

International organizations, their employees and volunteers and their values*

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Abstract

In the current era, the world faces global challenges for which increasingly international organizations (IOs) are called upon to help addressing them. While many of these organizations operate under mandates that limit their scope of action, in many areas employees of IOs nevertheless have some leeway. So far, however, the issue of who selects him- or herself into an IO as a workplace has not been studied systematically. Drawing on surveys carried out among employees and volunteers of several IOs, we assess this self-selection process by comparing the values of employees and volunteers in IOs with those of the citizens of their country of origin. We find that seeking employment in an IO is linked to particular values, but that cultural differences persist depending on the background of the employees. This suggests that for a fuller understanding of an IOs action in a global governance context, the literature should also take into account the characteristics of the IOs employees and volunteers.

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1 Introduction

For¹ a considerable time international organizations (IOs)² have lived a life in dark shadows. Considered by some theoretical approaches as epiphenomenal to nation-state interactions or assumed to be the puppets of their international masters, they were hardly studied as the complex organizations that they are (e.g., Ness and Brechin, 1988). Increasingly, however, scholars become aware that member states of IOs are best conceived as principals of agents who might have their own view about what IOs should accomplish.

Considering IOs in this perspective, however, alerts us to the fact that we know very little about the agents³ that carry out tasks for member states (or their citizens. If we presume that employees in IOs have some leeway in carrying out their tasks (as is normal in most principal-agent relationships) understanding what characterizes the former is of central importance. In this paper we wish to assess what values prevail among IO employees and volunteers, and whether these values differ from those of their compatriots. We find that there are significant differences especially on two dimensions identified by Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) (see also Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz, 1992), namely conservation and self-transcendence. On the two other dimensions characterizing human values, namely openness-to-change and self-enhancement, IO employees differ to a lesser extent from their compatriots.

In the next section we briefly review the literature on IOs, and how it has come to ignore (for a long time) their employees and volunteers. We discuss the rather scarce literature on various aspects of IO employees before situating our contribution to this literature. In section three we discuss our empirical

¹The present paper draws in part on a review article by Anderfuhren-Biget, Häfziger and Hug (2013).

²We consider international organizations in contrast to “institutions” as described by North (1990, 7): “Institutions . . . determine the opportunities in a society. Organizations are created to take advantage of those opportunities. . .” (see for a similar conception Martin and Simmons, 2001, 1-2). Cogan (2009, 213) usefully, and partly implicitly, argues that the former, in the international realm, are created by prescriptive agreements, while the latter are based on constitutive ones.

³Obviously, there are numerous studies of prominent figures in IOs (see for instance Reinalda, 2010), whose appointment processes are nicely discussed by Cogan (2009). See also the study of Gerster (1993) who highlights the issue of accountability in IOs. Implicitly these studies hark back to the behavioral perspective prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s (see for instance Riggs, Hanson, Heinz, Hughes and Volgy, 1970) that focused on characteristics of (s-)elected officials in IOs. The staff of IOs, however, has rarely attracted scholarly attention.

approach as regards measuring the values of individuals, and how these might relate to differences among IO employees and citizens. We argue that differences that we might observe may come about either by self-selection and recruitment strategies by IOs or socialization processes. In section four we present our main results before concluding in section five.

2 Employees in international organizations

An inadvertent reader of recent survey articles (e.g., Martin and Simmons, 1998; Jacobson, 2000; Simmons and Martin, 2002) or recent text books on international organizations (e.g., Hurd, 2011; Rittberger, Zangl and Kruck, 2012) might be surprised how little attention scholars appear to pay to the employees who work in these international forums. As with so many things in the international relations literature also these actors have fallen to the wayside in sterile theoretical battles.⁴ While some theoretical conceptions of international organizations could not conceive that they might be of any practical relevance, others envisioned them as puppets of their masters. As puppets rarely develop a life of their own, their inner workings seemed of no practical relevance.

One might argue that public choice scholars criticizing this sorry state of affair from the outside (e.g., Fratianni and Pattison, 1982; Frey, 1984; Vaubel, 1986; Vaubel and Willet, 1991; Vaubel, 1991; Frey, 1997; Vaubel, 2006), gave a first impetus for opening the IO black-box. By rejecting the idea that “states,” and IOs for that matter, had interests, and that IOs faithfully carried out whatever task their masters envisioned for them, these authors highlighted that heads of state and governments were central figures in creating international institutions and organizations, and that bureaucrats operated with their own preferences as in any other organization. Even though the latter were assumed to be endowed with rather simplistic self-interested goals, drawing largely on the work by Niskanen (1971) on bureaucracies (see for instance the contributions to Vaubel and Willet, 1991), at least individual actors came to the forefront of IO theorizing.

While not entirely embracing this new perspective, a series of scholars (e.g., Fratianni and Pattison, 1982; Kindleberger, 1986; Moravcsik, 1995; Pierson, 1996;

⁴Simmons and Martin (2002, 193), on the other hand, suggest that such a focus on individuals in IOs (as for instance adopted in the behavioral perspective, see Riggs, Hanson, Heinz, Hughes and Volgy, 1970) obscured the more relevant questions.

