

# **Crowdsourcing Local Feedback about World Bank Projects in India: Analysis Plan for a Large-Scale Online Field Experiment**

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## **Abstract**

Non-governmental organizations affect world politics through their implementation of assistance programs, their advocacy of policy positions, and their monitoring of governments and international organizations. Yet questions remain about the incentives that drive NGOs to engage in political action at the international level. In particular, scholars have questioned whether NGOs fill gaps in governance by adopting principled positions that are unlikely to be supported by firms and public sector agencies. In a large-scale field experiment on 51,847 NGOs in India, we explore the relative strength of different incentives that induce NGOs to monitor World Bank projects. Based on an email invitation, we invite NGOs to provide feedback on ten World Bank projects nearest to them geographically. The feedback – including photographs, documents, and other comments containing factual information – is displayed publicly on project pages at the AidData website. NGOs are randomly assigned to receive one of five invitations within blocks: (Control) a simple invitation and a link to the list of projects; (T1) a charge to make a meaningful contribution to public goods; (T2) a sincere promise to connect the NGO to coaching on fundraising from the well-known charity website GlobalGiving; (T3) a sincere promise to pass feedback received to the World Bank’s India office; (T4) a sincere promise to feature the NGO on AidData’s prominent international blog. For outcomes, we will measure visits to the AidData website, as well as the quantity and quality of feedback about projects. With these outcome measures, we will compare the strength of normative, financial, voice, and reputational incentives that prompt NGOs to provide public monitoring of an international organization. A pilot wave of the study has been completed and all data collection for the main wave will be done in October of 2015 and analyzed according to the included analysis plan.

## **Purpose of the Experiment**

One of the key challenges in managing foreign aid projects is understanding when projects meet the needs of beneficiaries. Foreign donors increasingly consult with national governments, local community groups, and NGOs about the design of projects, but engagement often ends there. NGOs are rarely involved in systematically monitoring and evaluating the outcomes and long-term impacts of projects that are supposed to benefit the people where they work. However, given the wealth of information that local organizations often possess (or could possess) about development projects, NGOs might be well-positioned to help donors improve the effectiveness of their projects by offering project-specific monitoring and evaluation in real-time. Fortunately, recent advances in information technology should make the process of sharing and processing information easier. And yet not enough is known about what drives individuals and organizations to provide information about aid projects and public sector agencies. In this project, we propose harnessing new crowdsourcing tools to solicit, aggregate, and publicize feedback from NGOs about development assistance from the World Bank.

In particular, we will test which incentives motivate NGOs to provide quality information about aid projects. The recent release of the AidData 3.0 web-based platform makes this possible for the first time. This platform will allow NGOs and other stakeholders to provide comments and upload documents about individual aid projects. These materials will be displayed publicly on individual project pages. While there has been a lot of buzz

about tapping the wisdom of crowds for development (Surowieki 2005), little is known about how to motivate organizations and individuals to provide feedback in the absence of a crisis (for an exception, see Blaschke et al. 2014). This project will have broad implications for other crowdsourcing efforts that are being developed, and our study will help answer basic questions about the strength of incentives for NGOs to provide information-based public goods in developing countries.

Isolating particular incentive structures is not straightforward and thus requires caution in the research approach. We will conduct a randomized controlled trial that assigns different invitations to 51,847 NGOs in India. The interventions are designed to test the motivations of NGOs to provide comments about active World Bank projects close to their physical offices. We randomly vary the incentive offered for providing feedback: the intrinsic benefit of providing a public good; the opportunity for a professional fundraising consultation with representatives from a popular NGO fundraising website, GlobalGiving; the possibility of direct contact with World Bank India staff; or the opportunity to be featured and publicly praised on a prominent international blog. By understanding what types of incentives drive feedback, we will be in a better position to advise donors and public agencies about using new tools to close the feedback loop in development and mobilize NGOs to monitor international organizations. Data have not yet been collected, but all of the contact information has been obtained and a successful pilot has been run on 2,500 of the NGO subjects. The main wave of data collection will occur in October of 2014 and will be analyzed according to the plan detailed below.

