Minor powers’ influence in international organizations: Empirical evidence exploiting the natural experiment of African representation on the UN Security Council

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Abstract

To what extent is the work of international organizations shaped by their most powerful members? Can minor powers influence the decisions taken by these institutions? This paper contributes to answering these questions by systematically testing the proposition that minor powers have an impact on the substantive work of the United Nations Security Council. Recent studies on the Security Council find that its most powerful members provide aid and loans to other Council members in an effort to buy their votes. This literature leaves open the question whether minor powers trade away their entire influence in exchange for side payments or whether they also impact on the Council’s substantive work. This paper relies on a novel approach to investigate this question. It exploits exogenous variation in Africa’s participation in the work of the Security Council to estimate the influence of African states on the outcome of decision-making processes inside the Council. Using a design-based approach and permutation tests for causal inference, the study finds that African states have a substantial impact on the Council’s response to civil wars in Africa between 1988 and 2013. During years when an African region is represented on the Security Council, the UN deploys 767 more blue helmets and allocates larger peacekeeping budgets to civil-war countries in the region than during years when no state in that region is a member of the Council, on average. The finding that minor powers exert significant influence on the decisions of one of the most important international institutions is consistent with the argument that great powers display strategic constraint by sharing influence on international organizations with weaker powers.
1 Introduction

To what extent is the work of international organizations shaped by their most powerful member states? Can minor powers exert substantial influence on the decisions taken within these institutions? Three observers of the study of international organizations recently noted that “the consensus view is that small states do not affect IO behavior in significant ways” (Lyne, Nielson and Tierney, 2006, p.56). The notion that states’ power is a reflection of their national capabilities has a long tradition, as does the argument that international organizations are merely fora for power-based interactions between their member states (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 1994). Thus, Drezner (2007, p.5) argues that a “great power concert is a necessary and sufficient condition for effective global governance over any transnational issue”. In a similar vein, liberal intergovernmentalism explains European integration in terms of the preferences of, and bargaining between Europe’s three most powerful states (Moravcsik, 1998). The rational design approach to the study of international institutions presents the related conjecture that asymmetries of member states’ power translate into differential control of the institution by its member states (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001).

Several arguments form the basis of the conventional wisdom that international organizations are controlled by their most powerful members. Minor powers possess few attractive unilateral outside options for realizing the gains they could obtain through institutionalized multilateral cooperation (Katzenstein, 1985; Moravcsik, 1998; Stone, 2011). Even in international organizations with majority voting rules, minor powers’ strength in numbers does not enable them to change international regimes against the will of great powers since any attempt by the weak to impose their will on the mighty would lead the latter to withdraw their vital support from the institution (Krasner, 1985, p.30). The ability of great powers to ‘go it alone’ may enable them to force minor powers to consent to multilateral cooperation even when such cooperation leaves the latter worse off than the status quo (Gruber, 2000).

At the same time, recent studies on international financial institutions (IFIs) and the European Union (EU) challenge the conventional wisdom that minor powers do not exert substantial influence on international organizations’ behavior. New empirical evidence shows that weak powers play a significant role in shaping the work of IFIs (Lyne, Nielson and Tierney, 2006; Copelovitch et al., 2013). Stone (2011) finds that great powers cede disproportionate influence in the International Monetary Fund and
This paper uses decision-making in the United Nations (UN) Security Council as a case study to examine whether the conclusion in the recent literature that minor powers yield substantial influence inside international organizations can be extended beyond IFIs and the EU, or whether the conventional wisdom about great powers’ dominance holds in the issue area of international security cooperation. The UN Security Council is a hard case for testing the proposition that minor powers exert a substantial impact on the work of international institutions, because five great powers have permanent membership and a veto right, and because decisions require positive votes from only four of the ten other members that serve on nonrenewable two-year terms. Recent studies show that minor powers obtain more aid and loans while they hold a nonpermanent seat on the Security Council in an apparent attempt by great powers to buy the votes of the Council’s temporary members (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2009a, b, 2010; Lim and Vreeland, 2013; Mazumder, McNamara and Vreeland, 2013; Vreeland and Dreher, 2014). If minor powers were unable to influence the work of the Security Council, as the conventional wisdom suggests, great powers would have little incentive to spend substantial resources to purchase their favor. Recent studies leave open the question whether minor powers use their influence inside the Council only to attain economic side payments or whether they also impact on the Council’s substantive work. This paper addresses this gap in the literature. It presents the argument that great powers’ strategic restraint enables minor powers that serve on
the Security Council to exert substantial influence on the decisions taken in this body.

To empirically test this argument, this study relies on a novel design-based approach to solve the identification problem posed by the fact that the Council’s changing composition is not exogenously determined. While five great powers have permanent membership in the Council, the other ten seats are filled through elections held in the UN General Assembly. This poses a challenge for causal inference: it may not be the influence of elected Council members that leads the Council to respond to the security threats that are most salient to these states, but rather the fact that states whose security threats are actively dealt with by the Council seek election to this body.¹ To solve the identification problem posed by the endogenous selection of states that temporarily serve on the Council, this study exploits exogenous rotation of two Security Council seats between four African regions.

The paper finds that during years when an African region is represented on the Security Council, the Council responds more actively to civil wars in that region than it does during years when no state in that region is a member of the Council. An African region’s representation on the Security Council is associated with an average of 767 additional UN peacekeepers per year that are deployed to civil-war countries in that region. This effect corresponds to almost half the average number of blue helmets deployed to an African civil-war country. During years when an African region is represented on the Council, the budget of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in that region increases by USD 65 million more than it does during years when no state in the region serves on the Council. This is equivalent to 37 percent of the average amount spent on UN peacekeeping in an African civil-war country. The finding that exogenous variation in minor powers’ participation in the Council has a strong impact on the deployment of UN peacekeepers challenges the conventional wisdom that the five great powers with permanent Council membership and veto power completely dominate decision-making inside this body. Since we have no reason to believe that the preferences of the Council’s permanent members undergo regular swings in two-year intervals, great powers’ preferences cannot explain the variation in the UN’s response to civil wars found by this study. At the same time, this result is not due to great

¹This endogeneity concern is similar to the one discussed in the literature on United States congressional committee influence (Ray, 1981; Rundquist, Lee and Rhee, 1996). Assessing the effect of serving on a committee is complicated by the fact that committees tend to be composed of congressmen whose districts are particularly affected by the work of the committee. A similar selection effect may operate in elections of non-permanent Security Council members.
powers’ indifference over civil wars in Africa. Protracted diplomatic disputes about the UN’s role in Darfur and Libya exemplify the intense preferences of the Council’s permanent members over multilateral intervention in African civil wars, in part due to former colonial ties and present-day trade relations, due to the fact that these five great powers bear half the cost of UN peacekeeping in Africa, and due to the precedent that is set for other world regions when the UN intervenes in civil conflicts in Africa.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Part 2 discusses decision-making inside the Security Council. The following part presents an original argument on the sources and manifestations of minor powers’ influence on the work of the Security Council. Part 4 describes the design-based inference strategy for this study, and the subsequent part presents the results. Parts 6 and 7 summarize various robustness checks, sensitivity analyses, and a placebo test, which leverage original data on the budget of UN peace operations and on the size of UN civilian missions and non-UN peace operations. The conclusion discusses implications for IR theory and for multilateral diplomacy.