Pollack, 1997; Lupia, 2001; Nielson and Tierney, 2003; Pollack, 2003; Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney, 2006; Stone, 2011) saw the fruitfulness of putting actors and their relationships to the forefront by relying on the principal-agent framework (Bendor, Glazer and Hammond, 2001; Lupia, 2001; Miller, 2005), developed largely in the economic theories of the firm.⁵ In this perspective both the principals (member state governments) and agents (the employees of IOs) regained their well-deserved center-stage. Not surprisingly, scholars working in this perspective were quick to establish fruitful links with literatures on domestic public administrations (e.g., Gailmard, 2010). These are also related to studies trying to assess what motivates employees in international organizations in general (e.g., Anderfuhren-Biget, Varone and Giauque, 2012; Häfliger, 2012; Anderfuhren-Biget, Häfliger and Hug, 2013) or the European commission in particular (e.g., Ban and Vandenabeele, 2009; Vandenabeele and Ban, 2009).

The latter had already been the object of anthropological studies carried out by Abélès, Bellier and McDonald (1993) (see also Bellier, 1995; Abélès and Bellier, 1996). Starting from the presumption that IOs form specific cultural environments, these authors started to explore this presumed “culture” in the European commission. Similarly, Fresia (2009) studied employees in the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Such studies, almost by definition rely on a reification of organizational cultures. Fresia (2009, 171), for instance, simply presumes that UNHCR employees form an epistemic community as conceived by Haas (1991, 40ff). Similarly, Abélès, Bellier and McDonald (1993) never consider that many of the cultural traits they discuss might be part of a more general pattern in expatriate and international environments in general. Inspired from a largely neo-functional perspective Hooghe (1999, 2000, 2001, 2005) also proposes to study the values and orientations of Commission officials. She finds that the latter largely come with their own ideological and political baggage to Brussels and keep it. She finds barely any evidence suggesting that these officials undergo an organizational socialization process.

Finally, a last strand of research also touched upon some aspects of values in international organizations and that is constructivism. Relying heavily on arguments on socialization etc. when studying international institutions scholars

⁵Interestingly enough this perspective on IOs animated debates among Soviet specialists of international law already in the 1960s and 1970s (see for instance Osakwe, 1971). We wish to thank Robert Kolb for having explained to us this development in international law.

frequently referred to processes characteristic of individuals (e.g., Finnemore, 1993; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Checkel, 2005). As emerges clearly in the debate between Checkel and Moravcsik (2001) on the role of constructivism in understanding European integration, the socialization envisioned by this latter approach is considerably underspecified and hardly offers empirically testable implications.

3 Values and recruitment

As we argued above work on employees and volunteers in IOs is rather partial and underdeveloped. Clearly, however, if we conceive IOs as agents for their principals an understanding of what values they hold is of central importance, if the latter influence the actions taken. The few studies that exist, however, do not allow assessing to what extent values and motivations of IO employees actually differ from their ultimate principals, namely the citizens of the member states.

By carrying out a series of surveys among employees and volunteers in various IOs and covering a wide array of values and motivations our research project allows for a more comprehensive view on this question (see Anderfuhren-Biget, Varone and Giauque, 2012; Häfliger, 2012; Anderfuhren-Biget, Häfliger and Hug, 2013, for various discussions of the data used here).

Thus in the next section we first discuss how we envision measuring (and comparing) values of employees and volunteers in IOs. In a second step we will provide some theoretical expectations concerning possible differences we might expect and the reasons for which these might appear.

3.1 Measuring values

When it comes to values of IO employees and volunteers a considerable set of different conceptions may be relevant⁶ As our aim is to compare these values with those of common citizens, we need to rely on a conception that is pertinent for both sets of individuals. As Steenbergen and Leimgruber (2010) nicely discuss, the current literature on values largely agrees on the usefulness of Schwartz's (1992, 1994) conception of human values (see also Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987). Based on the idea that individual and shared human experiences form basic

⁶Anderfuhren-Biget, Häfliger and Hug (2013) discuss various of these conceptions.

set of human values (Rokeach, 1973), Schwartz and Bardi (2001) and Schwartz (2006) tested these human values cross-nationally and found them to be robust across different cultures. Ten values form the basis of this conception. One of Schwartz's (2004) model assumes these ten values to form four basic dimensions, namely the following: openness-to-change, conservation, self-enhancement, and self-transcendence.⁷ Conservation and self-transcendence values, on the one hand, and openness-to-change and self-enhancement, on the other hand, relate to the collectivism/individualism divide discussed in the literature (e.g., Triandis, Bontempo, Leung and Hui, 1990).

The advantage of relying on this conception of values is that it is sufficiently broad and has been used in several large scale population surveys. In this paper we rely on the most recent wave of the World Value Survey (European Values Study Group and Association, 2006) that comprises at least a partial set of items to measure human values.⁸

3.2 Recruitment of employees

If we consider IO employees and volunteers and their values in a principal-agent perspective the way in which the former are (self-)selected immediately comes to centerstage. Clearly, employees and volunteers are individuals that for one reason or another are motivated to work in the international realm. Consequently, we might well expect that individuals that apply for IO positions differ from the average citizen in their home countries. In addition, it is quite likely that when choosing among the pool of applicants IOs (or their human resources department, to be precise) will choose particular individuals. For these two reasons alone, we would expect differences in values among our interviewees.

