

# INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, INFORMATION TRANSMISSION, AND PUBLIC OPINION: MAKING THE CASE FOR TRADE

Date: January 22, 2019

Ryan Brutger\* and Siyao Li†

ABSTRACT: Increasing anti-trade and anti-globalization attitudes among the mass public are undermining support for economic cooperation, raising the question of whether, and how, domestic support can be rallied in support of international trade agreements. We argue that IOs can send important cues to domestic audiences that shape public support for international trade agreements. When trade deals are negotiated multilaterally, institutional characteristics of IOs, specifically the membership of the participants and the voting rules, provide information to the public that affects support for proposed deals. We use a survey experiment to show that the US public is more supportive of trade when it is negotiated through an IO with a biased membership – composed of like-minded countries – and when the US has veto power. We also find that these traits have differential effects among partisan audiences, and that right-wing voters strongly favor agreements when the US has veto power in the negotiations. Our findings suggest that such institutional characteristics alleviate domestic concerns about trade agreements and play a significant role in rallying support, especially among Republican members of the public.

---

\*Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania, Department of Political Science, Email: brutger@sas.upenn.edu

†PhD Candidate, University of Pennsylvania, Department of Political Science, Email: siyaoli@sas.upenn.edu

The international trade system is built upon a dense network of trade agreements that include immense multilateral agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to bilateral trade deals such as the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement. While trade agreements that liberalize trade are generally considered to be welfare enhancing in the aggregate, the mass public is increasingly skeptical of such agreements (Guisinger 2017, p.69)<sup>1</sup> and there has been a rise of popular opposition to international organizations and international cooperation more broadly (Bearce and Scott, 2018). The rise of popular opposition to international economic agreements and international cooperation is emblematic of the shifting landscape of public attitudes toward trade and globalization, and is putting increasing pressure on the international economic system. For example, Brexit was triggered by a popular referendum expressing public opposition to the EU and the US withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) due to a lack of domestic support for the agreement. In light of rising opposition toward trade agreements and international economic institutions, this paper examines how the institutional design of international organizations (IOs) affects domestic support for international trade agreements, and how leaders can build coalitions to sustain international economic cooperation.

While trade was often a back-burner issue for the public, domestic political discourse has increasingly focused on trade issues, thus increasing public exposure to the issue and facilitating the formation of public attitudes that can affect both domestic politics and international trade policy. Across countries, a common refrain that has gained popularity is that countries can improve their trade policies if they avoid multilateral deals and organizations, and instead go it alone when negotiating trade deals. This logic was promulgated by Brexiteers, who reassured British voters that Britain could form trade agreements with more autonomy and bargaining power once they were separated from the EU – a narrative that falls into the general Brexit framing of regaining sovereignty and democratic control of the homeland. Boris Johnson, former London Mayor and a major proponent of Brexit, articulated in an opinion piece published three months before the referendum that Brexit is an opportunity for Britain to “spearhead the success of [British] products and services not just in Europe, but in growth markets beyond” (Johnson, 2016). President Trump followed a similar script, repeatedly voicing opposition to the TPP during his presidential campaign,<sup>2</sup> a position

---

<sup>1</sup>Since 2000 there has been increasing support of protectionism and decreasing opposition of protectionism in the United States (Guisinger, 2017, p. 69).

<sup>2</sup>For example, in a rally in eastern Ohio in June of 2016, Trump called the TPP a “rape of our country” due to its potential to take away jobs from the US.

that reflected and amplified public apprehensiveness towards globalization and opposition to trade agreements.<sup>3</sup> Once elected, the rhetoric became policy with Trump’s withdrawal from the TPP, unilateral push to renegotiate NAFTA and the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement, and the escalation of tariffs against allies and adversaries. The changing landscape of trade policy has spilled over to make it a central issue for many governments, with the European Parliament debating responses to US tariffs on steel and aluminum, Mexico’s recent presidential election increasingly focused on a response to US trade policies, and countless other examples as well. Given shifting public attitudes toward trade and international cooperation, the question remains whether leaders will be able to rally sufficient domestic support to maintain and expand the network of liberal international trade agreements that underpin the global economic system.

To better understand how domestic attitudes toward international trade agreements are formed, we argue that there are lessons from scholarship on the role of IOs in shaping domestic public support that can be applied to the politics of trade. In the security realm scholars have shown that IOs can provide information to domestic audiences that can rally support for international actions. There are numerous channels through which IOs can provide information, such as acting as an elite cue (Guisinger and Saunders, 2017), providing evidence of the legitimacy of the policy (Chapman, 2007, 2009, 2011; Fang, 2008; Greenhill, 2018; Voeten, 2005), or through a signal about burden sharing and the costs and benefits to the home country (Milner and Tingley, 2012). Some of these mechanisms, though not all, are relevant for international economic agreements and can be used to help generate domestic support for international trade. Focusing on the role of international organizations and their ability to provide cues to the public, we examine how domestic support for multilateral trade cooperation can be sustained and enhanced.