## Theory of Causation

NGOs play important roles in global governance, enhancing the ability of states to act collectively and to solve transboundary challenges, or alternatively filling voids left by states where state interest is not sufficient to motivate behavior. NGOs independently provide scientific advice, monitor compliance with agreements, provide signals of political support for different policies, report information on local conditions, and implement policies on behalf of states (Raustiala 1997). For international agreements, particularly those that deal with regulation, NGOs are often crucial for providing monitoring that allows for reciprocal commitments (Dai 2007). NGOs are also well-positioned to monitor the implementation of thousands of projects around the world that are funded by international organizations (Danaher 1994).

One of the key ways that NGOs gain influence with states and international organizations is by using information strategically. They provide useful information to actors that are in a position to affect international decisions (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Often, the difficulties involved with compiling and disseminating information weaken the ability of NGOs to achieve influence over the decisions that they monitor. Additionally, when NGOs do not coordinate their monitoring activities, it can be extremely difficult for decision-makers within state agencies or international organizations to make sense of the information provided by disparate groups in different formats. In the management of aid projects in particular, many writers decry the “broken feedback loop” between donors and the ultimate beneficiaries of aid projects (Barder 2009; Jacobs 2010; Martens et al. 2002;

Milner et al. 2014). Donor organizations may not have the ability to sort through information that is presented in a variety of places and formats.

Institutions that allow any and all NGOs to submit monitoring information into a centralized platform may be important for increasing accountability in aid projects. Buntaine (forthcoming) shows, for example, that the creation of an Inspection Panel at the World Bank, which allows civil society groups to submit complaints of poor performance in an institutionalized way, has shifted lending away from the types of projects that give rise to complaints. This result points to the potential for other institutions that focus and centralize monitoring to close the feedback loop and make international aid donors more responsive to the needs of local people. Before we can reach this practical goal, we must understand why NGOs contribute feedback.

Thus, the theoretical goal of this study is to understand the relative strength of incentives that motivate NGOs to provide feedback about active or recently completed development projects. To address this question, we evaluate the strength of various incentive structures available to NGOs. Because the development of new platforms for feedback will depend largely on the ability to mobilize NGOs and citizens in developing countries, all parties need better information about what drives quality feedback. There are a number of obstacles – time, material costs, willingness, for example – that might deter NGOs from providing information through an online crowdsourcing platform.

If a sufficient level of feedback is essential to close the broken feedback loop between aid agencies and their intended beneficiaries, it is vital to understand the

conditions that encourage feedback. Only after we learn how to motivate useable and constructive feedback will we be able to test the impact of the information on decision-making. Formal accountability mechanisms are becoming more important at many international organizations (Grigorescu 2010), suggesting that donors are interested in becoming responsive to civil society feedback about their programs. By first understanding what motivates feedback, we can better design and test how institutions make international organizations more responsive.

One way to overcome these obstacles might be to offer reputational and/or monetary incentives that induce participation (Blaschke et al. 2014). Or perhaps NGOs can be motivated purely through appeals to intrinsic motivations. Scholars who have studied NGOs and their roles in international affairs have debated the extent to which NGOs act according to principled positions or according to organizational imperatives to generate revenue through donations or contracts (Johnson and Prakash 2007). For proponents of greater participation by NGOs in international affairs, the propensity of NGOs to act according to principled positions has important implications. NGOs can serve as agents for policy positions that are not popular with elites or profit-making firms and can use their organizational advantages to engage in persistent advocacy that is often not possible for individuals (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Related to the delivery of development and humanitarian assistance, NGOs are less likely to be swayed by the strategic foreign policy goals of states, allowing them to more effectively serve beneficiaries on the basis of need (Bütche et al. 2012). If this perspective is correct, appeals to the collective benefits of providing feedback or the ability to engage policy-makers might help drive NGO participation in online crowdsourcing platforms.