Scholarship inspired by a constructivist perspective would in addition expect that once IO employees and volunteers are recruited, they will be socialized in their work environment and thus adopt particular values. As previous research, for instance on the Commission officials in the European Union suggests, there

⁷These four dimensions are formed by the following subdimensions: self-direction and stimulation form openness to change, security, tradition, and conformity conservation, power and achievement self-enhancement, and finally universalism, benevolence, and hedonism self-transcendence.

⁸Unfortunately, not all national surveys included this set of question. For this reason we will not be able to compare IO employees and volunteer with their compatriots from Italy and Colombia, for instance.

is rather limited evidence that in terms of values “where you stand is where you sit” (see Hooghe, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2005). Nevertheless in what follows we will assess whether IO employees and volunteers have different values than their compatriots, and whether this is due to the recruitment process or socialization in the IO.⁹

4 Results

From our IO employees and volunteers,¹⁰ as discussed above, we have responses to 21 of Schwartz’s (1992, 1994) value questions (see also Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004). The World Value Survey (European Values Study Group and Association, 2006), however, only covers ten of these questions. The response categories to these questions form an ordinal scale.¹¹ To arrive at latent value dimensions Schwartz and Boehnke (2004) propose a series of models. As we can only employ ten items, each covering one subdimension, we resorted to the

⁹We are unable to distinguish in the recruitment process the contribution of the self-selection from the selection process proper, as we have no information on potential applicants for IO positions.

¹⁰The survey was designed and implemented by Simon Anderfuhren-Biget, David Giauque, Frédéric Varone and the authors of this paper in the context of a research project financed by the Swiss Network for International Studies.

¹¹To maintain consistency across various questions we proposed in our IO employee survey five point scales, compared to the six point scales used in the World Value Survey (WVS). In addition, the polarity of the two question formats differed so that we had to reorder the answer categories. To combine the two datasets we regrouped the two middle categories in the WVS data to arrive at a five-point scale. Also, in the present version of the paper we simply drop all observations with missing data on the value items and the citizenship of the respondent. This leads in our IO data to a drastic reduction of the number of individuals. As in general we have a sample selection problem (the respondents volunteered to respond to our survey) that we do not address here either, the results have to be taken with a grain of salt. Finally, we also do not address the cross-cultural dimension of our study, i.e. that the responses especially to value questions will be influenced by culture and language (see for instance Davidov, 2009; Davidov, Schmidt and Billiet, 2010). As our IO survey was carried out only in English and French, compared to a wider array of languages for the WVS, it is not easy to address these cultural and linguistic issues. Hence, we chose to ignore them. In the appendix tables 9 and 10 report the distribution of responses in our two samples. As the responses indicate individuals in our IO survey in general hardly consider themselves like the persons described in the value questions. The most important differences concern the questions dealing with the benevolence, universalism and security (in this order) dimensions. This difference might be in part due to the fact that the polarity of the question format differs in the two surveys. Consequently we will interpret our comparative results with some caution.

simplest model proposed, namely relying on a four-dimensional value structure.¹² We derived these four dimensions by employing an item-response theory (IRT) model for each of the four sets of items.¹³

Figure 1 depicts both citizens and employees and volunteers of IOs in two two-dimensional spaces as derived from the four IRT models. We depict citizens as triangles and employees and volunteers of IOs as circles. In addition the respective mean positions on the two dimensions are reported at the margins with the labels MP (mean population) and MIO (mean IO employees and volunteers). While figure 1 shows that IO employees and volunteers are in terms of their position in these two two-dimensional space positioned in the hull of the positions of citizens (i.e., they are not outliers on the four value dimensions), they seem on average to position themselves slightly differently on all four value dimensions, but particularly on the conservation dimension. On all dimensions IO employees and volunteers score lower values on average than the citizens of their respective home countries.

In figures 2 and 3 we depict the same information contained figure 1 but for all countries that we cover in our analysis separately.¹⁴ The figures show that the general conclusion based on figure 1, namely that IO employees and volunteers differ, has to be modified when we consider each nationality separately.¹⁵ While we still find that in almost all countries (the exceptions are Japan and the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent Germany and Switzerland) IO employees and volunteers have on average lower scores on the conservation dimension, we find barely differences on the openness-to-change and self-enhancement dimension (the exceptions are the Netherlands and to a lesser extent Britain and Japan, respectively Germany, India and Poland). On the last dimension, i.e.,


¹²These four dimensions are formed by the following subdimensions: self-direction and stimulation form openness to change, security, tradition, and conformity conservation, power and achievement self-enhancement, and finally universalism, benevolence, and hedonism self-transcendence.

¹³Quinn (2004) (see also Martin and Quinn, 2004) propose an ordinal factor model drawing on an IRT approach on which we base our analyses. We also estimated for the subset of IO employees such a model both for ten and 21 items and find closely related results. In addition we also generated four dimensions in an exploratory fashion, both as linear and ordinal models and also resorted to polychoric correlations for the former. We report in the appendix some results demonstrating the relationship among these variously constructed value dimensions.

