

Seatmate, Votemate: Spatial Peer Effects on Voting Behavior at the United Nations General Assembly

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Abstract

Global politics depends on where people sit. I compile novel data on the physical location of country representatives at the United Nations General Assembly for 80 million dyadic voting outcomes on 5,334 resolutions since 1952, and exploit random variations of seating arrangements to examine spatial peer effects on vote decisions. My results suggest that adjacently seated delegations are, on average for all resolutions, 0.15 percentage points or 0.5 percent of a standard deviation less likely to vote in line compared to non-neighboring country representatives. For strategically relevant resolutions, however, vote agreement rates between seating neighbors are up to 2.36 percentage points or 7.5 percent of a standard deviation higher. Heterogeneity analyses show that spatial peer effects have been more pronounced in recent decades, and depend on the exact relative position of two delegations. As a policy implication, the United Nations may consider strategic seating set-ups as a low-cost way of steering diplomatic exchange.

JEL-Classification: D72, F53, Z13

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1 Introduction

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) constitutes the highest level of intergovernmental diplomacy. Delegates which execute voting on behalf of their countries, however, are still humans. Their decisions are not bounded by pure rationality, but may be subjected to trust, sensibilities, or affection (Van Rythoven and Sucharov, 2019). Such emotions are shaped by personal interactions with fellow delegates, and extend to how diplomats game the political arena. It is conceivable that physical proximity facilitates personal interactions, as well as information exchange, and thus affects voting behavior. Institutionally, seating arrangements in the UNGA are determined by a lottery and exogenous shocks, providing a source of random variation in physical proximity - and hence the likelihood of personal interactions - among delegates.

I compile novel data on seating set-ups in the UNGA since 1952. Using historical and previously unpublished floor plans, I reconstruct the date-specific physical location of each country delegation during sessions of the UNGA, which predominantly took place in the General Assembly Hall. My sample covers 92 exogenous alterations of seating arrangements which were triggered by the commencement of a new session, admission of member states and changes of official country names. To examine whether physical proximity matters for political alignment in the UNGA, I compare the vote agreement rates of adjacently and non-adjacently seated country delegations for votes on 5,334 resolutions.

My empirical results suggest that, on average, the vote agreement rate is 0.15 percentage points or 0.5 percent of a standard deviation lower for seating neighbors compared to all non-neighboring delegations. Further heterogeneity analyses indicate that spatial peer effects depend on the relative position of two delegations, have been stronger in recent decades, and may even lead to an increase in voting alignment for strategically important resolutions.

The case of buying votes through bilateral foreign aid (Alexander and Rooney, 2019; Carter and Stone, 2015; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Wang, 1999) or multilateral development loans (Andersen et al., 2006; Dreher and Jensen, 2007; Dreher and Sturm, 2012; Dreher et al., 2009) is well documented. Besides such monetary benefits, social networks are a key determinant of diplomatic effectiveness (Battaglini et al., 2020). As Rorty (1938) puts it, “personal contacts between human beings lie at the very heart of all problems of government”. A common alumni connection among legislators, for example, sharply increases the likelihood of trading votes in the Senate of the United States of America (US) (Cohen and Malloy, 2014) and affects how interest groups allocate monetary contributions to political campaigns (Battaglini and Patacchini, 2018). More generally, congressmen consider advice by their colleagues before casting a vote (Kingdon, 1989), and may even just follow the lead of someone who immediately precedes them in the alphabet (Matthews and Stimson, 1975).

Scholars have shown that seating arrangements, as a mode of physical proximity, indeed influence political outcomes. Deskmates at the California State Assembly are more likely to vote identically compared to non-deskmate legislators (Masket, 2008), and seat locations on the chamber floor impact the voting behavior of newly elected US Senators (Cohen and Malloy, 2014). Spatial effects also matter at the parliament of Iceland, where seat distributions are based on a lottery system: politicians are more likely to diverge from their own party line when the fraction of adjacently seated peers from an opposing party is higher, yet the physical direction of interactions matters (Saia, 2018). At the European Parliament, elected members are seated by surnames within each party group, and seat neighbors in the same row are 0.6 percentage points less likely to differ in their vote (Harmon et al., 2019). The proximity of randomly allocated offices for members of the US Congress, however, does not predict common voting patterns (Rogowski and Sinclair, 2012).

My research fills a gap in the political economy literature on spatial peer effects. Previous studies have focused on individual members of parliament in usually (sub-)national settings, rather than official representatives of countries at the highest intergovernmental level. I use novel data to identify directional effects of spatial positions on political alignment, distinguish between the strategic relevance of voting decisions, and cover a time period of over six decades.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents a brief history of seating arrangements at intergovernmental organizations. Section 3 describes the data on and institutional background of seating set-ups at the UNGA. Section 4 presents the empirical model to examine whether physical proximity influences resolution voting outcomes. The results are shown in section 5. Robustness tests are discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes.

2 History of Seating Arrangements at Intergovernmental Organizations

The League of Nations was among the first global forums after World War I. Founded in 1920, the organization fostered diplomatic exchange, especially through its Assembly which was the principal body and consisted of representatives of all 47 member states. The organization held its first Assembly meetings between 15 November and 18 December 1920 at the Salle de la Réformation in Geneva, Switzerland. From the beginning, seating space at the venue was constrained. Each delegation was allowed to bring only three members, who shared tables with delegates from other member states (League of Nations, 1920). Seats were arranged in straight lines and divided by an aisle in the middle of the hall (see Figure 4). Coupled with rather poor acoustics, the seating set-up hindered observing and hearing at the rostrum or across the hall (Mikkelsen and Jourdenais, 2015).

Even before the first Assembly of the League of Nations took place, one of the organization's specialised agencies began its work. In late 1919, the plenary body of the International Labour Organization held its first annual meeting. Diplomats convened at a conference hall of the Pan American Union Building in Washington, D.C., United States. Delegates faced each other on tables which spanned the entire length of the floor and were arranged in multiple straight lines. To face the rostrum, attendees had to turn sideways, and space for personal items was cramped (see Figure 3). The protocol of the first meeting mentions that complaints about acoustic difficulties were made early on. Delegates specifically attributed poor hearing conditions to physical seating arrangements. On 5 November 1919, for example, the South African delegation asked the chairman to hear an amendment again because he "(...) could not hear anything at this end of the hall" (ILC, 1920, p. 50). The Secretary-General responded to the complaints and altered seating arrangements two days later to overcome "(...) the difficulties which were experienced by some of the delegates seated at the farthest end of the room" (ILC, 1920, p. 57). To make matters worse, delegates regularly engaged in private conversations with seatmates during plenary sessions¹. The informal talks were so vivid that on 20 November 1919, the chairman interrupted a speaker to "(...) ask delegates to listen attentively, and to suspend private conversation in order to give [a delegate] the opportunity of making her argument heard" (ILC, 1920, p. 102). Private conversations continued, however, as a remark by the chairman that "(...) it is very difficult for [a gentlemen on the left of the plenum] to hear what is going on, because of conversations around the center of the floor" (ILC, 1920, p. 149) illustrates.

The League of Nations ceased to exist in April 1946. The organization was succeeded by the United Nations, whose charter was already ratified in late 1945. Seating arrangements at its main organ, the UNGA, have shaped policy discussions since the organization's very beginning.

The first meeting of the UNGA took place at the Methodist Central Hall in London, United Kingdom, on 10 January 1946. With more floor space available, the UNGA used a classroom-style seating arrangement with forward-facing tables in a middle column and slightly inclined table rows at the left and right columns. The U-shaped set-up made following the debates easier for delegations seated at the lateral extremes. With the hall's flat ground, however, views for delegations sitting at the opposite end of the rostrum remained obstructed by representatives of member states sitting in front (see Figure 5). Delegates shared tables with other country delegations sitting adjacently, including a second row of chairs for support staff.

¹ Baigorri-Jalón (2005) notes that many diplomats as well as delegates of employers' and workers' organizations could not follow speeches in the official languages of the conference, English and French, which may have fostered private conversations.

The second, fourth, fifth and sixth sessions of the UNGA were held at Flushing Meadows in New York City, United States. The UN used a building from the 1930 World's Fair as their temporary headquarters, and the UNGA met in converted ice- and roller skating-rings (Reiter, 2015). Arranged in three columns and ten rows, seats were slightly tilted towards the rostrum. A delegation had five seats at the desk and five seats behind them available, and shared a table with other country representatives. With an upward-sloping ground floor, views - and thus preconditions for participation - improved for delegates sitting at the back of the hall (see Figure 6). Additional space for spectators and the media was provided at the rear through an elevated stand and glassed boxes at the sidewalls of the hall.

For a single occasion, delegates moved to Paris, France. The third session of the UNGA was held at the underground theater of the Palais de Chaillot. Spatial circumstances surrounding the meeting were chaotic: craftsman were still renovating the hall when the session had already started, crowded elevators got stuck and staircases were blocked by construction material, spectators crowded the steps to the plenum, and most support offices located in the building's maritime museum were not ready. Seating capacity at the meeting venue was scarce, too: of the 3,000 seats in the hall, 900 were reserved for each the press and distinguished guests. The remaining 1,200 seats for delegates did not fulfil the country members' demand for support staff, and many diplomats were blusterously wandering around to find a seat (Katzander, 1948). Those who did settle in a chair found themselves arranged in three columns with the outer ones being slightly inclined. Two delegations shared a table which accommodated ten delegates plus another ten seats installed behind the desk-seats (see Figure 7).

Finally, the UNGA moved to the permanent headquarters of the UN at the East River in New York City, United States, for the opening of the seventh session. Since 14 October 1952, delegates have met at the General Assembly Hall which is 50 meters long and 35 meters wide. It occupies the second, third and fourth floors of the General Assembly Building. Country delegations may occupy six seats, three at the tables for delegates and another three seats behind them for support staff. Usually, two delegations share one table in each column, and adjacent tables are divided by an aisle. Tables extend to the back in rows which are upward-sloping and form a slightly U-shaped layout facing a raised rostrum. The original set-up had four columns and ten rows which allowed for a total of 70 UN member states (see Figure 8).

The originally planned capacity was already exceeded in 1955. As UN membership grew, the number of seats in the General Assembly Hall was increased. At first, new rows in the back were appended, including an aisle between the 13th and 14th row. A major expansion program, which added another column of seats on each side of the hall, was completed before the 19th session in 1964. After the seating capacity was reached again in 1976, the UNGA decided to refurbish the hall, and added more rows in the back (United Nations, 2008).

Due to renovations which started in May 2013, the 68th session was held at a temporary meeting venue in the North Lawn Building of the UN Headquarters. Seats were arranged in straight lines spanning four columns and nine rows. Each delegation occupied three seats at the table and another three seats directly behind them. Six country representatives shared a single table at the inner two columns, and five delegations sat adjacently at tables at the outer two columns. Because views of the rostrum were obstructed by pillars, television screens were installed for delegations at the extreme ends of the conference room to broadcast the speaker at the podium (see Figure 9). Delegates returned to the General Assembly Building for the closing of the regular session in September 2014.

As of 2021, the General Assembly Hall hosts 193 country delegations seated in six columns and 17 rows (see Figure 10). To cast votes, delegations press red, yellow or green buttons installed on the tables in front of them. Large panels behind the speaker's rostrum list country-specific votes (see Figure 11). Glass-walled rooms are installed on the sides of the room and host interpreters, media representatives and UN staff.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, only one representative per country was allowed to attend meetings during the 75th session, and delegates were seated at the extreme ends of each table (see Figure 12).


In short, seating arrangements at the UNGA have regularly undergone modifications over the last decades to improve preconditions for interactions among country delegates.

3 Data and Institutional Setting

I compile novel data on seating arrangements of country delegations at the UNGA since 1952 when delegates first convened at the General Assembly Hall. The data include the date-specific physical position of delegations in the meeting venue, i.e. their seat, row and column number, and spatial information on their location relative to neighboring delegations for votes on 5,334 contested resolutions.

The basic seating layout in the General Assembly Hall has remained unchanged since the seventh session in 1952. Usually, each country delegation has eight other delegations as direct seating neighbors: one neighbor sits next to the delegation at the same table, another delegation is seated across the aisle in the same row, representatives of two countries have seats diagonally at the front and back table, another two delegations sit diagonally across the aisle in the front and back, and two delegations sit straight to the front and back in the adjacent rows. Figure 1 exemplary illustrates the spatial positions of adjacently seated delegations.

Figure 1: Spatial positions of adjacently seated delegations, stylized example



The exact physical location of each country delegation in the General Assembly Hall is determined at random. Four exogenous shocks may alter seating arrangements:

First, the initial seating set-up at the beginning of each session is randomly determined. The UNGA usually meets every year in fall for a regular session (United Nations, 2016, I.1). On the day of the election of the President of the UNGA, the Secretary-General draws lots to determine which country delegation will occupy the first seat at the right end of the front row as seen from the podium. The remaining delegations are then seated in alphabetical order according to the official English names of their country (United Nations, 2019a).

Historical and previously unpublished copies of floor plans for initial seating arrangements at the beginning of sessions have been obtained through the United Nations (2019b) for the seventh to 44th session², and through the Federal Foreign Office of Germany (2019) for the 55th, 61st to 65th, 67th and 68th, 70th and 71st, and 73rd sessions. The floor plan for the 72nd session was obtained through United Nations (2017). I reconstructed the initial seating arrangements for the 52nd to 54th, 56th to 60th, 63rd, 66th and 69th sessions using information on which country occupies the first seat, which is provided in the Delegates Handbooks (United Nations, 2021a), and the official roster of member states from the Yearbooks of the UN' appendices (United Nations, 2021g). Data for the 45th to 51th sessions have not been published yet.

My sample includes 60 new seating arrangements due to the commencement of a session.

² See Figure 13 for the initial floor plan of the 37th session as an example.

Second, seating arrangements change when a new member state is admitted to the UNGA after a session has already started. Once a country has applied to the Secretary-General and the Security Council recommends the applicant state for membership, the UNGA needs to pass a resolution with a two-thirds majority of the existing members to approve the application (United Nations, 2016, XIV.134 and 136). If the application is approved, the membership becomes immediately effective (United Nations, 2016, XIV.138). The newly admitted country's delegates are seated after the resolution is passed and before the next resolution is voted on. The representatives are seated according to their country's official English name, and all existing delegations that follow behind in alphabetical order move one seat up (United Nations, 2019c).

Data on votes of new member states were obtained through Voeten (2013). 24 changes of the seating order occurred due to the admission of new member states.

Third, a country may change its official English name during an ongoing session. A name change may occur with or without a jurisdictional change, and can be announced at any time. The permanent mission to the UN of the member state informs the UN Chief of Protocol of any change to the official country name (United Nations, 2020, XVII.). Once the name change is received, the UNGA delegation gets seated alphabetically as per their new English country name, and a revised seating plan is put together (United Nations, 2019c). Historic examples during ongoing sessions include the name change of Dahomey to Benin or of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to North Macedonia.

Data on official country name changes were obtained through press releases by the United Nations (2021c). The seating order was altered eight times because countries changed their official name during a live session.

Finally, a country may be removed from the UNGA once a session has already begun. The concerned delegation would vacate their seat, and all delegations from countries whose name follow behind the removed member in the English alphabet move one seat down (United Nations, 2019c). A removal of a delegation may occur for three reasons: First, a member state may be dissolved or merged with other existing member states. Examples include Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which merged to form the single member of the United Republic of Tanzania, or the German Democratic Republic which was dissolved after the reunification of Germany. Second, a member state against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council can be suspended by the UNGA (United Nations, 2016, II.5). Third, a member of the UN which has persistently violated the principles contained in the UN Charter may be expelled upon the recommendation of the Security Council (United Nations, 2016, II.6). Theoretically, a country may also unilaterally withdraw from the UN. The UN Charter does not regulate this process, however.

In my sample, no change of the seating order occurred due to the removal of a delegation during an ongoing session^{3,4}.

