

Explaining Elite Perceptions of Legitimacy in Global Governance¹

Soetkin Verhaegen (Stockholm University),

Jan Aart Scholte (University of Gothenburg), and Jonas Tallberg (Stockholm University)

Abstract: Elites are central in operating, defending and contesting global governance institutions (GGIs), but very little research is available about their attitudes toward these bodies. To address this gap, this paper offers the first systematic and comparative analysis of elite perceptions of GGI legitimacy. Building on a unique multi-country and multi-sector survey of 728 elites undertaken in 2017-18, we map and explain elite legitimacy beliefs toward three key GGIs: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Integrating public opinion research and international relations theory, the paper examines three potential explanations of elite legitimacy beliefs: cosmopolitan orientation, utilitarian calculation, and institutional satisfaction. The analyses show that elites' satisfaction with institutional qualities of GGIs consistently explains variation in legitimacy beliefs: when elites are more satisfied with democracy, effectiveness, and fairness in GGIs, they also regard these GGIs as more legitimate. Cosmopolitan orientation is not significantly related to elites' legitimacy beliefs toward GGIs and utilitarian calculation receives mixed support. These findings suggest that elite perceptions of legitimacy in global governance are partly driven by different factors than those which primarily have been found to inform general public opinion toward GGIs.

Keywords: legitimacy, elites, global governance, International Monetary Fund, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, United Nations Security Council

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Recent history has seen global governance institutions (GGIs) acquire substantially enlarged authority, on the premise that increased transnational policy challenges require expanded global regulation (Hooghe et al. 2017; Zürn 2018). However, whether these expectations of GGIs translate into actual greater action and impact depends in part on whether these organizations have legitimacy (Buchanan and Keohane 2006).² The more that a GGI is perceived to be legitimate – i.e. is seen to exercise its authority appropriately – the more that it may be able to obtain resources, take decisions, secure compliance, and, ultimately, solve problems (Sommerer and Agné 2018). Conversely, a GGI with lower legitimacy faces greater difficulties to act and impact – and indeed may struggle to maintain its role in competition with other sites of governance (Morse and Keohane 2014; Zelli 2018).

Given this importance, the question of legitimacy in global governance has attracted growing research attention over the past decade (Zaum 2013; Tallberg et al. 2018). Most of the relevant empirical work has addressed citizen perceptions of GGI legitimacy using public opinion data (Johnson 2011; Bechtel and Scheve 2013; Bernauer and Gampfer 2013; Voeten 2013; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015, 2018; Schlipphak 2015; Anderson et al. 2018). In contrast, little systematic investigation has been undertaken of the legitimacy beliefs toward GGIs among political and societal elites. While some studies have examined elite opinion toward the European (EU) specifically (Hooghe 2002; Best et al. 2012), there is no corresponding body of research on central global institutions, such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations (but see Rosenau et al. 2006; Binder and Heupel 2015; Schmidtke 2018).

This omission is striking, since elites generally have the greatest access and input to GGIs – and indeed conduct the actual global governing. Elites undertake the decision-making in GGIs (Cox and Jacobson 1973), engage in bureaucratic implementation of GGI policies (Hawkins et al. 2006), lead civil society advocacy vis-à-vis GGIs (Scholte 2011), contribute knowledge to GGIs through research (Haas 1992), shape perceptions of GGIs via media (Zaller 1992), and exert economic leverage on GGIs through business (Dür et al. 2019). Whether GGIs enjoy high or low stocks of legitimacy among elites is therefore likely to be consequential for the capacity of these institutions to govern in world politics.

To address this research gap, this paper offers the first systematic and comparative analysis of elite perceptions of GGI legitimacy. Building on a unique multi-country and multi-

² This paper studies *sociological* legitimacy (i.e. the perceptions of appropriate authority held by political subjects) rather than *normative* legitimacy (i.e. the philosophical grounds for appropriate authority as discussed by political theorists) (Buchanan and Keohane 2006).

sector survey of elites undertaken in 2017-18, we map and explain elite legitimacy beliefs toward key GGIs in three issue-areas: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in economic governance; the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in environmental governance; and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in security governance. We conceptualize elites as people who hold leading positions in key organizations in society that strive to be politically influential. The survey includes 728 elites in six elite sectors (partisan-political, bureaucratic, business, civil society, news media, and research) in five countries (Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, South Africa, and the USA) as well as global arenas (e.g., staff of GGIs, multinational corporations, global news media, and international NGOs).

Theoretically, we test three possible explanations of elite perceptions of GGI legitimacy. The first two accounts draw from the large literature on public opinion toward international issues and institutions, which highlights social identification and utilitarian calculation as determinants of popular attitudes toward global and regional governance institutions (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Lake 2009; Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Rho and Tomz 2017). Attention to these propositions is based on the expectation that elite opinion is driven by the same dynamics as public opinion. The first account suggests that elite beliefs in GGI legitimacy derive from the extent to which these subjects hold a cosmopolitan orientation. The supposition is that elites who “think globally” are more likely to perceive of GGIs as legitimate. The second account explains elite legitimacy beliefs in terms of utilitarian calculation regarding costs and benefits of a GGI for one’s country. The proposition is that elites are more likely to consider a GGI legitimate if they perceive the institution to bring more positive returns to their country. The third account draws from literature in international relations that privileges institutional qualities of GGIs (Hurd 2007; Scholte and Tallberg 2018; Tallberg and Zürn 2019). The expectation here is that elites’ legitimacy beliefs are shaped by their satisfaction with GGIs’ institutional procedures and performance. It suggests that elites are more likely to regard a GGI as legitimate when they perceive it to function in line with their expectations of democratic, effective, and fair governance.

Our principal conclusions are threefold. First, elites’ satisfaction with institutional qualities of the IMF, the UNFCCC, and the UNSC consistently explains variation in legitimacy beliefs: when elites are more satisfied with democracy, effectiveness, and fairness in GGI procedures and performance, they also regard these GGIs to be more legitimate. While all three qualities matter for elite legitimacy beliefs toward all three GGIs, questions of institutional fairness stand out as of particular importance in the context of IMF. Second, cosmopolitan

orientation is not significantly related to elite beliefs in GGI legitimacy. Neither a cosmopolitan preference for global problem-solving nor a cosmopolitan identification with the world is significantly related to elites' perceptions of GGI legitimacy. Third, utilitarian calculation receives mixed support: while perceived material benefits for one's country are consistently positively related to legitimacy perceptions toward all three GGIs, perceived influence for one's country in decision-making only matters for the beliefs of political elites toward the UNFCCC.

Taken together, these results suggest that elite perceptions of legitimate global governance are partly driven by different factors than those which mainly have been found to inform general public opinion on GGIs. Elite opinion appears to be based most consistently on the perception that GGIs meet standards regarding well-functioning governance, while identity and utility considerations are of no or mixed importance. This picture may potentially reflect elites' greater political sophistication, which makes them less reliant on social identification and narrow self-interest when forming opinions about GGIs, and offers them better opportunities to judge the institutional workings of GGIs.

In elaborating this argument, the rest of the paper proceeds in four steps. The next section develops cosmopolitan orientation, utilitarian calculation, and institutional satisfaction as possible explanations of elite legitimacy beliefs. The second section introduces the research design, including the construction and execution of the elite survey, as well as principal descriptive patterns in elite legitimacy beliefs in the different sub-samples. The third section offers a multivariate analysis of the perceived legitimacy of GGIs among elites in relation to the three hypothesized explanations. The conclusion summarizes the findings and considers their implications for research and policy on global governance.

Explaining Elite Perceptions of GGI Legitimacy

In the following, we theorize three logics that could explain elites' legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis GGIs, each emphasizing one distinct driver: cosmopolitan orientation, utilitarian calculation, and institutional satisfaction. The first two logics pick up the two principal explanations that have been developed in research on public opinion toward GGIs and apply them to elite opinion. The third logic draws from international relations research on legitimacy in global governance and explains elite legitimacy beliefs toward GGIs in terms of satisfaction with key institutional qualities.

Cosmopolitan orientation

The first logic of explanation suggests that elites form beliefs about the legitimacy of GGIs based on the extent to which they hold a cosmopolitan orientation. The proposition here is that elites who “think globally” are more likely to perceive of GGIs as legitimate sites of governance. Conversely, by this logic, elites whose orientation is more national or sub-national are less likely to conceive of GGIs as legitimate.

This explanation draws on a wealth of public opinion research concerning social identity, symbolic beliefs, and nationalist values as sources of attitudes toward international issues and institutions (e.g., Norris 2000; Sniderman et al. 2004; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Rho and Tomz 2017). In the study of public opinion toward the EU, European identification is advanced as one of the principal explanations of people’s support for the organization (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hobolt and de Vries 2016). This explanation also aligns with a long tradition of liberal international relations theory, which argues that recognition of global interdependence and commitment to global solidarity would encourage multilateral cooperation (Keohane 1984; Held 1995). Building on this previous literature, we consider the two main components of a cosmopolitan orientation (Norris 2000).

