Institutional Racism in International Relations

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How does racism structure the patterns of cooperation and contestation in international relations? We propose a theory of *institutional racism* in international relations, examining how international organizations perpetuate racial disparities despite their nominally race-neutral principles. Based on our original data, language in the founding charters of international organizations has shifted from open expressions of racism to the espousal of antiracism. However, membership patterns suggest a persistent bias in favor of white-majority countries: 1) such countries remain overrepresented as inception members of newly formed organizations; 2) even after accounting for a variety of potential confounders, organizations that overrepresent white-majority countries tend to disproportionately draw new members from other white-majority countries. International organizations that explicitly profess antiracist principles, such as the International Criminal Court, exhibit similar bias. The findings suggest that scholarship needs to pay greater attention to race in understanding the structure and biases of the international order.

Introduction

Scholars have increasingly called attention to the neglect of race in international relations scholarship (Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam 2014; Bhambra et al. 2020; Freeman, Kim, and Lake 2022; Zvobgo and Loken 2020). Critics argue that core international relations theories were developed from "white" perspectives rooted in structural power asymmetries and racist assumptions about concepts like anarchy and sovereignty (Rolim 2021; Sabaratnam 2020). Racist ideas played an important role in early 20th century international relations scholarship, illustrated by *The Journal of Race Development*, which was later renamed to become *Foreign Affairs* (Vitalis 2017). These legacies came to be neglected as explicitly racist theories fell to the wayside and the subfield increasingly sought to portray itself in objective, scientific terms.

There is a general presumption that overt racism has diminished in international relations over time. Búzás (2021) traces the evolution of racial diversity regimes in the Liberal International Order, which have evolved from outright racist discrimination to "embedded racism" that shielded domestic racism from external interference, to greater transformative efforts reflecting decolonization and civil rights movements. There is little doubt that open expressions of racism have declined in the conduct of international relations, though populist leaders like Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro represent meaningful aberrations. It seems inconceivable today that policymakers of major Western countries could survive in office while opposing racial equality principles outright, as the leaders of the US and UK did at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

However, the decline of overt racism does not imply the elimination of racism per se. As scientific racism was widely discredited, attention turned to the social construction and

institutionalization of race. As Thompson (2014, 48) notes, racism can be defined as the use of constructed racial boundaries to maintain a hierarchical order of differentiated access to "protection, privilege, property, or profit." Domestically, studies have examined how race shapes state formation and structures elite alliances (Goldberg 2002; D. S. King and Smith 2005) and conversely, how the state apparatus has been used to create a racialized population (Thompson 2016). In these racialized environments, seemingly racially benign institutions can be leveraged to protect and perpetuate allocations of resources and opportunities in a manner that disproportionately benefits members of a specific race (Banting and Thompson 2021; D. S. King and Smith 2005; Marx 1996). These include policies related to welfare, education, and immigration (Banting and Thompson 2021; Bhopal 2018; D. S. King and Smith 2005; Lieberman 1998; Rattansi 2005).

It is equally crucial to consider institutional racism in international relations. The increasing institutionalization of the international system represents a major development of the past two centuries. Scholarship has generally focused on the positive consequences of this transformation, arguing from rationalist or idealist perspectives that international institutions among other things facilitate interstate cooperation (Keohane 1984), reduce militarized conflict (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004; Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998), and diminish various forms of discrimination (Helfer and Voeten 2014; Simmons 2009). However, there is a striking absence of scholarship that considers the connection between international institutionalization and institutionalized racism.[2]

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[2] To illustrate this point, we conducted a comprehensive review of articles published in top political science journals and found only a handful of articles that draw connections between racism and international institutions in any manner. None of them considered institutional racism as we do here. We collected relevant articles through the following procedure: using the Web of Science (app.webofknowledge.com), we searched for articles in the top 10 political science journals according to Giles and Garand (2007), Table 4, Column 2, which ranks political science

There are several features of international institutions that make them plausible vehicles of institutional racism. First, international institutions constitute the structural architecture of international governance, cooperation, and contestation. By definition they *institutionalize* international principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures (Krasner 1982). It is thus plausible that they play a role analogous to their domestic counterparts in perpetuating racist hierarchies and power relations. Second, international institutions are prone to path dependence, locking in initial conditions despite underlying shifts (Fioretos 2017; Lipscy 2015; Pierson 2000). Insofar as underlying racist beliefs and norms have genuinely evolved, established institutions may be prone to lag behind and perpetuate patterns of interaction from an earlier era.

To evaluate institutional racism in international relations, we examine data on language usage and membership patterns in international organizations. The data suggests that open expressions of racist language in the founding documents of international organizations has declined over time, and antiracist language has become more common. However, membership patterns suggest the presence of a less overt form of racism: white-majority countries continue to dominate membership in international organizations, including organizations newly created in recent years. Furthermore, even after controlling for a variety of potential confounders, international organizations that overrepresent white-majority countries at inception tend to disproportionately expand membership to other white-majority countries. The findings suggest

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journals based on citation-rated-adjusted impact, weighted for the impact of the sending journal. The included journals were, in order of ranking: *American Political Science Review, International Organization, World Politics, American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Conflict Resolution, International Studies Quarterly, International Security, International Interactions, European Journal of International Relations, and Journal of Politics*. Articles were searched based on topic, i.e. the relevant term appears in the title, abstract, or keywords of the article. The terms used were: [international institution OR international organization] AND [race OR racism OR racist]. This only produced thirteen articles, none of which are directly relevant to the topic of this paper.

that scholarship on international organizations, regime complexity, and institutional contestation need to pay greater attention to race.

Theory and Hypotheses

Our key theoretical prediction is that international institutions should be increasingly characterized by a disparity between overt expressions of racism on the one hand and racist bias in their activities. This mirrors the evolution of institutional racism in national politics and legal systems, which has seen overt expressions of racism subject to increasing condemnation and ostracization even while racial disparities prove stubbornly persistent.

In the domestic political context, after World War II, overt articulation of racist beliefs, prejudice, and laws have become less common in favor of race-neutral discourses. Many white-majority countries now have explicit laws on the books that prohibit discrimination based on race. In the United States, the post-civil rights period saw a flurry of laws that banned racial discrimination and allowed race to be considered only to counteract historical disparities for the purposes of affirmative action in areas like education and housing (Berrey 2015). The United Kingdom also enacted antiracist laws (Parsons 2009) and eschewed racialized language in policy areas like immigration (Rattansi 2005). In Canada, the trend began from the use of race-neutral laws and proceeded to include laws acknowledging racial inequalities (Banting and Thompson 2021). South Africa resisted this trend until the 1990s and maintained an explicitly racist Apartheid regime, but it was subject to considerable international pressure and ostracization as a result.

This leads to our first hypothesis, which predicts an analogous shift away from the use of racist language in international organizations over time. Although overt racism has always been a

matter of contestation – particularly by non-white-majority countries – a taboo against outright

racism has become firmly entrenched across societies since the end of World War II, albeit to

different degrees and not necessarily at the same time. The normative shift against racist

expression among the nation-state principals of international organizations should affect the

language used by international organizations. Members states are unlikely to advocate for the

inclusion of racist language if such language is either delegitimized or illegal within their own

societies. States are also more likely to support the inclusion of antiracist language if such

principles pose no conflict with their own laws and domestic practices. We thus predict that

international organizations should increasingly eschew outright expressions of racism in their use

of language. This leads to our first hypothesis:

H1: The use of racist language in international organizations should decline over time, while the use of antiracist language should increase.

Despite shifts against open expressions of racism and explicitly racist laws, racial

inequalities have proven persistent across societies. Thus, scholarship on race has increasingly

shifted to analyses of institutional racism. While using different terms and theoretical

frameworks, these studies share a common recognition of the persistent, insidious effects of

institutions, practices, and norms that perpetuate racial inequalities notwithstanding the absence

of racist justification or even intention (Parsons 2009; Phillips 2011; Rattansi 2005; J. Williams

1985). Banting and Thompson (2021) provide the following definition, which can be applied

directly to international relations, and which we will use for the remainder of this paper:

"Institutional racism manifests as the rules, norms and/or patterns of behaviour that perpetuate

relative disadvantage for some racial groups and advantage for others; the institutionalization of

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implicit racial bias; the ways that seemingly universal rules affect populations differently and result in the reification of pre-existing racial inequalities; the way that seemingly universal rules are, in fact, designed to advantage white populations and disadvantage non-white populations; or any combination of these tendencies."[3]

Institutional racism may reflect intentional efforts by members of a specific race to design rules or norms that serve their own interests. It may also be the product of unconscious biases or the unintended consequences of well-meaning activities. Crucially, racist intent is difficult to establish in the presence of normative taboos and legal prohibitions against overt racism, which give racists and non-racists alike strong incentives to appeal to universalistic principles to justify their actions. Thus, both legal remedies and empirical studies of institutional racism focus on establishing disparate impact rather than explicit intent (Barnes, Chemerinsky, and Jones 2009; Darby and Levy 2016; Phillips 2011; D. R. Williams and Mohammed 2013).

For example, in the United States, white-dominated homeowner associations successfully defended neighborhood exclusivity without explicitly racist rules through land use regulations limiting new housing developments (Trounstine 2018, 2021). When the status quo already reflects racially biased outcomes, resistance to change based on appeals to seemingly universalistic and desirable principles – such as maintaining neighborhood character or preventing excessive development – can be sufficient to perpetuate disparities. Similarly, white-majority countries have designed immigration policies that effectively favor white migrants through purportedly race-blind criteria (Douglas, Sáenz, and Murga 2015; Rosenberg 2019,

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[3] Also see Better (2008, 11), who defines institutional racism as follows: "those patterns, procedures, practices, and policies that operate within social institutions so as to consistently penalize, disadvantage, and exploit individuals who are members of nonwhite racial/ethnic groups. Institutional racism functions to reinforce white skin privilege in all facets of American life."

2022). Race-neutral language can also be leveraged to deepen racial disparities and segregation. In the US court system, the language of race neutrality is increasingly invoked to strike down measures designed to protect minority groups or remedy historical imbalances, such as the preclearance conditions in the Voting Rights Act and affirmative action policies (Gallagher 2020).