2 Decision-making in the UN Security Council

The UN Security Council is responsible for countering threats to international peace and security, which can take the form of interstate disputes, military aggression, civil war, mass atrocities, terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Frowein and Krisch, 2002). It has vast discretion in designating political crises or actions as threats to international peace and security (Wellens, 2003; Matheson, 2006). The Council’s tool kit includes authorizing military interventions against aggressors, deploying peace operations, establishing transitional administrations, imposing sanctions, initiating criminal proceedings before international tribunals, and sponsoring crisis diplomacy efforts (Luck, 2006). The Council has fifteen members, five of whom are permanent (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The other ten members serve on this body on non-renewable two-year terms. The permanent members have the right to veto non-procedural decisions. The adoption of a resolution by the Council requires nine positive votes. These institutional characteristics make the Security Council a particularly hard case for testing the influence of minor powers on the work of international organizations. Their veto right, permanent membership, and preponderant national material capabilities put great powers
at a formidable advantage in bargaining with minor powers that serve as temporary members of this body.

The conventional wisdom about decision-making inside the Security Council holds that the five great powers with veto power and permanent membership in the Security Council leave the ten other members with virtually no influence over that body’s decisions. Formal models of decision-making in the Security Council suggest that the five permanent members of the Security Council monopolize almost all voting power (O’Neill, 1996; Winter, 1996; Voeten, 2001; Hosli et al., 2011, p.171). O’Neill (1996, p.235) pointedly concludes that, as far as voting power is concerned, “the Security Council has five members”. Formal models presented in Winter (1996, p.820) yield the related insight that “the bargaining power of the nonveto members is effectively null”. Empirical studies concur with this assessment and characterize the Council as an elite pact between great powers (Voeten, 2005; Rosecrance, 1992; Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985, p.501-4). The telling title of a recent book on the history of the Security Council refers to the five great powers with permanent membership as *Five To Rule Them All* (Bosco, 2009). The conventional wisdom about the dominating role of the Council’s five permanent members serves as motivation or premise for several recent studies: Stojek and Tir (2014, p.10) posit that “[c]learly, P5 states have a hold on Security Council decision-making and their interests ultimately drive the outcomes in the Security Council”; Allen and Yuen (2014, p.1) concur that “[b]ased on previous research (Mullenbach, 2005), we know that the work of the Council is shaped by the interests and preferences of the five permanent members”; and Johns (2007, p.252, 255) characterizes deliberations in the Security Council as “controlled by a small number of states with effective veto power”.

Some diplomats who served on the Security Council concur that the great powers on the Security Council - its five permanent members - all but monopolize control of this body. Mahbubani (2004), who represented Singapore on the Council in 2001 and 2002, describes the ten non-permanent members of the Council as being at an extreme structural disadvantage in the body’s deliberations and decision-making processes. He explains that the permanent members’ veto power as well as the non-permanent members’ lack of an institutional memory of past deliberations and of tacit understandings on longstanding disputes on the Council’s agenda tend to marginalize the influence of non-permanent members. Several other practitioners of diplomacy inside the Council agree that the five permanent members dominate decision-making processes in this
Several recent studies on the effects of non-permanent membership in the Security Council challenge the finding that non-permanent Council members lack influence on the body’s deliberations and decision-making. Kuziemko and Werker (2006) and Vreeland and Dreher (2014) find that great powers spend significant resources on bilateral and multilateral aid to non-permanent Council members in an attempt to buy their votes on the Council’s decisions. Non-permanent members of the Security Council also receive loans with more lenient terms from the International Monetary Fund (Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2009b, 2010) and from the Asian Development Bank (Lim and Vreeland, 2013), more favorable treatment by the World Bank (Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2009a), and in some cases more aid from the European Union (Mazumder, McNamara and Vreeland, 2013) than other states. These studies ascribe such benefits of temporary Security Council membership to ‘global horse trading’ of minor powers’ votes in exchange for side payments by great powers. Clearly, great powers would not spend considerable financial and political resources to buy the favor of non-permanent Council members if minor powers on the Council had no influence on the body’s work in the first place, as the conventional wisdom would suggest.

The recent finding that great powers incur significant costs to woo non-permanent members of the Council raises important questions about decision-making in the Security Council: Do the great powers on the Council merely offer side payments in the form of aid and loans to secure the non-permanent member’s votes or do they also compromise over the substance of the Council’s decisions in order to gain minor powers’ assent? Put differently, do non-permanent members trade away their entire influence in exchange for aid and loans or do they utilize some of their influence to impact on the Council’s substantive work? A recent literature investigates the effects of temporary Council membership on economic and political outcomes in the member states (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010, 2013; Besley and Persson, 2011; Bashir and Lim, 2013; Voeten, 2014), but it does not address the the impact of their temporary presence in the Council on that body’s work. This paper aims to close this gap in the literature by systematically testing whether minor powers with temporary Council membership have an impact on the substantive work of the Security Council.

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2Not all practitioners in the Council concur with this assessment. Dedring (2008, p.x) argues that, in the areas of peacekeeping, terrorism, nonproliferation, peacebuilding, and humanitarian assistance “in the sum total of the Council’s deliberations and decisions, the presumed predominance of the five permanent members does not appear as decisive or even critical.”
Great powers’ strategic restraint as the source of minor powers’ influence inside the UN Security Council

The influence of states on international organizations can be understood as the probability that a member state can change the actions of other members or the work of the organization itself. In the issue area of international security, great powers have incentives to share influence on international institutions with minor powers. After victory in World War II, great powers sought to establish a postwar order that they can maintain without continuously incurring the cost of coercing less powerful states. To secure the latters’ voluntary compliance and cooperation, great powers engaged in strategic restraint, which was institutionalized in the United Nations (Ikenberry, 2001). Today, strategic restraint by great powers helps ensure that most states implement the Security Council’s resolutions. Broad acceptance of the measures adopted by the Council is a prerequisite for giving effect to the body’s decisions (Voeten, 2008; Krisch, 2008). In particular, the effectiveness of sanctions imposed by the Council depends on their universal implementation. In turn, the imposition of sanctions is a key aspect of the Security Council’s strategy to entice warring factions’ compliance with its demands (Mikulaschek, 2014). If the Security Council’s work consistently reflected the preferences of great powers and did not take into account the interests of minor powers, the latter would likely refrain from providing the material and political support for the work of the Council (Beardsley and Schmidt, 2012, p.36-7). The Council is highly dependent on the resources of minor powers. For instance, the five great powers with permanent membership in the Security Council only provide four percent of the 94,000 blue helmets that serve in UN peace operations, while the remaining 96 percent are provided by other states (United Nations, 2012b).

The practices of the Security Council contain several concrete manifestations of strategic restraint by great powers. First, most resolutions are adopted unanimously, and their sponsors consistently aim to secure unanimous approval. The practice of pursuing unanimity lends some weight even to votes that are not needed for the adoption of a draft resolution. It thus enables minor powers on the Council to obtain side payments, as the literature on aid and loans to temporary Security Council members

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3 This definition echoes the seminal definition of power in Dahl (1957) as the probability of getting the other to do what he would not have done otherwise.

4 Between 1988 and 2013, 89 percent of all draft resolutions were adopted unanimously in the Council (author’s calculation based on UN voting records).
shows, or to logroll in order to gain substantive compromise on the Council’s work. In particular, states that draft Security Council resolutions are eager to secure positive votes by member states from the region that is addressed by the text. The consent of these regional representatives helps avoid the perception that the Council’s measures are foreign impositions, thus making voluntary compliance and cooperation by actors in that region more likely. The great powers’ desire to secure the assent of African Council members to resolutions that deal with Africa grants more weight to the votes of African Security Council members than the national power of these states would imply.