Our paper makes three contributions to the field. First, we shift the focus of studying the information channel of IOs to the public from the security realm to the international trade realm, and present some of the first empirical evidence that information transmission from international economic organizations to the public functions differently from that of international security organizations. Second, we study the effect that institutional variation has on the informational channel, contributing to the study of institutional design of international organizations. We examine not only variation in institutional membership but also in voting rights distribution, thus presenting the first

---

<sup>3</sup>A survey commissioned by POLITICO and the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health found that among those who had heard about the TPP, 63 percent of the respondents were against it.

empirical evidence on how different decision rules in IOs have different effects on public opinion. Lastly, we theorize on how partisanship affects public reactions to IOs, and show that Republicans and Democrats have diverging opinions towards information from IOs with different voting rights distributions.

To examine the role of IOs and domestic support for international trade agreements, we first discuss and build upon existing theories that connect IOs and domestic public support for international actions. We then outline our hypotheses specifying how features of an IO can enhance support for trade agreements, which we test using a national survey experiment fielded on a sample of 3696 Americans. The experiment draws on a recently proposed set of trade reforms that were negotiated in the WTO. We then present our results, which show that information about the membership of the IO and its voting rules can significantly shift public support for trade agreements. In contrast to work in the security realm that shows the benefits of neutral IO membership, we find that the public favors trade agreements when the IO has a membership that is biased in the home country's favor and the home country has a veto. Interestingly, we find that certain features, such as having veto power, have significantly different effects on Democrats and Republicans, with Republicans responding much more positively to the US having a veto than Democrats. We then conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of our argument for theory and policy.

## **IOs and Information Transmission**

IOs have the ability to shape domestic public opinion by signaling information to domestic audiences. For example, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decisions change perceptions of the legitimacy of the use of force among the public (Voeten, 2005) and IO endorsements have been shown to provide a valuable “second opinion” that can increase public support for the use of force in controlled survey experiments (Grieco et al., 2011). Leaders are therefore motivated to seek IO endorsements for their proposals because it can boost domestic public support and enable them to conduct foreign policy with a stronger support base and less domestic constraints (Chapman, 2009). However, it remains an open question whether IOs can play a similar role when it comes to trade agreements, and if so, what features of the IO will provide the most significant information for shaping domestic support for trade agreements.

Our focus on trade is motivated by the increasingly conflictual and public nature of trade

politics. While the public has oftentimes been more focused on security issues (Guisinger, 2009) and more likely to look to IOs for political reassurance about the consequences of proposed military ventures (Voeten, 2005), recent political events in the US and abroad have brought trade issues to the forefront of public debates. Events such as the US withdrawal from the TPP, renegotiation of NAFTA, and escalating trade tensions with other countries have received significant media attention and have been fiercely debated. All of these issues involve multilateral negotiations and international trade forums, which have been highlighted by President Trump’s tweets and media headlines. In the US case, skepticism toward multilateral trade agreements is embodied in President Trump’s rhetoric. For example, Trump claimed that China has been gaining an unfair advantage in trade through the WTO, blasting the WTO as “badly represent[ing] and unfair to US” (Trump, Donald J. (realDonaldTrump), 2018a).<sup>4</sup> Given domestic public concerns and opposition toward international trade agreements, we seek to understand how public attitudes are formed, with a focus on how IOs can shape domestic public support for trade agreements.

Our study tests whether or not IOs provide information to the public that can enhance public support for trade agreements, and explores the institutional features of IOs that affect information transmission from IOs to the public. By doing so we make three primary contributions. First, we advance the study of how IOs affect public opinion through informational channels by examining an economic issue area and establishing evidence on IOs’ informational impact on trade policies. The literature has overwhelmingly focused on studying the informational channel for security proposals and initiatives (Chapman, 2007, 2011; Fang, 2008) such as military interventions (Grieco et al., 2011; Chu, 2018a) and humanitarian war (Chu, 2018b; Wallace, 2017), but has not focused on economic issues.<sup>5</sup> One exception is Bearce and Cook’s (2017) study that looks at the informational channel in an economic area by testing whether the public responds to WTO identification of government compliance or noncompliance with free trade rules. Their study found that while a negative signal of noncompliance has an effect on public support for government economic policy, a positive signal of compliance from the WTO has no effect.<sup>6</sup> In contrast, we find significant effects on public opinion

---

<sup>4</sup>This tweet has been liked close to 100,000 times and has significant exposure to the public.

<sup>5</sup>Davis, Murdie, and Steinmetz (2012) and McEntire, Leiby, and Krain (2015) have studied the informational channel of nongovernmental organizations governing human rights issues. Greenhill (2018) studies the effect of IOs on attitudes toward cooperation on human rights and environmental issues.

<sup>6</sup>Chaudoin (2014) also provides a theory of domestic audiences responding to the alarm of non-compliance raised by the WTO.

that arise from information transmission from international economic organizations with particular institutional configurations.

