Legitimation Effect: Do Foreign Publics Care About IO Approval in the Use of Military Force?

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"We need your help with our public opinion."

Then Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar to President George W. Bush, from the Crawford Transcript of February 22, 2003.

Why do powerful countries often attempt to channel coercive military action through international organizations (IOs)? The process of seeking IO approval for military action is often costly and the outcome of such efforts is uncertain. However, many states delay or forgo military action unless or until proposed missions are approved by one or more IOs. One explanation for such behavior focuses on the legitimizing effect of IO approval – if state leaders or citizens are more likely to support the use of force in the event of IO approval, then such support provides evidence for the legitimacy beliefs of relevant actors in the international system. In this paper we seek to explore the conditions under which IO approval will increase the political support for the use of force and we seek to empirically sort out some of the mechanisms that cause support to vary across time, space, issue area, and IO. The legitimacy of different IOs and the legitimacy of the same IOs likely vary across time and space. Hence we design our empirical strategy in an effort to describe and explain this variation.

The mechanisms by which IO approval increases support for some action are typically dependent upon the perceived legitimacy of that organization in the minds of leaders or their publics. If "political legitimacy refers to the acceptance of an institution's right to rule as appropriate among its audiences," (Tallberg and Zurn 2014), then the most straightforward measure of such legitimacy for any audience is the stated approval of some act independent of the content of that act. So, if we had a measure of support for two identical acts stemming from two different organizations, the difference in support would reflect differences in the perceived legitimacy of the two organizations within that issue domain. The factors explaining the differences in the level of support likely vary across different theoretical approaches. In this paper we focus on one prominent explanation in the literature on IO legitimation and political support for the use of force.

In the process we identify alternative explanations and seek to design an empirical strategy that helps us to distinguish different causal mechanisms.

Thompson (2006) argues IO approval of coercive military action will shape the level of support among foreign publics.[1] In this paper, we provide an empirical test of Thompson's hypothesis and several related mechanisms. According to Thompson's theory, support for unilateral and ad hoc multilateral coalitions will be lower than support for military actions approved by formal IOs with large and heterogeneous memberships. Thompson further suggests that the UN Security Council plays a "uniquely important role" in this regard.

Support for military action within foreign public opinion matters because it shapes the policy choices of potential allies and thus the costs paid by the great power considering the use of military force.[2] Spanish Prime Minister Anzar revealed a similar sentiment in the quote above when he asked Bush to go through the UN Security Council in early 2003; he clearly hoped that this procedure would boost Spanish public support for the use of military force in Iraq. Many of President Obama's own advisors offered similar arguments prior to the U.S. use of force against Libya in March of 2011.

In this paper, we seek to accomplish four goals. First, we make an empirical contribution by describing and analyzing the results of a survey experiment conducted on July 11th and 12th 2008 in the United Kingdom. The questions focus attention on support for military intervention against the governments of Iran and Sudan under a variety of different conditions. We bolster these results with evidence from other surveys with similar questions and methods. Second, we develop a research design and employ empirical methods that permit a more direct test of the role of IOs in shaping foreign support for coercive action. Our approach improves upon and compliments Thompson's initial case study of the 1991 buildup to the Gulf war. Our survey results are largely consistent with Thompson's hypothesis: formal IOs with larger memberships (representative of the international community) tend to increase support for coercive action by foreign publics. Third, and contrary to Tomz (2008), we provide indirect evidence that the "legalization" of the action through UNSC approval does not have a significant effect on support for military action. This suggests that the major benefit of UN approval may have less to do with its status as "legal" under international law, but, instead, that it signals broad support from a diverse set of states. Finally, we seek advice on a research design that complements and extends our original survey experiment. We ask how we might get the most leverage on questions of IO legitimacy and political force for the use of force by varying the countries in which we conduct the surveys, the sample frame (public or elite), and/or the cases where military support might be used.

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[1] Thompson 2006.

[2] Any comparison of the diplomatic and economic costs paid by the United States in the Persian Gulf War (1990-91) and the Iraq War (2003) clearly reveals the importance of convincing allies to share the burden of military intervention. In the most recent conflict the U.S. has spent an estimated $640 billion, lost 4253 lives (over 30,000 injured), and suffered diplomatic losses around the world as anti-Americanism rose and members of the "coalition" became unwilling and withdrew their troops from Iraq. In 1990-91 the U.S. lost only 390 lives, maintained its coalition throughout the conflict and subsequent embargo operations, and persuaded its allies to pay 85 percent of the $61 billion cost of the war (DOD 1992).

We organize the paper into five sections. First, we describe Thompson's initial theory and discuss the relevant literature on IOs, legitimation, and the use of military force, as well as more generally public opinion and foreign policy. Second, we describe our research design and discuss the costs and benefits of our survey-experiment method. Third, we discuss "legality" as a factor driving public support for coercion that draws primarily upon a logic articulated by Tomz.[3] Fourth, we present the results of our initial survey and interpret our findings in light of the hypotheses suggested by Thompson and Tomz. Finally, we outline alternative research strategies for moving this paper forward during the spring/summer of 2014 in the context of the broader project on Legitimacy and Legitimation in International Organizations.

Not all Multilateral Military Interventions are Created Equal

Thompson's theory has three main components: the role of IO neutrality in conveying information, how military action approved by an IO conveys information to foreign leaders, and how military action approved by an IO conveys information to foreign publics. Thompson's theory is an effort to explain why powerful states act through IOs. Powerful states—hegemons or other major powers—are, by definition, able to act without military support from other states or IOs. They are able to impose their will on their own so acting through an IO is not a necessary condition for employment of coercion, but a choice made by the coercing state.[4]

If a powerful state is able to act without the support of other states or can act in concert with an ad hoc "coalition of the willing," why would it ever seek IO approval? Thompson argues that support is desirable "because it determines the political costs of a given policy and may affect its long-term success."[5] (This claim speaks directly to two issues raised by Tallberg and Zurn in the introductory essay). IO approval enables great powers to signal their intentions and solve commitment problems.[6] Thompson argues that IOs are able to limit coercers and thus the choice of acting through an IO provides a signal reflecting the limited ambitions of the military intervention. Much like Schelling's discussion of credible commitments, the powerful state knowingly "weakens" its position in an effort to signal credibly its limited intentions.[7] The key factor, and most important for Thompson, is that properly large IOs are representative of diverse interests within the international community. The approval of a representative IO generates positive—or disinterested—expectations on the policy consequences of a proposed use of military force, which are then disseminated to foreign leaders and publics.