Second, great powers display strategic restraint by allowing the Council’s president to exert some influence on the Council’s work even though this practice primarily benefits minor powers. The Council’s president has some control over its agenda and over the order of voting over amendments (Bailey and Daws, 1998, p.130-1). Security Council presidents often host open debates, which frequently lead to a Presidential Statement. Council presidents can add new items to the agenda of the Security Council, which frequently preoccupy the Council for years to come (Dedring, 2008, p.x). The Council president’s de facto discretion exceeds her formal writ, as demonstrated in several instances when the presidents violated the Council’s rules out of political expediency (Bosco, 2009, p.162, 228). Since the presidency of the Security Council rotates on a monthly basis among all fifteen members, the ten non-permanent members benefit more from the presidency’s power than the five permanent members.

Third, great powers on the Council display strategic restraint by allowing non-permanent members to chair most of the Council’s sanctions committees, such as the one on Al-Qaeda, and working groups, such as the one on peacekeeping operations. These positions allow non-permanent Council members to influence the substantive work of the Council.  

5In November 1990, for instance, the US rushed to adopt a resolution against Iraq during its own presidency in November and prior to the presidency of Iraq’s ally Yemen during the following month, which would “significantly complicate council diplomacy” (Bosco, 2009, p.159).

6In January 1991, Zaire refused three Council members’ requests to convene an emergency meeting of the council on civilian casualties of Operation Desert Storm, even though it had no authority to refuse such a request (Pilger, 2002; Bosco, 2009, p.162). In December 2002, the Colombian president of the Council handed the highly sensitive documentation of Iraq’s nuclear program, which had been submitted to the UN’s weapons inspectors by the Iraqi government, to US diplomats even though he had been unsuccessful at obtaining the required prior approval by all Council members (Bosco, 2009, p.228).

7For instance, Austria’s chairmanship of the Iraq sanctions committee in 1991-2 enabled it to broker a compromise between Western and non-aligned members of the Council, to secure exceptions for humanitarian deliveries, and to augment the importance of the Austrian capital as a hub for the UN by hosting negotiations.
Finally, while the Council’s rules grant the permanent members the invaluable veto power, they also give all members the right to introduce resolutions. Thus, all Council members can force great powers to take a public position and to incur domestic and international political costs for casting an unpopular veto on a draft resolution. While this right is seldom exercised - just like the permanent members’ veto - the mere threat of exercising it gives non-permanent Council members some bargaining power in the Council’s deliberations, which enables them to influence the body’s substantive work.\textsuperscript{8}

In conclusion, the argument about strategic restraint implies that great powers grant disproportionate influence in the body’s deliberations and decision-making processes to minor powers that temporarily serve on the Security Council. It explicates the causal logic of the hypothesis tested in this paper - namely, that minor powers have a substantial impact on the work of the Security Council. In the following section I present a design-based strategy for empirically testing this proposition.

\section{Design-based empirical strategy}

This section explains the empirical test of minor powers’ influence on the work of the UN Security Council. It addresses, in turn, the identification strategy, estimation procedure, permutation tests, data, and measurement of the variables. This paper relies on a design-based empirical approach, which rests on the identification of an “opportunity where the causal factor of interest varies due to some ‘as if’ random manipulation” (Dafoe and Caughey, 2012). Specifically, the study exploits exogenous variation in the participation of minor powers in the work of the Security Council.

\subsection{Identification strategy and estimation procedure}

Participation of African states in the decision-making in the Security Council provides a natural experiment that can be leveraged to test the influence of minor powers in deliberations and decision-making processes in the Security Council. Ten of the

\footnote{For instance, New Zealand successfully used this procedural lever during the 1994 Rwandan genocide to secure passage of a Presidential Statement that was extremely unpopular with the Council’s permanent members. Since these great powers were loath to publicly display their opposition to a forceful response to the genocide by vetoing a strongly worded draft resolution introduced by New Zealand they acquiesced to a Presidential Statement in exchange for the withdrawal of the draft resolution (Kovanda, 2010).}
Council’s fifteen members are elected for nonrenewable two-year terms through annual votes in the General Assembly. Every year, five outgoing Council members are thus replaced on January 1. Under a formula devised by the UN General Assembly in 1963 and implemented in 1966, three of these ten non-permanent seats are reserved for African states (United Nations, 1963). The Rules of Procedure of the Organization of African Unity’s Ministerial Committee within the International System and the rules of its successor, the African Union, stipulate that Central and North African states rotate one of these three Security Council seats every two years, that Eastern and Southern African states rotate the other seat every two years, and that the third African seat is always occupied by a West African state. Figure 1 displays a map of the five African regions. This set of agreements implies that Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa are represented on the Security Council for two years in a row and subsequently not represented for the two following years. This system of rotation between African regions has been consistently implemented since the 1970s.\footnote{In most years, African states reach an understanding to propose only one candidate for each Council seat that is reserved for an African region, effectively leaving the UN General Assembly with no choice but to elect this candidate (Vreeland and Dreher, 2014). In some years, two states from the same African region compete for a seat on the Council, and their contest is decided by a vote in the General Assembly or settled through negotiations (see, e.g., fn. 13). While African states sometimes bargain or compete over the choice of a state to fill the seat reserved for a given African region, they have consistently implemented the principle of rotating Council seats between African regions in every year. To clarify, the natural experiment consists in the rotation of Security Council seats between African \textit{regions} and not between individual \textit{states}.} Table 1 lists all Security Council members from the Central, Eastern, Northern, and Southern African regions since the end of the Cold War. In conclusion, whether one of the four African regions is represented on the Security Council in a given year is determined by rules that were established several decades ago. Since the temporal scope of the study is limited to the post-Cold War era (1988-2013) it is safe to assume that the rotation of seats in the Security Council between the four African regions, which is governed by an arrangement that dates back to the 1960s, is exogenous to the outcome of interest, the influence of states in Central, Eastern, Northern, and Southern Africa on the Council’s response to security threats in Africa since 1988.\footnote{Between 1988 and 2013 three states switched from one regional group to another: Mauritania shifted from Western to North Africa in 2004, Rwanda from Central to Eastern Africa around 2002, and Angola from Central to Southern Africa in 1995. These shifts did not allow these three countries to break free from the rotation principle, which ensures that each of them is only represented on the Council by a state from their region half of the time.}

If minor powers have a substantial influence inside the UN Security Council, exogenous variation in the representation status of different African regions should have a
Figure 1: Map of African regions

Note: The map displays the five African regions (as of 1988) in different colors. Central Africa appears in light blue, Eastern Africa in grey, North Africa in dark blue, Southern Africa in dark red, and Western Africa in dark green. Note that Western Sahara is administered by Morocco and does not form part of any region. Eritrea and South Sudan, which gained independence after 1988, are part of Eastern Africa.
### Table 1: North, Central, East, and Southern African members of the UN Security Council, 1988-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>North Africa</th>
<th>Central Africa</th>
<th>Eastern Africa</th>
<th>Southern Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* In accordance with the rules established by the UN General Assembly, the Organization of African States, and the African Union, North African and Central African states rotate one Security Council seats every two years, and Southern African and East African states rotate another seat every two years. A third Security Council seat is always occupied by a West African state for two years at a time. This study examines the effects of rotation of the two seats between Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa. The West African Security Council members are not displayed in the table. Rwanda shifted from the Central African to the Eastern African group (see fn. 10).
visible effect on the Council’s work. Specifically, the Council’s decisions should align more closely with the preferences of states in a given African region during years in which that region is represented on the Council than in other years. In contrast, if great powers completely dominate decision-making inside the Security Council, as the conventional wisdom suggests, exogenous variation in the representation status of African regions should not affect the Council’s work. Thus, it is possible to evaluate the influence of African states inside the Council by comparing the outcome of the Council’s deliberations and decision-making processes in years with and without regional representation.