¹⁴We selected countries if at least 10 IO employees and volunteers in our survey indicated the country as their country of citizenship.

¹⁵This might obviously be due in part to the fact that the number of IO employees and volunteers per country is small. We nevertheless prefer these more conservative tests.

Figure 1: Values of IO employees and citizens



self-transcendence dimension, we again find differences between IO employees and citizens in almost all countries, except Japan and Malaysia and to a lesser extent Australia.

In table 4 we approach this issue more systematically by regressing the four value dimensions on dummies reflecting the home countries of IO employees, volunteers and citizens, as well as interactions between these dummies and a dummy for IO employment. The results largely confirm what we have discussed above.

Figure 2: Values of IO employees and citizens in Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and India




Figure 3: Values of IO employees and citizens in Japan, Netherlands, Malaysia, Poland, Switzerland, and the USA




Table 1: Differences in values among IO employees and volunteers and their compatriots

	conservation		openness to change		self-enhancement		self-transcendence	
Difference IO employees - citizens	-0.49*		-0.25*		-0.43*		-0.32*	
	(0.21)		(0.14)		(0.23)		(0.04)	
Difference IO employee - citizens: Australia	0.17		-0.11		-0.13		0.42	
Britain	(0.21)		(0.14)		(0.23)		(0.25)	
Canada	-0.85*		-0.31		-0.20		-0.93*	
	(0.23)		(0.16)		(0.26)		(0.28)	
France	-0.81*		-0.09		-0.30		-1.08*	
	(0.24)		(0.17)		(0.28)		(0.29)	
Germany	-0.79*		-0.19		-0.16		-0.61*	
	(0.22)		(0.15)		(0.24)		(0.26)	
India	-0.46		-0.24		-0.64*		-1.08*	
	(0.24)		(0.17)		(0.27)		(0.29)	
Japan	-0.74*		-0.15		-0.63*		-1.10*	
	(0.29)		(0.21)		(0.32)		(0.35)	
Malaysia	-0.28		0.31		-0.20		-0.15	
	(0.26)		(0.18)		(0.28)		(0.30)	
Netherlands	-1.09*		-0.22		-0.46		-0.37	
	(0.28)		(0.20)		(0.32)		(0.33)	
Poland	-0.10		-0.53*		-0.12		-0.74*	
	(0.29)		(0.21)		(0.31)		(0.33)	
Switzerland	-0.93*		-0.25		-0.66*		-1.07*	
	(0.27)		(0.20)		(0.31)		(0.32)	
USA	-0.43		-0.08		0.36		-0.93*	
	(0.24)		(0.17)		(0.28)		(0.29)	
country: Australia	-0.67*		-0.11		-0.16		-0.69*	
	(0.23)		(0.16)		(0.26)		(0.27)	
Britain	-0.05*		-0.07*		-0.10*		-0.01	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.01)	
Canada	0.14*		0.04*		-0.09*		0.10*	
	(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
France	0.12*		0.07*		-0.05*		0.27*	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Germany	0.06*		0.10*		-0.18*		0.04*	
	(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
India	-0.10*		-0.03*		0.09*		-0.15*	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Japan	0.24*		0.08*		0.43*		0.11*	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Malaysia	-0.40*		-0.28*		-0.31*		-0.39*	
	(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Netherlands	0.09*		-0.00		0.33*		-0.19*	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Poland	-0.23*		0.09*		-0.20*		-0.00	
	(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Switzerland	0.25*		-0.04*		0.20*		0.08*	
	(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
USA	-0.15*		0.08*		-0.17*		0.14*	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
N	-0.01		-0.06*		-0.14*		-0.12*	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Resid. sd	16411	16411	16365	16365	16309	16309	16346	16346
	0.53	0.50	0.40	0.39	0.61	0.57	0.58	0.55

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

The comparisons that appear in figures 1-3 and in table 4 give a rough answer to the question whether employees and volunteers of IOs differ in terms of values from their fellow citizens. They do, however, not take into account that employees and volunteers of IOs are likely to be very different in terms of the sociodemographics, which might be much more important in explaining the values they hold than their work in a specific environment.¹⁶

¹⁶Even though our data has a hierarchical structure we do not report results from models taking this into account and assume complete pooling (Gelman, Shor, Bafumi and Park, 2007, 252ff). The consequence of this is that our uncertainty regarding the effects at the IO and country level will be underestimated. Consequently, we will provide rather conservative estimates.