Our second contribution comes from our study of the effects of IO institutional design on information transmission from IOs to the public. We combine exploration of institutional design and the study of the informational channel of international institutions on public opinion, and take the question of how international institutions matter for public opinion a step further by asking what institutional design features of international organizations are conducive to eliciting more public support? The conventional literature predicts that endorsement by an IO comprised of neutral members with heterogeneous interests that do not align with that of the state seeking endorsement tends to be perceived as more legitimate by the public and bolsters public support for military disputes such as the 1991 Persian Gulf War (Chapman, 2009). The mechanism for legitimacy is that the domestic audience interprets information coming from IOs with diverse state interests to be more fair procedurally (Hurd, 2008), more neutral in policy making (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999), or more inclusive in interests (Grant and Keohane, 2005). The UNSC for example is composed of member states that are relatively ideologically distant from the United States, and its authorizations serve to bolster US public support for military intervention (Chapman, 2009). However, recent studies have found instead that the public tends to rely more on information transmission from like-minded or identity-sharing member states in international organizations (Chu, 2018a,b). For example, NATO members possess more affinity with Japan in terms of democratic institutions and political interests, and the Japanese public's support for US military intervention is thereby stronger when NATO endorses action as opposed to when the UNSC does (Chu, 2018a).

We in turn test the effects of institutional variation in membership using the context of the WTO and a multilateral trade proposal, and find that biased membership enhances the American public's support of multilateral trade agreements. We use the WTO as our venue of interest because, even as Trump criticizes the WTO, it remains a critical body for international trade and is the most salient IO for the public in terms of multilateral trade negotiations and trade agreements. The WTO functions not only as a venue for multilateral negotiations, but also as a key player that influences how trade agreements are negotiated, influencing the nature of proposals and the course of negotiations through its procedures and institutional design. For example, in the 2001 Doha meeting, then Chairman of the WTO General Council Stuart Harbinson circulated his own draft declarations, which shaped the direction of negotiations and allowed room for compromise among nations (Odell,

2009). Similarly, Director General Dunkel issued the “Dunkel Draft” which played a key role in steering Uruguay round negotiations towards success. In a time when support for globalization and trade liberalization appears to be receding in Western democratic countries, understanding how the public responds to IO information on trade issues and how they tend to support trade proposals put forth by IOs with certain institutional characteristics has important policy implications for how multilateral trade proposals could attract support from domestic audiences.

In shifting from questions about the use of force that have been the focus of previous work, to the economic realm, we theorize that the public will still respond to institutional features, but with a different set of priorities. One feature of IOs that can be informative to domestic audiences is the composition of the member states. Although IO members are generally assumed to act upon their own interests (Chapman, 2007), domestic publics perceive IOs with heterogeneous members as more neutral and their decisions as more legitimate (Thompson, 2006). Thus, information about who an IO’s members are, and whether they are viewed as neutral or biased, can shape domestic attitudes toward agreements and policies negotiated through or proposed by an IO. Thompson (2006) defines IO membership as “neutral” when the IO membership is heterogeneous and includes a wide distribution of policy preferences that are representative of the international community. Endorsement by IOs with neutral membership can send powerful signals about the proposed policy, which is documented in existing research on both the UNSC and NATO, who can endorse multilateral military initiatives, but the UNSC has more heterogeneous membership and is found to generate a stronger boost to domestic support for the use of force (Chapman, 2011; Fang, 2008).

Shifting to the trade realm, if the public believes an IO is comprised of a diverse set of countries with heterogeneous preferences, the public may also view this as being a signal of the legitimacy of the process and believe that the outcome is likely to be fair and representative. However, a diverse membership of the IO can also raise concerns, such as those voiced by President Trump, that the United States is getting the short end of the stick since it must compromise with a diverse group of countries with different goals (Trump, Donald J. (realDonaldTrump), 2018b; Trump and Kernan, 2018). Additionally, recent research shows that Americans prefer that trade benefits their in-group (Mutz and Kim, 2017), so we expect that a more diverse membership of the IO signals to the public that out-groups are benefiting, which will reduce support for proposed trade agreements. Whereas the public values a neutral IO endorsing the use of force because it signals that a broad range of countries view the operation as legitimate, in the trade realm a more neutral and heterogeneous

membership will reduce support by signaling that out-groups are benefiting and that the home country is likely getting a worse deal.

We predict that when the membership is biased in favor of the home country and comprised of similar countries and/or allies, support will be higher for trade agreements. With a biased membership, the public is more likely to be supportive of those countries benefiting, since they are viewed as more similar and less likely to be associated with out-groups. Furthermore, if the public believes the membership of the IO is biased in favor of the home country's preferences, the public should infer that the home country will get a good deal since its interests are well represented and dominant in the organization.<sup>7</sup> This will lead to increased support for the agreement among those who are seeking to promote domestic interests. We thus expect that domestic audiences will draw inferences about trade agreements based off of the venue in which the negotiations take place, specifically the membership of the group negotiating the agreement and the rules used to vote on the deal, and that these inferences will shape public support for trade agreements.

