Elite and Mass Support for Foreign Aid Versus Government Programs: Experimental Evidence from Uganda

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Abstract

We compare elite and mass support for foreign aid versus government spending on development projects. We performed an experiment and survey on members of the Ugandan national parliament and a parallel study on a representative sample of roughly 3,600 Ugandan citizens. For two actual aid projects in the pipeline, we randomly assigned exposure to the projects' different funders. Significant treatment effects on attitudes and behaviors reveal that members of parliament support government programs over foreign aid, whereas citizens prefer aid over government. Using subgroup analysis, we explore several mechanisms that might explain this pattern: partisanship, co-ethnic bias, nationalism, incumbency, a foreign media effect, and corruption. Effects are most apparent for members of parliament and citizens who perceive significant government corruption, suggesting that citizens see foreign aid as an escape from corruption, but elites perceive more avenues for the capture of government resources compared to aid.

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Introduction

Academic disputes rage over what foreign aid allows politicians to do. For some scholars, aid enables political elites to buy votes, build militaries for repression, and enrich themselves through corruption (Svensson, 2000; Alesina and Weder, 2002; Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Easterly, 2006; Morrison, 2009; Moyo, 2009; Morrison, 2012). Aid may thus undermine citizens' ability to hold political elites accountable for how public revenues are spent (Ross, 2004; Knack, 2009; Morrison, 2009; Moyo, 2009).

Alternatively, others argue that foreign aid can bypass corrupt politicians and thus deliver needed public goods directly to recipients even as it promotes civil society actors that can demand better governance (Finkel et al., 2007; Wright and Winters, 2010; Bermeo, 2014; McLean and Schneider, 2014; Mosley, forthcoming). Additionally, much aid targets government capacity building and might contribute to the development of better-functioning institutions and thus constrain politicians to clean up corruption and mismanagement (Riddell, 2007; Baser and Morgan, 2008).

Missing from the debate, however, are two important elements. First, greater attention needs to be focused on the support for aid of both political elites and citizens in recipient countries, whose outlook is little understood despite being aid's critical intermediaries and ultimate beneficiaries, respectively. Second, aid does not occur in an institutional vacuum, so we need a meaningful baseline to which to compare it, and government projects provide the most relevant alternative. What might be inferred from theoretical models and cross-national statistical studies based on observational evidence may be different from the reality on the ground. Most theories share expectations about domestic elites, arguing

that they play a significant role in shaping how foreign aid affects their country. Yet, to our knowledge, no direct and systematic evidence has been gathered that employs politicians as respondents in studies where they reflect on the disposition of aid. Studies of recipient citizens' support for aid are likewise rare. Moreover, the current evidence lacks identification of causal effects that might be better supplied by experimental methods that compare attitudinal and behavioral support for aid versus government spending within and between politicians and citizens.

We report two parallel experiments performed in 2012 in Uganda that contrast elite and citizen support for development projects in treatment conditions attributed to foreign donors compared to identical projects in a control condition in which no donor was explicitly mentioned and that most sampled Ugandans took to be the domestic government. A sizable minority of subjects believed the unnamed funder in the control condition was actually a foreign donor, but this works in favor of the null hypothesis of no significant difference between treatment conditions and control. The differences reported below thus understate elites' and citizens' contrasting preferences for aid versus government projects given the information we have, a result we show in detail in the robustness section.

While our experiments cannot settle the broader debate on aid effectiveness, they can provide direct causal evidence about the effects of different sources of development funding on the attitudes and behavior of elites and citizens. These attitudes and behaviors are important and worthy of study. But they may also reflect at least indirectly on an important link in the chain connecting revenue sources to governance and policy outcomes.

In all, we were able to conduct nearly hour-long interviews with more than two thirds of the sitting Ninth Ugandan Parliament (276 out of 375 members of parliament). We also conducted the study with 78 former MPs from the Eighth Parliament. (Total current and former MPs surveyed is 354.) Moreover, we randomly sampled a nationally representative group of roughly 3,600 Ugandan citizens for comparisons. The parallel experiments provided an opportunity for each set of subjects to demonstrate individual-level support for foreign aid or government funds through behavioral actions that imposed personal costs as well as through responses to attitudinal survey questions.

Interestingly, we find that the members of parliament are significantly more likely to support projects in the control condition that most took to be the government rather than treatment projects identifying foreign donors. However, citizens are significantly more likely to support foreign donors over the control condition, precisely the opposite of the elites. Effect sizes are generally modest and approach a ceiling, but the differences are significant and robust across a variety of specifications. These differences between the public and elite in Uganda form an interesting and novel puzzle.

Employing subgroup analysis, we explore the leading candidates for the mechanisms that might underlie these differences: partisanship, ethnicity, nationalism, incumbency, a foreign media effect, and corruption. In general, the subgroup results provide null or weak evidence for all of the possible mechanisms, except one: the corruption mechanism. MPs who perceive greater government corruption are especially likely to prefer the government projects over foreign aid, whereas citizens perceiving government corruption were significantly more likely to support the aid projects. Subjects who did not perceive

corruption appeared indifferent between aid and government projects. Effect sizes for corruption subgroup analyses were considerably larger than in the main analysis.

This study makes at least three contributions that directly address key gaps in our understanding of the political economy of development. It is the only experimental study randomly assigning foreign versus domestic sources of project funding and thus able to reveal causal effects on both the attitudes and behavior of recipients. Second, it is the first detailed study of foreign aid versus domestic government funding to employ members of parliament in a recipient government as respondents. Third, it provides an investigation of six alternative mechanisms that might explain the significant differences between elite and mass support for development projects from competing sources of funding.

In the next section, we review the debate over how political elites might use aid compared to government resources to promote their own ends on the one hand or serve public goals on the other, and we further delineate the empirical expectations of the opposing arguments. We then discuss the evidence for the competing arguments drawn from our experiment on members of parliament and citizens. The results tell an interesting story about mass and elite beliefs, preferences, and behavior. In particular they suggest that – at least in the minds of those with direct experience – aid may be less susceptible to political capture than government resources. In the next section, we look at the main alternative explanations for our findings and evaluate whether our data support these interpretations. In the robustness section, we discuss two issues that arise from our experimental procedures and show that neither of them should invalidate our results. We conclude by returning to the main themes about attitudes toward aid relative to government funding of develop-

ment projects. And we note how bringing together the comparative politics research on corruption and clientelism with the literature on foreign aid may be fruitful.

The Debate

Strong arguments exist on both sides of the debate over how elites might employ aid versus government revenues to promote their political careers. On the one hand, analysts have likened aid to natural resources in the way they "curse" developing countries with conflict, autocracy, and poor governance (Morrison, 2009; Moyo, 2009, p. 59; Morrison, 2012). Prominent studies have held that external sources of money, such as natural resources and aid, enable politicians to entrench themselves rather than be held accountable for the use of tax revenues (Bräutigam, 2000; Smith, 2008; Morrison, 2009; Gervasoni, 2010). Citizens, it is claimed, demand more accountability and better outcomes when their tax dollars are at play (Schumpeter, 1954; North and Weingast, 1989; Ross, 2004).

Prominent work implies that there might exist a difference between political elites and the mass public in attitudes toward aid. For example, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007, 2009) argue that political elites in the donor and recipient countries are the major beneficiaries of aid, so aid functions to increase the political longevity of elites in recipient countries. They also argue that the biggest losers from aid are the mass publics in poor nations who are forced to accept policy concessions they oppose and to endure more corruption from their own leaders (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009, p. 311).

Alternatively, other scholars argue that donors understand many of the challenges they face in developing countries and try to act strategically to advance their goals.[1] Foreign aid – especially if it is monitored, has conditions attached to it, or is less fungible – may serve more as a public good that politicians struggle to divert to themselves and their allies (Mavrotas and Ouattara, 2006). Often, aid explicitly targets improvements in government capacity. For example, Bermeo (2014, p. 4) presents findings that aid does not inhibit democratization, noting that "aid is not oil. Foreign aid comes from donors and donors have preferences. They also have tools to provide a heterogeneous basket of aid which can look very different from the revenue stream attached to a state-owned enterprise."

Even if aid fails to strengthen institutions or build capacity directly, an alternative literature claims that aid – especially for democracy and governance – can find ways around incumbent politicians. Dietrich (2013) shows that donors strategically decide how much aid to provide directly to governments and how much to bypass them. This "circumvention" aid can support opposition parties, watchdog media, and civil society organizations that might effectively demand more accountability. Indeed, some evidence suggests that aid contributes significantly to democratization in recipient governments (Finkel et al., 2007; Scott and Steele, 2011; Aronow et al., 2012).

The debate remains unresolved. Extant studies address the problem from multiple methodological perspectives, but thus far have not taken the study directly to the political elites who may use (or abuse) foreign aid nor to the masses who may benefit or suffer.

[1] Bermeo, 2010; Bermeo, 2011. shows that donors goals seem to have changed since the end of the Cold War and that they are more focused now on development and democracy promotion. She demonstrates that donors pursue "strategic development," targeting and strategically allocating different types of aid to different types of countries.

While no methodology is perfect, and our experimental approach does not resolve the aid effectiveness debate, focused experiments using elites and citizens as subjects may contribute to this debate by providing evidence about who supports foreign aid or government funding for development projects, and their reasons for doing so. Support for different sources of revenue among masses and elites – particularly their behavioral support – ought to shed some light, even if indirect, on a key link in the causal chain connecting funding to outcomes.

