

# Socialization, Information, and the Underpinnings of Institutionalized Cooperation

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## Abstract

While numerous international relations theories stipulate how international organizations (IOs) facilitate interstate cooperation, less literature has examined how IOs might alter individual-level interactions. Ongoing participation in IO meetings and plenary sessions is likely to impact diplomats' views of the IO and attitudes toward cooperation with other states. This paper leverages plausibly exogenous variation in countries' eligibility for election onto the UN Security Council to probe whether IO participation socializes diplomats to view cooperation more favorably. We theorize that non-permanent Council membership could promote three types of pro-cooperation outcomes: perceived institutional legitimacy, institutional affinity and in-group sentiments, and tactical ability to achieve strategic goals. We probe the plausibility of this theory with text analysis examining the similarity of Security Council members' speeches in the General Assembly and with survey data on public opinion in non-permanent member countries and other states. We then propose a research design of a panel survey of diplomats at the UN in New York, which will entail a diff-in-diff analysis of attitude shifts among diplomats whose countries serve as non-permanent members on the Council and the corresponding shifts among diplomats whose countries were ineligible for seats.

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# Introduction

A core area of inquiry in international relations is how international organizations (IOs) affect the likelihood of future cooperation between states. Canonical theories of rationalist institutionalism highlight the tangible benefits of cooperation through IOs, which reduce information asymmetries and make it less costly to pursue future negotiations (Keohane, 1984; Abbott & Snidal, 1998). Early constructivist theories, meanwhile, point to socialization effects, as IOs shape how states understand their identities and interests (Wendt, 1992; Johnston, 2001). Subsequent literature has extended both lines of reasoning, suggesting that IOs influence both norms and information in ways that reshape how governments interpret their incentives and preferences (Ikenberry & Kupchan, 1990; Dai, 2007; Johnston, 2008).

While recent scholarship transcends paradigmatic boundaries, many arguments remain firmly rooted in a state or coalition-centric approach to international cooperation. Empirical models often treat the state as the unit of analysis or analyze how the prominence of a particular industry or interest group might alter cooperation tendencies, with little attention to individual-level outcomes.<sup>1</sup> Yet IO negotiations and plenary sessions involve numerous bureaucrats and government officials, who learn and whose strategies evolve throughout their tenures in ways that likely affect future cooperative outcomes. Individual-level attitude shifts and socialization in IOs may be harder to theorize and probe empirically, but may nevertheless be microfoundations of international cooperation.

This paper opens the black box of cooperation theory to analyze individual-level attitudinal and behavioral changes among government elites. We examine the conditions under which IO participation shifts diplomats' views of an institution and promotes future interstate cooperation. Participating in an IO could change how diplomats view the legitimacy of

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<sup>1</sup>Notable exceptions to this trend include the work on international institutions and public opinion (e.g., Mikulaschek, 2022), political psychology (e.g., Hafner-Burton *et al.*, 2017), and transnational bureaucratic networks (Slaughter, 2004; Clark, 2021).

an IO's procedures or the outcomes of its decisions. Working with officials from other countries might also promote a greater affinity to the broader international community. Finally, close engagement with an IO could provide important information that makes it easier for diplomats to achieve their strategic goals (e.g., Arias (2022b)).

All of these hypotheses are plausible, yet they are difficult to evaluate empirically due to endogeneity concerns. As a general rule, states do not move in and out of IOs; once they join, they typically remain in the organization.<sup>2</sup> To understand how IO participation shapes individual attitudes in such contexts, scholars would ideally randomly assign states to a new IO and then compare members and non-members. Since such an experiment is impossible, we investigate an institution where most members serve non-renewable two-year terms: the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). We leverage plausibly exogenous variation in countries' eligibility for election onto the UNSC to compare the states that join the Council in 2024 (treatment group) with a set of countries that were not politically eligible to fill these seats in 2024 (control group).<sup>3</sup> More specifically, we will conduct a panel survey of diplomats who represent countries in the treatment and control groups at the UN in New York. To examine attitudinal changes over time, we plan to conduct a baseline in the summer of 2023 (before the treatment group joins the Council) and midline and endline surveys in mid-2024 and mid-2025. By comparing attitudinal changes over time and across groups — a difference-in-differences strategy — we will be able to test competing theories of institutionalized cooperation.

As an initial probe of our core theoretical contention, namely that IO membership can alter individual-level attitudes and preferences, we conduct two tests. First, we employ textual analysis of General Assembly speeches, examining whether the diplomats' speeches

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<sup>2</sup>Though see Gray (2018); von Borzyskowski & Vabulas (2019, 2022) on IO exit, vitality, and death.

<sup>3</sup>These countries are politically ineligible for several years to fill a seat reserved for a given world region after having occupied that seat in the recent past. The duration of this period varies between different world regions (see below).

become more similar in content to other Security Council members when their countries serve on the Council than otherwise. We conclude that they do, and that these changes in elite behavior are sticky and last several years beyond the end of the Council term. Second, we analyze how public opinion about the United Nations shifts when countries join the Security Council, finding that perceptions of the UN improve after countries accede to the Council. The results of both analyses are consistent with our argument since we detect changes in individual-level attitudes and behaviors, both at the public and elite level.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. First, we explain why participating in an IO might change individual-level attitudes and lay out three possible pathways for pro-cooperation shifts. Second, we explain why the UN Security Council offers an empirical opportunity to probe how IO participation may shift how individual government officials approach institutionalized cooperation, and we discuss our research design for the elite panel survey. Third, we provide empirical evidence on some of the observable implications of our argument. Specifically, we show that non-permanent membership in the Security Council shifts diplomatic elite rhetoric in the General Assembly and public opinion in non-permanent member countries. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of our project.

## **IOs and Individual-Level Attitude Change**

IOs change interstate interactions through a variety of channels. Cooperation problems arise, even when states have overlapping interests, due to information asymmetries, commitment and enforcement problems, and high transaction costs, but institutionalized cooperation can transform such dynamics (Keohane, 1984). IOs may have bureaucratic procedures that facilitate information sharing and monitoring (Dai, 2002; Fang, 2008; Carnegie & Carson, 2020). Adjudication may help resolve ambiguity about facts or underlying concepts (McAdams,

2005; Powell & Mitchell, 2007), or even the terms of an agreement (Ginsburg & McAdams, 2004; Huth *et al.*, 2011). Institutions can tie the hands of governments in ways that promote welfare-enhancing outcomes over the long-run (Fearon, 1998).