Skeptics point out that influential NGOs can be co-opted once they reach a certain size and need to constantly raise revenue to pay for staff and other fixed expenses. Under pressure to raise resources, NGOs pursue fundable actions, rather than the principled positions that drove them to organize in the first place (Antrobus 1987; Cooley and Ron 2002; Sell and Prakash 2004). In a forthcoming book, Sarah Bush (2014) finds for example that NGOs involved in democracy promotion have become more “tame” in recent decades and rarely are involved in direct challenges to dictators. She demonstrates that the professionalization of prominent democracy-promoting NGOs and their need to deliver measurable results to raise resources has resulted in NGOs that no longer pursue programs that have a direct link to political reform.

If this logic is correct, and monetary incentives are needed to motivate feedback, NGOs are not necessarily representing the broader social interests of people that have traditionally been excluded from international governance. The literature on NGOs in poor countries demonstrates that fundraising goals are important determinants of activities. Local NGOs in poor countries often tailor their programs to align with the priorities of external funding sources (Antrobus 1987). Many NGOs became increasingly dependent on external funding as donors expanded their interactions with NGOs (Hellinger 1987). We will test whether modest financial rewards can prompt NGOs with a field presence in poor countries to provide more monitoring, which would raise concerns about the sustainability of online crowdsourcing and the strategic nature of information that is provided by NGOs to crowdsourcing platforms.

Finally, as Gourevitch, Lake, and Stein (2012) have persuasively argued, NGOs face significant hurdles in signaling credibility to donors, governments, and beneficiaries. NGOs, by their very nature, act outside the bounds of public law, which makes their actions particularly difficult to observe. NGOs thus typically do not face the same scrutiny that governmental or even market actors face: “they are bound only by their own standards of behavior when engaged in humanitarian work in other countries” (ibid. p. 6). While this may seem an advantage, it also hampers NGOs in establishing credibility. The Gourevitch, Lake, and Stein argument implies that credibility—and, by extension, reputation—weighs strongest in the calculations of NGOs and thus incentives to enhance reputation ought to generate NGO action.

In sum, we will test hypotheses about the relative strength of different incentives. We expect that all of the incentives will produce more and higher quality feedback than the control condition, which is a simple invitation.

(H1) Control < Public Good ~ Monetary ~ Voice ~ Reputation

We do not begin the experiment with strong prior hypotheses about the relative strength of the different incentives. Thus, our second main hypothesis is that the different incentives will produce unequal amounts and quality of feedback from the population of subject NGOs.



(H2) Public Good  $\neq$  Monetary  $\neq$  Voice  $\neq$  Reputation

We do have a number of directional hypotheses within particular subgroups of subjects pre-assigned to different experimental blocks. For NGOs that engage in political advocacy as a primary activity, we expect that the voice and reputation treatments will generate more and higher quality feedback than the other incentives and that this effect will be larger than the subgroup of NGOs that do not engage in political advocacy as a primary activity.

(H3) For NGOs that engage in political advocacy as a primary activity:

Control < Public Good  $\sim$  Monetary < Voice  $\sim$  Reputation

For NGOs that received grants from international organizations or governments in the past five years, we expect that opportunities for direct contact with the World Bank and opportunities to raise resources will generate more and higher quality feedback and that these effects will be larger than for the subgroup of NGOs that have not received contracts.


(H4) For NGOs that receive government or international organization contracts:

Control < Public Good  $\sim$  Reputation < Voice  $\sim$  Monetary

## **Basic Experimental Setup**

The pool of subjects will be 51,847 NGOs located in India (Figure 1). We web-scraped the email address for each NGO from the national registry of the Planning Commission of the Government of India. Any NGO that wishes to enter into cooperation with a government ministry, bid on a government contract, or receive a government benefit must first register with the Planning Commission. NGOs register with an [online form](#), indicating that all NGOs in our subject pool have the baseline technical proficiency required to respond to an email invitation to contribute feedback on an online platform. When registering with the Planning Commission, NGOs also provide their physical address and the city of their registration as an organization.