If the literature claiming that aid enables corrupt politicians to entrench themselves is correct, politicians should prefer foreign aid over government-funded programs since they will be freer to use the aid for their own purposes compared to tax revenues for which they must answer to the public. If aid is more accountable to foreign agencies, however, and donors have the capacity to audit, constrain, and punish politicians who try to use aid for their own political ends, then we expect a different result: elites should prefer government programs to foreign aid projects. MPs should be especially keen to use available resources to maintain their privileged position through clientelism and should therefore prefer the funding source with fewer constraints (see van de Walle, 2003, p. 313).[2]

Preferences of citizens should move in the opposite direction. If citizens believe they can better hold their representatives accountable for tax revenue, they should more strongly support government spending over aid. But if citizens perceive foreign donors and aid as

[2] Similarly, what Rothchild, 1986. called "hegemonial exchange" and Bayart, 1993. "reciprocal assimilation of elites," clientelism pervades Africa since political stability there has often been constructed by using state resources to forge alliances across different social elites, often in the form of overt power-sharing arrangements van de Walle, 2003..

better at producing public goods than government spending, they should prefer aid.[3] Along nearly every major byway in Uganda, as in many developing countries, signs tying projects to foreign or domestic donors crowd the roadside and therefore would make the connection of aid to outcomes possible. Of course, citizens' perceptions may be mistaken about the effects of aid, and we are open to interpreting our data in this light. However, even if citizens are misinformed, politicians, we would argue, have a better grasp of the effects of different sources of revenue on their political careers. And so combining studies of the two subject pools and comparing their attitudes and behaviors toward the same experimental conditions is particularly useful and novel.

Our experiments cannot resolve the aid effectiveness debate. However, we do contend that the results – especially for the MP experiment – may reflect indirectly on key links in the causal chain connecting aid to outcomes. Nevertheless, we stress that the dispositions – and especially the behavioral actions taken – toward aid by citizens and especially MPs are interesting in the own right. Citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of aid, and they notoriously suffer from the results of "broken feedback loop" underscoring the missing communication between donors and recipients (Martens et al. 2002). The broken feedback loop requires that citizens be asked about aid, which is what we do here.

Moreover, members of parliament often influence how aid is distributed in recipient countries. Learning MPs' disposition and behavior toward aid, especially as it compares with government funding, appears important to understanding how aid might be chan-

[3] We also investigated preferences of local government officials (similar to state and city level officials in the US), but found no significant preference for government or aid-funded projects. This is likely the case because these officials mostly receive funds from the central government that are earmarked already.

neled through domestic institutions. It may also reflect on the ways that aid might be different from government money in garnering parliamentary support for programs that foreign governments and international organizations want recipients to pursue.

The Ugandan Context

Uganda currently has a semi-authoritarian regime in which the government of Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) has retained power for nearly 30 years (van de Walle, 2007; Greene, 2010). In 2006, Uganda began holding multiparty elections; yet they have not been fully free and fair (Cheibub et al., 2010; Hyde and Marinov, 2012). Scholars describe the party's ruling methods as relying heavily on patronage and clientelism to retain its control (van de Walle, 2003, 2007; Muhumuza, 2009; Green, 2010; Tripp, 2010). As one recent study points out, "In Uganda, the ruling NRM has established patronage networks throughout the country through the use of local government. The civil service is another such network of patronage, and perhaps the most important is the military. These clientelist networks, while consolidating key sources of support, at the same time undermine governance and erode the viability of institutions and leadership" (Tripp, 2010, p. 25). As of 2010, Uganda ranks on the higher end of corruption scales, scoring in the 72nd percentile (129th out of 178) on Transparency International's *Corruption Perceptions Index*.

Partisanship and ethnic attachments have also played important roles in Ugandan politics at both the citizen and elite levels, revolving around the NRM-opposition split. However, recently, the NRM has faced important opposition not just from opposition par-

ties, who are fractured and currently only hold 16% of the seats in parliament, but mainly from within the NRM's own ranks. In the run-up to the 2011 parliamentary elections, for example, the NRM primaries were hotly contested (in many instances more contested than the general elections). Ballot boxes were stuffed and elections rigged to ensure that party-leader favorites won the NRM party nomination (Malinga, 2010). This led to wide discontent among the losers of the primaries. Many of these individuals then ran as independents in 2011, and now the current parliament has more independents than any single opposition party, which makes the role of partisanship more complicated and less predictable.[4]

Ethnicity is also important in the Ugandan political context. Critically, shared ethnicity with the chief executive of the country has important political and developmental consequences in that the leader's co-ethnics are likely to benefit (Franck and Rainer, 2012). In Uganda, it is commonly understood that when Northerners such as President Milton Obote were in power, the Northern region of the country received the most benefits in terms of development, government employment, and other material goods. Now, under President Museveni, many citizens argue that the Western region, especially those areas in which his fellow Muyankole are dominant, receive the new roads, schools, and clinics. Whether or not this is in fact true, citizens tend to operate under these assumptions (see Posner, 2005).

[4] The current Ugandan parliament has 375 members representing 7 political parties: 238 Constituency MPs, 112 Woman MPs, 10 Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF) representative, and 5 representatives for each of the following special interest groups: people with disabilities (PWD), workers, and youth. The vast majority of MPs are elected under plurality rules in single-member constituencies. Each district elects one female representative and each constituency (usually two or three constituencies are contained in one district) elects one Constituency MP. Eleven ex-officio members are appointed in addition, and each of the five geographical regions elects one PWD, Worker, and Youth representative and two UPDF representatives.

Uganda provides a useful setting for the experiment because it receives substantial amounts of foreign development assistance. Since the 1990s, aid including off-budget sources equals approximately 70 percent of government expenditures. Moreover, aid encompassed about 15 percent of total GDP for much of that period, though the share has declined to some extent in the last few years as economic growth has increased. Some basic information garnered from our survey confirmed that citizens had general awareness both of foreign aid and their parliamentary representatives. More than two thirds of subjects knew that more than 30 percent of the Ugandan budget comes from foreign aid; the vast majority (66 percent) could name both their Constituency member of parliament and District Woman member of parliament; and the majority of subjects were aware of foreign aid flowing to their local areas. Uganda is also typical of African countries in terms of its democratization processes, current level of democratization, and executive dominance (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, Resnick and van de Walle 2013). Likewise, much like many of the countries across the continent, the Ugandan parliament sees quite competitive elections and while it is much weaker than the executive it is much more than simply a rubber stamp and is a venue for important and lively debates (Humphreys and Weinstein 2013). If we consider Uganda's level of democracy (Polity IV score) and degree of aid dependence (World Bank's World Development Indicator of net official development assistance per capita), Uganda is very similar to Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Chad, and the Central African Republic. While there are various other considerations such as ethnic diversity, colonial history, levels of economic development, etc. similarity on these two key measures are important for understanding to which cases these results most likely generalize.

Research Design

To investigate competing expectations regarding elite and mass preferences for foreign aid compared to a control condition implying government programs, we conducted two different experiments in the field, each with companion surveys. First, we carried out an experiment on a convenience sample of 276 of the 375 Members of the 9th Ugandan Parliament (the sitting legislature) and 78 former MPs from the 8th Parliament (total current and former MPs surveyed is 354). Although we sampled MPs by convenience, the distribution is strikingly similar to the actual parliament at that time, which we discuss below (See Table 1). Second, we conducted a nationally representative experiment on nearly 3,600 citizens in 42 of Uganda's 112 districts. We used a clustered random sample for the citizen survey to ensure regional and political representativeness. Both experiments were similar, but not identical. They were performed between June and October 2012 by local Ugandan enumerators.[5]

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

To maximize the number of responses in the MP survey, we attempted to conduct a census of all current MPs and achieved a 72 percent response rate. In addition, we also contacted as many former MPs as possible (from the previous parliament) and obtained a 55

[5] It is possible that subjects believed the local Ugandan enumerators represented a foreign aid donor or the government rather than academic researchers. Indeed, data from the Afrobarometer suggests that most respondents think the government is the one doing surveys. We examined the Afrobarometer questions about subjects' perceptions of who sent the enumerators. In the 2012 round of Uganda AB (Round 5), 56% of respondents thought the government sent the interviewer. In the 2008 round for 20 different countries pooled together, 58% of respondents thought the government sent the interviewer. This should bias against the results we find.

percent response rate.[6] While key aspects of the experimental instruments were identical for each population group in order to facilitate comparisons, the citizen survey was lengthier and thus generated richer information.

The samples of respondents reflect the underlying populations well, and assignment to treatment conditions is not predicted by available observables, providing evidence of random assignment. For the MP survey, we do not have data on individual MP characteristics such as religion or education levels.[7] Table 1, however, presents descriptive statistics from our sample and from Parliament as a whole for gender, party, region and MP type, which generally matches the 9th Parliament as a whole. The distribution of MPs by region is largely representative, though it slightly oversamples those from the Central region and undersamples those from the Northern region. And finally, assignment to treatment conditions among MPs is not significantly related to party, gender, MP type, or region, so there is good covariate balance across experimental conditions. For the citizen survey, balancing and randomization procedures also worked well. Key variables, such as education, gender, age, party, religion, and region, were not significantly related to whether citizens were assigned to a given experimental condition.

[6] The former MP response rate is likely lower because many former MPs are scattered through the country and not as easily accessible to our research team when compared to current MPs who are usually in the capital of Kampala (our research headquarters).

[7] Given time constraints in the MP survey, we were unable to obtain much demographic data on MPs to compare with the mass sample. Beyond the comparisons in outcome data explored below, we can identify some comparisons. For example, the MP sample has more men, which is understandable given the parliament is disproportionately male and the MP sample also has a higher proportion of NRM than the mass sample.

