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The Missing Link: How Political Values Matter for Global Legitimacy Beliefs

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Abstract: While many scholars expect people's political values to shape their legitimacy beliefs toward international organizations (IOs), research has found surprisingly limited support for this common assumption. This paper resolves this puzzle by identifying ideological proximity as the missing link between political values and IO legitimacy beliefs. Theoretically, it develops the novel argument that citizens accord IOs greater legitimacy when they perceive these organizations as ideologically closer to their own political values. Empirically, it evaluates this expectation through an ambitious multi-method design, combining observational and experimental analyses of new survey evidence from four countries: Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, and the United States. The results show that citizens indeed perceive IOs to have particular ideological profiles and that those perceptions moderate the relationship between political values and IO legitimacy beliefs. These findings suggest that political values matter systematically for people's legitimacy beliefs toward IOs, but in ways previous research has been unable to capture.

International organizations (IOs) appear to be increasingly contested. Britain's decision to leave the European Union (EU), disillusionment with United Nations (UN) climate negotiations, pushback against the World Health Organization's (WHO's) handling of COVID-19, recurring criticism of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the general rise of anti-globalist populism all signal substantial discontent with IOs (Copelovitch and Pevehouse 2019; Stephen and Zürn 2019; Adler-Nissen and Zarakol 2020; Walter 2021).

This development in world politics has led to a wave of new research on the popular legitimacy of global governance – i.e., the extent to which citizens consider an IO's authority to be appropriately exercised (e.g., Tallberg, Bäckstrand, and Scholte 2018; Zürn 2018; Bexell, Jönsson, and Uhlin 2022; Dellmuth et al. 2022; Sommerer et al. 2022). A key issue in this literature pertains to the sources of legitimacy beliefs. Existing research has found support for a variety of individual-level (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Schlipphak 2015; Ecker-Ehrhardt 2016; Dellmuth et al. 2022), institutional (Anderson, Bernauer, and Kachi 2019; Dellmuth, Scholte, and Tallberg 2019; Bernauer, Mohrenberg, and Koubi 2020), and communicative drivers (Spilker, Nguyen, and Bernauer 2020; Brutger and Clark 2021; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2021; Ghassim 2022).

Yet one core expectation has failed to attract significant support, namely, that citizens' legitimacy beliefs toward IOs would be influenced by the *political values* they hold. Previous studies have typically found no, weak or inconsistent relationships between citizens' political values and their legitimacy beliefs toward IOs (e.g., Torgler 2008; Weßels and Strijbis 2019; Dellmuth et al. 2022; Bearce and Jolliff Scott 2019). Expectations that people on the left systematically would perceive IOs as more legitimate, or that people with traditionalist values generally would regard IOs more negatively, are usually not borne out by the data. The most comprehensive assessment to date concludes: "For all the talk that value shifts in mass publics would drive a backlash against IOs, our study finds the values-based explanation to matter the least" (Dellmuth et al. 2022, 159).

The weak support for political values is puzzling in several respects. It conflicts with findings in American and comparative politics that political values are of fundamental importance for people's attitudes toward political issues and institutions (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Jacoby 2006). It challenges recent accounts that present ideology

as central to the new wave of contestation over IOs (P. de Wilde et al. 2019; Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks 2019). And it flies in the face of the common observation that anti-globalist populism in contemporary politics appears to be fueled by right-wing and nationalist movements.

This paper helps to resolve this puzzle by providing a new understanding on how political values matter for legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. It argues that political values are linked to legitimacy beliefs in more complex ways than previous research has been able to capture. Instead of expecting an unconditional and uniform association between citizens' political values and legitimacy beliefs, we submit that this relationship is moderated by an overlooked mechanism: citizens' perceptions of IOs as ideological objects. How citizens are located on certain ideological dimensions is insufficient to predict their attitudes toward IOs; what also is required is an appreciation of how they perceive the ideological profiles of IOs. We develop this new understanding by way of two contributions.

First, we develop a novel theoretical argument about the importance of ideological proximity for citizens' legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. Because of IOs' policy agendas and impacts, citizens associate these organizations with certain ideological profiles. When citizens perceive an IO as more ideologically close to their own political values, they are likely to regard it as more legitimate. We theorize this ideological proximity on two dimensions: the classic left-right dimension and a more recent dimension distinguishing between green, alternative, and liberal (GAL) values on the one hand, and traditional, authoritarian, and nationalist (TAN) values on the other hand.

Second, we test this expectation empirically by combining observational and experimental analyses based on new survey data from nationally representative samples in four countries: Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, and the United States (US).¹ The observational analysis evaluates our argument by relying on measures of citizens' perceptions of the ideological profiles of real-world IOs. The experimental analysis offers a complementary causal assessment by examining the effects on legitimacy beliefs of treatments that vary the ideological profiles of hypothetical IOs. We selected these four countries because they show inconsistent relationships between

¹ The survey was pre-registered (EGAP Registration ID: 20221005AA, <https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/5E7JD>) and approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Social Sciences at University Duisburg-Essen in September 2022.

political values and IO legitimacy beliefs at the aggregate level. If our analyses reveal that these varying aggregate patterns are underpinned by the very same mechanism at the individual level – ideological proximity – then we have identified a generic way in which political values matter for IO legitimacy beliefs.

Our central findings are three-fold. First, citizens indeed tend to perceive existing IOs to have particular ideological profiles. With striking consistency, citizens rate some IOs as more left-leaning and GAL and other IOs as more right-leaning and TAN. The exception is the evidence on respondents from Indonesia, which do not differentiate between the assessed IOs on the left-right dimension. This pattern supports our assumption that citizens associate IOs with certain ideological orientations.

Second, as expected, citizens' legitimacy beliefs toward IOs depend on the proximity between their perceptions of an organization's ideological profile and their own political values. The observational analysis shows that the perceived ideological profiles of real-world IOs moderate the relationship between political values and legitimacy beliefs. This finding is consistent across all of four IOs and both ideological dimensions. Similarly, the experimental analysis demonstrates that legitimacy beliefs are stronger among those treated with hypothetical IO profiles that accord more closely to their own political values.

Third, the importance of ideological proximity for IO legitimacy beliefs varies across political values. The perceived ideological profile of IOs appears to matter more for right-leaning and TAN citizens than for left-leaning and GAL citizens. People with left and GAL values tend to have high confidence in IOs largely irrespective of the perceived ideological profile of these organizations, whereas people with right and TAN values are more influenced by perceived ideological profiles. We attribute this finding to strong political priors among people with left and GAL values on international issues.

The remainder of the paper is in four parts. The next section presents the puzzle at greater length, summarizing previous research on the relationship between political values and IO legitimacy beliefs, and contributing an empirical illustration based on new data from the World Values Survey (WVS). The third section develops our theoretical argument. The fourth section introduces the general survey design, the design of the observational part, and the design of the

experimental part. The fifth section presents the findings of the observational and experimental analyses. By way of conclusion, we discuss the broader implications of the results for our understanding of the sources of IO legitimacy, the role of political values, and the conceptualization of IOs as ideological actors in international relations theory.

The Puzzle: Political Values and Global Legitimacy Beliefs

The expectation that political values influence people's legitimacy beliefs toward IOs builds on a rich literature in comparative politics and international relations that highlights the role of political values in attitude formation. Political values refer to "abstract, general conceptions about the desirable or undesirable end-states of human life," which provide people with a "general evaluative standard for confronting the world" (Jacoby 2006, 706; see also Rokeach 1973).

Political values are commonly mapped on one or several ideological dimensions. Ideologies refer to shared sets of "beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved" (Erikson and Tedin 2015, 64; see also Jost, Federico, and Napier 2013). The distinction between the political "left" and "right" is a central ideological dimension. The left-wing end of this dimension is typically associated with support for a more egalitarian distribution of income and greater government intervention in economy and society, whereas the right-wing end is usually associated with the belief that inequality is a natural condition and with support for a more laissez-faire approach to politics (Bobbio 1996). The ordering of people's political values along the left-right spectrum has been related to deep-seated societal cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), to the dominant role of socialist and conservative parties in many party systems (Mair 2007), and to individual attitudes toward welfare (Feldman and Steenbergen 2001) and government spending (Jacoby 2006).

Recent years have seen growing scholarly attention to another ideological dimension, which appears to be orthogonal to the left-right dimension, and which distinguishes between "GAL" and "TAN" values (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Kriesi et al. 2008; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Dellmuth et al. 2022). This GAL-TAN scale captures attitudes on a range of social, cultural, and environmental issues that fit poorly on the left-right dimension, but that have

become more visible in contemporary politics, such as immigration, gender equality, ecological concerns, and national sovereignty. The GAL-TAN dimension is borne out of a large literature that has critically examined the left-right dimension and proposed alternative distinctions, for instance, between materialist and post-materialist values (Inglehart 1990) and between libertarian and authoritarian orientations (Kitschelt 1995). Studies show that growing contestation along the GAL-TAN dimension has contributed to a restructuring of national party systems, as manifested particularly in the rising importance of green parties and new nationalist parties (Norris and Inglehart 2019; Hooghe and Marks 2018).

A growing body of research suggests that these ideological dimensions structure people's attitudes toward international politics. Studies have found that people on the left tend to be more positively disposed toward globalization (Noël and Thérien 2008), international cooperation (Holsti and Rosenau 1990), and foreign trade (Mutz 2021) than people on the right. These findings are consistent with ideas sometimes referred to as "left internationalism" (Hardt and Negri 2000; Sluga 2013; Dogliani 2017; Walzer 2018). The weight of the left-right dimension on international issues appears to be particularly strong in the US (Milner and Tingley 2015; Brutger and Clark 2021), while the evidence in Europe is more mixed (e.g., Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Van Elsas and Van Der Brug 2015).

Similarly, the GAL-TAN dimension has been found to shape attitudes toward international issues, especially when they concern policies on immigration, environment, and trade (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks 2019; Weßels and Strijbis 2019; Dellmuth et al. 2022). In the European context, the GAL-TAN dimension appears to have grown in importance as regional integration has deepened, invoking issues related to state sovereignty (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005).

Inspired by this literature in comparative politics and international relations, students of legitimacy in global governance have recently turned to political values as a promising explanation. The core expectation is that citizens' political values shape their beliefs in the legitimacy of IOs (e.g., Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Schlipphak 2015; Ecker-Ehrhardt 2016; Verhaegen, Scholte, and Tallberg 2021; Dellmuth et al. 2022). Such an explanation would be consistent with earlier research on the role of political values for attitude formation, but also

with observations that the legitimacy of IOs appears to be increasingly contested on ideological lines (Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks 2019).

Yet, the evidence remains weak or contradictory. Edwards (2009) analyzes data from the Pew Global Attitudes Survey and finds that left-leaning people in 24 developing countries are more critical of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO than right-leaning people. Likewise, Lee and Prather (2020) show in their survey-experimental study in Australia and the US that left-leaning citizens are less likely to support international law enforcement. By contrast, Weßels and Strijbis (2019) find that left-leaning citizens are more supportive of IO authority when examining attitudes toward the UN in five countries (Germany, Mexico, Poland, Turkey, and the US).

Several other studies find no or inconsistent relationships. Torgler (2008) analyzes data from the WVS across a broader sample of 38 countries, but does not find any support that left-right values matter for attitudes toward the UN. Anderson et al. (2019) find that legitimacy beliefs toward global climate governance are related to left-right ideology in the US but not in Germany. Bearce and Jolliff Scott (2019) analyze attitudes toward IOs in 32 countries and find that being left does not matter while being right is associated with more negative evaluations. Wratil and Wäckerle (2023) do not find left-right values to consistently moderate cueing effects on legitimacy beliefs toward the EU in five member states (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain).

The most comprehensive assessment so far has been undertaken by Dellmuth and colleagues (2022, 137-134), who examine whether legitimacy beliefs toward six major IOs (International Criminal Court (ICC), IMF, UN, World Bank, WHO, and WTO) are systematically related to left-right and GAL-TAN values. A pooled analysis of respondents in Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, and the US suggests that political values matter. However, separate country analyses show that these findings are driven exclusively by the US, where more left-leaning and GAL-oriented respondents have greater confidence in these IOs than right-leaning and TAN-oriented respondents, while no association is found in the other four countries.

As this brief survey shows, political values do not appear to consistently link to IO legitimacy beliefs. Our own examination of new data from the seventh wave of the World Values Survey

(WVS7) underlines this conclusion. We focus on 38 countries² for which data are available on citizen legitimacy beliefs toward six prominent IOs: the ICC, IMF, UN, World Bank, WHO, and WTO.

To operationalize legitimacy beliefs, we use a measure of confidence in IOs, as discussed in the research design section. To model cross-country variation in how IO confidence is related to political values, we apply a multi-level random-coefficient models (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). These models estimate associations between respondents' political values and IO confidence, controlling for other factors as suggested in Dellmuth et al. (2022, ch. 7; see Appendix A).³

We present results of this analysis in Figures 1 and 2. The left panel of Figure 1 shows that the association between left-right values and IO confidence across all respondents varies extensively across country samples. This variation across countries is statistically significant.⁴ In one group of countries, left-leaning individuals tend to have significantly more confidence in IOs than right-leaning citizens. The US stands out as an extreme case in this group. However, in another group of countries, among them, Indonesia, the relationship is the reverse. Finally, a third group of countries, which include Brazil and Germany, are closer to the global average, showing no significant relationship between left-right and IO confidence.

A similar picture arises in relation to GAL-TAN values (Figure 2).⁵ Again, this variation across countries is statistically significant. In one group of countries, including Indonesia and the US, citizen with GAL values tend to have more confidence in IOs than citizens with TAN values. However, in the large majority of countries, among them, Brazil and Germany, there is no significant relationship between GAL-TAN values and IO confidence.


² For a full list of countries covered in the analysis, see Appendix A.

³ All models estimate “fixed effects” – population-averaged effects of political values on IO confidence across all respondents – and “random effects” – which capture the variation of estimated effects across country-samples of respondents. Figures present “total effects” by combining the “fixed” and “random” portion.

⁴ A likelihood-ratio test confirms that the inclusion of a random-coefficient for left-right significantly improves the overall fit of the model ($\chi^2(2) = 730.98, p < .0001$). While statistically insignificant on average, country-specific (total) effects of left-right substantially vary from positive to negative cases.


⁵ A likelihood-ratio test again confirms that the association between GAL-TAN and IO confidence varies across countries: the inclusion of a random-coefficient is warranted to increase the overall fit of the model ($\chi^2(2) = 487.03, p < .0001$). While statistically significant on average (see Appendix A, Table A2), country-specific (total) effects of GAL-TAN substantially vary from insignificant to negative cases

Figure 1: Estimated association between left-right values and IO confidence by country



Note: Lines represent country-specific estimates for the total (fixed + random) effect of left-right self-placement on confidence in IOs (index). Estimates from two random-coefficient models controlling for country-specific variation of left-right self-placement and using pooled data from the WVS7 of 38,101 to 43,052 individuals from 38 countries (see Appendix A, Table A2 for full results). Grey areas indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 2: Estimated association between GAL-TAN values and IO confidence by country



Note: Lines represent country-specific estimates for the total (fixed + random) effect of GAL-TAN (index) on confidence in IOs (index). Estimates from two random-coefficient models controlling for country-specific variation of GAL-TAN (index) and using pooled data from the WVS7 of 38,101 to 43,052 individuals from 38 countries (see Appendix A, Table A2 for full results). Grey areas indicate 95% confidence intervals.