We theorize a similar pattern of institutional racism in international relations. International institutions are by definition the mechanisms through which the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures among states are institutionalized (Krasner 1982). Furthermore, established institutions are often sticky, lagging behind shifts in underlying conditions such as power relationships and normative shifts (Fioretos 2017; Lipscy 2015; Pierson 2000). They thus plausibly play a role analogous to their domestic counterparts in sustaining racial bias. We predict that, even as language and attitudes around racism have evolved, international institutions will continue to be associated with racist patterns of interaction. As with the domestic political context, the development of a strong normative taboo against overt expressions of racism makes it impractical to establish racist intent. We will thus focus on disparate impact: the creation and perpetuation of institutions that are exclusionary or exhibit patterns of bias according to race.

Our predictions are general and apply to the entire range of international institutions, including informal principles, norms, and rules. Nonetheless, we will focus on formal international organizations for the purposes of empirical analysis in this article. This is for several reasons. First, the universe of international organizations is well defined based on the existing literature, and we can conduct a systematic analysis of all organizations in a way not possible for the universe of international institutions. Second, while the universe of institutions

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includes unwritten norms and principles for which the boundaries of participation can be ambiguous, all international organizations are associated with at least some published language and well-defined memberships. It is thus possible to examine the presence of both racist language and institutionalized racism among the same set of organizations.

For the purposes of operationalizing institutional racism, we focus on patterns of membership according to white-majority status. Olson (2004, 75) describes "whiteness" as both "an interest in and an expectation of favored treatment within a color-blind society." In Bhopal's (2018, 25) study of white privilege, she refers to "white spaces" as places where "whiteness and white Western practices are the norm and those which do not comply with these are seen as outsiders and others." Institutional racism is associated with segregation through seemingly race-neutral policies and rules that carve out or reinforce white spaces.

In a similar vein, we examine the degree of domination of international organizations by white-majority states to the relative exclusion of others. Much like domestic institutions – e.g. legislatures, courts, banks, civic associations, educational institutions – international organizations play an important role in setting policy, marking status, and mediating access to resources. Segregation and disparate access to membership is thus one of the most basic measures of institutionalized racism, though other potential determinants of membership must obviously be considered.

We evaluate two observable implications of institutional racism on membership patterns. First, if institutional racism remains persistent, this should manifest in the overrepresentation of white-majority states in international organizations. Exclusion from structures of power and influence is the most visible and among the most pernicious manifestations of institutional racism. Thus, we predict:

H2a: White-majority states are overrepresented in the membership of international organizations.

Second, institutional racism should be associated with the perpetuation of white spaces that normalize white, Western norms to the exclusion of others. By implication, we predict a pattern of segregation in which membership patterns in white-dominated international organizations will be relatively biased in favor of white-majority countries. This may reflect exclusionary decisions about membership per se – e.g. the prioritization of new white-majority members – but it may also be the consequence of non-white-majority countries eschewing organizations dominated by the prerogatives and normative priorities of white-majority countries. We thus predict:

H2b: International organizations dominated by white-majority countries will tend to disproportionately admit new white members.

Although formal expulsion or exit from international organizations is a rare event, we test an analogous proposition for the cessation of membership. White-dominated organizations should be "white spaces" that are relatively comfortable for white-majority countries, reducing the likelihood of irreconcilable differences and conflicts that trigger a termination of membership. Thus:

H2c: International organizations dominated by white-majority countries will tend to face disproportionately less exit by white members.

Racist Language in Founding Documents

To evaluate H1, we collected an original dataset of racist and antiracist language contained in the founding documents of 426 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). IGOs produce a wide variety of written documents, including annual reports, treaty agreements, and internal policy memos. We focus on founding documents for two reasons. First, essentially all IGOs have a founding document, while the range and availability of other written output varies considerably. Focusing on founding documents thus avoids potential bias according to document availability and publication volume. Second, founding documents serve a similar purpose across IGOs, laying out the basic purposes and structures of the organization. They are thus broadly comparable across organizations. Third, they are public documents for which the precise language is carefully negotiated by founding members. The wording is thus likely to be highly sensitive to prevailing norms and understandings about appropriate phrasing and taboos.

It is important to emphasize that we use founding documents primarily on account of their availability and comparability, not because they are the most likely outlets for expressions of racism or antiracism. There is no intrinsic reason why a founding document needs to reference or take a position on race. The documents very likely understate the volume of racist language used in private correspondence and conversations behind closed doors. However, they allow us to trace the evolution of language use by IGOs over time in public documents that serve the same functional purpose.

We coded founding documents based on two types of racism, explicit and implicit racism. The detailed coding rules are available in the appendix (Appendix A). Explicit racism is coded based on the presence of terms that clearly concern race or specific racialized groups, such

as "race," "racial," "coloured," or "natives of…" An IGO was coded as explicitly racist if the term a) refers to a particular race in a derogatory manner; b) establishes or presumes a clear hierarchy among races; c) explicitly distributes rights, privileges, or obligations differently according to race. It was coded explicitly antiracist if the reference was made to reject or oppose discrimination based on race.

Implicit racism is coded based on the inclusion of terms historically associated with white hierarchy over non-white races or the construction of white privileges. These include terms like "colony," "possession," "dominion," and "Third World." An IGO is coded implicitly racist if the founding document uses the terminology in a way that a) presumes or affirms a hierarchy between predominantly white countries and non-white entities; b) grants authority over a non-white majority entity to a white-majority country. It is coded as antiracist if the terminology is used to diminish hierarchy by granting equal treatment or autonomy to a non-white majority entity.

For consistency, we only coded original founding documents, ignoring subsequent amendments. Founding documents were coded as either racist, antiracist, or neutral based on the incidence of the language described above. There were ten IGOs in the data whose founding documents contained both racist and antiracist language – these were coded as racist such that only IGOs using exclusively antiracist language were coded as antiracist.

Based on the data, Figure 1 plots the proportion of IGOs founded in each decade since the 1850s based on the presence of racist (positive values) and antiracist language (negative values). The figure pools explicit and implicit racism as there were relatively few identified instances of explicit racism (two instances of explicit racism and eight instances of explicit antiracism). The figure suggests that the use of racist language by IGOs has been falling over

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time. There is a noticeable decline in the use of racist language starting in the 1940s, and this has been accompanied by an increase in antiracist language. There were no instances of IGO founding documents that used only antiracist language prior to the 1940s. In contrast, there were no IGOs founded in the 2000s and 2010s that used racist language.

The trend illustrated in Figure 1 is consistent with H1 and existing scholarship that suggests a shift away from outright racism in the international system (e.g. Búzás 2021). The downward trend to some degree reflects an evolution in how language is used – e.g. it is unlikely for an IGO founded today to include language like that in the founding treaty of the International Sugar Council (1937), describing "sugar produced by primitive methods by natives of Java." However, it also reflects tangible changes in the relationship between white-majority countries and other peoples, most obviously decolonization, which means references to colonies and possessions are now less necessary to incorporate into IGO founding documents. This can be considered analogous to changes in the formal, legal status of racialized peoples in domestic political systems, which is reflected in the decreasing use of terms like "slave" in legal documents.

Figure 1: Racist Language in Founding Documents of IGOs by Decade

Note: Racism expressed in the founding documents of intergovernmental organizations has declined over time, while antiracist language has become more common.

Institutional Membership

We now turn to our analysis of membership in IGOs. The data presented in the previous section suggests that language use by IGOs has shifted considerably in the direction of antiracism, particularly since the end of World War II. This is consistent with existing narratives of racism in international relations, which observe transformative shifts away from open racist discrimination. However, it is possible that rhetoric does not match practice. Thus, in this section, we consider the role race might play in in the membership patterns of IGOs.

Operationalizing Race

To operationalize race in international relations, we code a dichotomous measure of "white" status at the country level. We base our coding on two criteria, firstly, the country's geographical location in the European region according to the UN geoscheme classification, and secondly, countries characterized by a white-majority demographic and white-domination of the political system. For the latter, in addition to Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, we include 11 Latin American countries coded based on demographic majority and political domination of a "white"-delineated racial group according to the coding available in the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009).[4] We only code as "white"

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[4] The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset codes all "politically relevant ethnic groups", that is, "if either at least one significant political actor claims to represent the interests of that group in the national political arena or if group members are systematically and intentionally discriminated against in the domain of public politics" (Vogt and Rüegger 2021). These include ethnolinguistic, ethnoreligious, and ethnosomatic groups. They also include a measure for the group's access to power at the national level. We coded as 'white' countries those with a "white"-delineated ethnic group that was not only the majority demographic but also dominated access to power at the national level for most of the years in the dataset (1949-2021). As this data is unavailable prior to 1949, we conducted a survey of primary and secondary literature on the demographics of the countries and recoded any for which there were periods where a country's "white" ethnosomatic group constituted a minority demographic between 1816 and 1949. This led to coding Brazil, Bolivia and Peru as "non-white" countries.

countries that had white demographic majorities and white political control throughout the entire period of 1816-2014. The advantage of this coding strategy is that it avoids sharp disjunctures in the racialized status of countries that are unlikely to match perceptions in reality. The disadvantage is that we may be classifying some countries perceived as white during some periods of the data as non-white. This coding rule should make our findings conservative: the direction of bias due to misclassifying some white countries as non-white should work against findings consistent with our hypotheses.

We combine this measure with the IGO membership data available in the Correlates of War Intergovernmental Organizations v3.0 dataset (Pevehouse et al. 2020). The dataset contains data on state membership in intergovernmental organizations between the years 1816 and 2014. The dataset includes states with populations of over 500,000 in addition to having the rank of charge d'affaires with Britain and France during the period before 1920 and being a member of the United Nations or League of Nations and receiving diplomatic missions from at least two major powers after 1920 (Correlates of War 2017). IGOs need at least three states in their membership to be included in the dataset amongst other characteristics.[5] The number of IGOs in the dataset range from one in 1816 in an international system with 23 states to 336 IGOs at the peak in 1998 in a system with 187 states.

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[5] "To qualify as an IGO, an international institution must have the following characteristics: (1) be a formal entity, (2) have states as members, and (3) possess a permanent secretariat or other indication of institutionalization such as headquarters and/or permanent staff" (Pevehouse et al. 2020).

Raw Data

To evaluate H2a, we first examine the membership composition of IGOs during their year of founding. Inception members in IGOs play a critical role in rule making and institutional design. They often create and lock in outsized privileges for themselves, such as persistent disparities in formal and informal leadership roles and decision-making authority (Lipscy 2017; Pratt 2021). It is thus informative to examine the relative weight of white countries among inception members in IGOs, and to what extent this has changed over time.

Figure 2 depicts the share of white countries among inception members in all IGOs. Each dot represents an IGO plotted at the founding year (x-axis) with the white share of founding members (y-axis), for example the League of Nations in 1919 (0.70), International Monetary Fund in 1945 (0.61), NATO in 1949 (1.0), United Nations in 1945 (0.61), WTO in 1995 (0.36). The solid line is a lowess curve, and the dotted line is the share of white countries in the international system.

