) benefits from the EU's existing institutional framework and the familiarity of its members with each other's interests (Kirchner 2011). When EU member-states finally decided to create a security structure under the EU umbrella, they could rely on established rules of procedure within the Council of Ministers such as chairman rules based on rotating presidencies. Similarly, both ECOWAS and SADC have built on their experience in economic cooperation – stressing interdependencies, confidence-building measures as well as norms such as solidarity and sovereign equality – to develop security structures under their umbrella (Francis 2006).

While Haas (1961) suggests that spillover would not occur from the economic to security domain due to high sovereignty costs, we argue otherwise, relying on a different causal mechanism. Haas argued that issue interdependence and increased regulatory complexity would lead to functional spillovers as international bureaucrats exploit their position within the IO. We emphasize the confidence-building that occurred between member states that reduces sunk and transaction costs. Through previous cooperation on weakly interrelated policy issues, that is reflected in delegated authority, states are willing

to rely on these institutional capacities to help mediate and manage political and military conflict between and within them. Hence, additional security structures do not necessarily have to respond to an immanent or potential security need, such as inter- or intrastate conflicts, but emerge out of regular information sharing, reduced uncertainty among member states, and procedures of deliberation (Wallander 2000: 711). With more delegated authority, states become more willing to invest in additional organizational design features as part of a political project.

Overall, organizations with delegated authority hold big amounts of general assets that facilitate scope expansion. Weaker organizations, in contrast, hold a smaller amount of general assets and cannot support states in creating an additional policy domain under the same organizational umbrella. In these situations, states can as well create an autonomous organization outside the familiar organizational framework.[2] We can therefore state the following key hypothesis: *the higher the level of institutional authority, the deeper the security cooperation within REOs.*

Before proceeding, it is worth noting that this hypothesis does not necessarily rely on the assumption that a given region first faces economic challenges and only later experiences security setbacks. It is certainly possible that member-states suffer security predicaments during the initial set up of the economic organization. Nevertheless, while the evolution of regional institutions can take different shapes and forms, theory (Haas 1958) as well as history suggest that an expansion from cooperation in economic issue-

[2] Beyond the calculations of member-states, one might expect more capable organizations to engage in "creeping competence" (Pollack 1994) or "pathological" expansion (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). Those bureaucracies that have the ability to set the organization's agenda, for example, may attempt and succeed in expanding the mandate of the organization to include new issue-areas (Hawkins et al. 2006, 32; Jupille et al. 2013). This logic is probably less applicable to the security sphere, given the potential sovereignty costs involved in such cooperation.

areas to security matters is more likely than the reversed sequence. Regarding the latter, the evolution of organizations such as ECOWAS, ASEAN, and the EU (to name a few) substantiates this observation insofar as these organizations first tackled social and economic issues and only later embedded other policy domains that are arguably more politically divisive. Thus, even if security considerations motivated the creation of some REOs, they were initially tackled indirectly, perhaps with the hope that economic cooperation will boost regional amity and security (Monnet 1978). In addition, we do not preclude the possibility of existing separate security organizations alongside REOs. We address this issue, as well as other potentially confounding factors – such as the risk of violent conflict, distribution of power, and regional rivalries – in the succeeding section.

Research Design

This study examines the sources of security sub-structures within REOs, which are institutional traits of the organization and not of any particular dyad. The empirical analysis is therefore conducted at the regional level, defined by organizational membership. The dependent and independent variables, described in more detail below, are thus defined and measured at the regional level. Given the incremental change on the variables related to REO institutions, all variables are coded in five-year intervals from 1982 to 2012.[3] The values of the dependent variables are ordinal (see below). They are therefore estimated with an ordered probit model with robust standard errors clustered by REOs. We account for temporal dynamics with time dummies.[4]

[3] For a thorough discussion and justification of the regional level of analysis and the temporal aggregation, see Author.

[4] We also used a random-effects specification and obtained similar results. They are available upon request.