In sum: contrary to common expectations, existing studies as well as new WVS7 data provide mixed and contradictory evidence on the relationship between citizens' political values and their legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. Next, we develop a new argument that seeks to resolve this puzzle by privileging a hitherto overlooked factor: the ideological proximity between citizens' own political values and their perceptions of the ideological profiles of IOs.

Theorizing the missing link: ideological proximity

In our argument, citizens' legitimacy beliefs toward an IO depend on the proximity between their perceptions of the IO's ideological profile and their own political values. When citizens perceive an IO as ideologically closer to their own political values, they tend to regard it as more legitimate. This expectation rests on two key assumptions: that citizens hold political values which guide their outlook on politics, and that citizens perceive IOs as political institutions with ideological profiles. While we share the first assumption with previous research on political values, the second assumption sets our argument apart from earlier scholarship and leads to novel expectations about the ways in which political values matter for IO legitimacy beliefs. In the following, we outline the logic of this argument and derive testable hypotheses.

In international relations theory, IOs are oftentimes presented as political institutions that perform non-ideological functions, such as coordinating expectations, lowering transaction costs, and monitoring non-compliance (e.g., Keohane 1984; Martin and Simmons 2013; Rittberger et al. 2019). Much like legislatures at the domestic level, IOs are understood as political institutions that do not, in and of themselves, represent any particular ideological position. While IOs may adopt decisions with distinct political implications, those decisions result from competition within these organizations, where some actors come out as winners and others as losers on a given issue (Moravcsik 1998; Dreher and Lang 2019; Rittberger et al. 2019). From this perspective, there is nothing inherently ideological about IOs.

Our assumption moves away from this conception of IOs. We regard it as more plausible that citizens interpret IOs as ideological by nature than as apolitical institutions.

First, IOs have typically been construed to advance certain policy goals rather than others: free trade (WTO), human rights (UN), poverty alleviation (World Bank), labor protection (International Labor Organization, ILO), democracy promotion (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE), macro-economic stability (IMF), and so on. These policy goals are usually hard-wired into IOs through formal treaties and informal understandings, making them a core part of the organizational DNA. Because of the way in which IOs actively protect and promote certain political ideals, they have even been said to function as “norm teachers”

(Finnemore 1993) and “moral authorities” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004) vis-à-vis states and societies.

Some observers describe the policy goals of IOs as generally associated with liberal political values, leading them to characterize the global governance system established by Western countries post-World War II as a “liberal international order” (Ikenberry 2010). Other observers rather speak of how IOs such as the UN typically advance a form of “welfare internationalism,” characterized by strong leftist ambitions to “accommodate the poor and disempowered” (Holthaus and Steffek 2020, 203). Yet others take an in-between position, describing the post-war order as an ideological compromise between free-market ideals and state interventionism (Ruggie 1982). Developments in recent years have also led observers to characterize some IOs, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as authoritarian in ideological profile, because of the non-liberal goals they promote (Obydenkova and Libman 2019, 230–32).

Second, the political nature of the policy goals promoted by IOs likely lead citizens to view IOs as having particular ideological profiles. Promoting free trade, defending labor rights, ensuring macroeconomic stability, and combatting poverty may not be regarded by citizens as neutral goals as much as efforts to further certain political ideals rather than others. Often, the goals of IOs link to dimensions of ideological contestation, such as left versus right. For instance, the goals of free trade and deregulation are associated with market liberalism, while the goals of redistribution and social rights are associated with socialism or social democracy.

The exact ways in which citizens construct the ideological profile of IOs are bound to vary. An IO’s ideological position is ultimately a perception in the eye of the beholder. It is not uncommon that the very same IO is criticized from competing political angles. Consider the EU, which oftentimes is debated on left-right lines of market intervention versus market liberalization. Many left-wing critics portray European integration as a right-wing project to undermine social welfare provisions, while many right-wing critics regard the EU as a left-wing project for supranational market regulation. On other occasions, however, left-wing supporters see the EU as a way to tame global capitalism, while right-wing supporters see the EU as a way to liberalize markets that, in their eyes, are overly regulated at the national level.

Similar dynamics are at play in relation to global organizations. While the UN often is seen as a guardian of human rights, the organization has also been accused of violating those very same rights in its peacebuilding missions (Westendorf and Searle 2017). While many have praised NATO's efforts to protect liberal democracy, critics have also condemned the organization for neo-imperialist interventionism (Risse-Kappen 1991; Kuperman 2013). While the World Bank is appreciated by many for promoting development in the Global South, it is also regarded by others as a neoliberal organization representing a "Washington Consensus" that has aggravated inequalities within and between societies (Weaver 2008).

Why citizens perceive IOs to have certain ideological profiles is likely shaped by a variety of factors next to the policy goals of these organizations. Citizens are differentially exposed to the policies of IOs and may form varying perceptions of these organizations on that basis (Chapman and Chaudoin 2020). Likewise, how citizens perceive IOs ideologically may be shaped by the national political landscape, including the positions that political parties and social movements take toward specific IOs (cf. della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Kriesi et al. 2008; Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012; Dellmuth et al. 2022, 292–93).

Citizens perceiving IOs to have certain ideological profiles is not dependent on them being highly knowledgeable about global governance. When citizens lack knowledge about political issues in general, they typically compensate for these deficits by relying on various forms of heuristics to form opinions (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Lau and Redlawsk 2001). We expect such dynamics to be at play also when citizens form perceptions of the ideological profiles of IOs. A simple heuristic are the names of IOs, which often point to policy goals that (rightly or wrongly) can be interpreted in ideological terms. Consider the "World Trade Organization" and the "International Labour Organization." A more advanced, but common, heuristic are cues about IOs from elites that citizens trust, such as national governments, political parties, and non-governmental organizations (Maier, Adam, and Maier 2012; Torcal, Martini, and Orriols 2018; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020a; Brutger and Clark 2021).

The assumption that citizens perceive IOs to have certain ideological profiles leads to novel expectations about the way in which political values matter for legitimacy beliefs. It suggests that citizens form attitudes toward IOs by jointly considering their own political values and their perception of the ideological orientation of an IO. Taken together, those two features yield

a citizen's ideological proximity to an IO. Ideological proximity will be high when citizens, for instance, embrace left-wing or TAN values and perceive an IO to stand for the same ideological position. Conversely, ideological proximity will be low when citizens, for instance, hold right-wing or GAL values and associate an IO with the opposite ideological position. In other words, ideological proximity is the inverse difference between a citizen's political values and perception of the ideological profile of an IO.

We expect the mechanism of ideological proximity to provide the missing link between political values and IO legitimacy beliefs. In our understanding, previous research has failed to properly capture the effect of political values on legitimacy beliefs because it has neglected the different ways in which citizens perceive the ideological profiles of IOs and thus the varying levels of ideological proximity they experience. Political values by themselves are seldom enough to explain citizen attitudes toward IOs, as evidenced by findings in earlier research and our empirical illustration. We also need to consider the distinctive ways in which individual citizens perceive the ideological profiles of specific IOs. With those two components in place, we can identify the unique ideological proximity of a citizen toward a given IO.

Our expectation about the importance of ideological proximity extends theorizing on political values, but also develops intuitions in prior research on sources of legitimacy. Scott (1991, 169) speaks of how legitimacy for an institution may derive primarily from "societal evaluations of organizational goals." Nielson et al. (2019, 692) suggest that "actors may assess organizations not merely on how they operate and whether they accomplish their goals, but on what the goals themselves are and whether these are normatively desirable." Dellmuth and Tallberg (2023, Ch. 7) suggest that people's legitimacy beliefs toward IOs are influenced by the social purposes of these organizations. Research in American politics also offers support for this intuition, indicating that trust in the US Supreme Court is directly related to the degree to which its rulings match citizens' principled beliefs (Malhotra and Jessee 2014).

We formulate two hypotheses on the basis of our core expectation – one for each of the two key dimensions of ideological contention. Previous research has found varying support for left-right and GAL-TAN as ideological dimensions structuring the international attitudes of citizens (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks 2019; Dellmuth et al. 2022). Similarly, our empirical illustration in the previous section suggests that left-right and GAL-

TAN are varyingly related to legitimacy beliefs toward IOs in different countries. Providing two hypotheses therefore allows for a more nuanced and precise assessment of our core claim:

H1a. When citizens perceive an IO as more ideologically close to their own political values on the left-right scale, they regard this IO as more legitimate.

H1b. When citizen perceive an IO as more ideologically close to their own political values on the GAL-TAN scale, they regard this IO as more legitimate.

Research design

To examine our hypotheses, we have collected novel survey data, which we analyze by combining observational and experimental methods. The two parts are complementary: while the observational analysis evaluates our expectations based on citizen perceptions of the ideological profiles of real-world IOs, the experimental analysis offers a causal assessment of the same relationship in the context of hypothetical IOs. In this section, we describe the design of the overall survey, the observational study, and the experimental study.

Survey design

As the association between political values and IO legitimacy beliefs varies greatly across contexts, we conducted a cross-national survey. We selected four countries that display considerable variation in the nature of this association at the aggregate country level – Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, and the US (Table 1) – which allows us to draw generalizable conclusions about the potential importance of ideological proximity for IO legitimacy beliefs.

Table 1: Country selection based on association between political values and IO legitimacy

	Positive association (left-right)	Statistically insignificant	Negative association (left-right)
Negative association (GAL-TAN)	Indonesia		US
Statistically insignificant		Germany, Brazil	

Note: Entries reflect associations as discussed in the section on the research puzzle (see Figure 1 and 2).

This selection has three additional advantages. First, these countries are major powers in their respective world region, implying that our findings will stem from countries that are politically important for IOs. Yet there is variation in international status, with Germany and the US being established international powers, Brazil a rising power, and Indonesia more peripheral on the world stage. Second, focusing on democracies minimizes the risk that legitimacy might be interpreted differently across countries (Jamal and Nooruddin 2010). There are, however, differences on the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) index, which categorizes Germany and the US as liberal democracies, and Brazil and Indonesia as electoral democracies (Boese et al. 2022). Third, these four countries all have high levels of Internet penetration, which strengthens our confidence in the external validity of the survey data: Germany and the US over 90 percent, Brazil over 80 percent, and Indonesia over 60 percent (World Bank 2022).

The survey was fielded online by Belindi/Respondi between mid-October and mid-December 2022. Belindi/Respondi uses targeted quota sampling for age and gender, where quotas match the age-sex distributions in each country.⁶ The sample size is 3246 for Brazil, 3221 for Germany, 3070 for Indonesia, and 3284 for the US.

The questionnaire contained 79 questions. It began with a range of questions on respondents' political interests and political value orientations on both the left-right and GAL-TAN dimensions. We then presented vignettes about hypothetical IOs, each followed by a question

⁶ Bilendi/Respondi provided double opt-in access panels and had an e-points system in place to gratify respondents. In 2022, fielding took place from October 19-29 in the US, November 30 to December 13 in Germany, December 2-15 in Indonesia, and December 7-17 in Brazil.

capturing the outcome of main interest – IO legitimacy beliefs – and a manipulation check. Finally, we finally asked for people’s perceptions of the ideological profiles of various IOs, and included a range of political knowledge items, as well as an instructional attention check. We also collected demographic data, such as age, gender, and partisanship.

Observational study

The observational part has two purposes. First, we examine the extent to which people perceive IOs to have distinct ideological profiles, as we assume in our argument. Second, we conduct an observational test of our hypotheses, regressing legitimacy beliefs on indicators of political values, an interaction term between political values and perceptions of IOs’ ideological orientations, and potential correlates.⁷

Political values and perceptions of ideological profiles of IOs are operationalized on the left-right and GAL-TAN dimensions.⁸ Political values are measured by two items. A first item asks for a self-placement on a quasi-continuous left-right scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right). A second item similarly asks for self-placement on a GAL-TAN scale ranging from 0 to 10, providing statements of respective orientations at both ends of the scale (see Appendix C). To measure perceptions of IOs’ ideological profiles, we provide a series of equivalent scales that each ask respondents to place a single IO on the left-right and GAL-TAN scales. Here we focus our measurement on four major IOs: the IMF, World Bank, WHO, and UN. We select these IOs as they work in different issue areas, potentially invoking varying ideological associations among respondents. Moreover, these four IOs have substantial authority in their respective domains which makes it more likely that citizens have developed opinions on them.

We operationalize legitimacy beliefs through a question about the extent to which respondents have confidence in a specific IO on a scale from 0 (no confidence) to 10 (complete confidence). The confidence measure has two main advantages. First, it aligns well with our understanding

⁷ The main regression model is as follows: $Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 Z_i + \beta_3 XZ_i + V_i + \varepsilon_i$. Y_i refers to *confidence* for each respondent i , X to *political values*, Z to *perceived IO ideology*, XZ to a product term, and V to vectors for individual-level controls. ε refers to a regression residual.

⁸ These dimensions are moderately but not highly correlated: regarding self-placement as left-right and GAL-TAN, respectively, the correlation is .38 ($p < .001$) for the pooled dataset (with Brazil .37, $p < .001$; Germany .44, $p < .001$; Indonesia .15, $p < .001$, US .48, $p < .001$ for country samples).

of legitimacy as the belief that a governing power has the right to rule and exercises it appropriately. Second, it allows us to evaluate our findings in the context of other studies that have used the confidence indicator (e.g., Caldeira 1986; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Inglehart 1997; Newton and Norris 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Johnson 2011; Kaya and Walker 2014; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; 2020).

We control for a range of potentially confounding variables that have been shown to matter for IO legitimacy beliefs in previous studies. These variables are indicators of socioeconomic status (education and financial household satisfaction), geographical identification (with the nation state and the world), domestic institutional trust (confidence in domestic government and democracy satisfaction), and demographics (age, gender; see Appendix C for details). Finally, while our main models in this part include all respondents, we also conduct robustness tests that exclude those respondents who failed an instructional manipulation check at the end of the questionnaire (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 2009).

Experimental study

The experimental study complements the observational part by providing a causal analysis of the effect of ideological proximity on IO legitimacy beliefs. For this analysis, we conducted four rounds of survey experiments, which were presented in block-randomized order to minimize priming effects. In each of the four experiments, respondents were randomly assigned to four treatments and one control group to ensure that observed treatment effects do not depend on potentially uncontrolled influences (Mutz 2011). The respondents in the treatment groups received a vignette containing the treatment, followed by the confidence question. Respondents in the control group only received the confidence question. We allocated the same number of individuals to each treatment group and the control group (see Appendix D for balance tests).

To formulate the vignettes, a central choice had to be made between hypothetical and real-life vignettes. While both come with their respective advantages and disadvantages, we opted for vignettes presenting information about hypothetical IOs. While using real-world information about IOs could have increased the credibility of the vignettes, hypothetical cases enabled us to

vary the relevant theoretical factors with greater precision and to test them without having respondents think about specific IOs (cf. Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020; Ghassim et al. 2022).

Each experiment focused on a different issue area in global governance: climate change, migration, peacebuilding, and trade. These are all crucial areas related to transnational problems affecting people's lives, implying that they should be perceived as relevant by respondents. Conducting four experiments enables us to offer a comparative assessment of treatment effects across issue areas, providing information about the generalizability of our argument.

The experiments began with a brief statement that introduced a governance issue and explained that there is a proposal to set up a new IO to address this issue. The vignette then systematically varied whether this new IO would address this governance issue in ways that would promote left, right, GAL or TAN values (Table 2).

To test H1a/b, we examine whether observed associations between respondents' own value orientations and IO confidence differ across experimental groups in terms of a moderation effect. We test two observable implications from the hypotheses. First, the association between own value orientations and IO confidence should be more positive among respondents that received an IO ideological profile in line with own value orientations compared to respondents that received an IO profile contradicting own values.