IOs may also shape how governments understand what constitutes “acceptable” conduct in international relations. IOs create rules around state behavior, engendering cognitive and ethical incentives to conform to widely shared expectations (March & Olsen, 1998). Shared knowledge and understandings make it easier to cooperate (Katzenstein *et al.*, 1998), even as “common knowledge” may be shaped by a highly political process of contestation (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Political institutions create norms of behavior, establishing a type of “civic culture” that promotes consensus values and constrains uncooperative behavior (Weingast, 1997). Even IO principles that disproportionately benefit one set of countries may nonetheless require normative legitimacy, shaping widespread behavior (Garrett & Weingast, 1993).

If IO participation changes broad patterns of interaction between countries, it is also likely to affect how individual government officials approach negotiations and diplomacy. An individual’s life experiences shape their underlying moral values,<sup>4</sup> and Kertzer *et al.* (2014) show that moral values like fairness/reciprocity and in-group/loyalty are strongly associated with foreign policy attitudes.<sup>5</sup> A large body of research indicates that higher levels of trust promote cooperative behavior among individuals, groups, and organizations (Axelrod, 1984; Gambetta, 1988; McAllister, 1995; Schoorman *et al.*, 2007; Clark, 2021) In experiments, repeated interactions between the same individuals lead to the development of cooperative norms (Duffy & Ochs, 2009).

Along these lines, we argue that participating in IO plenary sessions, meetings, and negotiations could alter how individual diplomats approach future cooperation in at least three

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<sup>4</sup>For an overview of theories of moral development, see Garrigan *et al.* (2018).

<sup>5</sup>Also see Brutger & Rathbun (2021).

ways. First, more experience with an IO could change perceived institutional legitimacy. IO meetings provide up-close views of institutional procedures and shed light on the desirability and effectiveness of IO policy choices. This increased transparency could shift views in a positive direction, as we discuss subsequently.

Second, IO participation might lead to increased feelings of solidarity with or affinity to the broader international community. Diplomats might begin to view a broader set of people or countries as part of their “in-group” or feel less attachment to their own national identity or group. Individuals might also develop a stronger sense of personal identification with an IO’s mission.

Finally, working with other countries through an IO might provide important information and tactical insights that increase a diplomat’s ability to achieve strategic objectives. Through learning and emulation, individuals could become better at their jobs (Arias, 2022b). Issue-linkage strategies enable diplomats to leverage influence in one IO to attain more favorable bargaining outcomes in other institutions as well (Mikulaschek, 2018). This increased sense of efficacy could lead to more positive views toward future cooperation.

Shifts in legitimacy, affinity, and strategic thinking could positively correlate with each other, or they could operate independently. IO participation might also affect one or two outcomes but have little-to-no impact on the third. If IO participation affects individual-level attitudes, however, we expect that it is most likely to be through at least one of these channels, and thus we develop all three lines of argumentation in the sections below.

## **Perceptions of Institutional Legitimacy**

Legitimacy is often defined as an actor’s belief or perception that an exercise of authority is appropriate (Lipset, 1959, 86, Tallberg *et al.*, 2018, 8). It includes the belief that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed (Hurd, 2007, 30) and the choice to voluntarily participate (Stone, 2011, 18). It also closely relates to an individual’s confidence in an organization

(Dellmuth *et al.*, 2022a).

Studies of the legitimacy of domestic and international political institutions often distinguish between input- and output-based legitimacy — a divide that draws attention to decision-making processes or procedures (inputs) versus performance (outputs).<sup>6</sup> In the context of IOs, procedural legitimacy highlights the importance of how an IO is structured and operates, whereas performance legitimacy showcases the significance of IO policy outcomes. Because participating in an IO provides a window into how an IO makes its decisions and may reveal insights into the impact or effectiveness of its policy outcomes, diplomats may experience attitudinal shifts in perceived IO legitimacy over time after accession.

### *Procedural Legitimacy*

Institutional processes, rules, and decision-making procedures affect perceptions of legitimacy through several channels. IOs standardize interactions in ways that are designed to somewhat level the playing field between states. Pre-established rules and practices serve as focal points for members of the institution seeking to move a discussion forward. Following these rules and practices also generates a perception of the correctness of a given procedure, which in turn augments process legitimacy (Hurd, 2007). Many institutions operate on a one-state, one-vote principle that promotes an underlying sense of democratic legitimacy (e.g., the World Trade Organization). Indeed, Johnson (2011) finds that when IO decision-making procedures grant disproportionate influence to a subset of states, perceptions of legitimacy decrease. This is especially true when states with significant formal power throw their weight around to help allies and punish adversaries (Stone, 2011). In recent years, some IOs have tried to enhance their perceived legitimacy by making decision-making processes more inclusive of a broader set of actors, including civil society organizations, private industry, and weaker countries (Mallaby, 2004; Kaya, 2015; Malik & Stone, 2018). Such efforts are based

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<sup>6</sup>This distinction was first introduced by Scharpf (1970). See also Scharpf (1999); Tallberg *et al.* (2018); Tallberg & Zürn (2019), among others.

on a notion of legitimacy as tied closely to democratic procedures.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, inclusiveness is thought to be essential to procedural legitimacy (Grant & Keohane, 2005), and countries may break off from IOs when decision-making protocols are perceived to advantage some states over others (Pratt, 2021).

In addition to democratic underpinnings, much of the work on procedural legitimacy emphasizes the importance of technocratic standards and procedures. Such arguments build on the pioneering work of Max Weber, who argued that bureaucracies can acquire a type of rational-legal legitimacy that is based on impersonal order and authority (Weber, 1947). Drawing on Weber to analyze IO bureaucracies, Barnett & Finnemore (1999, 707) argue that this pattern of rational-legal authority is viewed as “particularly legitimate and good.” States delegate authority to IOs in part so that they do not have to develop their own expertise in all issue areas (Hawkins *et al.*, 2006). In some cases, IO bureaucrats provide core technocratic authority (Clark & Zucker, 2022), but in others, government officials may develop this expertise themselves as they work together on more complex policy challenges. International soft law bodies, for example, tend to have high levels of technocratic expertise as they draw on intergovernmental networks of bureaucrats to make agreements and monitor compliance (Zaring, 1998; Slaughter, 2004; Brummer, 2010). Because such agreements issue non-binding rules, expertise provides a veneer of legitimacy to institutional decisions; such processes make it possible for non-state actors to respond to institutional monitoring in ways that punish non-compliance (Morse, 2022).