Coercion brings about third-party costs for states outside the coercer-coerced relationship. These costs can come in the form of short-term or long-term sanctions,

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[3] Ibid. Tomz original formulation applies to a different issue area (trade) and a different IO (WTO), but the argument about international law is general.
[4] Thompson 2006.
[5] Ibid., 3.
[6] See Ikenberry 2001; Martin 1992; and Martin 2007.
[7] Schelling 1980, 47-52.

labeled *S* below. As seen in figure 1, the model assumes the ideal median preference of the IO, x_{IO}, is the same as the ideal median preference of the international community, x_i, while the ideal point for the coercing state is closer to a policy of intervention. The solid line and the dotted line represent the distribution of preferences of the international community and IO membership, respectively. A coercing state must modify its policy enough to appeal to x_{IO}, which will cost *C*, or the value of the preferred strategy less the value of the new strategy. This leads Thompson to claim, *"When powerful coercers work through IOs, they do so strategically to lower the international political costs of coercion."*[8] Implicit in Thompson's argument is that the perceived value of *S* is greater than *C*.

Figure 1:[9]

—— International community	
.... IO membership	

Thompson assumes that the information an IO approval provides works differently for the two target audiences. First, foreign leaders are assumed to be well informed about politics, and therefore the IO does not have an information advantage over them. The true intentions of a coercing state cannot be known, and an act of coercion may be a first step in a larger plan that has negative externalities for these third-party states.[10] For example, a US unilateral invasion of an oil-rich country may be conducted under the guise of protecting a vulnerable ethnic group. However, the invasion may be the first step in a larger plan to gain control of oil supplies. By controlling the more of the global oil supply, the U.S. might use this market power to increase costs on all oil consuming third-party states. Alternatively, and more directly, a US invasion might be the first step toward additional attacks in the region or might be the first step toward establishing permanent military bases in the region, which might reduce the security of neighboring states or other great powers. Without knowing how threatening or costly unannounced or unilateral action might be, third-party states will try to limit the actions of a coercer.

Thompson argues that IOs are able to pose real constraints on powerful states because of the procedures required for the approval of any use of force. Further, to mobilize support for their action, a coercer must pay significant transaction costs when

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[8] Thompson 2006, 9. Italics are in original publication.
[9] Rebuilt from ibid., 8.
[10] This is how the Russian government reacted to the overthrow of Qadaffi's regime in Libya. Russia believed that it signed up for limited military action to prevent the destruction of Benghazi. However, once military force had been approved by both the Arab League and the UNSC, Western military forces supported rebel forces to support the ouster of the Libyan government. Such mission creep reportedly made the Russian government much less cooperative during discussions of the use of military force in Syria and made a UN Resolution on the use of force against the Syrian regime a non-starter.

acting through an IO. Last, by taking a case to an IO, the coercer gives up any chance of the action being a surprise to the coerced or to third party states, which may delay any military action approved through IO procedures. Therefore, acting through an IO requires the coercer to pay substantial costs in a public forum in order to signal credibly its intentions.

Second, and most important for our empirical test below, IO approval transmits information to foreign publics. Thompson argues that publics are unable to tell if a coercive action will serve the collective interest, and whether or not the policy is a reasonable means to accomplish the proposed goal. Building on Popkin, Thompson argues that the public seeks "information shortcuts" to evaluate foreign policy issues.[11] IOs can provide this shortcut, or signal.[12] Because IOs are neutral and have a median preference closer to or equal with that of the international community, publics understand that actions receiving IO approval must appeal to at least the median member of the international community. As Wedgewood puts it, IO approval "can be seen as an impartial certification that an adversary does indeed pose a threat to international peace and security, and that the use of force is not intended to serve the narrow interests of a single country."[13] Thompson further argues that after the foreign public is more supportive of the action, the leaders of that country will more readily support coercion.

Of course, Thompson is not alone in explaining how or whether IO approval of coercive force will have any impact on support among foreign publics or on outcomes in IR more generally. Debates about why powerful states act through IOs break down into three approaches: realist skepticism about the role of IOs, a constructivist focus on norm transmission, and the liberal alternative of IO information transmission and signaling.

For realists power is the dominant factor in state decisions and states are the relevant units of analysis in IR (Waltz 1979). Thus, realists ignore variation in public support for war, whether domestic or foreign.[14] In the words of John Mearsheimer, "NATO provides a good example of realist thinking about institutions… (It) was essentially an American tool for managing power in the face of the Soviet threat."[15] Realists suggest that IOs are the tools of great powers and will not affect outcomes in the international system, rather they will be employed if there is no cost, and ignored if they impede the will of a powerful state. Hence, regardless of public opinion, no third party state should change its position of support/opposition based on the sentiments of their own public and certainly the potential coercing state should not concern itself with public support/opposition in foreign countries. However, the public may think like realists and have similar concerns and understanding of the international system. If so, they should not care much about whether the proposed military action is unilateral, ad hoc multilateral, approved by a regional IO (like NATO), or approved by the UNSC.[16] What matters is the relative

[11] Popkin, 1993.
[12] One survey used NATO and UN approval as a signal of elite opinions. Grieco et al. 2008.
[13] Quoted in Thompson 2006, 12.
[14] Waltz, Kenneth. *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York. Columbia UP. 1959. More to the point see *Theory of International Politics*, 1979.
[15] Mearsheimer, 1994-1995.
[16] Drezner 2008.

power of the coalition doing the coercing, and how burden-sharing might decrease the costs to that country. Joining a U.S. lead coercive action may be a way to influence an event that will happen regardless.

Social constructivists argue that shared norms and beliefs drive outcomes in the international system.[17] Some agree that the realist theory may accurately describe how states perceive the world at a particular time or in a particular context.[18] However, constructivists claim that these perceptions are subject to change based on the practices and shared beliefs of actors within the international system. With regard to IOs specifically, many constructivists argue that IO approval has become or is becoming an internalized norm, rather than a rational calculation.[19] States work through IOs because they believe it to be the appropriate way to act. As Ruggie puts it, "there seems little doubt that multilateral norms and institutions have helped stabilize their international consequences. Indeed, such norms and institutions appear to be playing a significant role in the management of a broad array of regional and global changes in the world system today." [20] Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that these norms are rooted in the domestic or sociological base. Thus, counter to realists, they stress the importance of domestic opinion in shaping leader's (state's) beliefs about appropriateness.[21] This mechanism also distinguishes constructivists from the strategic informational arguments.

For the specific application to this question, constructivists would argue that the degree to which residents and leaders internalize the norm should determine the willingness of the coercer to act within or outside an IO when using military force and could even specify which IOs were appropriate for approving the use of force. As Barnett and Finnemore argue, "(IOs) also create actors, specify responsibilities and authority among them, and define the work these actors should do, giving it meaning and normative value. Even when they lack material resources, IOs exercise power as they constitute and construct the social world."[22] Moreover, Hurd (2005) argues that as IOs gain legitimacy, they become tools that are more attractive. Lacking actual coercive power as an actor, their ability to grant legitimacy is their primary purpose, and, if true, an IO's role in evaluating coercive actions is not one of strategically providing information, but rather defining the appropriate behavior of all actors within a particular context. If the norm has been internalized, then it will be appropriate to support military action if sanctioned by the UNSC, but inappropriate to support an identical military action if undertaken unilaterally. The tests provided below cannot rule out this explanation as well, because where legitimacy is conferred, so too might strategic information. The research design cannot confer only legitimacy and not information about state preferences. Thus, results may provide evidence for or against both of these approaches.