As the figure shows, most IGOs prior to World War II overrepresented white members among their ranks at inception, even accounting for the high share of white states in the international system. This seems intuitive during a period of imperialism and racist ideologies espoused by leading Western states. During the postwar period, a large number of IGOs were created with non-white members, reflecting inclusive principles of United Nations organizations and greater assertiveness of non-white countries as decolonization progressed. However, the gap has subsequently widened again. The mean share of white countries among inception members in IGOs founded in the 1970s was 0.35 against a 0.29 share of white countries in the international system, while the same shares in the 2000s were 0.45 against 0.30.

Figure 2: White Share of Members States in Intergovernmental Organizations at Founding

Note: The figure shows that the share of white countries among inception members in IGOs has consistently exceeded the share of white countries in the international system. Although the shares almost converged in the 1970s, the gap has widened in recent years. The dots indicate the year of founding (x-axis) and white share of members at founding (y-axis) for each intergovernmental organization. The solid line is a lowess curve of the same data. The dotted line depicts the white share of countries in the international system for each year. A gap between the sold line and the dotted line indicates a discrepancy in the white share of inception members of IGOs and members of the international system.

Figure 3 depicts the average annual white share of member states in IGOs. This figure is produced by separately calculating the white share for each IGO in each year and then computing the average annual value across all IGOs. The figure thus accounts for both inception membership and subsequent membership changes. As the figure shows, membership of IGOs has consistently skewed toward white countries. The gap between white share of IGO membership and white share of the international system has not meaningfully closed during the entire time period depicted.

Figure 3: Average Annual White Share of Member States in Intergovernmental Organizations, Inclusive of Membership Changes

Note: This figure depicts the average white share of current membership in IGOs on an annual basis, accounting for both inception members and subsequent membership changes. IGOs have consistently overrepresented white countries throughout the past two centuries.

Membership Changes

To consider H2b and H2c, we examine the evolution of IGO membership after inception. In the domestic political context, institutional approaches to the study of racism have highlighted systematic exclusion of racialized groups from important civic and political institutions (e.g. Banting and Thompson 2021; Bhopal 2018; Lieberman 1998). Do IGOs dominated by white states analogously exhibit a bias against potential non-white member states? Alternatively, do they exhibit a preference toward remedying their lack of diversity by courting and prioritizing the admission of non-white members?

We compute a measure of white overrepresentation by dividing the share of white countries among an IGO's founding members by the share of white countries in the international system during the founding year, f. The equation is computed as follows:

$$\text{Inception Ratio}_{IGO,system,t=f} = \frac{\text{White Share}_{IGO,f}}{\text{White Share}_{system,f}} = \frac{\dfrac{n_{IGO_f}\big|_{white}}{n_{IGO_f}}}{\dfrac{n_{system_f}\big|_{white}}{n_{system_f}}}$$

The measure effectively takes the vertical location of each data point plotted on Figure 2 and divides by the location of the dotted line. The measure will equal 1 if an IGO's membership is representative of the racial composition of all states in the international system during the year of founding, for example if all countries are included as members. The measure will be greater than 1 if white countries are overrepresented in the IGO relative to the international system, while it will be less than 1 if white countries are underrepresented.

We then compute an analogous measure of white overrepresentation among all post-inception members added to the IGO. For this measure, we first calculate the white share of countries added to the IGO after the IGO's inception through the end of its life or 2014, the last year of available data, g. This is then divided by the white share of "available" states during the same time period, i.e. states that existed in the international system but that were not inception members of the IGO. The equation is thus computed as follows:

$$\text{Added Ratio}_{IGO,system,t\in\{f,g\}} = \frac{\text{White Share of New Members}_{IGO_g-IGO_f}}{\text{White Share of Potential Members}_{system_g-IGO_f}} = \frac{\dfrac{n_{IGO_g}\big|_{white} - n_{IGO_f}\big|_{white}}{n_{IGO_g} - n_{IGO_f}}}{\dfrac{n_{system_g}\big|_{white} - n_{IGO_f}\big|_{white}}{n_{system_g} - n_{IGO_f}}}$$

Figure 4 plots our measure of white overrepresentation among IGO founding members against white overrepresentation among new members.[6] There is a remarkably stark association between the two measures: IGOs that overrepresent white countries exhibit a strong tendency to admit new members that are also white countries. Combined with the relatively large number of IGOs that overrepresent white countries at their founding (Figure 2), this is suggestive of considerable structural bias against non-white countries in the international system. Rather than diversifying their membership, white-dominated IGOs tend to disproportionately expand their ranks among other white countries.

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[6] The data in figure 4 excludes IGOs without any added members because they have a zero in the denominator, which is mathematically undefined. There are 134 of these (out of 537), 89 of which are white-overrepresented and 45 white-underrepresented.

Figure 4: White-Overrepresented IGOs Tend to Add New White Members

Note: The figure shows that IGOs founded with more white member countries relative to the international system tend to overrepresent white countries among their new members as well. Overrepresentation of white countries among founding members (x-axis) is computed by calculating the share of white countries among IGO founding members (white inception IGO members / total inception IGO members) and then dividing this number by the white share of countries in the international system during the same year (white countries / total countries). Analogously, overrepresentation of white countries among new members is computed by calculating the share of white countries among new IGO members for all years subsequent to founding (white new IGO members / total new IGO members) and then dividing this number by the white share of all potential new members in the years after inception (white potential new members / total potential new members). Values exceeding one indicate overrepresentation of white members, while values below one indicate underrepresentation. If IGOs added new member states at random from the pool of non-member states in the international system, we would expect the data points to fall on the depicted dotted horizontal line. The dots depict actual values and the solid line is a lowess curve.

Analysis

There are plausible alternative explanations for the apparent affinity of white-dominated IGOs toward new white members. Existing statistical analyses suggest that factors like alliance relationships (Davis and Pratt 2020), democratization (Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, and Pevehouse 2015; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006), development, trade dependence, regional proximity (Boehmer and Nordstrom 2008), regional strategic rivalry (Haftel and Hofmann 2019), and risk of militarized conflict (Donno, Metzger, and Russett 2015) are associated with joint membership in IGOs. These can be considered potential confounders. For example, white countries are clustered regionally and many are relatively wealthy, democratic countries that share some degree of geopolitical alignment. They thus plausibly share common interests that are not necessarily related to race.

This race-neutral framing is the conventional wisdom in the study of IGOs. None of the existing studies of IGO membership cited above mentions race as a potential explanatory variable. It may be that any purported association between IGO membership and race is spurious. However, in light of the broader neglect of race in the study of international relations, it is also plausible that variation related to racism has been attributed in the existing literature to closely correlated race-neutral variables. In the domestic political context, the hallmark of institutional racism is the justification or rationalization of egregiously disparate outcomes according to race based on seemingly universalistic, race-neutral principles. Furthermore, it is plausible that some of the potential confounders are themselves endogenous to racism, such as the delineation of regions or alliance relationships according to racial lines. It is nonetheless useful to consider whether the association between white-dominated IGOs and subsequent membership changes

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favoring white members is attributable entirely to race-neutral variables identified in the existing literature.

To evaluate H2b and H2c, we draw on Davis and Pratt (2020), who assembled a dataset to analyze the determinants of IGO membership, expansion, and exit, all three of which are binary measures. Respectively, they measure at the state-IGO-year level whether a state in the international system is an existing member, whether a non-member state joined the IGO, and whether an existing member state exited the IGO. We build on the logistic regression model from Davis and Pratt (2020) by adding our time-invariant coding of "White" countries and the Inception Ratio (white overrepresentation in the IGO at the point of founding) to estimate IGO expansion and exit for state i in IGO j and year t:

$$\Pr\left(\text{IGO Expansion/Exit}_{ijt} = 1\right) = logit^{-1}(\alpha + \beta_1 \text{White}_i + \beta_2 \text{Inception Ratio}_j + \beta_3 \text{White}_i \times \text{Inception Ratio}_j + \beta_4 X_{ijt-1})$$

In the appendix, we analogously model the current membership of state i in IGO j and year t as the dependent variable, though current membership is partially attributable to inception membership and should be interpreted with appropriate caution (Appendix B1).

We begin by running the model in the postwar period (1949-2014), for which values on all relevant control variables are available. X_{ijt-1} controls for other potential determinants of membership outcomes in IGOs that may be correlated with the white status of a country or white overrepresentation in an IGO. These include variables at the state level: logged *GDP* and *GDP per capita,* which measure economic size and development; *IGO membership* that measures the number of IGOs that a state is a member of; *Polity* that captures the level of democracy; and *Trade Openness*, measured as the trade-to-GDP ratio. At the IGO level, control variables include

a dummy variable *Regional IGO* that codes IGOs that are regionally defined in their charter or title; a count of the number of states in the IGO; and a dummy variable *Stringent Accession* for IGOs that require at least a supermajority vote by existing members to permit new membership. To consider the relation between each state and the existing IGO members, we control for *Average Alliances*, a measure of security relationships operationalized as the proportion of members in IGO *j* with which state *i* has an alliance; the number of *Fatal Militarized Disputes* between state *i* and members of IGO *j*; the number of *Members from Region*, based on eight geographic regions; *Trade with Members* measuring trade dependence using average volume of bilateral trade state *i* has with members in IGO *j*; potential effects of colonial history using a variable for *Shared Colonial History* that measures proportion of members with colonial history under the same colonizer as state *i* as well as proportion of *Former Colonizer in IGO*; and the logged *Average Geographic Distance* between state *i* and members of IGO *j*. Lastly, we consider the effects of time by including a cubic polynomial *t* for time dependence;[7] and a dummy variable *Cold War* that codes the period 1947 to 1991 to account for polarized membership of IGOs during this period. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level to account for correlation in the error term.

The statistical results are presented in Table 1. Each column depicts the coefficients and standard errors respectively for the dependent variables, expansion and exit. Columns 1-2 exclude the control variables, which are included in columns 3-4. As the results indicate, inclusion of the control variables for the most part does not meaningfully alter the statistical association between the independent variables of interest and the dependent variables, with the

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[7] The cubic polynomial *t* is scaled by a multiple of 10 to a magnitude comparable to the rest of the regressors, as recommended by Carter and Signorino (2010, 283).

exception of the interaction term for the exit variable, which is not significant in the model without control variables.