Interventions

The experimental manipulation presented each subject with a randomly assigned project description and a randomly assigned funder for that project. This between-subjects design is important for eliciting comparisons between government and foreign donor projects where direct comparisons might be too sensitive. We randomly assigned the manipulation for *actual* pipeline projects forthcoming from the World Bank and its co-financers. As such, the study avoided active deception. The projects were co-financed by the World Bank and multiple agencies, which allowed us to manipulate which of the multiple donors was presented to the subjects as funder of the project. We also randomly assigned the type of project: an infrastructure project (electricity) and an education project. Multilateral and bilateral donors jointly funded the projects. As is true with all World Bank projects, the Ugandan government was also involved in the funding and implementation. MPs, in order to increase the number of observations, were presented with and asked to express their support in various ways for both the electricity and education projects individually (and in random order) but only one donor. Citizens received only one of the two possible projects.

We chose the electricity and education projects because they represent the types of projects that can be given selectively to constituencies that support politicians. For the mass survey, we randomly assigned the donor and the project type. Neither project type in the mass survey was significantly preferred over the other in the between-subjects design, which may reflect the fact that both types of projects are desperately sought after in Uganda. Because there were no significant differences between project types, we focus our discussions on the difference across funder types.

Our framing question read, "The Electricity Sector Development Project will improve the reliability of and increase access to electricity. One major aspect of the project is to extend electricity to those who do not yet have access to it. The project may require your community to provide funding for maintenance in the future. [This project will be funded by the {RANDOMLY ASSIGNED FUNDER}.] How much would you support this project?" We include the text for the education project in the appendix.

We included the sentence about future expenses ("may require your community to provide funding…") to increase the respondents' sense that this project might cost them in the medium and long term to support it. Given that aid may be perceived as "free money" whereas government programs may imply increased taxes, we were concerned that offering a project without any noted costs might lead all subjects to support it. A skeptic might worry that the added cost condition is not sufficient to overcome a bias toward "free" resources among subjects. Aid may feel like a windfall, but government programs may seem to cost something tangible. This is a reasonable concern, and we took some measures to address it. We present these details in the robustness section below.

The funding organizations we randomly assigned in the MP experiment were the World Bank, the Government of the United States, a generic multilateral institution ("an international organization funded by many countries"), a generic bilateral agency ("a single foreign country"), and No Donor, in which we omitted the sentence indicating which agency was funding the project and served as the control condition. In the mass experiment, we also included the African Development Bank and the Government of China because the

larger subject pool enabled greater power and therefore the possibility for more treatment conditions.[8]

In the case of the control condition, we assumed that recipients would associate this case with domestic government spending. We mentioned nothing about foreign aid or foreign donors in this version of the survey. We elected not to name the government explicitly for the citizen survey out of fear that generalized paranoia toward government or associations with the ruling party might bias responses.[9] We did the same for the MPs to avoid social desirability bias (i.e., government MPs might feel they *should* support projects by the government, and thus when the government is explicitly named, we would receive inaccurate responses).

Although we made this design choice in good faith at the time, in retrospect this design choice may not have been optimal: explicit identification of the Ugandan government would have presented a less ambiguous control condition. But as we describe below, this design choice actually works in favor of the null hypothesis of no difference between treatment and control; and therefore our results likely understate the full extent of treatment effects. Moreover, given the information we have, we show that our results hold even

[8] In addition to testing the treatment effect of receiving an aid donor relative to the government control, we also tested the effect of individual donors across groups. Because elites did not receive the African Development Bank and Government of China treatments, we estimated difference in means tests to detect the effect of the various treatments relative to the control and the other treatment conditions. Across all groups, there is never a consistently significant effect for any of the individual donors. These results are reported in Appendix Tables A1 and A2.

[9] Concern for biased responses out of fear about the government seems fairly reasonable in a non-democratic context like Uganda. In round 5 of Afrobarometer done in 2012, the same year as our study, 50% of the respondents said they did not feel completely free to say whatever they believe, and 1/3 said they felt some kind of pressure about whom to vote for. Moreover, 63% admitted fear of being intimidated in election campaigns.

if some subjects misinterpreted the control condition; see the detailed discussion in the robustness section below.

Further, our intervention focuses on one type of aid: project aid. Thus, our results may not apply to general budget support. However, we chose to focus on project aid because it is the most common type, it constitutes the overwhelming monetary share, and it is the most visible to citizens and thus would maximize our ability to obtain informed preferences regarding aid. According to the AidData information base, which is the largest repository of aid statistics, between 2000 and 2012 Uganda received 157 budget support grants and loans summing to $3.2 billion. Over the same period, the country was host to 16,019 aid projects summing to $24.5 billion in total aid. This suggests that budget-support aid in Uganda constitutes 1 percent of the count but 13 percent of total Ugandan aid. This is roughly on par with the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, which received 3,811 budget support grants and loans for $57.5 billion in relation to 352,839 projects that totaled $615 billion. Budget support in the region thus comprised 1 percent of the count but 9 percent of the money (Tierney et al. 2011).

We acknowledge that project aid and budget-support aid might have different political effects. Indeed, given our focus on project aid, past findings would suggest that our results regarding corruption are actually likely to be conservative. The findings of Tripp (2013) and Gazibo (2013) in Tanzania and Benin, respectively, suggest that budget support aid is more corruptible than project aid. In fact, perceptions of increased corruption have led donors to reduce budget support in Benin and Uganda in favor of project aid.

Outcomes

Each survey accompanying the experiment asked a variety of demographic, political, and aid-related questions. To avoid any priming effects, we posed all aid questions after the experimental portion of the survey. To measure the outcome of support or opposition for the foreign or domestic funded projects, we asked all respondents to first express their level of support, then to report to us their willingness to tell a higher authority (Party leader for MPs, and Local Council official for citizens) of their support (or not) for the project, their willingness to sign a petition voicing their support, and to actually sign the petition.[10]

MPs were asked to express their willingness to coordinate with peers in support of (or in opposition to) the project, tell constituents about the project, rally locals in support of (or in opposition to) the project, and sign a letter to the President in support of or opposition to the projects. Citizens, but not elites, were also asked if they were willing to send a text message (SMS) and to actually send the SMS in support (or not) of the project.

Because the MPs were presented with both projects, we have two observations for each on all of these outcomes, except the petition to the president. Each MP was asked to sign a single petition that reported their level of support for both projects to the President, thus we have one observation for each MP on this outcome. This design choice was made to reduce the burden on the MPs and to reduce redundancy of sending two nearly identical letters to the president. Because the MPs received the same donor across the two projects

[10] Full text of the petition language is included in the Appendix. Note that the language in the petition only asks them to sign without specifying a foreign donor or government. If a donor would have been named in the petition language, then the treatment condition (with a donor named) would not have been comparable to the control condition (where no one was named). Instead, we opted to simply ask them to sign a petition in support or opposition.

this should not affect the results we report here because we are comparing differences in donors and not sectors (given that there was no meaningful difference between project types). These various measures of support present the respondents with varying levels of cost (attitudinal vs. behavioral responses) and will be used as the key outcome variables to gauge support for projects across treatment arms.

Results

In this section we examine the survey and experimental data to understand our respondents' views. First, we ask whether MPs are more supportive of government programs or foreign aid projects. Second, we ask whether the mass public is more supportive of aid or government programs and then compare them to Ugandan MPs. And finally, we consider possible mechanisms that could explain the overall trends in preferences.

Differences across groups

Table 2 reports results from difference-in-means tests comparing levels of support under all of the aid treatment conditions compared to the government control condition for MPs and masses. Panel A reports outcomes that were measured for all respondents (plus the SMS and Presidential Letter outcomes for citizens and MPs, respectively), and Panel B reports outcomes for those only measured for MPs. These overall results show that with only one exception, MPs are consistently more supportive of government projects than foreign aid. This difference in support is significant in 3 of the 9 outcomes, and treatment ef-

fects range from less than 1 to 12 percentage points.[11] See Figure A1 in the Appendix for a graphic representation of the treatment effects and significance levels for a subset of outcomes.

The results in Table 2 also show that citizens consistently prefer aid over government projects; this difference in support is significant in 5 of the 6 outcomes, including the behavioral outcomes. The treatment effects range from 2 to 4 percentage points, which are not large but nonetheless significant statistically. The modest substantive differences may result from strong ceiling effects given that the projects are extremely popular and therefore clustered near the upper bound of 100 percent support. Despite these small substantive differences in the overall analysis, when we subgroup on the corruption/clientelism mechanism we observe quite large substantive differences between elites and masses. As detailed below, for elites who believe government funds are used for corruption the treatment effects on four of the most important outcomes range from 10 to 19 percentage points.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

[11] Note that Table 2 reports intent-to-treat effects. For the masses, we asked a manipulation check that allows us to determine the level of compliance. Those results are qualitatively the same as the intent-to-treat effects. Moreover, if we restrict the analysis to those subjects passing the manipulation check, the results show strong differences in favor of masses supporting aid in every possible outcome category. Because of the status of members of parliament, we opted not to ask manipulation check questions. We thus must rely on the intent-to-treat effects alone.

Why do these differences appear?