The identification of the effect of African powers’ influence on the work of the Security Council requires two innocuous assumptions about the preferences of Security Council members. First, the preferences of the permanent Council members are assumed not to systematically vary together with the representation status of African regions on the Council. The preferences of permanent Council members over UN intervention in Africa at a given point in time are thus independent of which African region is represented on the Council. This assumption is plausible since there is no reason to believe that the preferences of the Council’s permanent members over peacekeeping in Africa exhibit a pattern of regular swings in two-year intervals. While the preferences of the Council’s permanent members do not undergo cyclical changes, great powers are not indifferent about peacekeeping in Africa either. They have multiple reasons to be interested in whether, where, and when the Council deploys peacekeepers to Africa. First, their colonial history makes two permanent Council members, France and the United Kingdom, particularly attentive to armed conflicts in their former colonies in Africa. Second, even the failure of a UN peace operation in a peripheral setting harms the perceived authority and effectiveness of the Security Council in many unrelated conflicts of vital importance to the five permanent members (Goulding, 1999, p.163). Third, UN intervention in African civil wars sets a precedent for UN intervention in other parts of the world that affect the core interests of the five permanent members of the Council. Fourth, the five veto powers bear more than half of the financial cost of UN peace operations (United Nations, 2012a), which currently amounts to almost 8 billion USD per year. Fifth, UN peacekeepers are a scarce resource. Therefore, the opportunity cost of deploying blue helmets in Africa is high, because they could alternatively form part of multilateral peace operations that respond to core national interests of the Council’s five permanent members. Moreover, the burden of assembling a sufficient number of troops by offering side-payments to troop contributors is
primarily incumbent to the great powers with permanent membership in the Council (see Henke, 2012).

The second identifying assumption is that African states that temporarily serve on the Council prefer the deployment of larger UN peacekeeping missions in response to ongoing civil wars in their own region. This assumption can be justified as follows. Civil wars generate negative economic externalities in the region where they occur, reducing growth rates in neighboring countries and beyond (Murdoch and Sandler, 2002, 2004). In fact, 87 percent of the economic cost of state failure, which often results from civil war, materialize in countries that border the failing state (Hoeffler, 2010). Civil wars also jeopardize political stability and peace in neighboring states. Recent scholarship shows that states are more likely to experience both interstate and intrastate conflict if a neighboring country is undergoing a conflict (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008; Gleditsch, 2002, 2014; Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz, 2008; Kathman, 2010). Refugee flows caused by civil war are associated with a higher risk of civil war in neighboring refugee-recipient countries (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). International peace operations reduce the risk of conflict contagion to neighboring countries by securing borders, by reducing transborder refugee flows, and by facilitating repatriation and resettlement (Beardsley, 2011). Moreover, UN peace operations have been found to increase the prospect of sustainable peace in civil-war countries, and large multidimensional peace operations have a particularly strong positive impact (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2013; Fortna, 2008; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006). African members of the Security Council consistently express a preference for the deployment of larger UN peacekeeping missions in response to ongoing civil wars in their own region over inaction by the international community: between 1988 and 2013, the Security Council deployed thirty-three civilian or military peace operations in response to African civil wars during years in which the region of the civil-war country was represented on the Council, and in each case, the representative of that region voted in favor of establishing the peace operation.11 African states have often expressed regret about the Security Council’s unwillingness to undertake more peacekeeping efforts in Africa.12 Preference outliers among African states, which are more hostile to UN peacekeeping in Africa, are consistently kept from being elected to the Council, and therefore the

11 Author’s calculation based on UN voting records. This figure includes UN missions in West Africa.
political preferences of African Security Council members do not perfectly align with those of African states, on average (Lai and Lefler, 2011, p.32). The assumption that African Security Council members prefer the deployment of larger UN peacekeeping operations in response to civil wars in their region does not imply that they also favor other forms of UN intervention (such as the imposition of sanctions against the warring factions) or that they are agnostic about the outcome of civil wars in their region. It also does not imply that they hold favorable views on UN peace operations in less lethal conflicts or interstate wars in their region, or in civil wars in other regions.

On the basis of these two assumptions about the preferences of Security Council members, it is possible to evaluate the influence of African Security Council members by comparing the average amount of change in the size and budget of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in a given African region during years when this region is represented on the Security Council with the corresponding figure for years when no state in that region serves on the Council. If African states are able to influence the substantive work of the Council, they express their preference for UN peace operations by lobbying for more and better funded blue helmets in civil-war countries in their region. Consequently, the size and budget of UN peace operations in civil-war countries should increase at a higher rate when the region of the civil-war country is represented on the Council than at times when the region is not represented on the Council. The main quantity of interest (average treatment effect) is the difference between the change in the size of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in an African region during months when the region is represented on the Security Council (treatment group) and the change in the size of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in an African region during months when the region is not represented on the Security Council (control group). This quantity can be expressed as

\[
\Delta Y_T - \Delta Y_C
\]

where

\[
\Delta Y_T = \frac{1}{N_T} \sum_{i \in T} (Y_{i_t} - Y_{i_{t-1}})
\]

13The cases of Libya and Sudan exemplify this pattern. In 1995, Libya was elected to fill North Africa’s seat on the Council, but it withdrew before joining the Council “after prolonged agitation from the United States and others” in favor of neighboring Egypt (Pisik, 2000). In 2000, Sudan’s bid to represent Eastern Africa on the Security Council was derailed by Mauritius, another East African state, which won the vote in the General Assembly (Pisik, 2000). As noted above, the representation of African regions in the Council follows a strict rotation while African states sometimes compete within their own region for a seat on the Council.
\[ \overline{\Delta Y_C} = \frac{1}{N_C} \sum_{i_t \in C} (Y_{i_t} - Y_{i_t-1}) \]  

and \( Y_{i_t} \) is the number of military and civilian personnel of UN peace operations deployed to any civil-war country in region \( i \) in month \( t \). \( i_t \in T \) designates the as-if-random assignment of African region \( i \) to the treatment group in month \( t \) under the rotation system devised in the 1960s, and \( i_t \in C \) designates the as-if-random assignment of region \( i \) to the control group in month \( t \), while \( t - 1 \) designates the month prior to month \( t \). Thus, the unit of analysis is the region-month, and the treatment status indicates whether region \( i \) was represented on the Security Council during month \( t \) or not. In line with the definition of the primary quantity of interest above, region-months are only included in the analysis if at least one civil war was ongoing in the region at the time. The secondary quantity of interest is the difference between the change in the budget of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in an African region during years when the region is represented on the Security Council (treatment group) and the corresponding measure during years when the region is not represented on the Security Council (control group). It can be expressed with the same equations, where \( Y \) is now defined as the size of the budget of UN peace operations deployed to any civil-war country in region \( i \) in year \( t \), and all other parameters are defined as stated above. This analysis is conducted at the level of the region-year since the UN does not adopt monthly peacekeeping budgets. All analyses are conducted at the geographic level of treatment assignment, which is the region, in order to account for clustered treatment assignment to all African countries in the same region. Since the clusters vary by size, cluster totals are used instead of cluster means to avoid ratio-estimator bias (Middleton and Aronow, 2012; Dunning, 2012, p.184-5).