To interpret the results, we calculate the change in predicted probability of the dependent variables when increasing the inception ratio by one standard deviation (i.e. when an IGO is more white-dominated at inception). Figure 5 depicts the predicted probabilities for the models presented in column 3-4, i.e. the models including the full set of controls. As the figure shows, there is a statistically meaningful difference between the predicted probability of a white state and nonwhite state joining an IGO according to the share of white members in the IGO at inception. Substantively, a one standard deviation increase in the inception ratio is associated with about a 57% increase in the likelihood of a white state joining the IGO and a corresponding 20% decrease in nonwhite states joining.[8] This is consistent with H2b. In terms of exit, a one standard deviation increase in the inception ratio suppresses the likelihood of exit by a white state by about 31%, while the point estimate for nonwhite states is positive but indistinguishable from zero.[9] Combined with the statistically weak results for the baseline model in column 2, support for H2c is suggestive but unstable. This is likely attributable to the relative rarity of exits from IGOs.

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[8] Holding other things constant, the predicted probability that an IGO with an average inception ratio expands its membership to a white state in a given year is 0.47%. A one-standard-deviation increase in the IGO's inception ratio raises this probability to 0.74%, a 57% increase in the likelihood. In comparison, the predicted probability that an IGO with an average inception ratio expands its membership to a nonwhite state is 0.45%. A one-standard-deviation increase in the IGO's inception ratio decreases this probability to 0.36%, a 20% decline in the likelihood.

[9] The predicted probability that an IGO with an average inception ratio sees a white state exiting the IGO in a given year is 0.39%. A one-standard-deviation increase in the IGO's inception ratio lowers this probability to 0.27%, a 31% decline in likelihood. In comparison, the predicted probability that an IGO with an average inception ratio sees a nonwhite state exiting the IGO is 0.30%, and this value is the same after a one-standard-deviation increase in the IGO's inception ratio.

Table 1: Effect on IGO Expansion/Exit

| | Dependent variable: | | | |
| | Expansion | Exit | Expansion | Exit |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
White	−0.587*	0.666*	−0.702*	0.720*
	(0.059)	(0.295)	(0.130)	(0.234)
Inception Ratio	−0.153*	0.023	−0.220*	0.007
	(0.020)	(0.205)	(0.053)	(0.149)
White x Inception Ratio	0.542*	−0.316	0.751*	−0.341*
	(0.040)	(0.214)	(0.071)	(0.157)
Controls	N	N	Y	Y
# IGOs	318	315	318	315
# States	164	164	164	164
Observations	1,208,435	372,246	1,208,435	372,246

Note: *p$<$0.05

Figure 5: Predicted Probabilities: White-Overrepresented IGOs tend to Disproportionately Add and Retain White Members

Note: Even in models that control for a wide variety of other determinants of IGO entry and exit, a one standard deviation increase in the white share of IGO membership at inception is associated with a higher likelihood of expansion involving new white members and lower likelihood of expansion involving new non-white members. White members are also less likely to exit from IGOs with a high inception ratio of white states. On the other hand, the inception ratio is not meaningfully associated with a higher likelihood of exit by nonwhite states.

Robustness Checks

We conducted a variety of robustness checks. We reran the models using current

membership status in IGOs as the dependent variable in place of expansion and exit.

Membership at any given time includes inception members and is thus a less precise measure of

bias, but the results are consistent with our main analysis (Appendix B1). We also ran an IGO-

level analysis that strips out time and regresses the inception ratio against the ratio of white states

among all subsequent new members for each IGO along with IGO-level control variables.

Consistent with the main analysis, the results show a strong association between the inception

ratio and the white ratio of subsequent members (Appendix B2).

Due to the availability of data, the main model including the full set of controls can only

be run on post-World War II data. To consider a longer time horizon, we reran the models while

limiting the control variables to those available for the entire period of available data (1817-

2014; Appendix B3). The results were substantively similar to those reported for the postwar

period for entry and membership, while the results for exit were sensitive to specification. As a

further robustness check, we also reran models using rare events logistic regression to account

for to the rare occurrence of accession and exit in the data (G. King and Zeng 2001) (Appendix

B4, B5) and found substantively similar results.

To consider the sensitivity of our results to how we coded white states, we excluded 11

Latin American states, such that only European countries and Australia, Canada, New Zealand

and the United States are coded as white. The substantive results were similar (Appendix B6). It

is possible that our results are biased by patterns of regionalism, such as the concentration of

white countries and institution-building in postwar Europe. To address the potential confounding

effects associated with regional organizations and European regionalism, we ran the analysis

with a subset of non-regional IGOs as well as a subset of IGOs excluding European IGOs.[10] In

both cases, the results were similar with one exception: the coefficient for non-white expansion

for non-regional IGOs was statistically indistinguishable from zero. However, there was still a

clear and large difference in the relative rates of expansion for white and non-white states

(Appendix B7 and B8).

The COW dataset includes a variety of IGOs ranging from universalistic organizations

with large portfolios like the United Nations to relatively inactive and obscure organizations with

small memberships. We therefore reran the analysis by limiting the sample to IGOs identified as

important in Hooghe et al.'s (2017) Measuring International Authority dataset. There are 76 such

IGOs, of which 74 are present in the COW dataset. Limiting the data to this set of IGOs shows a

consistent pattern of IGOs with high inception ratios disproportionately expanding membership

among white countries. One the other hand, the estimates for exit do not exhibit a meaningful

difference between white and non-white countries (Appendix B9).

Overall, the robustness checks indicate a pattern similar to the main analysis: IGOs that

overrepresent white countries at inception tend to attract new white members at disproportionate

rates, even after accounting for a variety of potential confounders. The results for exit are

suggestive but more sensitive to specification.

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[10] European IGOs were coded where words referring to European states (i.e. 'Europe', 'European', 'Benelux',
'Nordic') or its contiguous geographic features (e.g. 'North Atlantic', 'Northeast Atlantic', 'Black Sea') are found in
the IGO name or founding document. 54 European IGOs were identified using this coding rule and removed from
the analysis.

Cheap Talk? IGO Language and Membership

One interesting question raised by the preceding analysis is whether there is any association between the language contained in the founding documents of IGOs and membership patterns. As depicted in Figure 1, many IGOs now include anti-racist language in their founding documents. Such IGOs may exhibit less bias in their membership patterns for several plausible reasons. First, there may be a selection effect, i.e. anti-racist language is more likely written into IGO charters by inception members that have a genuine preference to avoid discrimination on account of race. Second, anti-racist language may send a positive signal, encouraging membership applications by non-white states. Third, the language may have a causal effect, for example through invocation by aspiring members or current members that support nondiscrimination. On the other hand, the language may be performative cheap talk that bears little relationship to actual behavior, as is the case for anti-corruption mandates among international development organizations (Ferry, Hafner-Burton, and Schneider 2020).

To evaluate the relationship between language, race, and membership, we ran a modified version of our main model. The model includes our variable coding racist language as described earlier, which takes on three possible values: -1 (anti-racist), 0 (neutral), 1 (racist). This variable is interacted with the time-invariant coding of "White" countries and the inception ratio. All sub-interactions and control variables from the main analysis are included in the model. The substantive results are presented in Figure 6. If anti-racist language is associated with less discriminatory membership outcomes, we would expect the point estimates for the predicted probabilities for anti-racist language to be closer to zero compared to those for racist and neutral language. As the figure shows, this is not the case: there is no meaningful difference in the

membership patterns of IGOs using anti-racist language compared to other IGOs. In the appendix, we present results from alternative specifications that use separate models for each IGO language category in lieu of triple interactions. The results are substantively similar (Appendix C).

Our main results suggested that the general shift in favor of anti-racist language among IGOs has not been associated with less broadly discriminatory patterns in IGO membership. The results in this section suggest that this pattern extends to variation among individual IGOs. IGOs that explicitly profess anti-racist principles in their founding documents do not exhibit membership patterns that meaningfully differ from those that do not.

Figure 6: Predicted Probabilities: Racist Language and Membership Changes

Note: IGOs that use anti-racist language in their founding documents do not exhibit membership patterns that meaningfully differ from IGOs that use racist language or neutral language.

Case Study

Our statistical findings indicate that race is strongly associated with membership patterns in IGOs, even after controlling for a variety of other potential determinants. By its nature, institutional racism is not associated with overt expressions of racism, and excluded parties may not even be aware that they have been subject to discriminatory biases. However, to support the plausibility of the basic proposition that institutional racism can persist even as overt racism diminishes, we provide a brief case study of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The International Criminal Court (ICC) was founded in 2002 to adjudicate cases of heinous crimes that are of concern to the international community. Based on the measures used in this paper, the ICC had an inception ratio of 1.74, reflecting considerable overrepresentation of white states: at founding, the proportion of white states in ICC was 0.52 (45 white states, 42 nonwhite states), compared to 0.30 for the international system (57 white states, 135 nonwhite states).

In the ICC's founding document (Rome Statute), we observe language that reflects the Court's commitment to antiracism not only in terms of its functional goals, but also in its administration. The document states four types of crimes within the Court's jurisdiction, of which the crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity are defined with specific reference to race. Genocide is defined as acts "with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998, Art. 6). Similarly, crimes against humanity include attacks involving persecution of racial groups, such as the crime of apartheid (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998, Art. 7). In addition to these functional goals, Article 21(3) stipulates with regards to "Applicable Law", that the "application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with

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internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on

grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion

or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status"

(Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998, Art 21). Despite these written

commitments to antiracism, states have raised concerns regarding the Court's double standards,

especially toward African countries.

First, the ICC is no stranger to controversies over its judicial independence. Most notably,

encroachment on its independence by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is apparent

in the prerogatives conferred to the Council in the Rome Statute. For example, Article 16 in the

Rome Statute allows the UNSC to grant deferral of investigation and prosecution. This article

was debated by both Western states and non-Western states when the United States, in a bid to

protect its citizens, proposed to invoke Article 16 to apply blanket immunity to individuals

involved in UN missions (Jalloh 2017). Although the ICC has refuted this effort nominally,

Ssenyonjo (2018) notes that this has not been followed through in practice. While the ICC has

taken action against acts of atrocities, it has been criticized for its silence on conflicts involving

UNSC permanent members, which aside from China are all white states (Jalloh 2017).