These results present some interesting and counterintuitive findings. We explore the six possibilities that to us appeared the most probable in accounting for this difference. To provide a plausible explanation, a subgroup mechanism needs to differ substantively between the masses and MPs, to explain the differences between the treatment and control within each subgroup, and most of all to account for the differences between treatment and control across the elites and masses. Six viable contenders are partisanship, ethnicity, nationalism, government incumbency bias, a bias due to foreign media, and corruption and clientelism. We present the basic argument for each mechanism and the difference-in-means results of tests that evaluate them. We split the masses and MPs along the relevant dimension (e.g., those who do and do not perceive corruption) and compare these subgroups to determine if that dimension produces separation on the post-experiment outcomes. For the mechanism that was best supported by evidence, the corruption and clientelism condition, we report results below; the rest of the results are reported graphically in the Appendix (Figures A2-A13).[12]

Before we proceed to the specific mechanisms, it is important to first establish that MPs do not simply think that government projects are more effective or superior in any way simply because the Ugandan government is involved. If that were the case, then our

[12] We do not discuss the foreign media effect in detail, but note that mass respondents could be more likely to voice their support for a project when it is associated with a foreign donor rather than when it is a domestic source. Citizens and elites that prefer foreign media are more likely to be biased in favor of foreign projects because those projects are referenced favorably in the foreign media We thus separated masses and MPs by the extent to which they prefer foreign media over Ugandan media. See Figures A2 and A3 in appendix. The results generally are in consistent and weak.

story would be simple: MPs prefer government projects because they view the government, of which they are a part, as a preferable manager of aid funds and projects.

However, MPs on average do not hold the view that government-funded projects are superior. Only 32 percent of MPs believe government funds are more likely to go to those most in need compared to foreign aid funds, which 59 percent believe go more to the neediest. In addition, only 34 percent of MPs believe that government funds are more effective and less wasteful compared to foreign aid funds. Only 39 percent of MPs believe that government-funded projects better meet the needs of their constituents than do foreign-funded projects. And only 31 percent believe that government-funded programs are more transparent than foreign aid projects. Finally, when asked who they think would be the most effective in carrying out the electricity or education project, only 23 percent of MPs named the Ugandan government. Moreover, roughly 80 percent of MPs thought foreign aid had a positive effect on the government and their constituents. Therefore, MPs actually tend to have less confidence in government-funded projects compared to foreign aid even though they tend to more readily support government programs. So why should they then choose to support government projects more than foreign aid?

Partisanship

One might expect that ruling-party NRM MPs and mass NRM partisans would be strong supporters of their government's own projects, but it is also possible that NRM MPs and supporters favor foreign aid because it shows that the government is capable of attracting funds from abroad. One might also expect MPs and masses who support the opposition to favor foreign projects simply because they are not run completely by the NRM.

Thus, for partisanship to explain the divergent findings across MPs and voters, there must be significant differences between NRM and opposition support for government vs. aid projects, and the difference in differences must favor government projects for MPs and aid projects for citizens. In other words, NRM MPs must prefer government more than opposition MPs prefer aid, and opposition supporters among the citizenry must prefer aid more than NRM supporters prefer government.

The difference in means tests comparing preferences for foreign aid versus government funds among both MPs and masses who are and are not members of the NRM are reported in Figures A2-A3 in the Appendix. Figure A2 shows that among the public, opposition supporters have stronger preferences for aid-funded projects (in 3 of 6 conditions), whereas opposition MPs have stronger preferences for government funded projects (in 4 of 9 conditions) although the number of MPs in that cell is very small. Figure A3 shows that NRM supporters in the citizenry are not significantly more likely to prefer one type of project over another. NRM MPs are likewise not significantly more likely to prefer either type of funding. It is puzzling that NRM MPs and masses do not support their own government projects most of all, but given the divisions within the NRM this may be understandable. Overall, partisanship does not seem to explain the main results about differences between elites and masses.

Ethnicity

Another possible explanation for the divergent preferences between MPs and masses is co-ethnic identity with the president. On the one hand, ethnicity is often understood to be a vehicle for clientelism or patronage (Posner 2005, Frank and Rainer 2012) and may

therefore be associated with mass and MP support for the government. According to this logic, masses and MPs who are of the same ethnicity as the President should prefer government spending over aid. But this would not present a possible explanation for the divergent preferences that we actually observe in the data. Instead, it would have to be the case that co-ethnic masses had a different set of preferences relative to co-ethnic MPs. While we question whether this could be the case, we want to conjecture about ethnic explanations that can account for the divergent preferences.

One possibility would be to tie into the logic of descriptive representation benefits for voters (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Barreto et al., 2004). By this argument, Musveni's fellow Munyankole citizens[13] receive sufficient benefits from having one of their own in the highest office in the country such that they do not necessarily expect material benefits from the government and therefore might prefer aid projects. Co-ethnic MPs, on the other hand, expect greater favor, access to more funds, and cabinet positions from the president *because* they are from the same ethnic group as the president. Thus, these MPs should be more likely to support government funds because they should be the ones most likely to directly benefit.

If co-ethnicity provides descriptive benefits to the masses and financial benefits to MPs, then co-ethnic masses should have a stronger preference for aid and co-ethnic MPs should prefer government funds. The results of the difference of means test comparing co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic masses as well as MPs are reported in Figures A4 and A5. The results show that neither non-co-ethnic masses nor MPs have a clear and consistent prefer-

[13] Runyankole is the language that Munyankole speak, which are the President's ethnic group and language.

ence for one funding source over another (Figure A4 – non-coethnic), which at best partially supports the argument. However, Figure A5 (co-ethnic) shows this same trend: neither co-ethnic masses nor MPs have a clear preference for either source of funding. Thus, there is no clear evidence that ethnicity is driving the main effects.

Nationalism

Related to the ethnicity argument, an alternative explanation for the results could be that MPs are nationalistic and resent relying on outside donors for development interventions. They should thus be averse to supporting what appears to be charity from outsiders. While some citizens may also hold nationalistic views, they may be less nationalistic than MPs who serve in national office. We specifically question whether individuals who feel a strong sense of commitment to a national or state identity as opposed to a particular ethnic group view foreign involvement differently.[14]

Following other surveys, we measured attachment to nation vs. ethnic group by asking individuals to respond to the following: "Let us suppose that you had to choose between being Ugandan and being [insert respondent's ethnic identity]." Response options range from feeling exclusively Ugandan, to mostly Ugandan, to equally Ugandan and a member of one' ethnic group, to mostly ethnic, to exclusively ethnic. We then measured whether those who feel more Ugandan behave differently from those who feel greater attachment to their own ethnic group. In our data, relative to the masses, Ugandan MPs re-

[14] Nationalism and its relationship to ethnicity are often debated and a full discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. See fuller treatments elsewhere including Calhoun, 1993. and Chandra, 2006..

port higher levels of attachment to Uganda as a national identity than they do to their particular ethnic category.

For individuals who do not consider themselves nationalist (see Figure A6), masses prefer foreign aid whereas MPs prefers government spending, though the results are not consistently significant. For those individuals who considered themselves more nationalist (see Figure A7), there are no consistent patterns of support for aid or government spending. Moreover, there are no consistent differences between masses and MPs among nationalist respondents. The evidence for a nationalist explanation is thus weak at best.

Government Incumbency Bias

Related to the nationalism claim, MPs may simply be more likely to prefer government programs because they are part of the government. To test this, we took advantage of a unique aspect of our study: we surveyed 78 former MPs. If being in the government matters, then we should see greater levels of support for government-funded projects among current MPs compared to former MPs. The difference-in-means tests that compare former and current MPs are reported in Figures A8 and A9. These figures show that there is almost no difference between current and former MPs, thus casting doubt on this alternative claim that actual presence in government drives the pro-government bias.

Corruption and Clientelism

Is the difference between MPs and the public produced by different views of corruption and clientelism? Evidence in favor of the corruption and clientelism mechanism would indicate that citizens who believe that the government is corrupt and clientelistic would prefer foreign aid projects. MPs should have the opposite preference. When politicians see

corruption in government it may be a boon to them personally or electorally, and hence they may prefer government projects because they provide an easier way to access money for their own personal gains.

In the survey, we asked both MPs and citizens whether government funds are most likely "to benefit government officials and their political allies" or "help those most in need" to capture aspects of both clientelism and corruption (using money to help friends *and* themselves). Both are intimately linked concepts in Africa because corruption largely sustains clientelism (Szeftel, 2000). We see a very large difference between the public and MPs in their perceptions of corruption and clientelism: 75 percent of the public believes that current government leaders take government money to benefit themselves and their friends rather than everyone in the country, while only 35 percent of the MPs agree with this statement. We therefore use this question to divide the sample into those who see government funds as more susceptible to capture and abuse and those who do not.

We acknowledge the fact that the corruption question may be susceptible to social desirability bias; however, further analysis mitigates the concern. First, while MPs who are more corrupt may be less likely to admit to corruption in government, one could easily argue the contrary. It may just as well be the case that MPs who are involved in corruption are more likely to report that corruption is a problem in order to present an even stronger signal that they themselves are not corrupt. So, on average, the social desirability effects might plausibly wash out.

However, we can leverage some evidence from our survey to see if social desirability is at play. If some MPs are more susceptible to social desirability pressures, then we

should expect a strong positive correlation between low responses to the corruption question and a variety of other questions reflecting socially desirable responses, such as reporting more visits to the MP's constituency, perceiving a good economy, and claiming better attendance at plenary sessions of parliament. However, answers to these questions are never strongly positively correlated with low corruption perceptions. There is a weak negative correlation (Pearson's r) between low corruption reports and claiming more days spent in the MP's constituency each month (-0.1189). There is a weak positive correlation between low corruption reports and maintaining that the national economy is in at least a "good" condition (0.1017). And finally there is a weak negative correlations between low corruption reports and declaring higher rates of attendance at plenary sessions of parliament (-0.0183). There seems to be no consistent social desirability bias. While we cannot rule out the possibility, our data suggest that MPs who are corrupt are not necessarily under-reporting corruption.