Second, a similar difference in associations (between value orientations and IO confidence) should be statistically significant if comparing respondents that received an IO ideological profile and those who did not (control group), in two different directions: compared to the control group, those receiving a treatment congruent with own value orientations should show higher levels of confidence, while those receiving an incongruent treatment should show lower levels of confidence.

For testing the first implication of our hypotheses, the treatment dummies are coded to compare treatment groups "IO=Right" (1) with the "IO=Left" (0) as the baseline, and "IO=TAN" (1) with the "IO=GAL" (0). In order to be in line with expectations, interactions effects should be positive and statistically significant (as own value orientations are coded to be more "right" or "TAN" with larger values, so treatments are more congruent if "1" instead of "0").

Table 2. Vignettes

Treatment	Issue area	Introductory statement	Wording of vignette
IO=Left	Migration	Many people move to other countries to live and work there. Governments around the world are currently discussing how to cooperate in the area of international migration. One proposal is to set up a new international organization addressing this issue. The new organization would promote government regulation protecting migrants from being exploited by employers
IO=Right			... promote the freedom of businesses to employ migrants
IO=GAL			... promote free and safe migration between countries
IO=TAN			... promote stricter controls of migration between countries
IO=Left	Trade	Many goods and services are traded between countries. Governments around the world are currently discussing how to cooperate in the area of international trade. One proposal is to set up a new international organization addressing this issue. The new organization would ensure that international trade promotes social equality among people
IO=Right			... ensure that international trade is not restricted by government regulation
IO=GAL			... ensure that international trade does not harm the environment
IO=TAN			... ensure that international trade respects national cultural traditions
IO=Left	Climate	The global climate is warming on average. Governments around the world are currently discussing how to cooperate in the area of global climate. One proposal is to set up a new international organization addressing this issue. The new organization would promote government regulation as the main way of addressing climate change
IO=Right			... promote business innovation as the main way of addressing climate change
IO=GAL			... promote changes in people's way of living required to address climate change
IO=TAN			... ensure that climate change is addressed in ways that safeguard countries' sovereignty and traditions
IO=Left	Peace building	Many countries suffer from violent internal conflicts. Governments around the world are currently discussing how to cooperate in the area of peacebuilding. One proposal is to set up a new international organization addressing this issue. The new organization would promote peace and stability based on more equal incomes, services for the poor, and government ownership of business and industry
IO=Right			... promote peace and stability based on free entrepreneurship, private business and more responsibility for individuals to provide for themselves
IO=GAL			... promote peace and stability based on free and equal rights for all, including women, homosexuals, and ethnic minorities
IO=TAN			... promote peace and stability based on traditional values and customs associated with family, religion, and nation

For testing the second implication of our hypotheses, the two treatment dummies are coded to compare each treatment group (“IO=Right,” “IO=Left,” “IO=TAN,” “IO=GAL,” all coded as “1”) to the respective control group (coded “0”). In order to be in line with expectations, interactions effects should be positive and statistically significant for “IO=Right” and “IO=TAN,” but negative and statistically significant for “IO=Left” and “IO=GAL.”

All models include control variables and fixed effects for our four country samples and the ordering of experiments across rounds.⁹ The experimental analysis is conducted on the basis of the responses from those respondents that mastered the manipulation check for the respective experiments, in order to reduce noise in the data from non-diligent respondents (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 2009; Schlipphak, Meiners, and Kiratli 2022; Ghassim, Koenig-Archibugi, and Cabrera 2022). Further robustness analyses explore treatment effect heterogeneity across country samples. We will also test robustness by including respondents that did not pass the manipulation checks.


⁹ The inclusion of control variables might be unwarranted, as our experimental design includes randomized assignment of respondents to treatments and control groups. However, we aim at estimating treatment effects on observed associations of respondents' values and IO confidence. To avoid omitted variable bias when estimating these associations, we thus include control variables to capture additional explanatory factors.

Results

Observational Analysis

Our theoretical argument starts from the assumption that people perceive IOs to have distinct ideological profiles. We find evidence for this assumption in three of our four countries. Figure 3 reports the average perceptions of the ideological profiles of IOs on two scales ranging from “left” (0) to “right” (10) and from “GAL” (0) to “TAN” (10).

Figure 3: Average perception of IOs’ ideological profiles by country



Note: Mean of perceived location of IOs (on scales ranging from 0 to 10) with 95%-confidence intervals. Sample size slightly varies (Brazil $N \geq 3226$, Germany $N \geq 3201$, Indonesia $N \geq 3059$, USA $N \geq 3270$).

The results show that there is considerable variation in how respondents, on average, locate IOs on both ideological dimensions. More specifically, the WHO and the UN tend to be located more toward the left and GAL ends of the spectrum, whereas the IMF and the World Bank rather tend to be located more toward the right and TAN ends. The sole exception is the

Indonesian sample, where respondents, on average, locate the WHO more GAL than the other IOs, but do not ascribe different profiles to four IOs on the left-right dimension.¹⁰

In terms of the country-specific variation, US respondents, on average, locate all IOs more on the left and GAL sides than respondents from other countries. Conversely, Indonesian respondents locate all IOs more on the right and TAN sides. US respondents, on average, perceive all four IOs as left and GAL, while Indonesian respondents do the opposite. These patterns suggest that the average perceived ideological profiles of IO vary substantially across countries, possibly because of how these organizations have been politicized in domestic political debates.

Table 3 shows the results from the hypothesis test. As elaborated earlier, the observable implication of H1a and H1b is that perceived ideological profiles of IOs should moderate how IO confidence relates to respondents' own value orientations. Such moderation effect is tested by including interaction terms for value orientations and IO-profiles. All estimates for these interaction terms are positive and significant. Thus, we find evidence for a moderation effect across all four IOs and both ideological dimensions, strongly supporting H1a and H1b.

Figure 4 provides a more fine-grained analysis of these moderation effects. Estimated slopes for all regression lines substantially vary across different IO profiles as expected: If respondents perceive an IO as right, the observed association of own value orientations and IO confidence tends to be more negative as if the same IO is perceived as neutral or left. Similarly, if respondents perceive IOs as TAN, the observed association of values and confidence tends to be more negative compared to those respondents perceiving the respective IO as neutral or GAL. However, observed level of confidence do not vary symmetrically across groups of respondents who perceive different IO profiles: levels vary strongly on the right-hand side of all sub-graphs in Figure 4 but much less on the left-hand side. Thus, perceived IO profiles do not explain as much variation in respondents' IO confidence for those that hold left or GAL orientations compared to those with more right or TAN orientations. We take this remarkable finding to suggest that IO confidence of those who self-place as more left or GAL tends to depend much less on how these citizens perceive IOs in ideological terms. People on the left

¹⁰ Using a two-sample t-test with unequal variances, we found the placement of WHO on Left-Right to be significantly different ($p < .001$) on average from the placement of all other IOs in the Indonesian sample.


and GAL sides of the political spectrum appear to value IOs even when their ideological profiles are not in line with their own value orientations. This finding is in line with the idea of left internationalism (e.g., Sluga 2013; Walzer 2018) and research suggesting that people with GAL values tend to be more supportive of international cooperation (e.g., Weßels and Strijbis 2019). However, this finding also suggests that the explanatory power of our argument varies along both ideological dimensions.

Table 3: OLS regression of confidence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	UN	WHO	WB	WB
Left-Right	-0.321***	-0.339***	-0.218***	-0.169***
Self-placement	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Left-Right	-0.027	0.027	-0.081***	-0.399***
IO-placement	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.058)
Interaction (self-place*IO-place)	0.043*** (0.003)	0.040*** (0.003)	0.036*** (0.003)	0.130*** (0.009)
GAL-TAN	-0.141***	-0.219***	-0.119***	-0.106***
Self-placement	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
GAL-TAN	-0.441***	-0.152***	-0.073***	-0.030*
IO-placement	(0.045)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Interaction (self-place*IO-place)	0.089*** (0.007)	0.026*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.002)
N	12746	12739	12735	12735
adj. R ²	0.461	0.414	0.421	0.417

*Note: OLS-regression with IO-confidence as dependent variable. Additional control variables, country fixed effects and constant omitted, see Appendix C, Table C2 for all estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001*

Figure 4: Predicted confidence by value orientations and perceived ideological profiles of IOs



Note: OLS-regression models with IO-specific confidence as dependent variable, IO-specific perceptions of IO-ideological stances, own value orientations, interaction terms and additional control variables (see Appendix D). Lines represent mean predicted values of confidence. Colored areas indicate 95% confidence intervals.

These findings are robust across different model specifications. First, focusing on those respondents who master the instructional attention check, results do not change substantially (see Appendix C, Table C2, Figure C2). Second, a separate analysis of each country sample suggests some variation in the results (see Appendix C, Table C3). In the case of the Brazilian, German, and US samples, estimates for all interaction effects are statistically significant and in the expected direction. However, in Indonesia, we only find similar results in the context of the UN.

Experimental Analysis

As explained, the experimental analysis tests two observable implications of our hypotheses. While the first implication compares across treatment groups, the second implication compares treatment groups with the control group.

The first observable implication is that the relationship between own value orientations and IO confidence should be more positive among respondents that received an IO ideological profile in line with their own values compared to respondents who received an IO profile contradicting their own values. Table 4 shows the results for this observable implication.

Table 4: OLS regression (treatments on the same dimension coded as two-level contrasts)

	(1) Migration	(2) Migration	(3) Trade	(4) Trade	(5) Climate	(6) Climate	(7) Peace	(8) Peace
Left-Right Self-Placement	-0.119*** (0.027)	-0.030 (0.024)	-0.063* (0.029)	-0.004 (0.023)	-0.169*** (0.034)	-0.048* (0.022)	-0.138*** (0.033)	0.003 (0.024)
Left (vs. R) Treatment	-0.737** (0.243)		-0.950*** (0.244)		-0.848** (0.260)		-1.684*** (0.264)	
Interaction (self-pl*treat)	0.087* (0.043)		0.019 (0.043)		0.168*** (0.047)		0.283*** (0.046)	
GAL-TAN Self-placement	-0.034 (0.019)	-0.202*** (0.025)	-0.017 (0.020)	-0.074** (0.023)	-0.061** (0.023)	-0.066** (0.023)	0.001 (0.022)	-0.195*** (0.025)
GAL (vs. T) Treatment		-2.147*** (0.198)		-0.557** (0.180)		-0.496** (0.186)		-2.889*** (0.198)
Interaction (self-pl*treat)		0.323*** (0.033)		0.050 (0.031)		0.069* (0.031)		0.407*** (0.034)
<i>N</i>	1892	1998	2026	2007	1474	2185	1682	2205
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.246	0.238	0.186	0.203	0.262	0.239	0.222	0.223

Note: OLS-regression with country fixed effects and control variables. Constants, fixed effects and control variables omitted (s. Appendix D). Only respondents who mastered the manipulation check.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The first series of models (Table 4) include factor variables that compare mean levels of confidence between contrasting treatments of the same ideological dimension, that is “IO=Right” with “IO=Left” as the baseline and “IO=TAN” with “IO=GAL” as the baseline. In line with our expectations, estimated coefficients for six out of eight interaction terms suggest


a positive moderation effect. In the migration, climate, and peacebuilding experiments, right-leaning respondents have more confidence in IOs if treatments suggest the IO will pursue a rightist agenda (instead of a leftist one). In the same experiments, suggesting the new IO to pursue a GAL agenda (instead of a TAN one) yields similar results: respondents have more confidence in the organization if their value orientations are congruent with the proposed agenda of the new IO.

Figure 6 visualizes this relationship. Regarding migration, climate, and peacebuilding, the graphs illustrate how the treatments moderate the effects of political values on IO confidence. The suggested ideological profiles affect this relation across both ideological dimension in expected ways but to different degrees. In three of eight graphs in Figure 6, we see a rather symmetric moderation effect: In case of migration, those respondents receiving an “IO=Right” treatment show more confidence in the new IO the more they locate themselves to the right, while those receiving an “IO=Left” treatment show the reverse tendency. We find a similarly symmetric moderation effect in the peace-building experiment for both left and right and GAL and TAN.

In another three graphs, the moderation effect is less symmetric. In case of climate, those respondents receiving an “IO=Right” treatment show more confidence in the new IO the more they locate themselves to the right, as expected. However, those respondents receiving an “IO=Left” treatment do not show the opposite tendency. Similarly, “IO=TAN” treatments have the expected impact in the cases of migration and climate, but the respective “IO-GAL” treatments do not.

In the remaining two graphs on trade, we do not see any moderation effect. One reason could be that the treatments were hard to grasp. However, closer inspection of the data does not support this interpretation. Average treatment effects on confidence in this experiment are strong and significant (see Appendix D, Figure D3). We thus suspect that the treatments we provided appealed to respondents with different political values on both dimensions.

Figure 6: IO confidence by treatment groups and ideological self-placement



Note: Shown are predicted levels of IO confidence by value orientations and across treatment groups with 95%-confidence intervals as shaded areas. Estimates this visualization is based on are the same as in Table 4 and are fully reported in Appendix D, Table D3.

To summarize, there is ample evidence for H1a and H1b in three out of four experiments, in which treating respondents with IO profiles changed the observed association of value orientations and IO confidence in expected ways.

The second observable implication of our hypotheses is that the relationship between own value orientation and IO confidence should be more positive (or negative) among respondents who are treated with IO profiles compared to respondents in the control group. Table 5 shows the results for this observable implication.

Table 5: OLS regression (three level contrasts, control as baseline)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Migration	Migration	Trade	Trade	Climate	Climate	Peace	Peace
Left-Right	-0.094***	-0.061***	-0.090***	-0.049***	-0.133***	-0.095***	-0.097***	-0.049**
Self-Placement	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.015)
Left (vs. Control)	0.440*		0.037		0.023		0.092	
Treatment	(0.178)		(0.182)		(0.214)		(0.205)	
Interaction	-0.009		0.045		-0.033		-0.027	
(self-place*treat)	(0.031)		(0.032)		(0.038)		(0.036)	
Right (vs. Control)	-0.310		-0.954***		-0.838***		-1.659***	
Treatment	(0.222)		(0.214)		(0.233)		(0.228)	
Interaction	0.080*		0.074*		0.136***		0.265***	
(self-place*treat)	(0.039)		(0.037)		(0.041)		(0.038)	
GAL-TAN	-0.058***	-0.094***	-0.041**	-0.065***	-0.068***	-0.079***	-0.033*	-0.067***
Self-placement	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.016)
GAL (vs. Control)		0.537***		0.361*		-0.180		0.978***
Treatment		(0.154)		(0.149)		(0.157)		(0.154)
Interaction		-0.086**		0.002		0.024		-0.110***
(self-place*treat)		(0.027)		(0.026)		(0.027)		(0.028)
TAN (vs. Control)		-1.586***		-0.201		-0.663***		-1.939***
Treatment		(0.170)		(0.162)		(0.167)		(0.174)
Interaction		0.238***		0.053		0.091**		0.300***
(self-place*treat)		(0.028)		(0.027)		(0.028)		(0.028)
N	4432	4538	4566	4547	4014	4725	4222	4745
adj. R ²	0.244	0.231	0.201	0.211	0.234	0.233	0.212	0.194

Note: OLS-regression with country fixed effects and control variables. Constants, fixed effects and control variables omitted (s. Appendix D). Only respondents that mastered the manipulation check.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

More specifically, we expect a positive moderation effect for “IO-Right” and “IO=TAN”, because respondents in these treatment groups should tend to have *more* confidence than those in the control group if holding congruent value orientations (coded with *larger* values on the respective scales). However, treating respondents with “IO-Left” or “IO=GAL,” we expect a negative moderation effect, because respondents should tend to have *less* confidence than those


in the control group if holding congruent value orientations (coded with *smaller* values on the respective scales).¹¹

The results in Table 5 suggest two main observations. First, estimates for the interaction terms indicate that the treatments have the expected moderation effects in nine out of sixteen cases. Second, these moderation effects vary significantly across ideological dimensions: all four treatments for “IO=Right” have the expected effect, as do three for “IO=TAN,” but only two for “IO=GAL” and none for “IO=Left.”