Table B.5 lists all seating arrangements since the seventh session of the UNGA in my sample. Note that each session has at least one unique seating arrangement, as the first seat in the hall is allocated randomly at the beginning of a session.

4 Econometric Model

I estimate the following fixed effects model to examine whether seat adjacency of country delegations in the General Assembly Hall affect political alignment on resolution voting:

$$\begin{aligned} Voteagreement_{ijrtys} = & \alpha + \text{Seatneighbor}_{ijrtys,m} \beta_{ijrtys,m} + \mathbf{P}_{iy} \gamma_{iy} + \Delta \mathbf{P}_{ijy} \zeta_{ijy} \\ & + \mathbf{R}_{rtys} v_{rtys} + \mathbf{D}_{irtys} \omega_{irtys} + \Delta \mathbf{D}_{ijrtys} \vartheta_{ijrtys} + \mathbf{E}_{iy} l_{iy} \\ & + \Delta \mathbf{E}_{ijy} \tau_{ijy} + \mathbf{L}_{ijrtys} \kappa_{ijrtys} + \mathbf{S}_{is} \psi_{is} + \eta_i + \xi_j + \mu_s + \varepsilon_{ijrtys} \end{aligned}$$

where *Voteagreement* is the vote agreement rate in percentage points between the UNGA delegations of country *i* (the ‘focal country’) and *j* (the ‘paired country’) on the contested resolution *r* on date *t* in year *y* given the seating arrangement *s* according to Voeten (2013). The vote agreement rate is 100 if the focal country voted the same as the paired country delegation, 50 if country *i* voted with either ‘in favor’ or ‘against’ and country *j* voted with ‘abstain’ (or vice versa), and zero if the focal country voted with ‘in favor’ and the paired country voted with ‘against’ (or vice versa).

The vector **Seatneighbor** contains up to $m = 1, \dots, 8$ seating dummy variables that capture physical proximity in the General Assembly Hall. *Table neighbor* has the value one if the paired country shares a table with the focal country delegation, and zero otherwise. *Aisle neighbor* is one if delegation *i* sits across the aisle in the same row as delegation *j*, and zero otherwise. *Diagonal front table neighbor* is one if country *j* sits diagonally at the table in front of country delegation *i*, and zero otherwise. *Diagonal back table neighbor* is one if the paired country

³ UNGA Resolution 47/1 marginalized Yugoslavia from the General Assembly in support of Security Council Resolution 777. Yet, Yugoslavia still remained a member of the UN because the legal successor state was disputed, and the country’s official expulsion from the UNGA did not influence the seating order. The state kept an empty seat without delegates even after its effective dissolution (Jovanovic, 1997). The placeholder was only removed from the UN country roster and UNGA seating lists once all five independent successor states had been admitted as new UN members.

⁴ In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 20 January 1965, Indonesia unilaterally announced its withdrawal from the UN “(...) at this stage and under the present circumstances”. After a coup d’état, however, the country sent a telegram to the Secretary-General dated 19 September 1966 stating that they would “(...) resume full cooperation with the United Nations and resume participation in its activities”. Shortly thereafter, the UNGA invited representatives of Indonesia to take their seats in the General Assembly Hall (United Nations, 2021b). The absence has retrospectively been interpreted as a cessation of cooperation rather than a full withdrawal.

occupies the seat diagonally behind the focal country at the table in the same column, and zero otherwise. *Diagonal front aisle neighbor* and *diagonal back aisle neighbor* are one if country j sits diagonally across the aisle either in front or behind delegation i , and zero otherwise. *Front neighbor* has the value one if the paired country is seated directly in front of country i in the same column, and zero otherwise. Finally, *back neighbor* is one if country j sits directly behind the focal country in the same column, and zero otherwise. In a more generalized specification, only the variable *seat neighbor* is included. It has the value 1 if one of the previous seating variables is one, and zero otherwise.

Variables that control for political characteristics of each focal country are included in the vector \mathbf{P} . Previous research has shown that the type of government influences UNGA voting decisions (Dreher and Jensen, 2013; Hillman and Potrafke, 2015; Mosler, 2020). I use the continuous democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019) to classify the level of democracy of country i . The index is one for fully democratic countries and zero for autocratic regimes.⁵ The ‘political color’ of governments affects voting decisions at the UNGA (Dreher and Sturm, 2012). I consider the ideological position of a government by including a binary indicator by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020) which is one if the focal country i has a communist government, and zero otherwise. I assume that not only a focal country’s level of characteristics, but also the difference to its paired country matters for vote agreement rates. $\Delta\mathbf{P}$ includes the absolute differences of the democracy index and the communism indicator between countries i and j .

More than half of the topics on the agenda of the UNGA in a given year are not novel, but have been discussed in the past (Panke, 2014). The vector \mathbf{R} controls for the content of contested resolutions. I include a set of binary indicators for six recurring topics: the variables are one if a resolution concerns either colonialism, human rights, economic development, the Middle East conflict, nuclear proliferation, or disarmament, and are zero otherwise. Data are provided by Voeten (2013).

\mathbf{D} are control variables at the delegation-level. Scholars have shown that the gender of legislators influences voting behavior (Jenkins, 2012; O’Regan, 2000; Ramstetter and Habersack, 2020). I use Christensen (2021)’s data to construct three dummy variables which are one if the focal country i has either a female executive state leader, female Minister of Foreign Affairs, or female Permanent Representative to the UN, and are zero otherwise. I assume that experience and legacy of a member state affect its voting decision, and include the number of days since a focal country first voted on a contested UNGA according to Voeten (2013). Moreover, elected members of the UN Security Council are shown to behave similarly with the council’s permanent members in the UNGA (Hwang et al., 2015). I include a binary

⁵ Gründler and Krieger (2019)’s democracy index is built using support vector machines which recognize data patterns. See Gründler and Krieger (2016) for a detailed description of the estimation procedure.

indicator for non-permanent UN Security Council membership of country i . $\Delta \mathbf{D}$ adds the absolute differences between countries j and i for all delegation-level variables.

Following related studies (Dreher and Jensen, 2013; Smith, 2016), I control for the growth of output-side real GDP, real GDP per capita, and the population size of country i according to Feenstra et al. (2015) with the vector \mathbf{E} . I include the differences of all macro-variables between each focal and paired country with $\Delta \mathbf{E}$.

The vector \mathbf{L} contains two variables which address linguistic similarities between the official English country names of the focal and paired country. Country names may indicate underlying characteristics of nations, such as state building, geographical characteristics or forms of government⁶. Orthographic similarity of country names is measured by the standardized Levensthein distance, i.e. the smallest number of changes needed to transform the characters of one country name into the other. For phonetic similarities, I use a dummy variable which is one if both country names sound similar according to the SoundEx algorithm, and is zero otherwise. The SoundEx algorithm encodes homophones to the same letter-number code representation, and disregards potential differences in spelling.

\mathbf{S} controls for the overall seating position of the focal country. It contains the country's seat and column number in the General Assembly Hall.

I include η and ξ as country-fixed effects. μ are seating arrangement-fixed effects which control for spatial-fixed effects of the seating set-ups, which change over time as rows and columns at the meeting venue are added to accommodate the growing number of UN member states, and for time-fixed effects of voting sessions. Finally, ε denotes the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the seating arrangement-level.

Table B.6 lists the summary statistics of all variables.

5 Results

5.1 General Spatial Peer Effects

Seating arrangements affect political alignment in the UNGA. Table 5.1 presents the estimation results for the average effect of seat adjacency on the vote agreement rates for contested resolutions between 1952 and 2019. Column (1) shows coefficient estimates without control variables. Political and resolution-specific variables, delegation-level variables, as well as economic and population variables are included as additional controls in columns (2) to (4).

⁶ Note, however, that most UN member states have chosen to not include their form of government in their official English country name.

Variables that control for name similarity and a delegation's location in the meeting venue are added in column (5). The full specification with country- and seating arrangement-fixed effects is shown in column (6).

Table 5.1: General spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
General seat neighbor	-0.4135*** (0.1533)	-0.5947*** (0.1604)	-0.4319*** (0.1151)	-0.2867*** (0.1608)	-0.3944*** (0.1031)	-0.1466** (0.0727)
Constant	82.5061*** (0.4003)	90.5025*** (0.9245)	88.2217*** (1.3316)	89.9109*** (1.1206)	88.5862*** (1.2411)	557.7821*** (113.6666)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	79,742,480	68,079,315	68,079,315	55,040,433	48,947,754	48,947,754
Adjusted R ²	0.0000	0.0407	0.0429	0.0526	0.0534	0.1460

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.


Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

All coefficient estimates in Table 5.1 are negative and statistically significant at the one (columns [1] to [5]) and five percent-level (column [6]). With fixed-effects included in column (6), the coefficient estimate suggests that on average the vote agreement rate of seat neighbors is 0.15 percentage points or 0.5 percent of a standard deviation lower compared to all non-adjacent delegations in the General Assembly Hall.

The average effect of seat adjacency on vote agreement rates has varied over time. Figure 2 presents the coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals of the seat neighbor variable employing the full empirical specification with fixed-effects (column [6]) for each decade separately.

Figure 2: Coefficient estimate and 95 percent confidence intervals of the seat neighbor variable by decade



Note: The dot indicates the coefficient estimate, the horizontal line visualizes the 95 percent confidence interval.

Sources: Voeten (2013), own calculations

The results suggest that seat adjacency did not have a statistically significant effect on political alignment during the first three decades from the 1950s until the 1970s. The coefficient estimate does turn out to be statistically significant for the 1980s, however: physical proximity in the General Assembly Hall increased vote agreement rates in the years preceding the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain. Physical proximity has negatively affected political alignment in the UNGA only during the two most recent decades, the 2000s and 2010s.

Table 5.2 shows the estimation results if the spatial peer effect is disentangled into its directional components. The effect of seat adjacency on resolution is measured for each neighbor of a delegation: table and aisle neighbors in the same row, the four diagonally seated delegations, and the seat neighbors directly in front and at the back.

The coefficient estimates for table and aisle neighbors lack statistical significance in columns (1) to (4). Once I include linguistic and spatial location variables, however, the coefficient estimates of both variables become negative and statistically significant at the one and five percent-level (column [5]). The coefficient estimate of the table neighbor indicator remains

Table 5.2: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.1930 (0.2252)	-0.2662 (0.2074)	-0.1146 (0.1703)	-0.2027 (0.1608)	-0.6589*** (0.1606)	-0.2726** (0.1225)
Aisle neighbor	-0.1585 (0.2049)	-0.0169 (0.1915)	0.1747 (0.1552)	0.0486 (0.1524)	-0.3664** (0.1619)	0.0769 (0.1408)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.5530*** (0.1918)	-0.8692*** (0.2064)	-0.7176*** (0.1689)	-0.4502*** (0.1466)	-0.4386** (0.1772)	-0.2881** (0.1303)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.4294** (0.1760)	-0.7199*** (0.1813)	-0.5610*** (0.1507)	-0.3334** (0.1298)	-0.3099** (0.1494)	-0.1721 (0.1321)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.3629* (0.2123)	-0.7080*** (0.2170)	-0.5244*** (0.1818)	-0.3522* (0.1813)	-0.4157** (0.1895)	-0.2344* (0.1303)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.3599* (0.1983)	-0.7696*** (0.2001)	-0.5836*** (0.1648)	-0.4751*** (0.1707)	-0.5145*** (0.1754)	-0.2603* (0.1332)
Front neighbor	-0.6080*** (0.1783)	-0.6900*** (0.1907)	-0.5470*** (0.1574)	-0.1911 (0.1612)	-0.1766 (0.1987)	-0.0134 (0.1403)
Back neighbor	-0.6419*** (0.1541)	-0.7224*** (0.1635)	-0.5850*** (0.1343)	-0.3507*** (0.1241)	-0.2738 (0.1655)	-0.0059 (0.1332)
Constant	82.5061*** (0.4003)	90.5030*** (0.9244)	88.2221*** (1.3315)	89.9111*** (1.1206)	88.5837*** (1.2413)	557.7885*** (113.6673)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	79,742,480	68,079,315	68,079,315	55,040,433	48,947,754	48,947,754
Adjusted R ²	0.0000	0.0407	0.0429	0.0526	0.0534	0.1460

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

statistically significant at the five percent-level once fixed effects are included in column (6). On average, a given country delegation is 0.27 percentage points or 0.9 percent of a standard deviation less likely to vote in line with delegations with which it shares the same table compared to all non-neighboring delegations on all contested UNGA resolutions since 1952.

Seating neighbors in adjacent rows are on average less likely to be politically aligned with diagonal seat neighbors compared to all other non-neighboring country delegations in the General Assembly Hall. The four coefficient estimates of the diagonally seated delegations are negative and statistically significant at least at the five percent-level once all controls but the fixed effects are included in column (5). If country- and seating arrangement-fixed effects are added in column (6), the coefficient estimates of the diagonal back table, diagonal back aisle and diagonal front aisle neighbors remain statistically significant at least at a ten percent-level. On average, the vote agreement rates of those diagonally seated representatives are 0.23 and 0.29 percentage points or 0.7 to 0.9 percent of a standard deviation lower than rates of non-neighboring delegations.

For front neighbors, the coefficient estimates are negative and statistically significant at the one percent-level in column (3), and for back neighbors in column (4). The coefficient estimates of both variables lack statistical significance once I add controls for country name similarity and the spatial location (columns [5] and [6]).

5.2 Strategic Peer Effects on Middle Eastern Issues

The Middle East conflict has dominated discussions at the UNGA since delegates first met in New York. On average, every fifth contested resolution at the UNGA dealt with issues related to the topic, including the question of Palestine and related UN missions.⁷ I consider a group of countries with high foreign policy interests in the issue, namely the member countries of the League of Arab States. Only resolutions about Middle Eastern issues remain in the sample. Table 5.3 presents the estimation results for the effects of seat adjacency on political alignment with Arab League member states.

Direct seat neighbors in the same row are more likely to vote in line with Arab League member states on Middle Eastern resolutions compared to non-adjacent delegations. The coefficient estimates of the table and aisle neighbor are positive and statistically significant at the one percent-level without fixed effects in column (5). With the full specification in column (6), only the aisle neighbor variable remains statistically significant at the one percent-level: the

⁷ See Chapter ?? and Mosler (2020) for more details concerning Israeli- and Palestinian issues-related UNGA resolutions.

Table 5.3: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019

Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.5768 (0.5214)	0.9110* (0.4609)	1.2710*** (0.4210)	1.6656*** (0.3908)	2.4834*** (0.3589)	-0.1719 (0.2601)
Aisle neighbor	0.0755 (0.4369)	1.2929*** (0.3959)	1.9041*** (0.3711)	2.7268*** (0.3849)	3.9967*** (0.3629)	0.7507*** (0.2225)
Diagonal front table neighbor	1.0377* (0.5912)	0.8872* (0.4896)	0.8984* (0.4696)	1.0764** (0.4921)	1.3258** (0.5502)	0.0762 (0.3717)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.7930 (0.6555)	-0.4725 (0.6506)	-0.2644 (0.6250)	-0.3885 (0.7249)	0.1193 (0.7811)	0.8689*** (0.3130)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	0.1006 (0.7403)	0.7287 (0.5431)	0.9082* (0.4870)	1.1936** (0.5035)	1.5723*** (0.5468)	1.2440*** (0.3191)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	0.7624 (0.5879)	-0.2113 (0.4878)	0.1147 (0.4566)	0.1952 (0.5456)	0.3403 (0.6256)	0.7209** (0.2848)
Front neighbor	1.3110** (0.4919)	1.3656** (0.5172)	1.5912*** (0.5254)	1.8383*** (0.6297)	1.9764*** (0.6312)	0.5360 (0.3559)
Back neighbor	-1.6981** (0.7345)	-3.3359*** (0.7282)	-3.0860*** (0.7160)	-3.4869*** (1.0197)	-4.2761*** (1.1339)	-1.3254 (1.0506)
Constant	90.3622*** (0.3604)	98.3148*** (0.4646)	91.0362*** (1.0727)	90.5369*** (1.0501)	90.1272*** (1.0772)	360.7761*** (87.4881)
Political variables? ^a .	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b .	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c .	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d .	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e .	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f .	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	1,764,621	1,548,893	1,548,893	1,230,606	1,080,148	1,080,148
Adjusted R ²	0.0001	0.0627	0.0844	0.0877	0.0903	0.3958

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenstein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

estimated increase in voting alignment is 0.75 percentage points or 2.4 percent of a standard deviation.