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[17] Adler 2002.
[18] Wendt 1992.
[19] See Risse 2000; Adler 2002.
[20] Ruggie 1992, 561.
[21] Finnemore and Sikkink??
[22] Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 700.

In contrast to both realists and constructivists, neo-liberal institutionalist's (NLI), like Thompson, argue that IOs are specifically able to help overcome coordination and collaboration problems. While the substantive claims of NLI arguments vary, they often focus on the way in which IOs influence transaction costs and information flows for a variety of strategic actors in world politics. The standard story from Keohane suggests that IOs minimize transaction costs and allow states to overcome problems of asymmetric information.[23] But once we move from Keohane's world, where IOs serve as structural constraints on rational unitary states, into a world where IOs have agency and domestic politics matters to policy makers, then the impact of IOs on information and transaction costs varies in interesting ways. For example, Milner argues that states work through IOs because their domestic publics have less information about actions conducted through IOs.[24] Thus, delegation to an IO can be a strategic choice by the state to hide information from their public, rather than to provide it to a foreign state (or a group of voters within that state). Voeten argues against the constructivist view that a "logic of appropriateness" drives coercers to act through IOs. Instead, he argues that approval of any military action by an IO will signal the observance of limits to power, "which are defined not by legal, moral, or efficiency standards, but by an undemocratic political process that seeks to achieve compromise among elite actors."[25] In this regard, Voeten and Thompson agree that signals to leaders are important. However, while Voeten does not explicitly theorize any effect on foreign publics, Voeten and Thompson's theories are not explicitly in conflict, and give a logic as to why UNSC approval should relay strategic information to the public. Slantchev (2006) looks to public opinion in an effort to elucidate the micro-foundations of audience costs. He argues that "domestic audience costs can arise only if for some reason the leader (is tempted to be) an unfaithful agent."(449) Here, a focus on the domestic institutions and the role of the media helps to explain under what conditions states might be able to generate audience costs.

Beyond the more narrow discussion within the IR community, a broader questions remains for the issue of public opinion and foreign policy. While each of the theoretical traditions above hold some view about how IOs should matter, they do less with explicit predictions about the role of public opinion. This debate has occurred within a relatively smaller literature among scholars of public opinion. For Thompson and others who include the role of foreign publics, an understanding about public opinion formation is crucial to the theory. For Grieco et al. (2008), the elite opinions are communicated by approval or disapproval of Congress, the President or the UN. However, Page and Barabas (2000) work to refute the realist idea that "foreign policy is too important to allow public opinion to get involved". They look specifically at the gap between the public and the foreign policy leaders. They find that gaps exist and are persistent over time, administration, as well as during and after the Cold war. Moreover, Jacobs and Page (2005) find that in analyzing the position of elected officials, public opinion shows surprisingly weak influence, and at some points reaches significance only with a negative

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[23] Keohane 1984.
[24] Milner 2006.
[25] Voeten 2005, 59.

effect (change in public opinion leads to votes in the opposite direction).[26] More importantly, the role of institutions shows through in the analysis, where members of the House (the "people's chamber") are more likely to follow the sway of public opinion in foreign policy.

The vast majority of this literature has focused on two major debates. First, scholars argue over the ability of the public to form rational and consistent views on foreign policy options. Holsti (2004) argues that the public does not know much about foreign affairs and are generally bad at processing events in the international arena. Those countering this view, Popkin included, argue that elites may serve as an information shortcut. Aldrich et al. (2006) conclude that the public generally can assess competence in foreign policy based on these shortcuts and that this should cause leaders to considering the electoral implications. The case of Spanish Prime Minister Anzar helpfully illustrates this point.

Thus, the second important debate in this literature is whether citizens matter for the making of foreign policy. The obvious problem arises based on one's answer to the first question. If it is the case that the public forms irrational or inconsistent views, then in the best interest of the country, politicians and policy-makers should ignore the guidance from the public's views and pursue what they believe to be most in line with the goals of the state. However, if we believe that media bias, cues from co-partisans and other elites generally drive the public, and then public opinion is endogenous to the exact policy that they are supposed to drive. Elites do not need to worry about public opinion because the mere act of deciding on a policy drives voters to support or oppose that act not based on evaluations of the act, but of the actor. However, if the public looks to sources outside the state as well, as Grieco et al show, then convincing external elites may be an important way of increasing support. Chapman and Reiter (2004) find that the generally 'rally-round-the-flag' effect is larger in the U.S. when there is UN approval for the military action. They attribute this to the UNSC acting as an information shortcut to a costly signal paid by the coercer. However, Lai and Reiter (2005) do not find a similar pattern in their analysis of the United Kingdom. While their research approach differs from our own, it does suggest that our findings must be considered in the light that our experiment may not be representative of the overall trends in British public opinion.

Other than Lai and Reiter's work, the overwhelming majority of the work on public opinion on foreign policy in relation to elite opinion and to actual policy outcomes is heavily concentrated on the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations polling in the U.S. For theorizing abroad, and especially in taking the role of institutions more seriously, it is hard to rely on this research for predictions. More cases in more countries with variation on the types of democratic (or even non-democratic) institutions might lead to more broad and rich theoretical improvements.

Previous Survey Evidence

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[26] This may be due to a lack of controlling for partisanship. If the public cues off political elites, it may be the case that the issue gains salience to a respondent only when their party or faction is in the opposition, and therefore shifts in public opinion rely heavily on partisanship.

A number of studies address the question of how international organizations help shape public opinion. As mentioned above, Grieco et al (2008) look at the importance of UN approval in the American case. Other surveys provide some interesting experimental results as well. In 1994, Gallup[27] conducted a poll simply asking Americans if they would hypothetically support war with North Korea if they developed a nuclear bomb. Table 1 reproduces the results from their split sample question. Here, there is no reference to any formal IO, but we see statistically significant larger levels of support when the action includes other nations.[28]   Thus, while this does add to the claim that Americans support multilateral action, it may be the case that this is just a preference toward burden-sharing rather than reflecting information that the action received approval by any number of nations.

Table 1[29]

	Support	Oppose
United States, along with other countries	47	44
United States	37	56

Kull (1996) performs an interesting experiment with two hypothetical conflicts: One with Iraq invading Saudi Arabia, and one where North Korea invades South Korea. The survey split the respondents into four treatments. Two treatments receive a prompt asking about whether or not the respondent would support U.S. contribution to a UN force. Those who favored U.S. participation receive a second question asking whether the respondents would still support U.S. military action if other nations declined to participate in the UN coalition. In both cases (Iraq and North Korea), when the intervention went from multilateral to unilateral, a majority of those respondents who initially supported the action then opposed U.S. involvement. In the second set of cases, the survey initially asked respondents about support for U.S. unilateral action in response to the invasion. Those who opposed the unilateral intervention received a second question asking whether they would support the action if it became multilateral. In both cases, a majority of those who initially opposed a unilateral intervention supported the action when it became a UN sanctioned mission. Table 2 summarizes the results of this survey below.