Figure 1. Indian NGOs geocoded by registration address



We will randomly assign each NGO to receive one of five email invitations to provide feedback on AidData 3.0 project pages, as described in the randomization procedure below. Each of the four treatment conditions will offer a different inducement to compare with a control condition where no added inducement is offered. All treatments have been approved by human subjects committees at UCSB, UT-Austin, and BYU prior to the submission of this design. To ensure that NGOs are presented with World Bank projects familiar to them, we will create a unique landing page on the AidData website for each NGO that will display the ten World Bank projects that are closest to their city of record, using

“Mapping for Results” geocoded data available for active World Bank projects.

## **Treatment Conditions**

*Control Condition:* our control email will not offer any form of tangible reward or remind the subject of the intrinsic benefits of providing feedback about development projects. It will simply solicit information.

*Public Good Treatment:* our email invitation will highlight the importance to the development community and peer organizations of NGOs providing feedback about projects. The prime will highlight the moral imperative of action and the benefits that feedback has to the broader public.

*Monetary Treatment:* Working together with GlobalGiving, we will inform NGOs that top contributors will receive some free training that will assist them in preparing and ramping up their fundraising efforts. GlobalGiving has agreed to provide training to 10 of the NGOs that pass the “concrete feedback” threshold described below. It is important we do not simply hand out money to top contributors, but rather capture the essence of material incentives in a way that continues to place the onus of the fundraising work on the local organizations.

*Voice Treatment:* We will inform NGOs that all comments that pass the “concrete feedback” threshold will be directly passed onto relevant staff at the World Bank together with contact information and a request that the World Bank staff follow-up. We will publicly post whether a response was received about the feedback.

*Reputation Treatment:* We will inform NGOs that 10 contributors that pass the “concrete feedback” threshold will be featured on the internationally recognized AidData blog, which receives almost 10,000 unique visits every week. We will specifically tell NGOs in this treatment condition that they will be highlighted as important contributors to enhancing accountability in global governance and improving development practice.

## **Randomization Procedure**

We collected data on the background characteristics of a subset of the NGOs as part of another experiment led by Nielson using the same set of subjects. In that experiment, all NGOs were sent a message asking if they would be interested in a research partnership with the Political Economy & Development Lab at Brigham Young University. Before being presented with experimental conditions, the subjects were asked to report characteristics about their organization to help the Political Economy & Development Lab understand the landscape of NGO activities in India. The background data collected included:

- Number of staff and volunteers

- Number of active projects
- Political advocacy as a primary activity
- Prior contracts or grants with a government agency
- Prior contracts or grants with an international organization

Approximately 2,241 NGOs (4.3%) responded and provided the full set of covariates that we use to generate blocking factors. Other NGOs opened the online form that collected covariate data but did not respond. We will use the covariate data from the Nielson study to generate three high-level blocks: (1) Active/Covariate block; (2) Active/No Data block; (3) Inactive block. For each of these blocks, we will further block on whether the NGO opens and clicks the AidData link in our pre-notification email.

We will further divide the Active/Covariate block based on the following covariate values:

- *At least one World Bank activity within 20 km.* We will present each NGO with a list of ten project locations that are most proximate to their address of registration. In the case of project locations that are not coded precisely (e.g., at the state level), the furthest possible point in the particular uncertainty buffer is chosen. Because we expect NGOs that have the opportunity to observe nearby World Bank projects

- *Grant from an international organization.* Because we strongly expect NGOs who already interact with international organizations to provide more and higher quality feedback across the treatment conditions, we further block on this binary factor.

- *Political advocacy as a primary activity.* Because we strongly expect that NGOs who engage in public advocacy will be most likely to post public information across the treatment conditions, we further block on this binary factor.

We have confirmed that this 2x2x2 blocking design which generates 8 blocks leaves enough subjects in each block so that all treatment conditions can be assigned (min block size: 79; max block size: 708). We will further block by *state of registration* within these 8 blocks to the extent that at least five subjects remain in the blocks. We will merge all the NGOs that cannot be blocked by state and also maintain a sufficient size to fully assign all treatment conditions into a multi-state block for treatment assignment.