Our paper also contributes to the design of institutions literature that argues for the importance of studying the institutional design of international organizations (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, 2001).<sup>8</sup> As with recent work studying the effects of institutional features and design (Bechtel and Scheve, 2013; Büthe and Milner, 2013; Davis, 2016), we answer the call of Martin and Simmons (1998) and advance the research on international institutions by treating international organizations as independent variables and explaining "variation in institutional effects" (757). Bearce, Eldredge, and Jolliff (2016) make the case that the question of whether or not institutional design matters for international outcomes should be studied before institutional design is treated as an independent topic of study with its own substantive importance, and our results answer this question in the affirmative.

Our study of the causal effects of institutional design of IO voting rights on public opinion opens up a new direction to take the literature, especially the emerging strand of literature on institutional design on public opinion (Chu, 2018a,b). While voting procedures are recognized as important to public perception and relevant to institutional reform (Chapman, 2007, 2009, 2011), there has

---

<sup>7</sup>This follows a similar logic as the research by Gray (2013) and Gray and Hicks (2014), which shows that agreements with "unstable" or "bad" countries increases perceptions of risk.

<sup>8</sup>Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal (2001) identify five dimensions along which institutions vary: membership rules, scope of issues covered, centralization of tasks, rules for controlling the institutions (control), and flexibility of arrangements.

not been empirical studies testing the effect that different decision rules in IOs might have on public opinion. Chapman (2011) mentions voting rules as a key fixed characteristic of international organizations that affects whether IOs are perceived as altruistic, neutral or biased, but does not go into depth about how specific variations in the voting rules will affect public opinion. Similar to member state composition, voting rules are a dimension of institutional variation that affects IO legitimacy and can affect how the public responds to IOs (Chapman, 2007). The literature’s prevailing logic suggests that the domestic public would view information from IOs that have more equitable or equal voting rules as more legitimate. Compared to IOs where one state has veto voting rights and can veto multilateral proposals singlehandedly, equitable or equal voting rules imply that decision power to endorse or reject proposals in the IO is more fairly distributed across member states. However, equitable voting rules may also increase concerns about protecting the interests of the home country, and in contrast, allowing the home country to have a veto over a potential agreement will allay domestic audiences’ concerns about the IO “overreaching” or encroaching on the sovereignty of the home country. Our study lends support to the latter proposition and prompts a continued discussion of how different voting rules can send different signals that appeal to or alienate support from distinct domestic audiences.

### **Partisanship and Ideology: Individual-level mediators of Public Opinion towards IO proposals**

Our third contribution is theorizing and assessing how partisanship and ideology interact with information from IOs. We focus on these interactions because personal values and perceptions are essential to foreign policy attitudes (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987). Whether or not individuals view an international organization and its statements as legitimate depends on the values and characteristics of individuals. Bearce and Cook (2017) show that endorsement from the UNSC and WTO can have differential effects on public opinion due to individual-level attributes, and there’s a growing body of research showing that partisanship plays a significant role in shaping foreign policy preferences (Brutger, 2017; Kreps and Maxey, 2017; Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2007).

We theorize that partisanship and ideology are significant characteristics influencing how individuals view IO legitimacy and respond to variations in institutional design. Partisanship and ideology are salient in US politics, the context in which we field our experiment, and the common ground

between Democrats/liberals and Republicans/conservatives is shrinking and political polarization is far more likely to affect foreign policy instead of stopping at the waters edge (Ahn, 2011; Beinart, 2008; Trubowitz and Mellow, 2005). Guisinger and Saunders (2017) show that partisanship can be “a powerful filter, shaping perceptions even in the face of expert knowledge or basic facts” across a range of issues including those on international institutions like the WTO (p.431). Until recently the United States had been leading the trend towards embracing multilateral commitments both to advance its leadership in the world (Holsti, 2004) and to render its predominance less threatening to allies (Ikenberry, 2001; Lake, 2009). The Trump administration however is engaged in anti-trade rhetoric, has withdrawn from multilateral agreements and has imposed unilateral tariffs on allies and adversaries alike, which has increased the partisan divide with regard to foreign policy. Party divides and party stances toward IOs and multilateralism are thus an important factor to consider in how public attitudes react to IOs and trade policy.

In this section we theorize on why and how Democrats/liberals and Republicans/conservatives hold different perceptions towards international organizations and multilateral cooperation by bringing in literature from political psychology. While the liberal-conservative ideological spectrum is based on ideological self placement and not political affiliation (Jost, Nosek, and Gosling, 2008; Jost, 2006), it is strongly correlated with partisan affiliations. For example, Jost’s (2006) analysis of Democratic and Republican voting behavior finds that ideology self-placement explains 85% of the variation in voting behavior in the last 32 years. In this paper we thus test the effects of both partisanship and ideology, but generally assume that the two move together and, for the purposes of this paper, can be theorized together.