Table 2: Regression analysis

	conservation	openness to change	self-enhancement	self-transcendence
(Intercept)	0.30*	0.46*	1.07*	-0.10
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)
sector: private business or industry	-0.03*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.08*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
sector: private non-profit organization	0.07*	0.07*	0.17*	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
humanitarian IO	-0.12	-0.31*	-0.50*	-0.02
	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.16)
technical IO	-0.21	-0.25	-0.54*	-0.17
	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.22)
volunteer	0.04*	0.07*	0.00	0.14*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
education 1	-0.12*	-0.10*	-0.33*	-0.09*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
2	-0.17*	-0.11*	-0.33*	-0.14*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
3	-0.14*	-0.06*	-0.46*	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
4	-0.23*	-0.10*	-0.41*	-0.11*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
5	-0.13*	-0.06*	-0.36*	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
6	-0.25*	-0.13*	-0.38*	-0.12*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
7	-0.23*	-0.07*	-0.41*	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
8	-0.28*	-0.06*	-0.34*	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
age	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.02*	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
age ²	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
sex (NA)	-0.07	0.19	0.41	0.13
	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.23)
woman	0.02*	-0.08*	-0.17*	0.07*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
tenure	-0.05	-0.01	0.02	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
tenure ²	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N	11128	11102	11069	11095
Resid. sd	0.52	0.38	0.58	0.57

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

In table 2¹⁷ we address this issue by regression the four latent dimensions (i.e., the positions of the interviewed individuals) on a dummy indicating whether the individual is from our IO survey and in what type of organization he works as well as controlling for a set of socio-demographic characteristics.¹⁸ The results¹⁹ confirm what we have found above, namely that even when controlling for the gender, age (and its square), religiosity, and education IO employees and volunteers differ. As we also control for the sector of employment and consider IO

¹⁷In this analysis we omit Switzerland as the sector classification used in the WVS survey differs from the one employed in all other countries.

¹⁸In the appendix we report the results of a similar analysis which also takes account of country differences. As the substantive conclusions from this table (5) do hardly differ we refrain from reporting it in the main text.

¹⁹Strictly speaking the analysis we carry out relies on hierarchical data, as individuals are nested by their citizenship. In the appendix we report on an additional analysis where we also control through country fixed effects and find almost identical results. We do not estimate a hierarchical model as the estimates for the country fixed effects are more nuisances than of substantive interest.

employees and volunteers to work in the public sector, the estimated coefficients suggest especially for the openness-to-change and self-enhancement IO staff differ from other public service employees, and this especially for the staff of humanitarian IOs.²⁰ When considering the control variables we find considerable differences in values due to the educational level, gender and a curvilinear relationship with age. On the other hand, we find no evidence whatsoever that among IO staff tenure in the organization affects the values held. This result suggests that the values of IO staff are not due to any organizational socialization process.

Table 3: Effect of working for an IO

	conservation	openness to change	self-enhancement	self-transcendence
Australia	-0.425* (0.193)	0.076 (0.601)	-0.110 (0.314)	0.351 (0.443)
Britian	-0.226 (0.207)	0.064 (0.277)	-0.486* (0.228)	0.435 (0.229)
Canada	-0.155 (0.210)	-0.544 (0.352)	-0.357 (0.346)	0.148 (0.316)
France	-0.431* (0.123)	-0.776* (0.185)	-0.473* (0.176)	-0.575* (0.263)
Germany	-0.477* (0.134)	-0.551* (0.238)	-0.773* (0.195)	-0.754* (0.367)
India	-0.509* (0.145)	-0.548* (0.256)	-0.757* (0.205)	-0.894* (0.349)
Japan	0.347 (0.222)	-0.010 (0.250)	0.746 (0.406)	0.846* (0.333)
Malaysia	-0.583* (0.194)	-1.037* (0.227)	-0.836* (0.275)	0.521 (0.646)
Netherlands	-0.678* (0.176)	-0.590 (0.342)	-0.248 (0.305)	-0.793* (0.350)
Poland	-0.582* (0.156)	-0.575 (0.362)	-0.784* (0.193)	-1.173* (0.273)
Switzerland	-0.064 (0.184)	-0.346* (0.169)	0.241 (0.245)	-0.450 (0.238)
USA	-0.193 (0.156)	-0.632* (0.195)	-0.534* (0.207)	-0.443 (0.253)

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

While the analysis reported om in table 2 suggests interesting results, the disadvantage of proceeding this way is that we presume that we know that the sociodemographic characteristics are in a linear relationship with the value dimensions. A way to address this issue is to attempt matching each interviewed person from our IO survey with a most similar individual from the WVS survey (see for instance Sekhon, 2009). We employ Sekhon’s (2011) genetic matching and report in table 3 the estimated average treatment effects and their standard errors for each country separately.²¹

These analyses confirm again the conclusion reached on the basis of the table , namely that on the conservation and self-transcendence dimension IO staff differ compared to most of their compatriots. Compared to the results obtained from

²⁰Interestingly enough sector differences appear to exist among the general public as well.

²¹Balance statistics may be obtained from the authors on request.

the simpler analysis used to generate table we find, however, also considerable difference on the two other dimensions. For instance, the French and Malaysian IO staff hold quite different openness-to-change values, while Polish, German and Indian IO staff do so on the self-enhancement dimension.

5 Conclusion

To date, only a small part of the IR literature has considered IO employees as individuals with particular norms and values that may, or may not, differ from that of their organization, the government of their home country or the latter's citizens. As IOs were considered as epiphenomenal studying their staff appeared hardly as relevant. Other strands of the IR literature implicitly simply assumed that IO staff would simply embody the preferences, values and norms of their master. Only by employing the economists' principal-agent perspective did scholars start to consider divergences of interest between principals (member state governments and their electorate in democracies) and agents (IO staff).