Procedural legitimacy is also tied to perceived fairness. When an IO protects rights through processes and policies “that are themselves at least minimally just,” it meets a higher standard of legitimacy (Buchanan, 2002, 719). IOs that operate via impartial procedures are also more likely to be perceived as fair.<sup>8</sup> For some IOs, such as international courts or

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<sup>7</sup>Though see Dahl (1999).

<sup>8</sup>This is especially true of left-leaning publics, see Brutger & Clark (2022)



dispute settlement bodies, fair procedures may be a core source of institutional legitimacy (Dellmuth *et al.*, 2019).<sup>9</sup>

Ongoing participation in an IO could alter perceptions of procedural legitimacy along any or all of these three dimensions. Participation typically increases influence over outcomes, which could lead individuals to perceive an IO's procedures as more legitimate. It also tends to provide more transparency with respect to how an IO operates and makes decisions.<sup>10</sup> In sum, the experience of being a part of an IO's meetings and plenary sessions over several months or years is likely to lead a diplomat to revise their appraisals of an institution along some procedural dimensions.<sup>11</sup>

### *Output Legitimacy*

In contrast to procedural legitimacy, output legitimacy centers on how actors perceive the legitimacy of an IO's substantive policy choices. More often than not, scholars associate output legitimacy with "effective" or "efficient" problem solving that meets the expectations of the governed.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, IO performance is often defined as whether the organization meets its established goals (Gutner & Thompson, 2010).<sup>13</sup>

An IO that adopts policies tied closely to the underlying cooperation problem in its mandate is more likely to be seen as effective (Miles *et al.*, 2002; Young, 2011) and to be viewed as legitimate (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006; Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2015). Recent research on citizen attitudes toward IOs finds a link between successful IO problem-solving

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<sup>9</sup>Politicians that oppose international courts, meanwhile, often frame them as unfair (Alter *et al.*, 2016; Madsen *et al.*, 2018; Voeten, 2020).

<sup>10</sup>Of course, participation could reveal an underlying lack of democratic procedures and fairness, which was masked from view before (e.g., if powerful countries leverage procedures to exert their will, see Clark & Dolan (2021)). Such negative effects might be offset with technocratic expertise or they might not. In such a situation, it is possible that participation could significantly worsen perceptions of procedural legitimacy. We plan to probe for this possibility in our panel data collection.

<sup>11</sup>See e.g., Johnston (2008).

<sup>12</sup>See, for example, Horeth (1999); Bäckstrand (2006); Curtin & Meijer (2006); Risse (2006); Lindgren & Persson (2010), among others.

<sup>13</sup>Also see Tallberg *et al.* (2016); Lall (2017).

and perceived institutional legitimacy (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2015; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2016). In contrast, when an IO performs poorly, the affected states may seek institutional reform as remediation (Clark & Carnegie, 2022).

Output legitimacy need not refer exclusively to effectiveness, but may also incorporate the extent to which IO policies cater to the global public interest (Steffek, 2015) or protect democratic rights and processes (Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). Domestic elites may use IO membership to advance democratic rights within their countries (Pevehouse, 2005). IOs may also undertake activities that promote democratic principles like accountability or protection of minority rights (Keohane *et al.*, 2009).

In addition to effective and democratic outputs, Dellmuth *et al.* (2019) argue that fairness may be an important component of output-based legitimacy. Franck (1998) suggests legal fairness is tied to both legitimacy and distributive justice. Laws are perceived as legitimate when they are applied in accordance with right and fair processes. Institutions and laws that advance human dignity and distributive justice may be more likely to be viewed as legitimate and be obeyed (Tyler, 1990).

Ongoing participation in an IO could alter perceptions of output legitimacy through all of these pathways. Participation is likely to boost subject-area expertise and institutional knowledge, which should enable diplomats to better evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of an IO's decisions. Familiarity with an IO also provides increased insight into whether an IO's procedures lead to democratic and fair outputs. If an IO designs effective policy solutions or promotes impactful pro-democracy policies, diplomats may update their views of output legitimacy in a positive direction.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Alternatively, up-close knowledge might showcase a lack of efficiency and outcome fairness, which could damage perceived institutional legitimacy. We will probe for this possibility in our panel survey.

## Socialization and Institutional Affinities

Much of the literature on IOs highlights how institutionalized cooperation can socialize states into new identities, ideas, and affinities. Socialization processes can work through a variety of channels. IOs may promote specific norms and ideas that are subsequently internalized by states (Pevehouse, 2002; Johnston, 2008). IOs might offer states material benefits for adopting certain policies, as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank do through conditionality (Kentikelenis *et al.*, 2016); norms that are strategically adopted at first may gradually become accepted. Alternatively, an IO might convince states that certain policies ought to be pursued, even when these policies are in tension with states' prior policy dispositions (Johnston, 2008). This latter process is most likely to occur when member states perceive IOs to be legitimate (Hurd, 1999, 2007; Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). Material incentives and socialization processes may also complement each other (Ikenberry & Kupchan, 1990), and both are central pillars of the liberal international order (Ikenberry, 2001), which encourages norms such as democratic governance and the protection of human rights.

IOs can also socialize states more organically by serving as forums for meetings and negotiations (Pevehouse, 2002; Checkel, 2003; Bearce & Bondanella, 2007; Greenhill, 2010). Indeed, institutionalist scholars have long noted that a primary function of multilateral bodies is to serve as stable negotiating forums (Keohane, 1984; Abbott & Snidal, 1998), enabling issue linkage (Davis, 2004), as well as socialization. By working together on a routine basis, states may gradually internalize different international standards and norms of behavior, even ones ostensibly unrelated to the subject area at hand (Greenhill, 2010). When IOs focus on more technocratic standards, they may also promote policy diffusion from states at the center of global power to those at the periphery (Jones & Zeitz, 2019). Such policy diffusion is more common when the European Union or a group of important economies legalize informal best practices through their own domestic laws (Newman &

Bach, 2014).