### 4.2 Causal inference through permutation tests

The approach to causal inference that was chosen for this study is based on randomization tests, which make it possible to test the null hypothesis of no influence of minor powers on the substantive work of the Security Council with minimal assumptions. Unlike model-based inference strategies, this design-based approach does not require any parametric assumptions and avoids the risk of bias from incorrect assumptions about the error structure.
If the null hypothesis is correct and minor powers do not have any influence on decision-making in the Security Council, the Council’s response to civil wars in Africa will be the same, in expectation, irrespective of whether the region of the civil-war theater is represented on the Council or not. Since the treatment is immaterial for the outcome if the null hypothesis is true, one should obtain outcomes that are similar to the observed outcome even if the treatment is randomly reassigned across observations. Permutation tests are conducted by randomly reshuffling the treatment status (i.e., the representation status of African regions in a given month) across observations many times. These tests account for clustering of region-month observations in region-two-year units, which correspond to Council members’ two-year terms. In this process, a large number of permutations of the data is generated. The null hypothesis is tested by calculating a one-sided p-value on the proportion of permutations with a value of the test statistic that is at least as supportive of the alternative hypothesis as the average treatment effect observed in the original data (Pesarin and Salmaso, 2010; Dafoe and Caughey, 2012). If only a small number of permutations yield values that are as extreme as the observed value of the test statistic, the null hypothesis can be rejected with a high level of confidence.

To show that the results are robust to the use of parametric tests instead of permutation tests, all analyses are replicated with Welch’s t-test, a parametric test of the hypothesis that the mean of the treatment group is higher than that of the control group. This test also accounts for clustering. Even though Welch’s t-test relies on parametric assumptions and is more prone to bias than a non-parametric permutation test if these assumptions do not hold, the results of the t-test are consistent with those obtained from the permutation test. Table 4 in the Appendix compares both sets of results.

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14 This procedure is executed by constructing a matrix composed of three vectors. The first vector records the change in the number of UN peacekeepers from the previous month for each region-month observation. The second vector records the treatment status for each region-month. The third vector contains the region-two-year cluster ID of each region-month observation. Subsequently, the values of the second vector are randomly reassigned many times so that all units in the same cluster share the same treatment status, and the resulting matrices are stored. The analysis of UN peacekeeping budgets follows the same procedure, except that the first vector records the change in the budget from the previous year.

15 Welch’s t-test is an adaptation of Student’s t-test, and it allows for possibly unequal variances of the treatment and control groups.
4.3 Data and variables

The treatment variable indicates whether a given African region was represented on the Security Council in a given month. Data on this variable was obtained from the website of the Security Council. It is displayed in Table 1. For a given region-month observation, the binary independent variable takes a positive value if the region is represented on the Council in that month and zero otherwise.

The outcome variables measures change in the number of civilian and military personnel of UN peace operations deployed to civil-war countries from one month to the next, as well as annual changes in the budget of UN peace operations in civil-war theaters. The study uses the conventional definition of civil war in Themnér and Wallensteen (2014).\textsuperscript{16} The data on battle-related deaths from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute Oslo (2014\textsuperscript{b}) was used to identify civil wars. Between 1988 and 2013, Eastern African states experienced civil wars during twenty-three years, states in Central Africa underwent civil wars during fifteen years, and Southern and North African states went through civil wars during eight and seven years, respectively. Table 2 in the Appendix lists these civil wars.

Fourteen UN peace operations were deployed to countries in Central, Eastern, North, or Southern Africa during or immediately after civil wars between 1988 and 2013. These peace operations had military capabilities and mandates. Six of these peace operations were located in Central Africa, six in Eastern Africa, two in Southern Africa, and none in North Africa. Data on the end-of-month staff size of these peace operations was obtained from the website of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.\textsuperscript{17} On average, a UN peace operation deployed to a civil-war country in Central, Eastern, Northern, and Southern Africa had a staff of 1,692 persons.

In addition to fourteen UN peace operations, eight civilian UN missions were deployed to Central, Eastern, North, or Southern Africa during or immediately after civil wars between 1988 and 2013. These civilian missions engaged in mediation, crisis

\textsuperscript{16}Civil war is defined as one or several simultaneous disputes over generally incompatible positions that: 1) concern government and/or territory in a state; 2) are causally linked to the use of force, resulting in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths during a given year during the conflict; and 3) involve two or more parties, of which the primary warring parties are the government of the state where armed force is used, and one or several non-state opposition organizations. See Uppsala Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute Oslo (2014\textsuperscript{a}, pp.1-3, 8).

\textsuperscript{17}Data is missing from this source prior to November 1990. These missing values were imputed from the official Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council and from secondary sources.
Figure 2: UN peace operations in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa, and worldwide, 1988-2013

Note: The figure on top displays the total number of personnel in UN peace operations in Central, Eastern, Northern, and Southern Africa (solid line) and worldwide (dashed line). The figure in the middle shows the total expenditure in constant 2013 US dollars for UN peace operations in these four African regions (solid lines) and across the world (dashed line). The figure at the bottom displays the size (solid line) and budget (dotted line) of UN peace operations in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa as a percentage of the size and budget of all UN peace operations in the world. During the entire post-Cold War era, almost three in ten UN peacekeepers worldwide was deployed to Central, Eastern, North, or Southern Africa, and almost four in ten US dollars spent on UN peacekeeping financed peace operations in one of these four regions. During the 2000s, the share of these four regions steadily increased to 62 percent of the UN’s total peacekeeping budget and 54 percent of the personnel in UN peace operations (as of December 2013).
diplomacy, and postconflict reconstruction, but they did not perform military tasks. Three civilian missions were located in Eastern Africa while Central and Southern Africa each hosted two. One mission was located in North Africa. An original data set of the end-of-year staff size of these missions was compiled for this study from data obtained from the website of the UN Department of Political Affairs and from various other primary as well as secondary sources. All UN civilian missions and peace operations are listed in Table 3 in the Appendix.

All peace operations and civilian missions were endorsed by the UN Security Council, which also adopted the mandates of peace operations and decided their size. The appropriation of funds for peace operations required the approval of the UN General Assembly to a budget prepared by the Secretary-General on the basis of Security Council’s decision on the tasks, size, and characteristics of the force. In 1987, a procedural reform weakened the General Assembly’s control over the Security Council’s budget (Woods, 1999, p.51), and the the General Assembly reviewed the budgets for peacekeeping operations “rather lightly” during the past three decades (Sagasti, Casabonne and Prada, 2007, p.35). This means that the Security Council’s decisions and the Secretary-General’s steps to implement them, rather than the subsequent appropriation by the General Assembly, are the main determinants of the amount of resources available to UN peace operations. An original data set of yearly UN peace operations budgets was compiled for this study from more than 250 UN budget appropriations. Between 1988 and 2013, the UN spent an average of USD 177 million (in constant 2013 dollars) on peace operations in civil-war countries in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa.