While this perspective has fostered some interest in IO staff, most studies remain either top-heavy (focusing on top-officials in IOs) or partial. In this paper we have attempted to contribute to fill the gap by presenting results based on a more comprehensive conception of IO staff. Based on a broad survey in several IOs with different briefs, we are able to give a broader view about what values IO employees and volunteers hold. By comparing these values with those of the IO staff's ultimate principal, namely citizens, we were able to demonstrate that IO staff differs considerably on the dimensions of human values as conceived by Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) (see also Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz, 1992). As there are no relationships between these values and tenure, we found no evidence for organizational socialization. As already Hooghe (1999, 2000, 2001, 2005) found no evidence for socialization among EU Commission staff and Anderfuhren-Biget, Häfliger and Hug (2013) find for various conception of values no evidence either among IO staff, the constructivists' claim seems on shaky grounds.

Finding evidence for differences in values and rejecting as explanation organizational socialization suggests that either self-selection by staff or recruitment efforts are at play. Further research will have to assess which of these two processes is more important. Similarly, while we were able to demonstrate differences in values, we can obviously not claim that these differences are of relevance in

the principal-agent relationship in which IO staff find themselves. It might be, though rather unlikely, that none of the human values relate to decisions that have to be reached by IO staff. Similarly, it might be that where these values are of essence the principals have set up ex-ante controls that mitigate the principal-agent problem. Only further studies will allow to assess in a fuller sense the complex relationship between IO staff and their masters. Our study was able to show, at least, that the puppeteers are quite different from the puppets when it comes to human values.

Appendix

In this appendix we provide supplementary material regarding our empirical analysis. First we discuss in detail how we have combined the WVS data with the data stemming from our IO employees and volunteers survey. Second, we discuss in detail how the chosen dimensional analysis for the value question relates to other approaches one might reasonably choose. Finally, in the last part we present additional empirical results, among them also the distribution of responses to the value questions as well as robustness checks,

Combining IO employee survey with World Value Survey

Below we indicate how the datasets (IO and WVS) were combined.

Values

The WVS retains 10 of the 21 value items used in the IO employee survey. As the latter used a five-point answering scale, we regrouped the two central categories of the six point scales of the WVS-variables. In addition, the polarity of the questions were different and by recoding made equivalent.

Gender

IO: sex; WVS: v235 sex 1 male 2 female

Age

IO: age; WVS: v237 age

Switzerland's survey recorded the year of birth. As the survey was carried out in 2005-2006 we subtracted the year of birth from 2006 to generate the age variable.

Education

IO: educationallevel
Incomplete primary
Complete Primary
Complete Secondary technical/vocational
Complete Secondary intermediate/baccalaureate level
Tertiary Bachelor degree
Tertiary Master degree
Doctorate

WVS: V238. What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [NOTE: if respondent indicates to be a student, code highest level s/he expects to complete]:

- 1 No formal education
- 2 Incomplete primary school
- 3 Complete primary school
- 4 Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type
- 5 Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type
- 6 Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type
- 7 Complete secondary: university-preparatory type
- 8 Some university-level education, without degree
- 9 University-level education, with degree

The two categoriations coincide largely. Unfortunately, the Swiss WVS survey retained its own categorisation. We recoded these categories in the following way:

```

wvssel$education[wvssel$edu_p=="no formal education"]<-0
wvssel$education[wvssel$edu_p=="incomplete primary school"]<-1
wvssel$education[wvssel$edu_p=="primarschule"]<-2
wvssel$education[wvssel$edu_p=="anlehre (mit anlehrvertrag)"]<-2
wvssel$education[wvssel$edu_p=="incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type"]<-3
wvssel$education[wvssel$edu_p=="berufslehre / berufsschule"]<-3
wvssel$education[wvssel$edu_p=="sekundarschule"]<-4
wvssel$education[wvssel$edu_p=="diplommittelschule / allgemeinbildende schule"]<-4
wvssel$education[wvssel$edu_p=="handelsschule / handelsdiplom"]<-5
wvssel$education[wvssel$edu_p=="hhere fachschule"]<-5
wvssel$education[wvssel$edu_p=="maturittsschule / gymnasium / seminar"]<-6
wvssel$education[wvssel$edu_p=="berufsmatura"]<-6
wvssel$education[wvssel$edu_p=="hhere berufsausbildung mit meisterdiplom"]<-6
wvssel$education[wvssel$edu_p=="fachhochschule / technikerschule / technikum"]<-7
wvssel$education[wvssel$edu_p=="universitt / eth"]<-8

```

Dimensional analysis

As discussed in the main text we rely on an IRT model to determine the four value dimensions assumed to characterize the responses of individuals to the various value items. Obviously, a simpler way to reduce the information provided by the interviewed is to resort to a simple linear factor analysis. Such an analysis, however, is based on the assumption that the ordinal response scales are continuous and provide at least interval level based measures. A shortcut to address this problem is to resort to polychoric correlations.²² And finally we might also resort to Quinn's (2004) ordinal factor analysis.²³ We compare these various alternative approaches to determine the four value dimensions in tables 4-8. They generally suggest that the various factors are closely related. As tables 4 and 5 report in essence the results of exploratory linear factor analyses and table 5 a similar polychoric factor analysis, it cannot surprise that the dimensional structure differs (i.e., there is not a one to one relationship among the factors obtained from the various factor analyses and the IRT model). Interesting to note is that the confirmatory ordinal factor analyses reported in tables 7 and 8 show that the assumed factor structure clearly appears as each of the latent variables of the IRT models is associated with mostly one of the factor scores. In terms of the fit we note that whether using 21 or ten items in the ordinal factor model apparently does not matter much. This comforts us in using the latent variables of our four IRT models to cover the four value dimensions.