Table 2

First	Scenario		Favor	Oppose

[27] *Survey by Cable News Network, USA Today and Gallup Organization, July 15-July 17, 1994.* Retrieved April 29, 2009 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

[28] A t-test of the levels of support between the two cases is significant at the p<0.0001 level.

[29] The two actual scenarios read: "If North Korea actually develops a nuclear bomb, do you think the United States, along with other countries, should go to war against North Korea to destroy that country's nuclear weapons capability, or not?" and "If North Korea actually develops a nuclear bomb, do you think the United States should go to war against North Korea to destroy that country's nuclear weapons capability, or not?"

Topic			Favor	Oppose	Favor	Oppose
Multilat First	Iraq	U.S. contributing to UN force	76		21	
		U.S. contributing after others decline	44	52		
	NK	U.S. contributing to UN force	68		29	
		U.S. contributing after others decline	31	64		
Unilateral First	Iraq	U.S. unilateral action	60		36	
		U.S. contributing to UN force			77	18
	NK	U.S. unilateral action	33		62	
		U.S. contributing to UN force			70	27

In the 2003 Transatlantic Trends survey, researchers included an experimental question with four levels of approval—unilateral, U.S. and allies, NATO and UN. The survey was administered in eight countries. The questions are similar to that of Kull (1996), as they ask whether respondents would support their troops being a part of the intervention.[30] While they do not do any statistical analysis, they do provide some general trends, showing that although Americans generally have higher levels of support for the two hypothetical cases—North Korea and Iran—there is an appreciable increase in levels of support with larger coalitions and more formal IOs. Using these data, we test the effect of this experiment in each country. We find four important points. First, The American data follows the same pattern seen in Kull (1996). Second, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom all follow a similar patter, higher levels of IO approval yield higher levels of public support. Third, Poland displays a statistically significant reaction to the experiment, but in opposite direction to what most of the other countries show. The more formal the IO, and the more general its membership, the less Polish citizens support involvement in the coercive use of force. Finally, IO approval at any level has no effect on French support. The French public show no sign of greater or lower approval. However, this survey was conducted in the wake of the Iraq war, so it is likely that anti-Bush sentiment and aversion to U.S. military action in general might have skewed results from where they might be otherwise.

Testing Hypotheses about the Use of Force

Thompson suggests that public polling should reflect the intuitions of his theory. Past studies use survey data in an attempt to quantify the role of IOs in signaling to the

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[30] The exact wordings of the questions are "Imagine North Korea has acquired weapons of mass destruction. The United States government has decided to attack North Korea to force that country to give up these weapons. Would you support [country] government decision to take part in this military action or not?", "Imagine North Korea has acquired weapons of mass destruction. NATO has decided to attack North Korea to force that country to give up these weapons. Would you support [country] government decision to take part in this military action or not?", "Imagine North Korea has acquired weapons of mass destruction. The united nations security council has decided to attack North Korea to force that country to give up these weapons. Would you support [country] government decision to take part in this military action or not?" and "Imagine North Korea has acquired weapons of mass destruction. The United States and its allies have decided to attack North Korea to force that country to give up these weapons. Would you support [country] government decision to take part in this military action or not?"

American public.[31] However, efforts to quantify this effect are plagued by various types of question bias and survey bias.[32] Questions are most often framed in the form of conditionals: "would you prefer U.S. unilateral action or multilateral," or alternatively studies ask two questions within the same survey, "Would you support U.S. unilateral action? Would you support multilateral action?" These designs raise three potential problems. First, respondents who see both answers might "trade off" between the two answers in a way that would be impossible if they only received one of the two treatments. Thus, respondents might be more likely to answer yes to one and no to the other, even though if only asked about the one they support less, they may have still answered affirmatively Second, such research designs are unable to isolate the substantive effect of IO approval from referenda on U.S. actions more generally.   Put in a specific and contemporary context, can we truly know if any answer in favor of multilateralism is not merely a criticism of the Bush administration's handling of the lead up to Iraq? Finally, because they are "within subject" tests, it is impossible to know whether the prior question (or the respondent's answer to the prior question) will influence the respondent's answer on the subsequent question. In an effort to remain consistent, the respondent may adapt her second answer in a way she would not have if she had never seen the first question. While experimental research can help alleviate this problem, researchers often test within subject, or at least ask multiple questions within the same treatment. However, these questions cannot control for whatever framing affect comes along with the entire treatment without varying question order.

To better deal with these problems, we work to eliminate the "within subject" element from our test. We ask respondents only one question with no follow-ups other than demographics.

Thompson argues his second hypothesis, that IOs provide information to foreign public, "is the most empirically challenging. It is impossible to know precisely how and why individuals updated their beliefs about a given policy."[33]   He suggests three possible strategies to evaluate this hypothesis. First, one could look at support levels before IO approval, and compare them with post-approval levels. This design is weak because it is at risk of historical and maturation threats. The many events that occur between measurements of public opinion add countless confounds to any results. In addition, the release of information between measurements, assuming this issue is in the news, could drive the results. Second, he suggests that one could compare levels of support among many cases where the level of IO involvement varies. However, this design relies on assumptions about the correlation of unobserved errors. This is the standard critique of the experimental approach compared to large-n approaches. Given that the number of cases of coercion may be small, and the variation around IO involvement is also limited, statistically, these inferences are hard to make at best and likely wrong at worst. His last strategy is one of measuring not the level of support, but the strategic nature of political actors and how they use IO involvement to communicate information. While he discusses this as two parts, here one relies on political actors to use the theory then to

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[31] See Grieco et al. 2008; Maliniak et al. 2007; and Tierney 2008.
[32] For one example of research that may suffer from these problems see Tierney 2008.
[33] Thompson 2006, 13.

produce an observable side effect. This method, however, cannot rule out the logic of appropriateness as the mechanism that increases support for military action that proceeds through an IO. If the effect of IO involvement is completely normative, without variation on the information that political actors provide, and there is little variation in the success of observed actors attempting to signal using the theory's logic, then there is no way to rule out this alternative. Moreover, measuring revealed preferences and claiming the variation is the result of changes in the information provided is quite problematic unless one makes a very strong case for what actual preferences are. Finally, no single case study, however strong, can firmly establish any theory or hypothesis, but can only suggest the plausibility of the hypothesized mechanism. To Thompson's credit, he is conscious of these problems and attempts to draw upon multiple strands of evidence and to multiply the number of observations within his case study. However, with one case it is difficult to rule out completely possible confounds.