Dependent Variable

The feature at the heart of this study is the presence and depth of security cooperation embedded in REOs. The design of security arrangements is rather diverse, thereby complicating a structured comparison across regions. In one of the first efforts to conceptualize this variation, we identify five general categories of security organs and activities and develop two ordinal variables that capture the degree of security cooperation envisioned by member-states.[5]

More superficial security cooperation entails relatively modest institutionalization and delegation. In these cases, security sub-structures aspire to assure member-states against aggression and conflict as well as facilitate the exchange of information and perspectives between relevant stakeholders.[6] Such bodies may be instrumental in building mutual trust and confidence among the members and foster the coordination of security policies within the region and with respect to external actors (Kirchner and Domínguez 2011; Lundgren 2014). We consider three specific institutions in this context:

- *Security Commission* – a body that facilitates the coordination of security and defense policies. It often involves officials from the ministry of defense or military personnel and mostly tackles technical issues. Such bodies meet regularly and are commonly labeled as a commission, a committee, or a working group. Examples of security

[5] For a similar exercise in the context of international organizations' intervention in civil wars, see Lundgren (2014).

[6] We exclude more passive security provisions, such as neutrality and non-aggression clauses, agreements on a region free of weapons of mass destruction, and declarations on regional solidarity and the need to settle disputes peacefully. These agreements usually have little practical implications. We also exclude provisions related to "non-traditional" security matters, such as terrorism, organized crime, and natural disaster. A careful treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper and is a promising avenue of future research.

commissions are the ASEAN Defense Senior Official Meeting and CAN's High Level Group on Security and Confidence Building Measures.

- *Ministerial Council* – an institutional set up that brings together top-level government officials, that is, either ministers of defense, security, or foreign affairs or heads of states. Generally, this body engages in decision-making on particular crises and broad political guidelines as well as deals with controversial political issues. Examples include COMESA's Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and CARICOM's Council for National Security and Law Enforcement.

- *Conflict Early Warning System* – an arrangement designed to collect information on domestic and international conflicts and in so doing to prevent escalation of exiting strains. It is usually involves a network of offices in different parts of the region that analyze and report tensions, incidents, and other security problems. EAC's Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution Framework and CACM's Security information and Communications Mechanism illustrate such systems.

Deeper levels of security cooperation envisage the execution of common security policies in the event that violent conflict erupts. This more intense level of cooperation requires greater delegation of authority to the organization and an agreement regarding the coordination of security strategy and operational procedures. This category contains two security sub-structures:

- *Designed Military Exercise* – an agreement on a framework of regular joint military exercises of either national units or regional forces. ECCAS and EAC's joint maneuvers and military exercises exemplify such arrangements.

- *Designed Military Operation* – an agreement to establish a multinational military force for the purpose of military cooperation and peace operations. This may involve the establishment of a central command, headquarter structures or other organs that engage the implementation of such activities. Notable examples include the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), CSDP's Operation Centre and five national headquarters that can become multinational, and GCC's Al-Jazeerah Shield Joint Force.

We use these five indicators to produce two ordinal variables. The primary variable, labeled **Security_2**, scores two for deep security cooperation, that is if either designed military exercise or operation are present; one for shallow security cooperation, that is if an REO has either a commission, or a council, or a conflict early warning system; and zero if the organization has none of the five indicators and thus no security cooperation. We create a second variable, labeled **Security_5**, which sums up the presence of all five indicators, thereby ranging from zero for no security cooperation to five for a high level of security cooperation within the regional organization.

Sample and Data

With these indicators and variables in hand, one can turn to the identification of relevant organizations and their coding. This section briefly discusses these procedures and describes the original data set of security cooperation within REOs. It demonstrates that substantial variation on this institutional dimension exists.

As already mentioned, the unit of analysis is the regional economic organization, which is one type of international governmental organizations (IGOs) and should therefore have a continuous institutional framework, a formal structure, and at least three

national governments as members (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004). It is "regional" in the sense that membership in these organizations is restricted to geographically proximate states and "economic" to the extent that the promotion of economic policy cooperation among the organization's members is one of their original and primary (but not necessarily exclusive) goals (Mansfield and Milner 1999).

The question of sequencing is important because the theoretical framework assumes a process of expansion from economic cooperation into the security realm. Here, it is noteworthy that most regional organizations that currently address both economic and security matters indeed started from the former and moved into the latter over time. Even in several prominent organizations that had strong political underpinnings, such as ASEAN, GCC, and SADC, initial agreements emphasized economic cooperation. In line with this logic, regional organizations that involved substantial security cooperation from the start – such as the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – and regional organizations that tackle security matters but do not promote economic cooperation – such as NATO, the Organization of American States, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – are excluded from the sample. While these IGOs are important providers of regional security, they do not meet the selection criteria.