The coefficient estimates of three diagonal seat neighbors are positive and statistically significant at least at the five percent-level once fixed effects are included in column (6): the diagonal front and back aisle neighbors, and the diagonal back table neighbor. Vote agreement rates increase by 0.72 to 0.87 percentage points or 2.3 to 2.8 percent of a standard deviation if a delegation is seated diagonally to the back of representatives of an Arab League member state. Voting alignment between an Arab League member state and a delegation which is seated diagonally in front across the aisle is estimated to be 1.24 percentage points or 4 percent of a standard deviation higher compared to non-adjacent delegations.

For column neighbors, the coefficient estimates are statistically significant at least at the five percent-level without fixed effects (columns [1] to [5]). The coefficient estimates do not turn out to be statistically significant, however, when country- and seating arrangement-fixed effects are included in column (6).

5.3 Strategic Peer Effects on Colonialism

The issue of decolonization has played a major role in negotiations at the UNGA. About one out of six resolutions that were ever tabled in the UNGA was related to colonialism. In the decade between 1960 and 1970 alone, 28 former colonies gained independence and were admitted to the UN as new member states. The topic has prominently remained on the agenda of the UNGA until today.

I examine the political alignment of nine countries with a colonial past with their seating neighbors: Australia, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. The countries may or may not have ruled colonies at the time of each resolution. Solely UNGA resolutions which cover topics surrounding colonialism remain in the sample. I assume that such resolutions are strategically important for countries with a colonial past.

Table 5.4 shows the estimation results for spatial peer effects on voting alignment with the colonial powers for UNGA resolutions covering colonialism between 1952 and 2019.

The results suggest that direct seating neighbors in the same row support colonial powers even less than all other non-adjacent delegations in the UNGA. Once linguistic and spatial control variables are added in columns (5) and (6), however, coefficient estimates on both variables are negative and statistically significant at the one percent-level. With fixed effects included, the vote agreement rate between countries with a colonial past and their table neighbors decreases by 2.92 percentage points or 9.3 percent of a standard deviation for resolutions about

Table 5.4: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019

Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.6309 (0.7754)	0.0795 (0.6931)	0.7904 (0.6973)	0.8859 (0.5915)	-2.1760*** (0.6522)	-2.9247*** (0.6049)
Aisle neighbor	-1.1768 (0.7841)	-1.1785* (0.6050)	-0.3039 (0.5997)	-0.0453 (0.6062)	-3.9753*** (0.9343)	-3.2671*** (0.8014)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.8313 (0.7087)	0.8326 (0.7797)	1.0404 (0.7161)	0.1211 (0.7961)	0.2536 (0.9186)	0.4440 (0.7882)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.7038 (0.8584)	-0.9220 (0.9174)	-0.1902 (0.9941)	0.0634 (0.9270)	0.7678 (0.9223)	1.0145 (0.6821)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-2.5088*** (0.7920)	-0.1509 (0.8867)	0.3907 (0.8250)	0.7717 (0.8633)	1.0335 (0.9375)	0.1356 (0.7962)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-1.1191 (0.8961)	-0.4886 (0.7475)	0.3491 (0.7404)	1.4540** (0.6584)	2.2364*** (0.6641)	1.7562*** (0.5460)
Front neighbor	-2.3284*** (0.6679)	-0.0569 (0.6678)	0.5716 (0.6284)	0.4572 (0.6318)	0.6016 (0.7550)	0.3718 (0.5647)
Back neighbor	-2.9018*** (0.6105)	-1.1009 (0.7573)	-0.5260 (0.7275)	0.9661 (0.6741)	1.6592** (0.7387)	2.3620*** (0.4574)
Constant	66.8453*** (1.2744)	60.9893*** (4.1320)	56.0594*** (4.3587)	67.1480*** (4.9976)	66.6721*** (5.0511)	1,076.3880 (942.4094)
Political variables? ^a .	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b .	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c .	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d .	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e .	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f .	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	678,266	616,201	616,201	545,879	500,936	500,936
Adjusted R ²	0.0001	0.0714	0.1063	0.2081	0.2125	0.3067

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenstein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

colonialism. Aisle neighbors are 3.27 percentage points or 10.4 of a standard deviation less likely to vote in line with colonial powers on colonialism topics.

Opposite effects on vote agreement rates are observed for delegations which sit diagonally across the aisle or directly behind countries with a colonial past. Both coefficient estimates are positive and statistically significant at the one percent-level with the full specification in column (6). The results indicate that sitting diagonally to the back and across the aisle of a country with a colonial past leads to an increase of vote agreement rates by 1.76 percentage points or 5.6 percent of a standard deviation. Seating neighbors directly at the back row are 2.36 percentage points or 7.5 percent of a standard deviation more likely to vote in line with colonial powers on resolutions covering colonialism.

All remaining coefficient estimates do not turn out to be statistically significant once control variables are included.

6 Robustness Checks

Spatial peer effects should be observed for the first circle of seating neighbors, i.e. direct neighbors. Personal interactions with delegations in the second seating circle, i.e. the neighbors of neighbors, are hampered by country representatives seated in between. I examine spatial peer effects with the 16 seating neighbors in the second circle for general and strategically important resolutions (Tables B.7 to B.9). Out of the 48 estimated coefficients, only one turns out to be statistically significant at the five percent-level and only six are statistically significant at the ten percent-level.

Seating neighbors are drawn from a subset of the population as seats are arranged according to the official English country names. A delegation whose country name begins with ‘M’, for example, is likely be seated next to representatives from countries named ‘I’ to ‘R’, but is unlikely to sit close to delegations from countries whose official names start with ‘A’ or ‘Z’. I exclude all paired countries that never sat adjacently to the focal country. Instead of all country delegations in the UNGA, the coefficient estimates now indicate the difference in vote agreement rates between countries that are seating neighbors at the date of the resolution vote and all countries that have at least once sat together. On average for all resolutions, only the estimated coefficient for table neighbors remains negative and statistically significant at the five percent-level (Table B.10). Inferences regarding spatial peer effects for strategic resolutions about the Middle East conflict and colonialism do not change (Tables B.11 and B.12).

As an alternative measure of voting alignment, I disregard voting outcomes with an abstention from either the focal country or the paired country. Results for the dichotomous vote agreement

rate without abstentions are shown in Tables B.13 to B.15. Inferences regarding spatial peer effects do not change.

I check whether inferences depend on including or excluding individual control variables. I replace the democracy index with the dichotomous version of Gründler and Krieger (2019)'s index in Tables B.16 to B.18, Marshall et al. (2019)'s Revised Combined Polity score (Tables B.19 to B.21) and Institutionalized Autocracy score (Tables B.22 to B.24), and the democracy indicator by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020) in Tables B.25 to B.27. For all resolutions, the coefficient estimates of the diagonal front and back aisle neighbor variables lack statistical significance once I use the Revised Combined Polity score or the democracy indicator. These results depend on the specific samples, however: if I run the estimation with the continuous democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019), but only use observations for which data by Marshall et al. (2019) or Bjørnskov and Rode (2020) are available, the seating neighbor indicators lack statistical significance. For all other specifications, inferences regarding spatial peer effects do not change.

I replace the growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population variables with data by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014). Results are shown in Tables B.28 to B.30. Inferences regarding spatial peer effects on voting behavior do not change.

Personal interactions are facilitated if two delegates have the same native tongue. I create a dummy variable that is one if one of the four de-facto most widely spoken languages in a country is the same in the focal and paired country, and 0 otherwise. I include the binary indicator for having the same language as an additional control variable (Tables B.31 to B.33). Inferences do not change.

Former colonial powers have often established strong diplomatic ties with their previous colonies after the nations gained independence, and countries with a common colonial history may share institutional characteristics such as a similar legal system. I add a binary indicator which is one if the focal and paired country gained independence from the same colonizing nation after 1952, and zero otherwise. Tables B.34 and B.35 present the estimations for all resolutions and strategic votes about the Middle East. Inferences regarding spatial peer effects do not change.

To control for all characteristics that do not vary over time between the focal and paired country, I include country pair-fixed effects. Spatial peer effects on vote agreement rates do not turn out to be statistically significant once I consider all contested resolutions (Table B.36). Inferences for strategically important resolutions dealing with Middle Eastern issues and colonialism, however, do not change (Tables B.37 and B.38).

Finally, Tables B.39, B.40 and B.41 show the estimation results for all resolutions as well as strategic resolutions about Middle Eastern topics and colonialism if standard errors are clustered at the year-level. Inferences regarding spatial peer effects do not change.

7 Conclusion

I compile novel data on the physical location of country delegations at the United Nations General Assembly since 1952 and exploit shocks to seating arrangements to examine spatial peer effects on resolution voting. My results suggest that adjacently seated delegations are, on average, less likely to vote in line with their neighbors: vote agreement rates on contested resolutions are 0.27 percentage points (0.9 percent of a standard deviation) lower for delegations that share the same table compared to all non-neighboring delegations in the General Assembly Hall. Sitting diagonally across the aisle and at the back table of a delegation decreases vote agreement rates by 0.23 to 0.29 percentage points (0.7 to 0.9 percent of a standard deviation).

Opposite effects are observed for resolutions which are strategically relevant for the foreign policy of a country. For resolutions dealing with the Middle East conflict, vote agreement rates between Arab League member states and their aisle and diagonal seating neighbors are 0.72 to 1.24 percentage points (2.3 to 4 percent of a standard deviation) higher compared to non-neighboring country representatives. Regarding resolutions about colonialism, vote agreement rates increase by 1.76 to 2.36 percentage points (5.6 to 7.5 percent of a standard deviation) between countries with a colonial past and delegations seated across the aisle in the back or directly behind them. Former colonial powers are, however, less likely to vote in line with their direct row neighbors.

Global politics depend on where people sit. As a policy implication, the United Nations may implement strategic seating set-ups as a low-cost way of encouraging diplomatic exchange. More generally, physical proximity among political agents facilitates ‘face-to-face’ interactions in many settings. Seat adjacency allows for informal coordination, and may bridge a divide between two parties when formal relations are restricted. On the contrary, “if you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu” as a common saying puts it. Policy-makers should consider such spatial peer effects when deciding on how to arrange seats in their political forum.

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Appendix A Figures

Figure 3: Seating arrangements at the first annual meeting of the International Labour Conference in Washington, D.C., United States, 1919



Source: International Labour Organization (2021)

Figure 4: Seating arrangements at the first Assembly of the League of Nations at the Salle de la Réformation in Geneva, Switzerland, 1920



Source: Frankl (1920)

Figure 5: Seating arrangements at the first session of the UNGA at Methodist Central Hall in London, United Kingdom, 1946



Source: United Nations (2021d)

Figure 6: Seating arrangements at the session of the UNGA at Flushing Meadows in New York City, United States, 1950



Source: United Nations (2021e)

Figure 7: Seating arrangements at the third session of the UNGA at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris, France, 1949



Source: United Nations (2021d)

Figure 8: Seating arrangements at the eighth session of the UNGA in the General Assembly Hall in New York City, United States, 1953



Source: United Nations (2021d)

Figure 9: Seating arrangements at the 68th session of the UNGA at the North Lawn Building in New York City, United States, 2013



Source: United Nations (2021f)

Figure 10: Seating arrangements at the 74th session of the UNGA in the General Assembly Hall, 2019



Source: United Nations (2021d)

Figure 11: Vote display panels at UNGA in the General Assembly Hall, 2021




Source: United Nations (2021d)

Figure 12: Seating arrangements at the 75th session of the UNGA in the General Assembly Hall, 2020



Source: United Nations (2021f)

Figure 13: Floor plan of the 37th session of the UNGA

Source: United Nations (2019b)

Appendix B Tables

Table B.5: List of seating arrangements since the seventh session of the UNGA

Seating arrangement	First date	Reason for change of seating order
1 st arrangement, 7 th session	2 October 1952	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 8 th session	7 September 1953	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 9 th session	2 September 1954	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 10 th session	3 September 1955	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 10 th session	1 December 1955	first vote of Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Romania and Spain
1 st arrangement, 11 th session	1 November 1956	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 11 th session	2 December 1956	first vote of Japan
3 rd arrangement, 11 th session	4 March 1957	first vote of Ghana
1 st arrangement, 12 th session	3 September 1957	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 13 th session	3 September 1958	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 13 th session	1 December 1958	first vote of Guinea
1 st arrangement, 14 th session	5 September 1959	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 15 th session	6 September 1960	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 15 th session	1 October 1960	first vote of Nigeria
1 st arrangement, 16 th session	1 August 1961	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 16 th session	7 September 1961	first vote of Sierra Leone
3 rd arrangement, 16 th session	2 October 1961	first vote of Mauritania and Mongolia
4 th arrangement, 16 th session	1 December 1961	first vote of Tanganyika
1 st arrangement, 17 th session	5 July 1962	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 17 th session	1 September 1962	first vote of Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda and Trinidad and Tobago
3 rd arrangement, 17 th session	4 October 1962	first vote of Algeria and Uganda
1 st arrangement, 18 th session	4 June 1963	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 18 th session	1 October 1963	country name change to Malaysia
<i>No data available for seating arrangement of 18th session before first votes of Kenya and Zanzibar.</i>		
1 st arrangement, 19 th session	6 February 1965	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 20 th session	3 November 1965	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 21 st session	4 September 1966	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 21 st session	4 October 1966	first vote of Botswana and Lesotho
3 rd arrangement, 21 st session	3 December 1966	first vote of Barbados
1 st arrangement, 22 nd session	3 September 1967	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 22 nd session	1 December 1967	first vote of Southern Yemen
3 rd arrangement, 22 nd session	3 June 1968	first vote of Mauritius
1 st arrangement, 23 rd session	6 September 1968	beginning of session

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Seating arrangement	First date	Reason for change of seating order
2 nd arrangement, 23 rd session	1 November 1968	first vote of Equatorial Guinea
1 st arrangement, 24 th session	1 September 1969	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 25 th session	1 September 1970	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 25 th session	25 July 1970	country name change to Khmer Republic
3 rd arrangement, 25 th session	1 December 1970	country name change to People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
1 st arrangement, 26 th session	2 September 1971	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 26 th session	3 October 1971	first vote of Oman
3 rd arrangement, 26 th session	3 November 1971	country name change to Zaire
4 th arrangement, 26 th session	1 December 1971	country name change to Congo and first vote of United Arab Emirates
1 st arrangement, 27 th session	5 September 1972	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 28 th session	1 October 1973	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 29 th session	2 September 1974	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 29 th session	2 December 1974	country name change to Benin
1 st arrangement, 30 th session	1 November 1975	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 30 th session	3 December 1975	first vote of Suriname
1 st arrangement, 31 st session	4 October 1976	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 31 st session	1 December 1976	first vote of Samoa
1 st arrangement, 32 nd session	5 October 1977	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 33 rd session	1 November 1978	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 33 rd session	1 December 1978	first vote of Dominica
1 st arrangement, 34 th session	5 September 1979	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 35 th session	1 October 1980	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 36 th session	1 September 1981	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 36 th session	2 November 1981	first vote of Antigua and Barbuda
1 st arrangement, 37 th session	3 October 1982	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 38 th session	4 October 1983	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 39 th session	5 September 1984	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 40 th session	6 October 1985	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 41 st session	2 October 1986	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 42 nd session	4 October 1987	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 43 rd session	2 October 1988	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 44 th session	5 September 1989	beginning of session
<i>No data available for seating arrangements between the 45th and 51st session.</i>		
1 st arrangement, 52 nd session	3 November 1997	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 53 rd session	2 October 1998	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 53 rd session	8 June 1999	first vote of Kiribati, Nauru and Tonga
1 st arrangement, 54 th session	2 November 1999	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 54 th session	15 June 2000	first vote of Tuvalu
1 st arrangement, 55 th session	3 October 2000	beginning of session

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Seating arrangement	First date	Reason for change of seating order
1 st arrangement, 56 th session	4 November 2001	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 57 th session	3 September 2002	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 57 th session	5 June 2003	country name change to Serbia and Montenegro
1 st arrangement, 58 th session	4 November 2003	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 59 th session	22 October 2004	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 60 th session	31 October 2005	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 60 th session	30 June 2006	first vote of Montenegro
1 st arrangement, 61 st session	30 October 2006	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 62 nd session	30 October 2007	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 63 rd session	8 October 2008	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 64 th session	28 October 2009	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 65 th session	26 October 2010	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 65 th session	3 May 2011	first vote of South Sudan
1 st arrangement, 66 th session	16 September 2011	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 67 th session	13 November 2012	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 68 th session	29 October 2013	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 69 th session	28 October 2014	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 70 th session	27 October 2015	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 71 st session	26 October 2016	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 72 nd session	1 November 2017	beginning of session
1 st arrangement, 73 rd session	16 October 2018	beginning of session
2 nd arrangement, 73 rd session	22 May 2019	country name change to Northern Macedonia

The first date refers to the first contested vote on a resolution for each seating arrangement.