While it is impossible to observe directly policy beliefs, the process of information updating or strategic trade-offs that are entailed by the Thompson hypothesis, the experimental design is able to control for other confounds such that only the introduced treatment causes the observed effect. We use an experimental research design that focuses one question per respondent on a survey of a sample public in the UK. The key dependent variable is the public's level of support for the proposed coercion. The key independent variable is how a coercing state (in this case the U.S.) chooses to conduct the action. We employed five distinct treatments that corresponded to unilateral military action, an ad hoc coalition, NATO approval, UN Security Council approval, and UN Security Council approval with a reminder that such approval is consistent with international law. While we readily admit that even this better test is nowhere near perfection, we believe that it does overcome many failures of past tests, and bolsters the findings of Thompson. Additionally, more observations added to the other empirical evidence help to provide support that this trend is a consistent one in the public.

To conduct the survey, we contracted a British polling firm, YouGov, to administer two distinct public opinion surveys of British citizens from July 11th to July 12th, 2008. A sample of 2000 was drawn from of their omnibus pool of respondents for each day. YouGov produces a representative sample based on prior information about the respondents. The online polls are used for political questions, along with market research. The series of five Sudan questions was run on July 11th and the five Iran question on July 12th. No respondent was allowed to answer more than one treatment of the question and no respondent was allowed to answer more than one survey per week; therefore, we know that no respondent answered both surveys.

In each of the two surveys, respondents were first asked:

> Please choose the DATE of your birthday from the drop-down list. (For example, if your birthday is on Christmas Day, the 25th of December, please choose "25").

Depending on their response, they were split into one of 5 groups. Assuming that the day of the year on which one is born will be randomly distributed, we had a random sample. Each respondent in group 1 was then asked the following question:

> If Sudan continues to perpetrate human rights abuses within its borders, would you support or oppose the United States taking unilateral military action against Sudan?
>
> Definitely support
> Probably support
> Neither support nor oppose
> Probably oppose
> Definitely oppose
> Unsure/ don't know

Respondents in the remaining four groups received separate cues on what type of military action the U.S. might take against Sudan. Those who saw the "unilateral" option, as seen above, received the zero dosage of IO involvement. In Thompson's terms, at this level the respondent only knows the action is no more hawkish than the most hawkish the U.S. might be. Rather than simply dichotomizing multilateral and unilateral action, the first factor tests what effect increasingly diverse coalitions (and later organizations) have on foreign domestic opinion. Thompson claims the institution must be a formal IO and it must be sufficiently large such that it represents a diverse number of opinions in order to send a meaningful signal to a foreign public. To address this portion of the claim, and thus get some leverage on the alternative explanations, we vary the type of IO and the composition of the necessary winning coalition by asking, in addition to unilateral action, if one would support a coalition of willing nations (ad hoc alliance, informal), a NATO action (formal, but limited in size), and UN approved invasion (formal, large and diverse).

Thompson's model suggests the lowest level of support for unilateral action, since a foreign public would know that the coercing country's actions have not been approved necessarily by any other countries, and thus there is no signal, positive or negative, on the consequences of this action. Moreover, evidence on the effectiveness of a formal but small IO compared to a group of countries in an informal alliance may help to shed light on whether or not it is important to work through a formal organization or whether or not information is actually passed on to the public by including a large number of states in the decision to use force. Formal IOs generally employ institutionalized rules in their decision process that are known to foreign leaders and known to at least some subset of the public (UNSC require 9 of 15 votes plus no veto by any member of the P5; NATO requires "consensus of all members; etc…). Such formal rules do not apply to ad hoc coalitions of the willing. Hence, such coalitions may simply be composed of those states with preferences closely aligned to the coercer and thus should not represent any credible signal about the intentions of the coercer.

The remaining treatments read as follows:

If Sudan continues to perpetrate human rights abuses within its borders, would you support or oppose a U.S.-led coalition of willing countries taking military action against Sudan?

If Sudan continues to perpetrate human rights abuses within its borders, would you support or oppose a NATO-approved force, led by the U.S., taking military action against Sudan?

If Sudan continues to perpetrate human rights abuses within its borders, would you support or oppose a UN Security Council-approved force, led by the U.S., taking military action against Sudan?

Key to these rewordings is the inclusion of "U.S.-led" or "led by the U.S.," since it ensures each group of respondents is reminded that the action is, at heart, an American-led operation. Moreover, unlike previous studies that have utilized experimental techniques, we do not ask whether the respondent supports troops from their own country being involved. It is possible that some respondents will infer this in part of their approval. However, we hope to get at opinions strictly of approval, and not necessarily confounding the choice with consideration of military commitments as well.

The second part of our design varies the target country. In addition to Sudan, we chose Iran as a possible realistic target for coercion. We vary the target country because some respondents may have preconceptions about what a war with any particular country will entail. Because Iran is next door to Iraq (and sounds similar to many members of the public), we wanted to guard against the possibility that respondents would infer too much about the test case from some analogous or ongoing conflict and thus have the results driven by factors other than our treatments. Further, by including more cases, it serves to increase the external validity of the claim, or point out situations in which the theory may not hold. The inclusion of Sudan is important because it would likely be viewed as a more humanitarian action as compared to a strictly security one. One can imagine that action to stop genocide in Sudan is more popular with the British public than stopping potential WMD proliferation in Iran. Perhaps Thompson's signaling model holds more strongly in security cases than in humanitarian cases or vice versa. This variation helps to increase the external validity of hypothesized changes as we vary the treatments.

For Iran the questions take the following form:

If Iran continues to produce material that can be used to develop nuclear weapons, would you support or oppose the United States taking unilateral military action against Iran?

The level of IO approval varies in the same way as in the Sudan case. One group receives unilateral while the remaining groups receive COW, NATO, and UNSC. We chose Iran and Sudan because they are possible targets of future coercion by the U.S. We chose real cases over hypothetical to increase the external validity. Grieco et al. use East Timor in their survey, because it is small enough that most respondents will not know the particulars regarding a hypothetical Indonesian invasion, while those sophisticated

respondents would know enough to consider the case believable.[34] Because Iran and Sudan have received greater attention, we believe these cases more closely mimic conditions in the real world.

In a second experiment, we added a vignette to the UNSC question explaining that military actions approved by the UNSC were in fact legal under international law. The two variants of the UNSC question are reproduced below.

> If Iran continues to produce material that can be used to develop nuclear weapons, would you support or oppose a UN Security Council-approved force, led by the U.S., taking military action against Iran?

> Military actions approved by the UN Security Council are legal under international law. If Iran continues to produce material that can be used to develop nuclear weapons, would you support or oppose a UN Security Council-approved force, led by the U.S., taking military action against Iran?

This experiment allows us to isolate the effect of how additional information on the legality of the action shapes public opinion. Tomz pioneered experimental work on the effect of international legal commitments on public support for various foreign policy goals.[35] In this case, evidence supporting Tomz's contentions would show a significant increase in the support for military action if the respondent was provided with information that the act was legal. Tomz's research design focuses on the negative, where respondents are given information that a suggested action is illegal under international law. Our design instead adds a positive cue, informing the reader that some action or process is "legal." If Tomz's findings were due to an internalization of the norms of international law, we would expect comparable effects; an increase in support in our study to a decrease in support in his.