A second strand of socialization literature focuses on how IOs shape the views and identities of permanent staff. IO social environments often reflect the preferences of powerful member states. Staff are frequently citizens of powerful or wealthy member countries or received their education in such states (Weaver, 2008; Novosad & Werker, 2014; Parizek, 2017). Bureaucrats may also internalize the preferences of powerful states because IOs often maintain headquarters in such countries (Kilby, 2013), allowing host government officials to socialize bureaucrats directly (Clark & Dolan, 2021). Staff members' previous field experiences (i.e., time spent in specific countries) may socialize them such that they privilege the dispositions of these host states over an IO's goals (Woods, 2007; Clark & Zucker, 2022).<sup>15</sup>

Work on IO bureaucrats also highlights how organizations create their own bureaucratic cultures and identities. IOs can foster unique, even pathological bureaucratic procedures and norms (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; Autesserre, 2014). They can also become more autonomous in the process (Johnson, 2014). Norm entrepreneurs within an IO can shape its unique cultural disposition (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). The act of participating in negotiations abroad may foster more inclusive identities: extant work suggests bureaucrats in the European Union develop more pro-European dispositions when they participate in institutional negotiations far from home (Lewis, 1998; Hooghe, 1999; Checkel, 2003). Similarly, Voeten (2014, 289) notes, "there is some evidence that individuals that are delegated to IOs are socialized into the goals of their organizations."

We build on these two strands of literature — work on the socialization of states and IO staff — to theorize about how participation in an IO might shape the identities and affinities of individual diplomats. We expect that socialization may occur if diplomats develop a sense of solidarity or community with other countries' officials or the institution itself. Genuine socialization involves a reconstitution of in-group and out-group identities. Delegates may

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<sup>15</sup>Though see Honig (2018).

develop a “club” feeling where they perceive other delegates as the in-group and home country governments as the out-group. Although diplomats each possess their own unique backgrounds, ideologies, and extra-organizational interests, they may come to sympathize with one another and develop shared beliefs as they work together. For instance, March & Simon (1993) discuss how competition between organizational sub-units within a firm can increase bureaucrats’ identification with the organization and improve individual effort to the group cause. Though bureaucrats’ identification with their work in-group may be low ex ante since they hail from different countries and organizations with divergent cultures, repeated interaction in the workplace can foster in-group solidarity (Selznick, 1948). These conclusions are bolstered by long traditions in social and contract theory, which maintain that social interactions and face-to-face contact among individuals foster solidarity and awareness of commonality.<sup>16 17</sup>

## **Tactical emulation and efficacy**

In addition to legitimacy and socialization, working with other countries through an IO might provide important information and tactical insights that increase a diplomat’s ability to achieve strategic objectives. Through learning and emulation, individuals could become better at their jobs (Arias, 2022b). This increased sense of efficacy could lead to more

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<sup>16</sup>See, for example, work by Allport (1954); Durkheim (1997); Oorschot & Komter (1998); Stjerno (2010), among others.

<sup>17</sup>Of course, participation in an IO could also weaken a delegate’s affinity to the IO or to diplomats from other countries. National socialization may be stronger than socialization within IOs; Hooghe (2005, 861) finds that national norms and loyalties, along with prior experience, decisively shape how European officials view supranational norms. Participating in multilateral negotiations could also intensify national ties as diplomats are empowered to bargain and negotiate on behalf of their countries. Finally, if a diplomat negatively updates their perceptions of institutional legitimacy, this shift may also weaken institutional affinity. We probe this possibility in our panel survey.

positive views toward future cooperation.<sup>18</sup>

Learning might also lead to *strategic socialization*, where government officials report an increased affinity with an institution’s mission or other governments, but this reported shift is purely strategic rather than internalized. Constructivists describe this pattern as “Type 1” internalization, where an individual is essentially playing a role based on what is socially acceptable, irrespective of whether they agree with it or not (Checkel, 2003, 804). Through participation, diplomats may learn that their arguments are more effective when they employ language that resonates with the IO’s goals and/or the shared beliefs of its members rather than rhetoric that focuses on national interests. Diplomats can also use issue-linkage strategies in this vein to attain bargaining advantages in unrelated intergovernmental negotiations (Mikulaschek, 2018). Even in the absence of “Type 2” socialization, this augmented bargaining leverage may render diplomats who wield it more sanguine about future cooperation.

Though strategic and genuine socialization may be observationally equivalent while a diplomat remains at an IO, strategic behavior should not stick beyond a diplomat’s deployment while attitudinal shifts driven by genuine socialization should be longer lasting.<sup>19</sup>

## Proposed Research Design

To test our argument on the attitudinal and behavioral effects of participation in an international institution, we rely on a three-pronged empirical approach that combines the analysis of diplomatic speeches and public opinion surveys (presented below) with a unique panel survey administered to diplomatic elites. This elite survey examines the individual-level

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<sup>18</sup>If IO participation provides information that illustrates a state’s *lack* of power or agency, this could decrease perceived efficacy (c.f., Kaya (2015) and drive diplomats to endorse forum shopping (Busch, 2007; Clark, 2022), regime shifting (Morse & Keohane, 2014), or the creation of new cooperative venues (Pratt, 2021).

<sup>19</sup>See Howard (2008); Campbell (2008) on first- versus second-level learning.

impact of serving on the UNSC, an international institution where two-thirds of members have non-renewable two-year terms rather than permanent seats. To estimate the attitudinal impact of serving on the Council, we need to compare attitudinal change among diplomats who serve on the Council to simultaneous changes among other diplomats. Diff-in-diff estimation requires the assumption of parallel trends between these two groups. Of course, the treatment of joining the UNSC in 2024 is not assigned exogenously but through an election held in the UNGA. The set of countries that seeks and wins this election is likely to be systematically different from the underlying population of countries; selection into treatment and the effect of the treatment could both explain any observed differences in changes in attitudes.

To overcome this challenge to causal inference, we leverage plausibly exogenous variation in eligibility for the treatment of attaining UNSC membership in 2024. Whether a country is eligible to serve on the Council at that point in time is a function of whether it decided to run for election in the recent past, whether it won that earlier election, and exogenous constraints on running again soon after completing a previous Council term, which are fixed for all countries in the same world region. The treatment group is composed of representatives of the countries that will join the UNSC in January 2024: Algeria, Guyana, Sierra Leone, and the two winners of upcoming competitive elections that will fill seats reserved for Asian and Eastern European countries: Belarus, Slovenia, South Korea, and Tajikistan. The control group includes countries from the same regions that are politically — but not legally — ineligible to run for election onto the UNSC because they recently held a seat on the Council. UNSC seats are allocated to different world regions, and countries can only run for election when a seat reserved for their region opens up. We consider a country politically ineligible to fill its region’s seat if no country except regional great powers has previously (successfully or unsuccessfully) pursued election onto the Council within the time span that has elapsed since that country’s most recent term on the Council. Table 1 shows that this

time period varies between world regions due to differences in the processes of determining candidates for the seats reserved for these regions. In each world region, all countries except regional great powers have consistently waited for at least this time period before they ran for election onto the UNSC again - presumably not because they would not have liked to rejoin the Council sooner, but because their candidacy would not be viable sooner. For instance, in the Eastern European group, which always has one seat on the Council, no country ran for reelection within 12 years after the end of its earlier term on this body.<sup>20</sup>