Additional results

Tables 9 and 10 report the distribution of responses to the ten value questions asked both in our IO employees and volunteers survey and the World Values Survey. Table 5 reports the results of models that are identical to those reported in table 2 except that we control for country differences.

²²We employed Stas Kolenikov's stata module (see <http://www.unc.edu/~skolenik/stata/>) to calculate these correlations

²³It needs to be noted here that Quinn's (2004) ordinal factor analysis accounts also for the missing values.

Table 4: Relationship between factor scores from linear factor analysis and IRT dimensions (10 items)

	conservation	openness to change	self-enhancement	self-transcendence
(Intercept)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)
1st dimension	0.42* (0.00)	0.32* (0.00)	0.48* (0.00)	0.46* (0.00)
2nd dimension	-0.41* (0.00)	0.30* (0.00)	0.44* (0.00)	-0.36* (0.00)
3rd dimension	0.43* (0.00)	-0.25* (0.00)	0.43* (0.00)	-0.52* (0.00)
4th dimension	0.03* (0.00)	0.23* (0.00)	-0.19* (0.01)	0.04* (0.00)
<i>N</i>	15144	15144	15144	15144
<i>R</i> ²	0.94	0.87	0.87	0.87
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.94	0.87	0.87	0.87
Resid. sd	0.14	0.15	0.22	0.21

Standard errors in parentheses
* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Table 5: Relationship between factor scores from linear factor analysis and IRT dimensions (21 items)

	conservation	openness to change	self-enhancement	self-transcendence
(Intercept)	-0.60* (0.02)	-0.26* (0.03)	-0.51* (0.03)	-0.37* (0.06)
1st dimension	0.58* (0.03)	0.18* (0.03)	0.35* (0.03)	0.67* (0.06)
2nd dimension	-0.07* (0.03)	0.18* (0.04)	0.40* (0.03)	-0.41* (0.07)
3rd dimension	-0.38* (0.03)	0.31* (0.04)	-0.14* (0.03)	0.24* (0.07)
4th dimension	-0.19* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.23* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.07)
<i>N</i>	95	95	95	95
<i>R</i> ²	0.89	0.59	0.82	0.64
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.89	0.57	0.81	0.62
Resid. sd	0.23	0.30	0.26	0.58

Standard errors in parentheses
* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Table 6: Relationship between factor scores from polychoric factor analysis and IRT dimensions (10 items)

	conservation	openness to change	self-enhancement	self-transcendence
(Intercept)	-2.38* (0.01)	-1.69* (0.01)	-1.94* (0.01)	-2.84* (0.01)
1st dimension	0.42* (0.00)	0.33* (0.00)	0.43* (0.00)	0.50* (0.00)
2nd dimension	-0.37* (0.00)	0.27* (0.00)	0.45* (0.00)	-0.37* (0.00)
3rd dimension	0.37* (0.00)	-0.24* (0.00)	0.41* (0.00)	-0.51* (0.00)
4th dimension	0.03* (0.00)	0.19* (0.00)	-0.13* (0.00)	0.06* (0.00)
<i>N</i>	15144	15144	15144	15144
<i>R</i> ²	0.94	0.86	0.87	0.85
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.94	0.86	0.87	0.85
Resid. sd	0.13	0.15	0.22	0.22

Standard errors in parentheses
* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Table 7: Relationship between factor scores from ordinal factor analysis and IRT dimensions (10 items)

	conservation	openness to change	self-enhancement	self-transcendence
(Intercept)	-0.51* (0.02)	-0.25* (0.02)	-0.44* (0.02)	-0.33* (0.06)
1st dimension	-0.23 (0.15)	2.61* (0.12)	0.10 (0.20)	1.00* (0.40)
2nd dimension	-0.77* (0.03)	-0.08* (0.02)	-0.11* (0.04)	-0.40* (0.07)
3rd dimension	-0.01 (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.62* (0.04)	0.00 (0.08)
4th dimension	-1.66* (0.63)	-0.82 (0.47)	-0.75 (0.74)	-12.24* (1.67)
<i>N</i>	206	216	197	186
<i>R</i> ²	0.79	0.71	0.62	0.34
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.79	0.70	0.61	0.33
Resid. sd	0.30	0.23	0.35	0.75