During the Cold War, the Security Council only deployed a single UN peace operation to Africa: the UN Operation to the Congo (1960-4). This mission predated the introduction of the system of rotating representation of African regions on the UN Security Council in 1966. Since the Council refrained from peacekeeping in African civil wars during the Cold War, the temporal scope of this study is restricted to the post-Cold War era (1988-2013).18

After the Cold War peacekeeping in Africa became a central part of the Security Council’s agenda. At any given time between 1988 and 2013, almost 20,000 UN peacekeepers served in UN peace operations. This represented a far cry from the fact that the Security Council only deployed a single peace operation to Africa during the Cold War (1960-1990).19

18During the Cold War, the Council was generally unwilling to intervene in African civil wars for two primary reasons. First, antagonism between the two veto-holding superpowers paralyzed the Council. Second, the Council was reluctant to engage in domestic armed conflicts. As superpower relations thawed at the end of the Cold War, the Security Council’s lethargy and its hostility to intervening in civil wars ended.
peacekeepers were deployed across Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa, on average. Over that period, almost three in ten UN peacekeepers worldwide was deployed to peace operations in these four African regions. In recent years, this share increased to 54 percent in December 2013. Between 1989 and 2013, almost four in ten dollars spent on UN peacekeeping financed peace operations in one of these four regions; in the 2000s this share increased to more than six in ten dollars. Figure 2 displays the growth of UN peacekeeping in Africa.

5 Results

Despite being minor powers, African members of the Security Council are able to influence the body’s substantive work. During months when the Council included a state from one the four African regions with rotating Security Council representation, it deployed 46 additional peacekeepers to civil-war countries in that region, on average. During months when an African region with rotating Council representation was not represented on the Security Council, the latter withdrew 18 peacekeepers from civil-war countries in that region, on average. Thus, the Council deployed 64 more peace operations staff to civil-war theaters in an African region during months when that region was represented on the Council than it did when no state from that region had a seat on the Council. Over the course of a year, the average effect of non-permanent membership of African countries amounted to 767 peacekeepers, which is almost half the mean size of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in the four African regions with rotating representation on the Council. This annualized effect corresponds to the size of an entire battalion, and it is substantively very significant because deploying more peacekeepers is associated with fewer killings of civilians (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2013), more cooperation by the warring factions (Ruggeri, Gizelis and Dorussen, 2013), and greater overall success of the peace operation (Hegre, Hultman and Nygård, 2013; Kreps, 2010). The result of a permutation test confirms that the value that was observed for the quantity of interest cannot be ascribed to random chance. The null hypothesis that minor powers in Africa cannot influence the substantive work of the Security Council is rejected (p<0.04). If the null hypothesis is assumed to be true and if the representation status of African regions in each year is randomly reshuffled many times, then we find that only 3.3 percent of all data permutations that are generated in this process display a positive effect of a region’s representation on
the Council on the latter’s peacekeeping deployments in that region that is at least as large as the value observed in the actual data. In short, random chance is a very unlikely explanation of the observed effect of an African minor power’s participation in the UN Security Council on the Council’s response to civil wars in the region of that minor power.

African minor powers’ participation in the UN Security Council also had a significant effect on the funds allocated to UN peacekeeping in Africa. During years when the Security Council included a state from a given African region, the budgets of all UN peace operations in civil-war countries in that region increased by USD 50 million, on average. In contrast, peacekeeping budgets declined by USD 15 million when no state in the region of the civil-war theater serves on the Council. Thus, the average effect of a single Council seat held by an African minor power amounted to an additional USD 65 million per year, which were allocated to UN peace operations in civil-war countries in the African Council member’s region. This effect corresponds to 37 percent of the average amount spent on UN peace operations in civil-war countries in Africa. It is substantively important since increases in UN peacekeeping budgets are associated with a strong decline in the risk of further armed conflict (Hegre, Hultman and Nygård, 2013; Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, 2008). A permutation test suggests that this effect is statistically significant ($p<0.08$).

The main results are displayed in Figure 3. These results are generally consistent with the patterns observed in individual African regions. In each region where UN peacekeepers were sent to civil-war theaters, the Security Council deployed more and better funded blue helmets when the region was represented on the Council than it did when no state in that region held a seat on the Council, on average, except for insignificantly larger UN mission budgets in Southern Africa at times when the region lacked Council representation. Dividing the sample into multiple sub-samples attenuates the statistical significance of the average treatment effect observed in each individual region. No UN peace operation was deployed in North Africa between 1988 and 2013.
Figure 3: Average effect of an African minor powers’ participation in the UN Security Council on the size and budget of UN peace operations deployed to civil-war theaters in the region of the minor power (1988-2013)

Note: This figure shows that the Security Council deploys more and better funded UN peacekeepers to African civil-war theaters when a state in the region of the conflict theater serves on the Council than it does when no state in the that region is a member of the Council. Rotation of two Council seats between four African regions as-if-randomly determines whether a given region is or is not represented on the Council at some point in time. The panel on the left displays the average monthly change in the size of all UN peace operations in civil-war countries in a given African region during years when that region was represented on the Security Council and during years when no state in that region served on the Council, as well as the difference between the two means, i.e., the average treatment effect (ATE). The panel on the right shows the average yearly change in the budget of all UN peace operations in civil-war countries in a given African region during years when that region was represented on the Security Council and during years when no state in that region held a seat on the Council, as well as the difference between the two means (ATE). Clustered standard errors are plotted around each point estimate.
6 Robustness checks

The results reported in the previous section hold in four different robustness checks. First, the analysis is replicated on a larger set of cases. While the analyses reported above are restricted to changes in the size of UN peace operations in civil-war countries, the first robustness check includes changes in the size and budget of UN peace operations during the first year after the end of a civil war. The identifying assumption that African members of the Security Council desire more capable UN peace operations in response to civil wars in their own region is plausible in the immediate aftermath of a civil war, when the risk of relapse into conflict is particularly high. Adding post-civil war settings increases the number of observations by 21 percent. It does not, however, change the result that UN peace operations in countries affected by civil war grow at a higher rate during years when the region of the civil-war country is represented on the Council than during years when no state in that region serves on the Council. On average, the Security Council added 115 civilian and military staff per month when the Council’s member included a country in the region that underwent or recently emerged from civil war, while it withdrew five peacekeepers in each month when the region was not represented on the Council. The effect of regional representation on the Council amounted to a difference in peace operation size of 119 blue helmets per month. A permutation test confirms that this difference is statistically significant (p<0.05).

In addition, the budget of UN peace operations in African countries with ongoing or recently terminated civil wars increased by USD 90 million more during years when the region of the conflict theater was represented on the Security Council than it was during years when no state in that region served on the Council. In years when a state in the region of the conflict theater served on the Council, peacekeeping budgets increased by an average USD 103 million, while they merely increased by USD 13 million during years when the Council’s membership did not include a state in that region. The effect of exogenous variation in minor powers’ participation in the Council on UN peacekeeping budgets is significant (p<0.09).

The results reported above are also robust to inclusion of eight civilian missions in addition to the fourteen peace operations analyzed in the previous section. When the analyses summarized in the previous section are replicated with data on the size of all peace operations and civilian missions, the results are consistent with those reported above. During years when a state in a region that experiences a civil war is
represented on the Security Council, the latter dispatched 755 more staff, on average, to peace operations or civilian missions in that region than it did in years without a regional representative on the Council. This difference is significant in permutation tests ($p<0.04$).\footnote{Data on the budgets of civilian UN missions is currently unavailable.}

A third robustness check confirms that the results are not an artifact of troop contributions by the African state that temporarily represents the region of the civil-war theater on the Security Council, even though temporary membership in the Security Council often leads countries to contribute more blue helmets (see Bove and Elia, 2011, Voeten, 2014). For this test, the analyses in the previous section were replicated without taking into account blue helmets that were contributed by this African Security Council member. The size and significance of the effect of African regions’ representation on the number of UN peacekeepers remain unchanged (64 more staff per month; $p<.04$).