We expect that Republicans and conservatives would in general prefer the United States to exercise more control over international institutions. This is due to two primary factors. First, Republicans/conservatives have a higher level of need to manage uncertainty and threat (Jost et al., 2003, 2007). Jost, Nosek, and Gosling (2008) argue that psychological needs for certainty and closure underlie the different preferences for ideology. As compared to liberals, conservatives are more inclined to avoid uncertainty and are less tolerant of ambiguity. They also tend to perceive the world as a more dangerous place, have higher fear of threat and loss (Jost et al., 2007), and have a stronger desire to maintain the existing order (Jost et al., 2003). By extension then, the more control that the United States exercises over multilateral processes in IOs, the less likely outcomes in IOs would threaten the American established order. In terms of institutional design in membership

arrangements and voting rules, conservatives would therefore prefer IOs to have membership biased towards American interests and prefer the United States to hold veto power over proposals. A biased membership composition within IOs enables the United States to exert informal influence over other member states decisions more easily. For example, Stone (2004) and Oatley and Yackee (2004) provide ample evidence that IMF processes of providing loans to countries in debt are influenced by American interests. In addition, veto rights would guarantee that the United States can block any proposal from implementation that it does not view to be in line with its own interests.

Conservatives/Republicans also tend to be more accepting of inequality (Jost et al., 2003). Indeed, acceptance of inequality is a hallmark for conservatives (Jost, Nosek, and Gosling, 2008). Liberals tend to be more open to social change and have stronger preferences for equality than conservatives (Jost, Federico, and Napier, 2009; Rathbun, 2004). This leads Democrats to champion an agenda of promoting rights of citizens in other countries such as human rights, democracy, and foreign aid (Rathbun, 2004, p.21), while humanitarian objectives do not increase the sense of moral obligation for Republicans (Kreps and Maxey, 2017). Haidt and Graham (2007) suggest that this stark contrast could be explained by the fact that liberals and conservatives subscribe to different moral foundations. Liberal morality rests primarily on the dimensions of fairness and reciprocity, empathy and care, whereas conservatives also include ingroup, authority, and purity concerns. Conservative/Republican acceptance of inequality suggests again that they would have no objection to the US holding disproportionate voting power in IOs in the form of veto power over proposals, whereas liberals/Democrats preference for fairness and equality would lead them to prefer equal voting rules.

On the other hand, conservatives tend to value principles of equity more than liberals (Jost, Federico, and Napier, 2009), where the benefits one receives are commensurate with the effort or inputs one provides. This suggests that conservatives/Republicans would be likely to also favor voting rights arrangements that are weighted by the contribution of member states to IO resources or by their economic size. We therefore predict that a weighted voting rights arrangement would also enhance conservative/Republican support of WTO proposals as compared to that of liberals/Democrats.

## Methods

To examine how the membership and voting rules of an IO affect domestic support for international agreements, we employ a survey experiment that is based on an actual negotiation that took place in the WTO. We use an experiment to help us isolate the effect of our key variables of interest, while holding the agreement and context constant, which is not possible with observational data. This approach builds from a substantial literature that has experimentally examined how IOs shape public opinion in the security realm (Grieco et al., 2011; Tago and Ikeda, 2015; Chu, 2018a,b), and allows us to test whether IOs can play a similar role in the increasingly salient area of trade politics.

Our study was fielded in the fall of 2017 by Survey Sampling International (SSI) on a national sample of 3,696 Americans.<sup>9</sup> This sample was part of the first wave of an omnibus panel study, and provided us a diverse and broadly representative group of respondents.<sup>10</sup> Respondents read an abbreviated news story about a proposal at the WTO to reform farm subsidies, which is one of the most contentious areas of trade policy. The story, which was based on real news reports about the proposed reforms that took place in preparation for the WTO’s eleventh ministerial conference, was titled “Agricultural Subsidies and Trade Reform Plan”. The experiment randomly assigned each respondent to either the control condition or one of the membership and voting rule treatment assignments.<sup>11</sup> The treatments varied information about WTO membership – listing a group of members states that would be considered neutral or biased – and randomly varied information about the voting rules of the WTO – whether each country has an equal vote, a weighted vote, or the US has a veto. After completing the survey, respondents were debriefed and directed to an article that provided a detailed description of the proposed reforms.<sup>12</sup>

In the control condition, the respondents read:

---

<sup>9</sup>For examples of other political science studies published using SSI, see: Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson (2008); Brutger and Kertzer (2018); Healy, Malhotra, and Mo (2010); Popp and Rudolph (2011); Kam (2012); Malhotra and Margalit (2010); Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo (2013); Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances (2014); Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017).

<sup>10</sup>SSI uses population targets, as opposed to quotas, to ensure representative samples. In this study the demographic targets based on the national census included age, income, education, and gender. See appendix §1 for demographic characteristics of the sample.

<sup>11</sup>Randomization achieved a well-balanced sample across treatment conditions, as is shown in the appendix §2.

<sup>12</sup>The text for debriefing is as follows: “For more information on agricultural subsidy negotiations and what the WTO is doing to address them, please visit: <https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/eu-brazil-call-for-new-wto-rules-on-farm-subsidies-food-security>”

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is proposing an international agreement to limit the use of agricultural subsidies that countries can provide farmers. The goal of the agreement proposed by the WTO is to limit the use of subsidies that may advantage some countries' farmers more than others.