One should note that the survey instrument does explicitly provide respondents with a reason to support the action. In both cases, we add wording, specific to the situation that might prompt respondents to be overly supportive. In the Sudan case, we cue the respondent with, "If Sudan continues to perpetrate human rights abuses within its borders," and in Iran, "If Iran continues to produce material that can be used to develop nuclear weapons." We include this explicit prompt for two reasons. First, without some references to the reality of the situation, we were concerned that respondents might be completely unfamiliar with the situation. If they were prompted by some of the facts that were in the news, this might help them recall their own opinions on the situation. Additionally, we believe that any real effort to convince respondents to support a military intervention would include at least this framing, if not an even greater concerted effort by elites in favor of the action. In consideration of the problem, we searched the BBC to see

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[34] Grieco et al. 2008.
[35] Tomz 2008

how many stories on Iran and Sudan occurred in the preceding two months before the survey. As Table 3 shows, these issues were frequently discussed by the BBC.[36]

Table 3

	Stories per day in preceding month		Stories per day in preceding two months	
	Iran	Sudan	Iran	Sudan
BBC	1.0	1.5	1.3	1.3

Additionally, our questions do not have any time element to them. Respondents are asked about hypothetical situations not set in any specific time frame. It may be the case that if the questions included an approximate time element, respondents would answer differently. For example, if the questions instead read, "If Iran continues to produce material that can be used to develop nuclear weapons, would you support or oppose a UN Security Council-approved force, led by the U.S., taking military action against Iran within the year?" respondents might be less inclined to support action. By leaving out any time element, we run the risk of respondents' estimation of timing possibly correlating with their treatment. Or, respondents might logically assume that different choices of coercion have different time elements. If respondents believe that unilateral action occurs faster while higher levels of cooperation take more time, the predictions on time could drive results. While we do not believe this happens in our data, we cannot reject this alternative explanation with our research design.

Data:

We use the data from our survey to test these hypotheses. One of the main benefits of random assignment of respondents to treatment comes from the assumption that attributes that might affect a person's response are not correlated with their treatment assignment. To assuage any fears that this may be driving later results, Tables 4a and 4b in the appendix show the results of regressing treatment on demographic variables available that one might argue could drive systematically different results. The results are for Iran and Sudan, respectively. As one can see, there are a few cases where variables are significant. However, in no case is there a systematic difference between in a direction one might think would drive the results.

Results of the Two Surveys:

The first claim we test is Thompson's proposition that increasingly formal IOs with broader representation tend to increase foreign public support for coercive action. As the design is experimental, we analyze the results with a simple analysis or variance (ANOVA) test.[37] As seen in Table 5 below, more formal institutions (UN and NATO)

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[36] These counts were collected through the BBC website www.bbc.co.uk. Articles relating to sports or other non-political issues were not included in the counts.

[37] These results retain the same levels of significance for a Kruskal-Wallis test, where we do not need the assumption of a normal distribution of the population.

have higher approval rates than either unilateral action or an ad hoc coalition. All three of the subsequent treatments after "unilateral" show monotonic increasing support. Not a single measure is inconsistent with the hypothesized expectations.   Excluding the 5th treatment ("UN-legal") from the analysis, the overall results are consistent with the predictions of the Thompson hypothesis for both Sudan and Iran. Interestingly, the largest step jump for the Sudan case is 11.6% between the support of a coalition of willing nations (45.7%) and NATO (57.3%). Using a t-test, this change is significant at the .005 level. For Iran, the largest jump in support is 4% between NATO (40.1%) and UN (44.1%). However, this change is not statistically significant.

Table 5

	Sudan		Iran	
Unilateral action	N	(Percent)	N	(Percent)
Oppose	147	(40.5)	183	(51.8)
Neither	68	(18.7)	46	(13.0)
Support	148	(40.8)	124	(35.1)
With support of a coalition of willing				
Oppose	140	(38.8)	176	(49.9)
Neither	56	(15.5)	44	(12.5)
Support	165	(45.7)	133	(37.7)
With NATO support				
Oppose	104	(30.9)	160	(47.9)
Neither	40	(11.9)	40	(12.0)
Support	193	(57.3)	134	(40.1)
With UN Support				
Oppose	78	(22.8)	135	(42.9)
Neither	62	(18.1)	41	(13.0)
Support	202	(59.1)	139	(44.1)
ANOVA				
	F (3, 12.42) p<0.0000		F (3, 2.25) p<0.0810	

Despite the fact that the results all move in the expected direction, the substantive shifts are much smaller than the gaps between "unilateral" and "multilateral" questions on previous surveys. Our previous survey results on U.S. public opinion[38] and other public opinion surveys[39] showed much larger gaps between support for hypothetical multilateral operations and hypothetical unilateral operations. Without any additional evidence to the contrary, we assume the muted substantive effects of multilateralism in

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[38] Tierney 2008.
[39] Pew 2002.

the current survey experiment are driven by the question bias issues that we discussed above.

The second test focuses on the effect of the legality on public support for coercive action. Tomz predicts that legality will have a positive effect on support for coercive action. As shown below in Table 6, the addition of the cue that UNSC approval makes military action "legal" under international law increases support marginally in both cases -- 0.3% for Sudan and 2% for Iran, as predicted. However, neither of these changes is substantively large and neither is statistically significant, and could be due to random error. One explanation for this lack of difference would be that respondents are already aware that UNSC approved coercive action is legal under international law. Thus, the boilerplate cue has little to no effect, informing only those respondents previously unaware of international legal standards. However, while we think it is not likely that random citizens understand the legal status of a UNSC resolution, only further testing can rule out this hypothesis. Even if it is the case that all citizens of the UK already know the special legal status of a UNSC resolution, the substantive change from NATO approval to UNSC approval is small and calls into question the "unique" status of the UNSC as a signaling device and also the relevance of "legality" for support of military action in international relations. Certainly the substantive shift from NATO to UNSC is much smaller than the shifts observed in Tomz' within subject experiments on the WTO.

Table 6

	Sudan		Iran	
With UN Support	N	(Percent)	N	(Percent)
Oppose	78	(22.8)	135	(42.9)
Neither	62	(18.1)	41	(13.0)
Support	202	(59.1)	139	(44.1)
With UN Support/Law				
Oppose	89	(24.6)	154	(42.5)
Neither	58	(16.0)	41	(11.3)
Support	215	(59.4)	167	(46.1)
t-test				
	t(702, 0.2291)		t (675, -0.321)	

While legality may be part of a complex calculation regarding the support for policy decisions, it cannot explain changes in levels of support between the first three treatments.