First, elites may to varying extents hold *cosmopolitan preferences*, in terms of considering the global level to be the most appropriate arena for dealing with societal problems. We expect that elites who see societal challenges as having a significant global character will look more readily to global governance to provide relevant policy responses. As a result, such elites are expected to hold more positive legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis GGIs that address these particular challenges (Norris 2000; Ecker-Ehrhardt 2011). Recent work on legitimacy beliefs toward the UN supports this expectation (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015). The authors show that people who consider the UN well-placed to handle issues of human rights, international peace-keeping, protection of the environment, aid to developing countries, and refugees also are more likely to have confidence in the institution. In contrast, elites who perceive policy problems in primarily regional, national or local terms are expected to have less inclination to turn toward global governance for solutions, and are correspondingly expected to be less inclined to perceive GGIs as legitimate.

Second, elites may to varying extents hold a *cosmopolitan identification*, in terms of affiliating themselves with a global community. We expect that elites who feel part of a global community are more likely to perceive GGIs as legitimate sites of governance, since this

orientation implies a congruence between the community they feel part of and the population that is governed (Beetham and Lord 1998). Conversely, elites who identify more strongly with the national or sub-national level are less likely to conceive of GGIs as legitimate. This logic draws on research concerning social identity as a determinant of attitudes (Sears 1993; Sniderman et al. 2004). When people identify with a certain sphere, they also tend to be more positive toward political authority which is exercised at that level (Berg and Hjerm 2010; Verhaegen et al. 2018). For instance, European identification is a prominent explanation of popular support for the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2005; de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005; Harteveld et al. 2013; Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Foster and Frieden 2017). Cosmopolitan identification has also been shown to matter for popular attitudes toward the UN (Furia 2005; Torgler 2008; Norris 2009; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015).

In sum, this first logic leads us to expect that elites will regard GGIs as more legitimate when they have a more cosmopolitan orientation (*Hypothesis 1*).

Utilitarian calculation

The second proffered logic to explain elite legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis GGIs highlights the importance of utilitarian calculation as regards costs and benefits for one's country. The proposition here is that elites are more likely to regard a GGI as legitimate if they consider the organization to bring positive returns to their country. Conversely, elites who see no such advantages – or indeed actual disadvantages for their country – are less likely to develop legitimacy beliefs toward GGIs.

This logic draws on a tradition of research that emphasizes cost-benefit calculation and personal advantage as central to the formation of opinions on international issues and institutions (e.g., Anderson and Reichert 1995; Gabel 1998; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Lake 2009; Curtis et al. 2014). Institutions produce uneven consequences for affected parties, and perceptions of these differential effects lead people to adopt varying attitudes toward these institutions. Utilitarian calculation constitutes one of the principal approaches to explaining public opinion vis-à-vis the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hobolt and de Vries 2016). This logic is also consistent with expectations of rationalist international relations theory, which emphasize perceived costs and benefits as determinants of cooperation between states (Oye 1986; Koremenos et al. 2001).

When applying utilitarian logic to elite attitudes toward GGIs, we build on research which stresses socio-tropic calculation (i.e. how people evaluate consequences of a political

regime for their affiliated group), rather than ego-tropic calculation (i.e. in terms of personal self-interest) (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Verhaegen et al. 2014). Research on “winners and losers of globalization” commonly expects people’s opinions toward international policies and institutions to reflect their individual gains and losses (e.g., Anderson and Reichert 1995; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Lake 2009). However, in respect of elite opinion toward GGIs, we privilege elites’ socio-tropic evaluations of the utility of GGIs for their country over their egocentric assessment of personal costs and benefits.³ We do so because elites are more likely to be “winners” in their societies and thus a fairly homogeneous group in terms of ego-tropic effects. Yet, as leaders in society, we could expect elites to care about how key GGIs affect their country. As we explain below, this pertains particularly to political elites, for whom the welfare and influence of their country is a more central concern. We distinguish between two types of country-related utility considerations: (a) perceived influence of one’s government in GGI decision-making; and (b) perceived material benefits to the country from GGI policies.

Regarding perceived influence, this logic proposes that elites who regard their state to have more influence in a GGI will consider this institution as more legitimate, while those who see their state to have less influence in a GGI will view the institution as less legitimate. Most GGIs accord some states a greater say in decision-making than others (Blake and Payton 2014). In some cases, such inequalities are formally established, as when the IMF and the World Bank differentiate voting power between states according to their capital subscriptions, or when the UN offers veto powers for permanent members of the Security Council. In other cases, where decisions are taken by consensus, informal GGI practices give certain countries more influence, as in the club model at the WTO (Stone 2011) or in negotiations of the UNFCCC, where large emitters have a particularly large say (Friman 2013).

Regarding perceived benefits, this logic suggests that elites who perceive their country to be gaining more from a GGI will consider this institution as more legitimate, while elites who judge their country to be gaining less, or even losing, from a GGI will regard it as less legitimate. Most GGIs generate policies that have varying distributional consequences for countries. For example, aid disbursements, environmental standards, financial regulations, and trade measures from GGIs differentially favor some countries and disadvantage others (Dreher

³ In the robustness checks, we control for egocentric considerations as well by assessing if elites’ satisfaction with the financial situation of their household affects their legitimacy beliefs toward GGIs. Indeed, in the cases of the IMF and UNFCCC we observe that respondents who are more satisfied with the financial situation of their household are significantly more likely to have more confidence in the IMF. Yet, the relationship between perceived benefits to one’s country by those GGIs and confidence in those GGIs is much more substantial.

and Lang 2016; Scholte et al. 2016). Similarly, countries are varyingly affected when GGIs engage in naming and shaming exercises, human rights monitoring, and conflict interventions. In some settings, member state contributions to GGI budgets are highly politicized, as in the case of US payments to UN agencies and net payers' subscriptions to the EU.

In sum, the utilitarian logic proposes that elites will regard GGIs as more legitimate when these political and societal leaders perceive that the GGI brings more advantage to their country. Conversely, elites' perceptions of national disadvantage from a GGI will reduce their legitimacy beliefs toward global governance (*Hypothesis 2a*).

In addition, it might be expected that utilitarian calculation of country advantage from a GGI is especially important in generating legitimacy beliefs among elites in the political sphere, as opposed to the societal sphere. For the political subgroup of elites, comprising elected politicians, party officials, and civil servants, the country is a particularly central point of reference, as these elites in their professional roles have the task to govern for this country. In contrast, business elites, for example, might be more concerned about the consequences of GGI policy-making for their company or the overall commercial sector than for the country. Thus, we hypothesize that, for elites in political parties, the civil service, and national representatives at GGIs, the relationship between perceived country advantages and legitimacy perceptions is stronger than for elites in wider society, including research, business, civil society and media circles (*Hypothesis 2b*).

Institutional satisfaction

Next to explanations related to cosmopolitan orientation and utilitarian calculation, we propose a third account of elite legitimacy perceptions, which focuses on satisfaction with institutional qualities of GGIs. While the previous logics build on the two most common explanations of public opinion toward GGIs, the institutional logic is inspired by work on sources of legitimacy in international relations research. While conventionally formulated as an organizational-level explanation, we develop this account into a logic with expectations testable at the individual level (see also Bechtel and Scheve 2013; Anderson et al. 2018). We expect that this institutional explanation may be especially relevant to explain elite legitimacy beliefs, since elites tend to have higher levels of political sophistication and organizational access than the general public, making them better positioned to evaluate the legitimacy of GGIs on institutional grounds.

The presumption is that elites who are more satisfied with key institutional qualities of GGIs also are more likely to regard these institutions as legitimate. The institutional qualities

expected to have such effects relate to social norms for governing the world order: democracy, effectiveness, and fairness. This explanation is distinct from the utilitarian logic, which privileges the narrow advantages for one's own country, rather than satisfaction with general governance principles, irrespective of their impacts on any particular party.⁴

We build here especially on a literature in international relations concerning institutional sources of legitimacy that emphasizes a dichotomy of procedure (how GGI decisions are taken) and performance (the consequences of GGI policies) (Scharpf 1999; Hurd 2007; Binder and Heupel 2015; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Scholte and Tallberg 2018; Tallberg and Zürn 2019). Other institutional qualities could notionally also be relevant for GGI legitimacy, including the purpose and mandate of the organization (e.g., the World Health Organization attracts legitimacy because it promotes human well-being) and the vision and inspiration of organizational leadership (e.g. with Dag Hammarskjöld and Kofi Annan at the UN). However, recent research findings have established strong grounds to suppose that procedure or performance, or both, can provide grounds for GGI legitimacy (Binder and Heupel 2015; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Anderson et al. 2018; Dellmuth et al. forthcoming).

In a further development of this literature, some research suggests that it is rather specific qualities of GGI procedures and performances that matter for legitimacy beliefs (Johnson 2011; Bernauer and Gampfer 2013; Dellmuth et al. 2018). Building on this notion, we here examine whether elites' satisfaction with democratic, effective, and fair qualities of GGI procedure and performance impact their legitimacy beliefs. These three qualities reflect established norms of governance and have been found to drive legitimacy perceptions in earlier social-psychological research (Tyler 2006).