Some of the specifics:

\*Along with outlining proposed new upper limits on trade-distorting agricultural domestic support, the proposal suggests ways to address the special needs of developing country governments and the special treatment for specific products.

In the membership treatments, the experiment randomly assigned respondents to either a neutral or biased condition. The neutral membership treatment followed Thompson's (2006) characterization of neutral IO membership and listed countries that have heterogeneous preferences covering a wide range of policy preferences. In contrast, the biased membership treatment listed countries that have more homogenous preferences that are more aligned with the US and less representative of the preferences of the global community. For each treatment, the first sentence of the story was modified as follows:

#### *Neutral Membership Treatment*

The World Trade Organization (WTO), an international organization that includes the United States, Great Britain, Mali, China, and Hungary, is proposing an international agreement to limit the use of agricultural subsidies that countries can provide farmers.

#### *Biased Membership Treatment*

The World Trade Organization (WTO), an international organization that includes the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, and Canada, is proposing an international agreement to limit the use of agricultural subsidies that countries can provide farmers.

The second set of treatments randomly varied information about the voting rules of the WTO. This information was provided as an additional bullet point in the "Some of the specifics" section of the story. The three treatment conditions varied whether respondents were told that this agreement

would be decided based on an equal vote for all members, a weighted vote, or a vote where the US gets to have a veto. The treatments were worded as follows:

*Equal Vote Treatment*

The WTO has equal voting for all members, so a majority of the states would have to support the agreement to enact the plan.

*Weighted Vote Treatment*

The WTO has a weighted vote for this agreement, based on each countrys agricultural production, so countries that are more reliant on agricultural production would have to support the agreement to enact the plan.

*Veto Vote Treatment*

The WTO gives the United States a veto, so the US would have to support the agreement to enact the plan.

After reading the brief news story about the proposed trade agreement, respondents were presented a bulleted summary of the story and were then asked whether they supported, opposed, or neither supported nor opposed the proposed agreement. They were then asked how strongly they supported or opposed the agreement, or if they selected neither they were asked if they leaned either way. This resulted in a seven-point dependent variable measuring the degree of support from each respondent.

In addition to our main dependent variable, we also asked respondents a series of questions about the agreement. These questions were designed to help us understand how the IO's membership and voting rules affect public opinion toward the trade agreement. Respondents answered two questions that were designed to get at the mechanism of legitimacy. These questions asked respondents to evaluate how fair they believed the agreement was and how much they trusted who proposed the agreement (the WTO). The second set of questions examined perceptions of individual and national interest, and asked the respondents to evaluate how good they believed the agreement was for them and for the United States. These questions draw from past literature on trade and public opinion that have found that altruism (Lü, Scheve, and Slaughter, 2012), trust for other nations (Brewer et al., 2004), personal economic interests (Rho and Tomz, 2017; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Scheve and

Slaughter, 2001) and sociotropic concerns, where individuals consider trade’s effect on the wellbeing of the US economy as a whole (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009), are determinants of how supportive individuals are of trade with other nations. Each of these questions had a five-point response scale where higher values corresponded to increased perceptions of fairness, trust, and self and national interest.<sup>13</sup>

## Results

We begin our analysis by examining the main-effects of our treatments on support for the trade agreement, which are displayed in Table 1. We find that the biased membership treatment has a positive and significant effect on the strength of support for the trade agreement. In terms of the percent of respondents who support the agreement, the biased treatment increases support by 6.5 percentage points ( $p < 0.01$ ) when compared to the control condition. This shows that the mass public is responsive to learning about the membership of an IO, and when it comes to whether they support a trade agreement or not, they are significantly more likely to do so when it is proposed by an IO that has members with preferences closer to that of the home government. This is in contrast to earlier studies on the use of force, which found the public expressed higher support for international actions when the endorsing IO had a more diverse membership (Thompson, 2006, 2009; Chapman, 2009, 2011).

We also find that learning about the voting rules of the IO proposing a trade agreement has a significant effect on support for the agreement. When the American public learns that their country has veto power in the IO, they express higher levels of support for the agreement as shown in the second column of Table 1. In terms of the percent of respondents who support the agreement, the veto treatment increases support by 7.3 percentage points ( $p < 0.01$ ). This result, combined with our finding that the biased membership treatment also generates increased support, suggests that respondents are more likely to support a trade agreement when their interests are most likely to be protected. Learning about the veto ensures that the public is aware that the agreement cannot take effect without their country’s approval, which can alleviate concerns about IO overreach or sovereignty costs. Similarly, the biased membership treatment may be convincing respondents that their country’s interests are more likely to be represented, or perhaps the mass public is just

---

<sup>13</sup>The complete wording of the questions are displayed in the appendix §4

expressing a preference for trading and doing business with more like-minded countries.