Figure 7 provides a visualization of these results. As can be seen from the graphs, estimated regression lines are often fairly close for the control group and the “IO=Left” and “IO=GAL” treatments. In contrast, the regression lines for the control group and the “IO=Right” and “IO=TAN” treatments tend to be more distinct. This finding is consistent with the observational evidence that ideological proximity matters more for confidence in IOs among respondents with right and TAN values than among respondents with left and GAL values. We expect this result to reflect strong cognitive priors in favor of international cooperation among people with left and GAL values, irrespective of the specific ideological profiles of IOs. Unless explicitly treated with IO profiles that are right and TAN, respondents with left and GAL orientations appear to assume that IOs promote values consistent with their own.

¹¹ Note that using the respective alternative treatments as baselines (as in Table 4), the addition of control groups does match the results discussed before (see Appendix D, Table D4 for full results).

Figure 7: IO confidence by treatments, control groups and ideological self-placement



Note: Predicted levels of IO confidence by value orientations and across treatment groups with 95%-confidence intervals as shaded areas. Estimates this visualization is based on are the same as in Table 5 and are fully reported in Appendix D, Table D4.

Robustness checks reported in Appendix D (Table D10 and D11) include results for estimates based on all respondents, which tend to support our main conclusions. However, there are some notable differences in estimates. Comparing levels of confidence across treatment groups, estimated direction of interaction effects mostly remain unchanged if also including respondents that failed the manipulation check. Only the interaction effect for treatments on "IO=Left" vs. "IO=Right" on trade is estimated within the confidence interval, while both interaction effects for treatments on climate turn insignificant. Regarding estimates that compare levels of confidence across both treatments per dimension with the respective control group, estimated interaction effects for "IO=TAN vs. control" and "IO=Right vs. control" do not substantially change if based on all respondents. However, the estimates for interactions of value orientations and "IO=GAL vs. control" and "IO=Left vs. control," respective, partly contradict our expectation. In case of experiments on trade and climate, control groups show a

more negative relation of respondents' self-placement as more "TAN" or more "Right" and IO confidence, then if treated with goal descriptions of the new IO that we expected them to react more negatively because it should strongly contradict their own value orientations.

Country specific models by-and-large confirm our main conclusions, but also show remarkable differences across countries. Regarding models that only compare levels of confidence across treatment groups (thus, excluding the control group, see Appendix D.X), results show most consistent support for our hypothesis in the German sample, where all eight interaction effects considerable explain variation in how value orientations related to IO confidence as expected. There is also substantial empirical support in the other samples, but to a much lesser degree. Out of eight interaction effects, estimates are only significant in four cases in the US sample, three cases in the Brazil sample, and even only one case in the Indonesian sample.

Regarding models that compare levels of confidence across both treatments per dimension with the respective control group, we yield a similar picture (see Appendix D.X). Treatments mostly made a difference in how value orientations and confidence relate (compared to the control group) with our German respondents (eight out of sixteen interaction effects). But respective estimates are mostly insignificant in the US (five times), Brazilian (five times) and Indonesian samples (two times). Alternative conclusions might be drawn from these differences. While we cannot rule out other methodological issues at play to some extent, we assume our deductive approach in defining ideological profiles of IOs has led to some European bias in how to formulate treatments: results might reflect that our formulation of treatments highlight goals, that substantially fit German respondents thinking more than those in the US and Brazil, and even to a lesser degree our Indonesian respondents. This conclusion is strongly corroborated by the fact that manipulation checks suggest that much more Indonesian respondents had problems to correctly recall treatments and German respondents to have the least (see Appendix D.1).

Finally, and again largely in line with the results of the pooled analysis, country specific results also show asymmetry between different sides of both ideological dimensions. Across country samples, suggesting new IOs to be "TAN" yielded significant interaction effects in ten (out of 32 estimates), but only three significant interaction effects if suggesting IOs to be "GAL." Similarly, treatments suggesting new IOs to be "right" had more discernible impact than "left" (five compared to one estimate).

Conclusion

Do citizens' political values matter for their legitimacy beliefs toward IOs? While previous research is rich in expectations on this topic, it is poor in consistent findings. Despite widespread assumptions that political values structure people's attitudes toward international cooperation, studies of IO legitimacy beliefs have typically found no, weak, or inconsistent relationships.

This paper puts forward a new understanding of how political values affect legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. Instead of expecting direct and uniform relationships, we have explained why political values matter in more complex ways, rooted in citizens' individual perceptions of IOs as ideological objects. We have advanced this understanding in two steps. First, we have developed a novel theoretical argument about the importance of ideological proximity, suggesting that citizens perceive IOs that are ideologically closer to their own political values as more legitimate. Second, we have examined this expectation empirically through observational and experimental analyses of new comparative survey evidence from four diverse countries.

Our key findings are threefold. First, citizens indeed tend to perceive major IOs as having particular ideological profiles. With great consistency, citizens tend to associate some IOs more with left and GAL positions and other IOs more with right and TAN positions. Second, citizens' legitimacy beliefs toward IOs depend on the proximity between their own political values and their perceptions of an IO's ideological profile. When citizens perceive an IO as ideologically closer to their own political values, they tend to accord this organization more legitimacy. Third, the importance of ideological proximity for IO legitimacy beliefs varies by political value. The perceived ideological profile of IOs matters more for citizens with right and TAN values than for citizens with left and GAL values.

While these findings are critical for our understanding of political values and IO legitimacy beliefs, we should also note the study's limitations and how future research might address them. First, we have focused on four prominent IOs, and future research should assess the generalizability of our findings by extending the study to less prominent IOs. Similarly, while we have analyzed data from diverse political contexts, future research could expand the

coverage to additional countries. Second, we have not examined how people come to perceive specific IOs as ideological, which is an issue that we leave for future research to explore. For instance, it may be that IOs in certain policy fields are more readily seen as ideological than IOs in other policy fields or with general-purpose mandates. Future research might also explore how political entrepreneurs shape public perceptions of IOs as ideological actors.

For now, our findings carry three important implications. First, they demonstrate that the sources of legitimacy beliefs toward IOs are richer than previously understood. While earlier research has found support for a variety of individual, institutional, and communicative drivers of legitimacy beliefs (e.g., Bernauer, Mohrenberg, and Koubi 2020; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2021; Dellmuth et al. 2022), previous studies have not been able to identify much of a systematic association with political values (cf. Torgler 2008; Bearce and Jolliff Scott 2019; Weßels and Strijbis 2019; Dellmuth et al. 2022). Our results indicate that political values present an individual-level explanation on par with socioeconomic status (Scheve and Slaughter 2001), geographical identification (Hooghe and Marks 2005), and domestic institutional trust (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020b), but that the main causal mechanism is more complex than previous research has imagined.

Second, our results show that political values have greater explanatory reach than previously established. While extensive research in American and comparative politics shows that values and ideologies structure people's attitudes toward political issues and institutions (e.g., Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Jacoby 2006), the evidence in international relations has been more scattered and mainly drawn from the polarized US context (Milner and Tingley 2015; Mutz 2021; Brutger and Clark 2021). Our findings indicate that political values matter more broadly for attitudes toward international issues and institutions than earlier understood. They show that the causal importance of political values extends to legitimacy beliefs toward IOs and also applies to a varied set of countries beyond the US.

Third, our findings suggest that influential scholarship in international relations has underestimated the extent to which IOs are perceived in ideological terms. While critical and post-colonial theorists for sure have underlined the ideological nature of IOs (Bernstein 2011; Cammack 2022), mainstream scholarship tends to conceive of IOs as apolitical institutions

performing non-ideological functions such as coordinating expectations and monitoring non-compliance (e.g., Keohane 1984; Martin and Simmons 2013; Rittberger et al. 2019). Much like domestic legislatures, IOs are regarded as political institutions that do not by definition represent certain ideological positions. Our results indicate that this theoretical conception of IOs poorly matches how IOs are perceived by general publics, which readily assign ideological profiles to IOs.

Fourth, our findings contribute to a more refined understanding of contemporary contestation of IOs. Much scholarship attributes the rise of anti-globalist populism around the world to a combination of cultural and economic factors (e.g., Gidron and Hall 2017; Norris and Inglehart 2019; Rodrik 2021). Our results suggest that the contestation over IOs might be fueled by political values to a greater extent than appreciated in dominant accounts (but see Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks 2019). The perceived ideological profile of IOs appears to be a powerful driver of whether citizens endorse or reject these organizations as legitimate political institutions.

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Appendix A Multi-level models

Our analysis of the WVS7 covers the following countries: Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Taiwan ROC, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Macau SAR, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Philippines, Puerto Rico, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, Zimbabwe, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United States.

Table A1: Descriptives

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Confidence in IOs (index)	38,101	1.473	0.725	0	3
Confidence in UN	38,101	1.472	0.894	0	3
Confidence in IMF	38,101	1.341	0.874	0	3
Confidence in ICC	38,101	1.430	0.872	0	3
Confidence in WB	38,101	1.411	0.899	0	3
Confidence in WHO	38,101	1.732	0.883	0	3
Confidence in WTO	38,101	1.454	0.859	0	3
Left-Right	38,101	5.579	2.425	1	10
GAL-TAN	38,101	5.964	1.925	1	10
Education	38,101	3.780	2.002	0	8
Financial satisfaction	38,101	5.276	2.374	0	9
Global identification	38,101	1.462	0.936	0	3
National identification	38,101	2.194	0.786	0	3
Confidence in government	38,101	1.369	0.940	0	3
Political satisfaction	38,101	4.347	2.654	0	9
Age	38,101	42.879	16.400	16	103
Male	38,101	0.503	0.500	0	1

Note: Only respondents included in the main models with the IO-confidence (index) as a dependent variable

Table A2: Random-coefficient models with a country-specific random slope for left-right

Model Dependent Variable	(1) Confidence Index	(2) UN Confidence	(3) ICC Confidence	(4) WHO Confidence	(5) WTO Confidence	(6) IMF Confidence	(7) WB Confidence
<i>Fixed effects</i>							
Education	0.014*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.004 (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)
Financial satisfaction	0.015*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.002)	0.016*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)
Left-Right	0.001 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)	0.008 (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)
GAL-TAN	-0.034*** (0.002)	-0.041*** (0.003)	-0.041*** (0.003)	-0.042*** (0.003)	-0.025*** (0.003)	-0.026*** (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.003)
Global identification	0.086*** (0.004)	0.096*** (0.005)	0.088*** (0.005)	0.072*** (0.005)	0.090*** (0.005)	0.086*** (0.004)	0.084*** (0.005)
National identification	0.026*** (0.004)	0.019*** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)	0.053*** (0.006)	0.030*** (0.005)	0.017** (0.005)	0.018*** (0.005)
Confidence in government	0.283*** (0.004)	0.290*** (0.005)	0.291*** (0.005)	0.258*** (0.005)	0.276*** (0.005)	0.287*** (0.005)	0.288*** (0.005)
Political satisfaction	0.009*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)
Age	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Male	0.011 (0.006)	-0.017* (0.008)	0.019* (0.008)	0.024** (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)	0.014 (0.007)	0.016* (0.008)
Constant	1.001*** (0.054)	1.095*** (0.057)	0.986*** (0.056)	1.332*** (0.052)	0.998*** (0.058)	0.769*** (0.067)	0.808*** (0.070)
<i>Random effects (std. dev.)</i>							
Left-Right	0.032*** (0.004)	0.040*** (0.005)	0.033*** (0.004)	0.032*** (0.004)	0.030*** (0.004)	0.036*** (0.004)	0.034*** (0.004)
Constant	0.305*** (0.036)	0.317*** (0.038)	0.309*** (0.037)	0.273*** (0.033)	0.320*** (0.039)	0.387*** (0.045)	0.398*** (0.047)
Residual	0.592*** (0.002)	0.786*** (0.003)	0.771*** (0.003)	0.785*** (0.003)	0.761*** (0.003)	0.750*** (0.003)	0.769*** (0.003)
<i>N</i>	38101	43052	41548	41892	40543	41913	40931
<i>Log-likelihood</i>	-34217	-50840	-48308	-49423	-46599	-47551	-47461

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A3: Random-coefficient models with a country-specific random slope for GAL-TAN

Model Dependent Variable	(1) Confidence Index	(2) UN Confidence	(3) ICC Confidence	(4) WHO Confidence	(5) WTO Confidence	(6) IMF Confidence	(7) WB Confidence
<i>Fixed effects</i>							
Education	0.013*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.018*** (0.002)	0.016*** (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)
Financial satisfaction	0.015*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.002)	0.016*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)
Left-Right	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
GAL-TAN	-0.028*** (0.007)	-0.037*** (0.007)	-0.036*** (0.007)	-0.035*** (0.008)	-0.021** (0.007)	-0.020** (0.007)	-0.019** (0.007)
Global identification	0.088*** (0.004)	0.099*** (0.005)	0.090*** (0.005)	0.073*** (0.005)	0.091*** (0.005)	0.088*** (0.004)	0.082*** (0.005)
National identification	0.024*** (0.004)	0.015** (0.005)	0.013* (0.005)	0.051*** (0.006)	0.029*** (0.005)	0.015** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)
Confidence in government	0.277*** (0.004)	0.283*** (0.005)	0.285*** (0.005)	0.254*** (0.005)	0.272*** (0.005)	0.281*** (0.005)	0.283*** (0.005)
Political satisfaction	0.008*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)
Age	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Male	0.006 (0.006)	-0.024** (0.008)	0.017* (0.008)	0.017* (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	0.010 (0.007)	0.012 (0.008)
Constant	1.028*** (0.051)	1.140*** (0.048)	1.012*** (0.052)	1.327*** (0.054)	1.007*** (0.056)	0.800*** (0.064)	0.862*** (0.072)
<i>Random effects (std. dev.)</i>							
Left-Right	0.039*** (0.005)	0.040*** (0.005)	0.040*** (0.005)	0.046*** (0.006)	0.038*** (0.005)	0.043*** (0.006)	0.041*** (0.006)
Constant	0.280*** (0.036)	0.244*** (0.033)	0.274*** (0.036)	0.288*** (0.038)	0.303*** (0.039)	0.366*** (0.045)	0.411*** (0.051)
Residual	0.594*** (0.002)	0.790*** (0.003)	0.773*** (0.003)	0.785*** (0.003)	0.762*** (0.003)	0.752*** (0.003)	0.771*** (0.003)
<i>N</i>	38101	43052	41548	41892	40543	41913	40931
<i>Log-likelihood</i>	-34339	-51045	-48405	-49433	-46650	-47658	-47557