The analysis for MPs (reported in Table 3) shows that MPs who believe government funds are more likely to be used for corruption and clientelism are significantly more likely to prefer government-funded projects. For 5 of the 9 outcomes, MPs who see government funds as more corrupt and clientelist are significantly more likely to prefer government funds. Importantly, these effects are strongly significant for the behavioral outcomes. The treatment effects range from 4% to 19%, thus indicating more meaningful substantive effect sizes.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

Conversely, the difference in support for aid and government projects is not statistically significant for MPs who do not perceive significant corruption and clientelism (this is true for all outcome measures; see Table 3). This suggests that the MPs who see few avenues for corruption and clientelism express no preference for government-funded projects over aid. One plausible interpretation of these results suggests that if the MP cannot capture some of the funding, then s/he does not manifest a clear preference toward such projects.

The results in Table 4 report the difference-in-means tests and support the claim that citizen support for aid is also conditional on their perceptions of corruption and clientelism, but in the opposite direction. The citizens who believe that government funds are used for corruption and clientelism are significantly more likely to support aid over government projects for 3 of the 6 outcomes (4 of the 6 at the 0.1 level). Among subjects who do not perceive the corrupt use of government funds, there are no significant differences, but most of the negative signs suggest a slight preference for government projects over aid. (The results for MPs and masses are also plotted in Figures A12 and A13.)

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

We also ran additional tests to determine if the effect of corruption and clientelism is mediated by ethnicity, partisanship, or regional identities. Even though many studies argue that clientelism operates along ethnic or regional channels or through partisan networks (i.e., Wantchekon, 2003; Stokes, 2005), we find no clear evidence that the effect of clientelism found here is mediated by any of these variables. These null results could in

part be due to the fact that we measure perceptions of, rather than involvement in, corruption and clientelism. The mediation analysis is reported in Appendix Figures A14 and A15.

This analysis provides support for the argument that citizens support aid over government programs conditional on their perceptions of corruption and clientelism. Further, we find that citizens do in fact consider corruption to be a bad thing: people who perceive there to be more corruption are significantly less likely to trust parliament, their MPs, and the president (effects are significant at the 0.01 levels). Taken together, this analysis offers some evidence that political elites may believe that government funds are more susceptible to clientelism and corruption. In addition, ordinary citizens who perceive corruption and clientelism in government behave in ways that suggest they see aid-funded projects as a more preferred mechanism than government action to obtain the public goods that they express they so desperately need.

Discussion of Robustness

As with any experiment numerous design choices were required, all of which presented difficult tradeoffs. In this section, we discuss two important aspects of the experimental design that at first glance may seem to raise questions about our results. First, we discuss the cost condition, which tries to address the difference between "tax-based" government projects and "free" aid projects even though, as we argue below, this characterization is not accurate in the context of the study. Second, we discuss the fact that the control condition does not explicitly name the government as the funder but is nevertheless interpreted as the government.

Taxed Government Projects Versus Free Aid Projects: A False Dichotomy

A first design objection might be that the public may prefer aid because it is viewed as free, whereas government projects require citizens to pay taxes. We do not believe this is the factor driving our results for several reasons. First, we added the cost statement to both the treatment and control conditions, so that individuals are aware that any project may require local funds and support.

Second, we undertook a follow-up study where we recruited an additional 460 subjects and randomly assigned them to receive the cost statement (or not) in association with one of the two randomly assigned project descriptions. The cost statement had no significant effect on subjects' support for the project. This may be either because the cost statement was too weak to produce treatment effects or because subjects were indifferent to costs for projects they feel they desperately need. While the cost statement may be weak, multiple reasons lead us to believe that citizens are relatively indifferent to costs for public goods.

First, subjects likely do not see government projects as costly to themselves any more than foreign aid is costly. The vast majority of Ugandans – 86 percent in our nationally representative subject pool – fall below the earnings threshold for paying income tax, which is roughly 600 dollars per year. And as Martin (2013) notes, tax rates have actually fallen in the country recently.

Second, Ugandan citizens receive very few public goods, be it from foreign or government sources. Uganda ranks among the poorest countries in the world, and public services do not extend broadly to the general population. Eighty percent of Ugandans live in

rural areas and more than ninety percent of our subjects reported earning less than two dollars per day in income. For most Ugandans, public services (health care, education, infrastructure) are weak and underdeveloped, which suggests that voters should have strong preferences for public goods regardless of source, which we find. Further, the government raises little revenue from taxes and what revenues exist are often transformed into private goods and/or directed to political allies for the purposes of corruption or clientelism (see Cox and McCubbins, 2001; Martin, 2013).

The Government Control Condition

A second design objection might be that the government was not named in the control condition. We were concerned about social desirability in responses if we actually labeled the control as the government. This is not a trivial concern in this context as the Afrobarometer data show (see footnote 9). For the citizens, we worried that they might fear government reactions and so always rank the government projects first. For the MPs, we feared social desirability bias in which they always said they preferred the government projects since they were part of the government and would want to avoid being seen as not supporting government development projects.

To assess what citizens perceived when they viewed the control condition, as well as what the implications of this are, we conducted a follow-up survey to ensure that subjects in the mass experiment did in fact interpret the control condition as the government, and we found that the majority of subjects did so (52% and 51% for the education and electricity projects, respectively) (Author 2013). More than one third of subjects in the follow-up study, however, attributed the control condition to a foreign donor. While a more direct

comparison could have been preferable, attribution of the control projects to foreign donors works in favor of the null hypothesis of no treatment effects.

The concern is that the control condition represented a combination of people who believe it implied either the government or a foreign aid donor; that is, support for the control is equal to some average of support for foreign aid projects combined with support for government projects. Because we know two of these three values—the outcome in the control condition overall and the outcome in the foreign aid condition, we can calculate the third: the level of support that subjects would provide had they been given the government control condition explicitly.

First, we know the average value that mass and MP respondents gave in support of the projects if they were assigned a foreign donor. In the two surveys we asked about support for the projects using 6 different aid donors for the masses and 4 for the MPs, assigning each subject a donor at random.[15] Our data show that across all these foreign donors, the mass respondents did not differentiate significantly between them, but on average they supported the foreign-funded projects at a higher level than did the control group. We have similar evidence for the MPs, except the MPs, on the other hand, supported all the aid projects on average *less* than the control condition. This implies that we can calculate an average value of support among the mass public and MPs for projects led by any foreign donor.

Second, on average the control group's level of support for the projects was lower than the average for all the foreign-donor treatment groups for the mass experiment. For

[15] Respondents were randomly assigned one of 6 donors: US, China, World Bank, African Development Bank, generic bilateral and multilateral donor. MPs did not see China or the AfDB.

the MPs, the control groups' support was higher than for all the foreign aid projects. Third, our post-survey data show that 51 or 52%, depending on the random assignment of electricity or education project, respectively, believe that the control was a government project and most of the remaining believed it was a foreign donor. So the actual value of support for the control group for those who thought it was the government can be deduced from this information. In the mass experiment it must necessarily be lower than that for the group that was given the foreign aid conditions, while in the MP experiment it must be higher.

We can use these three pieces of information to calculate the mean and standard errors of the mass respondents who attributed the control condition to the government. We can only obtain an estimate for the MPs since we did not ask them who they thought was funder in the control condition, but this still implies what the control group who attributed it to the government would have scored. Calculating the mean is straightforward. We know that the mean of the control group is made up of the respondents who thought that the control was a foreign donor and those who thought the control was the government:

$$\widehat{Control} = \alpha * \widehat{Gov} + (1 - \alpha) * \widehat{Foreign}$$

where $\widehat{Control}$ and $\widehat{Foreign}$ are the average levels of support for the development projects under the control and treatment conditions, respectively. These values are known from the data and α is the percentage identifying the control as the government. Rearranging to solve for $\widehat{Gov}$ we derive:

$$\widehat{Gov} = \frac{\widehat{Control} - (1 - \alpha) * \widehat{Foreign}}{\alpha}$$

Calculating the standard error to create the confidence intervals is a little more difficult and we describe the procedure in the following footnote.[16] Using these calculated means and standard deviations, we can then compare those receiving the foreign treatment to the control condition as reported in the paper to the portion of control respondents who thought the condition was the government. Figure 1 demonstrates the relative differences for the strong support condition among the masses. For all other outcome conditions for masses and MPs, this relative ordering holds and so we do not display them here. As the figure shows, the difference between those receiving the explicit foreign condition and those thinking the control represented the government is much larger than between the explicitly foreign condition and the undifferentiated control. The direction of the effect is opposite in the MP case. Thus, the results we report in the paper work against our stated hypotheses and therefore provide the most conservative test; that is, had we named the government explicitly in the control condition, we would have observed a much larger difference and therefore the results reported would be even stronger.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

[16] We know that the standard error is the standard deviation divided by the square root of N. The standard error for the control will be comprised of the standard error of the respondents who believed the government was the donor and those who believed that it was a foreign donor:

$$SE_{control} = \frac{\frac{S_{Gov}}{\sqrt{(N_{Gov})}} + \frac{S_{For}}{\sqrt{(N_{For})}}}{2}$$

Again we can rearrange the formula to calculate the standard deviation of the government respondents:

$$S_{Gov} = \left(2 * SE_{Control} - \frac{S_{For}}{\sqrt{N_{For}}}\right) * \sqrt{N_{Gov}}$$

Since the standard error is just the standard deviation divided by the square root of N, we can calculate $\frac{S_{Gov}}{\sqrt{N_{Gov}}}$ to get the standard errors of the government respondents.