Finally, the results are not sensitive to the choice of the region-month as unit of analysis. Since every non-permanent Security Council member serves on this body for two consecutive years, the treatment status of a given region in a given month is not independent of its treatment status during the previous month. Therefore, it makes intuitive sense to aggregate the data to the level of region-two-year units for a final robustness check.\footnote{Table 1 displays all region-two year units. Central Africa in 2008-9 and Eastern Africa in 2009-2010 are but two examples.} Aggregation reduces the number of observations by 95 percent, from 636 to 32, but it does not substantively alter the results.\footnote{Permutation inference is particularly well-suited for analyses with small treatment and control groups (Keele, McConnaughy and White, 2012), such as the test conducted for this robustness check.} The number and budget of UN peacekeepers dispatched to a region that was represented on the Council and that experienced at least one civil war was significantly higher (by 1,739 persons and USD 191 million over the course of a two-year term) than the corresponding figure for two-year intervals during which no state in the region was a member of the Council. Permutation tests show that these differences are statistically significant ($p<0.05$ for UN peacekeeping budgets and $p<0.06$ for personnel size).
7 Covariate balance and placebo test

The ‘as-if-random assignment’ of the representation status of African regions on the Security Council implies that the pretreatment characteristics of region-months with and without regional representation on the Council are equal in expectation. The fact that the four regions rotate on and off the Council suggests that the treatment and control groups are balanced with respect to time-invariant variables that may influence the likelihood of UN peacekeeping (such as terrain and colonial ties between the civil-war country and a permanent member of the Security Council). Even so, African civil-war parties or their external supporters might take into account the region’s representation (or lack thereof) on the Security Council in their planning, and they could thus pursue different strategies during years when a region is represented on the Council than during other years. Sensitivity analyses do not reveal any empirical evidence of such strategic behavior. Permutation tests do not allow us to conclude that the number of battle fatalities, victims of one-sided violence, or refugees was significantly higher or lower during years when the region of the conflict theater was represented on the Security Council than it was during years when no state in that region served on the Council.\textsuperscript{22} Moreover, permutation tests do not find a statistically significant difference between the extent of external support to civil-war parties during years when the region of the conflict theater was represented on the Council and the corresponding measure during other years.\textsuperscript{23}

A placebo test lends further support to the conclusion that the Security Council’s more active response to African civil wars during years when the body included a state from the region of the conflict theater was not due to systematic differences between pretreatment characteristics of African civil wars in the treatment group (i.e., conflicts during years with a regional representative on the Council) and those in

\textsuperscript{22}Data on battle deaths was coded by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute Oslo (2014b), the measure of one-sided violence was compiled by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2014), and information on the change in the number of refugees in host countries was recorded by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (2014). One-sided violence consists in armed force by a government or by a formally organized group against civilians, which results in at least 25 deaths (Eck and Hultman, 2007). Since data on battle deaths and one-sided violence is not available for 1988, these analyses are restricted to subsequent years.

\textsuperscript{23}A positive case of external support is recorded when a state or non-state actor provides troops, access to its territory, military or intelligence infrastructure, weapons, training, funding, or intelligence support to a party in an armed conflict abroad (Högbladh, Pettersson and Themnér, 2011). This analysis was restricted to the period from 1990 to 2009, for which this variable was coded by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2011).
the control group (i.e., civil wars during years without regional representation on the
Council). This test addresses the concern that the four sensitivity analyses summarized
above cannot capture all characteristics of civil wars that might potentially render the
baseline probability of the deployment of international peace operations particularly
high during years when the civil-war country’s region was represented on the Council.
If African regions were represented on the Security Council during years in which the
baseline probability of international peacekeeping deployment was particularly high,
we would expect that more non-UN peacekeepers were dispatched to civil wars during
those years than during other years. On the other hand, we would not expect such
a difference in non-UN peacekeeping deployments if the observed difference in UN
peacekeeping deployments was due to variation in Africa’s participation in the Security
Council’s deliberations and decision-making, because there is no reason to believe that
the rotation of UN Security Council seats among African regions influences the work of
other international organizations. Between 1988 and 2013, 16 non-UN peace operations
were deployed to Central, Eastern, and North African civil-war theaters. On average,
these missions fielded 952 civilian and military staff to African civil-war countries. The
placebo test compares the average change in the size of these non-UN peace operations
during years when an African region was represented on the UN Security Council
to the corresponding figure during years when no state in that region served on the
Council. As expected, the two means were very similar. When the UN Security
Council included a state from the region where the civil war took place, non-UN peace
operations increased in size by 534 persons, on average. When no state from that region
was a member of the Security Council, the personnel of non-UN peace operations grew
by 557 persons, on average. The insignificant placebo effect of 23 fewer staff for non-
UN peace operations contrasts with the significant treatment effect of 767 additional
UN peacekeepers who were deployed during years when the region of the civil-war
theater was represented on the Council. While it is impossible to rule out that the
difference between placebo effect and treatment effect is due to diverging logics of
intervention of the UN, on the one hand, and of regional organizations and states,
the other, the result of the placebo test yields further evidence that shows that
the Security Council’s particularly active response to African civil wars during years
when the region of the civil-war theater was represented on the Council was not due

24Civil-war theaters in Eastern Africa hosted six non-UN peace operations. Five missions were sent to
Central Africa, one to North Africa, and none to Southern Africa. An original data set of yearly changes in
the size of non-UN peace operations was coded for this study from various primary and secondary sources.
to systematic differences between the pretreatment characteristics of African civil wars in the treatment and control groups. In conclusion, the sensitivity analyses and the placebo test lend additional support to the proposition that the observed variation in the Council’s response to civil wars in Africa constitutes the effect of exogenous variation in the participation by a minor power in the region of the civil-war theater in the Council’s deliberations and decision-making.

8 Discussion and conclusion

This study exploits the natural experiment of rotation of UN Security Council seats among Central, Eastern, North, and Southern African states to investigate the influence of minor powers with temporary Council membership on the substantive work of the Council. It shows that during months when a region is represented on the Security Council, the body deploys 64 more UN peacekeepers per month to civil-war theaters in that region than during months when no state in that region is a member of the Council, on average. Over the course of a year, this effect of African regions’ representation on the Council amounts to 767 additional blue helmets, which corresponds to almost half of the average number of blue helmets deployed to African civil-war countries. The UN also allocates more funds to peace operations in civil-war countries during years when a state in the region of the conflict theater serves on the Security Council than it does during years when no state in that region is a member of the Council. The difference amounts to 37 percent of the average amount the UN spends on peacekeeping in African civil-war countries. Permutation tests confirm the statistical significance of the effect of minor powers’ participation in the Security Council’s deliberations and decision-making on the work of that institution. This result contradicts the conventional wisdom about decision-making inside the UN Security Council, which holds that the five great powers with permanent membership and veto right all but monopolize control of this institution. The finding shows that despite the great bargaining advantages that great powers have vis-à-vis minor powers that serve on the Security Council, minor powers are nonetheless able to exercise a substantial impact on the Council’s substantive work. While the recent literature on the effects of temporary membership in the Security Council shows that minor powers trade away some of their bargaining power in exchange for aid and loans from great powers, the results of this study indicate that non-permanent members also utilize their influence to shape the
response by the United Nations to security threats in their own region.

The findings of this study challenge the “the marked tendency in IR scholarship to focus solely on the most powerful players in an IO to the exclusion of all other actors. While this is often convenient analytically, it is equivalent to setting the weights for all of the neglected actors at zero.” (Lyne, Nielson and Tierney, 2006, p.43) This study provides an estimate of the weight of minor powers in decision-making on peacekeeping inside the UN Security Council, whose institutional characteristics make it a hard case for testing the proposition that minor powers yield substantial influence on the work of international organizations. The findings do not support the realist argument that international organizations are “basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world”, and that their decisions are entirely shaped by great powers (Mearsheimer, 1994, p.7).