Our comparison of attitudinal change among diplomats who represent today's winners of UNSC elections to the corresponding changes among past winners requires the assumption that the probability of being elected, conditional on running for election, is constant over time for a given country. If the same countries that won election in the recent past and thus became politically ineligible to run today did not have a chance to win their region's seat a few years later, then they would not be a good comparand for today's winners. By comparing countries that decided to run for election in 2023 to those who competed for election a few years earlier we also assume that countries did not strategically sort themselves into these two sets. This assumption would be implausible if the past winners would refrain from running for election today even if there were eligible to do so. Whether these assumptions are plausible or not is ultimately an empirical question, and we plan to probe them with analyses in the next version of this paper. If these assumptions hold, we can plausibly assume parallel trends between treatment and control groups.

This research design enables us to hold constant many potential confounders of the treatment effect of diplomatic participation in the Security Council. First, respondents in the treatment and control group are diplomats who specialize in multilateral diplomacy, and

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<sup>20</sup>Only the following regional great powers did not wait for this period to expire before they ran for election onto the Council again, thus demonstrating that they do not consider themselves bound by this eligibility constraint: Argentina, Brazil, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, South Africa, and pre-war Zaire. Neither the treatment nor the control group of our study include diplomats from these regional great powers. We calculated this time span by analyzing all UNSC elections since 1990.



they all represent their home countries at the UN. Second, all respondents live in New York and thus temporarily share the same home town. Third, by comparing change in attitudes between the treatment and control groups, we can difference out time-invariant discrepancies between opinions that result, e.g., from diplomats' character, cultural values, political views, and upbringing. Fourth, states' choice to compete for a seat on the Security Council is non-random, and so is their ability to win the election held in the UN General Assembly. Therefore, we compare countries that win election onto the UNSC before the midline survey and those who had seats on the Council at some point in the recent past. To avoid including individuals who received the UNSC participation treatment in the control group, we only interview control-group country representatives who joined their country's UN mission after its earlier UNSC term ended. This establishes a hard test for our argument on the effect of participating in the UNSC: if these effects diffuse between colleagues in the same diplomatic service, then diplomats in the treatment and control groups were jointly exposed to this treatment, and our estimate will establish a lower bound of the true effect of participating in the work of the UNSC.

Diplomats in both treatment groups will be interviewed three times: in the summer of 2023 before diplomats in the treatment group join the Security Council (baseline survey), in mid-2024 (midline survey), and in mid-2025 (endline survey). All in all, the sample includes 327 diplomats, with 237 in the control group and 90 in the treatment group. Based on the average response rate among survey experiments fielded to political elites reported in Kertzer & Renshon (2022), we expect to receive approximately 92 responses. If our power analyses lead us to conclude that we should gather a larger survey or if the response rate is lower, we plan to extend the duration of the study to include the representatives of five countries who will join the Council in 2025 (Denmark, Greece, Mauritius, Pakistan, and Somalia) in the treatment group as well as countries in their respective regional constituencies (Asia-Pacific, Eastern Africa, and Western European and Others) who are politically ineligible to

Treatment group		Control group			
Country	Respon- dents (#)	Country	Respon- dents (#)	Years since last SC term	Min. # of years betw. any minor power's two SC terms in this region
Algeria	21	Azerbaijan	13	10	12 (E. Eur.)
Guyana	6	Chad	6	8	10 (Lat. Am.-Carr.)
Sierra Leone	16	Cote d'Ivoire	15	4	14 (W. Af.)
Slovenia	11	Dom. Rep.	23	3	5 (E. Eur.)
South Korea	36	Egypt	21	6	10 (Asia-Pac.)
		Equ. Guinea	9	4	10 (N./C. Afr.)
		Indonesia	20	3	7 (Asia-Pac.)
		Kazakhstan	17	5	7 (Asia-Pac.)
		Kuwait	10	4	7 (Asia-Pac.)
		Lithuania	7	8	12 (E. Eur.)
		Peru	16	4	5 (Lat. Am.-Carr.)
		Poland	27	4	12 (E. Eur.)
		Senegal	30	6	14 (W. Af.)
		Togo	10	10	14 (W. Af.)
		Ukraine	13	6	12 (E. Eur.)
<b>SUM</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>SUM</b>	<b>237</b>		

Table 1: **Composition of sample that will take baseline survey in 2023.** The treatment group includes countries that will join the UNSC in 2024. The control group includes all countries from the same regions as those in the treatment group that are politically ineligible to fill a seat on the Council in 2024. The estimated number of potential interviewees is based on number of staff at countries' UN missions in New York at the end of 2022. It may change before elite survey is administered. This table depicts the sample composition if South Korea and Slovenia defeat Tajikistan and Belarus, respectively, in the upcoming UNSC elections. The treatment group size would shrink if Belarus and Tajikistan get elected.

fill these seats. In that case, representatives of these countries will take the baseline survey in mid-2024, the midline survey in the summer of 2025, and the endline in mid-2026.

## Participation in the UN Security Council and Rhetorical Change in the General Assembly

In addition to examining diplomats’ attitudes in an elite survey, we examine whether elites change their behavior in the UN General Assembly. Specifically, we make use of the text of delegates’ speeches in the General Assembly. This enables us to test our claims about socialization and institutional affinities: if diplomats on the Security Council come to view their institutional peers as an “in-group” to which they have strong affinity, we would expect their General Assembly speeches to become more similar after they join the Security Council. Moreover, this test allows us to adjudicate between genuine and strategic socialization; if shared UNSC membership drives convergence in UNGA speeches that lasts beyond countries’ UNSC terms, it would be evidence of genuine rather than strategic socialization.

We specifically construct a dyad-year dataset for all General Assembly members over the period 1970–2018. We then utilize the General Assembly speech data from Arias (2022a), which contains the text of all speeches delivered during the assembly’s General Debate by representatives from all member countries between 1970 and 2018.<sup>21</sup> Next, we compute the Jaccard similarity between the speeches for each dyad-year; this serves as our dependent variable.