While we had legitimate reasons for not naming the government in the control condition (because of the generalized paranoia toward the regime among citizens and social desirability among MPs), in retrospect doing so would have made the analysis clearer. Nonetheless, we do not believe that the way the control condition was stated vitiates our results; indeed, it may have led us to understate them. Thus for evaluating the different mass and elite preferences for foreign vs. government programs, the basic results already provide reasonably strong support for our claims, and with these adjustments the evidence in support would be even stronger.

For cost and logistical reasons we did not perform the same follow up study on MPs, but we expect that MPs might have voiced similar perceptions to other Ugandans. This of course means that some MPs, like some citizens, probably perceived the control condition as sponsored by foreign donors. Again, this would have led to an understatement of the difference between treatment and control in the MP experiment.

On the other hand, it is also possible that MPs may merely have a preference for unspecified over specified funding. We emphasize that the project descriptions were identical across conditions save the statement of the funding source, so the details of the education and electricity projects were equally specified between treatment and control, which diminishes our concern on this count. Moreover, two of the foreign donor conditions were deliberately generic in that they attributed the projects to either an unspecified multilateral or bilateral donor. MPs did not significantly prefer these generic conditions to conditions in which the World Bank or the United States were named, which moves us toward discounting the possibility that MPs simply prefer projects with unspecified donors. Rather, it ap-

pears more likely that their attribution of the control projects to the government prompted the treatment effects.

Conclusion

This paper provides what is, to our knowledge, the first experimental study to compare aid preferences and actions for members of parliament and a nationally representative, random sample of ordinary citizens in a prominent developing country. We were specifically concerned with preferences towards foreign vs. domestic development projects. Citizens preferred aid over government programs consistently, and with most dependent variables to statistically significant degrees, especially in the behavioral outcomes. This was particularly so among the respondents who perceived problems with government corruption and clientelism, thus providing evidence consistent with the argument that aid can help overcome governance problems. Likewise, members of parliament consistently preferred government programs over aid.

Looking at such individual-level evidence – for political elites and citizens – gives us some sense of how aid might function at the ground level. Our micro-level evidence provides some support for the argument that citizens may see foreign aid as a way of promoting public goods without strengthening corruption. Citizens are more willing to support aid by taking behavioral action imposing personal costs through signing a petition and sending an SMS. They view aid as less politicized than government programs.

For these same reasons, it perhaps makes sense that political elites were less enthusiastic about aid than they were about government-funded projects. MPs' likely face fewer

constraints over how they might utilize these domestic government resources. High levels of corruption and clientelism exist in developing countries even in the absence of foreign aid. And domestic resources may be even easier for governments to divert to these purposes since there are often no strong accountability mechanisms at work in poor developing countries. But citizens' significant preference for aid over government programs should give readers pause. Perhaps citizens are merely ill informed about aid and do not understand how it harms them. Alternatively, perhaps through aid they see a potential, if partial, means of escape from a system of governance that prevents them from receiving the public goods they strongly desire. Our data seem to support this latter claim.

Our study brings together two complimentary literatures. The large literature on clientelism and corruption in developing countries strongly implies that governments have the desire and will to use their funds to promote their own political purposes first and foremost. Staying in office is critical and using government projects to build support is one way to do this. Uganda's government is no exception. However, aid scholars often assess foreign assistance without any direct comparison to the most realistic alternative, which is government funding. Our study examines the beliefs and actions of both elites and citizens by comparing their support for these two different development mechanisms. These forms of evidence shed new light on two very prominent literatures by making more central the preferences of political elites and citizens. We expect that much is to be gained by complementing existing macro-level statistical approaches with micro-level experimental data on politicians and beneficiaries of aid in developing countries.

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Table 1: Comparison of MP Sample to the Actual 9th Parliament

	Sample	9th Parliament
Gender		
% Male	67	65
% Female	33	35
Party		
% NRM	74.6	73.5
% Independents	10.2	11.2
% FDC	8.5	8.8
% DP	3.1	3.4
% UPC	3.1	2.6
% CP	0.25	0.25
% JEEMA	0.25	0.25
Region		
% from Central	28	25
% from Eastern	28	27
% from Northern	18	22
% from Western	26	26
MP Type		
% Constituency MPs	59	62
% District Women MPs	28	29
% Special Interest MPs	6	7
% Ex-Officio MPs	8	2

Table 2: Citizen and MP Preferences for Government versus Aid Projects

Panel A: MP and Citizen Outcomes						
MPs	Strong Support	Tell	Willing to sign	Signed	Willing to *Sign Pres.*	Signed *Pres.*
Govt	0.84	0.97	.89	.78	.86	.75
N	136	136	136	138	59	59
Aid	0.83	0.99	.82	.75	.75	.68
N	567	567	567	570	292	292
Difference	-0.01	0.02	-0.07**	-0.04	-0.12**	-0.06
	Strong Support	Tell	Willing to sign	Signed	Willing to *SMS*	Sent *SMS*
Masses						
Govt	0.73	0.91	0.82	0.77	0.59	0.02
N	528	520	528	538	538	202
Aid	0.77	0.94	0.83	0.80	0.64	0.05
N	3007	2967	3008	3017	3017	1143
Difference	0.03*	0.03**	0.02	0.04*	0.04*	0.02*

Panel B: Elite Only Outcomes			
	Tell Constituents	Rally Local Officials	Coordinate with Peers
MPs			
Govt	0.99	0.98	0.99
N	136	123	136
Aid	0.98	0.97	0.97
N	567	501	567
Difference	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02**

A negative difference means that the proportion of support for projects in the control condition (government) is larger than the proportion under the treatment condition (aid), implying the government condition is preferred to the aid one. Note that if a subject stated s/he did not want to sign the petition (third column) we still presented them the possibility of signing the petition (fourth column). The higher Ns for willingness to SMS in the fifth column (e.g., 538 and 3017) are a result of subject refusals to answer the petition questions (where corresponding Ns are lower: 528 and 3008). That is, if a subject refused to answer petition questions, we still asked about SMS and fewer subjects declined to answer SMS questions. Also, the Ns decrease in the "Sent SMS" condition (relative to "Willing to SMS") because we only calculate Sent SMS for subjects who owned a phone.

Table 3: Testing the Corruption Mechanism (MPs)

MP Support Conditional on Perceptions of Corruption						
	Strong Support	Tell	Willing to Sign	Signed	Willing to Sign Pres.	Signed Pres. Pet.
Yes, Government Funds used for Corruption						
Govt	0.86	0.98	0.95	0.89	0.94	0.89
N	44	44	44	45	18	18
Aid	0.82	0.98	0.85	0.78	0.77	0.70
N	195	195	195	197	103	103
Difference	-0.05	0.01	-0.10**	-0.11**	-0.18**	-0.19**
No, Government Funds not used for Corruption						
Govt	0.82	0.97	0.86	0.73	0.83	0.68
N	90	90	90	91	41	41
Aid	0.83	0.99	0.81	0.73	0.74	0.68
N	366	366	366	367	188	188
Difference	0.01	0.02	-0.05	0.00	-0.09	-0.01

MP Support Conditional on Perceptions of Corruption			
	Tell Constituents	Rally Locals	Coordinate With Peers
Yes, Government Funds used for Clientelism			
Govt	0.98	0.97	1.00
N	44	39	44
Aid	0.98	0.96	0.96
N	195	171	195
Difference	-0.01	-0.01	-0.04***
No, Government Funds not used for Clientelism			
Govt	0.99	0.98	0.99
N	90	82	90
Aid	0.98	0.97	0.97
N	366	324	366
Difference	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02

A negative difference means that the proportion of support for projects in the control condition (government) is larger than the proportion under the treatment condition (aid), implying the government condition is preferred to the aid one. A positive difference implies that the aid condition is preferred to the government condition. Note that if a subject stated s/he did not want to sign the petition (third column) we still presented them the possibility of signing the petition (fourth column).

Table 4: Testing the Corruption Mechanism (Masses)

Mass Support Conditional on Perceptions of Corruption						
	Strong Support	Tell	Willing to sign	Signed	Willing to SMS	Sent SMS
Yes, Government Funds used for Corruption						
Govt	0.71	0.90	0.80	0.74	0.69	0.03
N	393	386	393	402	157	157
Aid	0.77	0.94	0.83	0.80	0.71	0.05
N	2274	2241	2274	2279	894	894
Difference	0.06**	0.04**	0.03	0.05**	0.02	0.03*
No, Government Funds not used for Corruption						
Govt	0.82	0.93	0.87	0.85	0.86	0.00
N	126	126	126	176	42	42
Aid	0.76	0.94	0.84	0.82	0.78	0.03
N	695	688	696	699	236	236
Difference	-0.06	0.01	-0.04	-0.03	-0.08	0.03***

A negative difference means that the proportion of support for projects in the control condition (government) is larger than the proportion under the treatment condition (aid), implying the government condition is preferred to the aid one. A positive difference implies that the aid condition is preferred to the government condition. Note that if a subject stated s/he did not want to sign the petition (third column) we still presented them the possibility of signing the petition (fourth column). The higher Ns for willingness to SMS in the fifth column (e.g., 538 and 3017) are a result of subject refusals to answer the petition questions (where corresponding Ns are lower: 528 and 3008). That is, if a subject refused to answer petition questions, we still asked about SMS and fewer subjects declined to answer SMS questions. Also, the Ns decrease in the "Sent SMS" condition (relative to "Willing to SMS") because we only calculate Sent SMS for subjects who owned a phone.