Surveying most, if not all, existing international economic agreements and organizations, we identified twenty-eight REOs that correspond to these criteria and for which sufficient information on institutional design is available.[7] The Appendix provides

[7] We were not able to find reliable information on the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (also known by its French acronym CEPGL).

a list of these organizations. The sample is therefore very comprehensive, spans all continents, and includes the majority of states world-wide. To code the five indicators pertaining to security cooperation, we surveyed all the available agreements and protocols and recorded the articles that deal with security matters. These texts provide a very good sense of the kind of security arrangements and institutions. In several instances, the actual texts were not available, and in others important details were hammered out in declarations, memorandums, and decisions rather than in formal treaties. In such cases, we surveyed relevant primary documents and secondary sources, which included the REOs' own websites and scholarly articles and reports, thereby depicting a complete picture of planned security cooperation.

Figure 1 presents a classification of all REOs included in the sample according to their level of security cooperation as of 2012. It indicates that half of the organizations (14 out of 28) have a security component. This simple fact substantiates the observation that the focus of many REOs is no longer strictly economic. Instead, a growing number of organizations link economic and security issues under one organizational umbrella.[8] A finer distinction between the different levels of security cooperation sheds additional light on the varying landscape of regional institutions. As one might expect given the high material and sovereignty costs associated with military operations, the majority of REOs that have security sub-structures (8 out of 14) emphasize coordination, mutual assurance, and conflict prevention. Only six REOs developed the legal framework and institutions required for joint military exercises or operations.

[8] Indeed, the average values of Security_2 and Security_5 have increased threefold from 1987 to 2012 (from 0.25 to 0.70 and from 0.50 to 1.53, respectively).

[Figure 1]

Figure 2 presents the specific indicators and cumulative level of security cooperation for each REO in the most recent time period (that is 2008-2012). A glance at this graph indicates that security cooperation is widespread and is not confined to one region or continent. Security sub-structures exist within REOs in Europe, Africa, Latin America, and the Asia Pacific. High levels of security cooperation appear to be popular among African REOs (although far from universal), but also present in Europe and Asia. As one might expect, all the organizations that embrace deep security cooperation (i.e. joint military exercise or operations) also installed institutions related to the shallower level (e.g. meetings of security officials), suggesting that the latter is often a precondition for the former.[9]

[Figure 2]

Independent and Control Variables

This section provides definitions and measurements of the main independent variable as well as a discussion of alternative explanations and the variables associated with them. To reduce the risk of endogeneity, all independent variables are lagged one time period. For instance, values on the dependent variable for the 2008-2012 period correspond to values on independent variables for the 2003-2007 period. The Appendix reports summary statistics and bivariate correlations of all the variables included in the analysis.

[9] Lundgren (2014) shows similar patterns.

Institutional Delegation

The primary hypothesis of this study links greater institutional capacity to deeper security cooperation. Recent studies on institutional design have used numerous terms and labels to describe variation across IOs. For the purpose of the analysis, institutional delegation subsumes several overlapping concepts developed elsewhere, such as centralization (Abbott and Snidal 1998), independence (Abbott and Snidal 1998), authority (Zürn et al. 2015), and, of course, delegation (Hawkins et al. 2006; Marks et al. 2015). While concepts and arguments are plentiful, efforts to measure them in a systematic manner are few and far between. Here, we employ perhaps the most sophisticated and detailed data collection effort along these lines. Specifically, we use the variable **Delegation**, which was developed by Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe and their colleagues (2015). According to them, delegation refers to the empowerment of IGOs to fill-in relevant agreements, provide expert information, select or prioritize tabled proposals, propose policy initiatives, and make and enforce decisions.

Based on this definition, they devised a variable that takes into account the transfer of agenda-setting or decision-making authority to four corporate bodies – a council, a secretariat, an assembly, and consultative bodies – with respect to six competencies (Marks et al. 2015).[10] The aggregate measure is an additive index of several weighted indexes standardized to range from zero, for no delegation, to one, for high delegation to a given REO. Marks and his colleagues coded twenty out of the

[10] These are accession, suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial non-compliance, and policy making. For a detailed description of the measure, see Marks et al. (2015). In another specification of this variable, they include the dimension of legalization as well. We prefer the variable that excludes this aspect, which is less pertinent to the issue at hand. Nevertheless, using the variable that does include legalization does not affect the results in a meaningful manner (not reported here).

twenty-eight organizations in the sample (as well as other IGOs not included in the analysis here). We used the coding scheme developed by Marks et al. to code the remaining eight organizations.[11] It is noteworthy that **Delegation** takes into account only the organization's general institutional structure and disregards the more specialized bodies and arrangements that tackle security matters. Thus, the data used for the measurement of the independent variables, on the one hand, and the dependent variables, on the other, do not overlap.