The ICC has also been criticized by African states for being "condescending" towards

them (Hickey 2013) and exercising "selective prosecution of Africans" (African National

Congress 2015). According to Jalloh (2017), the African Union (AU) made two requests for

deferral of ICC investigations in the Sudanese case in 2009 and the Kenyan case in 2013. The

first of these, pertaining to the arrest of Sudanese leader Al Bashir, received only cursory

consideration at the UNSC and was never put to a vote despite the AU's repeated appeals that

the investigation risked jeopardizing Sudan's peace process (Jalloh 2017, 182). In addition, the

ICC's selection of cases has been criticized. Ssenyonjo (2017, 63) questions the process of case initiation by the Prosecutor, noting that the cases tended to target African states, and there were no safeguards in place to mitigate the "politicization of prosecutorial discretion."

The ICC's adherence to its founding principles of equal treatment toward states remain a matter of considerable criticism and contestation. In the first two investigations initiated by the Prosecutor vis-à-vis Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire, the process of preliminary examination of evidence, request for authorization of investigation, and the granting of authorization had been completed within a year.[11] In contrast, preliminary examinations into crimes committed by British armed forces in Iraq were closed in 2020, 14 years after the first examination and 6 years after the case was re-opened by the Prosecutor.[12] Another case involving crimes committed in Afghanistan resumed in September 2021, 15 years after preliminary examinations had begun (Zvobgo 2021). Moreover, investigations resumed with the stance to "deprioritize" crimes committed by US national and Afghan forces—the original focus of the investigation (Office of the Prosecutor 2017)—despite evidence to support the case (Zvobgo 2021).

In terms of membership, expansion of the ICC has overrepresented white states despite the relatively small pool of such states that were not members at inception (Appendix D). Burundi and the Philippines have withdrawn from the ICC (Duerr 2018; Gutierrez 2019), and South Africa and The Gambia submitted statements of withdrawal but have since rescinded their decisions (Burke 2017; Saine and Jahateh 2017). No white members have withdrawn from the

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[11] In the Kenyan case, the Prosecutor had received evidence of the case on 9 July 2009, submitted the case for authorization in 26 November 2009, and received authorization in 31 March 2010 (Ssenyonjo 2017, 46). In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the state reconfirmed acceptance of ICC's jurisdiction on 14 December 2010; the case was authorized on 3 October 2011.

[12] The case was closed on grounds that "the Office could not substantiate allegations that the UK investigative and prosecutorial bodies had engaged in shielding, based on a careful scrutiny of the information before it" (Office of the Prosecutor 2020).

institution. Decisions by nonwhite members to join or withdraw from the ICC have been closely

intertwined with the perception that the institution is dominated by white countries and their

prerogatives. On its withdrawal decision, the Gambian Information Minister Sheriff Bojang

stated, "the ICC despite being called International Criminal Court, is in fact an International

Caucasian Court for the persecution and humiliation of people of color, especially Africans"

(O'Grady 2016). The withdrawal threats by Burundi, South Africa, and Gambia were a

coordinated effort supported by the AU, which sought to pressure the ICC to adopt reform

proposals to address such bias (Ssenyonjo 2018, 104–5).

In summary, the principles proclaimed in the Rome Statute express a strong normative

commitment to antiracism. Nonetheless, the ICC has been heavily criticized for aiding and

abetting unequal treatment towards nonwhite states. This "drift" has been the source of

considerable criticism and open accusations of racism against the institution (Banting and

Thompson 2021; Hacker and Pierson 2010).[13] While Russia and the United States have notably

failed to ratify the Rome Statute, the ranks of non-members are dominated by non-white states,

with more than 60 refusing to ratify or sign.

Conclusion

Institutional racism in international relations may be hiding in plain sight. Scholarship on

the institutionalization of international relations has generally focused on race-neutral

explanatory variables, such as interests, power, rules, and norms. In the domestic political

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[13] "Policy drift" refers to the prevention of policy updating by "groups with the ability to block change effectively resist the updating of policy over an extended period of time in the face of contrary pressure and strong evidence that policy is failing to achieve its initial goals" (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 168).

context, increasing attention has turned to the role that seemingly benevolent, race-neutral institutions play in perpetuating racist hierarchies and biased outcomes. International relations scholarship would benefit from a similar turn.

In this article, we have focused on membership as an illustrative indicator of institutional racism. However, there are a variety of other avenues for scholarship to explore. First, future research could examine racial bias in personnel hiring practices and the allocation of leadership positions in international organizations. Analyses of personnel hiring decisions by the UN Secretariat suggest persistent favoritism for citizens of Western countries (Novosad and Werker 2019). Is such bias exacerbated in the white-dominated organizations identified in this article? Studying personnel decisions will also make it possible to analyze whether citizens of a particular racial background are favored cross-nationally, such as white citizens from non-white-majority countries.

Second, do formal and informal hierarchies within international organizations reflect discriminatory biases? Existing studies of distortions in voting power and informal influence in international organizations have generally adopted a race-neutral framing. Do institutional rules create consistent biases against non-white countries? Are institutions less resistant to change when white countries are disfavored and demand change? Is informal influence by white countries exercised more easily in institutions that exhibit racial bias in other areas like membership or personnel hiring decisions?

Third, is there variation in how international organizations implement policy according to the racialization of target states, such as through the disposition of disputes or imposition of conditionality? Do such outcomes vary according to other indicators of racial bias, such as membership composition, personnel hiring decisions, or voting power disparities?

In answering all of these questions, it is important to carefully consider alternative explanations such as those examined above. Although race cannot be assigned randomly, identifying opportunities for credible causal inference will be an important task for ongoing research. Nonetheless, we would caution against over-deference to race-neutral explanations and variables, which have dominated existing scholarship. The hallmark of institutional racism is the association of persistent, discriminatory outcomes with nominally universalistic or even antiracist arrangements. It is important to acknowledge the possibility that seemingly race-neutral variables such as the delineation of geographic regions and formal rules favoring the status quo may reflect and perpetuate racist patterns of interaction. There is a compelling rationale for a broad research program on institutional racism in international relations.

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Appendix A: Coding of Racist Language

Racism: The coding of racism in the founding documents of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) was done as follows: '1' denotes that the founding document contains racist language; '0' denotes that the founding document does not contain any language related to race; and '-1' denotes that the founding document contains antiracist language.

Explicit Racism

A founding document is coded 1 or -1 if it contains any of the following terms. Founding documents that do not contain these terms are coded 0.

Terms:
- "Race"
- "Racial"
- "Coloured"
- "Apartheid"
- References to specific racial groups. These include "White", "natives of Java", "Indian problem".

If the above terms are included in the document, the document is coded 1 if the document: a) refers to a particular race in a derogatory manner; b) establishes or presumes a clear hierarchy among races; c) explicitly distributes rights, privileges, or obligations differently according to race. The document is coded -1 if it only makes reference to race in a manner that rejects racism or discrimination based on race.

Examples of Racist Language (coded as 1):

- International Sugar Council (3130). Article 1, paragraph 3 reads, "'Sugar' shall be deemed to include sugar in any of its commercial forms, except the product sold as final molasses, and also except the so-called 'Goela Mangkok' sugar produced by primitive methods by natives of Java for their own account to which sugar the Government of the Netherlands East Indies does not extend its legislative measures."

Examples of Anti-Racist Language (coded as -1):

- United Nations (4400). Article 1, paragraph 3 reads, "To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or

humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."

- International Criminal Court (2702). Article 7, paragraph 1 reads, "For the purpose of this Statute, 'crime against humanity' means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (j) The crime of apartheid." Article 7, paragraph 2 reads, "For the purpose of paragraph 1: (h) 'The crime of apartheid' means inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime."

Implicit Racism

The coding for implicit racism broadens the coding criteria to include language that may not be explicitly racist but implicitly establishes or assumes hierarchical relations between countries or people according to race. A founding document is coded 1 or -1 if any of the following terms are included in the document. The document is coded 1 if it uses the terminology in a way that presumes or affirms a hierarchy between predominantly white countries and non-white entities or grants authority over a non-white majority entity to a white-majority country. It is coded -1 if the terminology is used but in a way that diminishes hierarchy by granting equal treatment or autonomy to the non-white majority entity. A founding document in which none of the terms are used is also coded 1 if the document includes a clause that establishes or affirms a clear hierarchy between white-majority states and non-white majority entitites in the following ways: a) granting of authority to a white-majority state(s) through the use of proper noun over non-white peoples or territories; b) If none of the above applies, the document is coded 0.

Terms:
- "Colony"
- "Metropolitan"
- "Possession"
- "Protectorate"
- "Dominion"
- "Dependency"
- "Mandated Territory"
- "Overseas Territory"
- "Territory under suzerainty"
- "Territory for whose international relations they [white-majority state(s)] are responsible"
- "Third World"

- "Developing Country"
- "Less-industrialized Country"
- "Global South"
- A white-majority IGO is authorized to order the affairs of non-white majority states or region

Examples of Implicit Racism (coded as 1)

- International Relief Union (3070). Article 20 reads, "Any High Contracting Party may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that, in accepting the current Convention, he does not assume any obligations in respect of all or any of his colonies, protectorates or territories under suzerainty or mandate; and the present Convention shall not apply to any territories named in such declaration."
- International Commission for the Navigation of the Congo (2560). Preamble reads, "Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India; His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia; His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc, and Apostolic King of Hungary; His Majesty the King of the Belgians; His Majesty the King of Denmark; His Majesty the King of Spain; the President of the United States of America; the President of the French Republic; His Majesty the King of Italy; His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, etc; His Majesty the King of Portugal and the Algarves, etc; His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias; His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway, etc; and His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans,

  WISHING, in a spirit of good and mutual accord, to regulate the conditions most favourable to the development of trade and civilization in certain regions of Africa, and to assure to all nations the advantages of free navigation on the two chief rivers of Africa flowing into the Atlantic Ocean."

Examples of Implicit Antiracism (coded as -1)

- League of Nations (3460). Article 1 reads, "Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments."