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B Measurement

Table B1. Measures used in the observational study

Variable	Question wording
Confidence in IOs	I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: no confidence (0) to complete confidence (10) UN; IMF; WB; WHO (additive index divided by six, missings excluded)
Confidence in government	The government
Education	What is the highest educational level that you have attained? 0 Early childhood education (ISCED 0) / no education 1 Primary education (ISCED 1) 2 Lower secondary education (ISCED 2) 3 Upper secondary education (ISCED 3) 4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 4) 5 Short-cycle tertiary education (ISCED 5) 6 Bachelor or equivalent (ISCED 6) 7 Master or equivalent (ISCED 7) 8 Doctoral or equivalent (ISCED 8)
Financial satisfaction	How satisfied are you with the economic situation of [your household]? You can choose a number between 1: completely dissatisfied, and 10: completely satisfied.
Left-right orientation	In political matters, people talk of “the left” and “the right.” How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (10-point scale ranging from 0 – left; 10 – right)
Feeling of belonging to world;	People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. How close do you feel to...? (3- Very Close; 2- close; 1- Not very close; 0-Not close at all)
Feeling of belonging to country	The world; [Country]
Satisfaction political system country	On a scale from 0 to 10 where “0” is “not satisfied at all” and “10” is “completely satisfied”, how satisfied are you with how the political system is functioning in your country these days?
Age	Respondents’ birth year
Social trust	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted (1) or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people (0)?
Political knowledge	Here are some questions about international organizations. - Five countries have permanent seats on the Security Council of the United Nations. Which 1 2 3 ones of the following is not a member? <i>A) France, B) China, C) India</i> - Where are the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) located? <i>A) Washington DC, B) London, C) Geneva</i> - Which of the following problems does the organization Amnesty International deal with? <i>A) Climate change, B) Human rights, C) Destruction of historic monuments</i>

	(Each item coded as 1 (correct) versus 0 (incorrect), and then added in an index ranging from 0 to 3.)
GAL-TAN	<p>Based on sum of following variables:</p> <p>- Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between. You can choose a number between 1: never justifiable, and 10: always justifiable. Homosexuality; Abortion; Divorce; Sex before marriage</p> <p>- Now we would like to know your opinion about the people from other countries who come to live in [your country] - the immigrants. How would you evaluate the impact of these people on the development of [your country]? 5-Very good, 4-Quite good, 3-Neither good-nor bad, 2-Quite bad, 1-Very bad</p> <p>People sometimes talk about what the aims of their country should be for the next ten years. I will list four of the goals which different people would give top priority.</p> <p>- If you had to choose, which one of the things would you say is most important? Maintaining order in the nation, giving people more say in important government decisions, fighting rising prices, or protecting freedom of speech?</p> <p>- And which would be the next most important? Respondents who responded 'Maintaining order in the nation' as first or second priority received code 1, all others code 0.</p>
Gender	Respondent's sex (1 male, 0 otherwise)
Perceptions of IO values	<p>[The United Nations (UN)] The United Nations (UN) is an international organization responsible for dealing with a variety of transboundary issues.</p> <p>How would you place this organization on the following scales?</p> <p>0 This organization stands for making incomes more equal. 10 This organization stands for setting greater incentives for individual effort.</p> <p>0 This organization is politically "left". 10 This organization is politically "right".</p> <p>0 This organization stands for environmental protection having priority over economic growth. 10 This organization stands for economic growth having priority over environmental protection.</p> <p>0 This organization stands for all people to lead a life they wish in terms of gender identity, sexuality, and family relationships. 10 This organization stands for the protection of the traditional roles of women and men in family and society.</p> <p>0 This organization stands for all people to decide in which country to live and work. 10 This organization stands for people already living in a country to decide who is allowed to come and work there.</p> <p>[Generic GAL-TAN] 0 Organization stands for environmental protection, free and safe migration, and freedom to choose gender identity, sexuality, and family relationships.</p>

10 Organization stands for economic growth, restricted migration, and protecting the traditional roles of women and men.

0 This organization stands for strengthening private ownership of business and industry.

10 This organization stands for strengthening government ownership of business and industry.

0 This organization stands for increasing governments' responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.

10 This organization stands for increasing people's responsibility to provide for themselves.

[The World Health Organization (WHO)]

The World Health Organization (WHO) is an international organization responsible for dealing with global health.

[same left-right and GAL-TAN items as for United Nations]

[The World Bank]

The World Bank is an international organization responsible for dealing with poverty in developing countries.

[same left-right and GAL-TAN items as for United Nations]

[The International Monetary Fund (IMF)]

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an international organization responsible for dealing with financial stability and monetary cooperation.

[same left-right and GAL-TAN items as for United Nations]


Source: Authors' own political values and legitimacy survey.

Appendix C Observational study

Table C1: Descriptives

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Confidence in UN	12,821	0	5.084	10	2.782
Confidence in WHO	12,821	0	5.559	10	2.907
Confidence in WB	12,821	0	4.676	10	2.766
Confidence in IMF	12,821	0	4.490	10	2.705
Confidence in Gov	12,821	0	4.935	10	2.873
Confidence in new Migration IO	12,821	0	5.088	10	2.710
Confidence in new Trade IO	12,821	0	5.137	10	2.645
Confidence in new Climate IO	12,821	0	5.229	10	2.788
Confidence in new Peacebuilding IO	12,821	0	5.047	10	2.807
Left-Right self-place	12,821	0	5.303	10	2.643
GAL-TAN self-place	12,821	0	5.093	10	3.188
Left-Right UN	12,797	0	4.808	10	2.188
GAL-TAN UN	12,792	0	4.710	10	2.236
Left-Right WHO	12,780	0	5.197	10	2.288
GAL-TAN WHO	12,774	0	5.166	10	2.215
Left-Right WB	12,771	0	4.640	10	2.587
GAL-TAN WB	12,767	0	4.551	10	2.481
Left-Right IMF	12,767	0	5.127	10	2.419
GAL-TAN IMF	12,772	0	5.106	10	2.362
Global identification	12,820	0	2.468	4	.8397
National identification	12,820	0	2.668	4	.8242
Political satisfaction	12,820	0	3.536	10	2.849
Financial satisfaction	12,820	0	4.829	10	2.782
Age	12,821	18	44.38	96	16.15
Male	12,821	0	.488	1	.4999
Education	12,821	1	3.683	8	1.341

Figure C1: Average perception of IO ideological stances by country (attentive respondents)



Note: Mean of perceived location of IOs (on scales ranging from 0 to 10) with 95%-confidence intervals. Only those respondents that mastered the attention check at the end of the questionnaire. Sample size slightly varies (Brazil N=, Germany N=, Indonesia N=, USA N=)

Table C2: OLS regression (interacting self-placement with IO-placement)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	UN	WHO	WB	WB
Left-Right Self-placement	-0.321*** (0.014)	-0.339*** (0.015)	-0.218*** (0.015)	-0.169*** (0.012)
Left-Right IO-placement	-0.027 (0.018)	0.027 (0.020)	-0.081*** (0.017)	-0.399*** (0.058)
Interaction (self-place*IO-place)	0.043*** (0.003)	0.040*** (0.003)	0.036*** (0.003)	0.130*** (0.009)
GAL-TAN Self-placement	-0.141*** (0.009)	-0.219*** (0.012)	-0.119*** (0.013)	-0.106*** (0.013)
GAL-TAN IO-placement	-0.441*** (0.045)	-0.152*** (0.016)	-0.073*** (0.015)	-0.030* (0.015)
Interaction (self-place*IO-place)	0.089*** (0.007)	0.026*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.002)
Confidence Government	0.430*** (0.008)	0.388*** (0.009)	0.392*** (0.008)	0.395*** (0.008)
Financial satisfaction	0.004 (0.008)	0.026** (0.008)	0.056*** (0.008)	0.054*** (0.008)
Political Satisfaction	0.073*** (0.008)	0.052*** (0.009)	0.086*** (0.008)	0.087*** (0.009)
National Identification	0.034 (0.027)	0.100*** (0.030)	0.085** (0.028)	0.089** (0.028)
Global Identification	0.249*** (0.027)	0.180*** (0.029)	0.226*** (0.027)	0.228*** (0.027)
Age	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.001)
Male (0/1)	-0.350*** (0.037)	-0.298*** (0.040)	-0.315*** (0.038)	-0.301*** (0.038)
Education	0.048* (0.019)	0.118*** (0.021)	0.024 (0.020)	0.023 (0.020)
Germany (0/1)	-0.921*** (0.054)	-0.846*** (0.059)	-1.188*** (0.055)	-1.192*** (0.056)
Indonesia (0/1)	-0.319*** (0.068)	-0.135 (0.074)	0.139* (0.070)	0.147* (0.070)
US (0/1)	-0.636*** (0.062)	-0.680*** (0.068)	-0.510*** (0.064)	-0.532*** (0.065)
Constant	4.034*** (0.150)	4.901*** (0.166)	3.253*** (0.159)	3.037*** (0.152)
N	12746	12739	12735	12735
adj. R ²	0.461	0.414	0.421	0.417

Note: OLS-regression with IO-confidence as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure C2: Predicted IO confidence by value orientations and IO stances (attentive resp's)




Table C3: IO confidence by value orientations and perceived IO stances, country specific

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Germany	Germany	Germany	Germany	Indonesia	Indonesia	Indonesia	Indonesia	USA	USA	USA	USA
	confUN	confWHO	confWB	confWB	confUN	confWHO	confWB	confWB	confUN	confWHO	confWB	confWB	confUN	confWHO	confWB	confWB
LR	-0.395*** (0.026)	-0.368*** (0.027)	-0.266*** (0.027)	-0.252*** (0.028)	-0.182*** (0.039)	-0.214*** (0.042)	-0.159*** (0.045)	-0.186*** (0.046)	-0.105** (0.036)	-0.002 (0.039)	-0.045 (0.038)	-0.024 (0.038)	-0.173*** (0.024)	-0.273*** (0.026)	-0.157*** (0.025)	-0.199*** (0.026)
GAL-TAN	-0.247*** (0.024)	-0.247*** (0.026)	-0.136*** (0.026)	-0.118*** (0.027)	-0.097*** (0.020)	-0.209*** (0.024)	-0.136*** (0.027)	-0.118*** (0.028)	-0.126*** (0.024)	-0.066* (0.026)	-0.070* (0.027)	-0.026 (0.027)	-0.161*** (0.019)	-0.205*** (0.022)	-0.100*** (0.022)	-0.070** (0.023)
IO-LR	-0.056 (0.036)	0.091* (0.039)	-0.065* (0.032)	-0.072* (0.033)	-0.173*** (0.043)	-0.158*** (0.048)	-0.301*** (0.041)	-0.328*** (0.044)	0.123** (0.038)	0.173*** (0.040)	0.118** (0.040)	0.107** (0.040)	0.096** (0.033)	0.016 (0.036)	-0.038 (0.031)	-0.070* (0.033)
IntLR	0.051** (0.005)	0.042** (0.005)	0.041** (0.005)	0.039** (0.005)	0.043** (0.007)	0.043** (0.008)	0.049** (0.007)	0.055** (0.008)	0.014* (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	0.021** (0.005)	0.034** (0.005)	0.028** (0.004)	0.037** (0.005)
IO-GT	-0.106*** (0.028)	-0.142*** (0.031)	-0.054 (0.030)	-0.025 (0.030)	-0.103*** (0.025)	-0.231*** (0.031)	-0.175*** (0.029)	-0.145*** (0.031)	-0.058* (0.029)	-0.013 (0.032)	0.019 (0.032)	0.082* (0.032)	-0.146*** (0.025)	-0.094** (0.029)	-0.051 (0.026)	-0.017 (0.028)
IntGT	0.039** (0.004)	0.035** (0.005)	0.026** (0.005)	0.021** (0.005)	0.012** (0.004)	0.032** (0.005)	0.027** (0.005)	0.023** (0.005)	0.016** (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.024** (0.004)	0.019** (0.004)	0.015** (0.004)	0.008* (0.004)
Confidence	0.262*** (0.017)	0.165*** (0.018)	0.285*** (0.016)	0.282*** (0.016)	0.631*** (0.016)	0.594*** (0.018)	0.517*** (0.018)	0.512*** (0.018)	0.449*** (0.017)	0.409*** (0.018)	0.383*** (0.018)	0.383*** (0.018)	0.518*** (0.015)	0.507*** (0.017)	0.452*** (0.016)	0.454*** (0.016)
Government	-0.041* (0.018)	-0.037 (0.019)	0.017 (0.017)	0.015 (0.017)	0.021 (0.012)	0.046*** (0.014)	0.076*** (0.014)	0.072*** (0.014)	0.020 (0.016)	0.030 (0.017)	0.022 (0.017)	0.027 (0.017)	0.019 (0.013)	0.048** (0.015)	0.079*** (0.014)	0.069*** (0.014)
Political Satisfaction	0.005 (0.017)	-0.014 (0.018)	0.035* (0.017)	0.040* (0.017)	0.023 (0.017)	0.018 (0.019)	0.067*** (0.019)	0.068*** (0.019)	0.099*** (0.016)	0.058*** (0.017)	0.110*** (0.017)	0.107*** (0.017)	0.088*** (0.016)	0.078*** (0.017)	0.108*** (0.016)	0.105*** (0.016)
National Identification	0.074 (0.062)	0.178** (0.066)	-0.072 (0.060)	-0.059 (0.061)	-0.032 (0.047)	0.044 (0.053)	0.121* (0.053)	0.140** (0.053)	0.014 (0.057)	0.075 (0.060)	0.103 (0.062)	0.115 (0.062)	-0.049 (0.046)	0.009 (0.051)	0.079 (0.048)	0.079 (0.048)
Global Identification	0.302*** (0.063)	0.224*** (0.067)	0.376*** (0.061)	0.344*** (0.061)	0.396*** (0.043)	0.274*** (0.049)	0.260*** (0.049)	0.261*** (0.049)	0.115* (0.053)	0.115* (0.056)	0.099 (0.058)	0.100 (0.058)	0.226*** (0.047)	0.089 (0.052)	0.246*** (0.049)	0.234*** (0.049)
Age	-0.008* (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.018*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
Male (0/1)	-0.406*** (0.092)	-0.185 (0.098)	-0.231** (0.090)	-0.176 (0.090)	-0.033 (0.060)	-0.092 (0.068)	0.100 (0.068)	0.097 (0.068)	-0.677*** (0.069)	-0.627*** (0.074)	-0.781*** (0.076)	-0.786*** (0.076)	-0.248*** (0.068)	-0.185* (0.075)	-0.241*** (0.071)	-0.220*** (0.071)
Education	0.199*** (0.042)	0.285*** (0.045)	0.067 (0.041)	0.061 (0.041)	-0.001 (0.027)	0.070* (0.030)	0.002 (0.030)	0.001 (0.030)	-0.158*** (0.047)	-0.130** (0.050)	-0.127* (0.051)	-0.124* (0.051)	-0.039 (0.039)	0.027 (0.044)	0.089* (0.042)	0.092* (0.042)
_cons	5.576*** (0.304)	5.958*** (0.324)	4.372*** (0.299)	4.350*** (0.299)	2.708*** (0.305)	3.967*** (0.333)	2.922*** (0.338)	2.797*** (0.339)	3.800*** (0.309)	4.289*** (0.325)	3.954*** (0.330)	3.580*** (0.332)	2.982*** (0.248)	3.790*** (0.268)	1.663*** (0.260)	1.669*** (0.260)
N	3219	3222	3222	3216	3196	3190	3190	3189	3058	3055	3061	3061	3273	3272	3262	3269
BIC	15015.613	15421.669	14821.277	14829.683	12348.685	13086.797	13051.221	13057.322	12575.314	12928.430	13105.916	13122.464	13396.139	14075.786	13679.621	13679.603
ll	-7447.231	-7650.251	-7350.056	-7354.272	-6113.820	-6482.890	-6465.102	-6468.155	-6227.466	-6404.031	-6492.759	-6501.033	-6637.368	-6977.195	-6779.135	-6779.110

Note: OLS-regression with IO-confidence as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix D Experimental study