Table B.6: Summary statistics of variables, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Vote agreement rate	79,742,480	82.4863	31.3476	0	100
General seat neighbor	79,742,480	0.048	0.2137	0	1
Table neighbor	79,742,480	0.0061	0.0779	0	1
Aisle neighbor	79,742,480	0.0059	0.0768	0	1
Diagonal front table neighbor	79,742,480	0.0061	0.0776	0	1
Diagonal back table neighbor	79,742,480	0.0061	0.0776	0	1
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	79,742,480	0.0059	0.0766	0	1
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	79,742,480	0.0059	0.0767	0	1
Front neighbor	79,742,480	0.006	0.0772	0	1
Back neighbor	79,742,480	0.006	0.0773	0	1
Continuous democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019)	70,952,536	0.5228	0.4185	0	1
Difference of cont. democr. index by Gründler and Krieger (2019)	69,168,117	0.3991	0.3657	0	0.9995
Communism indicator	76,583,255	0.0942	0.2921	0	1
Difference of communism indicator	75,570,438	0.1612	0.3677	0	1
Middle East resolution indicator	79,742,480	0.1778	0.3823	0	1
Nuclear proliferation resolution indicator	79,742,480	0.17	0.3756	0	1
Disarmament resolution indicator	79,742,480	0.2143	0.4103	0	1
Human rights resolution indicator	79,742,480	0.2002	0.4002	0	1
Colonialism resolution indicator	79,742,480	0.1413	0.3484	0	1
Economic development resolution indicator	79,742,480	0.1312	0.3376	0	1
Number of days since first vote on a contested resolution	79,742,480	121.0257	64.8921	0	245
Difference of number of days since first vote on a contested resolution	79,742,480	47.0976	45.315	0	214
Non-permanent UN Security Council membership	79,742,480	0.0655	0.2475	0	1
Difference of non-permanent UN Security Council membership	79,742,480	0.1197	0.3246	0	11
Female executive state leader indicator	79,742,480	0.0632	0.2434	0	1
Difference of female exec. state leader indicator	79,742,480	0.1173	0.3218	0	1

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Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Female Minister of Foreign Affairs indicator	79,742,480	0.0693	0.2539	0	1
Difference of female Minister of Foreign Affairs indicator	79,742,480	0.1218	0.327	0	1
Female Permanent Representative to the UN indicator	79,742,480	0.0731	0.2604	0	1
Difference of female Permanent Representative to the UN indicator	79,742,480	0.1304	0.3368	0	1
Growth of real GDP by Feenstra et al. (2015)	66,302,996	4.4591	9.0885	-71.0986	132.0176
Difference of growth of real GDP by Feenstra et al. (2015)	58,225,030	8.1729	9.0828	0	142.33
Real GDP per capita by Feenstra et al. (2015)	66,417,785	12,626.35	17,157.18	425.3024	25,3329.9
Difference of real GDP per capita by Feenstra et al. (2015)	58,392,477	14,073.85	19,320.9	0.05	25,2710.6
Population by Feenstra et al. (2015)	66,417,785	29.6593	93.5798	0.041	1,339.18
Difference of population by Feenstra et al. (2015)	58,392,477	44.8589	123.3851	0	13,39.125
Standardized Levensthein distance	71,704,504	0.1463	0.1019	0	0.7895
SoundEx indicator	71,704,504	0.0014	0.0386	0	1
Row number	79,651,501	8.2151	3.7092	1	16
Column number	79,651,501	2.8953	1.5387	1	11
Vote agreement rate without abstentions	65,006,973	89.8501	30.1988	0	100
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor	51,348,831	0.0057	0.0756	0	1
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor	51,348,831	0.0057	0.0756	0	1
Front neighbor's front neighbor	51,348,831	0.0058	0.0763	0	1
Back neighbor's back neighbor	51,348,831	0.0059	0.0763	0	1
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's front neighbor	51,348,831	0.0057	0.0756	0	1
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's back neighbor	51,348,831	0.0058	0.0758	0	1
Table neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	51,348,831	0.006	0.0769	0	1
Table neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	51,348,831	0.006	0.077	0	1
Aisle neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	51,348,831	0.0057	0.0754	0	1

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Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Aisle neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	51,348,831	0.0058	0.0757	0	1
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's front neighbor	51,348,831	0.0058	0.0756	0	1
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's back neighbor	51,348,831	0.0058	0.0757	0	1
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	51,348,831	0.0057	0.0754	0	1
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	51,348,831	0.0058	0.0757	0	1
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	51,348,831	0.0057	0.0756	0	1
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	51,348,831	0.0058	0.0757	0	1
Dichotomous democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019)	70,952,536	0.5257	0.4876	0	1
Difference of dict. democr. index by Gründler and Krieger (2019)	69,168,117	0.4289	0.4716	0	1
Revised Combined Polity score	68,590,853	1.3635	7.4157	-10	10
Difference of Revised Combined Polity score	60,428,412	7.4658	6.3498	0	20
Institutionalized Autocracy score	66,973,435	3.1411	3.5155	0	10
Difference of Institutionalized autocracy score	57,612,365	3.2925	3.1594	0	10
Democracy indicator by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020)	76,583,255	0.4904	0.4999	0	1
Difference of democracy index by Bjørnskov and Rode (2019)	75,570,438	0.4635	0.4987	0	1
Growth of real GDP by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)	63,019,487	204.3688	8.468	133.629	324.7044
Difference of growth of real GDP by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)	54,685,899	7.5228	8.5754	0	144.1335
Real GDP per capita by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)	63,079,667	12,087.91	16,371.29	269	22,0717
Difference of real GDP per capita by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)	54,784,748	13,173.88	17,674.17	0	22,0055
Population by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)	63,572,534	31,016.23	89,981.25	64	126,8155
Difference of population by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)	55,731,578	45,806.56	117,802.2	0	126,8081
Same language	79,742,480	0.191	0.3931	0	1
Same colonizer	79,742,480	0.0803	0.2718	0	1

Table B.7: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: second circle seating neighbors

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor	-0.5587*** (0.1990)	-0.8805*** (0.2006)	-0.6882*** (0.1843)	-0.6202*** (0.2041)	-0.4814** (0.2199)	-0.2947 (0.2358)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor	-0.1100 (0.1960)	-0.4926*** (0.1831)	-0.3291** (0.1614)	-0.3579 (0.2222)	-0.2960 (0.2271)	-0.1642 (0.1454)
Front neighbor's front neighbor	-0.5161** (0.2205)	-0.7688*** (0.2171)	-0.6491*** (0.1988)	-0.5172** (0.2497)	-0.6109** (0.2663)	-0.0785 (0.1909)
Back neighbor's back neighbor	-0.2932 (0.2011)	-0.4942** (0.2046)	-0.3591* (0.1903)	-0.3448 (0.2258)	-0.4929* (0.2652)	0.0015 (0.1793)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's front neighbor	-0.1393 (0.2664)	-0.5004* (0.2609)	-0.3802 (0.2406)	0.0524 (0.2837)	0.0638 (0.3105)	0.1946 (0.2333)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's back neighbor	0.0665 (0.2575)	-0.3832 (0.2546)	-0.2759 (0.2265)	0.0394 (0.2414)	-0.1584 (0.2495)	0.2239 (0.1778)
Table neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	-0.2822 (0.2225)	-0.6666*** (0.2506)	-0.5450** (0.2290)	-0.3923 (0.2771)	-0.4620 (0.3235)	-0.0753 (0.2284)
Table neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	-0.1667 (0.2235)	-0.4194 (0.2633)	-0.2942 (0.2400)	-0.2780 (0.2696)	-0.3381 (0.2978)	-0.0948 (0.2236)
Aisle neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	-0.1035 (0.2077)	-0.5877*** (0.2048)	-0.4545** (0.1854)	-0.2406 (0.2102)	-0.2593 (0.2178)	-0.0198 (0.1717)
Aisle neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	-0.4511* (0.2341)	-0.4744** (0.217)	-0.4131** (0.1931)	-0.4098 (0.2937)	-0.4983 (0.2618)	-0.4158 (0.2702)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's front neighbor	-0.0768 (0.2486)	-0.4875** (0.2226)	-0.3428* (0.2018)	-0.1528 (0.1988)	-0.2420 (0.2276)	0.2621 (0.1988)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's back neighbor	-0.2660 (0.2239)	-0.5344** (0.2406)	-0.3871* (0.2202)	-0.1851 (0.1899)	-0.1957 (0.2123)	0.2148 (0.1779)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	0.1699 (0.2404)	-0.3319 (0.2249)	-0.2087 (0.1957)	-0.1506 (0.1717)	-0.2031 (0.2186)	0.2621 (0.1727)

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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	0.1332 (0.2295)	-0.3764* (0.2228)	-0.2531 (0.1958)	-0.0882 (0.2246)	-0.2679 (0.2231)	0.2873* (0.1701)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	-0.1283 (0.2467)	-0.6540*** (0.2285)	-0.5181** (0.1959)	-0.1783 (0.2086)	-0.1554 (0.2315)	0.2415* (0.1405)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	0.2687 (0.2034)	-0.2336 (0.2023)	-0.0978 (0.1833)	-0.1103 (0.2187)	-0.2716 (0.2650)	0.2169 (0.1885)
Constant	82.5527*** (0.3706)	90.8731*** (0.8828)	88.9891*** (1.2446)	90.3334*** (1.0719)	88.7806*** (1.2200)	603.7411*** (108.2045)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	48,932,180	41,376,527	41,376,527	33,549,594	29,790,959	29,790,959
Adjusted R ²	0.0001	0.0423	0.0440	0.0547	0.0553	0.1487

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

*** ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.8: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: second circle seating neighbors

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor	0.0347 (0.8256)	-0.7834 (0.9060)	-0.1629 (0.8871)	-0.1905 (1.0136)	0.5523 (1.1517)	0.5660 (0.4552)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor	-0.3388 (0.7978)	-0.2183 (0.8333)	0.3704 (0.8025)	0.1974 (0.9449)	1.5606 (1.1386)	0.9905 (0.951)
Front neighbor's front neighbor	0.9946 (0.5957)	0.6652 (0.4967)	0.7271 (0.5088)	0.8611 (0.5890)	0.3866 (0.6674)	-0.1453 (0.4257)
Back neighbor's back neighbor	2.1920*** (0.7073)	1.0925 (0.6755)	1.5143** (0.6604)	2.1649*** (0.7945)	2.4939*** (0.8414)	0.2654 (0.2900)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's front neighbor	-1.9580** (0.9712)	-0.7697 (0.8744)	-0.1457 (0.8549)	-0.0913 (0.9403)	0.1788 (1.0922)	-0.5533 (0.4711)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's back neighbor	1.5963* (0.8491)	0.4121 (0.8570)	0.7725 (0.8462)	0.4605 (0.9612)	0.3903 (1.0522)	-0.3265 (0.3986)
Table neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	0.4161 (0.5969)	-0.1602 (0.5719)	0.0948 (0.6127)	0.2062 (0.6825)	1.1486 (0.9211)	-0.4874 (0.4473)
Table neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	0.5897 (0.8446)	0.1740 (0.8680)	0.5004 (0.8921)	0.5110 (0.9858)	0.3523 (1.1840)	-0.6649 (0.6446)
Aisle neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	0.0134 (0.8172)	1.2415** (0.5362)	1.6430*** (0.5077)	2.4094*** (0.5467)	2.8312*** (0.6248)	0.5712 (0.4282)
Aisle neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	0.1068 (0.7467)	-0.7795 (0.7606)	-0.3293 (0.7437)	-0.0722 (0.7393)	-0.8056 (0.8587)	-0.2926 (0.4595)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's front neighbor	-1.1634 (0.9747)	-0.1151 (0.7215)	0.6496 (0.6762)	0.7476 (0.7606)	0.9772 (0.7084)	-0.6217 (0.4228)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's back neighbor	1.8986** (0.7565)	1.1417* (0.6746)	1.7175*** (0.6215)	1.4756** (0.6512)	1.5963** (0.6981)	0.8083* (0.4687)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	0.5558 (0.7292)	-0.6562 (0.8293)	-0.0554 (0.8314)	0.0150 (0.8834)	-0.1216 (0.9699)	-0.5065* (0.2623)

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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	-1.2392 (1.0836)	-1.9205 (1.1477)	-1.4711 (1.1145)	-1.5400 (1.2408)	-2.6841* (1.3515)	-0.7739 (0.5007)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	0.4545 (0.8771)	-0.2381 (0.8403)	0.1589 (0.7689)	0.0308 (0.9436)	-0.0749 (0.9763)	-0.2482 (0.3181)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	-0.3503 (0.8522)	-0.1457 (0.7811)	0.5195 (0.7368)	0.9609 (0.7914)	0.2178 (0.9555)	-0.0391 (0.5952)
Constant	90.3917*** (0.3524)	98.5097*** (0.4272)	91.3948*** (1.0557)	90.9145*** (1.1049)	90.1304*** (1.1087)	333.4252*** (95.1566)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	1,061,742	928,695	928,695	749,022	652,718	652,718
Adjusted R ²	0.0002	0.0626	0.0836	0.0879	0.0899	0.4009

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

*** ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.9: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: second circle seating neighbors