Table 1: Effects of IO Membership and Voting Rules

<i>Support for Agreement</i>		
	Membership	Voting Rule
Biased	0.16** (0.08)	
Neutral	0.11 (0.08)	
Equal Vote		0.14 (0.09)
Veto Vote		0.17** (0.09)
Weighted Vote		0.09 (0.09)
Constant	0.38*** (0.07)	0.38*** (0.07)
Observations	3,657	3,657

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

The dependent variable is a seven-point measure of support ranging from -3 to 3, where higher values represent greater support.

To examine what is changing in peoples' minds when they learn about the membership and voting rules of the IO, we assess how respondent's perceptions of the fairness of the agreement, trust in the proposer, and self/national interest vary across the treatments. Only one of the four variables is significantly different between the biased and neutral membership treatments. When comparing these treatments, we find that respondents express significantly more trust in the proposer of the agreement in the the biased membership treatment as opposed to the neutral membership treatment (0.08,  $p < 0.02$ ). When the biased membership treatment is compared to the control group the effect

on trust is even larger at 0.19 ( $p < 0.00$ ).<sup>14</sup> These findings demonstrate that the biased membership treatment increases trust in the proposer of the agreement among the mass public, and that this has a positive impact on support for the trade agreement. This is consistent with Kaltenthaler and Miller’s (2013) finding that trust of others leads to more willingness to engage with others in trade, and interestingly reveals that membership composition in trade proposals is an important gauge of the trust that the public feels towards the proposers of trade agreements, which in turn points to the level of public support for the agreement.

When comparing the voting rules treatments to each other, only the veto treatment generates significant effects on our additional variables. Comparing the veto treatment to the weighted voting treatment, we find that respondents believe the agreement is significantly better for themselves in the veto treatment (0.07,  $p < 0.05$ ).<sup>15</sup> When comparing the veto treatment to the control group the effect is even larger at 0.14 ( $p < 0.00$ ).<sup>16</sup> These results show that the veto treatment is viewed as generating a greater benefit for members of the public than when the IO uses other voting rules, or when respondents have no information about the rules, which is the case in the control group.

Our results suggest that what the public knows about IOs that govern international trade can significantly impact attitudes toward trade agreements. Importantly, in the trade realm IOs’ impact on public support appears to function differently than it does in the security realm. In the security realm, the public cares about the membership of the IO as a signal about the legitimacy of using force, where a more neutral IO membership demonstrates that a diverse set of countries endorses the operation. In contrast, when it comes to trade, the American public trusts the IO more when it has a biased membership and believes a proposed trade agreement will be better for them when their country has a veto. This suggests that the public is concerned with getting a trade deal that is to their advantage and they are reassured when the IO gives the US veto power or the other members are similar to the US.

---

<sup>14</sup>Mediation analysis, reported in the appendix §4, shows that the effect of the biased treatment is mediated through trust in the WTO, with an average causal mediation effect (ACME) of 0.16 ( $p < 0.00$ ).

<sup>15</sup>The veto vote treatment generates a slightly higher trust in the IO than the equal vote treatment (0.08,  $p < 0.08$ ), and the veto generates slightly higher perceived benefit to the nation (0.07,  $p < 0.08$ ).

<sup>16</sup>Mediation analysis, reported in the appendix §5, shows that the effect of the veto treatment is mediated in part through benefit to self, with an average causal mediation effect (ACME) of 0.18 ( $p < 0.01$ ).

## Effects of Partisanship

We now turn to the question of how partisanship conditions the effects of IO membership and voting rules on support for trade agreements. Our analysis begins by interacting respondents' self-identified political party – Democrat or Republican – with our treatments. The results are displayed in the first and third columns of Table 2.<sup>17</sup> The first notable result is that Republicans (and conservatives) have a lower baseline level of support for the trade agreement than Democrats. Considering the traditionally more pro-trade stance of Republicans as compared to Democrats, this finding corroborates Guisinger's account that party positions on trade have diverged in the opposite direction with the advent of Trump in the 2016 presidential elections (Guisinger, 2017, p.29).<sup>18</sup> Combined with Trump's ongoing focus on US trade issues that stirs up popular sentiments against trade, our result suggests that a significant anti-trade stance has found its way within the Republican party constituents. However, Republicans respond much more favorably to the veto treatment than Democrats. Figure 1 shows the marginal effects of partisanship on support for the proposal, depending on partisanship. This finding is consistent with the desire to exercise control, such as the ability to veto agreements, and the increasingly skeptical nature in which President Trump and his followers have viewed international trade agreements. This result is affirmed in the second and fourth columns of Table 2, which use a liberal-conservative ideology scale instead of partisanship. Figure 2 shows the marginal effects of partisanship on support for proposal, depending on ideology. Using ideology instead of partisanship shows that conservatives respond much more positively than liberals to the veto treatment. Given that responses to trade issues have been shown to differ according to race (Guisinger, 2017), we also test whether or not respondent racial identity is an alternative explanation for the diverging preferences we observe. We show in appendix §6 that treatment effects do not vary by whether or not the respondent is white, adding robustness to our argument that partisanship is a salient political identity that interacts with IO institutional arrangements to influence public support for trade agreements.<sup>19</sup>


---

<sup>17</sup>These models omit respondents who did not identify as either Democrat or Republican.