Alternative Explanations

Existing institutional delegation is by no means the only factor that is likely to determine the inclusion of security sub-structures within REOs. The creation and design of initiatives in this policy sphere may depend on various factors that affect member-states' needs and incentives, on the one hand, and internal and external constraints, on the other (Mattli 1999). Accounting for these variables in the statistical analysis, especially to the extent that they are correlated with the main independent variables, minimizes the risk of spurious correlation.

Violent Conflict – one important consideration with regard to the depth of security sub-structures pertains to the security predicament of the region. One might reasonably expect zones of conflict to set up security institutions in response to a greater perceived need for cooperation. While security and stability concerns are universal, their intensity varies across regions. Different regions experience varying degrees of violent conflict or militarized disputes. In conflict-prone regions, states that engage in cross-border militarized disputes may look for mechanisms to prevent further escalation of the conflict

[11] These are AMU, IOC, MRU, WAEMU, APTA, ECO, CEFTA, and EAEC.

or to prevent disagreements from becoming bloody in the first place. Perhaps more common in recent decades, governments may have to take notice of calls to intervene in instances of domestic strife and civil wars, which tend to have negative security, political, and economic "externalities" for their neighboring states (Gleditsch 2007). Zones of long-lasting peace and stability, the existence of an already established autonomous security organization, or REOs whose members are not contiguous (small island states, for example), on the other hand, may face less pressure to establish security arrangements. In such regions, security cooperation is unlikely to yield many benefits and will render investment in security structures within an REO undesirable.

The level of regional violence is measured with the number of armed conflicts as reported in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2012). This data set distinguishes among four types of wars: inter-state armed conflict, extra-state armed conflict, internationalized internal armed conflict, and internal armed conflict. It also divides armed conflicts into three levels of intensity: minor armed conflict, intermediate armed conflict, and war. Thus, the variable **Conflict** is a sum of all violent conflicts within member-states and between member-states of a given REO in a given five-year period.[12] Conflict is expected to increase the need for security cooperation, thereby to affect the dependent variable in a positive manner.

Hegemony **–** the existence of a powerful member – often labeled a regional "hegemon" – in the REO is thought to be conducive to regional cooperation at large (Mattli 1999;

[12] Given that the large majority of armed conflicts within REOs are intra-state, we do not differentiate between the three types of conflict.

Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1992, 61-66). Such a hegemon has both the willingness and capabilities required to sustain the activities associated with the REO (Ikenberry 2001). A regional hegemon might have initially suggested only cooperating on economic matters as this suggests more benign intentions than powerfully induced cooperation in the security realm (Krasner 1976, 332). Only with time, when the regional hegemon, has demonstrated its respect for other states' sovereignty, can security cooperation be introduced to the agenda. And other member states are willing to accept this nesting as security cooperation can be very demanding in terms of physical and human resources (Lemke 2002). In short, it is at this later stage that the participation in security institutions may allow the hegemon to demonstrate its benign intentions vis-à-vis the weaker members and project an image of a responsible regional player (Ikenberry 2001; Thompson 2006). One might therefore expect REOs with a hegemonic state to develop more far-reaching security sub-structures compared to REOs that lack an undisputable leader.

The regional balance of power is measured with the so-called concentration ratio, which takes into account both the relative economic size of all members and the number of members in the organization (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000). The value of **Hegemony** increases as asymmetry grows and is bounded between zero and one. Thus, numbers that are closer to one point to the existence of a regional hegemon. The Penn World Tables provide the data for this variable (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2002). All else equal, the received wisdom expects positive association between a higher concentration of regional power and security cooperation.

Regional Enmity – under certain conditions, hegemonic and other major states can be threatening to their neighbors. Security cooperation, in particular, can be perceived as an instrument used by the more powerful members to promote their own national interests in the region (Monteiro 2011/12). To the extent that other REO members believe that the interests of such powerful countries are significantly different from their own, they will be reluctant to join security arrangements that can infringe on their sovereignty. Thus, where regional powers have tense relationships with other REO members or where REOs, the organization is unlikely to enjoy a "hegemonic dividend." More generally, REOs in which the interests of their members do not align are expected to face difficulties when attempting to forge powerful security arrangements within economic organizations (Hawkins et al. 2006).[13] As Jupille et al. point out (2013, 47), the importance of cohesion and affinity increases as organizations deal with more contentious issues.