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor	-0.7725 (1.2372)	0.0387 (0.9032)	0.8571 (0.8752)	0.3446 (1.0390)	-3.6424*** (1.2501)	0.2962 (1.1441)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor	-2.8834*** (0.9347)	-0.8831 (0.8369)	-0.2931 (0.8027)	0.4816 (0.9615)	-2.6284*** (0.9497)	0.3350 (0.7916)
Front neighbor's front neighbor	-4.4857*** (1.1949)	-2.4545* (1.2977)	-1.9864 (1.2999)	-2.8824** (1.3716)	-2.8852** (1.3930)	-0.2415 (1.0931)
Back neighbor's back neighbor	-1.0837 (0.8961)	-0.4744 (0.9648)	0.4040 (0.8882)	0.6982 (0.9011)	0.4238 (1.0718)	0.6861 (0.8657)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's front neighbor	-1.8266 (1.2243)	0.2050 (1.1760)	0.4731 (0.9937)	1.6044 (0.9840)	1.7976* (1.0123)	1.2027* (0.6853)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's back neighbor	-4.7609*** (1.0760)	-3.6535*** (1.0138)	-2.5002*** (0.7955)	-2.4299*** (0.7423)	-2.7743*** (0.7929)	-1.3554** (0.6569)
Table neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	0.4972 (1.2202)	0.3760 (1.0824)	0.9318 (0.9647)	0.0182 (0.8490)	-0.6343 (1.0602)	0.3722 (0.6770)
Table neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	-0.5719 (1.4579)	-0.7826 (1.3427)	-0.1331 (1.0888)	0.2460 (1.1144)	0.4045 (1.2531)	0.7609 (0.8314)
Aisle neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	-2.3881* (1.2132)	-1.7639 (1.1860)	-0.8078 (1.0297)	0.3873 (1.1951)	-1.0596 (1.3024)	1.2041 (1.0117)
Aisle neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	-2.0769 (1.4530)	-2.2274* (1.1236)	-1.3342 (1.0610)	-1.1909 (1.0588)	-1.3561 (1.3162)	-0.5930 (0.9148)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's front neighbor	0.0806 (0.7578)	1.0492 (0.7809)	1.8414** (0.7519)	1.0799 (0.7201)	1.2938 (0.7813)	0.9972 (0.9681)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's back neighbor	-3.3591*** (1.1416)	-2.8983*** (1.0263)	-1.6153* (0.8479)	-1.9304* (1.0025)	-1.2629 (1.1088)	-1.3194 (0.9094)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	-3.4043*** (1.2427)	-1.9314* (1.1198)	-1.1736 (1.0621)	-1.5780 (0.9755)	-1.3705 (1.0726)	-0.2521 (0.8749)

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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Aisle neighbor's table neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	-0.8037 (1.0715)	-0.6850 (0.9856)	0.1249 (0.8907)	-0.0936 (1.0484)	-0.5044 (1.2203)	-0.4850 (0.9338)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's front neighbor's front neighbor	-2.6998** (1.2346)	-1.4488 (1.0423)	-0.6399 (1.0864)	-1.2775 (1.2638)	-1.2346 (1.3058)	-0.7475 (1.0023)
Table neighbor's aisle neighbor's back neighbor's back neighbor	-1.1480 (1.2412)	-1.1066 (1.2504)	-0.3461 (1.1799)	0.2467 (1.2008)	-0.2366 (1.1359)	-0.1827 (0.8043)
Constant	66.1883*** (1.6259)	57.9539*** (5.4244)	52.4749*** (5.6255)	63.0923*** (6.0296)	62.4804*** (6.7145)	1,419.1480 (955.3383)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	386,580	343,858	343,858	306,530	282,631	282,631
Adjusted R ²	0.0004	0.0715	0.1224	0.2285	0.2333	0.3257

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

*** ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.10: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: only paired countries with non-zero likelihood of seat adjacency

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.1741 (0.2054)	0.2366 (0.1833)	0.2454 (0.1537)	0.2342 (0.1568)	-0.3393** (0.1564)	-0.3226** (0.1256)
Aisle neighbor	-0.1396 (0.1954)	0.4927** (0.1879)	0.5645*** (0.1592)	0.5076*** (0.1702)	-0.0258 (0.1781)	-0.0524 (0.1635)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.5340*** (0.1908)	-0.3667* (0.1895)	-0.3576** (0.1529)	0.0081 (0.1463)	0.0755 (0.1794)	-0.1004 (0.1355)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.4104** (0.1895)	-0.2163 (0.1712)	-0.1956 (0.1405)	0.1355 (0.1429)	0.2254 (0.1651)	0.0091 (0.1387)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.3439 (0.2121)	-0.2020 (0.2033)	-0.1391 (0.1720)	0.1220 (0.1829)	0.1160 (0.1942)	-0.0839 (0.1283)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.3409* (0.2008)	-0.2624 (0.1864)	-0.1960 (0.1586)	-0.0006 (0.1752)	0.0215 (0.1802)	-0.1015 (0.1266)
Front neighbor	-0.5890*** (0.1560)	-0.1820 (0.1869)	-0.1874 (0.1579)	0.2941* (0.1716)	0.3680* (0.2134)	0.1863 (0.1483)
Back neighbor	-0.6229*** (0.1323)	-0.2145 (0.1611)	-0.2235 (0.1409)	0.1257 (0.1406)	0.2577 (0.1807)	0.1829 (0.1411)
Constant	82.4871*** (0.4132)	89.8420*** (1.0106)	86.5917*** (1.4749)	88.8063*** (1.2238)	87.0226*** (1.4052)	512.1063*** (117.7021)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	15,339,3450	13,549,9065	13,549,906	11,079,597	9,811,188	9,811,188
Adjusted R ²	0.0000	0.0378	0.0416	0.0541	0.0558	0.1505

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

*** ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.11: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: only paired countries with non-zero likelihood of seat adjacency

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.8222 (0.5086)	1.1467** (0.4515)	1.5549*** (0.4351)	1.8530*** (0.4327)	2.2906*** (0.4101)	-0.0618 (0.2611)
Aisle neighbor	-0.1699 (0.4498)	1.5355*** (0.3801)	2.2972*** (0.3746)	2.9950*** (0.4207)	3.8678*** (0.4015)	0.9306*** (0.2366)
Diagonal front table neighbor	0.7923 (0.6201)	1.0621** (0.5031)	1.0601** (0.4827)	1.2397** (0.4878)	1.3533** (0.5175)	0.2386 (0.3684)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.5476 (0.6461)	-0.3032 (0.6362)	-0.0414 (0.6003)	-0.1010 (0.7290)	0.4746 (0.7835)	0.8742*** (0.3162)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.1448 (0.7613)	0.8989 (0.5387)	1.0991** (0.4775)	1.4249*** (0.5043)	1.8130*** (0.5415)	1.3955*** (0.3502)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	0.5170 (0.5900)	-0.0329 (0.4867)	0.3863 (0.4489)	0.5314 (0.5572)	0.7473 (0.6695)	0.7736** (0.2989)
Front neighbor	1.0656** (0.5139)	1.5624*** (0.5587)	1.8238*** (0.5555)	1.9546*** (0.6648)	2.0728*** (0.6521)	0.5420 (0.3666)
Back neighbor	-1.9435** (0.7677)	-3.1803*** (0.7697)	-2.8356*** (0.7554)	-3.0540*** (1.0735)	-3.7445*** (1.1704)	-0.5104 (0.4182)
Constant	90.6076*** (0.3800)	98.4301*** (0.5392)	89.9877*** (1.2814)	90.0403*** (1.2227)	90.0859*** (1.2791)	406.9525*** (97.2890)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	347,539	308,237	308,237	247,473	216,697	216,697
Adjusted R ²	0.0003	0.0625	0.0895	0.0947	0.1027	0.3987

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,

and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.12: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: only paired countries with non-zero likelihood of seat adjacency

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	1.1348 (0.8081)	0.5309 (0.7206)	1.1863 (0.7381)	0.7385 (0.6446)	-2.0352*** (0.6785)	-7.0456*** (0.8541)
Aisle neighbor	-0.6730 (0.8060)	-0.7239 (0.6238)	0.1810 (0.6319)	0.0262 (0.6456)	-3.5678*** (0.9091)	-7.6660*** (1.0973)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.3275 (0.7686)	1.3146 (0.8376)	1.5994** (0.7970)	0.5280 (0.8543)	0.7061 (0.9823)	0.9153 (0.9053)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.1999 (0.9377)	-0.4367 (0.9889)	0.5491 (1.0672)	0.7586 (0.9767)	1.3944 (0.9615)	1.7383** (0.7654)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-2.0050** (0.8187)	0.3480 (0.9055)	0.8619 (0.8602)	1.1570 (0.9273)	1.4623 (1.0062)	0.1924 (0.9266)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.6153 (0.9301)	0.0014 (0.7716)	0.9729 (0.7702)	2.1209*** (0.6842)	2.8133*** (0.6938)	2.3688*** (0.7195)
Front neighbor	-1.8246** (0.6967)	0.4210 (0.6998)	0.7754 (0.6915)	0.4441 (0.6718)	0.6755 (0.7806)	0.3162 (0.6949)
Back neighbor	-2.3980*** (0.6720)	-0.6017 (0.7989)	0.2283 (0.8067)	1.9281** (0.7555)	2.5867*** (0.8162)	3.0238*** (0.6214)
Constant	66.3415*** (1.3179)	60.3602*** (4.1267)	55.1803*** (4.3631)	67.2397*** (5.1583)	67.8235*** (5.0087)	942.3308 (950.5786)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	149,451	137,227	137,227	120,677	109,573	109,573
Adjusted R ²	0.0002	0.0718	0.1054	0.1947	0.1994	0.2991

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,

and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.13: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: vote agreement rates without abstentions

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate without abstentions					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.1519 (0.1987)	-0.2488 (0.1753)	-0.1789 (0.1498)	-0.2741** (0.1369)	-0.6546*** (0.1315)	-0.3090** (0.1178)
Aisle neighbor	0.0029 (0.1807)	0.0751 (0.1630)	0.1684 (0.1374)	-0.0244 (0.1366)	-0.3818*** (0.1412)	-0.0334 (0.1283)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.3313* (0.1771)	-0.6171*** (0.1935)	-0.5587*** (0.1660)	-0.3000** (0.1450)	-0.2859* (0.1685)	-0.2668** (0.1250)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.2314 (0.1600)	-0.4736*** (0.1674)	-0.4055*** (0.1448)	-0.1875 (0.1269)	-0.1627 (0.1399)	-0.1777 (0.1236)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.1923 (0.1895)	-0.5229*** (0.1903)	-0.4567*** (0.1644)	-0.2660* (0.1531)	-0.3079* (0.1654)	-0.2377* (0.1224)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.1912 (0.1804)	-0.5692*** (0.1820)	-0.4998*** (0.1572)	-0.3603** (0.1534)	-0.3963** (0.1630)	-0.2740** (0.1273)
Front neighbor	-0.4144** (0.1710)	-0.5622*** (0.1761)	-0.5152*** (0.1523)	-0.2429* (0.1408)	-0.2139 (0.1819)	-0.0661 (0.1324)
Back neighbor	-0.4408*** (0.1529)	-0.5782*** (0.1589)	-0.5350*** (0.1381)	-0.3467*** (0.1230)	-0.2816* (0.1600)	-0.0538 (0.1351)
Constant	89.8617*** (0.4173)	96.6355*** (0.6224)	95.5633*** (1.0556)	97.5271*** (0.8310)	96.4634*** (0.9496)	412.9347*** (124.1088)
Political variables? ^a	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	X	X	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	X	X	X	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	X	X	X	X	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	X	X	X	X	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	X	X	X	X	X	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	X	X	X	X	X	✓
Observations	65,006,973	55,486,885	55,486,885	44,973,016	40,022,248	40,022,248
Adjusted R ²	0.0000	0.0332	0.0343	0.0445	0.0457	0.1487

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

X indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,

and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.14: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: vote agreement rates without abstentions

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate without abstentions with Arab league member states					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.1321 (0.4590)	1.0818*** (0.3098)	1.2493*** (0.3104)	1.4734*** (0.2933)	2.0933*** (0.2743)	-0.4362* (0.2354)
Aisle neighbor	0.8607** (0.3702)	1.6925*** (0.2072)	2.1161*** (0.2234)	2.5671*** (0.2541)	3.3779*** (0.2915)	0.4868** (0.2320)
Diagonal front table neighbor	0.9358* (0.4781)	0.8620* (0.4471)	0.8975** (0.4239)	0.9397** (0.4679)	1.2288** (0.5441)	0.2911 (0.1823)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.7212 (0.5742)	-0.3390 (0.6299)	-0.0886 (0.6091)	0.0905 (0.7242)	0.2683 (0.7766)	0.7630*** (0.2286)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	0.0064 (0.5556)	0.6437 (0.4386)	0.8104** (0.3888)	0.8515* (0.4448)	1.1491** (0.5096)	0.8656*** (0.2093)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	0.1334 (0.5408)	-0.5674 (0.5003)	-0.1936 (0.4744)	0.4050 (0.4987)	0.5225 (0.5444)	0.4657** (0.2306)
Front neighbor	1.5512*** (0.5158)	1.2227** (0.4610)	1.4822*** (0.4751)	1.2584** (0.5794)	1.2952** (0.5880)	0.4829** (0.2008)
Back neighbor	-2.4640*** (0.7682)	-3.8346*** (0.7880)	-3.5474*** (0.7720)	-3.5257*** (1.0360)	-4.1243*** (1.1497)	-0.8685 (0.7608)
Constant	95.7530*** (0.2406)	100.3245*** (0.2338)	94.7190*** (0.7345)	94.9589*** (0.6670)	94.5915*** (0.7597)	120.6226*** (23.1431)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	1,556,804	1,373,085	1,373,085	1,092,580	960,448	960,448
Adjusted R ²	0.0001	0.0301	0.0493	0.0538	0.0591	0.4948

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,

and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.15: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: vote agreement rates without abstentions

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate without abstentions with countries with a colonial past					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.4231 (0.9371)	-0.3395 (0.8782)	0.2791 (0.9182)	0.1636 (0.7623)	-3.4244*** (0.9610)	-4.5353*** (0.8661)
Aisle neighbor	-1.7272* (0.9723)	-1.9669** (0.7891)	-1.0514 (0.8132)	-1.0792 (0.7907)	-5.4594*** (1.3713)	-4.8394*** (1.1062)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.7840 (0.9647)	1.8209 (1.1197)	1.9395* (1.0670)	0.4762 (1.0650)	1.0507 (1.2507)	1.2306 (1.0920)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.2755 (1.2081)	-0.4833 (1.3426)	0.2339 (1.4762)	0.5184 (1.2570)	1.5391 (1.2545)	1.7377 (1.0458)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-3.2673*** (1.1396)	-0.1112 (1.2793)	0.4410 (1.2069)	0.5418 (1.2031)	1.0302 (1.3157)	0.0122 (1.1531)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-1.2264 (1.2302)	-0.4383 (1.1056)	0.3052 (1.1006)	1.8848** (0.8926)	2.8248*** (0.8998)	2.6250*** (0.7725)
Front neighbor	-2.9239*** (0.9503)	-0.2697 (0.9856)	0.2641 (0.9276)	-0.0965 (0.8610)	0.4554 (1.0730)	0.7976 (0.9141)
Back neighbor	-3.1748*** (0.9758)	-1.5508 (1.1205)	-0.7701 (1.0729)	1.8924** (0.9435)	2.5743** (0.9790)	3.8502*** (0.6903)
Constant	74.8241*** (1.5071)	65.7094*** (6.0729)	60.8049*** (6.3322)	75.1781*** (7.0835)	73.9264*** (7.0859)	1,389.572 (1,340.065)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	459,849	413,558	413,558	368,872	338,807	338,807
Adjusted R ²	0.0001	0.0786	0.1217	0.2763	0.2840	0.3880

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,

and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.16: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: dichotomous democracy indicator by Gründler and Krieger (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.3042 (0.2177)	-0.1570 (0.1824)	-0.2513 (0.1685)	-0.7421*** (0.1699)	-0.3256** (0.1259)
Aisle neighbor	-0.1022 (0.1981)	0.0841 (0.1642)	-0.0639 (0.1634)	-0.5127*** (0.1704)	-0.0232 (0.1502)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.8433*** (0.2053)	-0.6974*** (0.1692)	-0.4666*** (0.1438)	-0.4466** (0.1767)	-0.2698** (0.1341)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.6893*** (0.1819)	-0.5364*** (0.1533)	-0.3339** (0.1340)	-0.3116** (0.1526)	-0.1555 (0.1366)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.6916*** (0.2179)	-0.5159*** (0.1839)	-0.3679** (0.1846)	-0.4264** (0.1930)	-0.2294* (0.1314)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.7418*** (0.1993)	-0.5632*** (0.1647)	-0.4545** (0.1742)	-0.5050*** (0.1799)	-0.2472* (0.1339)
Front neighbor	-0.6805*** (0.1886)	-0.5422*** (0.1558)	-0.1989 (0.1552)	-0.1845 (0.1901)	-0.0234 (0.1369)
Back neighbor	-0.7072*** (0.1604)	-0.5744*** (0.1317)	-0.3572*** (0.1199)	-0.2974* (0.1582)	-0.0125 (0.1299)
Constant	88.3790*** (0.9253)	86.1550*** (1.3477)	87.9080*** (1.1346)	86.5750*** (1.2662)	557.0561*** (113.5287)
Political variables? ^a	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	68,079,315	68,079,315	55,040,433	48,947,754	48,947,754
Adjusted R ²	0.0346	0.0367	0.0471	0.0481	0.1435