Fig D1: % Respondents correctly answering the manipulation checks by treatment




Fig D2: % Respondents correctly answering the manipulation checks by country




Table D1: Balance tests

Experiment	Variable	Mean in control group	Differences from mean in control group				F	p
			IO=GAL	IO=TAN	IO=Left	IO=Right		
Migration	Age (18-96)	44.60 (0.32)	-0.27 (0.45)	-0.27 (0.45)	0.18 (0.45)	-0.74 (0.45)	1.17	0.32
Migration	Male (0/1)	0.49 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.73	0.57
Migration	Education (1-8)	3.67 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.56	0.69
Migration	LR self-place	5.28 (0.05)	0.11 (0.07)	0.09 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.07)	2.02	0.09
Migration	GT self-place	5.03 (0.06)	0.10 (0.09)	0.13 (0.09)	0.10 (0.09)	-0.00 (0.09)	0.96	0.43
Trade	Age (18-96)	44.60 (0.32)	-0.15 (0.45)	-0.52 (0.45)	-0.11 (0.45)	-0.32 (0.45)	0.41	0.80
Trade	Male (0/1)	0.49 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.62	0.65
Trade	Education (1-8)	3.67 (0.03)	0.08* (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	3.84*	0.00
Trade	LR self-place	5.28 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)	0.58	0.68
Trade	GT self-place	5.03 (0.06)	0.05 (0.09)	0.01 (0.09)	0.08 (0.09)	0.19* (0.09)	1.52	0.19
Climate	Age (18-96)	44.60 (0.32)	-0.79 (0.45)	0.24 (0.45)	-0.31 (0.45)	-0.23 (0.45)	1.46	0.21
Climate	Male (0/1)	0.49 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.44	0.78
Climate	Education (1-8)	3.67 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	1.49	0.20
Climate	LR self-place	5.28 (0.05)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	0.11 (0.07)	1.22	0.30
Climate	GT self-place	5.03 (0.06)	0.06 (0.09)	0.14 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.17 (0.09)	1.84	0.12
Peacebuilding	Age (18-96)	44.60 (0.32)	0.13 (0.45)	-0.54 (0.45)	-0.86 (0.45)	0.17 (0.45)	2.04	0.09
Peacebuilding	Male (0/1)	0.49 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.56	0.69
Peacebuilding	Education (1-8)	3.67 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	1.17	0.32
Peacebuilding	LR self-place	5.28 (0.05)	0.01 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	0.21	0.94
Peacebuilding	GT self-place	5.03 (0.06)	0.12 (0.09)	0.06 (0.09)	0.18* (0.09)	-0.03 (0.09)	1.90	0.11

One-way ANOVA with standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure D3: Average Treatment Effects (treatment vs. control group)




Table D3: OLS regression (treatments on the same dimension coded as two level contrasts)

	(1) Migration	(2) Migration	(3) Trade	(4) Trade	(5) Climate	(6) Climate	(7) Peace	(8) Peace
GAL-TAN Self-placement	-0.202*** (0.025)	-0.034 (0.019)	-0.074** (0.023)	-0.017 (0.020)	-0.066** (0.023)	-0.061** (0.023)	-0.195*** (0.025)	0.001 (0.022)
GAL (vs. T) Treatment	-2.147*** (0.198)		-0.557** (0.180)		-0.496** (0.186)		-2.889*** (0.198)	
Interaction (self-pl*treat)	0.323*** (0.033)		0.050 (0.031)		0.069* (0.031)		0.407*** (0.034)	
Left-Right Self-Placement	-0.030 (0.024)	-0.119*** (0.027)	-0.004 (0.023)	-0.063* (0.029)	-0.048* (0.022)	-0.169*** (0.034)	0.003 (0.024)	-0.138*** (0.033)
Left (vs. R) Treatment		-0.737** (0.243)		-0.950*** (0.244)		-0.848** (0.260)		-1.684*** (0.264)
Interaction (self-pl*treat)		0.087* (0.043)		0.019 (0.043)		0.168*** (0.047)		0.283*** (0.046)
Confidence Government	0.267*** (0.025)	0.290*** (0.024)	0.255*** (0.023)	0.237*** (0.024)	0.328*** (0.023)	0.257*** (0.027)	0.265*** (0.025)	0.269*** (0.026)
Financial satisfaction	0.010 (0.023)	0.020 (0.023)	-0.011 (0.021)	0.066** (0.022)	0.047* (0.021)	0.004 (0.025)	0.059* (0.023)	0.044 (0.024)
Political Satisfaction	0.056* (0.025)	0.055* (0.025)	0.061** (0.024)	-0.000 (0.025)	0.020 (0.024)	0.118*** (0.027)	0.029 (0.025)	0.038 (0.028)
National Identification	-0.034 (0.082)	-0.172* (0.080)	-0.176* (0.077)	0.048 (0.081)	-0.130 (0.077)	-0.058 (0.089)	-0.057 (0.082)	-0.103 (0.084)
Global Identification	0.249** (0.080)	0.393*** (0.079)	0.399*** (0.074)	0.264*** (0.079)	0.494*** (0.077)	0.346*** (0.087)	0.299*** (0.082)	0.312*** (0.086)
Age	-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.025*** (0.003)	-0.019*** (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.003)	-0.022*** (0.004)	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.029*** (0.004)
Male (0/1)	-0.110 (0.111)	-0.073 (0.107)	-0.075 (0.104)	-0.115 (0.109)	-0.189 (0.105)	-0.213 (0.122)	-0.079 (0.110)	-0.253* (0.118)
Education	-0.117 (0.060)	-0.095 (0.056)	-0.012 (0.056)	-0.178** (0.058)	-0.051 (0.055)	-0.166** (0.063)	-0.154** (0.058)	-0.075 (0.059)
Germany (0/1)	-0.574*** (0.166)	-1.576*** (0.148)	-1.186*** (0.147)	-0.942*** (0.159)	-0.992*** (0.152)	-1.030*** (0.169)	-0.942*** (0.156)	-1.014*** (0.168)
Indonesia (0/1)	0.569* (0.222)	-0.811*** (0.204)	-0.141 (0.204)	-0.343 (0.214)	-0.144 (0.201)	0.008 (0.251)	-0.393 (0.216)	-0.303 (0.232)
US (0/1)	-0.298 (0.192)	-1.412*** (0.188)	-0.828*** (0.187)	-0.698*** (0.190)	-0.641*** (0.187)	-1.121*** (0.212)	-0.942*** (0.191)	-0.897*** (0.205)
Round#2 (0/1)	0.009 (0.155)	0.212 (0.151)	0.044 (0.147)	-0.020 (0.153)	0.110 (0.149)	-0.010 (0.173)	-0.063 (0.157)	0.294 (0.168)
Round#3 (0/1)	-0.037 (0.156)	-0.005 (0.149)	0.071 (0.143)	0.134 (0.152)	0.169 (0.148)	-0.169 (0.175)	0.000 (0.155)	-0.114 (0.170)
Round#4 (0/1)	0.011 (0.157)	0.085 (0.149)	0.210 (0.140)	0.081 (0.151)	0.037 (0.151)	0.005 (0.170)	-0.169 (0.156)	0.031 (0.169)
Constant	5.730*** (0.408)	6.493*** (0.390)	5.453*** (0.389)	5.443*** (0.402)	4.635*** (0.387)	6.342*** (0.447)	6.378*** (0.393)	5.856*** (0.436)
N	1998	1892	2007	2026	2185	1474	2205	1682
adj. R ²	0.238	0.246	0.203	0.186	0.239	0.262	0.223	0.222

Note: OLS-regression with IO-confidence as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D4: OLS regression (treatments/controls as three-level contrasts, control as baseline)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Migration	Migration	Trade	Trade	Climate	Climate	Peace	Peace
GAL-TAN Self-placement	-0.094*** (0.016)	-0.058*** (0.012)	-0.065*** (0.015)	-0.041** (0.013)	-0.079*** (0.016)	-0.068*** (0.014)	-0.067*** (0.016)	-0.033* (0.013)
GAL (vs. Control) Treatment	0.537*** (0.154)		0.361* (0.149)		-0.180 (0.157)		0.978*** (0.154)	
Interaction (self-place*treat)	-0.086** (0.027)		0.002 (0.026)		0.024 (0.027)		-0.110*** (0.028)	
TAN (vs. Control) Treatment	-1.586*** (0.170)		-0.201 (0.162)		-0.663*** (0.167)		-1.939*** (0.174)	
Interaction (self-place*treat)	0.238*** (0.028)		0.053 (0.027)		0.091** (0.028)		0.300*** (0.028)	
Left-Right Self-Placement	-0.061*** (0.015)	-0.094*** (0.018)	-0.049*** (0.015)	-0.090*** (0.019)	-0.095*** (0.015)	-0.133*** (0.019)	-0.049** (0.015)	-0.097*** (0.019)
Left (vs. Control) Treatment		0.440* (0.178)		0.037 (0.182)		0.023 (0.214)		0.092 (0.205)
Interaction (self-place*treat)		-0.009 (0.031)		0.045 (0.032)		-0.033 (0.038)		-0.027 (0.036)
Right (vs. Control) Treatment		-0.310 (0.222)		-0.954*** (0.214)		-0.838*** (0.233)		-1.659*** (0.228)
Interaction (self-place*treat)		0.080* (0.039)		0.074* (0.037)		0.136*** (0.041)		0.265*** (0.038)
Confidence Government	0.045 (0.099)	0.143 (0.098)	0.114 (0.098)	0.089 (0.100)	0.207* (0.103)	0.183 (0.110)	0.109 (0.103)	0.290** (0.106)
Financial satisfaction	0.152 (0.101)	0.183 (0.098)	0.133 (0.096)	0.178 (0.099)	0.245* (0.103)	0.140 (0.111)	0.201* (0.102)	0.195 (0.106)
Political Satisfaction	0.133 (0.101)	0.175 (0.099)	0.212* (0.096)	0.147 (0.099)	0.195 (0.102)	0.211 (0.108)	0.103 (0.103)	0.228* (0.106)
National Identification	0.274*** (0.016)	0.289*** (0.015)	0.260*** (0.015)	0.253*** (0.016)	0.318*** (0.016)	0.294*** (0.017)	0.273*** (0.016)	0.272*** (0.016)
Global Identification	0.017 (0.015)	0.020 (0.015)	0.006 (0.014)	0.039** (0.015)	0.030* (0.015)	0.008 (0.016)	0.028 (0.015)	0.021 (0.015)
Age	0.074*** (0.016)	0.072*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	0.032* (0.016)	0.048** (0.016)	0.086*** (0.017)	0.060*** (0.016)	0.067*** (0.017)
Male (0/1)	-0.083 (0.053)	-0.150** (0.052)	-0.089 (0.051)	0.006 (0.053)	-0.102 (0.053)	-0.061 (0.057)	-0.052 (0.054)	-0.064 (0.055)
Education	0.278*** (0.051)	0.343*** (0.051)	0.322*** (0.050)	0.261*** (0.051)	0.352*** (0.052)	0.274*** (0.055)	0.306*** (0.053)	0.310*** (0.054)
Germany (0/1)	-0.018*** (0.002)	-0.022*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.002)
Indonesia (0/1)	-0.221** (0.072)	-0.206** (0.070)	-0.135 (0.070)	-0.163* (0.071)	-0.276*** (0.073)	-0.306*** (0.078)	-0.179* (0.073)	-0.256*** (0.075)
US (0/1)	-0.010 (0.038)	0.005 (0.037)	0.017 (0.037)	-0.055 (0.037)	0.006 (0.038)	-0.018 (0.041)	-0.018 (0.039)	0.033 (0.039)
Round#2 (0/1)	-0.908*** (0.105)	-1.331*** (0.100)	-0.912*** (0.100)	-0.807*** (0.103)	-0.944*** (0.105)	-0.954*** (0.111)	-0.882*** (0.105)	-0.906*** (0.108)
Round#3 (0/1)	0.310* (0.137)	-0.261* (0.132)	0.221 (0.133)	0.143 (0.135)	0.277* (0.136)	0.397** (0.149)	0.060 (0.139)	0.151 (0.142)
Round#4 (0/1)	-0.410*** (0.122)	-0.868*** (0.121)	-0.344** (0.121)	-0.287* (0.121)	-0.418*** (0.125)	-0.563*** (0.132)	-0.474*** (0.125)	-0.405** (0.128)
Constant	4.641*** (0.260)	4.976*** (0.255)	4.341*** (0.255)	4.481*** (0.263)	4.471*** (0.264)	4.962*** (0.280)	4.325*** (0.265)	4.346*** (0.272)
N	4538	4432	4547	4566	4725	4014	4745	4222
adj. R ²	0.231	0.244	0.211	0.201	0.233	0.234	0.194	0.212

Note: OLS-regression with IO-confidence as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D5: OLS regression (treatments/controls as three-level contrasts, left/GAL as baseline)

	(1) Migration	(2) Migration	(3) Trade	(4) Trade	(5) Climate	(6) Climate	(7) Peace	(8) Peace
GAL-TAN Self-placement	-0.179*** (0.023)	-0.058*** (0.012)	-0.063** (0.022)	-0.041** (0.013)	-0.055* (0.023)	-0.068*** (0.014)	-0.177*** (0.024)	-0.033* (0.013)
Control (vs. GAL) Treatment			-0.361* (0.149)		0.180 (0.157)		-0.978*** (0.154)	
Interaction (self-place*treat)	0.086** (0.027)		-0.002 (0.026)		-0.024 (0.027)		0.110*** (0.028)	
TAN (vs. GAL) Treatment			-0.562** (0.183)		-0.483* (0.189)		-2.918*** (0.193)	
Interaction (self-place*treat)	0.323*** (0.032)		0.051 (0.032)		0.067* (0.032)		0.409*** (0.033)	
Left-Right Self-Placement	-0.061*** (0.015)	-0.103*** (0.026)	-0.049*** (0.015)	-0.045 (0.027)	-0.095*** (0.015)	-0.166*** (0.034)	-0.049** (0.015)	-0.124*** (0.033)
Control (vs. Left) Treatment		-0.440* (0.178)		-0.037 (0.182)		-0.023 (0.214)		-0.092 (0.205)
Interaction (self-place*treat)		0.009 (0.031)		-0.045 (0.032)		0.033 (0.038)		0.027 (0.036)
Right (vs. Left) Treatment		-0.750** (0.245)		-0.991*** (0.239)		-0.861** (0.276)		-1.751*** (0.266)
Interaction (self-place*treat)		0.089* (0.044)		0.030 (0.042)		0.169*** (0.049)		0.292*** (0.046)
Confidence Government	0.274*** (0.016)	0.289*** (0.015)	0.260*** (0.015)	0.253*** (0.016)	0.318*** (0.016)	0.294*** (0.017)	0.273*** (0.016)	0.272*** (0.016)
Financial satisfaction	0.017 (0.015)	0.020 (0.015)	0.006 (0.014)	0.039** (0.015)	0.030* (0.015)	0.008 (0.016)	0.028 (0.015)	0.021 (0.015)
Political Satisfaction	0.074*** (0.016)	0.072*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	0.032* (0.016)	0.048** (0.016)	0.086*** (0.017)	0.060*** (0.016)	0.067*** (0.017)
National Identification	-0.083 (0.053)	-0.150** (0.052)	-0.089 (0.051)	0.006 (0.053)	-0.102 (0.053)	-0.061 (0.057)	-0.052 (0.054)	-0.064 (0.055)
Global Identification	0.278*** (0.051)	0.343*** (0.051)	0.322*** (0.050)	0.261*** (0.051)	0.352*** (0.052)	0.274*** (0.055)	0.306*** (0.053)	0.310*** (0.054)
Age	-0.018*** (0.002)	-0.022*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.002)
Male (0/1)	-0.221** (0.072)	-0.206** (0.070)	-0.135 (0.070)	-0.163* (0.071)	-0.276*** (0.073)	-0.306*** (0.078)	-0.179* (0.073)	-0.256*** (0.075)
Education	-0.010 (0.038)	0.005 (0.037)	0.017 (0.037)	-0.055 (0.037)	0.006 (0.038)	-0.018 (0.041)	-0.018 (0.039)	0.033 (0.039)
Germany (0/1)	-0.908*** (0.105)	-1.331*** (0.100)	-0.912*** (0.100)	-0.807*** (0.103)	-0.944*** (0.105)	-0.954*** (0.111)	-0.882*** (0.105)	-0.906*** (0.108)
Indonesia (0/1)	0.310* (0.137)	-0.261* (0.132)	0.221 (0.133)	0.143 (0.135)	0.277* (0.136)	0.397** (0.149)	0.060 (0.139)	0.151 (0.142)
US (0/1)	-0.410*** (0.122)	-0.868*** (0.121)	-0.344** (0.121)	-0.287* (0.121)	-0.418*** (0.125)	-0.563*** (0.132)	-0.474*** (0.125)	-0.405** (0.128)
Round#2 (0/1)	0.045 (0.099)	0.143 (0.098)	0.114 (0.098)	0.089 (0.100)	0.207* (0.103)	0.183 (0.110)	0.109 (0.103)	0.290** (0.106)
Round#3 (0/1)	0.152 (0.101)	0.183 (0.098)	0.133 (0.096)	0.178 (0.099)	0.245* (0.103)	0.140 (0.111)	0.201* (0.102)	0.195 (0.106)
Round#4 (0/1)	0.133 (0.101)	0.175 (0.099)	0.212* (0.096)	0.147 (0.099)	0.195 (0.102)	0.211 (0.108)	0.103 (0.103)	0.228* (0.106)
Constant	5.452*** (0.276)	5.705*** (0.280)	4.962*** (0.275)	4.771*** (0.284)	4.609*** (0.283)	5.279*** (0.322)	5.576*** (0.275)	4.710*** (0.308)
N	4538	4432	4547	4566	4725	4014	4745	4222
BIC	20915.478	20141.372	20671.322	20970.197	22056.877	18636.714	22264.103	19554.148