The result that minor powers exert substantial influence on decisions to deploy and withdraw UN peace operations hints at a gap in the literature on the determinants of UN intervention in armed conflict, which tends to focus primarily on three sets of explanations: the demand for peacekeeping by warring factions, the human toll and cost of hostilities, and the interests of the five permanent members of the Security Council (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Fortna, 2008; Fortna and Martin, 2009; Beardsley and Schmidt, 2012; Stojek and Tir, 2014). Future work on this research agenda should also consider the interests of Security Council members in the region of the conflict theater as an additional explanation of variation in the UN’s response to armed conflicts.

Future research will examine whether the findings reported in this paper also hold in other issue areas, such as the Security Council’s counter-terrorism efforts and the authorization of military intervention by the Council. While great powers have intense preferences over peacekeeping in Africa, African Council members’ preferences over the deployment of peace operations in civil-war countries in their own regional neighborhood are even more intense. If the distribution of preference intensities affects the distribution of influence over the Council’s work, the findings reported in this paper may not generalize to issue areas where the pattern of Council members’ preference intensities is different.

An extension of this study leverages African regions’ rotating Council representation on the deployment of UN peace operations as an instrument for the size of UN peace operations to investigate the causal relationship between the size of UN peace
operations and the successful restoration of peace after civil war. As a source of exogenous variation in the size of UN peace operations, the conflict region’s representation on the Council (or the lack thereof) allows us to overcome the methodological challenge of endogeneity of the deployment of UN peace operations, which has been recognized as the main obstacle to studying the effectiveness of such missions (see, e.g., Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013).

The findings of this study have implications for the practice of multilateral diplomacy and for a future reform of the Security Council. They cast doubts on the the policy recommendation in O’Neill (1996) that states should not seek to join the Security Council as non-permanent members since members without veto power could not influence the decisions taken by that institution. The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests a different conclusion: since non-permanent members of the Council exercise substantial influence on the substantive work of this institution the benefits of non-permanent membership may often outweigh the costs of campaigning for election to this body. Thus, even states that are not motivated by the desire to attract the additional development aid and loans that are often associated with temporary Security Council membership have an incentive to compete for a seat at the Council’s famous horseshoe table.

With respect to a possible reform of the Security Council, this study suggests that an increase in the number of Council members will change the substantive work of the Council if the regional distribution of the Council’s membership will be altered. This implication holds even if a reformed Council does not include any additional permanent members and even if the reform does not increase the number of veto powers. The two most prominent reform proposals entail a shift in the share of seats on the Security Council away from Europe and toward Africa and Asia (United Nations, 2004, para. 251-3). To the extent that some world regions will be more strongly represented on the Council than they are at present, the substantive focus of the Council’s work is likely to shift as well.
### Appendix

Table 2: List of civil wars in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa, 1988-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>UN peace operation</th>
<th>UN civ. mission</th>
<th>non-UN peace op.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1994-1999</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2000-2002</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1990, 2006</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1996-2000, 2013</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1988-1991</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1988-1991</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. of Congo</td>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* The table lists all countries in the four African regions with rotating Security Council representation that experienced civil wars between 1988 and 2013. It also indicates whether a UN or non-UN peace operation was deployed at any point during the civil war or in its immediate aftermath; peace operations that were established more than a year after the end of the civil war are not taken into account. See fn. 16 above for the conventional definition of civil war in Themnér and Wallensteen (2014) that is used in this study.
### Table 3: List of UN peace operations and civilian missions in civil-war theaters in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa, 1988-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Civil war</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>End date</th>
<th>Max. staff size</th>
<th>Max. budget m.USD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>12/1988</td>
<td>5/1991</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>5/1991</td>
<td>2/1995</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>117.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>6/1997</td>
<td>2/1999</td>
<td>4,220</td>
<td>251.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOA</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>civ.</td>
<td>10/1999</td>
<td>8/2002</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMA</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>civ.</td>
<td>8/2002</td>
<td>2/2003</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOB</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>civ.</td>
<td>10/1993</td>
<td>6/2004</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UN Assistance to the Facilitator of the Burundi peace process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Civil war</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>End date</th>
<th>Max. staff size</th>
<th>Max. budget m.USD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>9/2007</td>
<td>12/2010</td>
<td>3,814</td>
<td>606.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>11/1999</td>
<td>6/2010</td>
<td>20,819</td>
<td>1,444.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>7/2010</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>21,485</td>
<td>1,571.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSMIL</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>civ.</td>
<td>9/2011</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>10/1993</td>
<td>3/1996</td>
<td>6,138</td>
<td>361.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>3/1993</td>
<td>3/1995</td>
<td>29,209</td>
<td>1,343.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPOS</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>civ.</td>
<td>4/1995</td>
<td>6/2013</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSOM</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>civ.</td>
<td>6/2013</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSOA</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>1/2009</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>458.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>7/2011</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>7,684</td>
<td>926.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIS</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>civ.</td>
<td>6/2004</td>
<td>3/2005</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>3/2005</td>
<td>7/2011</td>
<td>10,519</td>
<td>1,216.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>11/2007</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>23,466</td>
<td>1,928.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The table describes all 14 UN peace operations (PO) and 8 civilian missions (civ.) that were deployed during or in the immediate aftermath of civil wars in Central, Eastern, Southern, or North Africa between 1988 and 2013. UN peace operations that were established more than one year after the end of the civil war are not taken into account. Missions are described as ongoing if they were in place at the end of December 2013. For each peace operation, maximal budget size corresponds to the largest amount, in million USD, that was appropriated for a single calendar year. Historical USD amounts are converted into 2013 US dollars. Data on the budget of peace operations was compiled for this study. Budget data for civilian missions is not yet available.
Table 4: Comparison of results of permutation tests and Welsh’s t-tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Average treatment effect</th>
<th>N obs.</th>
<th>N clusters</th>
<th>p (Perm. test)</th>
<th>p (Welsh’s t-test)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analyses of change in the size of UN peace operations’ staff</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main analysis (p.23)</td>
<td>64 PO staff/month</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incl. post-war settings (p.26)</td>
<td>119 PO staff/month</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incl. civ. missions (p.27)</td>
<td>755 PO staff/year</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excl. regional staff (p.27)</td>
<td>64 PO staff/month</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region-two-year units (p.27)</td>
<td>1,739 PO staff/2 ys.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placebo test: non-UN (p.29)</td>
<td>-23 PO staff/year</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placebo test: UN (p.29)</td>
<td>767 PO staff/year</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analyses of change in the size of UN peace operations’ budget</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main analysis (p.23)</td>
<td>$65M/year</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incl. post-war settings (p.26)</td>
<td>$90M/year</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region-two-year units (p.27)</td>
<td>$191M/2 ys.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table displays the results on the statistical significance of the effect of exogenous variation in African regions’ representation on the Security Council on the size and budget of UN peace operations deployed in civil-war countries in these regions (average treatment effect). It shows that the p-values obtained from Welsh’s t-test are consistent with those obtained from a permutation test. Some analyses are conducted with yearly data, because monthly data on the the size of the staff of civilian UN missions and of non-UN peace operations are unavailable and because the UN does not adopt monthly budgets for peace operations. Since budget data is not yet available for civilian UN missions and non-UN peace operations, the placebo test and some robustness checks are only conducted for the change in the size of peace operations’ staff.
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