Our primary independent variable is a binary equal to one if both countries in the dyad share membership on the Security Council. In some models, we include a battery of additional covariates, including a binary measure of alliance ties, a binary measure of whether the

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<sup>21</sup>We clean the data by removing punctuation, non-words, and English stop words.

countries are engaged in a military dispute, total trade between the dyad, Polity2 democracy scores for each country, and CINC capabilities scores for each country.<sup>22</sup> We might expect countries that become allies and countries that trade more with one another to give more similar speeches at the General Assembly. We might expect the opposite for countries engaged in military spats. In each model, we also include fixed effects for year and dyad to account for time- and dyad-specific factors not otherwise captured by our control variables.

In order to examine whether countries' speeches become more similar after they accede together to the Security Council and to study the stickiness of these preference shifts, we estimate the effect of common Security Council membership at various points in time both preceding and following accession. These results with all covariates included are illustrated visually in Figure 1 and in detail in Table 2. Bivariate results are included in the Appendix (Table A1).

In each case, we find strong support for our argument. In the year prior to UNSC accession, we observe no effect of prospective Security Council membership on General Assembly speech similarity. However, beginning in the year that each country joins the Security Council, we identify a positive and highly statistically significant correlation. Notably, the positive relationship persists up to five years after the countries initially join the Security Council (well after a country's temporary UNSC membership ends), though the effect size appears to peak around three years after joint membership (ten percent of a standard deviation increase in Jaccard similarity). Substantively, this means that when two countries simultaneously serve on the UNSC, their speeches are 0.03% more similar than they are otherwise. This coefficient is similar in size to that on MIDs and larger than that on Polity2 scores. Results are similar if we exclude the permanent Security Council members from the analysis (Appendix Table A2), which suggests that temporary members are also socialized in this

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<sup>22</sup>Alliance data comes from ATOP; trade data from COW; democracy scores from Polity, and CINC scores from COW.

	UNGA speech similarity				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	$t - 1$	$t$	$t + 1$	$t + 3$	$t + 5$
Both UNSC members	0.00002 (0.00004)	0.0002*** (0.00004)	0.0002*** (0.00004)	0.0003*** (0.00004)	0.0001** (0.00004)
Alliance	0.00004 (0.0001)	0.0001* (0.0001)	0.00004 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.00002 (0.0001)
MID ongoing	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.00004 (0.0001)
Smooth total trade (log millions)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.004*** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)
Polity2 (country one)	0.00000** (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000** (0.00000)	0.00001*** (0.00000)	0.00001*** (0.00000)
Polity2 (country two)	-0.000 (0.00000)	-0.00001*** (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000*** (0.00000)	0.00000*** (0.00000)
CINC (country one)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)
CINC (country two)	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)
N	440011	440014	440014	439370	413136
R-squared	0.215	0.210	0.215	0.232	0.302
Adj. R-squared	0.191	0.185	0.191	0.208	0.279

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Table 2: **Results with controls.** Includes dyad and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at dyad-level. Control variables are lagged by one year in the  $t + 1$  and  $t - 1$  specifications. They are lagged by three and five years in the  $t + 3$  and  $t + 5$  specifications respectively. They are not lagged in the  $t$  specification.




Figure 1: **Coefficient Plot (Effect of Shared UNSC Membership on UNGA Speech Similarity)**. All models include the controls from Table 1. Standard errors are clustered at the dyad-level.

way. The fact that convergence lasts beyond countries’ exit from the Council suggests that socialization is genuine rather than strategic.

## Participation in the UN Security Council and Public Opinion Change

We complement our investigation of elite attitudes and diplomatic speeches with an analysis of public opinion before and during UNSC terms. If our argument is right that diplomats on the Security Council come to view their institutional peers as an “in-group” to which they have strong affinity, their attitudes about the UN may change once they serve on the Council. In turn, this effect may trigger a shift in public opinion about the UN in countries with temporary Council membership. Publics tend to be rationally ignorant about foreign

affairs and typically form their opinion about world politics based on cues from trusted and knowledgeable elites (Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009; Guisinger & Saunders, 2017; Mikulaschek, 2023). A country’s government leaders and top diplomats may thus shape public opinion about the UN when they make statements that are transmitted to the public through the mass media. When the former’s views about the UN become more positive, public opinion about the organization will shift in turn.<sup>23</sup>

Three mechanisms can explain why more favorable elite attitudes about an IO improve mass opinion about the same IO. First, public perceptions of IOs tend to improve when citizens believe their country’s influence in the organization has increased (Brutger & Clark, 2022). This is the case when countries accede to the UNSC; we therefore expect publics to approve more of the United Nations after accession. Second, a country’s more prominent role in an IO can augment domestic press coverage of that IO, which in turn increases the public’s awareness of the IO. Citizens who were previously indifferent about the IO form an opinion about it, which increases average support for the IO as the frequency of neutral views declines. Finally, a country’s increased influence in an IO may not just alter the amount of domestic news coverage of an IO but also shift its tone. More positive news content about the IO may prime more positive considerations in the minds of citizens as they form their views about the IO, increasing popular support of the IO.

We probe the plausibility of these links with an analysis of cross-national data on change in public opinion about the UN after a country joined the UN Security Council. This repeated cross-sectional data was gathered by Gallup and Pew in 15 countries in the two years before they started a temporary term on the Council and during their Council membership. Nationally representative surveys were conducted in Argentina, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Denmark,

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<sup>23</sup>Even if trends in elite and public opinion covary, members of the public tend to be more skeptical about international organizations – including the UN – than elites in the same country (Dellmuth *et al.*, 2022b). Compositional differences can account for such discrepancies between elite and mass attitudes (Kertzer, 2022).

UN region	Number and share of seats on UNSC	Number and share of UNSC terms in sample
Western Europe & Others	5 UNSC seats (33%)	5 UNSC terms (31%)
Asia-Pacific	3 UNSC seats (20%)	6 UNSC terms (38%)
Africa	3 UNSC seats (20%)	0 UNSC terms (0%)
Eastern Europe	2 UNSC seats (13%)	2 UNSC terms (13%)
Latin America & Carribean	2 UNSC seats (13%)	3 UNSC terms (19%)

Table 3: **Composition of sample and underlying population of UNSC members.**

Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, Spain, and Turkey. Table 3 shows that the distribution of these countries by world region is similar to the distribution of UNSC seats between regions, except for Latin America’s and Asia’s overrepresentation and Africa’s absence from the sample.