Figure 1: The Value of the Control if Government was Named



Calculation of control value if it had specified government using information from surveys.

APPENDIX FOR "ELITE AND MASS SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN AID VERSUS GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM UGANDA"

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January 31, 2015

This appendix reports on design features as well as additional results not contained in the paper. All material here is referenced in the paper, but with more detail.

Design Details

Text of the Education Project

For the other project the question was: "The Post Primary Education and Training Adaptable Program Lending Project seeks to increase access to lower secondary education, improve the quality of lower secondary education, and enhance primary education and training. The project may require your community to providing funding for maintenance in the future. [This project will be funded by the {RANDOMLY ASSIGNED FUNDER}]. How much would you support this project?"

Text of the Petition

Dear Sir/Madam

I have learned about the Electricity Sector Development Project through participating in a survey project with **[University Name Redacted]**. I understand that this project will improve the reliability of and increase access to electricity and that one major aspect of the project is to extend electricity to those who do not yet have access to it. I am signing this letter to voice my [support/opposition] to this project's implementation in Uganda.

Signed:

_____ Date:_____

_____ Date:_____

Additional Statistical Results

Differences between treatment and control (graphically)

Figure A1a shows the differences in means between aid and government with the upper pane plotting raw means and the lower pane capturing the statistical difference between means for citizens and MPs. The results show some meaningful differences.

Figure A1a: MP and Citizen Support for Aid vs. Government Projects



Note: The upper pane displays the mean of subjects in the government vs. aid conditions, for both citizens and MPs, who supported the project. The first two bars in each column show the citizen results and the second two bars show the MP results. To capture the statistical difference between the two, the lower pane displays the difference between aid and the government (control) for citizens and MPs along with 95% confidence intervals surrounding the difference estimates. If the results were exactly as hypothesized, we should observe that the difference between aid and government for the citizens is always positive (the dots in the lower pane should always be above zero and 95% confidence intervals not crossing zero). Further, we should observe that the difference between aid and government for the MPs is always negative (the dots in the lower pane should always be below zero and 95% confident intervals not crossing zero).

Figure A1b shows the differences in means between aid and government for the combined dependent variable measures with the upper pane plotting raw means and the lower pane capturing the statistical difference between means for citizens and MPs. The results show some meaningful differences.

Figure A1b: MP and Citizen Support for Aid vs. Government Projects



Note: The upper pane displays the means for subjects in the government vs. aid conditions, for both citizens and MPs, who supported the project. The first two bars in each column show the citizen results and the second two bars show the MP results. To capture the statistical difference between the two, the lower pane displays the difference between aid and the government (control) for citizens and MPs along with 95% confidence intervals surrounding the difference estimates. If the results were exactly as hypothesized, we should observe that the difference between aid and government for the citizens is always positive (the dots in the lower pane should always be above zero and 95% confidence intervals not crossing zero). Further, we should observe that the difference between aid and government for the MPs is always negative (the dots in the lower pane should always be below zero and 95% confident intervals not crossing zero).

Probing Alternative Mechanisms

Foreign Media Effect

Mass respondents could be more likely to voice their support for a project when it is associated with a foreign donor rather than when it is a domestic source. Citizens and elites that prefer foreign media are more likely to be biased in favor of foreign projects because those projects are referenced favorably in the foreign media We thus separated masses and MPs by the extent to which they prefer foreign media over Ugandan media. See Figures A2 and A3 in appendix. The results generally are in consistent and weak. For the masses that do not prefer foreign media, there is a preference for foreign aid over government assistance, though the results are not consistently significant. The direction of this effect cuts against a foreign media effect hypothesis, moreover. MPs who do not prefer foreign media expressed more support for government assistance, but likewise the significance of the results is weak. For the masses preferring foreign media (Figure A3), there is again a preference for foreign aid. But again the results are not statistically strong. On the other hand, MPs that prefer foreign media express stronger support for government projects, and a number of these results are statistically significant, though in the opposite direction from what a media effect argument would predict. As an additional test of this mechanism, we also separated respondents into those who indicated that they had *heard* of at least two of the foreign donors used in the experiments (USAID, World Bank, etc.) and those who had not. We assume that prior knowledge of the donors that were used as treatment conditions is correlated with a stronger media effect for foreign donors. Importantly, we only asked these knowledge questions of voters, and can only text this mechanism among them, as we did not want to patronize the MPs by asking such question as "Have you heard of the World Bank". We find that citizens who had heard of at least two of the donors *were not* more likely to prefer foreign aid over government funds. These results are largely robust to using "only heard of one aid donor" as the cutoff point. The only change is that those who have heard of at least one donor are significantly more likely to sign a petition for an aid-funded project ($p < 0.05$).

Figure A2a: Difference in means tests for masses and MPs who do not prefer to watch foreign media. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that masses who prefer local media still support aid, though the results are not strong statistically. The results for MPs do not suggest any clear lessons.



Figure A2b: Difference in means tests for masses and MPs who do not prefer to watch foreign media. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that masses who prefer local media still support aid, though the results are not strong statistically. The results for MPs do not suggest any clear lessons.



Figure A3a: Difference in means tests for masses and MPs who prefer to watch foreign media. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that masses who prefer foreign media support aid, though the results are not strong statistically. The results for MPs suggest that those that prefer foreign media still support government assistance, contrary to expectations of a media effect argument.



Figure A3b: Difference in means tests for masses and MPs who prefer to watch foreign media. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that masses who prefer foreign media support aid, though the results are not strong statistically. The results for MPs suggest that those that prefer foreign media still support government assistance, contrary to expectations of a media effect argument.



Partisanship

Figure A4a: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who do not belong to the ruling NRM party. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. Thus, for non-NRM members the masses appear to support foreign aid more than the MPs who appear to support government funding. The results are significant in a few cases, but not consistently across most conditions.



Figure A4b: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who do not belong to the ruling NRM party. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. Thus, for non-NRM members the masses appear to support foreign aid more than the MPs who appear to support government funding. The results are significant in a few cases, but not consistently across most conditions.



Figure A5a: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who do not belong to the ruling NRM party. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that NRM masses and MPs do not consistently support aid or government funding over each other.



Figure A5b: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who do not belong to the ruling NRM party. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that NRM masses and MPs do not consistently support aid or government funding over each other.



Ethnicity

Figure A6a: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who do not share the same ethnicity as President Museveni. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that non-coethnic masses support aid more than government, though the result is not statistically strong. Non-coethnic MPs support government funding more but likewise the result is not strong statistically.



Figure A6b: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who do not share the same ethnicity as President Museveni. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that non-coethnic masses support aid more than government, though the result is not statistically strong. Non-coethnic MPs support government funding more but likewise the result is not strong statistically.



Figure A7a: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who share the same ethnicity as President Museveni. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that coethnic masses and coethnic MPs have no strong preferences for foreign aid or government.



Figure A7b: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who share the same ethnicity as President Museveni. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that coethnic masses and coethnic MPs have no strong preferences for foreign aid or government.



Nationalism

Figure A8a: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who feel a stronger attachment to tribe than to a larger Ugandan nationality. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that non-nationalist masses prefer foreign aid over government funding, though the result is not consistently significant. The direction of the results for the non-nationalist MPs is opposite, but again the results are not consistently significant.



Figure A8b: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who feel a stronger attachment to tribe than to a larger Ugandan nationality. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that non-nationalist masses prefer foreign aid over government funding, though the result is not consistently significant. The direction of the results for the non-nationalist MPs is opposite, but again the results are not consistently significant.



Figure A9a: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who feel a stronger attachment to a larger Ugandan nationality than to their own tribe. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that neither nationalist masses nor MPs have strong preferences for aid or government funds.



Figure A9b: Difference in means tests for MPs and masses who feel a stronger attachment to a larger Ugandan nationality than to their own tribe. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that neither nationalist masses nor MPs have strong preferences for aid or government funds.



Incumbency Bias

Figure A10a: Difference in means tests for former MPs. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that former MPs have no strong preferences for aid over government or vie versa.



Figure A10b: Difference in means tests for former MPs. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that former MPs have no strong preferences for aid over government or vie versa.



Figure A11a: Difference in means tests for current MPs. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that current MPs prefer government funds over aid, though the result is only significant in one condition.



Figure A11b: Difference in means tests for current MPs. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that current MPs prefer government funds over aid, though the result is only significant in one condition.



Corruption and Clientelism

Figure A12a: Difference in means tests for masses and MPs who do not perceive corruption or clientelism in the government. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that neither masses nor MPs have strong preferences when they do not perceive corruption or clientelism in the government.



Figure A12b: Difference in means tests for masses and MPs who do not perceive corruption or clientelism in the government. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that neither masses nor MPs have strong preferences when they do not perceive corruption or clientelism in the government.



Figure A13a: Difference in means tests for masses and MPs who perceive corruption or clientelism in the government. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that masses have strong preferences for foreign aid when they perceive corruption and those results are largely significant across conditions. MPs who perceive corruption, on the other hand, prefer government funds over aid, a result that is significant in five of the nine conditions.



Figure A13b: Difference in means tests for masses and MPs who perceive corruption or clientelism in the government. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding. This graph shows that masses have strong preferences for foreign aid when they perceive corruption and those results are largely significant across conditions. MPs who perceive corruption, on the other hand, prefer government funds over aid, a result that is significant in five of the nine conditions.