The divergence (or congruence) of interests is captured with two variables. We consider the existence of strategic rivalries between the regional hegemon or major member-states, on the one hand, and their counterparts, on the other. According to Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007, henceforth CRT), strategic rivalry exists when the political elite of two states perceive each other as rivals, competitors, or enemies. Importantly, this definition does not include actual militarized disputes, thereby minimizing the overlap between this variable and **Conflict**. Recalling that conflict and rivalry are expected to have opposite effects on the depth of security cooperation, this

[13] Here, it is worth pointing out that it is not uncommon for REOs to include rival countries. The joint membership of both India and Pakistan in SAARC is perhaps the most obvious, but by no means the only, example of states with a long and bitter history of conflict that nonetheless engage in cooperation through regional institutions.

approach is preferable to other conceptualizations, which use the frequency of militarized disputes to identify rivalries (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006). Using CRT's list of rivalries, we identified all the strategic rivalries within a given REO and then distinguished between major rivalries and minor rivalries. The former involve the regional hegemon or, if no clear hegemon can be identified, the more powerful state or states. REOs that have one or more major rivalries during a given five-year period score one on the variable **Rivalry**, and zero otherwise.

In a parallel manner, neighboring states that have shared political interests or friendly relations may be more inclined to institutionalize their security cooperation than states that have less in common (Hawkins et al. 2006). It is thus important to take into account the degree of affinity among REO members. We employ an S score to capture the intra-regional similarity of interests (Signorino and Ritter 1999). This score ranges from -1 to +1 whereas a value of 1 indicates that the interests of two states are perfectly aligned and a value of -1 indicates that the interests of the two states are diametrically opposed. The dyadic scores are averaged for the region and over the five-year period. This variable, labeled **Affinity**, is calculated with the similarity of voting in the United Nations General Assembly (Gartzke and Jo 2002). Given that Rivalry and Affinity capture similar concepts we include them in separate models.[14]

Institutional Overlap – the expansion of REOs into the security arena may be contingent on the existing institutional environment. In particular, moving into this policy sphere in a region where regional security organizations (RSOs) already operate can be redundant and inefficient, especially if the RSO performs well. One can therefore expect that REOs

[14] Including both variables in the same model does not affect the results.

that their membership significantly overlaps with a functioning RSO will be less likely to develop security sub-structures. We account for this possibility by, first, identifying all regional organizations that have a meaningful security component (both REOs, such as ECOWAS, and "pure" security organizations such as NATO and the Arab League). Next, we separate between high-performing RSOs and those that are less active. The former have conducted at least five military operations or employed at least 8,000 personnel in a five-year period.[15] To the extent that the majority of a given REO are also members of at least one such RSO, the variable **RSO Overlap** scores one, and zero otherwise.

Additional Considerations[16] – the number of members in the regional organizations might affect the prospects of cooperation. On the one hand, larger organizations may be able to amass greater capacity required for security cooperation. On the other, larger regional organizations are likely to be more diverse and find it more difficult to reach agreement on such cooperation. We assess these opposing expectations with **Members**, which is a count of the REO's member states. In addition, it is widely accepted that geographical proximity provides more opportunities for interaction and in turn for conflict (Bremer 1992; Gleditsch 2002). We account for the potential effect of territorial contiguity on the need to set up security institutions with **Borders**, which tallies the number of borders in the region. It is operationalized with the Correlates of War (COW) Direct Contiguity Dataset, Version 3 (Stinnett et al. 2002). Unsurprisingly, the number of members is highly correlated with the number of borders ($r2 = 0.75$), so we include them

[15] We coded all RSOs for the 2009-2014 period and assumed similar values into the past. Including all RSOs in the analysis does not change the empirical results. We have addressed this issue in greater depth elsewhere (Author).

[16] In additional models not reported in this paper, we tested for the effect of democracy end economic development. These variables were not statistically significant and did not affect the results presented below.

in separate models. Finally, the propensity to combine economic and security cooperation appears to be more pronounced in the developing world (perhaps with the exception of the EU). We account for this potential factor with a dummy variable labeled **South-South REOs**. This variable scores one for organizations that include only developing countries and zero otherwise.

Results and Discussion

Tables 1 and 2 present the results of the statistical analysis. Table 1 presents six models that account for the sources of security cooperation within REOs. The first model examines the determinants of **Security_2** and excludes time fixed effects. It is used for the substantive interpretation presented in Table 2.[17] Time fixed-effects are added to Model 2 (and all other models presented in the table). Models 3 and 4 substitute Members and Rivalry with Borders and Affinity, respectively.