One week prior to the experimental portion of the study, we will send a pre-notification from AidData to the subject organizations highlighting new mapping and visualization functionality, with an active link to explore the platform. We will use this email to generate further blocking factors. For these subjects we will block on whether the pre-notification did not bounce at the initial send, whether at least one World Bank activity

is located within 20 km, and the state of registration. Like above, the NGOs that cannot be blocked by state and maintain a sufficient block size will be merged into a multi-state block. For all subject organizations in any of the blocks, we will honor requests to be removed from the mailing list prior to implementation of the experiment.

We will perform complete randomization within each of the blocks that results from this procedure. Since the blocks sizes will not be multiples of the number of treatment conditions, we will first randomly assign the maximum number of complete assignments and then randomly select from the treatment conditions without replacement for the remainder. Within blocks, this means that the number of NGOs assigned to each condition cannot differ by more than one. See Appendix 2 for randomization code, which will be modified only in terms of file names and the next sequential seed for the main wave.

## **Outcomes**

*Participation outcomes.* When an NGO clicks on the unique URL provided in their email invitation, a user session will begin that records the number of pages visited, the duration of viewing, whether or not the NGO registers on the AidData website, and whether or not the NGO provides comments on the project pages. Since these outcomes must be tracked back to individual NGOs, we will include language in the invitation email that indicates that the email should not be forwarded to other organizations. The links in email invitations will expire after two clicks to ensure that our results are not badly contaminated by forwarded emails.



*Verifiability coding.* In addition to measuring the interaction of invitees with the AidData website, we will code and moderate all comments before they become part of any project page. In particular, we will code comments on whether they contain observable and verifiable facts about the results and outcomes of World Bank projects, only publicly releasing those that contain this content. We will adapt a coding scheme used for a previous crowdsourcing projects completed in collaboration with UNICEF (Blaschke et al. 2014), as follows:

- 1 - Off topic and not useful
- 2 - On topic, poor quality, broad or unclear opinions, without verifiable information
- 3 - On topic, with specific, but basic information about results that can be verified
- 4 - On topic, with thoughtful and highly verifiable information that is unambiguous
- 5 - On topic, excellent, insightful, and reasoned explanation with several verifiable information points

These codes will be used to operationalize the “concrete feedback” threshold for the voice and monetary incentives (code  $\geq 3$ ). Every NGO will receive identical instructions for providing feedback. In particular, each NGO will be asked to provide factual feedback in the comments section of the individual project records selected for them. The email invitation will stress the importance of factual information and the landing page will contain these

further instructions:

[Welcome to the AidData platform](#). Thank you for considering providing information about development projects located in your area. Below you will find a list of ten World Bank projects that are closest to your address of record. Click any of the links to explore these projects. On the individual project pages, you will find a button called "Add Comment." By clicking this button you will be able to add information about this project that you have observed. We seek to gather factual observations about how the project was design and implemented, as well as how it has impacted local people and communities. Please note that any information you submit will be displayed publicly on the platform along with the name of your organization after being approved by an AidData moderator. You are also welcome to add comments about any project you see on the AidData platform. If you have any questions or comments about the platform, feel free to contact us at [ngofeedback@aiddata.org](mailto:ngofeedback@aiddata.org).

*Other outcome measures.* In addition to coding the verifiability of information, we will code all comments on whether they contain positive, neutral, negative, or mixed information about the outcomes of World Bank projects. While these outcomes do not measure feedback, they will be used to analyze which incentives generate the most interest in providing feedback of various kinds across the experimental conditions. We will conduct exploratory hypothesis tests about subsets of positive and negative feedback per Hypothesis 2.

## **Plans for Data Analysis**

For binary outcomes, we will compare the rates of participation and feedback for NGOs that are assigned to the different treatment conditions by using randomization

inference, aggregated across blocks. The uncertainty about treatment effects will be analyzed using the sampling distribution produced by randomization inference under the sharp null hypothesis test. For all directional hypotheses listed above we will base inference on one-tailed tests and for inequality hypotheses we will base inference on two-tailed tests. We will complete subgroup analyses by randomization inferences as described for the above hypotheses.