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the dichotomous democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019) and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.17: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: dichotomous democracy indicator by Gründler and Krieger (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.5170 (0.4997)	0.8951* (0.4744)	1.1918*** (0.4213)	1.9219*** (0.3977)	-0.2142 (0.2599)
Aisle neighbor	0.8870** (0.3949)	1.4832*** (0.3776)	2.1862*** (0.3634)	3.3157*** (0.3535)	0.6953*** (0.2227)
Diagonal front table neighbor	1.1174** (0.4917)	1.1501** (0.4714)	1.3292** (0.5088)	1.5129** (0.5874)	0.0910 (0.3716)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.3804 (0.6677)	-0.1745 (0.6423)	-0.2604 (0.7494)	0.2910 (0.8021)	0.8963*** (0.3111)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	0.8100 (0.5630)	1.0054* (0.5078)	1.3162** (0.5335)	1.6259*** (0.5851)	1.2524*** (0.3222)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.1974 (0.5134)	0.1057 (0.4870)	0.2879 (0.5768)	0.4296 (0.6615)	0.7466** (0.2817)
Front neighbor	1.3740*** (0.4877)	1.5961*** (0.4864)	1.8156*** (0.6074)	1.9503*** (0.6072)	0.5500 (0.3573)
Back neighbor	-3.0272*** (0.7342)	-2.7466*** (0.7212)	-2.9485*** (1.0426)	-3.8846*** (1.1496)	-0.8648 (0.8882)
Constant	96.4823*** (0.4417)	89.0173*** (1.0743)	88.4525*** (1.0554)	88.0109*** (1.0824)	359.8442*** (87.6239)
Political variables? ^a	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	1,548,893	1,548,893	1,230,606	1,080,148	1,080,148
Adjusted R ²	0.0511	0.0714	0.0734	0.0761	0.3954

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the dichotomous democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019) and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.18: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: dichotomous democracy indicator by Gründler and Krieger (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.0878 (0.7001)	0.8614 (0.7077)	1.0433* (0.5969)	-2.1920*** (0.6390)	-2.8966*** (0.6035)
Aisle neighbor	-1.1907* (0.6198)	-0.2354 (0.6139)	0.0567 (0.6219)	-4.0092*** (0.9477)	-3.2353*** (0.8047)
Diagonal front table neighbor	0.7759 (0.7795)	1.0522 (0.7118)	0.1497 (0.7963)	0.3401 (0.9152)	0.4631 (0.7845)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-1.1384 (0.9345)	-0.2710 (1.0051)	0.0188 (0.9362)	0.7129 (0.9291)	1.0041 (0.6859)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.2616 (0.8863)	0.3617 (0.8189)	0.7040 (0.8679)	1.0323 (0.9429)	0.1508 (0.7972)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.6964 (0.7497)	0.2824 (0.7426)	1.3816** (0.6586)	2.1714*** (0.6639)	1.7087*** (0.5447)
Front neighbor	-0.2173 (0.6781)	0.4964 (0.6403)	0.4092 (0.6453)	0.6144 (0.7645)	0.4060 (0.5682)
Back neighbor	-0.9795 (0.7642)	-0.3571 (0.7238)	1.1484* (0.6812)	1.8412** (0.7514)	2.4090*** (0.4491)
Constant	63.8222*** (4.3711)	57.9890*** (4.5011)	67.3178*** (4.9781)	66.9366*** (5.0436)	1,077.128 (942.2663)
Political variables? ^a	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	616,201	616,201	545,879	500,936	500,936
Adjusted R ²	0.0689	0.1054	0.2065	0.2110	0.3063

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the dichotomous democracy index by Gründler and Krieger (2019) and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.19: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: Revised Combined Polity score by Marshall et al. (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.1673 (0.2270)	-0.0069 (0.1987)	-0.2340 (0.1941)	-0.3398* (0.1876)	0.2331* (0.131)
Aisle neighbor	-0.1511 (0.1922)	0.0234 (0.1772)	-0.2605 (0.1869)	-0.4239** (0.1899)	0.2060 (0.1511)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.9372*** (0.2299)	-0.7909*** (0.1997)	-0.3936** (0.1669)	-0.4009** (0.1950)	-0.3140* (0.1628)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.7522*** (0.1964)	-0.6164*** (0.1754)	-0.2119 (0.1508)	-0.2293 (0.1657)	-0.2135 (0.1653)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.6435*** (0.2101)	-0.4868*** (0.1815)	-0.3419* (0.1980)	-0.4269** (0.2124)	-0.2342 (0.1585)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.6396*** (0.2132)	-0.4886** (0.1947)	-0.3925* (0.2061)	-0.4441* (0.2266)	-0.2369 (0.1780)
Front neighbor	-1.3096*** (0.1978)	-1.1741*** (0.1704)	-0.6856*** (0.1625)	-0.6196*** (0.1972)	-0.2399 (0.1584)
Back neighbor	-1.3729*** (0.1736)	-1.2529*** (0.1509)	-0.8861*** (0.1417)	-0.7756*** (0.1792)	-0.2559 (0.1569)
Constant	87.7238*** (0.6953)	85.1968*** (1.2603)	86.7967*** (1.0562)	85.6277*** (1.1853)	609.1286*** (113.7983)
Political variables? ^a	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	59,014,475	59,014,475	47,394,778	42,108,331	42,108,331
Adjusted R ²	0.0422	0.0444	0.0541	0.0551	0.1472

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the Revised Combined Polity score and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.20: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: Revised Combined Polity score by Marshall et al. (2019)

Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states					
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.7306 (0.5231)	0.7952 (0.4865)	1.2488*** (0.4426)	2.2606*** (0.4430)	-0.2817 (0.2607)
Aisle neighbor	1.2543*** (0.3977)	1.6080*** (0.4097)	2.5647*** (0.3540)	3.9834*** (0.3604)	0.6568*** (0.2325)
Diagonal front table neighbor	1.7005*** (0.5615)	1.7101*** (0.5310)	1.5432*** (0.5132)	1.7945*** (0.5867)	0.2951 (0.3335)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.0756 (0.6633)	0.3231 (0.6642)	0.3105 (0.7532)	0.9228 (0.8199)	1.0846*** (0.3451)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	0.9288 (0.5575)	1.0780** (0.5214)	1.4223** (0.5450)	1.6911*** (0.5422)	1.2726*** (0.3292)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	0.2471 (0.6280)	0.5129 (0.6154)	0.6352 (0.6894)	0.8662 (0.8002)	0.9095*** (0.3151)
Front neighbor	1.1348** (0.5080)	1.1053** (0.4934)	0.8691 (0.6525)	1.0118 (0.6405)	0.5069 (0.3716)
Back neighbor	-3.0741*** (0.7654)	-2.8099*** (0.7535)	-2.8798*** (1.0620)	-3.6466*** (1.1589)	-1.1608 (1.0478)
Constant	97.8156*** (0.4225)	89.4180*** (1.2002)	89.5528*** (1.1216)	88.6371*** (1.1407)	403.5025*** (94.1490)
Political variables? ^a	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	1,439,700	1,439,700	1,131,492	994,039	994,039
Adjusted R ²	0.0594	0.0752	0.0782	0.0819	0.4041

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the Revised Combined Polity score and a communism indicator

of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development,

nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-

permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign

Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,

and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.21: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: Revised Combined Polity score by Marshall et al. (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.5291 (0.7130)	1.3349* (0.7101)	1.5467** (0.6032)	-0.9623 (0.6362)	-3.4693*** (0.6831)
Aisle neighbor	-0.3832 (0.6753)	0.5027 (0.6859)	1.0252 (0.6259)	-2.6941*** (0.9694)	-3.8856*** (0.8770)
Diagonal front table neighbor	0.7093 (1.0049)	1.0736 (0.9392)	-0.0070 (0.9110)	-0.0268 (1.1326)	0.2180 (0.8910)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.0187 (1.0767)	0.8812 (1.1073)	1.4073 (1.0118)	2.1351** (0.9882)	1.3989* (0.7193)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.5872 (0.9089)	-0.1535 (0.8859)	1.2803 (0.9591)	1.8999* (1.0724)	0.4018 (0.9571)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.4378 (0.9734)	0.5865 (0.9004)	2.3230*** (0.7913)	2.8571*** (0.8031)	1.9860*** (0.6508)
Front neighbor	0.1315 (0.7437)	0.9808 (0.6969)	0.6294 (0.6815)	1.0489 (0.8138)	0.1336 (0.6265)
Back neighbor	-2.1665*** (0.8069)	-1.3773* (0.7892)	0.3613 (0.7025)	0.9462 (0.7390)	2.4689*** (0.4930)
Constant	65.1913*** (2.0491)	57.6348*** (2.6464)	70.4186*** (3.0674)	70.2231*** (3.3366)	1051.2930 (998.8562)
Political variables? ^a	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	541,342	541,342	482,986	446,373	446,373
Adjusted R ²	0.0680	0.1046	0.2220	0.2252	0.3137

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the Revised Combined Polity score and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levensthein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.22: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: Institutionalized Autocracy score by Marshall et al. (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.3201 (0.2383)	-0.1852 (0.2151)	-0.3522* (0.2116)	-0.5302** (0.2023)	0.0147 (0.1421)
Aisle neighbor	-0.4169** (0.2086)	-0.2676 (0.1983)	-0.4861** (0.2177)	-0.7393*** (0.2272)	0.0860 (0.1618)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.9765*** (0.2254)	-0.8554*** (0.2010)	-0.4135** (0.1643)	-0.4530** (0.2013)	-0.3665** (0.1719)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.7897*** (0.1995)	-0.6769*** (0.1845)	-0.2198 (0.1596)	-0.2660 (0.1744)	-0.2872 (0.1730)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.7762*** (0.2205)	-0.6348*** (0.1988)	-0.4469** (0.2061)	-0.5573** (0.2210)	-0.3388** (0.1670)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.7472*** (0.2160)	-0.6197*** (0.2037)	-0.5072** (0.2071)	-0.5973** (0.2259)	-0.3456* (0.1819)
Front neighbor	-1.3476*** (0.1950)	-1.2310*** (0.1721)	-0.6905*** (0.1669)	-0.6293*** (0.2021)	-0.2901* (0.1648)
Back neighbor	-1.4435*** (0.1655)	-1.3450*** (0.1502)	-0.9153*** (0.1435)	-0.8221*** (0.1749)	-0.3156* (0.1605)
Constant	82.8737*** (0.5367)	80.3092*** (1.2405)	82.1328*** (1.0185)	80.8514*** (1.1513)	616.9247*** (114.5713)
Political variables? ^a	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	56,232,515	56,232,515	45,395,340	40,305,583	40,305,583
Adjusted R ²	0.0319	0.0339	0.0455	0.0464	0.1427

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the Institutionalized Autocracy score and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.23: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: Institutionalized Autocracy score by Marshall et al. (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.0379 (0.5913)	0.0515 (0.5382)	0.6554 (0.5107)	1.7490*** (0.4779)	-0.3408 (0.2749)
Aisle neighbor	0.7448* (0.3917)	1.0649** (0.4101)	1.9133*** (0.4002)	3.4249*** (0.3951)	0.6293** (0.2465)
Diagonal front table neighbor	1.9018*** (0.6173)	1.8543*** (0.5907)	1.8496*** (0.5576)	2.0061*** (0.6613)	0.2301 (0.3528)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.0808 (0.7417)	0.2969 (0.7365)	0.3127 (0.7791)	0.7707 (0.8420)	1.2228*** (0.3344)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	1.1031* (0.5822)	1.3171** (0.5443)	1.3581** (0.5680)	1.4986** (0.5696)	1.3106*** (0.3396)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.2200 (0.7098)	-0.0352 (0.7051)	0.1081 (0.7199)	0.1186 (0.8494)	1.0764*** (0.3768)
Front neighbor	0.8236 (0.5522)	0.7817 (0.5455)	0.5915 (0.7002)	0.6455 (0.6829)	0.5584 (0.3911)
Back neighbor	-3.1480*** (0.8270)	-2.8884*** (0.8097)	-2.7365** (1.1056)	-3.7160*** (1.1977)	-1.2340 (1.0363)
Constant	95.3055*** (0.4426)	85.7494*** (1.2841)	87.4014*** (1.2101)	86.4530*** (1.2737)	409.1110*** (96.5490)
Political variables? ^a	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	1,338,066	1,338,066	1,072,037	944,277	944,277
Adjusted R ²	0.0432	0.0592	0.0612	0.0650	0.4070

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the Institutionalized Autocracy score and a communism indicator

of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development,

nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-

permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign

Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,

and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.24: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: Institutionalized Autocracy score by Marshall et al. (2019)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.6049 (0.7587)	1.4476* (0.7571)	1.8205*** (0.6329)	-1.2168* (0.6998)	-3.7969*** (0.6976)
Aisle neighbor	0.0840 (0.7669)	1.0851 (0.7593)	1.2829* (0.6547)	-2.9962*** (1.0253)	-4.2119*** (0.8767)
Diagonal front table neighbor	0.6783 (1.0647)	1.1411 (0.9902)	-0.1477 (0.9475)	-0.3203 (1.1702)	0.1863 (0.8929)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.3504 (1.0788)	1.1700 (1.1134)	1.7339* (0.9928)	2.4721** (0.9753)	1.7165** (0.6931)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.9379 (0.9547)	-0.5078 (0.9321)	0.9157 (0.9914)	1.3544 (1.1110)	0.2310 (0.9985)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.5178 (1.0377)	0.4187 (1.0039)	2.1898*** (0.8155)	2.7206*** (0.8318)	1.8981*** (0.6518)
Front neighbor	0.1290 (0.7765)	1.0128 (0.7363)	0.5524 (0.6952)	0.7365 (0.8405)	-0.0748 (0.6336)
Back neighbor	-2.6655*** (0.8760)	-1.9686** (0.8603)	0.0160 (0.7767)	0.7261 (0.7627)	2.3018*** (0.5197)
Constant	69.7617*** (1.0034)	58.7913*** (2.2987)	75.0148*** (2.3303)	74.6448*** (2.8338)	1,090.684 (1,012.835)
Political variables? ^a	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	518,854	518,854	464,263	429,378	429,378
Adjusted R ²	0.0720	0.1099	0.2279	0.2307	0.3182

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the Institutionalized Autocracy score and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.25: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: democracy indicator by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.1812 (0.2094)	-0.0869 (0.1790)	-0.1139 (0.1563)	-0.6135*** (0.1625)	-0.1929* (0.1138)
Aisle neighbor	-0.1191 (0.1994)	-0.0139 (0.1760)	-0.0957 (0.1675)	-0.5458*** (0.1691)	-0.0388 (0.1467)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.7222*** (0.1999)	-0.6281*** (0.1722)	-0.3835*** (0.1337)	-0.3647** (0.1651)	-0.2622** (0.1183)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.5713*** (0.1809)	-0.4746*** (0.1577)	-0.3152** (0.1418)	-0.2774* (0.1540)	-0.1879 (0.1397)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.4962** (0.2139)	-0.3973** (0.1867)	-0.3319* (0.1828)	-0.3836* (0.1956)	-0.2119 (0.1341)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.5129** (0.1986)	-0.4211** (0.1696)	-0.3959** (0.1709)	-0.4264** (0.1799)	-0.2125 (0.1358)
Front neighbor	-0.5955*** (0.1721)	-0.5069*** (0.1416)	-0.2452* (0.1454)	-0.2361 (0.1821)	-0.1076 (0.1307)
Back neighbor	-0.6218*** (0.1449)	-0.5401*** (0.1179)	-0.3443*** (0.1096)	-0.3178** (0.1513)	-0.1051 (0.1257)
Constant	88.2292*** (0.7834)	86.7794*** (1.2518)	88.0414*** (1.0940)	86.6853*** (1.2296)	600.0361*** (113.5536)
Political variables? ^a	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	75,570,438	75,570,438	57,593,961	51,271,914	51,271,914
Adjusted R ²	0.0352	0.0366	0.0488	0.0496	0.1428