Model 5 substitute the dependent variable from **Security_2** to **Security_5**. Model 6 excludes the EU, which is possibly unique among existing REOs. Ordered probit models are non-linear and the substantive effects of their estimates are not easily interpreted. Table 2 reports the predicted probabilities of different values of the dependent variable (**Security_2**) conditioned by different values of explanatory variables that are statistically significant.

[Tables 1 and 2 here]

[17] The method used for estimating substantive effects does not allow for a fixed-effects specification. Reassuringly, the time fixed effects do not have a meaningful effect on the size of the coefficients (compare Model 1 and Model 2).

Beginning with the variable of primary interest, the analysis offers ample support for the effect of institutional capacity on the expansion of REOs into the security sphere. In line with the second hypothesis, the estimates on **Delegation** are always positive and highly statistically significant in all model specifications and robust to the inclusion of a battery of control variables as well as time fixed-effects. The substantive effect of this variable is sizable as well. As Table 2 shows, an increase from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean of **Delegation** increases the probability of any security cooperation by about thirty percent and of a high level of security cooperation by about fifteen percent.

This finding corresponds to the logic outlined by the institutionalist perspective. It shows that those REOs that have more powerful and independent capacities are more likely to have security sub-structures embedded in them. Presumably, member-states take advantage of the existing institutional infrastructure, knowledge, and experience when they confront sensitive political and military problems. By deploying these general assets in specific new issue-areas, members avoid the high costs associated with setting up a brand new institution or calling upon extra-regional actors to facilitate security cooperation. Member-states of REOs with less robust and capable capacities, on the other hand, have little general assets to rely on and therefore do not use these arrangements as a springboard for cooperation on security issues. Perhaps they manage their security relations informally or through macro-regional or global multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations.

Turning to alternative explanations, the effect of conflict on security cooperation within REOs is rather weak. The coefficients are always negative but almost always fail

to meet conventional levels of statistical significance. As discussed earlier, conflict may simultaneously increase demand for security cooperation and render such cooperation more difficult. In particular, member-states that fight each other or suffer from domestic violence may be unwilling or unable to engage in security cooperation. Possibly, these competing logics wash each other out in the analysis. It is also possible that some security arrangements are intended to tackle challenges outside the region. Most of the EU's CSDP activities were in areas adjacent to but outside the borders of the organization, for example. Similarly, GCC security cooperation was motivated by a threat from Iraq and Iran, which are not members of this REO. Nevertheless, most REOs have neither the wherewithal nor the will to operate beyond their regional borders.

There is little evidence to suggest that the regional balance of power affects the prospects of security cooperation. The sign of **Hegemony** is mostly positive but never statistically significant. It seems, then, that contrary to the conventional wisdom a regional hegemon is not an essential ingredient of security cooperation through REOs. Indeed, a glance over the experience of several organizations in the sample indicates that a hegemon played an important role in some of them – for example, South Africa in SADC and Australia in PIF – but that in others, member states were able to overcome the collective action problem in a more balanced setting – for example, ASEAN, EAC, and EU.[18] In contrast, several REOs with a clear hegemon, such as NAFTA, Mercosur, and SAARC, shy away from meaningful security cooperation.

[18] One might argue the measure used in this study misrepresents the balance of power within the EU, which in fact is highly skewed. Mattli (1999), for example, maintains that Germany was the undisputed leader of the EU and provided much of the impetus for integration. This assertion rests more on the proactive leadership role Germany plays in the EU, however, and less on objective measures of power differentials, which are rather modest in the EU compared to other REOs. Be that as it may, model 6 shows that the general results remain intact even when the EU is excluded from the sample.

Rivalry, on the other hand, appears to have a strong negative effect on the prospects of security cooperation within regional economic arrangements. The coefficient of this variable is highly statistically significant in all models irrespective of the specification. The substantive effect of this variable is sizable as well. Moving from zero (non-rivalry) to one (rivalry) decreases the probability of any security cooperation by twenty-seven percent and puts the likelihood of deep security cooperation at virtually zero. Consistent with this finding, the most notable cases of deep security cooperation, e.g. the EU, ECOWAS, and SADC, do not suffer from major political rivalries. On the other hand, such rivalries were significant impediments to security cooperation in REOs such as SAARC and CAN. Thus, the existence of intra-regional political enmity appears to be an important impediment to a meaningful expansion of economic organizations into the security realm. The second variable that gauges intra-regional political relations, **Affinity**, is positive but not statistically significant. Presumably, similarity of voting behavior in the UN does not capture the multifariousness of intra-regional interests.