We will also employ ordered probit regression with blocking covariates as controls to assess the treatment effects on the ordinal variable measuring the quality of the feedback. We may additionally add control variables for number of programs, number of volunteers, other measures of the average distance to projects, and the substantive issue areas of the subjects listed in their registration in the list presented to the NGOs. We will report results without covariates when reporting any of these regression results.

In addition to calculating the standard intent to treat (ITT) effects that measure the net impact of the treatments across the subject pool, we will also obtain the complier average causal effects (CACE) using information from our email server about whether the treatment was actually reached each organization. We using Qualtrics Mailer, we are able to see the group-level open rates for each treatment condition within each block. After performing a test that compliance does not vary systematically across the groups, we will adjust the estimates of ITT effects by the rate of compliance when calculating our hypothesis tests. We have no reason to expect compliance to vary across the experimental groups, since all subjects will receive an email with the same subject line and compliance is

measured when the email is opened and the invitation and its associated incentive is received.

One concern about the design is cross-contamination of the subjects with different experimental treatments. In particular, we cannot prevent NGOs from forwarding the invitations that they receive to other NGOs that they believe would like to contribute information. Our email distributor will build an identifier key into the link in the invitation that will allow us to match registration details with invitation details to ensure that cross-contamination is not occurring. In addition, each link in the experimental emails will only work for two clicks before registration is required to provide feedback.

We did not conduct a power analysis prior to this experiment as the marginal cost of additional subjects is zero and we have no way to expand the pool of subjects.

## Appendix 1: Preliminary and Treatment Emails

Email #1: To establish dead / inactive / active blocking factors

<<Organization name>>,

Greetings from AidData, the world's leading platform for collecting and disseminating information about development projects.

We have just launched a mapping platform that allows organizations and people around the world to visualize and explore nearby development projects. We seek to make information about development both more accessible and more actionable. We aim to provide organizations such as yours with the tools needed to stay informed about the projects and programs that are located in the areas where you work.

Some of our best information is in India, particularly projects funded by the World Bank. We wanted to send a link to our new web portal that allows you to visualize and explore these projects. Over time, we will be building this platform to be more complete and useful, but we wanted to make organizations like yours aware of this resource now. Click the map below to enter the AidData India platform or visit [this link](#).

[Insert static image of India map with link]

We hope that you will find this platform useful. If you have the chance, you will also see that the AidData web portal has a number of other tools, including a worldwide database and a blog about our work. We welcome you to explore these features.

In the near future, we might contact you about new functionality to the AidData platform that will allow organizations and people to submit their own information and comments. We hope this will be a useful addition and generate more information about what works in development. We also hope you will participate. However, if you would not like to hear from us again, please click the unsubscribe link.

All the best,  
AidData Feedback Team

## Email #2: Invitation with experimental treatments

<<Name of Organization>>:

AidData, the world's leading provider of information about development projects, has created a new platform to collect information about the outcomes of development projects. We are launching this platform in India. By clicking [this link](#), you can explore the AidData platform and provide comments about World Bank projects that are close to your location.

Control Subject: Provide feedback about World Bank projects at AidData

C [no additional text is added]

WB Subject: To potentially make contact with World Bank India office, provide feedback about World Bank projects

WB [We are offering a special opportunity to make your voice heard when you participate. We will directly send all high-quality comments to the World Bank India office for a response. We will publicly post whether you receive a response. The anticipated direct communication with World Bank staff will enable selected organizations to provide more information and discuss how local voices can improve development projects.]

GG Subject: For coaching on attracting new donors, provide feedback about World Bank projects

GG [We are offering a special opportunity to raise financial resources when you participate. GlobalGiving, the world's leading platform that connects non-profit organizations to donors, will reach out to at least ten organizations that provide high-quality feedback and provide coaching on reaching new donors. Coaching on fundraising provided by GlobalGiving will enable selected organizations to more effectively raise the resources necessary to participate in development].

FT Subject: To enhance reputation through popular blog, provide feedback about World Bank projects

FT [We are offering a special opportunity to enhance the profile and reputation of your organization when you participate. The AidData team, which runs a high-profile international blog that receives approximately 10,000 unique visitors each week, will reach out to at least ten organizations that provide high-quality feedback and feature their contribution to development in India. The opportunity to be recognized at an international level will enable selected organizations to enhance their reputation and status in the development community.