We analyze the Gallup and Pew data separately because the two sets of surveys pose different questions on UN support and rely on different scales to measure attitudes. Gallup conducted surveys in six countries in the year before they started a temporary term on the Council and at the end of the following year (Gallup International, 2012). Nationally representative surveys in Argentina, Denmark, Greece, and Japan were conducted in 2004 and 2005 and in Azerbaijan and in Pakistan in 2011 and 2012. Gallup also administered the same surveys in 84 other countries whose membership in the UNSC did not change during these years. Our DID estimation uses change in public attitudes between 2004 and 2005 and between 2011 and 2012 in these other countries as a basis of comparison. Specifically, we estimate the following model:

$$DV_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Post_i + \beta_2 E10_i + \beta_3 Post_i * E10_i + \beta_4 X_i + \beta_5 FE_i + \epsilon \quad (1)$$

The subscript  $i$  refers to the respondent. The  $DV_i$  measures her support of the UN.  $Post_i$  takes the value 1 if the respondent was interviewed in 2005 or 2012 and 0 if she took the survey in 2004 or 2011.  $E10_i$  indicates whether the respondent was interviewed in a country that



joined the UNSC in 2005 or 2012 and 0 otherwise. We interact both variables to estimate how much year-on-year change in public attitudes is due to a country’s accession to the UNSC. The variables contained in  $X_i$  describe individual-level socioeconomic characteristics. Country fixed-effects  $FE_i$  are included in the models.

Our analysis of Pew survey data also relies on DID estimation. Between 2006 and 2019, Pew fielded nationally representative surveys in ten countries during the two years before they joined the UNSC and again during their Council term (Pew Research Center, 2019). In chronological order of their UNSC terms (in parentheses), these countries are: Indonesia (2007-8), Japan (2009-10), Mexico (2009-10), Turkey (2009-10), Brazil (2010-11), Lebanon (2010-11), Germany (2011-12), India (2011-12), Spain (2015-16), Poland (2018-19). Due to the staggered entry into treatment (i.e., UNSC membership) of the ten Council members, we rely on a DID estimation procedure with multiple time periods and variation in treatment timing (Callaway & Sant’Anna, 2021). To probe robustness of our results to different sets of assumptions, we estimate the effect of joining the UNSC with two alternative DID models that rely on different counterfactuals:<sup>24</sup> First, we use contemporaneous change in UN attitudes in cross-sectional surveys in 38 other countries without temporary UNSC membership as a basis of comparison; these surveys were also fielded by Pew between 2006 and 2019. Second, we use simultaneous change in UN attitudes in pre-treatment surveys in the ten temporary UNSC members as a basis of comparison. In both DID models, we estimate the

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<sup>24</sup>The two approaches rest on different parallel trends assumptions conditional on covariates: The first estimate requires the assumption that change in UN attitudes at the time when countries joined the Security Council and simultaneous changes in UN attitudes in countries that did not join the Security Council between 2006 and 2019 would have followed parallel paths in the absence of the former group’s treatment. This assumption would be violated if trends in UN attitudes in countries is systematically different in countries that joined the Council between 2006 and 2019 and those that did not. The second estimate rests on the assumption that change in UN attitudes at the time when countries joined the Security Council and simultaneous change in UN attitudes in countries that joined the Council at a later point in time would have followed parallel paths during the latter group’s pre-accession period in the absence of the former group’s treatment. This assumption would be violated if the timing of states’ accession to the Council was systematically related to unobservables that affected trends in UN attitudes. The next version of the paper will include covariate balance tests and pre-tests of the two alternative parallel trends assumptions.




Figure 2: **Coefficient Plot (Effect of Joining UNSC on Public Opinion About UN Based on Gallup Survey Data)**. Estimations are based on Model 7 in Table 4.

effect of joining the UNSC by comparing change in UN attitudes from just before a country joins the Council to the time of its membership (treatment group) to change during the same years in a set of countries that did not join the Council (control group). We complement this DID analysis with a simple country fixed-effects model of Pew survey data from the ten countries that joined the Council that analyzes how UN attitudes changed after countries joined the UNSC; these models include data from each country’s last survey administered before it joined the Council, which was administered at most two years before accession, and the first survey fielded during their Council term.

After a country joined the UNSC, public opinion about the UN became more positive than it was in the same country a year earlier. Analyses of Gallup and Pew surveys yield remarkably similar results that support this finding. Table 4 and Figure 2 summarize the DID models of Gallup surveys. The coefficients of the interaction term in Models 6-7 in Table 4 show that the start of a term on the Council increased support of the UN by 4 percentage

	Change in public opinion					
	... in full sample	... after joining UNSC	... without change in UNSC affiliation (placebo effect)	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11
(Intercept)	0.92*** (0.01)	0.90*** (0.01)	0.48*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.02)	0.61*** (0.01)	0.59*** (0.01)
2nd year of survey	0.03*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)
Country joins UNSC	-0.44*** (0.02)	-0.46*** (0.02)				
2nd year of survey*Country joins UNSC	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)				
Age: 30-50 years		-0.02*** (0.00)		-0.02** (0.01)		-0.01*** (0.00)
Age: 51-65 years		-0.02*** (0.00)		-0.04** (0.01)		-0.02*** (0.00)
Age: >65 years		-0.01* (0.00)		0.03 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.01)
Female		0.02*** (0.00)		0.04*** (0.01)		0.02*** (0.00)
Income: medium/medium high		0.02*** (0.00)		0.01 (0.01)		0.02*** (0.00)
Income: high		0.02*** (0.00)		0.02 (0.01)		0.02*** (0.00)
Educ.: Secondary school		0.01*** (0.00)		-0.01 (0.01)		0.02*** (0.00)
Educ.: Tertiary education		0.03*** (0.00)		0.03* (0.01)		0.03*** (0.00)
Unemployed		0.00 (0.00)		0.01 (0.02)		0.00 (0.00)
Not seeking employment		0.01** (0.00)		0.02* (0.01)		0.01 (0.00)
Retired		-0.00 (0.00)		-0.04 (0.02)		-0.00 (0.00)
Country f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.08	0.09	0.11	0.12	0.06	0.07
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.08	0.09	0.11	0.12	0.06	0.07
Num. obs.	172,940	142,937	9,634	8,438	118,801	100,324

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

Table 4: Change in public opinion about UN after start of UNSC term: OLS models with country fixed effects

points during the first year on the Council, compared to year-on-year change in countries whose affiliation with the Council did not change during the same period. This effect is statistically significant (see Figure 2). Subsample analyses in models 8-9 in Table 4 show that the share of respondents with an positive overall opinion about the UN increased by 6-7 percentage points during the first year on the Security Council. This increase is statistically significant. It is twice as large as the change in public attitudes about the UN in the 84 countries that Gallup also surveyed in 2004 and in 2005 or in 2011 and 2012 and whose membership in the UN Security Council did not change between these years (see Models 10-11 in Table 4). The increase in public support of the UN in the wake of their country's accession to the UN Security Council is consistent with our argument on the effect of IO membership on individual attitudes.