Appendix B: Robustness Checks

B1: State-IGO-Year Membership Analysis

	Dependent variable:	
	Membership	Membership
	(1)	(2)
White	−0.470*	−0.730*
	(0.055)	(0.161)
Inception Ratio	−0.339*	−0.507*
	(0.027)	(0.068)
White x Inception Ratio	0.751*	0.571*
	(0.051)	(0.086)
Controls	N	Y
# IGOs	318	318
# States	164	164
Observations	1,600,136	1,600,136
Note:		*p<0.05

Table B2: IGO-Level Analysis

	Dependent variable:	
	New Member Ratio	New Member Ratio
	(1)	(2)
Inception Ratio	0.984*	0.984*
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Regional IGO		−0.048
		(0.071)
State Count in IGO		−0.003*
		(0.001)
Stringent Accession		0.050
		(0.064)
# IGOs	321	321
Observations	321	321
Note:		*p<0.05

Table B3: Reduced Model over Longer Time Horizon (1817-2014)

	Dependent variable:					
	Expansion	Exit	Membership	Expansion	Exit	Membership
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
White	−0.403*	−0.557*	−0.312*	−0.822*	0.866*	−1.056*
	(0.047)	(0.224)	(0.060)	(0.098)	(0.203)	(0.145)
Inception Ratio	−0.153*	−0.097	−0.340*	−0.281*	0.145	−0.421*
	(0.019)	(0.148)	(0.029)	(0.045)	(0.120)	(0.058)
White x Inception Ratio	0.496*	0.350*	0.718*	0.793*	−0.569*	0.781*
	(0.033)	(0.159)	(0.046)	(0.067)	(0.134)	(0.082)
Regional IGO				−1.044*	−0.627*	−0.682*
				(0.056)	(0.147)	(0.056)
Polity				0.023*	−0.013	−0.0004
				(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Alliances				1.862*	−0.868*	2.697*
				(0.136)	(0.187)	(0.137)
Cold War				−0.292*	−0.279*	0.041
				(0.078)	(0.115)	
# IGOs	535	531	536	535	531	536
# States	182	178	182	182	178	182
Observations	1,831,589	498,390	2,374,692	1,831,589	498,390	2,374,692
Note:						*p<0.05

Table B4: Rare Events Logit (1949-2014)

	Dependent variable:			
	Expansion	Exit	Expansion	Exit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
White	−0.587*	0.663*	−0.702*	0.719*
	(0.048)	(0.132)	(0.073)	(0.155)
Inception Ratio	−0.153*	0.023	−0.220*	0.009
	(0.016)	(0.063)	(0.028)	(0.064)
White x Inception Ratio	0.542*	−0.314*	0.634*	−0.341*
	(0.027)	(0.096)	(0.044)	(0.104)
Controls	N	N	Y	Y
# IGOs	318	315	318	315
# States	164	164	164	164
Observations	1,208,435	372,246	1,208,435	372,246
Note:				*p<0.05

Table B5: Reduced Model and Rare Events Logit (1817-2014)

	Dependent variable:			
	Expansion	Exit	Expansion	Exit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
White	−0.403*	−0.555*	−0.821*	0.865*
	(0.038)	(0.113)	(0.056)	(0.126)
Inception Ratio	−0.153*	−0.097	−0.281*	0.146*
	(0.014)	(0.054)	(0.023)	(0.052)
White x Inception Ratio	0.496*	0.349*	0.793*	−0.569*
	(0.022)	(0.082)	(0.035)	(0.086)
Regional IGO			−1.044*	−0.625*
			(0.032)	(0.071)
Polity			0.023*	−0.013*
			(0.002)	(0.004)
Alliances			1.863*	−0.867*
			(0.053)	(0.102)
Cold War			−0.291*	−0.274*
			(0.040)	(0.084)
# IGOs	535	531	535	531
# States	182	178	182	178
Observations	1,831,589	498,390	1,831,589	498,390
Note:				*p<0.05

Figure B6: Excluding Latin American states in 'white' coding

Figure B7: Excluding regional IGOs

Figure B8: Excluding European IGOs

Figure B9: Important IGOs subset

Appendix C: Racist Language and Membership Changes: Separate Regressions

Note: These predicted probabilities are generated from separate regressions for each language category in lieu of the triple interaction terms included in the main text.

Appendix D: Case study

Figure D1: Simulation of ICC Expansion

Note: The cross symbol and vertical line in the figures below represent the actual white ratio of new ICC members after founding (1.41, 97th percentile). The figures are derived from a simulation of ICC's membership expansion of 34 states after inception based on random draws. Based on the COW dataset, the ICC was founded in 2002 with 87 member states. Mirroring the actual number of states joining ICC each year, we simulated random draws without replacement from the pool of non-member states while taking into consideration entries of new states into the international system. In other words, the first draw involves six states being random drawn from 105 states (12 white-majority and 93 non-white majority states) in the pool of non-member states in 2003, thereafter four states are drawn from the remaining pool in 2004, etc. A total of 11 draws are made, ending with one state on the 11th draw which mirrors ICC's actual last member addition of Côte d'Ivoire in 2013 in the COW dataset. The figures above show the distribution of the ratio of white share in ICC vis-à-vis the international system using 5000 iterations.

Appendix E: Full Regression Tables

Table E1: Effect on IGO Expansion/Exit/Membership
(full regression table for Table 1, Figure 5, Appendix B1)

	Expansion (1)	Exit (2)	Membership (3)	Expansion (4)	Exit (5)	Membership (6)
			Dependent variable:			
White	−0.587*	0.666*	−0.470*	−0.702*	0.720*	−0.730*
	(0.059)	(0.295)	(0.055)	(0.130)	(0.234)	(0.161)
Inception Ratio	−0.153*	0.023	−0.339*	−0.220*	0.007	−0.507*
	(0.020)	(0.205)	(0.027)	(0.053)	(0.149)	(0.068)
White x Inception Ratio	0.542*	−0.316	0.751*	0.634*	−0.341*	0.571*
	(0.040)	(0.214)	(0.051)	(0.071)	(0.157)	(0.086)
State-level						
GDP				0.028	−0.024	0.052
				(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.063)
GDP per capita				−0.107*	−0.022	−0.224*
				(0.036)	(0.051)	(0.046)
No. of IGO Membership				−0.005	0.005	0.019*
				(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Polity				0.026*	−0.011	0.012
				(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Trade Openness				−0.013*	0.007*	−0.020*
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)
IGO-level						
Regional IGO				−1.130*	−0.642*	−0.685*
				(0.052)	(0.193)	(0.064)
State Count in IGO				0.022*	−0.020*	0.026*
				(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Stringent Accession				0.071*	−0.125	0.003
				(0.033)	(0.087)	(0.036)
Between State and IGO Members						
Average Alliances				1.107*	−0.813*	2.254*
				(0.160)	(0.322)	(0.201)
Fatal Militarized Disputes				−0.114	0.277*	0.264
				(0.141)	(0.130)	(0.135)
Members from Region				0.046*	−0.038*	0.152*
				(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Trade with Members				0.107*	−0.042*	0.325*
				(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.037)
Shared Colonial History				1.650*	−0.543*	2.003*
				(0.189)	(0.228)	(0.233)
Former Colonizer in IGO				−1.561	0.404	−1.532
				(1.380)	(0.570)	(1.460)
Avg Geographic Distance				−0.538*	0.454*	−0.543*
				(0.062)	(0.124)	(0.096)
Time						
Cold War				−0.650*	−0.761*	−0.061
				(0.099)	(0.203)	(0.037)
t				−0.713*	1.256*	−0.647*
				(0.135)	(0.236)	(0.085)
t^2				4.848	−36.936*	−3.636
				(5.365)	(8.280)	(3.596)
t^3				−4.912	26.678*	6.669
				(5.342)	(7.764)	(3.468)
# IGOs	318	315	318	318	315	318
# States	164	164	164	164	164	164
Observations	1,208,435	372,246	1,600,136	1,208,435	372,246	1,600,136
Note:						*p<0.05

Table E2: IGO-level
(same table as Appendix B2)

| | *Dependent variable:* | |
| | Final Year Ratio | Final Year Ratio |
	(1)	(2)
Inception Ratio	0.984*	0.984*
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Regional IGO		−0.048
		(0.071)
State Count in IGO		−0.003*
		(0.001)
Stringent Accession		0.050
		(0.064)
# IGOs	321	321
Observations	321	321
Note:		*$p<0.05$

Table E3: Effect on IGO Expansion/Exit/Membership (1817-2014)
(full regression table for Appendix B3)

	Dependent variable:					
	Expansion	Exit	Membership	Expansion	Exit	Membership
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
White	−0.403*	−0.557*	−0.312*	−0.822*	0.866*	−1.056*
	(0.047)	(0.224)	(0.060)	(0.098)	(0.205)	(0.150)
Inception Ratio	−0.153*	−0.097	−0.340*	−0.281*	0.145	−0.421*
	(0.019)	(0.148)	(0.029)	(0.045)	(0.120)	(0.059)
White x Inception Ratio	0.496*	0.350*	0.718*	0.793*	−0.569*	0.781*
	(0.033)	(0.159)	(0.046)	(0.067)	(0.134)	(0.082)
State-level						
No. of IGO Membership				−0.003	−0.0001	0.037*
				(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Polity				0.023*	−0.013	−0.0004
				(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
IGO-level						
Regional IGO				−1.044*	−0.627*	−0.682*
				(0.051)	(0.148)	(0.063)
State Count in IGO				0.021*	−0.015*	0.023*
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Between State and IGO Members						
Alliances				1.862*	−0.868*	2.697*
				(0.136)	(0.188)	(0.137)
Members from Region				0.057*	−0.047*	0.181*
				(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Cold War				−0.292*	−0.279*	0.041
				(0.086)	(0.134)	(0.037)
t				−0.248*	−0.698*	0.677*
				(0.107)	(0.168)	(0.087)
t^2				0.125*	0.308*	−0.261*
				(0.042)	(0.066)	(0.032)
t^3				−0.002*	−0.004*	0.003*
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
# IGOs	535	531	536	535	531	536
# States	182	178	182	182	178	182
Observations	1,831,589	498,390	2,374,692	1,831,589	498,390	2,374,692

Note: *p<0.05

Table E4: Effect on IGO Expansion/Exit (Rare Events Logit)
(full regression table for Appendix B4)