Democracy is sometimes claimed to be the foremost source of legitimacy in global governance (Held 1995; Bernstein 2011) and has been shown to matter for perceptions of the legitimacy of governing institutions in general (De Cremer and Tyler 2007). Some research finds that global governance, which allows for participation by a broad range of societal actors beyond states, enjoys greater perceived legitimacy (Bernauer and Gampfer 2013). Other work establishes that transparency in terms of public access to information about a GGI's activities strengthens confidence in the institution (Dellmuth et al. forthcoming). Further studies show

⁴ As we show in the operationalization section, these explanations are also empirically distinct. The measures for the utilitarian and institutional explanations are rather weakly correlated. The Pearson's correlation is lower than 0.30 between the perceived influence of one's country in a GGI and the measures for institutional satisfaction. The Pearson's correlation between the perceived benefits for one's country and institutional satisfaction with a GGI is lower than 0.40 for the IMF and UNSC, and lower than 0.45 for the UNFCCC. Principal component factor analyses further indicate that these measures do not load on a single factor.

that dissatisfaction with perceived non-democratic decision-making constitutes a crucial motivation for contestation of GGIs (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Norris 2011). On the side of democratic performance, GGIs might obtain legitimacy from activities that safeguard or improve domestic democracy, for instance, by monitoring elections or protecting civil rights (Keohane et al. 2009). Alternatively, elites may consider GGIs to be less legitimate because of perceived negative implications for democratic governance, for example, when global economic institutions are perceived to dictate member-state policies (Inglehart and Norris 2017; Hooghe et al. 2018).

Effectiveness is well-known to influence how people evaluate governance institutions (Skitka 2002; Doherty and Wolak 2012). Effective procedure can lie in the efficiency of GGI decision-making (Tallberg et al. 2016), or in use of the best available expertise (Majone 1998). Conversely, slow decision-making, mismanagement of funds, and organizational dysfunction may explain legitimacy crises for organizations such as the UN and the EU (Reus-Smit 2007). Effective performance refers to successful problem-solving (Scharpf 1999) and has been found to matter for legitimacy perceptions in the domestic context (Newton and Norris 2001). In global settings, recent research concludes that perceptions of GGI problem-solving constitute a strong base for legitimacy beliefs (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2016; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015).

Fairness is a third key concern regarding institutional qualities, and earlier research establishes that it matters for people's legitimacy perceptions in domestic contexts (Tyler 1990; Esaiasson et al. 2016). In global settings, elites may view GGIs as more legitimate if procedures are characterized by impartiality and proportionality. In the case of international courts, for example, fair procedure may be the chief institutional source of legitimacy perceptions (cf. Helfer and Showalter 2017). As for performance, elites' legitimacy beliefs may grow when GGIs promote distributive justice through equitable sharing of benefits and burdens. Indeed, popular protests have repeatedly targeted global economic institutions, including the IMF, for allegedly producing unacceptable inequalities (O'Brien et al. 2000; Scholte et al. 2016). Conversely, GGIs with poverty alleviation profiles often legitimize themselves in terms of promoting fairness for underprivileged people (Zürn 2018).

In sum, we expect that elites will regard GGIs as more legitimate when these institutions are perceived to better meet norms of democratic, effective, and fair governance. For each of these institutional qualities, we hypothesize that elites who are more satisfied with them regarding a certain GGI, will perceive this GGI as more legitimate (*Hypothesis 3*).

Research Design

To test these hypotheses, we conducted a survey of political and societal leaders, examining in particular their assessments of the IMF, the UNFCCC and the UNSC. In the following, we describe the design and execution of the survey, the operationalization of legitimacy beliefs, and the levels of legitimacy that interviewed elites ascribed to the three GGIs.

Survey design and implementation

We use data from the Legitimacy in Global Governance (LegGov) Elite Survey, fielded between October 2017 and December 2018 (see Appendix A). The survey was directed at elites in five countries as well as elites active at the global level. The survey data cover interviews with 728 elite individuals: 125 in Brazil, 123 in Germany, 123 in the Philippines, 124 in South Africa, 98 in the USA, and 135 at the global level.

Elites are defined in this study as persons who hold leading positions in key organizations in society that strive to be politically influential. While most studies of elite opinion focus exclusively on political elites, the LegGov Elite Survey also covered societal elites, on the premise that both governmental and nongovernmental sectors aspire to influence issues addressed in global governance. In the general category of political elites, the survey covered partisan-political and bureaucratic elites. In the general category of societal elites, the survey covered elites in media, civil society, research, and business circles. In sum, then, we interviewed elites in six sectors.

The survey focused on elite opinion toward key GGIs in three issue areas: the IMF in economic governance, the UNFCCC in climate governance, and the UNSC in security governance. The IMF seeks to promote economic prosperity by supporting countries with balance of payments difficulties and by more generally advising on the macroeconomic policies of its member states. Decision-making in the IMF differentiates voting power between member states according to their capital subscriptions. Historically, the institution has come under fire for its structural adjustment programs, handling of financial crises, and policymaking processes (Woods 2007). The UNFCCC is the principal forum for global negotiations on efforts to combat climate change. Decisions are taken through consensus, even if states that are large emitters of greenhouse gases tend to have greater voice (Friman 2013). The institution is relatively open to non-state actors, but critics argue that its policies are ineffective and unfair (Bäckstrand and Kuyper 2017). The UNSC enjoys a broad range of powers to further

international peace and security. However, its decision-making arrangements have historically hampered the institution's capacity to act (Dreher and Vreeland 2014). Power is concentrated with the Council's five permanent members, who can wield the veto to prevent unwanted decisions. Apart from playing a central role in global governance, the three GGIs present settings that have been known to invoke legitimacy concerns, making them particularly interesting for this study (see also Bernstein 2005; Hurd 2007; Edwards 2009; Binder and Heupel 2015; Dellmuth et al. forthcoming).

The survey targeted elites in a selection of five countries that offer geographical diversity, varying positions in the current world order, as well as different experiences of the GGIs in question. Regarding the IMF, Brazil, the Philippines, and South Africa have undergone Fund-sponsored structural adjustment programs and are part of multi-country constituencies on the IMF Executive Board, while Germany and the USA have not experienced IMF conditionality and hold their own seats on the IMF Executive Board. Regarding the UNFCCC, our sample includes both Annex I (developed) countries and non-Annex I (developing) countries, with different obligations. All five countries ratified the 2015 Paris Agreement, but the USA later withdrew, and the recently elected president of Brazil takes an ambiguous position. Regarding the UNSC, only the USA is a permanent member, while Brazil, Germany, and South Africa have all made claims for a seat on a reformed council. Next to the five countries, the survey included a sixth category, consisting of elites in organizations with a global structure and scope. The diversity of the six contexts allows us to test explanations for legitimacy beliefs beyond specific national conditions, even if the sample is not strictly representative of elites around the world.

In the selection of interviewees, we relied on quota sampling as the preferred procedure, since it offers advantages in identifying, sampling, and surveying elites. Since an exhaustive database of politically relevant elites and organizations is not available, it was not possible to draw a random sample, as is commonly done in public opinion research. Instead, prospective interviewees were identified with a targeted selection procedure, based on their position within relevant organizations. We first identified key organizations within each of the six elite sectors in the respective countries and global field (Deutsch et al. 1967; Hoffmann-Lange 2009). Then, within those organizations, we identified people in high- and mid-level positions with a coordinating or strategic function, and working on substantive issues. Constructed in this targeted rather than random fashion, our sample is not strictly representative for political and societal elites in these countries, and the results of our analyses therefore cannot be extrapolated beyond our sample.

Using quota sampling, our target was to include at least 100 interviews per sub-sample (country or global). Within each sub-sample of 100, we aimed to include at least 25 partisan-political elites, 25 bureaucrats, 12 media elites, 12 civil society elites, 12 research elites and 12 business elites. The quotas for the two political elite categories are higher, since these circles are most directly involved in political decision-making. For the global sub-sample, the political elite categories included state delegates to GGIs and permanent officials of GGIs, next to elites in globally active academic, business, civil society, and media organizations. We also aimed for a balanced distribution of respondents across the issue-areas of economy, environment, and security. See Appendix A for more information on the composition of the quotas.

The preferred survey method was by telephone (83 per cent of the interviews). Upon request of the interviewee an online survey format was provided (17 per cent of the interviews). More information on our contact and interview procedures is included in Appendix A.

Operationalization

The survey asked specific questions about assessments, expectations, and experiences of the IMF, UNFCCC, and UNSC. Additional questions covered social and political attitudes that are potentially related to legitimacy perceptions. The data allow us to test the hypotheses presented earlier.

To measure elite perceptions of GGI legitimacy, respondents were asked about their degrees of confidence in the IMF, the UNFCCC, and the UNSC. They were asked to indicate whether they had (1) “no confidence at all,” (2) “not very much confidence,” (3) “quite a lot of confidence,” or (4) “a great deal of confidence.” Confidence, along with trust, has emerged as a common way to measure legitimacy beliefs (e.g., Caldeira and Gibson 1995; Inglehart 1997; Bühlmann and Kunz 2011; Norris 2011; Johnson 2011; Bernauer and Gampfer 2013; Voeten 2013; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015).