Note: OLS-regression with IO-confidence as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D6: OLS regression (treatments/controls as three-level contrasts, Brazil)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Migration	Migration	Trade	Trade	Climate	Climate	Peace	Peace
GAL-TAN Self-placement	-0.022 (0.034)	0.001 (0.026)	-0.020 (0.032)	-0.004 (0.027)	-0.026 (0.035)	-0.008 (0.031)	-0.063 (0.035)	0.018 (0.029)
GAL (vs. Control) Treatment	1.284*** (0.346)		0.661* (0.305)		0.175 (0.361)		1.374*** (0.305)	
Interaction (self-place*treat)	-0.230*** (0.062)		0.027 (0.057)		0.019 (0.063)		-0.086 (0.060)	
TAN (vs. Control) Treatment	-2.569*** (0.392)		0.151 (0.368)		-0.443 (0.382)		-2.952*** (0.382)	
Interaction (self-place*treat)	0.265*** (0.067)		0.085 (0.066)		0.074 (0.065)		0.506*** (0.065)	
Left-Right Self-Placement	-0.132*** (0.028)	-0.150*** (0.033)	-0.140*** (0.027)	-0.194*** (0.034)	-0.171*** (0.028)	-0.204*** (0.036)	-0.110*** (0.028)	-0.185*** (0.035)
Left (vs. Control) Treatment		0.575 (0.337)		0.327 (0.353)		0.046 (0.419)		0.172 (0.414)
Interaction (self-place*treat)		0.039 (0.054)		0.056 (0.056)		0.002 (0.070)		0.051 (0.070)
Right (vs. Control) Treatment		-0.390 (0.417)		-0.588 (0.461)		-0.763 (0.479)		-1.271** (0.459)
Interaction (self-place*treat)		0.162* (0.070)		0.033 (0.074)		0.125 (0.079)		0.259*** (0.070)
Confidence Government	0.192*** (0.033)	0.163*** (0.030)	0.139*** (0.030)	0.167*** (0.032)	0.193*** (0.033)	0.156*** (0.035)	0.188*** (0.032)	0.174*** (0.033)
Financial satisfaction	-0.024 (0.034)	-0.024 (0.032)	-0.017 (0.031)	0.033 (0.033)	-0.022 (0.034)	-0.040 (0.036)	-0.024 (0.034)	-0.038 (0.035)
Political Satisfaction	0.024 (0.032)	0.023 (0.031)	0.051 (0.031)	-0.017 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.033)	0.050 (0.035)	0.025 (0.032)	0.061 (0.034)
National Identification	-0.179 (0.119)	-0.102 (0.112)	-0.206 (0.110)	-0.073 (0.116)	-0.069 (0.118)	-0.101 (0.125)	-0.052 (0.118)	-0.011 (0.121)
Global Identification	0.173 (0.119)	0.172 (0.113)	0.339** (0.112)	0.171 (0.116)	0.277* (0.121)	0.257* (0.127)	0.271* (0.118)	0.250* (0.124)
Age	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.018*** (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.011* (0.006)	-0.017** (0.006)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.011 (0.006)
Male (0/1)	-0.445* (0.176)	-0.274 (0.164)	-0.217 (0.166)	-0.232 (0.164)	-0.288 (0.182)	-0.365 (0.191)	0.015 (0.175)	-0.346 (0.182)
Education	0.094 (0.084)	0.069 (0.077)	0.099 (0.077)	0.104 (0.081)	0.100 (0.083)	0.126 (0.087)	0.140 (0.080)	0.172* (0.081)
Round#2 (0/1)	-0.018 (0.227)	0.059 (0.214)	0.316 (0.222)	0.519* (0.236)	0.204 (0.244)	0.351 (0.249)	0.182 (0.231)	0.068 (0.246)
Round#3 (0/1)	0.214 (0.230)	0.305 (0.215)	0.120 (0.220)	0.319 (0.231)	0.065 (0.240)	0.258 (0.254)	0.339 (0.230)	0.322 (0.251)
Round#4 (0/1)	0.457 (0.234)	0.297 (0.216)	0.314 (0.218)	0.271 (0.230)	0.325 (0.248)	0.158 (0.254)	0.393 (0.229)	0.312 (0.245)
Constant	5.417*** (0.532)	5.784*** (0.490)	4.812*** (0.497)	4.800*** (0.524)	5.316*** (0.554)	5.662*** (0.575)	4.242*** (0.516)	4.402*** (0.535)
<i>N</i>	1076	1168	1122	1097	1131	1011	1203	1038
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.131	0.073	0.072	0.075	0.067	0.078	0.130	0.077

Note: OLS-regression with IO-confidence as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D7: OLS regression (treatments/controls as three-level contrasts, Germany)

	(1) Migration	(2) Migration	(3) Trade	(4) Trade	(5) Climate	(6) Climate	(7) Peace	(8) Peace
GAL-TAN Self-placement	-0.133*** (0.031)	-0.082*** (0.025)	-0.061* (0.031)	-0.053* (0.025)	-0.079* (0.034)	-0.071** (0.027)	-0.083* (0.033)	-0.076** (0.025)
GAL (vs. Control) Treatment	0.345 (0.255)		0.560* (0.240)		0.030 (0.256)		0.818** (0.267)	
Interaction (self-place*treat)	-0.128** (0.048)		-0.050 (0.047)		-0.007 (0.050)		-0.060 (0.051)	
TAN (vs. Control) Treatment	-1.537*** (0.263)		-0.287 (0.261)		-0.739* (0.288)		-2.255*** (0.295)	
Interaction (self-place*treat)	0.362*** (0.048)		0.053 (0.048)		0.125* (0.052)		0.366*** (0.054)	
Left-Right Self-Placement	-0.021 (0.038)	-0.072 (0.047)	0.000 (0.036)	-0.026 (0.048)	-0.027 (0.039)	-0.060 (0.050)	-0.013 (0.040)	-0.024 (0.048)
Left (vs. Control) Treatment		1.260** (0.390)		0.257 (0.390)		-0.109 (0.437)		0.748 (0.395)
Interaction (self-place*treat)		-0.614 (0.416)		-1.701*** (0.420)		-0.608 (0.456)		-2.154*** (0.430)
Right (vs. Control) Treatment		-0.198* (0.079)		0.001 (0.078)		0.004 (0.087)		-0.126 (0.080)
Interaction (self-place*treat)		0.123 (0.083)		0.233** (0.085)		0.143 (0.093)		0.319*** (0.084)
Confidence Government	0.327*** (0.035)	0.296*** (0.034)	0.269*** (0.033)	0.258*** (0.034)	0.296*** (0.035)	0.313*** (0.038)	0.274*** (0.036)	0.264*** (0.034)
Financial satisfaction	0.050* (0.025)	0.056* (0.027)	0.008 (0.025)	0.066* (0.026)	0.058* (0.027)	0.061* (0.028)	0.048 (0.028)	0.047 (0.027)
Political Satisfaction	-0.005 (0.036)	0.047 (0.036)	0.064 (0.035)	-0.018 (0.036)	0.071 (0.037)	0.082* (0.039)	0.028 (0.037)	0.007 (0.037)
National Identification	0.027 (0.102)	-0.084 (0.101)	-0.036 (0.100)	0.082 (0.103)	-0.018 (0.107)	-0.032 (0.110)	-0.021 (0.105)	0.163 (0.102)
Global Identification	0.226* (0.093)	0.439*** (0.094)	0.385*** (0.089)	0.391*** (0.092)	0.414*** (0.099)	0.274** (0.100)	0.284** (0.098)	0.371*** (0.095)
Age	-0.021*** (0.004)	-0.025*** (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.016*** (0.004)	-0.022*** (0.004)	-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.029*** (0.004)	-0.026*** (0.004)
Male (0/1)	0.034 (0.129)	-0.052 (0.130)	0.090 (0.127)	0.142 (0.130)	-0.156 (0.137)	-0.229 (0.141)	-0.028 (0.137)	0.201 (0.132)
Education	-0.139* (0.058)	-0.135* (0.060)	-0.179** (0.059)	-0.232*** (0.058)	-0.178** (0.063)	-0.193** (0.063)	-0.257*** (0.061)	-0.147* (0.060)
Round#2 (0/1)	0.090 (0.179)	0.172 (0.178)	-0.015 (0.171)	0.077 (0.175)	-0.004 (0.189)	-0.098 (0.196)	-0.143 (0.193)	0.100 (0.187)
Round#3 (0/1)	0.099 (0.177)	-0.096 (0.177)	0.169 (0.172)	0.304 (0.176)	0.230 (0.188)	0.319 (0.196)	-0.104 (0.190)	-0.280 (0.186)
Round#4 (0/1)	0.022 (0.177)	0.193 (0.177)	0.010 (0.168)	-0.045 (0.177)	-0.143 (0.190)	0.159 (0.192)	-0.096 (0.191)	-0.027 (0.186)
Constant	4.337*** (0.494)	4.192*** (0.502)	4.139*** (0.480)	3.949*** (0.515)	4.124*** (0.528)	4.397*** (0.542)	5.387*** (0.520)	4.039*** (0.522)
<i>N</i>	1255	1194	1261	1281	1305	1138	1275	1203
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.268	0.304	0.229	0.191	0.242	0.264	0.224	0.234

Note: OLS-regression with IO-confidence as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D8: OLS regression (treatments/controls as three-level contrasts, Indonesia)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Migration	Migration	Trade	Trade	Climate	Climate	Peace	Peace
GAL-TAN Self-placement	-0.059* (0.030)	-0.001 (0.024)	-0.057 (0.030)	0.004 (0.024)	0.004 (0.030)	0.021 (0.027)	0.034 (0.031)	0.037 (0.026)
GAL (vs. Control) Treatment	0.085 (0.434)		0.079 (0.436)		-0.267 (0.347)		-0.100 (0.469)	
Interaction (self-place*treat)	0.067 (0.067)		0.041 (0.062)		0.072 (0.053)		-0.019 (0.074)	
TAN (vs. Control) Treatment	-0.483 (0.409)		-0.921* (0.381)		-1.470*** (0.415)		0.658 (0.359)	
Interaction (self-place*treat)	0.076 (0.060)		0.162** (0.057)		0.122* (0.060)		-0.096 (0.052)	
Left-Right Self-Placement	0.114*** (0.032)	0.136*** (0.040)	0.156*** (0.031)	0.103* (0.041)	0.153*** (0.031)	0.115** (0.041)	0.139*** (0.034)	0.082* (0.041)
Left (vs. Control) Treatment		0.485 (0.422)		-0.033 (0.423)		0.349 (0.723)		-0.431 (0.504)
Interaction (self-place*treat)		-0.039 (0.070)		0.022 (0.071)		-0.085 (0.119)		0.078 (0.087)
Right (vs. Control) Treatment		-0.454 (0.971)		-1.157 (0.720)		-0.332 (0.534)		-0.559 (0.691)
Interaction (self-place*treat)		0.071 (0.163)		0.166 (0.123)		0.067 (0.091)		0.147 (0.118)
Confidence Government	0.279*** (0.033)	0.217*** (0.033)	0.273*** (0.032)	0.270*** (0.033)	0.257*** (0.031)	0.265*** (0.035)	0.275*** (0.033)	0.312*** (0.034)
Financial satisfaction	-0.022 (0.030)	0.021 (0.029)	0.034 (0.029)	0.020 (0.030)	0.027 (0.028)	0.014 (0.032)	0.009 (0.030)	0.013 (0.032)
Political Satisfaction	0.048 (0.029)	0.068* (0.030)	0.021 (0.029)	0.030 (0.031)	0.056* (0.028)	0.029 (0.031)	0.071* (0.030)	0.088** (0.031)
National Identification	0.241* (0.107)	0.052 (0.104)	0.258* (0.103)	0.233* (0.109)	0.111 (0.100)	0.314** (0.114)	0.151 (0.109)	0.109 (0.110)
Global Identification	0.013 (0.100)	0.137 (0.100)	-0.085 (0.098)	-0.006 (0.102)	-0.023 (0.096)	-0.133 (0.108)	-0.003 (0.103)	-0.024 (0.106)
Age	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.018** (0.006)	-0.011* (0.006)	-0.013* (0.006)	-0.011* (0.006)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.014* (0.006)
Male (0/1)	-0.394** (0.136)	-0.283* (0.133)	-0.124 (0.131)	-0.133 (0.135)	-0.091 (0.127)	-0.267 (0.145)	-0.505*** (0.134)	-0.506*** (0.142)
Education	0.158 (0.096)	0.109 (0.087)	0.057 (0.091)	0.042 (0.097)	0.053 (0.088)	0.110 (0.102)	0.005 (0.098)	0.106 (0.097)
Round#2 (0/1)	0.303 (0.184)	0.217 (0.181)	0.177 (0.181)	0.115 (0.182)	0.177 (0.179)	0.033 (0.206)	0.522** (0.192)	0.602** (0.195)
Round#3 (0/1)	0.545** (0.186)	0.555** (0.185)	0.057 (0.183)	-0.120 (0.184)	0.269 (0.176)	-0.031 (0.203)	0.657*** (0.185)	0.799*** (0.197)
Round#4 (0/1)	0.401* (0.191)	0.356 (0.188)	0.496** (0.183)	0.496** (0.181)	0.109 (0.175)	0.108 (0.198)	0.503** (0.186)	0.748*** (0.196)
Constant	3.177*** (0.428)	3.324*** (0.426)	3.323*** (0.427)	3.333*** (0.443)	3.623*** (0.411)	3.596*** (0.463)	2.729*** (0.433)	2.730*** (0.454)
N	960	967	1033	985	1102	828	1050	899
adj. R ²	0.180	0.146	0.170	0.147	0.183	0.144	0.170	0.209