Discussion:

Our results are consistent with most of Thompson's expectations and compliment his qualitative empirical work which illuminates the pathways through which IO signaling works in practice. Primitive experimental work, as shown above, provides more focused evidence that the causal mechanisms advanced by Thompson may be operative in the minds of foreign publics when great powers employ military force.

Although the empirical test above seems to be consistent with the theoretical expectations of Thompson, it remains a modest first step in addressing the question we set out to answer. If publics are cueing on information shortcuts, we cannot rule out the possibility that this experiment has only captured another pathway used by the public to gain information about domestic elites. Baum and Potter (2008) argue that it is the interactions and dynamic processes of learning that tell us more about the relationship between learning and public opinion. In this regard, our study cannot address this possibility because it is just a snapshot at one moment that cannot capture dynamics across time. However, when combined with the growing empirical evidence from other survey experiments, we further bolster the basic claim with an expanded element by including our cue on the legality of various actions. Since this additional treatment was not significant, we can rule out one alternative hypothesized mechanism in this case.

Overall, this paper presents evidence from previous surveys, as well as new evidence from a survey experiment to illustrate the role of IOs on public opinion. While the Thompson hypothesis does receive support, we wonder whether the differences between the treatments will increase as we vary the third party foreign public. If Dutch or German citizens demonstrate a much larger preference for multilateralism, this might suggest that some of the constructivist factors (internalized norms of multilateralism) are driving the results. It also seems advisable to include some non-NATO countries and some countries that are not traditionally members of any U.S. led "coalition of the willing." As important, we think it makes sense to survey citizens of a country that lacks a veto on the UNSC. If the public know their government has the ability to veto something in the UNSC, they may think that their views will necessarily be represented in the IO. The same logic holds for NATO membership where a consensus decision rule implies a unit veto system. The UK is both a NATO member and a permanent member of the UNSC. So, while surveying again in the UK is the best way to address change over time and ensure the robustness of our original result, surveying outside the UK would address these two later points. Finally, future work would ideally include an experimental negative cue on International Law for the three non-UNSC treatments.

Future Work and Setting Priorities:

Our goal is to expand the current data and research design in ways that directly speak to the aims of this workshop. To this end, we propose five additions that we believe could help speak more broadly to the importance of legitimacy and IOs as they relate to public opinion and the use of military force. It is these areas in which we would most appreciate comments. And since resources are not unlimited, we need to prioritize the additional empirical work so that we can get the most bang for our legitimation buck.

First, we plan to add another round of survey experiments to the public opinion data presented here. These will speak more consistently to legitimacy beliefs. Second, we intend to address the degree to which public opinion and elite opinion differs using both demographic data on current respondents as well as replicating the survey in a cross-national survey of IR scholars. (We will have the IR scholar survey in the field in August of 2014 in 34 different countries). Third, we aim to provide an additional two cases evaluating the legitimacy of IO approval of belligerent action. In our hypothetical scenarios we have varied the target country (Iran and Sudan) and the issue at stake (nuclear proliferation and humanitarian intervention). Other realistic target countries include North Korea, Syria, and Russian forces in Ukraine. The corresponding issues are typically conceived as nuclear non-proliferation, humanitarian intervention, and protection of sovereignty, but these are certainly complicated cases open to interpretation. Fourth, while we will conduct the new surveys in the UK, we also plan to add an additional public opinion case of a non-NATO country. Finally, we hope to include a battery of questions that will allow us to better understand whether individuals are explicitly answering in line with the UN's increased legitimacy, or if there are other factors that may be observationally equivalent. (This has become a standard approach among those using survey experiments, to ask respondents about their reasons). We discuss the goals and opportunities provided by each of these below.

We already show evidence for the legitimacy of military intervention when approved by the UN, and limited evidence of more legitimacy when approved by NATO. Our results cover a number of years, with some gaps, most recently from 2008. Studies of public opinion utilizing experimental evidence are primarily conducted once without extended replication or in rapid succession over the course of dealing with journal reviewer concerns. While experiments always face critiques of external validity, the concept of legitimacy by its very nature is fluid and presents a unique problem for our design. We only know that an institution is legitimate at the point in which some action requires the approval or we conduct a survey. However, most research on the legitimacy of IOs suggests a dynamic process, evolving norms creation and contestation. By replicating the experiment again, we extend the time frame and external conditions under which the finding holds (or not). Providing an additional data point in time will give us more confidence in the face of consistent findings, or will launch a search for conditions if the findings are inconsistent.

Second, the types of issues faced by the global community, cases in which states may or may not decide to intervene, vary drastically in their circumstances. Some situations call for intervention on humanitarian grounds or to prevent further escalation of conflict. In other cases force is used in an effort to support territorial integrity or non-proliferation. The ability of the UN, NATO, the Arab League, or any other IO to legitimize these actions consistently over time and across multiple types of conflict would provide even stronger evidence for the legitimacy of the institution in the eyes of the public, and evidence for one or more explanations of the legitimation mechanisms at work. Conducting this next set of experiments will allow us to add two more hypotheticals. In either case, we plan to draw from real-world events to build reasonably realistic scenarios where force might be used, just as we have in the past.

For this possibility, we think there are four obvious contenders: Syria, Iran, North Korea and Ukraine. Of course, we will be limited to some degree by real-world events. Having overlap on the same case over time seems appealing. However, comparisons only hold the proper names constant. Events on the ground change rapidly enough to make the questions quite different in the minds of citizens and decision makers. Even now, asking our same question about Iran is hardly comparable to the results situation faced by publics evaluating it in 2008 due to the advances in proliferation as well as the development of diplomatic talks between Iran and the P5+1. We think that the best way to deal with this in the future is to focus more on the causal mechanisms and whether they vary across cases.

Third, as suggested by the Tallberg and Zurn memo for this conference, there may be important differences between the public and elites. The differences between these two groups have real implications for legitimacy. Elites, as the ones setting the agenda and choosing the forum through which to focus intervention, either have beliefs about the legitimacy of certain institutions compared to others, or have some understanding of the publics' views. When they select particular IOs to work through (or avoid) they may also be internalizing the probability that any proposal/resolution will receive the required support to pass. In recent experimental work on the democratic peace, Tomz and Weeks (2012, working paper) argue that when accounting for demographic differences, elite and public opinion map closely (see Wittkopf and Maggioto (1983), Wittkopf (1987) and (Holyk 2011) for other evidence). We plan to take advantage of this strategy in the next round of surveys as well as previous surveys. We hope to see how demographically similar groups respond to the experiment compared to the rest of the public.

In addition to public opinion surveys, we plan to utilize the TRIP survey of IR scholars, to be administered in 34 countries in late August 2014. The survey will give us another data source which we believe will closely align with elite opinion in those countries. The amount academics engage with the policy community and political elites varies in many aspects. However, this group will provide an additional check, since like elites, they will be well educated and, relative to the public at least, much more in touch with the actual issues surrounding a potential use of force scenario.