PG Subject: To promote the public good, provide feedback about World Bank projects

PG [We are offering a special opportunity to contribute to the public good and promote better development practice when you participate. For development projects to be more effective, we need organizations to take the time to contribute high-quality feedback on behalf of all citizens. Organizations that contribute information are doing their part to make sure that everyone benefits from better development projects.]

Your organization has been specifically selected to participate because we believe you will have valuable feedback about development projects. We obtained your contact information from the registry of non-government organizations at the Ministry of Planning.

To make it easy to provide observations and feedback, we have pre-selected ten active World Bank projects that are located close to the mailing address on record for your organization in the registry, which can be accessed at [this link](#). We are interested in collecting factual, direct observations about how these projects have been implemented and how they have impacted the lives of people who live nearby. AidData is committed to open and transparent data about development finance. Please note that any information you submit will be displayed publicly on the platform along with the name of your organization.

Over time, the goal of this platform is to improve development projects and practice. We are very interested in your observations and comments. Thank you in advance for any contributions of information.

Click the image to enter the AidData platform:

<<Embed AidData logo>>

All the best,  
AidData Feedback Team

### **Email #3 - Reminder Language**

If no response is received, within a week we will send reminder emails that reinforce the key treatment language and refer to the original email.

Control Reminder Subject: Reminder: Provide feedback about World Bank projects

C We recently sent you an invitation to provide feedback about World Bank projects on AidData's platform. Please see the original invitation copied below. We hope you can take the time to visit the AidData platform and leave feedback. Thank you in advance for your observations and comments.

Original C invitation copied here...

WB Reminder Subject: Reminder: To potentially make contact with World Bank India office, provide feedback about World Bank projects

WB We recently sent you an invitation to potentially be in contact with the World Bank India office by providing feedback about World Bank projects on AidData's platform. Please see the original invitation copied below. We hope you can take the time to visit the AidData platform and leave feedback. Thank you in advance for your observations and comments.

Original WB invitation copied here...

GG Reminder Subject: Reminder: For coaching on attracting new donors, provide feedback about World Bank projects

GG We recently sent you an invitation to receive coaching on attracting new donors by providing feedback about World Bank projects on AidData's platform. Please see the original invitation copied below. We hope you can take the time to visit the AidData platform and leave feedback. Thank you in advance for your observations and comments.

Original GG invitation copied here...

FT Reminder Subject: Reminder: To enhance reputation through popular blog, provide feedback about World Bank projects

FT We recently sent you an invitation to enhance your organization's global reputation through a popular development blog by providing feedback about World Bank projects on AidData's platform. Please see the original invitation copied below. We hope you can take the time to visit the AidData platform and leave feedback. Thank you in advance for your observations and comments.

PG Reminder Subject: Reminder: To promote the public good, provide feedback about World Bank projects



PG We recently sent you an invitation to promote the public good and improve aid effectiveness by providing feedback about World Bank projects on AidData's platform. Please see the original invitation copied below. We hope you can take the time to visit the AidData platform and leave feedback. Thank you in advance for your observations and comments.

Original PG invitation copied here...

## Appendix 2: Randomization Code in R

```
set.seed(103) #Random number generator seed
treats <- c("C","PG","WB","GG","FT") #List of treatment conditions
blocks <- unique(pilot2$block) #List of blocks within which to perform complete
randomization

for (i in 1:length(blocks)){
  size <- nrow(subset(pilot2,block==blocks[i])) #Obtaining the size of each block
  treat.list <- rep(sample(treats),40)[1:size] #Set this list to cover even the largest block
  treat.list <- sample(treat.list) #Randomly resorting treatment states within each block
  pilot2$type[pilot2$block==blocks[i]] <- treat.list #Assigning treatment states to each
  block
}
pilot2$type <- ifelse(pilot2$block=="No",0,pilot2$type) #Removing treatment from opted-
out subjects
```

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