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy indicator and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.26: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: democracy indicator by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.5047 (0.5377)	0.7734 (0.5354)	1.6294*** (0.4231)	2.2627*** (0.4011)	-0.2769 (0.2652)
Aisle neighbor	1.6680*** (0.4560)	1.9829*** (0.4550)	2.5350*** (0.3707)	3.5770*** (0.3443)	0.6950*** (0.2180)
Diagonal front table neighbor	1.0201* (0.5561)	1.0164* (0.5283)	1.4028** (0.5767)	1.5400** (0.6560)	0.1234 (0.3729)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.4733 (0.6217)	0.4706 (0.6096)	-0.0670 (0.7294)	0.3193 (0.7776)	0.9274*** (0.3026)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	0.0564 (0.6443)	0.2540 (0.5930)	1.5022*** (0.5260)	1.8528*** (0.5545)	1.2830*** (0.3301)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	0.3776 (0.5109)	0.3346 (0.4949)	0.1437 (0.6098)	0.1513 (0.6929)	0.6675** (0.2923)
Front neighbor	1.8386*** (0.4715)	1.9160*** (0.4743)	1.4574** (0.5751)	1.5930*** (0.5744)	0.4510 (0.3471)
Back neighbor	-2.1634*** (0.6848)	-2.0631*** (0.6839)	-2.8914*** (1.0428)	-3.8355*** (1.1437)	-1.2052 (1.0442)
Constant	96.5806*** (0.3620)	92.3543*** (1.0432)	89.3534*** (1.0352)	88.8010*** (1.0698)	422.1475*** (95.9963)
Political variables? ^a	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	1,659,197	1,659,197	1,269,381	1,115,245	1,115,245
Adjusted R ²	0.0660	0.0785	0.0790	0.0819	0.3910

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy indicator and a communism indicator

of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development,

nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-

permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign

Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country,

and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.27: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: democracy indicator by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past				
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.7627 (0.7143)	1.3986* (0.7169)	1.5112** (0.6129)	-1.5354** (0.6583)	-2.8191*** (0.5987)
Aisle neighbor	-0.6316 (0.6493)	0.1973 (0.6453)	0.5239 (0.6298)	-3.4826*** (0.9138)	-3.2849*** (0.7814)
Diagonal front table neighbor	0.3778 (0.7231)	0.9154 (0.6783)	-0.0464 (0.8009)	0.1250 (0.9263)	0.3786 (0.7825)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.5931 (0.8915)	0.0178 (0.9387)	0.2299 (0.8833)	0.8243 (0.8844)	1.0205 (0.6551)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.5673 (0.8342)	0.1303 (0.7820)	0.3547 (0.8462)	0.6613 (0.9218)	0.0326 (0.7906)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.3120 (0.8052)	0.5525 (0.7704)	1.4524** (0.6901)	2.1625*** (0.7028)	1.8337*** (0.5556)
Front neighbor	-0.6653 (0.6311)	0.1800 (0.6170)	0.4535 (0.6375)	0.6842 (0.7523)	0.2404 (0.5579)
Back neighbor	-1.1623 (0.7415)	-0.4109 (0.7177)	1.1679* (0.6482)	1.7253** (0.7150)	2.5433*** (0.4560)
Constant	61.0126*** (3.4605)	55.4842*** (3.7313)	64.5062*** (4.5473)	64.1264*** (4.6192)	1,166.646 (984.1038)
Political variables? ^a	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	646,560	646,560	562,132	515,952	515,952
Adjusted R ²	0.0626	0.0992	0.2109	0.2151	0.3097

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy indicator and a communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.28: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: economic and population data by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate		
	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.3266 (0.1979)	-0.5991*** (0.2141)	-0.3478** (0.1423)
Aisle neighbor	-0.1615 (0.1867)	-0.3810* (0.1989)	-0.1072 (0.1388)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.6116*** (0.1821)	-0.6816*** (0.1966)	-0.3660** (0.1513)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.4261*** (0.1572)	-0.4439** (0.1766)	-0.2429* (0.1425)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.4415** (0.1924)	-0.6143*** (0.1992)	-0.2786* (0.1519)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.4945** (0.1919)	-0.6239*** (0.1976)	-0.2405 (0.1544)
Front neighbor	-0.7402*** (0.1753)	-0.8431*** (0.2053)	-0.2856** (0.1377)
Back neighbor	-0.9005*** (0.1615)	-0.9507*** (0.1916)	-0.2613* (0.1415)
Constant	84.3679*** (4.2565)	82.5131*** (4.3918)	457.5458*** (134.5776)
Political variables? ^a	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓
Observations	54,104,602	48,406,456	48,406,456
Adjusted R ²	0.0579	0.0591	0.1459

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and a communism indicator of a country,

and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development,

Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include the number of days since a delegation first voted on a contested

resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, and indicators whether a country's

executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN is

female, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population, and the

differences of the variables between each country-pair according to Bolt and Van Zanden (2014).

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenstein distance and the SoundEx indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables available upon request.

Table B.29: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: economic and population data by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states		
	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	1.3182*** (0.4299)	1.8767*** (0.4407)	-0.2721 (0.2958)
Aisle neighbor	2.1993*** (0.4771)	3.3913*** (0.4631)	0.6197** (0.2813)
Diagonal front table neighbor	1.0453** (0.5078)	1.2305** (0.5640)	0.0003 (0.3412)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.7865 (0.7890)	-0.3129 (0.8674)	0.7664** (0.3221)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	1.0380* (0.5284)	1.3816** (0.5574)	0.8952*** (0.2728)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.5138 (0.5800)	-0.5443 (0.6715)	0.5096 (0.3060)
Front neighbor	2.5652*** (0.6318)	2.7775*** (0.6308)	0.7136** (0.3126)
Back neighbor	-3.9397*** (0.7948)	-4.7662*** (0.8886)	-0.9083 (0.7912)
Constant	91.5102*** (3.0236)	90.7691*** (2.9122)	388.6570*** (91.8702)
Political variables? ^a	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓
Observations	1,253,950	1,107,925	1,107,925
Adjusted R ²	0.0901	0.0917	0.3998

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and a communism indicator of a country,

and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development,

nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include the number of days since a delegation first voted on a contested

resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, and indicators whether a country's

executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN is

female, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population, and the

differences of the variables between each country-pair according to Bolt and Van Zanden (2014).

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables available upon request.

Table B.30: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: economic and population data by Bolt and Van Zanden (2014)

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past		
	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	1.4439** (0.6983)	-1.6199** (0.7383)	-2.9349*** (0.6139)
Aisle neighbor	0.5165 (0.5869)	-3.4648*** (0.8727)	-3.8291*** (0.7947)
Diagonal front table neighbor	0.3455 (0.8021)	0.4230 (0.8729)	0.4851 (0.7074)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.7873 (1.0266)	1.4021 (1.0104)	1.1372 (0.7927)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	0.2299 (0.8418)	0.2531 (0.9030)	-0.3490 (0.7898)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	1.0383 (0.8240)	1.6853** (0.8385)	1.2354* (0.7088)
Front neighbor	0.1204 (0.7037)	0.1159 (0.7943)	0.5952 (0.5766)
Back neighbor	0.0105 (0.6596)	0.5510 (0.7303)	1.4954*** (0.4586)
Constant	89.1230 (57.7806)	89.8516 (57.1760)	631.6486 (845.9246)
Political variables? ^a	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✓
Observations	553,148	508,250	508,250
Adjusted R ²	0.2098	0.2136	0.3054

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population, and the differences of the variables between each country-pair according to Bolt and Van Zanden (2014).

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.31: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: same language

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.1572 (0.2293)	-0.2285 (0.2114)	-0.0654 (0.1733)	-0.1729 (0.1610)	-0.5059*** (0.1612)	-0.2191* (0.1225)
Aisle neighbor	-0.1449 (0.2050)	0.0020 (0.1913)	0.2071 (0.1542)	0.0588 (0.1532)	-0.2262 (0.1601)	0.1220 (0.1385)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.5510*** (0.1905)	-0.8556*** (0.2055)	-0.6953*** (0.1673)	-0.4228*** (0.1428)	-0.3620** (0.1727)	-0.2614** (0.1274)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.4373** (0.1727)	-0.7183*** (0.1782)	-0.5514*** (0.1464)	-0.3252** (0.1228)	-0.2546* (0.1405)	-0.1518 (0.1275)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.3595* (0.2091)	-0.6989*** (0.2142)	-0.5043*** (0.1774)	-0.3322* (0.1753)	-0.3412* (0.1813)	-0.2099 (0.1266)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.3495* (0.1953)	-0.7540*** (0.1974)	-0.5561*** (0.1607)	-0.4479*** (0.1655)	-0.4408** (0.1675)	-0.2358* (0.1294)
Front neighbor	-0.6346*** (0.1798)	-0.7069*** (0.1927)	-0.5591*** (0.1595)	-0.1800 (0.1651)	-0.1313 (0.2024)	-0.0027 (0.1413)
Back neighbor	-0.6691*** (0.1535)	-0.7423*** (0.1643)	-0.5999*** (0.1347)	-0.3430*** (0.1244)	-0.2399 (0.1669)	0.0035 (0.1330)
Constant	81.8707*** (0.4115)	89.7090*** (0.9526)	87.2184*** (1.3504)	89.1242*** (1.1454)	87.9074*** (1.2661)	557.5048*** (113.6427)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Same language indicator?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	79,742,480	68,079,315	68,079,315	55,040,433	48,947,754	48,947,754
Adjusted R ²	0.0017	0.0421	0.0446	0.0537	0.0543	0.1462

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.32: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: same language

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.2779 (0.5131)	0.9147* (0.4578)	1.3004*** (0.4193)	1.6332*** (0.3940)	2.3640*** (0.3618)	-0.1645 (0.2605)
Aisle neighbor	0.3471 (0.4350)	1.2958*** (0.3973)	1.9279*** (0.3785)	2.6999*** (0.3960)	3.8863*** (0.3746)	0.7561*** (0.2230)
Diagonal front table neighbor	1.0710* (0.5929)	0.8877* (0.4902)	0.9029* (0.4711)	1.0619** (0.4965)	1.2916** (0.5548)	0.0785 (0.3726)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.7189 (0.6526)	-0.4729 (0.6503)	-0.2668 (0.6242)	-0.3913 (0.7255)	0.1073 (0.7841)	0.8654*** (0.3123)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	0.1259 (0.7438)	0.7295 (0.5427)	0.9149* (0.4872)	1.1803** (0.5028)	1.5366*** (0.5456)	1.2473*** (0.3192)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	0.6964 (0.5842)	-0.2117 (0.4883)	0.1118 (0.4565)	0.1935 (0.5456)	0.3298 (0.6287)	0.7169** (0.2840)
Front neighbor	1.1805** (0.4856)	1.3630** (0.5193)	1.5707*** (0.5274)	1.8562*** (0.6337)	2.0249*** (0.6326)	0.5218 (0.3569)
Back neighbor	-1.7188** (0.7329)	-3.3355*** (0.7295)	-3.0821*** (0.7178)	-3.5062*** (1.0213)	-4.3294*** (1.1358)	-1.1175 (0.9863)
Constant	89.8308*** (0.4107)	98.3002*** (0.5887)	90.9073*** (1.2039)	90.6459*** (1.1627)	90.3902*** (1.1760)	360.7404*** (87.4851)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Same language indicator?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,764,621	1,548,893	1,548,893	1,230,606	1,080,148	1,080,148
Adjusted R ²	0.0016	0.0627	0.0844	0.0877	0.0904	0.3956

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.33: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: same language

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.9071 (0.8082)	0.4994 (0.7382)	1.1783 (0.7377)	1.1107* (0.6137)	-2.3672*** (0.6656)	-2.8568*** (0.5973)
Aisle neighbor	-0.7805 (0.8071)	-0.5949 (0.6391)	0.2160 (0.6339)	0.2486 (0.6363)	-4.0927*** (0.9321)	-3.1761*** (0.7884)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.8588 (0.7042)	0.8780 (0.7933)	1.0805 (0.7303)	0.2059 (0.8021)	0.1801 (0.9378)	0.4406 (0.7832)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.7539 (0.8522)	-1.1226 (0.9262)	-0.3907 (0.9939)	-0.0444 (0.9202)	0.6480 (0.9184)	1.1181 (0.6876)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-2.5249*** (0.8054)	-0.0391 (0.9135)	0.4972 (0.8569)	0.9002 (0.8929)	0.9877 (0.9585)	0.1149 (0.7911)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-1.1749 (0.9117)	-0.5920 (0.7617)	0.2479 (0.7497)	1.4124** (0.6702)	2.1936*** (0.6787)	1.7912*** (0.5412)
Front neighbor	-2.3695*** (0.6690)	0.0049 (0.6718)	0.6622 (0.6210)	0.5349 (0.6322)	0.4890 (0.7562)	0.3398 (0.5647)
Back neighbor	-2.9666*** (0.6224)	-1.0058 (0.7621)	-0.4693 (0.7270)	0.9992 (0.6712)	1.7106** (0.7363)	2.4090*** (0.4623)
Constant	67.6748*** (1.3405)	61.5119*** (4.1474)	56.5762*** (4.3675)	67.3823*** (4.9966)	66.9131*** (5.0530)	1,077.035 (942.4203)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Same language indicator?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	678,266	616,201	616,201	545,879	500,936	500,936
Adjusted R ²	0.0016	0.0740	0.1083	0.2087	0.2133	0.3068

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.34: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: same colonizer

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.0636 (0.2136)	-0.1188 (0.1985)	0.0805 (0.1598)	-0.0059 (0.1468)	-0.2737* (0.1460)	-0.1851 (0.1217)
Aisle neighbor	-0.0216 (0.1898)	0.1344 (0.1777)	0.3844** (0.1467)	0.2275 (0.1469)	0.0139 (0.1539)	0.1607 (0.1373)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.6210*** (0.1796)	-0.8969*** (0.1949)	-0.7013*** (0.1618)	-0.4246*** (0.1421)	-0.4226** (0.1673)	-0.3122** (0.1289)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.4673*** (0.1642)	-0.7233*** (0.1673)	-0.5194*** (0.1417)	-0.3523*** (0.1221)	-0.2832** (0.1315)	-0.1871 (0.1276)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.4425** (0.1980)	-0.7413*** (0.2015)	-0.5037*** (0.1739)	-0.3427* (0.1756)	-0.3674** (0.1801)	-0.2550* (0.1293)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.3964** (0.1844)	-0.7741*** (0.1864)	-0.5315*** (0.1603)	-0.4771*** (0.1695)	-0.4207** (0.1729)	-0.2729** (0.1310)
Front neighbor	-0.6334*** (0.1708)	-0.6649*** (0.1804)	-0.4725*** (0.1504)	-0.0994 (0.1511)	-0.0665 (0.1870)	-0.0156 (0.1374)
Back neighbor	-0.6722*** (0.1468)	-0.7265*** (0.1531)	-0.5428*** (0.1260)	-0.2715** (0.1166)	-0.1483 (0.1495)	-0.0197 (0.1314)
Constant	81.8513*** (0.3747)	88.7195*** (0.9037)	85.6735*** (1.2204)	87.5352*** (1.0184)	86.4896*** (1.1262)	557.5145*** (113.6445)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Same colonizer indicator?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	79,742,480	68,079,315	68,079,315	55,040,433	48,947,754	48,947,754
Adjusted R ²	0.0161	0.0517	0.0552	0.0645	0.0656	0.1466