The effect of **Members** is positive and statistically significant in all models. This finding suggests that larger REOs are more likely to engage in security cooperation, perhaps due to advantages to scale.[19] Substantively, moving from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean (or from three to twelve members) increases the probability that an REO will include a security sub-structure by about thirty-five percent. One should keep in mind, though, that all the organizations in our sample are regional and as such have limited membership. It may well be the case that the advantages that come with larger membership decline with more diverse mega-

[19] For an analysis of membership size and issue scope, see Slapin and Gray (2014) and Lundgren (2014).

regional or global organizations. Similarly, Model 3 indicates that the effect of **Borders** is positive and highly statistically significant. This result indicates that, like membership, contiguity boosts regional security cooperation.

Perhaps surprisingly, it is apparent that the presence of a regional security organization does not prevent regional economic organizations from expanding into the security realm. The estimates of **RSO Overlap** are positive, indicating that, if anything, REOs that overlap with existing RSOs are *more* likely to engage in security cooperation. The estimates never reach conventional levels of statistical significance, however. Thus, the existence of regional security institutions in a given region does not seem to have a systematic effect on the spillover of economic organizations into matters of the national security. These findings call for further investigation into the potentially complex relationship between overlapping regional institutions.

We also find empirical support for the conjecture that REOs in the developing world are more likely to address security issues compared with their counterparts in the developed world. The substantive analysis shows that security sub-structures, especially shallow ones, are much more likely to be erected by South-South REOs. Finally, the coefficients of the time fixed-effects (not presented in the Table 1) corroborate the observation that security sub-structures within REOs are becoming increasingly common over time. None of these variables wipes out the positive effect of institutional capacity on the presence and depth of security cooperation within REOs.

Conclusion

REOs are ubiquitous in the current global political scene. While initially preoccupied with cooperation on economic issues, many of them have gradually "trespassed" into new

policy areas. Especially since the end of the cold war, more and more REOs take on international and domestic security challenges. Despite the potential significance of such cooperation for regional stability and peace, the sources of this phenomenon are poorly understood.

This study is perhaps the first exploration of this question in a systematic manner. It develops several conjectures with respect to the sources of security sub-structures within REOs and argues, in particular, that organizations with more authoritative and capable organs are in a better position to expand their mandate into these more contentious issue-areas. It then develops a typology of security institutions nested within REOs and utilizes it to code a large number of organizations around the world on the depth of security cooperation. Utilizing this new set in a statistical analysis, we find that, indeed, greater institutional capacity is associated with deeper planned security cooperation. Political rivalry, on the other hand, appears to discourage such cooperation and the severity of conflict and skewed distribution of power have no discernible effect on security sub-structures within REOs.

The empirical findings with respect to REO capacity are broadly consistent with the institutional perspective, which emphasizes the advantage of cooperation through international organizations even when circumstances evolve and change. Such organizations may contain enough general assets to justify their adaptation to the environment rather than investing in the creation of new ones. Of course, their ability to adjust depends on the power and autonomy delegated to them by member-states, which varies a great deal across REOs. Given that scope expansion may require additional delegation of authority to the organization, one might expect a positive feedback loop

between institutional independence and the issues tackled by the REO. This may lead some organizations to be very dynamic, but others to be rather static.

Further research ought to contemplate not only the causes of security cooperation within REOs but also its effectiveness in promoting regional peace and stability. Extant research of specific cases often highlights the problems and challenges faced by regional bodies that strive to implement security policies and the lack of concrete achievements. A comprehensive and comparative evaluation of these institutions is therefore needed to determine if they are merely symbolic and, to the extent that they are not, the conditions under which they mitigate violent conflict and provide their members with greater national and regional security.[20]

[20] Lundgren (2014) is the only study that has taken up this issue thus far, to the best of our knowledge.