Using confidence as a measure of legitimacy has several advantages. First, it aligns well with our conceptualization of legitimacy as the belief that an institution exercises its authority appropriately. The confidence measure taps into respondents’ general faith in an institution, beyond short-term satisfaction with its distributional outcomes (Easton 1975; Hetherington 1998; Norris 2011). Second, a narrow measure of legitimacy, such as confidence (or trust), has advantages when studying sources or effects of legitimacy. Different from some alternative operationalizations, confidence does not integrate into the measure either potential sources of legitimacy (such as the fairness or effectiveness of an institution) or potential consequences of

legitimacy (such as compliance with an institution’s rules). Third, the confidence measure allows us to relate the findings of this study to the large literature on public opinion which also employs this indicator. Ultimately, one of the most interesting questions is whether the levels and drivers of elite legitimacy beliefs toward GGIs differ from those of the general public.

Table 1 presents the mean levels of confidence in the IMF, the UNFCCC, and the UNSC for our entire sample of respondents. On average, the interviewed elites have “quite a lot” of confidence in the UNFCCC. According to the paired t-tests ($p < 0.001$), average confidence toward the IMF and the UNSC is significantly lower, lying midway between “not very much” confidence and “quite a lot” of confidence.


Table 1. Mean confidence in the IMF, UNFCCC, and UNSC

	Mean	Standard deviation	95 % confidence interval	Range	N
IMF	2.572	0.801	[2.513; 2.632]	1-4	702
UNFCCC	2.852	0.822	[2.791; 2.913]	1-4	701
UNSC	2.479	0.805	[2.420; 2.538]	1-4	714

Source: LegGov Elite Survey 2017-2018.

Figure 1 breaks down confidence levels toward these three GGIs by sub-sample (countries and global). Dots indicate mean levels of confidence in the IMF, the UNFCCC, and the UNSC, while attached lines indicate the 95 per cent confidence intervals around the means. Confidence in the UNFCCC is particularly high among respondents in Brazil, the Philippines and in the global sub-sample. Paired t-tests also show that, in all sub-samples except the USA, the UNFCCC enjoys higher levels of confidence than the IMF and the UNSC, similar to what is observed for the overall sample ($p < 0.05$). In the USA, there is no statistically significant difference in elites’ confidence toward the UNFCCC and the IMF, but their confidence in both of these institutions is significantly higher than in the UNSC ($p < 0.05$). A higher level of confidence in the IMF is also observed among the global elites. Regarding the UNSC, elites in South Africa have significantly lower confidence in this institution than the other five sub-samples. Finally, Figure 1 shows that elites in all three countries in the Global South – Brazil, the Philippines, and South Africa – have significantly less confidence in both the UNSC and the IMF compared to the UNFCCC (differences confirmed by t-tests, $p < 0.001$).

Figure 1. Mean confidence by geographic sub-sample




Source: LegGov Elite Survey 2017-2018.

Notes: Mean confidence and 95% confidence intervals are presented. See Appendix C for mean values and standard deviations.

Figure 2 presents confidence levels when disaggregating the sample by elite sector. We observe that, in contrast to the country figures, the UNFCCC does not always score highest for confidence, as business elites accord similarly high levels of confidence to the IMF, distinguishing them from all other elites ($p < 0.01$). Business elites also accord significantly less confidence to the UNSC than to the IMF and the UNFCCC ($p < 0.001$).

Figure 2. Mean confidence by elite sector



Source: LegGov Elite Survey 2017-2018.

Note: Mean confidence and 95% confidence intervals are presented. See Appendix D for mean values and standard deviations.

To operationalize the explanatory variables, the elite survey asked questions which tapped into respondents' cosmopolitan orientation, their utilitarian calculation of country advantages, and their satisfaction with institutional qualities of each GGI. Full wordings of the various survey items are given in Appendix B. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of each survey item.

We use two separate measures for cosmopolitan orientation, respectively relating to cosmopolitan preferences and cosmopolitan identification. Regarding cosmopolitan preferences, respondents were asked whether the issue area that is key to the UNFCCC (environment), the UNSC (security), and the IMF (economy) should be dealt with on a global, regional, country or sub-national level. A dummy variable was created to indicate whether respondents preferred global governance for the issue (code 1) or governance on a different level (code 0). Table 2 shows that the majority of respondents identified the global as the most appropriate level for trade and environmental governance, while only a minority preferred global governance for issues related to development and military. Regarding cosmopolitan identification, respondents were asked about their level of attachment to the world as a community. The average respondent has quite some cosmopolitan identification.

Utilitarian calculation is also operationalized with two measures. First, respondents were asked to evaluate their country's influence in decision-making at the IMF, the UNFCCC, and the UNSC. Second, respondents were asked to assess how far their country benefits from decisions taken in these three GGIs. As can be seen in Table 2, respondents on average think that their country has close to "little influence" in the decision-making process of the UNSC, and something between "little influence" and "quite some influence" in the UNFCCC and the IMF. Also, respondents estimate the benefits to their country from the UNSC and the IMF as mid-way between "low benefit" and "quite some benefit", and close to "quite some benefit" from the UNFCCC.

Respondents' satisfaction with institutional qualities of the GGIs is measured through separate survey items asking respondents to what extent they are satisfied with the level of democracy, fairness, and effectiveness in the IMF, the UNFCCC, and the UNSC, on a scale from 1 to 10. Paired t-tests show that the UNFCCC scores significantly higher than the UNSC and the IMF on respondents' satisfaction with democracy and fairness ($p < 0.001$). On effectiveness, the UNFCCC scores significantly higher than the UNSC, but is at the same level as the IMF.

Finally, the models include controls for age and sex. The mean as well as median age of respondents is 51 years. The gender distribution of respondents is 65 percent male and 35 percent female. The overrepresentation of older and male individuals corresponds to commonly observed socio-demographics of elites.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables

Variable	Proportion	Range
<i>Cosmopolitan orientation</i>		
Cosmopolitan preference	Trade: 53% Development: 38% Environment: 61% Defense: 19%	0-1
<hr/>		
Mean (SD)		
<hr/>		
<i>Cosmopolitan orientation</i>		
Cosmopolitan identification	2.992 (0.784)	1-4
<i>Country advantage</i>		
Country influence	IMF: 2.441 (0.874) UNFCCC: 2.575 (0.807) UNSC: 2.148 (0.999)	1-4
Country benefit	IMF: 2.650 (0.818) UNFCCC: 2.844 (0.826) UNSC: 2.518 (0.901)	1-4
<i>Institutional satisfaction</i>		
Democracy	IMF: 4.677 (2.143) UNFCCC: 6.211 (1.996) UNSC: 4.338 (2.353)	1-10
Effectiveness	IMF: 5.616 (2.099) UNFCCC: 5.631 (1.929) UNSC: 4.918 (2.168)	1-10
Fairness	IMF: 5.067 (2.116) UNFCCC: 6.284 (1.946) UNSC: 4.838 (2.169)	1-10

Source: LegGov Elite Survey 2017-2018.

Explanatory Analysis

We now turn to testing how far our theoretically developed hypotheses explain elite legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis the three GGIs. Do cosmopolitan orientation and utilitarian calculation explain elite perceptions of GGI legitimacy, in line with earlier research on public opinion toward GGIs? Or might evaluations of institutional qualities matter more for elites' legitimacy perceptions, as suggested in some prior international relations research? And how far might these explanatory accounts differ between GGIs in the three issue areas?

Tables 3A, 3B and 3C present the results in odds ratios of the generalized ordered logistic regression models, simultaneously testing the three lines of explanation in relation to the three GGIs.⁵ Odds ratios above 1 indicate that higher values on the independent variable make it more likely that a respondent has a higher level of confidence in the GGI. Odds ratios below 1 indicate that higher values on the independent variable increase the likelihood of having the current level of confidence in the GGI, or to have less confidence. Country-fixed effects and clustered robust standard errors are included in all analyses to account for the clustering of the data into six sub-samples (5 countries and a global sample). We estimate generalized ordered logistic regression models, since the dependent variable consists of four categories that can be ranked from lower to higher confidence in a GGI, and since a Brant test (of the parallel regression assumption underlying ordered logistic regression) is significant ($\chi^2_{IMF}=58.85$, $p<0.01$; $\chi^2_{UNFCCC}=49.76$, $p<0.01$; $\chi^2_{UNSC}=65.09$, $p<0.001$). This test suggests that the parallel lines assumption of the ordered logit estimation is violated⁶ for at least one of the independent variables in the model (Long 2012). Additionally, a Wald test is used to identify the independent variables for which the parallel lines assumption is violated (Williams 2006). Finally, models are fitted that only impose the parallel lines assumption to those variables for which the Wald test has indicated that the assumption is not violated (i.e. partial proportional odds models are estimated).

The effect size of variables for which the parallel lines assumption has not been violated can be interpreted as follows, using satisfaction with the fairness of the IMF as an example: for a one-unit increase in satisfaction with the fairness of the IMF, the odds of having more confidence in the IMF compared to having less confidence in the IMF change by a factor of 1.842, or increase by 84.2 percent, holding other variables constant. However, to interpret the size of the relationship between the other variables of interest and levels of confidence in the GGIs, we turn to the estimated marginal effects for the different confidence outcomes, while keeping the other variables in the model fixed at their means. The marginal effects of the explanatory variables that are consistently significantly related to confidence in the three GGIs are included in Figures 4A-C. For each GGI, the figures present the predicted probability of

⁵ When each line of explanations is tested separately, the results are largely the same. The only deviations are: (1) preference for trade on the global level and perceived influence of one's country in the IMF are significantly positively related to confidence in the IMF; and (2) respondents with a stronger cosmopolitan identification tend to have significantly more confidence in the UNFCCC. Yet, those variables account for but a few percentage points in explained variance.