	Expansion	Exit	Expansion	Exit
	Dependent variable:			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
White	−0.587*	0.663*	−0.702*	0.719*
	(0.048)	(0.132)	(0.073)	(0.155)
Inception Ratio	−0.153*	0.023	−0.220*	0.009
	(0.016)	(0.063)	(0.028)	(0.064)
White x Inception Ratio	0.542*	−0.314*	0.634*	−0.341*
	(0.027)	(0.096)	(0.044)	(0.104)
State-level				
GDP			0.028*	−0.022
			(0.011)	(0.028)
GDP per capita			−0.107*	−0.022
			(0.015)	(0.034)
No. of IGO Membership			−0.005*	0.005
			(0.001)	(0.003)
Polity			0.026*	−0.011*
			(0.002)	(0.005)
Trade Openness			−0.012*	0.008
			(0.003)	(0.004)
IGO-level				
Regional IGO			−1.129*	−0.639*
			(0.039)	(0.089)
State Count in IGO			0.022*	−0.020*
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Stringent Accession			0.071*	−0.125*
			(0.028)	(0.062)
Between State and IGO Members				
Average Alliances			1.107*	−0.812*
			(0.068)	(0.135)
Fatal Militarized Disputes			−0.104	0.298*
			(0.092)	(0.125)
Members from Region			0.046*	−0.038*
			(0.002)	(0.005)
Trade with Members			0.106*	−0.044*
			(0.007)	(0.015)
Shared Colonial History			1.650*	−0.539*
			(0.087)	(0.184)
Former Colonizer in IGO			−1.513*	0.480
			(0.635)	(0.542)
Avg Geographic Distance			−0.539*	0.453*
			(0.030)	(0.068)
Time				
Cold War			−0.650*	−0.758*
			(0.067)	(0.138)
t			−0.714*	1.248*
			(0.096)	(0.229)
t^2			4.895	−36.657*
			(3.313)	(7.634)
t^3			−4.958	26.433*
			(3.081)	(7.006)
# IGOs	318	315	318	315
# States	164	164	164	164
Observations	1,208,435	372,246	1,208,435	372,246

Note:	*p<0.05

Table E5: Effect on IGO Expansion/Exit/Membership (1817-2014; Rare Events Logit)
(full regression table for Appendix B5)

	Dependent variable:			
	Expansion	Exit	Expansion	Exit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
White	−0.403*	−0.555*	−0.821*	0.867*
	(0.038)	(0.113)	(0.056)	(0.126)
Inception Ratio	−0.153*	−0.097	−0.281*	0.146*
	(0.014)	(0.054)	(0.023)	(0.052)
White x Inception Ratio	0.496*	0.349*	0.793*	−0.570*
	(0.022)	(0.082)	(0.035)	(0.086)
State-level				
No. of IGO Membership			−0.003*	−0.0002
			(0.001)	(0.002)
Polity			0.023*	−0.013*
			(0.002)	(0.004)
IGO-level				
Regional IGO			−1.044*	−0.625*
			(0.032)	(0.071)
State Count in IGO			0.021*	−0.015*
			(0.0004)	(0.001)
Between State and IGO Members				
Alliances			1.863*	−0.866*
			(0.053)	(0.102)
Members from Region			0.057*	−0.047*
			(0.002)	(0.004)
Time				
Cold War			−0.292*	−0.281*
			(0.040)	(0.084)
t			−0.256*	−0.751*
			(0.069)	(0.151)
t^2			0.127*	0.326*
			(0.026)	(0.057)
t^3			−0.002*	−0.004*
			(0.0003)	(0.001)
# IGOs	535	531	535	531
# States	182	178	182	178
Observations	1,831,589	498,390	1,831,589	498,390

Note:	$^*p<0.05$

Table E6: Latin American States Excluded from "White" Coding
(full regression table for Appendix B6)

	Dependent variable:					
	Expansion	Exit	Membership	Expansion	Exit	Membership
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
White	−0.679*	0.711*	−0.572*	−0.970*	0.798*	−1.242*
	(0.063)	(0.279)	(0.054)	(0.129)	(0.237)	(0.193)
Inception Ratio	−0.123*	0.039	−0.286*	−0.195*	0.002	−0.435*
	(0.019)	(0.186)	(0.027)	(0.048)	(0.134)	(0.060)
White x Inception Ratio	0.614*	−0.371	0.813*	0.708*	−0.396*	0.552*
	(0.038)	(0.195)	(0.049)	(0.066)	(0.148)	(0.080)
State-level						
GDP				0.027	−0.040	0.066
				(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.058)
GDP per capita				−0.095*	−0.021	−0.168*
				(0.036)	(0.051)	(0.044)
No. of IGO Membership				−0.004	0.006	0.021*
				(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Polity				0.028*	−0.010	0.017*
				(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Trade Openness				−0.012*	0.006*	−0.018*
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)
IGO-level						
Regional IGO				−1.133*	−0.637*	−0.701*
				(0.052)	(0.193)	(0.064)
State Count in IGO				0.022*	−0.020*	0.026*
				(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Stringent Accession				0.074*	−0.124	0.010
				(0.033)	(0.086)	(0.036)
Between State and IGO Members						
Average Alliances				1.096*	−0.698*	2.115*
				(0.162)	(0.335)	(0.196)
Fatal Militarized Disputes				−0.103	0.275*	0.263*
				(0.138)	(0.129)	(0.128)
Members from Region				0.045*	−0.040*	0.153*
				(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Trade with Members				0.107*	−0.043*	0.321*
				(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.037)
Shared Colonial History				1.619*	−0.623*	1.931*
				(0.186)	(0.220)	(0.223)
Former Colonizer in IGO				−1.917	0.262	−1.590
				(1.599)	(0.581)	(1.687)
Avg Geographic Distance				−0.541*	0.484*	−0.653*
				(0.067)	(0.134)	(0.111)
Time						
Cold War				−0.655*	−0.756*	−0.072
				(0.098)	(0.202)	(0.037)
t				−0.746*	1.277*	−0.748*
				(0.133)	(0.238)	(0.087)
t^2				5.403	−37.638*	−1.743
				(5.391)	(8.289)	(3.654)
t^3				−5.381	27.311*	5.055
				(5.389)	(7.764)	(3.495)
# IGOs	318	315	318	318	315	318
# States	164	164	164	164	164	164
Observations	1,208,435	372,246	1,600,136	1,208,435	372,246	1,600,136

Note: *p<0.05

Table E7: Regional IGOs Excluded
(full regression table for Appendix B7)

	Expansion	Exit	Membership	Expansion	Exit	Membership
			Dependent variable:			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
White	−0.514*	0.993*	−0.508*	−0.594*	1.163*	−1.095*
	(0.067)	(0.215)	(0.060)	(0.139)	(0.203)	(0.178)
Inception Ratio	−0.138*	0.296*	−0.384*	−0.029	0.138	−0.370*
	(0.023)	(0.101)	(0.028)	(0.055)	(0.090)	(0.082)
White x Inception Ratio	0.470*	−0.507*	0.808*	0.537*	−0.700*	0.889*
	(0.048)	(0.137)	(0.074)	(0.088)	(0.148)	(0.120)
State-level						
GDP				0.051	−0.059	0.151*
				(0.038)	(0.053)	(0.064)
GDP per capita				−0.098*	0.004	−0.165*
				(0.038)	(0.050)	(0.045)
No. of IGO Membership				0.003	−0.001	0.033*
				(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Polity				0.023*	−0.016*	0.006
				(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Trade Openness				−0.012*	0.007*	−0.015*
				(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.005)
IGO-level						
State Count in IGO				0.025*	−0.021*	0.031*
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Stringent Accession				−0.045	−0.034	−0.012
				(0.036)	(0.071)	(0.037)
Between State and IGO Members						
Average Alliances				0.878*	−0.322	2.127*
				(0.206)	(0.257)	(0.301)
Fatal Militarized Disputes				−0.141	0.250	0.108
				(0.157)	(0.136)	(0.099)
Members from Region				0.028*	−0.029*	0.101*
				(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Trade with Members				0.068*	0.016	0.216*
				(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.044)
Shared Colonial History				2.222*	−1.198*	2.801*
				(0.260)	(0.358)	(0.309)
Former Colonizer in IGO				−1.831	0.585	−2.556
				(1.648)	(0.467)	(2.525)
Avg Geographic Distance				−0.203*	0.630*	−0.142
				(0.068)	(0.155)	(0.120)
Time						
Cold War				−0.881*	−1.117*	−0.061
				(0.103)	(0.185)	(0.043)
t				−0.710*	1.323*	−0.818*
				(0.133)	(0.258)	(0.080)
t^2				0.787	−37.870*	−3.085
				(5.341)	(8.722)	(3.508)
t^3				−1.534	26.283*	7.027*
				(5.336)	(8.176)	(3.436)
# IGOs	121	121	121	121	121	121
# States	164	164	164	164	164	164
Observations	383,523	274,607	660,826	383,523	274,607	660,826

Note: *p<0.05

Table E8: European IGOs Excluded
(full regression table for Appendix B8)

	Expansion	Exit	Membership	Expansion	Exit	Membership
Dependent variable:						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
White	−0.621*	0.452	−0.640*	−0.639*	0.758*	−1.001*
	(0.056)	(0.315)	(0.051)	(0.124)	(0.257)	(0.161)
Inception Ratio	0.169*	0.052	−0.014	−0.170*	0.028	−0.430*
	(0.024)	(0.215)	(0.035)	(0.055)	(0.138)	(0.076)
White x Inception Ratio	0.480*	−0.125	0.840*	0.539*	−0.379*	0.772*
	(0.031)	(0.231)	(0.046)	(0.071)	(0.177)	(0.092)
State-level						
GDP				0.036	−0.033	0.064
				(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.063)
GDP per capita				−0.108*	−0.012	−0.237*
				(0.036)	(0.050)	(0.044)
No. of IGO Membership				−0.003	0.006	0.021*
				(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Polity				0.023*	−0.012	0.012
				(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.006)
Trade Openness				−0.015*	0.006*	−0.019*
				(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.007)
IGO-level						
Regional IGO				−1.116*	−0.640*	−0.515*
				(0.065)	(0.239)	(0.073)
State Count in IGO				0.022*	−0.020*	0.028*
				(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Stringent Accession				−0.003	−0.115	0.018
				(0.036)	(0.090)	(0.037)
Between State and IGO Members						
Average Alliances				1.252*	−0.812*	2.355*
				(0.155)	(0.380)	(0.204)
Fatal Militarized Disputes				−0.134	0.259*	0.212
				(0.146)	(0.123)	(0.126)
Members from Region				0.043*	−0.038*	0.140*
				(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Trade with Members				0.103*	−0.042*	0.334*
				(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.038)
Shared Colonial History				1.644*	−0.552*	2.007*
				(0.193)	(0.231)	(0.239)
Former Colonizer in IGO				−0.773	0.390	−1.225
				(0.981)	(0.598)	(1.300)
Avg Geographic Distance				−0.470*	0.437*	−0.627*
				(0.064)	(0.160)	(0.101)
Time						
Cold War				−0.676*	−0.748*	−0.057
				(0.099)	(0.198)	(0.037)
t				−0.594*	1.239*	−0.554*
				(0.134)	(0.238)	(0.086)
t^2				−0.047	−35.805*	−8.063*
				(5.299)	(8.292)	(3.571)
t^3				−0.747	25.436*	10.706*
				(5.297)	(7.796)	(3.440)
# IGOs	264	261	264	264	261	264
# States	164	164	164	164	164	164
Observations	969,903	346,942	1,331,598	969,903	346,942	1,331,598