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.35: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: same colonizer

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.2832 (0.5189)	1.0267** (0.4641)	1.4809*** (0.4148)	1.9357*** (0.3980)	2.9001*** (0.3750)	-0.1686 (0.2604)
Aisle neighbor	0.1675 (0.4608)	1.2545*** (0.4169)	1.9599*** (0.3957)	2.8032*** (0.4083)	4.2609*** (0.3885)	0.7504*** (0.2225)
Diagonal front table neighbor	0.8563 (0.6376)	0.6963 (0.5341)	0.7479 (0.5152)	0.8983 (0.5389)	1.1284* (0.6053)	0.0721 (0.3729)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.7152 (0.6388)	-0.5429 (0.6365)	-0.2795 (0.6137)	-0.4368 (0.6929)	-0.0575 (0.7389)	0.8628*** (0.3125)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.0821 (0.7500)	0.5642 (0.5500)	0.7749 (0.4948)	0.9868* (0.5201)	1.2934** (0.5558)	1.2361*** (0.3194)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	0.7462 (0.5668)	-0.2618 (0.4697)	0.1144 (0.4353)	0.2005 (0.5354)	0.2288 (0.6112)	0.7145** (0.2843)
Front neighbor	0.9004 (0.5439)	1.0158* (0.5308)	1.3123** (0.5412)	1.3447** (0.6553)	1.4918** (0.6565)	0.5287 (0.3570)
Back neighbor	-1.4726* (0.7454)	-3.1644*** (0.7354)	-2.8626*** (0.7246)	-3.2399*** (0.9945)	-4.1171*** (1.0965)	-1.0922 (0.938)
Constant	89.5553*** (0.3738)	97.4276*** (0.4854)	89.3824*** (1.1127)	88.5042*** (1.0938)	88.3952*** (1.0588)	360.7356*** (87.4854)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Same colonizer indicator?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,764,621	1,548,893	1,548,893	1,230,606	1,080,148	1,080,148
Adjusted R ²	0.0082	0.0680	0.0931	0.0961	0.0985	0.3956

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.36: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: country pair-fixed effects

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-2.0645*** (0.6622)	-2.3670*** (0.5989)	-1.5352*** (0.4038)	-0.6250* (0.3237)	-0.9986*** (0.3458)	0.0710 (0.267)
Aisle neighbor	-2.1267*** (0.6639)	-2.3809*** (0.5997)	-1.5275*** (0.4089)	-0.6512** (0.3176)	-0.9987*** (0.3518)	0.0446 (0.2671)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.8690*** (0.2107)	-0.9423*** (0.2080)	-0.6606*** (0.1443)	-0.5532*** (0.1303)	-0.5264*** (0.1343)	-0.1686 (0.1126)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.8158*** (0.1955)	-0.8751*** (0.1944)	-0.5965*** (0.1337)	-0.4338*** (0.1317)	-0.4265*** (0.1287)	-0.1053 (0.1225)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.6356*** (0.2262)	-0.7460*** (0.2145)	-0.4341*** (0.1617)	-0.3274** (0.1554)	-0.3307** (0.1568)	-0.0181 (0.1114)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.5839** (0.2234)	-0.7031*** (0.2126)	-0.3935** (0.1600)	-0.2954* (0.1589)	-0.3152* (0.1591)	-0.0276 (0.1128)
Front neighbor	-0.9098*** (0.2490)	-0.9848*** (0.2308)	-0.6885*** (0.1618)	-0.3990*** (0.1251)	-0.3709*** (0.1236)	-0.0811 (0.1121)
Back neighbor	-0.8682*** (0.2433)	-0.9350*** (0.2204)	-0.6442*** (0.1532)	-0.4074*** (0.1196)	-0.3920*** (0.1208)	-0.0740 (0.1068)
Constant	82.5395*** (0.2929)	83.2642*** (0.6722)	81.2785*** (0.9354)	82.9648*** (0.7991)	82.4316*** (0.8504)	-5135706*** (0.5022)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Country pair- fixed effects?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	79,742,478	68,079,314	68,079,314	55,040,432	48,947,754	48,947,754
Adjusted R ²	0.1588	0.1753	0.1768	0.1828	0.1866	0.1947

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.37: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: country pair-fixed effects

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-4.8984*** (0.9602)	-5.6286*** (0.9288)	-2.6430*** (0.6364)	0.1533 (0.8143)	-0.3126 (0.8517)	0.3738 (0.8739)
Aisle neighbor	-4.5725*** (0.9274)	-5.3313*** (0.9168)	-2.3274*** (0.6103)	0.6279 (0.8272)	0.5586 (0.8037)	1.2276 (0.8504)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.2283 (0.3426)	-0.3700 (0.3651)	-0.0932 (0.3252)	0.2807 (0.3952)	0.3458 (0.4183)	0.5401 (0.3873)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.3251 (0.3530)	0.3817 (0.3380)	0.6511* (0.3572)	0.9674** (0.3875)	1.1513*** (0.3721)	1.0637*** (0.3751)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	0.5245 (0.3825)	0.4701 (0.3730)	0.7791** (0.3285)	1.0238*** (0.3614)	1.4032*** (0.3912)	1.7044*** (0.3839)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	0.2061 (0.3807)	0.4264 (0.3392)	0.7362** (0.3183)	1.0453*** (0.3686)	1.1317*** (0.3920)	0.9278** (0.3641)
Front neighbor	0.0996 (0.3729)	-0.1250 (0.3963)	0.3042 (0.3552)	0.4838 (0.4625)	0.6712 (0.4578)	0.8496* (0.4481)
Back neighbor	-0.7913* (0.4144)	-0.7282* (0.4278)	-0.6897* (0.3949)	-1.2812*** (0.4464)	-1.4769*** (0.4691)	-0.4224 (0.4094)
Constant	90.4269*** (0.3470)	90.6118*** (0.6720)	84.8873*** (1.3309)	85.5201*** (1.1624)	88.2682*** (1.1618)	97.4141*** (0.7335)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Country pair- fixed effects?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,764,621	1,548,893	1,548,893	1,230,606	1,080,148	1,080,148
Adjusted R ²	0.3865	0.3454	0.3578	0.3679	0.3775	0.3963

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.38: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: country pair-fixed effects

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-5.1441*** (1.2105)	-4.2661*** (1.0094)	-2.3961** (1.0038)	-5.0723*** (1.1202)	-5.4157*** (1.2632)	-5.8565*** (1.1915)
Aisle neighbor	-6.0942*** (1.2358)	-4.5850*** (1.0793)	-2.6369** (1.0102)	-5.1672*** (1.1762)	-6.0696*** (1.5533)	-5.4350*** (1.4876)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.7429 (0.7680)	1.1669 (0.8058)	1.7337** (0.8152)	1.3804 (0.9671)	1.1103 (0.9857)	1.2738 (0.9168)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.4689 (0.8172)	1.0652 (0.9597)	1.8404* (1.0133)	1.4906 (0.9300)	2.0022** (0.9081)	2.1470** (0.8834)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-1.7820** (0.8519)	0.6155 (0.8326)	1.1658 (0.8245)	1.7159* (0.9624)	1.4966 (1.0232)	0.8723 (0.9215)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.6680 (0.8380)	1.4684* (0.8736)	2.1942*** (0.8093)	1.8739*** (0.6776)	2.6012*** (0.7246)	2.5264*** (0.6830)
Front neighbor	-1.1044* (0.6416)	0.8470 (0.6186)	1.2806** (0.6372)	0.6833 (0.7128)	0.1699 (0.7562)	0.9274 (0.6924)
Back neighbor	-0.7611 (0.6671)	1.1187 (0.7389)	1.9921*** (0.6740)	2.6590*** (0.7137)	3.1783*** (0.7548)	2.7656*** (0.6537)
Constant	66.8837*** (1.0948)	50.4880*** (3.8925)	46.4313*** (4.1396)	54.4528*** (5.0292)	56.3395*** (5.3223)	70.0200** (28.2687)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Country pair- fixed effects?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	678,266	616,201	616,201	545,879	500,936	500,936
Adjusted R ²	0.1979	0.2565	0.2635	0.2717	0.2746	0.3076

Standard errors clustered at the seating arrangement-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.39: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment, all contested UNGA resolutions, 1952-2019, robustness test: standard errors clustered at the year-level

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.1930 (0.2190)	-0.2662 (0.1988)	-0.1146 (0.1612)	-0.2027 (0.1563)	-0.6589*** (0.1612)	-0.2726** (0.1253)
Aisle neighbor	-0.1585 (0.2043)	-0.0169 (0.1930)	0.1747 (0.1538)	0.0486 (0.1526)	-0.3664** (0.1618)	0.0769 (0.1483)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.5530*** (0.2009)	-0.8692*** (0.2178)	-0.7176*** (0.1779)	-0.4502*** (0.1533)	-0.4386** (0.1849)	-0.2881** (0.1327)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.4294** (0.1877)	-0.7199*** (0.1946)	-0.5610*** (0.1601)	-0.3334** (0.1337)	-0.3099* (0.1548)	-0.1721 (0.1312)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-0.3629* (0.2137)	-0.7080*** (0.2199)	-0.5244*** (0.1799)	-0.3522* (0.1757)	-0.4157** (0.1811)	-0.2344* (0.1299)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-0.3599* (0.1985)	-0.7696*** (0.2008)	-0.5836*** (0.1609)	-0.4751*** (0.1620)	-0.5145*** (0.1644)	-0.2603* (0.1337)
Front neighbor	-0.6080*** (0.1847)	-0.6900*** (0.1989)	-0.5470*** (0.1623)	-0.1911 (0.1638)	-0.1766 (0.1986)	-0.0134 (0.1403)
Back neighbor	-0.6419*** (0.1609)	-0.7224*** (0.1734)	-0.5850*** (0.1403)	-0.3507*** (0.1252)	-0.2738 (0.1651)	-0.0059 (0.1341)
Constant	82.5061*** (0.4072)	90.5030*** (0.9571)	88.2221*** (1.3920)	89.9111*** (1.2099)	88.5837*** (1.3252)	557.7885*** (116.8664)
Political variables? ^a	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	X	X	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	X	X	X	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	X	X	X	X	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	X	X	X	X	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	X	X	X	X	X	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	X	X	X	X	X	✓
Observations	79,742,480	68,079,315	68,079,315	55,040,433	48,947,754	48,947,754
Adjusted R ²	0.0000	0.0407	0.0429	0.0526	0.0534	0.1460

Standard errors clustered at the year-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

X indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.40: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with Arab League member states, contested UNGA resolutions about Middle Eastern issues, 1952-2019, robustness test: standard errors clustered at the year-level

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with Arab League member states					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	-0.5768 (0.5259)	0.9110* (0.4718)	1.2710*** (0.4291)	1.6656*** (0.3986)	2.4834*** (0.3690)	-0.1719 (0.2660)
Aisle neighbor	0.0755 (0.4405)	1.2929*** (0.3839)	1.9041*** (0.3574)	2.7268*** (0.3734)	3.9967*** (0.3370)	0.7507*** (0.2148)
Diagonal front table neighbor	1.0377* (0.5840)	0.8872* (0.4941)	0.8984* (0.4729)	1.0764** (0.4904)	1.3258** (0.5500)	0.0762 (0.3794)
Diagonal back table neighbor	0.7930 (0.6673)	-0.4725 (0.6638)	-0.2644 (0.6399)	-0.3885 (0.7415)	0.1193 (0.7914)	0.8689** (0.3264)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	0.1006 (0.7557)	0.7287 (0.5377)	0.9082* (0.4798)	1.1936** (0.4895)	1.5723*** (0.5298)	1.2440*** (0.3249)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	0.7624 (0.5700)	-0.2113 (0.4631)	0.1147 (0.4358)	0.1952 (0.5261)	0.3403 (0.6000)	0.7209** (0.2796)
Front neighbor	1.3110** (0.4904)	1.3656** (0.5171)	1.5912*** (0.5220)	1.8383*** (0.6266)	1.9764*** (0.6278)	0.5360 (0.3586)
Back neighbor	-1.6981** (0.7215)	-3.3359*** (0.7108)	-3.0860*** (0.6993)	-3.4869*** (0.9915)	-4.2761*** (1.0992)	-1.3254 (1.0406)
Constant	90.3622*** (0.3741)	98.3148*** (0.5040)	91.0362*** (1.1749)	90.5369*** (1.0930)	90.1272*** (1.1234)	360.7761*** (78.6743)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	1,764,621	1,548,893	1,548,893	1,230,606	1,080,148	1,080,148
Adjusted R ²	0.0001	0.0627	0.0844	0.0877	0.0903	0.3956

Standard errors clustered at the year-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for colonialism, human rights, economic development, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.

Table B.41: Directional spatial peer effects on voting alignment with countries with a colonial past, contested UNGA resolutions about colonialism, 1952-2019, robustness test: standard errors clustered at the year-level

	Dependent variable: vote agreement rate with countries with a colonial past					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Table neighbor	0.6309 (0.8014)	0.0795 (0.7292)	0.7904 (0.7213)	0.8859 (0.5908)	-2.1760*** (0.6610)	-2.9247*** (0.6044)
Aisle neighbor	-1.1768 (0.7741)	-1.1785* (0.6052)	-0.3039 (0.6139)	-0.0453 (0.5858)	-3.9753*** (0.9093)	-3.2671*** (0.7780)
Diagonal front table neighbor	-0.8313 (0.7164)	0.8326 (0.7883)	1.0404 (0.7369)	0.1211 (0.8266)	0.2536 (0.9435)	0.4440 (0.8421)
Diagonal back table neighbor	-0.7038 (0.9056)	-0.9220 (0.9889)	-0.1902 (1.0736)	0.0634 (0.9987)	0.7678 (0.9970)	1.0145 (0.7334)
Diagonal front aisle neighbor	-2.5088*** (0.7843)	-0.1509 (0.8838)	0.3907 (0.8292)	0.7717 (0.8671)	1.0335 (0.9496)	0.1356 (0.8124)
Diagonal back aisle neighbor	-1.1191 (0.9293)	-0.4886 (0.7832)	0.3491 (0.7898)	1.4540** (0.7036)	2.2364*** (0.7155)	1.7562*** (0.5995)
Front neighbor	-2.3284*** (0.6691)	-0.0569 (0.6577)	0.5716 (0.6170)	0.4572 (0.6221)	0.6016 (0.7522)	0.3718 (0.5730)
Back neighbor	-2.9018*** (0.6319)	-1.1009 (0.7912)	-0.5260 (0.7656)	0.9661 (0.7297)	1.6592** (0.7733)	2.3620*** (0.4824)
Constant	66.8453*** (1.3123)	60.9893*** (4.9718)	56.0594*** (5.1946)	67.1480*** (5.8945)	66.6721*** (5.8539)	1,076.388 (820.7188)
Political variables? ^a	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Resolution variables? ^b	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Delegation variables? ^c	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
Macro variables? ^d	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Linguistic variables? ^e	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Spatial variables? ^f	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Seating arrangement- fixed effects?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Observations	678,266	616,201	616,201	545,879	500,936	500,936
Adjusted R ²	0.0001	0.0714	0.1063	0.2081	0.2125	0.3067

Standard errors clustered at the year-level are shown in brackets.

***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at one, five and ten percent-level.

✗ indicates that the respective variables are not included, ✓ indicates that they are included.

Note a.: Political variables include the democracy index and the communism indicator of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note b.: Resolution variables include indicators for human rights, economic development, Middle East, nuclear proliferation and disarmament topic resolutions.

Note c.: Delegation variables include a focal country's number of days since its first vote on a contested resolution, non-permanent UN Security Council membership, indicators for female executive state leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note d.: Macro variables include growth of real GDP, real GDP per capita and population of the focal country, and the differences of the variables with each paired country.

Note e.: Linguistic variables include the standardized Levenshtein distance and the SoundEx similarity indicator.

Note f.: Spatial variables include the row and column number of the focal country.

Full tables are available upon request.