⁶ When this assumption is violated, the relationship between the independent variable and confidence is not the same at every value of the independent variable. Hence, separate estimations of the relationship have to be estimated, which calls for more nuanced interpretations.

having a certain level of confidence when respondents expressed a certain level of perceived benefits from, or satisfaction with the institutional qualities of, this GGI.

Table 3A. Explaining elite confidence in the IMF

Contrasted categories confidence IMF	1 vs. 2, 3, 4	1 and 2 vs. 3, 4	1, 2, 3 vs. 4
	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio
<i>Cosmopolitan orientation</i>			
Cosmopolitan preference: trade	0.756	1.797*	1.158
Cosmopolitan preference: development	0.964	0.964	0.964
Cosmopolitan identification	0.998	0.998	0.998
<i>Utilitarian calculation</i>			
Country influence IMF	1.189	1.189	1.189
Country benefit IMF	1.432**	1.432**	1.432**
<i>Institutional satisfaction</i>			
Democracy IMF	1.112*	1.112*	1.112*
Effectiveness IMF	1.202***	1.202***	1.202***
Fairness IMF	1.842***	1.842***	1.842***
<i>Controls</i>			
Age	1.007	1.007	1.007
Gender (female = 1)	0.746	0.746	0.746
<i>Country fixed effects (global = ref.)</i>			
Brazil	0.599	1.146	0.487***
Germany	0.919	0.024	1.260
Philippines	0.496	0.197***	0.647**
South Africa	0.514	0.340***	0.841
USA	0.465***	0.465***	0.465***
Baseline odds	0.161*	0.005***	0.000***
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-515.5		
N	639		
Pseudo-R ²	0.3090		

Source: LegGov Elite Survey 2017-2018.

Notes: Coefficients of the generalized ordered logistic models estimated in Stata 15, using *gologit2* (Williams, 2006). The parallel lines assumption is violated for cosmopolitan preference trade, Brazil, Germany, Philippines, South Africa and USA.

Table 3B. Explaining elite confidence in the UNFCCC

Contrasted categories confidence UNFCCC	1 vs. 2, 3, 4	1 and 2 vs. 3, 4	1, 2, 3 vs. 4
	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio
<i>Cosmopolitan orientation</i>			
Cosmopolitan preference: environment	2.862**	1.005	0.743
Cosmopolitan identification	1.018	1.018	1.018
<i>Utilitarian calculation</i>			
Country influence UNFCCC	0.989	0.989	0.989
Country benefit UNFCCC	0.874	1.996***	1.866**
<i>Institutional satisfaction</i>			
Democracy UNFCCC	1.236***	1.236***	1.236***
Effectiveness UNFCCC	1.828***	1.326***	1.380***
Fairness UNFCCC	1.332***	1.332***	1.332***
<i>Controls</i>			
Age	1.020*	1.020*	1.020*
Gender (female = 1)	1.355	1.355	1.355
<i>Country fixed effects (global = ref.)</i>			
Brazil	0.215***	2.052***	1.815***
Germany	2.712**	0.692**	0.906
Philippines	0.810**	0.810**	0.810**
South Africa	0.304***	1.037	0.493***
USA	0.120***	0.460***	0.699***
Baseline odds	0.061**	0.001***	0.000***
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-535.2		
N	605		
Pseudo-R ²	0.2606		

Source: LegGov Elite Survey 2017-2018.

Notes: Coefficients of the generalized ordered logistic models estimated in Stata 15, using *gologit2* (Williams, 2006). The parallel lines assumption is violated for cosmopolitan preference environment, country benefit, effectiveness UNFCCC, Brazil, Germany, Philippines, South Africa and USA.

Table 3C. Explaining elite confidence in the UNSC

Contrasted categories confidence UNSC	1 vs. 2, 3, 4	1 and 2 vs. 3, 4	1, 2, 3 vs. 4
	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio
<i>Cosmopolitan orientation</i>			
Cosmopolitan preference: defense	1.002	0.802	2.455*
Cosmopolitan identification	0.907	0.907	0.907
<i>Utilitarian calculation</i>			
Country influence UNSC	0.952	0.952	0.952
Country benefit UNSC	1.767***	1.767***	1.767***
<i>Institutional satisfaction</i>			
Democracy UNSC	1.123***	1.123***	1.123***
Effectiveness UNSC	1.316***	1.316***	1.316***
Fairness UNSC	1.486***	1.486***	1.486***
<i>Controls</i>			
Age	1.001	1.001	1.001
Gender (female = 1)	1.275	1.431	0.813
<i>Country fixed effects (global = ref.)</i>			
Brazil	1.100	6.947	2.345***
Germany	2.213***	3.371***	1.194*
Philippines	1.115	1.090	4.041***
South Africa	0.697***	1.284**	0.512***
USA	1.523***	1.742***	0.525***
Baseline odds	0.113***	0.002***	0.000***
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-550.9		
N	652		
Pseudo-R ²	0.2904		

Source: LegGov Elite Survey 2017-2018.


Notes: Coefficients of the generalized ordered logistic models estimated in Stata 15, using *gologit2* (Williams, 2006). The parallel lines assumption is violated for cosmopolitan preference defense, Brazil, Germany, Philippines, South Africa and USA.

As Tables 3A-C indicate, our survey evidence rejects the first hypothesis on *cosmopolitan orientation*: namely, that elites who think more globally are more likely to perceive GGIs as legitimate. Neither a preference for global problem-solving nor a cosmopolitan identification has a consistently significant correlation with respondents' levels of confidence in the IMF, the UNFCCC or the UNSC. While one might suspect that insufficient variation of cosmopolitan orientation across elites could explain the absence of significant effects, the data does not support this interpretation (see Table 2). Overall, this finding suggests that one of the commonly established sources of public opinion toward GGIs does not drive elite legitimacy beliefs toward GGIs (Norris 2000; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Hobolt and de Vries 2016).

Results for the hypothesis regarding *utilitarian calculation of country advantage* are mixed between the two indicators. The first indicator, perceived influence in the decision-making of the IMF, the UNFCCC and the UNSC, lacks a statistically significant correlation to confidence in these GGIs. The second indicator, perceived benefit to one's country from the policies of the respective GGIs, has a significant odds ratio above 1 for confidence in all three institutions. This means that perceiving more benefits from a GGI for one's country makes higher levels of confidence more likely. For the IMF, it is observed that for a one-unit increase in perceived country benefits, the odds of having more confidence in the IMF compared to having less confidence in the IMF change by a factor of 1.432, or an increase by 43.2 percent, holding other variables constant. For the UNSC, a one-unit increase in perceived country benefits changes the odds of having more confidence by a factor of 1.767.

Given that the parallel lines assumption is violated for country benefits in the model for the UNFCCC, we look instead at the calculated marginal effects (predicted probabilities) in Figure 3. These figures illustrate the magnitude of the association between perceived country benefits and confidence in GGIs, and they show the predicted probability for specific levels of confidence at specific levels of perceived benefits. For all three institutions, we observe that at higher levels of perceived benefits, the predicted probability of having 'quite a lot of confidence' increases, while the predicted probability of having 'not very much confidence' decreases. The steepness of the curves indicates the magnitude of the relationship. For the UNFCCC, the figure shows why no significant relationship is observed when the odds of scoring 1 on the confidence scale are compared to higher levels of confidence. Moreover, the figure shows that, in comparison to the IMF and UNSC, for the UNFCCC the predicted probability of having 'a great deal of confidence' substantially increases (from 5 to 22 percent) when respondents move from the lowest to the highest score on the measure of perceived country benefits from the organization.

Figure 3. Marginal effects perceived country benefits



Source: LegGov Elite Survey 2017-2018.

Notes: The figures present predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals.

We furthermore hypothesized that perceived country advantages would be a particularly relevant explanation among political, as opposed to societal, elites. Political elites include partisan-political elites, elites within national bureaucracies, and national representatives at GGIs.⁷ This expectation is tested by including interaction effects in the regression models of Tables 3A-C. We indeed observe such an effect in respect of the UNFCCC, both regarding the perceived influence of one's country in the decision-making process and regarding the perceived benefits for one's country from policies (see Appendix E). The positive interaction effect indicates that the positive relationship between the two utilitarian measures and confidence in the UNFCCC is significantly stronger among political elites than societal elites. However, no such significant interaction effects are observed in respect of the IMF and the UNSC.

⁷ The dataset includes 316 political elites, and 304 societal elites in the country samples. The analyses exclude the global societal elites and permanent officials of GGIs, as these groups are assumed to have less concerns about their home country.

Overall, the results for hypotheses 2a and 2b suggest that elites' legitimacy beliefs are partly driven by the same utilitarian dynamics that have been shown to shape public opinion toward GGIs (Anderson and Reichert 1995; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Lake 2009; Hobolt and de Vries). The important qualification is that elites care more about policy benefits than decision-making influence, which only matters for political circles in respect of the UNFCCC.