Fourth, we plan on conducting a public opinion survey in an additional country. Ideally, we would like to extend this to a "hard" case. Most studies of this type occur either in the U.S. or UK. We already present evidence from other countries, however, all are NATO members, and the UK and US both have vetoes in the UN. To extend the external validity of the results, we intend to run the survey in a non-UNSC veto player, non-NATO member state. This will help to alleviate the concern that current findings are the result of individuals intuiting the position of their own country by the approval of NATO or the UNSC. Moreover, much has been made of the "democratic deficit" in IOs. We believe it would be important to see whether the current finding persists outside of democratic countries. We are interested in what countries or types of countries would be most interesting in terms of expanding this analysis.

Fifth, as is increasingly common among those doing survey experiments, we aim to add questions that allow us to get at the mechanisms behind the treatment effects. Our current results are consistent with a number of different theories. In all cases, members of the public should increase their support with increasing levels of IO approval. However, we cannot know exactly why this increased support exists beyond what we assume from the experiment. We aim to add a number of questions that ask respondents why they answered the way they did. We will list out possible reasons consistent with various theories, and then allow respondents to choose between them after they provide their support or opposition to the intervention. From this, we should be able to better gauge which theoretical line of reasoning is most prevalent among the public, as well as among scholars.

All of these proposed additions are aimed at extending the already robust finding that IO approval, ceteris paribus, increases public support for military action. We intend to increase the external validity of the finding by expanding the cases of proposed intervention, the countries in which we test the theory, as well as the time period under study. We hope to provide more refined tests to better determine exactly how the mechanism work both by looking at specific subsamples for consistent results, as well as adding questions to address these mechanisms explicitly in our next round of surveys.

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Appendix

Table 4a (Iran)

VARIABLES	(1) T1	(2) T1	(3) T1	(4) T1	(5) T1
ABC1	0.0113	-0.0152	-0.00677	-0.000187	0.0109
	(0.0205)	(0.0204)	(0.0202)	(0.0195)	(0.0211)
London	0.00935	0.0319	0.00163	-0.0299	-0.0130
	(0.0414)	(0.0432)	(0.0434)	(0.0443)	(0.0413)
Rest of South	0.0492	-0.0257	0.0339	-0.0895**	0.0321
	(0.0375)	(0.0382)	(0.0395)	(0.0396)	(0.0377)
Midlands & Wales	0.0691*	-0.0267	-0.00652	-0.0525	0.0166
	(0.0407)	(0.0402)	(0.0408)	(0.0422)	(0.0398)
North	-0.0421	0.00316	-0.00133	-0.0431	0.0834**
	(0.0366)	(0.0391)	(0.0404)	(0.0408)	(0.0404)
Male	0.0434**	-0.0243	-0.0177	0.0101	-0.0115
	(0.0198)	(0.0196)	(0.0197)	(0.0193)	(0.0203)
Age 25 to 34	0.00612	0.0110	0.0499	-0.0688	0.00173
	(0.0399)	(0.0386)	(0.0391)	(0.0421)	(0.0403)
Age 35 to 44	0.00326	0.0342	0.0138	-0.0721*	0.0209
	(0.0409)	(0.0395)	(0.0378)	(0.0421)	(0.0410)
Age 45 to 54	-0.0168	0.0402	0.0684*	-0.0832*	-0.00858
	(0.0408)	(0.0409)	(0.0405)	(0.0425)	(0.0413)
Age 55-plus	0.0143	0.0227	0.0206	-0.0663*	0.00865
	(0.0360)	(0.0352)	(0.0340)	(0.0390)	(0.0365)
Conservative	-0.00515	0.0562**	-0.0664***	0.0485**	-0.0331
	(0.0251)	(0.0242)	(0.0249)	(0.0246)	(0.0255)
Liberal-Dems	-0.0281	0.0327	0.00486	0.0569*	-0.0664**
	(0.0324)	(0.0329)	(0.0358)	(0.0337)	(0.0327)
Labour	-2.54e-05	0.0511*	-0.0186	-0.0195	-0.0130
	(0.0288)	(0.0285)	(0.0299)	(0.0259)	(0.0311)
Constant	0.154***	0.172***	0.197***	0.276***	0.201***
	(0.0487)	(0.0461)	(0.0472)	(0.0508)	(0.0475)
Observations	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955
R-squared	0.015	0.008	0.011	0.013	0.010

Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 4b (Sudan)

VARIABLES	(1) T1	(2) T1	(3) T1	(4) T1	(5) T1
ABC1	-0.0127	-0.0119	-0.0249	0.0383*	0.0113
	(0.0204)	(0.0200)	(0.0196)	(0.0202)	(0.0209)
London	0.0151	0.0220	-0.0425	-0.00555	0.0109
	(0.0405)	(0.0401)	(0.0386)	(0.0413)	(0.0454)
Rest of South	-0.0102	0.0291	-0.00604	0.00189	-0.0148
	(0.0360)	(0.0362)	(0.0357)	(0.0358)	(0.0388)
Midlands & Wales	0.0281	-0.00555	-0.0209	-0.00512	0.00349
	(0.0397)	(0.0386)	(0.0382)	(0.0388)	(0.0418)
North	-0.00945	0.0294	-0.0185	0.0310	-0.0326
	(0.0374)	(0.0376)	(0.0361)	(0.0383)	(0.0398)
Male	0.00840	0.0198	0.00263	-0.0134	-0.0175
	(0.0193)	(0.0199)	(0.0190)	(0.0196)	(0.0202)
Age 25 to 34	0.0163	0.0195	0.0726*	-0.0398	-0.0685
	(0.0382)	(0.0415)	(0.0387)	(0.0431)	(0.0439)
Age 35 to 44	0.0519	-0.0158	0.0458	-0.0449	-0.0370
	(0.0384)	(0.0400)	(0.0374)	(0.0423)	(0.0444)
Age 45 to 54	0.0410	0.0648	0.0400	-0.0727*	-0.0731*
	(0.0396)	(0.0435)	(0.0386)	(0.0431)	(0.0442)
Age 55-plus	0.0568*	-0.00161	0.0409	-0.0536	-0.0425
	(0.0344)	(0.0364)	(0.0336)	(0.0390)	(0.0400)
Conservative	0.0265	-0.0136	-0.00161	-0.0183	0.00696
	(0.0244)	(0.0252)	(0.0240)	(0.0237)	(0.0254)
Liberal Dems	0.0174	-0.0698**	-0.0148	0.0554	0.0119
	(0.0339)	(0.0332)	(0.0333)	(0.0371)	(0.0358)
Labour	-0.00770	-0.0203	-0.0410	0.0262	0.0429
	(0.0268)	(0.0289)	(0.0264)	(0.0290)	(0.0295)
Constant	0.146***	0.190***	0.184***	0.218***	0.262***
	(0.0416)	(0.0486)	(0.0428)	(0.0472)	(0.0509)
Observations	2042	2042	2042	2042	2042
R-squared	0.005	0.009	0.006	0.010	0.006

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors in parentheses