Standard errors in parentheses
 * indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Table 8: Relationship between factor scores from ordinal factor analysis and IRT dimensions (21 items)

	conservation	openness to change	self-enhancement	self-transcendence
(Intercept)	-0.49* (0.02)	-0.25* (0.02)	-0.44* (0.02)	-0.35* (0.04)
1st dimension	-0.10* (0.03)	-0.46* (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.06)
2nd dimension	0.84* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.16* (0.04)	0.19* (0.06)
3rd dimension	0.06* (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.55* (0.03)	0.00 (0.06)
4th dimension	-0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.86* (0.06)
<i>N</i>	206	216	197	186
<i>R</i> ²	0.81	0.51	0.63	0.62
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.80	0.50	0.62	0.61
Resid. sd	0.29	0.30	0.35	0.57

Standard errors in parentheses
 * indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Table 9: Responses to value questions in two samples (1)

	self-direction			power			security			hedonism			benevolence		
	WVS	IO	Total	WVS	IO	Total	WVS	IO	Total	WVS	IO	Total	WVS	IO	Total
1	3.19	3.55	3.19	19.66	36.09	19.75	2.94	8.18	2.97	9.93	13.02	9.95	1.14	0.60	1.14
2	9.60	60.95	9.90	33.53	61.54	33.70	8.58	71.07	8.92	20.08	71.60	20.38	3.03	57.14	3.34
3	41.16	0.00	40.92	33.22	0.59	33.04	34.99	0.63	34.80	40.91	0.59	40.67	35.14	0.60	34.94
4	28.13	0.00	27.97	9.01	0.00	8.96	31.44	0.00	31.27	19.53	0.00	19.42	36.88	0.00	36.67
5	17.92	35.50	18.02	4.58	1.78	4.56	22.04	20.13	22.03	9.55	14.79	9.58	23.81	41.67	23.91
Total	28748	169	28917	29084	169	29253	29051	159	29210	29028	169	29218	168	29386	100
χ^2	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
P	593.18	0.00	134.37	0.00	810.58	0.00	325.33	0.00	1600.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Table 10: Responses to value questions in two samples (2)

	achievement			stimulation			conformity			universalism			tradition		
	WVS	IO	Total	WVS	IO	Total	WVS	IO	Total	WVS	IO	Total	WVS	IO	Total
1	6.61	7.74	6.61	18.35	13.17	18.32	3.67	2.99	3.67	1.67	1.20	1.67	5.51	17.37	5.57
2	17.98	72.02	18.29	26.97	76.05	27.25	10.28	70.66	10.63	4.95	55.09	5.24	9.63	69.46	9.97
3	42.08	0.00	41.83	34.30	0.00	34.10	36.10	0.00	35.89	38.58	0.00	38.35	32.17	0.60	31.99
4	21.50	0.60	21.38	12.89	0.60	12.82	30.48	0.60	30.31	33.72	0.00	33.53	29.24	0.00	29.07
5	11.84	19.64	11.88	7.50	10.18	7.51	19.47	25.75	19.50	21.09	43.71	21.22	23.46	12.57	23.40
Total	28901	168	29069	28832	167	28999	29015	167	29182	28841	167	29008	29190	167	29357
χ^2	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
P	380.54	0.00	227.65	0.00	682.15	0.00	958.22	0.00	747.34	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

	conservation	openness to change	self-enhancement	self-transcendence
(Intercept)	-0.16*	0.31*	0.65*	-0.39*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
sector: private business or industry	0.01	0.02	0.03*	-0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
sector: private non-profit organization	0.01	0.07*	0.03	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
humanitarian IO	-0.22	-0.36*	-0.37*	-0.14
	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.16)
technical IO	-0.34	-0.33*	-0.27	-0.37
	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.21)
volunteer	0.02*	0.05*	0.01	0.09*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
education 1	0.07*	-0.13*	-0.16*	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
2	0.08*	-0.09*	-0.17*	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
3	0.05	-0.07*	-0.20*	0.12*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
4	0.02	-0.06*	-0.18*	0.08*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
5	0.02	-0.03	-0.19*	0.11*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
6	0.01	-0.03	-0.14*	0.10*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
7	-0.01	-0.03	-0.17*	0.10*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
8	-0.03	0.00	-0.10*	0.14*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
age	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.02*	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
age ²	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
sex (NA)	-0.15	0.17	0.33	0.02
	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.22)
woman	0.07*	-0.08*	-0.12*	0.09*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
tenure	-0.03	-0.01	-0.00	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
tenure ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
country Britain	0.21*	0.09*	-0.05	0.16*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Canada	0.16*	0.17*	0.06*	0.29*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
France	0.09*	0.18*	-0.09*	0.10*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Germany	-0.06*	0.07*	0.20*	-0.10*
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
India	0.38*	0.11*	0.46*	0.24*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Japan	-0.32*	-0.21*	-0.24*	-0.35*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Malaysia	0.23*	0.00	0.31*	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Netherlands	-0.16*	0.17*	-0.13*	0.07*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Poland	0.34*	0.07*	0.31*	0.16*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Switzerland	0.01	0.28*	0.57*	-0.11
	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.21)	(0.20)
USA	0.05*	0.01	-0.02	-0.09*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
<i>N</i>	11128	11102	11069	11095
<i>R</i> ²	0.15	0.14	0.19	0.12
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.15	0.14	0.19	0.12
Resid. sd	0.49	0.37	0.55	0.55

Standard errors in parentheses
* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Table 11: Regression analysis with country controls

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