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Table 1: Ordered Probit Estimates of the Sources of Security Substructures within REOs, 1982-2012

	Model 1 No time dummies	Model 2 Basic	Model 3 Borders	Model 4 Affinity	Model 5 Security 5	Model 6 No EU
Delegation	4.774*** (2.92)	4.450*** (2.68)	4.571*** (2.89)	4.576*** (2.62)	4.205*** (2.68)	5.542** (2.29)
Conflict	-.013 (-0.72)	-.016 (-0.88)	-.009 (-0.57)	-.035* (-1.78)	-.013 (-.74)	-.010 (-0.57)
Hegemony	.450 (0.40)	.309 (0.28)	.657 (0.53)	.795 (0.64)	-.228 (-0.21)	.146 (0.13)
Rivalry	-1.001*** (-2.69)	-.964** (-2.32)	-.935** (-2.30)		-1.071** (-2.40)	-1.052** (-2.55)
Affinity				.786 (.60)		
Members	.123*** (2.93)	.120*** (2.65)		.122** (2.58)	.129*** (2.84)	.109** (2.58)
Borders			.049* (1.87)			
RSO Overlap	.440 (1.19)	.292 (0.63)	.026 (0.06)	.296 (0.63)	.320 (0.71)	.374 (0.76)
South-South REO	1.532** (2.53)	1.426** (2.38)	.825 (1.46)	1.291** (2.33)	1.422** (2.57)	1.127** (2.03)
Wald chi^2	22.79***	51.99***	46.45***	54.83***	50.44***	50.59***
Pseudo R^2	.26	.29	.25	.25	.23	.28
Log likelihood	-93.71	-89.88	-94.11	-93.98	-134.10	-86.14
NT	149	149	149	149	149	143

Note: Standard errors are clustered and robust. Figures in parentheses are *z* statistics. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 (two-tailed).

Table 2: Predicted Probability of Security Cooperation within REO due to Changes in Statistically Significant Independent Variables

Variable	Value	Score on Security_2		
		No (0)	**Low (1)**	**High (2)**
DELEGATION	LOW	0.8564	0.1186	0.0250
	HIGH	0.5435	0.2991	0.1574
RIVALRY	LOW	0.6321	0.2591	0.1087
	HIGH	0.9096	0.0776	0.0127
MEMBERS	LOW	0.8810	0.1000	0.0190
	HIGH	0.5321	0.3035	0.1644
SOUTH-SOUTH REO	LOW	0.9671	0.0298	0.0031
	HIGH	0.6210	0.2647	0.1143

Note: effects are generated using Spost (Long and Freese 2005). Variables except the variable of interest are held at mean values. For continuous variables high and low values are one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. For binary variables, high and low values equal one and zero, respectively.

Appendix

List of regional economic organizations

1. Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)
2. Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA)
3. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
4. Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
5. Central American Common Market (CACM)
6. Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)
7. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
8. Community of Andean Nations (CAN)
9. Community of Independent States (CIS)
10. East African Community (EAC)
11. Economic and Customs Union of the Central African States (CEMAC)
12. Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
13. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
14. Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)
15. European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
16. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
17. Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)
18. Latin American Integration Association (LAIA)
19. Mano River Union (MRU)
20. Mercado Comun del Sur (Mercosur)
21. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
22. Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
23. Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)
24. South African Customs Union (SACU)
25. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
26. Southern African Development Community (SADC)
27. The European Union (EU)
28. West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
SECURITY_2	.46	.74	0	2
SECURITY_5	.99	1.64	0	5
CONFLICT	8.37	10.78	0	44
DELEGATION	.09	.10	0	.48
HEGEMONY	.46	.19	.04	.96
RIVALRY	.25	.43	0	1
MEMBERS	7.74	4.46	2.2	21.8
BORDERS	8.66	7.62	0	35
AFFINITY	.94	.15	-.05	1
SOUTH-SOUTH REO	.81	.39	0	1
RSO OVERLAP	.36	.48	0	1

Table A2: Correlation Matrix

	SECURITY_2	SECURITY_5	CONFLICT	DELEGATION	HEGEMONY	RIVALRY	MEMBERS	BORDERS	AFFINITY	RSO OVERLAP
SECURITY_5	.96									
CONFLICT	-.06	-.02								
DELEGATION	.45	.48	-.10							
HEGEMONY	-.06	-.10	.01	-.30						
RIVALRY	-.24	-.22	.48	-.07	-.22					
MEMBERS	.38	.40	.24	.43	-.10	.10				
BORDERS	.41	.49	.27	.48	-.30	.16	.75			
AFFINITY	.12	.14	.10	.13	-.29	.09	.11	.20		
RSO OVERLAP	.20	.22	-.16	.26	-.09	-.08	-.07	.09	.15	
SOUTH-SOUTH REO	.08	.10	.31	-.15	-.18	.25	-.04	.22	.43	.12

Figure 1: Number of REOs in Three Categories of Security Cooperation



Figure 2: Security Cooperation in Twenty-Eight REOs in 2012