Note: OLS-regression with IO-confidence as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D9: OLS regression (treatments/controls as three-level contrasts, USA)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Migration	Migration	Trade	Trade	Climate	Climate	Peace	Peace
GAL-TAN Self-placement	-0.129*** (0.031)	-0.091*** (0.024)	-0.094** (0.031)	-0.086*** (0.024)	-0.169*** (0.031)	-0.135*** (0.026)	-0.093** (0.032)	-0.065* (0.027)
GAL (vs. Control) Treatment	0.419 (0.269)		-0.050 (0.293)		-0.644* (0.304)		0.701* (0.280)	
Interaction (self-place*treat)	-0.012 (0.046)		0.001 (0.050)		0.041 (0.051)		-0.110* (0.049)	
TAN (vs. Control) Treatment	-1.301*** (0.326)		0.136 (0.307)		-0.528 (0.283)		-2.027*** (0.347)	
Interaction (self-place*treat)	0.198*** (0.051)		-0.052 (0.053)		0.116* (0.048)		0.327*** (0.056)	
Left-Right Self-Placement	-0.014 (0.028)	-0.065 (0.034)	0.004 (0.028)	-0.019 (0.035)	-0.042 (0.028)	-0.088* (0.035)	-0.029 (0.029)	-0.050 (0.037)
Left (vs. Control) Treatment		0.077 (0.330)		-0.104 (0.337)		-0.177 (0.363)		-0.062 (0.390)
Interaction (self-place*treat)		0.023 (0.056)		0.066 (0.058)		-0.034 (0.061)		-0.086 (0.065)
Right (vs. Control) Treatment		0.029 (0.410)		-0.614 (0.361)		-1.254** (0.428)		-1.511*** (0.433)
Interaction (self-place*treat)		0.011 (0.069)		0.030 (0.058)		0.142 (0.073)		0.260*** (0.068)
Confidence Government	0.303*** (0.030)	0.420*** (0.031)	0.367*** (0.032)	0.334*** (0.031)	0.450*** (0.031)	0.417*** (0.033)	0.388*** (0.032)	0.369*** (0.034)
Financial satisfaction	0.019 (0.027)	0.005 (0.028)	0.018 (0.028)	0.033 (0.027)	0.037 (0.027)	-0.020 (0.029)	0.034 (0.028)	0.041 (0.030)
Political Satisfaction	0.197*** (0.033)	0.134*** (0.033)	0.068* (0.033)	0.135*** (0.033)	0.104** (0.032)	0.148*** (0.035)	0.119*** (0.033)	0.089* (0.036)
National Identification	-0.254** (0.094)	-0.301** (0.099)	-0.245* (0.100)	-0.132 (0.097)	-0.289** (0.098)	-0.310** (0.106)	-0.214* (0.100)	-0.321** (0.104)
Global Identification	0.448*** (0.094)	0.348*** (0.099)	0.394*** (0.097)	0.267** (0.097)	0.464*** (0.096)	0.453*** (0.104)	0.416*** (0.101)	0.409*** (0.106)
Age	-0.026*** (0.004)	-0.023*** (0.005)	-0.026*** (0.005)	-0.024*** (0.005)	-0.021*** (0.004)	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.022*** (0.005)	-0.030*** (0.005)
Male (0/1)	-0.349* (0.140)	-0.221 (0.142)	-0.398** (0.144)	-0.619*** (0.140)	-0.594*** (0.141)	-0.345* (0.151)	-0.327* (0.145)	-0.548*** (0.153)
Education	-0.076 (0.081)	-0.050 (0.083)	0.101 (0.083)	-0.059 (0.083)	-0.048 (0.081)	-0.109 (0.088)	-0.016 (0.085)	-0.023 (0.090)
Round#2 (0/1)	-0.252 (0.188)	0.074 (0.198)	-0.040 (0.198)	-0.229 (0.194)	0.422* (0.191)	0.381 (0.211)	0.180 (0.190)	0.458* (0.203)
Round#3 (0/1)	-0.144 (0.192)	0.023 (0.195)	0.145 (0.184)	0.135 (0.185)	0.428* (0.198)	0.041 (0.213)	0.113 (0.193)	0.116 (0.202)
Round#4 (0/1)	-0.209 (0.188)	-0.128 (0.193)	0.106 (0.192)	-0.063 (0.193)	0.547** (0.189)	0.374 (0.202)	-0.110 (0.197)	-0.018 (0.208)
Constant	4.751*** (0.430)	4.468*** (0.433)	4.279*** (0.433)	4.834*** (0.435)	4.231*** (0.425)	4.681*** (0.451)	3.977*** (0.437)	4.803*** (0.469)
N	1247	1103	1131	1203	1187	1037	1217	1082
adj. R ²	0.305	0.331	0.264	0.273	0.372	0.352	0.303	0.271

Note: OLS-regression with IO-confidence as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D10: OLS regression (treatments/controls as three-level contrasts, all respondents)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Migration	Migration	Trade	Trade	Climate	Climate	Peace	Peace
GAL-TAN Self-placement	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.059*** (0.009)	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.017 (0.009)	-0.080*** (0.016)	-0.044*** (0.010)	-0.057*** (0.016)	-0.024* (0.010)
GAL (vs. Control) Treatment	-0.089 (0.125)		-0.168 (0.121)		-0.496*** (0.128)		0.292* (0.135)	
Interaction (self-place*treat)	-0.009 (0.021)		0.047* (0.020)		0.044* (0.021)		-0.074*** (0.022)	
TAN (vs. Control) Treatment	-1.273*** (0.124)		-0.136 (0.122)		-0.582*** (0.129)		-1.173*** (0.133)	
Interaction (self-place*treat)	0.193*** (0.021)		0.027 (0.020)		0.063** (0.022)		0.181*** (0.022)	
Left-Right Self-Placement	-0.057*** (0.011)	-0.089*** (0.018)	-0.049*** (0.011)	-0.098*** (0.018)	-0.077*** (0.012)	-0.142*** (0.019)	-0.051*** (0.012)	-0.100*** (0.019)
Left (vs. Control) Treatment		0.037 (0.147)		-0.099 (0.149)		-0.385* (0.153)		-0.129 (0.152)
Interaction (self-place*treat)		0.010 (0.025)		0.016 (0.025)		0.041 (0.026)		0.000 (0.026)
Right (vs. Control) Treatment		-0.429** (0.146)		-0.950*** (0.148)		-0.412** (0.154)		-0.768*** (0.152)
Interaction (self-place*treat)		0.078** (0.025)		0.097*** (0.025)		0.058* (0.026)		0.121*** (0.026)
Confidence Government	0.267*** (0.012)	0.293*** (0.012)	0.278*** (0.012)	0.265*** (0.012)	0.308*** (0.012)	0.305*** (0.012)	0.295*** (0.013)	0.273*** (0.012)
Financial satisfaction	0.019 (0.011)	0.035** (0.011)	0.004 (0.011)	0.039*** (0.011)	0.014 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.018 (0.012)	0.007 (0.012)
Political Satisfaction	0.104*** (0.012)	0.077*** (0.012)	0.092*** (0.012)	0.069*** (0.012)	0.082*** (0.013)	0.099*** (0.013)	0.075*** (0.013)	0.095*** (0.013)
National Identification	-0.085* (0.040)	-0.185*** (0.040)	-0.132*** (0.040)	-0.001 (0.041)	-0.117** (0.042)	-0.067 (0.042)	-0.072 (0.044)	-0.083* (0.042)
Global Identification	0.295*** (0.039)	0.449*** (0.039)	0.374*** (0.039)	0.310*** (0.039)	0.403*** (0.040)	0.304*** (0.041)	0.351*** (0.042)	0.387*** (0.040)
Age	-0.020*** (0.002)	-0.023*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.002)	-0.020*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.022*** (0.002)
Male (0/1)	-0.149** (0.055)	-0.188*** (0.055)	-0.114* (0.054)	-0.123* (0.055)	-0.256*** (0.057)	-0.139* (0.057)	-0.209*** (0.059)	-0.167** (0.057)
Education	0.007 (0.029)	0.026 (0.028)	0.026 (0.028)	-0.047 (0.029)	0.010 (0.029)	0.047 (0.030)	-0.055 (0.031)	-0.014 (0.029)
Germany (0/1)	-0.813*** (0.080)	-1.137*** (0.079)	-0.791*** (0.078)	-0.636*** (0.081)	-0.842*** (0.083)	-0.814*** (0.083)	-0.656*** (0.086)	-0.792*** (0.082)
Indonesia (0/1)	0.342*** (0.100)	-0.277** (0.101)	0.107 (0.100)	0.081 (0.100)	0.282** (0.104)	0.440*** (0.105)	-0.210 (0.108)	0.134 (0.104)
US (0/1)	-0.273** (0.092)	-0.560*** (0.094)	-0.229* (0.092)	-0.092 (0.093)	-0.268** (0.096)	-0.290** (0.096)	-0.399*** (0.101)	-0.282** (0.095)
Round#2 (0/1)	0.082 (0.076)	0.226** (0.076)	0.004 (0.076)	0.093 (0.077)	0.208** (0.079)	0.182* (0.080)	0.184* (0.082)	0.188* (0.079)
Round#3 (0/1)	0.194* (0.076)	0.175* (0.076)	0.035 (0.075)	0.136 (0.077)	0.209** (0.080)	0.113 (0.080)	0.291*** (0.082)	0.115 (0.079)
Round#4 (0/1)	0.163* (0.077)	0.187* (0.076)	0.094 (0.074)	0.139 (0.076)	0.252** (0.080)	0.210** (0.079)	0.206* (0.082)	0.247** (0.079)
Constant	4.655*** (0.205)	4.788*** (0.209)	4.371*** (0.203)	4.515*** (0.212)	4.502*** (0.212)	4.638*** (0.219)	4.528*** (0.221)	4.590*** (0.218)
N	7755	7605	7614	7746	7727	7633	7624	7736
adj. R ²	0.231	0.244	0.211	0.201	0.233	0.234	0.194	0.212

Note: OLS-regression with IO-confidence as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D11: OLS regression (same as D10, but recoded contrasts, all respondents)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Migration	Migration	Trade	Trade	Climate	Climate	Peace	Peace
GAL-TAN Self-placement	-0.102*** (0.015)	-0.059*** (0.009)	-0.013 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.009)	-0.037* (0.015)	-0.044*** (0.010)	-0.131*** (0.017)	-0.024* (0.010)
Control (vs. GAL) Treatment	0.089 (0.125)		0.168 (0.121)		0.496*** (0.128)		-0.292* (0.135)	
Interaction (self-place*treat)	0.009 (0.021)		-0.047* (0.020)		-0.044* (0.021)		0.074*** (0.022)	
TAN (vs. GAL) Treatment	-1.184*** (0.125)		0.032 (0.122)		-0.086 (0.129)		-1.465*** (0.135)	
Interaction (self-place*treat)	0.202*** (0.021)		-0.019 (0.020)		0.020 (0.021)		0.255*** (0.023)	
Left-Right Self-Placement	-0.057*** (0.011)	-0.079*** (0.019)	-0.049*** (0.011)	-0.082*** (0.018)	-0.077*** (0.012)	-0.101*** (0.019)	-0.051*** (0.012)	-0.099*** (0.019)
Control (vs. Left) Treatment		-0.037 (0.147)		0.099 (0.149)		0.385* (0.153)		0.129 (0.152)
Interaction (self-place*treat)		-0.010 (0.025)		-0.016 (0.025)		-0.041 (0.026)		-0.000 (0.026)
Right (vs. Left) Treatment		-0.467** (0.148)		-0.851*** (0.149)		-0.028 (0.155)		-0.639*** (0.152)
Interaction (self-place*treat)		0.067** (0.025)		0.082** (0.025)		0.017 (0.026)		0.120*** (0.026)
Confidence Government	0.267*** (0.012)	0.293*** (0.012)	0.278*** (0.012)	0.265*** (0.012)	0.308*** (0.012)	0.305*** (0.012)	0.295*** (0.013)	0.273*** (0.012)
Financial satisfaction	0.019 (0.011)	0.035** (0.011)	0.004 (0.011)	0.039*** (0.011)	0.014 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.018 (0.012)	0.007 (0.012)
Political Satisfaction	0.104*** (0.012)	0.077*** (0.012)	0.092*** (0.012)	0.069*** (0.012)	0.082*** (0.013)	0.099*** (0.013)	0.075*** (0.013)	0.095*** (0.013)
National Identification	-0.085* (0.040)	-0.185*** (0.040)	-0.132*** (0.040)	-0.001 (0.041)	-0.117** (0.042)	-0.067 (0.042)	-0.072 (0.044)	-0.083* (0.042)
Global Identification	0.295*** (0.039)	0.449*** (0.039)	0.374*** (0.039)	0.310*** (0.039)	0.403*** (0.040)	0.304*** (0.041)	0.351*** (0.042)	0.387*** (0.040)
Age	-0.020*** (0.002)	-0.023*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.002)	-0.020*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.022*** (0.002)
Male (0/1)	-0.149** (0.055)	-0.188*** (0.055)	-0.114* (0.054)	-0.123* (0.055)	-0.256*** (0.057)	-0.139* (0.057)	-0.209*** (0.059)	-0.167** (0.057)
Education	0.007 (0.029)	0.026 (0.028)	0.026 (0.028)	-0.047 (0.029)	0.010 (0.029)	0.047 (0.030)	-0.055 (0.031)	-0.014 (0.029)
Germany (0/1)	-0.813*** (0.080)	-1.137*** (0.079)	-0.791*** (0.078)	-0.636*** (0.081)	-0.842*** (0.083)	-0.814*** (0.083)	-0.656*** (0.086)	-0.792*** (0.082)
Indonesia (0/1)	0.342*** (0.100)	-0.277** (0.101)	0.107 (0.100)	0.081 (0.100)	0.282** (0.104)	0.440*** (0.105)	-0.210 (0.108)	0.134 (0.104)
US (0/1)	-0.273** (0.092)	-0.560*** (0.094)	-0.229* (0.092)	-0.092 (0.093)	-0.268** (0.096)	-0.290** (0.096)	-0.399*** (0.101)	-0.282** (0.095)
Round#2 (0/1)	0.082 (0.076)	0.226** (0.076)	0.004 (0.076)	0.093 (0.077)	0.208** (0.079)	0.182* (0.080)	0.184* (0.082)	0.188* (0.079)
Round#3 (0/1)	0.194* (0.076)	0.175* (0.076)	0.035 (0.075)	0.136 (0.077)	0.209** (0.080)	0.113 (0.080)	0.291*** (0.082)	0.115 (0.079)
Round#4 (0/1)	0.163* (0.077)	0.187* (0.076)	0.094 (0.074)	0.139 (0.076)	0.252** (0.080)	0.210** (0.079)	0.206* (0.082)	0.247** (0.079)
Constant	4.566*** (0.204)	4.825*** (0.212)	4.203*** (0.204)	4.416*** (0.212)	4.006*** (0.213)	4.254*** (0.220)	4.821*** (0.221)	4.461*** (0.217)
N	7755	7605	7614	7746	7727	7633	7624	7736
adj. R ²	0.231	0.244	0.211	0.201	0.233	0.234	0.194	0.212

Note: OLS-regression with IO-confidence as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$