The third hypothesis, emphasizing *institutional satisfaction*, proposed that elites will regard GGIs as more legitimate the more these institutions are perceived to meet norms of democratic, effective, and fair governance. Tables 3A-C present the relationship between confidence and satisfaction with democracy, effectiveness, and fairness in each GGI, finding consistent support for this hypothesis. A more positive assessment of each institutional quality makes greater confidence in the GGI significantly more likely. As the parallel lines assumption is not violated for most of these variables in the case of the IMF and the UNSC, we can easily compare the odds ratios within these institutions. For the IMF, the association with confidence is most substantial for elites' satisfaction with its fairness (odds ratio is 1.842). This correlation also shows the strongest relationship among all considered factors for confidence in the IMF. For the UNSC it is less clear-cut which association is more substantial. For the UNFCCC, the parallel lines assumption is violated for satisfaction with the institutions' effectiveness, calling for a more detailed interpretation. It is observed that the odds of scoring the lowest level of confidence in the UNFCCC is lower, the more elites are satisfied with the effectiveness of the UNFCCC. At this estimation point (contrasting score '1' in confidence to the other scores), is the most substantial observed relationship. Yet, at the other estimation points, the relationship between perceived country benefits and confidence in the UNFCCC seems more substantial.


Next to the regression tables, we include Figures 4A-C, estimating marginal effects. These figures provide more specific information on the predicted probability for a specific level of confidence at specific levels of institutional satisfaction. For the IMF, for instance, the predicted probability of having 'a great deal of confidence' raises from 0 per cent to 42 per cent when respondents are entirely satisfied with its fairness, rather than not satisfied at all. For the UNFCCC, high levels of satisfaction with all three institutional qualities significantly heightens predicted probabilities to have the highest level of confidence. For the UNSC, none of the institutional qualities steeply raises the predicted probability of having the highest confidence level. However, perceived benefits from the UNSC are clearly more strongly related to elite confidence in that institution.

In sum, our analysis suggests that elites' beliefs in the legitimacy of GGIs are most consistently related to institutional concerns. These findings corroborate recent theorization in

the field of international relations (Hurd 2007; Scholte and Tallberg 2018; Tallberg and Zürn 2019) as well as several empirical studies in public opinion research (Bechtel and Scheve 2013; Binder and Heupel 2015; Anderson et al. 2018; Dellmuth et al. forthcoming).


Figure 4. Marginal effects institutional satisfaction


A) IMF



Source: LegGov Elite Survey 2017-2018.
 Notes: The figures present predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals.

B) UNFCCC






Source: LegGov Elite Survey 2017-2018.

Notes: The figures present predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals.

C) UNSC



Source: LegGov Elite Survey 2017-2018.

Notes: The figures present predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals.

The analysis of country-fixed effects (Tables 3A-C) assesses the likelihood that elites in the five country sub-samples to have more or less confidence in the three GGIs, using global elites as the reference category for comparison and keeping all other factors in the model equal. Elites in Brazil are more likely to have the highest level of confidence in both the UNSC and

UNFCCC. Regarding the IMF, it is more likely that Brazilian elites have ‘quite a lot of confidence’ or less, than to have ‘a great deal of confidence’. German elites tend to have more confidence in the UNSC than global, but for the UNFCCC they are more likely to have indicated ‘(2) not very much confidence’, compared to global elites. No significant differences are observed for Germany regarding confidence in the IMF. South African elites tend to have less confidence in the IMF and the UNFCCC than global elites, while the picture regarding the UNSC is mixed. Like South Africa, US elites tend to have less confidence in the IMF and the UNFCCC compared to global elites. Hence, multivariate calculations reconfirm some of the differences across countries observed in Figure 1, while others disappear, reverse or are further qualified.

Finally, the control variables (see Tables 3A-C) indicate that for each year a respondent is older, the odds of having more confidence changes with a factor of 1.020. Gender is not statistically significant in any model.

Taken together, these findings lend broad and consistent support to the expectation that institutional satisfaction shapes elites’ confidence in GGIs. For all three GGIs, satisfaction with democracy, effectiveness, and fairness at the institution explains a substantial share of the variation in elite confidence. The results also offer some, but more mixed, support for utilitarian calculation as an explanation of elite confidence in GGIs. While assessments of country benefits from GGI policies positively relate to elite confidence in these institutions, evaluations of country advantages through influence in GGI decision-making only matter for political elites in relation to the UNFCCC. The evidence shows no significant relationship between cosmopolitan orientation and elite perceptions of GGI legitimacy.

In addition to the main analyses presented in this paper, we performed a number of robustness tests to verify whether the results would have been different had we used alternative operationalizations of the theoretical expectations, or had we included additional control variables. We also tested whether the conclusions of the analyses hold in various subsets of the data. These tests confirmed the main lines of the argument resulting from the presented analyses.

First, we tested an alternative way of operationalizing institutional satisfaction. The main analyses used measures of respondents’ satisfaction with each GGI’s democracy, effectiveness and fairness. Yet, elites may vary in the extent to which they prioritize democracy, effectiveness or fairness in global governance. Could it be that the assessment of an institutional quality weighs in more in the level of confidence in a specific GGI when one attributes more

importance to this institutional quality? To answer this question, we examined the extent to which each respondent prioritizes democracy, effectiveness and fairness in respect of GGIs and interacted this opinion with satisfaction with these qualities for each GGI. However, these calculations only revealed a significant relationship in the case of the UNSC regarding fairness. The relationship between satisfaction with institutional fairness and confidence in the UNSC is stronger when respondents attach more importance to fairness vis-à-vis GGIs. Given the limited contribution to the analysis of this ‘weighting’ of independent variables, we excluded this option in favor of a more straightforward argument.

Second, we replicated the main analysis with additional control variables beyond age and gender. Previous studies of public opinion towards the EU have observed mechanisms of congruence and compensation between country-level attitudes, experiences and identification on the one hand, and confidence in EU institutions on the other (Armingeon & Ceka, 2014; Arnold et al., 2012; Hartevelde et al., 2013; Kumlin, 2009). Thus we included robustness tests regarding satisfaction with national economic outcomes, satisfaction with the political system in one’s country, confidence in national government, and national identification. The only significant relationship that resulted showed that respondents who have more confidence in their national government tend to have more confidence in the IMF. Since inclusion of these controls does not alter any of the conclusions of the paper, we excluded these variables were excluded from the final analyses in order not to overcrowd the models.

Third, we tested whether the observation that cosmopolitan orientation is not significantly related to elites’ confidence in the IMF, UNFCCC and UNSC, while institutional satisfaction is significantly related to elite confidence in these GGIs holds across the different (country and global) sub-samples, across both political and societal elites, and when one distinguishes between elites based on their level of specialization in global governance. The conclusion proved to be robust for this test. The latter is particularly important, given that cosmopolitan orientation, which has been recurrently observed as a key explanation for variation in citizen confidence in GGIs and the EU, does not explain variation in elite confidence in the IMF, UNFCCC or UNSC. One reason for this difference could be that citizens (who generally have less knowledge of and experience with GGIs than elites) use a more general orientation towards global governance and global community as cognitive shortcuts (Armingeon and Ceka, 2014). While a conclusive answer to this question would require a comparative study of public and elite opinion, we explored this mechanism among our elite sample with two tests. First, we tested whether the relationship between cosmopolitan orientation and confidence in each GGI is different for respondents who correctly answered all knowledge questions about GGIs.

Second, we distinguished between respondents who do not have any experience with the GGI of interest, and those who do. However, these two tests showed hardly any significant relationships. Thus, within this sample of elites, variation in levels of political sophistication and levels of experience with the GGIs does not explain why cosmopolitan orientation is not significantly related to elites' confidence in the IMF, UNFCCC and UNSC.

Conclusion

This paper has offered a unique systematic examination of legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis global governance held by elites around the world. Survey evidence from over 700 people in leading national and global positions across six elite sectors has been used to measure and explain levels of legitimacy toward three GGIs – the IMF, the UNFCCC, and the UNSC. The analysis yields several important results. While we cannot generalize these findings beyond our sample, they suggest conclusions of broader relevance. In particular, our findings defy certain expectations derived from previous studies of legitimacy in global governance.

As noted earlier, existing research on public opinion toward GGIs has regularly found that social identification and utilitarian calculation are major factors explaining citizen approval. Yet, this study of elite opinion towards the IMF, the UNFCCC, and the UNSC suggests a different picture. For one thing, cosmopolitan orientation does not contribute to the explanation of elite opinion toward the three GGIs explored here. Neither a preference for global problem-solving nor a cosmopolitan identification is significantly related to elites' perceptions of GGI legitimacy.

Evidence regarding utilitarian calculation as an explanation of elite legitimacy beliefs towards GGIs is mixed. Consistent with the theoretical expectation we find that, for all three GGIs studied, the more elites perceive their country to benefit from that institution's policies, the more they also consider it to be more legitimate. However, no such systematic relationship is found for our study's second measure of utilitarian calculation, focused on perceptions of country influence in GGI decision-making. Neither do the results support the more specific expectation that country advantage matters more for the legitimacy beliefs of political elites than societal elites, although this relationship does hold for the UNFCCC.