Robustness Tests

Donor Differences

As discussed in the paper, in addition to testing the treatment effect of receiving an aid donor relative to the government control, we also tested the effect of individual donors across groups. Because elites did not receive the African Development Bank and Government of China treatments, we estimated difference in means tests to detect the effect of the various treatments relative to the control and the other treatment conditions. Across all groups, there is never a consistently significant effect for any of the individual donors. The results for comparisons of the US to other donors are displayed in Tables A1 and A2 below.

Table A1a: Masses Results for Differences Between US and Other Donors

Dep. Variable	Comparison	Mean 1st Donor	Mean 2nd Donor	T stat on difference
Strong Support	US vs. not US	0.786	0.761	1.296
	US vs. Bilat		0.748	1.463
	US vs. Multilat		0.757	1.101
	US vs. Control		0.735	1.944
	US vs. WB		0.759	1.019
Tell Support	US vs. not US	0.948	0.934	1.334
	US vs. Bilat		0.949	-0.022
	US vs. Multilat		0.938	0.681
	US vs. Control		0.910	2.410
	US vs. WB		0.947	0.098
Willing to Sign	US vs. not US	0.825	0.830	-0.238
	US vs. Bilat		0.836	-0.445
	US vs. Multilat		0.828	-0.097
	US vs. Control		0.816	0.386
	US vs. WB		0.833	-0.312
Sign Petition	US vs. not US	0.793	0.798	-0.255
	US vs. Bilat		0.813	-0.815
	US vs. Multilat		0.800	-0.264
	US vs. Control		0.766	1.061
	US vs. WB		0.797	-0.175
Willing to SMS	US vs. not US	0.643	0.626	0.721
	US vs. Bilat		0.644	-0.047
	US vs. Multilat		0.623	0.664
	US vs. Control		0.591	1.717
	US vs. WB		0.631	0.384
Send SMS	US vs. not US	0.049	0.029	1.956
	US vs. Bilat		0.029	1.625
	US vs. Multilat		0.021	2.390
	US vs. Control		0.019	2.706
	US vs. WB		0.038	0.837

Table A1b: Masses Results for Differences Between US and Other Donors with Aggregated Dependent Variable Measures

Dep. Variable	Comparison	Mean 1st Donor	Mean 2nd Donor	T stat on difference
DV sum	US vs. not US	4.020	3.950	0.962
	US vs. Bilat		3.994	0.276
	US vs. Multilat		3.936	0.895
	US vs. Control		3.777	2.509
	US vs. WB		3.994	0.276
Alt. DV additive	US vs. not US	5.876	5.783	0.972
	US vs. Bilat		5.849	0.222
	US vs. Multilat		5.785	0.736
	US vs. Control		5.613	2.044
	US vs. WB		5.806	0.557
Alt. DV balance	US vs. not US	2.359	2.227	0.949
	US vs. Bilat		2.292	0.379
	US vs. Multilat		2.204	0.858
	US vs. Control		1.939	2.275
	US vs. WB		2.304	0.305

Table A2a: MP Results for Differences Between US and Other Donors

Dep. Variable	Comparison	Mean 1st Donor	Mean 2nd Donor	T stat on difference
Strong Support	US vs. not US	0.830	0.829	0.028
	US vs. Bilat		0.879	-1.178
	US vs. Multilat		0.809	0.455
	US vs. Control		0.838	-0.186
	US vs. WB		0.790	0.871
Tell Support	US vs. not US	0.987	0.982	0.472
	US vs. Bilat		0.993	-0.509
	US vs. Multilat		0.985	0.155
	US vs. Control		0.971	0.949
	US vs. WB		0.979	0.522
Willing to Sign	US vs. not US	0.784	0.851	-1.817
	US vs. Bilat		0.886	-2.363
	US vs. Multilat		0.824	-0.850
	US vs. Control		0.890	-2.457
	US vs. WB		0.804	-0.422
Sign Petition	US vs. not US	0.739	0.759	-0.500
	US vs. Bilat		0.773	-0.687
	US vs. Multilat		0.742	-0.074
	US vs. Control		0.783	-0.879
	US vs. WB		0.736	0.048
Coordinate Peer	US vs. not US	0.987	0.971	1.372
	US vs. Bilat		0.964	1.242
	US vs. Multilat		0.977	0.613
	US vs. Control		0.993	-0.485
	US vs. WB		0.951	1.766
Petition Pres	US vs. not US	0.6	0.717	-1.861
	US vs. Bilat		0.743	-1.843
	US vs. Multilat		0.658	-0.744
	US vs. Control		0.746	-1.806
	US vs. WB		0.735	-1.726

Table A2b: MP Results for Differences Between US and Other Donors with Aggregated Dependent Variables

Dep. Variable	Comparison	Mean 1st Donor	Mean 2nd Donor	T stat on difference
DV sum	US vs. not US	6.758	6.950	-1.200
	US vs. Bilat		7.099	-1.679
	US vs. Multilat		6.970	-0.984
	US vs. Control		6.949	-0.939
	US vs. WB		6.785	-0.123
Alt. DV additive	US vs. not US	9.906	10.351	-1.172
	US vs. Bilat		10.726	-1.849
	US vs. Multilat		9.841	0.132
	US vs. Control		10.600	-1.525
	US vs. WB		10.344	-0.893
Alt. DV balance	US vs. not US	6.098	6.373	-1.147
	US vs. Bilat		6.631	-1.791
	US vs. Multilat		6.333	-0.739
	US vs. Control		6.435	-1.129
	US vs. WB		6.097	0.003

Mediation Analysis

It is possible that clientelism could work through shared ethnicity with the president, region identities (if patronage-client ties are region-specific), or through partisanship networks. We test here whether or not the study's results regarding the role of clientelism are mediated by these three variables. To do so, we employ the mediation analysis proposed by Imai et al (2011) because it provides more appropriate assumptions than the traditional structural model approach to mediation analysis.

Imai et al's mediation analysis (1) models the mediator as a function of the treatment variable and pre-treatment covariates and (2) models the outcome as a function of the treatment, the mediator, and the pre-treatment controls (Imai et al 2011). The mediator model is used to predict two values of the mediator for each observation: one under treatment and another under control. The outcomes model is used to predict potential outcomes under treatment and control. Finally, Monte Carlo simulations (1000 simulations) are used to estimate the statistical certainty of the predicted average causal mediation effect (ACME).

The mediation analysis relies on two separate ignorability assumptions; what the authors call, sequential ignorability. First, we must assume that, given pre-treatment confounders, treatment assignment is statistically independent of potential mediators. Second, we must assume that the observed mediators are "ignorable given the actual treatment status and pretreatment confounders" (Imai et al 2011, 770).

The mediation analysis returns three quantities of interest. It estimates (1) the mediation effect, or the effect of the mediator on the outcome of interest, (2) the direct effect or the effect of the treatment on the outcome that does not flow through the

mediator, and (3) the total effect which is the sum of the previous two effects. These values are plotted in Figures A14 and A15. Figure A14 reports the mediation analysis for the mass sample. We conduct mediation analysis for each of the three variables on the sub-samples of those who do and do not perceive clientelism in government. Figure A15 reports the mediation analysis for the MPs. The ACME is the key outcome of interest: if this point estimate is significantly different from zero, then we have evidence that preferences for funding sources are mediated by the mechanisms of interest. However, for both the masses and the MPs, none of these three variables has a significant mediating effect.

Figure A14: Mediation Analysis for the Masses



Figure A15: Mediation Analysis for the MPs



Table A3a: Results for Masses Subjects Familiar with Donors

	Strong support			Tell Support			Willing to Sign Petitin			Signed Petition			Will. To SMS		
Subgroup	**Aid**	**Gov't**	**Diff.**	**Aid**	**Gov't**	**Diff.**	**Aid**	**Gov't**	**Diff.**	**Aid**	**Gov't**	**Diff.**	**Aid**	**Gov't**	**Dif**
Heard >= 2 Donors															
Subgroup N	1638	279		1625	276		1639	279		1646	283		1646	283	
N Outcome=1	1353	218		1543	260		1434	241		1407	232		1183	201	
Proportion	0.83	0.78	0.04*	0.95	0.94	0.01	0.87	0.86	0.01	0.85	0.82	0.04	0.72	0.71	0.0
Heard < 2 Donors															
Subgroup N	1369	249		1342	244		1369	249		1371	255		1371	255	
N Outcome=1	961	170		1247	213		1067	190		1015	180		733	117	
Proportion	0.70	0.68	0.02	0.93	0.87	0.06**	0.78	0.76	0.02	0.74	0.71	0.03	0.53	0.46	0.0

Statistical significance indicated as follows: *** p <0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10. All tests of statistical significance are two-tailed

Table A3b: Results for Masses Subjects Familiar with Donors

	DV sum			Alt. DV additive			Alt. DV balanc		
Subgroup	**Aid**	**Gov't**	**Diff.**	**Aid**	**Gov't**	**Diff.**	**Aid**	**Gov't**	**Diff.**
Heard >= 2 Donors									
Subgroup N	1646	283		1624	276		1646	283	
Mean	4.25	4.10	0.15	6.14	6.00	0.13	2.73	2.48	0.24
Heard < 2 Donors									
Subgroup N	1371	255		1342	244		1371	255	
Mean	3.68	3.42	0.27**	5.45	5.17	0.28*	1.79	1.33	0.46**

Statistical significance indicated as follows: *** p <0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10. All tests of statistical significance are two-tailed