Note: *p<0.05

Table E9: Important IGOs
(full regression table for Appendix B9)

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
| | Expansion | Exit | Membership | Expansion | Exit | Membership |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
White	−0.583*	−1.836*	−0.502*	−0.805*	−0.333	−1.363*
	(0.080)	(0.890)	(0.057)	(0.192)	(0.598)	(0.228)
Inception Ratio	−0.023	−1.758*	−0.265*	−0.034	−1.083*	−0.574*
	(0.015)	(0.792)	(0.021)	(0.058)	(0.453)	(0.100)
White x Inception Ratio	0.398*	1.977*	0.695*	0.629*	0.730	1.065*
	(0.040)	(0.810)	(0.063)	(0.107)	(0.401)	(0.135)
State-level						
GDP				−0.036	0.073	0.017
				(0.047)	(0.119)	(0.067)
GDP per capita				−0.096	−0.208	−0.090
				(0.057)	(0.133)	(0.049)
No. of IGO Membership				−0.003	−0.004	0.026*
				(0.006)	(0.018)	(0.008)
Polity				0.035*	0.006	0.022*
				(0.008)	(0.030)	(0.007)
Trade Openness				−0.007*	0.005	−0.018*
				(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.005)
IGO-level						
Regional IGO				−1.563*	1.233*	−1.011*
				(0.084)	(0.486)	(0.092)
State Count in IGO				0.024*	−0.012*	0.032*
				(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Stringent Accession				−0.119	−0.244	−0.028
				(0.064)	(0.234)	(0.074)
Between State and IGO Members						
Average Alliances				1.570*	−2.341*	2.722*
				(0.242)	(0.819)	(0.198)
Fatal Militarized Disputes				−0.179	0.344	0.060
				(0.204)	(0.230)	(0.123)
Members from Region				0.017*	−0.084*	0.100*
				(0.007)	(0.033)	(0.011)
Trade with Members				0.052*	0.017	0.190*
				(0.021)	(0.034)	(0.039)
Shared Colonial History				1.539*	−0.383	2.243*
				(0.376)	(0.438)	(0.283)
Former Colonizer in IGO				−0.787	−4.419	−1.346
				(2.090)	(5.540)	(2.542)
Avg Geographic Distance				−0.565*	0.668*	−0.608*
				(0.098)	(0.229)	(0.123)
Time						
Cold War				−1.099*	−0.327	−0.150*
				(0.165)	(0.526)	(0.063)
t				−0.718*	1.875*	−0.928*
				(0.202)	(0.569)	(0.124)
t^2				−3.456	−52.997*	−0.472
				(8.264)	(19.351)	(5.079)
t^3				3.800	38.855*	4.899
				(8.251)	(19.023)	(5.120)
# IGOs	71	70	71	71	70	71
# States	164	164	164	164	164	164
Observations	261,141	172,332	436,022	261,141	172,332	436,022

Note: *p<0.05

Table E10: Racist Language (Categorical)
(full regression table for Figure 6)

	Dependent variable:			
	Expansion	Exit	Expansion	Exit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
White	−0.977*	1.133*	−0.978*	1.565*
	(0.124)	(0.428)	(0.279)	(0.349)
Inception Ratio	−0.222*	0.724*	−0.273*	0.563*
	(0.029)	(0.272)	(0.094)	(0.143)
Non-Racist	−0.899*	1.953*	−0.0004	1.498*
	(0.049)	(0.540)	(0.110)	(0.382)
Racist	−0.151*	0.846	0.119	0.869*
	(0.061)	(0.432)	(0.159)	(0.323)
White x Incept. Ratio	0.620*	−0.427	0.993*	−0.562*
	(0.061)	(0.300)	(0.132)	(0.200)
White x Non-Racist	0.415*	−1.048	0.342	−1.227*
	(0.107)	(0.616)	(0.261)	(0.440)
White x Racist	0.384*	−0.061	−0.125	−0.752
	(0.143)	(0.562)	(0.344)	(0.538)
Incept. Ratio x Non-Racist	0.079*	−1.101*	0.075	−0.778*
	(0.026)	(0.407)	(0.089)	(0.243)
Incept. Ratio x Racist	0.048	0.020	−0.094	−0.140
	(0.037)	(0.333)	(0.126)	(0.216)
White x Incept. Ratio x Non-Racist	−0.053	0.510	−0.432*	0.492
	(0.048)	(0.440)	(0.124)	(0.267)
White x Incept. Ratio x Racist	−0.135*	−0.125	−0.102	0.240
	(0.065)	(0.387)	(0.181)	(0.325)
State-level				
GDP			0.010	−0.001
			(0.042)	(0.047)
GDP per capita			−0.102*	−0.059
			(0.039)	(0.059)
No. of IGO Membership			−0.005	0.006
			(0.005)	(0.007)
Polity			0.027*	−0.014
			(0.006)	(0.013)
Trade Openness			−0.014*	−0.001
			(0.004)	(0.009)
IGO-level				
Regional IGO			−1.132*	−0.564*
			(0.052)	(0.196)
State Count in IGO			0.022*	−0.020*
			(0.001)	(0.002)
Stringent Accession			0.141*	−0.104
			(0.036)	(0.113)
Between State and IGO Members				
Average Alliances			1.060*	−0.933*
			(0.167)	(0.330)
Fatal Militarized Disputes			−0.104	0.229
			(0.141)	(0.167)
Members from Region			0.047*	−0.040*
			(0.006)	(0.015)
Trade with Members			0.118*	−0.058*
			(0.024)	(0.015)
Shared Colonial History			1.721*	−0.472
			(0.212)	(0.243)
Former Colonizer in IGO			−1.693	0.428
			(1.561)	(0.687)
Avg Geographic Distance			−0.514*	0.397*
			(0.063)	(0.124)

	Dependent variable:			
	Expansion	Exit	Expansion	Exit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time				
Cold War			−0.612*	−0.513*
			(0.110)	(0.235)
t			−0.782*	1.490*
			(0.141)	(0.267)
t^2			6.406	−43.784*
			(5.653)	(9.261)
t^3			−5.908	33.762*
			(5.612)	(8.547)
# IGOs	285	282	285	282
# States	164	164	164	164
Observations	1,071,339	339,751	1,071,339	339,751

Note: *p<0.05

Table E11: Racist Language (Separate Regressions)
(full regression table for Appendix C)

	Dependent variable:					
	Expansion (anti-racist)	Expansion (non-racist)	Expansion (racist)	Exit (anti-racist)	Exit (non-racist)	Exit (racist)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
White	−1.003*	−0.671*	−1.295*	1.801*	0.265	0.748
	(0.207)	(0.144)	(0.282)	(0.516)	(0.321)	(0.477)
Inception Ratio	−0.325*	−0.221*	−0.312*	0.499*	−0.252	0.177
	(0.077)	(0.057)	(0.116)	(0.212)	(0.224)	(0.194)
White x Inception Ratio	0.859*	0.583*	1.034*	−0.813*	−0.004	−0.228
	(0.113)	(0.069)	(0.189)	(0.309)	(0.219)	(0.291)
State-level						
GDP	−0.131*	0.026	0.087*	0.110	−0.030	0.015
	(0.057)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.151)	(0.058)	(0.060)
GDP per capita	−0.172*	−0.081	−0.086	0.002	−0.105	0.026
	(0.054)	(0.042)	(0.052)	(0.136)	(0.074)	(0.074)
No. of IGO Membership	−0.001	−0.005	−0.007	0.016	0.010	−0.007
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Polity	0.028*	0.024*	0.038*	−0.049*	−0.012	−0.010
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.012)
Trade Openness	−0.039*	−0.012*	0.003	−0.010	−0.001	0.009
	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.009)
IGO-level						
Regional IGO	−1.243*	−0.959*	−1.933*	0.270	−0.485*	−0.953*
	(0.131)	(0.057)	(0.156)	(0.371)	(0.239)	(0.343)
State Count in IGO	0.015*	0.024*	0.023*	−0.022*	−0.018*	−0.027*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Stringent Accession	−0.085	0.091	0.425*	−1.615*	−0.306	0.543*
	(0.078)	(0.047)	(0.077)	(0.399)	(0.168)	(0.126)
Between State and IGO Members						
Average Alliances	2.083*	0.983*	0.893*	0.493	−1.174*	−0.503
	(0.273)	(0.171)	(0.291)	(0.550)	(0.403)	(0.412)
Fatal Militarized Disputes	−0.108	−0.100	−0.185	−0.483	0.280	0.271
	(0.292)	(0.134)	(0.251)	(0.907)	(0.191)	(0.222)
Members from Region	0.042*	0.053*	0.027*	−0.006	−0.052*	−0.031
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Trade with Members	0.178*	0.140*	0.038	−0.087	−0.045*	−0.080*
	(0.048)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.081)	(0.016)	(0.027)
Shared Colonial History	1.003*	1.684*	2.398*	−0.006	−0.664*	−0.438
	(0.330)	(0.223)	(0.271)	(0.709)	(0.313)	(0.408)
Former Colonizer in IGO	0.293	−1.469	−2.147	0.509	−0.335	1.150
	(2.200)	(1.176)	(2.339)	(0.679)	(1.435)	(0.601)
Avg Geographic Distance	−0.342*	−0.511*	−0.767*	0.992*	0.295*	0.538*
	(0.119)	(0.066)	(0.100)	(0.334)	(0.126)	(0.191)
Time						
Cold War	−1.155*	−0.328*	−0.971*	−1.705*	−0.490	0.029
	(0.208)	(0.121)	(0.190)	(0.570)	(0.289)	(0.298)
t	−1.874*	−0.993*	−0.230	2.625*	1.841*	0.895*
	(0.345)	(0.153)	(0.199)	(1.076)	(0.413)	(0.378)
t^2	25.639*	13.446*	−12.054	−69.483*	−59.835*	−17.680
	(11.255)	(6.242)	(7.930)	(34.897)	(14.080)	(12.510)
t^3	−19.989*	−11.093	10.538	44.591	49.296*	13.681
	(10.053)	(6.232)	(7.988)	(30.741)	(12.727)	(11.679)
# IGOs	41	200	44	41	199	42
# States	164	164	164	164	164	164
Observations	109,786	802,673	158,880	69,362	195,292	75,097

Note: *p<0.05