Instead of cosmopolitan orientation or utilitarian calculation, the most powerful explanation of elites' legitimacy beliefs is their satisfaction with the levels of democracy, effectiveness, and fairness in the procedures and performance of the three GGIs. The more

satisfied elites are with these institutional qualities, the more legitimate they find the three GGIs to be. As established in the robustness tests, this finding holds for both political and societal elites, and for elites in all five countries as well as at the global level. While all three institutional qualities matter consistently in respect of all three GGIs, an especially strong link exists between institutional fairness and legitimacy in the case of the IMF, possibly owing to fairness concerns around the Fund's voting arrangements and/or distributional effects (Gronau & Schmidtke, 2016).

How should we interpret these findings? Apparently, assessments of the extent to which GGIs uphold the qualities of democracy, effectiveness, and fairness in their functioning is what really matters for elites, next to assessments of country benefits from GGI policies. In contrast, elites' cosmopolitan orientation is of little or no importance for their beliefs in the legitimacy of GGIs. Possibly, this is due to elites being politically more sophisticated than the general public, which leads them to rely less on social identification and narrow self-interest when forming opinions about GGIs, and more on an evaluation of how these institutions conform to abstract principles of appropriate governance. It may also be because elites, unlike citizens at large, generally have greater access to GGIs and therefore have greater opportunity to judge their detailed institutional workings.⁸

These results suggest several important implications for research and policy on global governance. First, they indicate that the prevailing debate between social identification and utilitarian calculation as drivers of opinions on global issues (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Lake 2009; Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Rho and Tomz 2017) misses an important additional explanation – institutional satisfaction. Many global issues, from climate change treaties and multilateral aid arrangements to security guarantees and governance reforms involve aspects of institutional design. By demonstrating how institutional satisfaction matters for elite perceptions of GGI legitimacy, we complement others who recently have shown how institutional qualities of international agreements and organizations shape public opinion (Bechtel and Scheve 2013; Anderson et al. 2018; Dellmuth et al. forthcoming).

Second, these findings call for further research that systematically compares elite and public opinion toward GGIs. With the exception of work on effects of elite cuing (Gabel and Scheve 2007; Guisinger and Saunders 2017), existing research on elite and public opinion is curiously divided. While this study suggests that different dynamics may apply between leaders

⁸ Indeed, 66 percent of elite respondents scored full on three knowledge items about global governance in the survey, compared to only 17 percent of the US sample and 12 percent of the German sample in the most recent wave of the World Values Survey (forthcoming).

and citizens at large, properly examining this issue requires systematically coordinated surveys, measurements, and analyses for the two groups. Such an approach would allow us to address a number of critical questions. For instance, is there a gap in the perceived legitimacy of GGIs between elites and citizens, as support for anti-globalist populism would suggest? If so, what accounts for citizens' greater skepticism toward GGIs compared to elites?

Third, in the realm of practical politics, these findings have implications for GGIs' efforts to win the approval of elite audiences (Zaum 2013; Gronau and Schmidtke 2015). Thus, for example, GGI invocations of rhetoric about "international interdependence" and "global community" are unlikely to sway their elite constituencies. Nor will GGI efforts to stress opportunities for influence for particular countries necessarily generate major increases in support from the elites of those countries; on the contrary, this could decrease perceptions of fairness or democracy among the wider community of actors. Instead, by the findings of this study, GGIs seeking to bolster their legitimacy in the eyes of elites do best to enhance their democratic, effective, and fair qualities, as well as the benefits they deliver to countries.

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Appendix A. Respondent selection and interviewing procedures

Selection procedure

Figure A.1. presents an overview of the subsamples and within them elite sectors in the LegGov Elite Survey. The figure also indicates the quota of interviews to be completed within each sector, for each sample. By completion of the field period, at least 100 interviews will be conducted in each country and in the global sample, adding up to 600 interviews.

A targeted selection procedure using the positional method as described by Hoffmann-Lange (2009) was used to identify the most relevant people to interview for our study on legitimacy beliefs about GGIs among political and societal elites. As a first step in the two-step procedure, in each of the six samples (Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, South Africa, the USA and global), we identified the most central organizations and institutions within each of the six societal sectors of interest (partisan-political, bureaucracy, media, civil society, research and business). This selection was based on the expertise of the research team on global and regional governance organizations and transnational actors (e.g. Tallberg et al., 2013), the generous assistance of scholars specialized in the various national contexts, available databases and previous publications on civil society organizations, participation and accreditation lists of meetings of the GGIs that are central to our study and statistics on audience size for media organizations.

In the selection of these organizations, three types of balances were taken into account in order to arrive at a sufficiently varied sample. While in the global sample organizations and institutions all had an international orientation, both *nationally and internationally oriented organizations* were selected in the country samples. This mix is required to arrive at a (non-representative) picture of the views of, for instance, ‘Brazilian elites’ and not of solely ‘internationally oriented Brazilian elites’. The organizations and institutions we selected approximate an even representation of nationally and internationally oriented organizations. The inclusion of internationally oriented organizations in both the global and the country samples, raises the question of the demarcation between organizations that qualify for the global sample, and those that qualify for the country samples. We based this demarcation on the location of the main office(s) of an organization or institution. A philanthropic foundation based in the USA providing development aid to countries in the global South, for instance, is regarded as part of the USA civil society sample. A similar organization but with developed branches in multiple countries, would be regarded as a global organization. Similarly, BBC Global with its

broad base of reporters around the world would qualify for the global media sample, while a nationally oriented newspaper in the Philippines would be part of the Philippines sample, even though the newspaper also reports on international issues.

A second balance we strived for in the selection and interviews, is regarding the three *issue areas* in which the international organizations in our study can be grouped: security, economic and sustainable development governance, each broadly defined. Hence, they include amongst others organizations and institutions working on issues such as military, defense, environment, energy, trade, finance and labour. We aimed to reach an even distribution among issue areas in the six societal sectors in which we interviewed elites.

The purpose of the third balance is to account for the importance of *sub-national level* elites. The proportion of sub-national level elites selected depended on the structure of the country (more sub-national level elites were selected in more decentralized countries) and this balance was mostly – but not exclusively – strived for in the selection of partisan-political and bureaucratic elites.

Figure A.1. Distribution of interviews over elite samples and sectors

Total elite sample (600)			
Country samples (500)		Global sample (100)	
Political (250)	Societal (250)	Political (50)	Societal (50)
- Partisan-political (25/sample)	- Media (12/sample)	- National representatives at GGIs (25 per sample)	- Media (12/sample)
- Bureaucratic (25/sample)	- Research (13/sample)	- Permanent officials of GGIs (25 per sample)	- Research (13/sample)
	- Civil society (13/sample)		- Civil society (13/sample)
	- Business (12/sample)		- Business (12/sample)

Notes: Quota sampling per category is used, with due attention to the balances in issue area, national or international orientation and governance level within the country.

Once a sufficiently varied sample of relevant organizations was compiled, the second step was the identification of relevant people in leading positions within these organizations. People in mid- and high-level positions with a coordinating or strategic function, and working on substantive issues within their organization, were eligible for our study. For example, in the partisan-political category this included elected politicians such as senators and parliamentarians and their chief of staff, chief of communication and senior advisors. In the media category, this included editors and senior journalists. Senior researchers, professors and

postdoctoral researchers in relevant fields and think tanks were interviewed for the research category. In civil society organizations, this included, amongst others, general directors, advocacy directors, strategic advisors, leading activists and communication directors. In businesses, we interviewed managers, communication directors, and senior press and international relations officers. In the category of national representatives at GGIs we interviewed ambassadors, heads of delegations and senior advisors or negotiators. Within GGIs we interviewed presidents and directors, heads of committees within the GGI, senior officers and advisors, chiefs of staff, communication directors and spokespersons. Finally, interviewees within bureaucracies included senior diplomats and ambassadors, directors and advisors of departments related to the issue areas of our study, judges and highly ranked people within the military.

Also in the selection of specific people, we strived towards a balance between people in nationally and internationally oriented functions. This means, for instance, that we did not limit our study to parliamentarians that are part of the Foreign Affairs committee, or journalists working at the international division of their news outlet. When inviting respondents, we did notice that nationally oriented elites sometimes wanted to verify whether we did not rather want to speak with a colleague that is more specialized in international issues. Explaining the rationale behind our selection usually clarified the issue. For internationally oriented elites, the invitation to participate in an interview on international issues was more intuitive.

Contacting procedure

Contact with the selected people was first established by sending them an invitation for an interview.⁹ This invitation included information on the purpose of the study, the way in which data would be handled (anonymity and confidence) and the practicalities of the interview (telephone interview). Where direct email addresses were available, we used these. In other cases, we wrote to a specific person through a more general email address of the organization, or we first called or emailed the office to inquire about the contact details about a specific person. The first interview invitations were sent out in October 2017.

About a week after the invitations were sent, a telephone call was made to the offices of the invited people to inquire about their availability for an interview. When telephone numbers were not available, we followed up through email. When subsequent calling attempts were

⁹ The contacting procedure we used is based on Dillman et al. (2014), with adaptations made to tailor the method to our specific target group (elites, in contrast to the general public).

unsuccessful, we followed-up by another email reminder, again stating the relevance of the research and particularly of the importance of participation for the quality of our research. After this reminder, we followed up again by calling the office of the person we wanted to interview. In cases where these procedures resulted in neither a participation, nor a decline, we sent up to two more reminders, this time offering a link to an online survey that contained exactly the same questions as the telephone survey.