Analyses of Pew surveys corroborates these results. A simple comparison of within-country change in UN attitudes from the two-year period before joining the Security Council to the following two-year period indicates that public support of the UN increased by 3 percentage points, on average, in the ten temporary Council members in the sample (see 3). Two DID models with staggered treatment adoption estimate the effect of joining the Security Council. The first model indicates that joining the Council was associated with a four percentage point increase in favor of the UN, compared to simultaneous shifts in public attitudes in countries that did not join the Council between 2006 and 2019. According to the second model, the start of Security Council membership was associated with a five percentage-point increase in support of the UN relative to simultaneous changes in public opinion in countries that joined the Council at a later point in time before 2020. In conclusion, analyses of Gallup and Pew surveys fielded in 15 temporary Security Council member states and 100 other countries yield remarkably similar results, which are consistent with our argument about the individual-level attitudinal effects of IO membership.




Figure 3: **Coefficient Plot (Effect of Joining UNSC on Public Opinion About UN Based On Pew Survey Data)**. Country fixed effects model of change in UN attitudes from before to during UNSC term and two DID models with staggered treatment adoption with alternative sets of simultaneous surveys as counterfactuals: ‘never joiners’ did not join UNSC between 2006 and 2019; ‘later joiners’ joined UNSC during that period but after the UNSC member for which their pre-accession survey data serves as counterfactual.

## Conclusion

Participation in international organizations appears to meaningfully shift individual-level attitudes and behaviors. We show that this is true for both the diplomats that represent countries at the United Nations and for the public in member states. In the former case, countries that share membership on the Security Council come to express similar viewpoints in their General Assembly speeches. In the latter case, publics become significantly more supportive of the United Nations after their country joins the Security Council, perhaps owing to the power of elite cues on issues of foreign policy generally (Guisinger & Saunders, 2017) and on international cooperation more specifically (Mikulaschek, 2023; Brutger & Clark, 2022). We contribute to longstanding literature in international relations by open-

ing the black box of cooperation theory and taking an individual-level, microfoundational approach.

We encourage scholars to extend this line of inquiry by taking a similar approach to cooperation in other issue areas. The United Nations is hardly the only institution where participation is likely to contribute to attitudinal and behavioral changes among government elites (and by extension the public). Indeed, we believe our theory ought to apply to any institution in which diplomats from member states meet and deliberate regularly. Two institutions scholars might examine next are the World Bank and International Monetary Fund — both of which maintain careful records of meeting minutes and diplomats’ written statements.

We also believe this research carries important policy implications. There has been much pessimism among scholars in recent years about the future of the liberal international order and the international organizations that underpin it (Carnegie & Carson, 2019; Weiss & Wallace, 2021; Farrell & Newman, 2021; Lake *et al.*, 2021). Such pessimism derives in part from the notion that multilateral organizations no longer meaningfully change state behavior, whether because of forum shopping and regime complexity (Busch, 2007; Morse & Keohane, 2014; Clark, 2022) or noncompliance on the part of populist and nationalist leaders (Copelovitch & Pevehouse, 2019; Voeten, 2021; Mansfield & Pevehouse, 2022). Our findings suggest that the future of international cooperation may be brighter than these accounts lead us to believe; participation in cooperative processes can alter the way government elites think and act on the international stage.

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# Socialization, Information, and the Underpinnings of Institutionalized Cooperation

Online Appendices

## Contents

1 Robustness Checks

2

# 1 Robustness Checks

	UNGA speech similarity				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	$t - 1$	$t$	$t + 1$	$t + 3$	$t + 5$
Both UNSC members	-0.00001 (0.00004)	0.0001** (0.00004)	0.0002*** (0.00004)	0.0002*** (0.00004)	0.0001** (0.00004)
N	1226380	1263052	1226380	1153036	1079696
R-squared	0.206	0.206	0.213	0.228	0.286
Adj. R-squared	0.194	0.194	0.201	0.215	0.273

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Table A1: **Bivariate results.** Includes dyad and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at dyad-level.

	UNGA speech similarity				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	$t - 1$	$t$	$t + 1$	$t + 3$	$t + 5$
Both UNSC members	-0.00005 (0.0001)	0.0001* (0.0001)	0.0003*** (0.0001)	0.0002*** (0.0001)	-0.00002 (0.0001)
Alliance	0.00005 (0.00005)	0.0001* (0.00005)	0.00005 (0.00005)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0001)
MID ongoing	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0004*** (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.00004 (0.0001)	-0.00005 (0.0001)
Smooth total trade (log millions)	-0.022*** (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.022*** (0.004)	-0.029*** (0.006)	-0.031*** (0.006)
Polity2 (country one)	0.00001*** (0.00000)	0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00001*** (0.00000)	0.00001*** (0.00000)	0.00002*** (0.00000)
Polity2 (country two)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00001*** (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000** (0.00000)	0.00000 (0.00000)
CINC (country one)	0.023*** (0.005)	0.011** (0.006)	0.023*** (0.005)	0.026*** (0.005)	0.022*** (0.005)
CINC (country two)	-0.025*** (0.003)	-0.029*** (0.003)	-0.025*** (0.003)	-0.023*** (0.003)	-0.025*** (0.004)
N	409564	409567	409567	408943	384304
R-squared	0.208	0.203	0.208	0.225	0.297
Adj. R-squared	0.183	0.178	0.183	0.200	0.274

\*\*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*p < .1

Table A2: **Robustness check excluding permanent members.** The P-5 are dropped from this test. Includes dyad and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at dyad-level. Control variables are lagged by one year in the  $t + 1$  and  $t - 1$  specifications. They are lagged by three and five years in the  $t + 3$  and  $t + 5$  specifications respectively. They are not lagged in the  $t$  specification.