As the data collection has not been finished by the time this conference paper was written, a response rate has not been calculated yet. It is currently estimated to be around 35 per cent. While country-differences occur, overall partisan-political, business and media people have been the hardest categories to schedule an interview with. Compared to public opinion surveys that aim to gather data on a representative sample of the population, this is a rather low response rate. Yet, compared to other elite studies, it is not unusual (Walgrave and Joly 2018).

Interviews

The preferred survey mode was telephone surveys as these offer multiple benefits. First, one can more easily verify whether the correct person takes the survey (and not an assistant, for instance). Second, it allows recording the level of interest and concentration of the respondent during the interview, as an indication of the quality of the data. Third, the interviewer could provide standard clarifications should questions come up during the interview.

In cases where we couldn't get access to a telephone number of invited respondents, we would send out a link to the online version of the survey. Also, upon specific request, we would provide this option. Time was the main reason for such requests, as it takes less time to complete the survey online than over the phone. In these cases, it was clearly communicated that we particularly invited the respondent for the interview (and not an assistant, for instance) and we added a control question at the end of the online survey. So far, 87 per cent of the interviews was completed over the phone, 13 per cent online. In both survey modes contained identical questions and response options.

In addition to the survey mode, the choice for a survey rather than open-ended interviews when studying elites, requires some additional reflection. As also noted in previous studies (e.g. Aberbach et al. 1975), people in leading positions are not always as keen on participating in surveys. Some interviewees had to get used to the standardized approach as being asked to select one response option did not allow them to elaborate on their own framework of thinking about the issues we asked them about. Some interviewees wanted to contextualize their

responses, but they only had this opportunity for the most central concept in the study: confidence in institutions. This qualitative information is analyzed in a separate publication.

Since the aim of our study is to “explain the structure of relationships within a clearly defined system of variables” (Aberbach et al. 1975, p. 5), however, the comparability of answers to specific questions took priority over capturing more individualized accounts about international organizations. Indeed, an important innovation of our study lays in the fact that we systematically study patterns of variation in legitimacy beliefs of a broad set of GGIs among a diverse set of elites covering six societal sectors, five countries and the global level. These unique large-scale quantitative data allow us to answer research questions which can hardly be answered with qualitative interview data.

Another concern about the interviews is the truthfulness of interviewees. While this is an important question for all categories of interviewees in any type of research, this is a particular concern when respondents’ function implies high levels of public visibility. To limit this problem, we stressed the confidentiality and anonymity of the interviews in all our communications. We clarified that all personal data is removed at the end of the fieldwork period, that we only perform large-scale analyses with the data instead of reporting the responses of a single respondent, and the use of standardized response options also contributes to the anonymity of participating. The standardized format was thus experienced as a limitation by some respondents, but as a relief to others. Finally, after having ended the telephone interview, the interviewers reported on their impression of whether the respondent was alone when they took the interview and whether they felt that the respondent spoke freely during the interview. Of course, this is only a subjective estimation, but in 86 per cent of the cases the respondent seemed to be alone in a room so that the conversation could not be overheard, and the impression among interviewers that respondents spoke freely was even more widespread.

Appendix B.

Variable	Question wording
<i>Cosmopolitan orientation</i>	
Cosmopolitan preference	<p>Issues may be addressed at different levels of decision-making. What do you think is the most appropriate level for dealing with the following policy areas? The sub-national level, the national level, the regional level (which gathers countries in the same geographical region), or the global level?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Environment - Trade - Defense - Development <p>(global level is coded as '1', other levels as '0', sum scale)</p>
Cosmopolitan identification	<p>People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How close do you feel to the world? <p>Response options: very close (1), close (2), not very close (3), not close at all (4). (Answers reversely coded)</p>
<i>Country advantage</i>	
Country influence	<p>How much influence do you think [country] has in the decision-making process in each of the following international organizations? Do you think [country] has no influence at all, little influence, quite some influence or a lot of influence?</p> <p>Response options: no influence at all (1), little influence (2), quite some influence (3), a lot of influence (4).</p>
Country benefit	<p>How much do you think [country] benefits from the decisions taken in each of the following international organizations? Do you think [country] has no benefit at all, a low benefit, a moderate benefit or a major benefit?</p> <p>Response options: no benefit at all (1), low benefit (2), quite some benefit (3), major benefit (4).</p>
<i>Institutional satisfaction</i>	
Democracy	<p>How satisfied are you with the level of democracy of the following international organizations? You can choose a number between 1: not satisfied at all with its democracy, and 10: completely satisfied with its democracy.</p>
Effectiveness	<p>How satisfied are you with the level of effectiveness of the following international organizations?</p> <p>You can choose a number between 1: not satisfied at all with its effectiveness, and 10: completely satisfied with its effectiveness.</p>
Fairness	<p>How satisfied are you with the level of fairness of the following international organizations? You can choose a number between 1: not satisfied at all with its fairness, and 10: completely satisfied with its fairness.</p>

Appendix C.

	IMF	UNFCCC	UNSC
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Global	2.815 (0.745)	2.984 (0.715)	2.401 (0.750)
Brazil	2.556 (0.819)	3.000 (0.912)	2.500 (0.888)
Philippines	2.453 (0.841)	2.942 (0.806)	2.703 (0.880)
Germany	2.621 (0.770)	2.764 (0.788)	2.569 (0.714)
South Africa	2.270 (0.798)	2.608 (0.759)	2.147 (0.789)
USA	2.716 (0.710)	2.785 (0.895)	2.589 (0.660)

Appendix D.

	IMF	UNFCCC	UNSC
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Partisan-political	2.690 (0.797)	2.893 (0.784)	2.601 (0.790)
Bureaucratic	2.714 (0.772)	2.899 (0.844)	2.525 (0.840)
Civil society	2.192 (0.813)	2.718 (0.857)	2.385 (0.744)
Media	2.420 (0.788)	2.841 (0.867)	2.241 (0.820)
Business	2.846 (0.685)	2.836 (0.817)	2.538 (0.768)
Research	2.441 (0.778)	2.843 (0.780)	2.467 (0.821)

Appendix E. Significant interaction effects hypothesis 2b for UNFCCC

Contrasted categories confidence UNFCCC	1 vs. 2, 3, 4	1 and 2 vs. 3, 4	1, 2, 3 vs. 4
	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio
<i>Cosmopolitan orientation</i>			
Preference global level environment	3.156 ***	0.996	0.743
Cosmopolitan identification	1.050	1.050	1.050
<i>Utilitarian calculation</i>			
Country influence UNFCCC	0.906	0.906	0.906
Country benefit UNFCCC	0.792	1.792 ***	1.698 **
Political elites (societal elites = ref.)	0.450	0.450	0.450
Interaction political elites*country benefit UNFCCC	2.192 *	1.545	1.455 *
<i>Institutional satisfaction</i>			
Democracy UNFCCC	1.188 **	1.188 **	1.188 **
Effectiveness UNFCCC	2.058 ***	1.368 ***	1.275 *
Fairness UNFCCC	1.099	1.322 ***	1.523 ***
<i>Controls</i>			
Age	1.015	1.015	1.015
Gender (female = 1)	1.439 *	1.439 *	1.439 *
<i>Country fixed effects (Germany = ref.)</i>			
Brazil	0.091 ***	2.739 ***	2.068 ***
Philippines	0.194 ***	0.976	0.930
South Africa	0.115 ***	1.213	0.568 **
USA	0.050 ***	0.632 **	0.817
Baseline odds	0.324	0.001 ***	0.000 ***
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-447.49		
N	549		
Pseudo-R ²	0.3250		

Contrasted categories confidence UNFCCC	1 vs. 2, 3, 4	1 and 2 vs. 3, 4	1, 2, 3 vs. 4
	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio
<i>Cosmopolitan orientation</i>			
Preference global level environment	2.119 *	1.048	0.743
Cosmopolitan identification	1.070	1.070	1.070
<i>Utilitarian calculation</i>			
Country influence UNFCCC	0.708	0.708	0.708
Country benefit UNFCCC	1.963 ***	1.963 ***	1.963 ***
Political elites (societal elites = ref.)	0.453 *	0.453 *	0.453 *
Interaction political elites*country benefit UNFCCC	1.614 **	1.614 **	1.614 **
<i>Institutional satisfaction</i>			
Democracy UNFCCC	1.182 ***	1.182 ***	1.182 ***
Effectiveness UNFCCC	1.911 ***	1.395 ***	1.279 *
Fairness UNFCCC	1.000	1.330 ***	1.533 ***
<i>Controls</i>			
Age	1.014	1.014	1.014
Gender (female = 1)	1.387	1.387	1.387
<i>Country fixed effects (Germany = ref.)</i>			
Brazil	0.081 ***	2.432 ***	1.967 ***
Philippines	0.176 ***	0.955	0.957
South Africa	0.098 ***	1.129	0.541 ***
USA	0.042 ***	0.623 **	0.852
Baseline odds	0.264 *	0.002 ***	0.000 ***
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-461.72		
N	522		
Pseudo-R ²	0.2699		