<sup>18</sup>See Guisinger (2017) and Hiscox (1999) for accounts of shifts in Republican and Democrat party positions towards trade over time.


<sup>19</sup>In addition, we show in Appendix §3 the proportion of Democrats and Republicans who support the trade proposal, which are both around 40%. This indicates that there are no floor effects from which the proportion of support could only increase for respondents in the treatment conditions as compared to the control.

Figure 1: Conditional marginal effects of veto vote treatment  
(Partisanship)



Marginal effects of veto vote treatment on support for proposal conditional on partisanship. Figure corresponds to column 3 of table 2 below. Confidence intervals set at 95%. Respondents who self identify as Republicans tend to support the proposal when treated with the veto vote treatment.

Figure 2: Conditional marginal effects of veto vote treatment  
(Ideology)



Marginal effects of veto vote treatment on support for proposal conditional on ideology. Figure corresponds to column 4 of table 2 below. Confidence intervals set at 95%. Respondents who self identify as conservatives (Ideology=4, 5) tend to support the proposal when treated with the veto vote treatment.

One surprising result of the partisan analysis is that Republicans and conservatives respond more positively to the neutral membership treatment than Democrats. In an attempt to understand this result, we looked at the differences between Democrats and Republicans in the neutral membership condition for our supplementary variables, which are shown in the appendix §7. Only trust of the proposer is significantly different between the two, but Republicans have *less* trust in the proposer than Democrats, which does not explain why Republicans respond more favorably to the neutral membership treatment, and we thus leave this as an open question for future research.<sup>20</sup>

## Robustness to Potential Moderators

We now supplement our main analysis by adding individual-level controls for variables that are expected to influence attitudes toward trade agreements and IOs. We did not include these variables in our main analysis, since the treatment randomization achieved a well-balanced sample across treatment conditions, as is shown in the appendix §2. These variables were measured in other blocks of the omnibus survey and the ordering of the blocks were randomized. We begin by adding controls for education (a proxy for skill), income, gender, and age. Each of these variables has been associated with attitudes toward trade and international organizations (Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli, 2004; Kaltenthaler and Miller, 2013; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Scheve, 2001; Guisinger, 2016), and has the potential to moderate our treatment effects. We also include variables that are likely to affect perceptions of IOs, the first of which is a measure of cooperative internationalism, which is compiled using a set of questions from Kertzer et al. (2014) that follows the classic “Wittkopf-Holsti-Rosenau” framework of militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism (Holsti and Rosenau, 1988; Wittkopf, 1986).<sup>21</sup> Lastly, we control for respondents’ baseline level of trust of the WTO. One potential concern with this final control is that respondents’ trust in the WTO could be influenced by treatment assignment. We address this concern in a number of ways. First, we designed the survey so that this question was asked far from our experiment in the survey flow to minimize the chance of spillover. We also repeated the trust in the WTO question in a second wave of the omnibus study, so that we could measure respondents’ trust in the WTO weeks after the first wave, when the chance of our treatments contaminating the measure is extremely low. To

---

<sup>20</sup>Conditional marginal effects of the neutral membership treatment depending on partisan identity and ideology are shown in appendix §7 as well.

<sup>21</sup>The full wording of the questions is included in the appendix §8.

Table 2: Partisan Interaction with IO Treatments

	<i>Support for Agreement</i>			
	Membership-1	Membership-2	Voting Rule-1	Voting Rule-2
Biased	0.048 (0.152)	-0.106 (0.252)		
Equal Vote			0.039 (0.160)	-0.007 (0.268)
Republican	-0.391** (0.188)		-0.391** (0.188)	
Ideology		-0.120* (0.066)		-0.120* (0.066)
Neutral	-0.138 (0.152)	-0.387 (0.253)		
Biased*Republican	0.228 (0.219)			
Republican*Neutral	0.393* (0.219)			
Biased*Ideology		0.087 (0.077)		
Ideology*Neutral		0.161** (0.077)		
Veto Vote			-0.048 (0.160)	-0.525** (0.267)
Weighted Vote			-0.124 (0.160)	-0.206 (0.266)
Equal Vote*Republican			0.051 (0.233)	
Republican*Veto Vote			0.456** (0.232)	
Republican*Weighted Vote			0.419* (0.233)	
Equal Vote*Ideology				0.048 (0.081)
Ideology*Veto Vote				0.227*** (0.081)
Ideology*Weighted Vote				0.098 (0.081)
Constant	0.716*** (0.133)	0.754*** (0.220)	0.716*** (0.133)	0.754*** (0.220)
Observations	2,216	3,596	2,216	3,596

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

The dependent variable is a seven-point measure of support from -3 to 3, where higher values represent greater support. Columns 2 and 4 only include respondents who identified as either Democrat or Republican.

validate the trust measure from the first wave, we tested whether there was a difference between the first-wave and second-wave trust measures, and we found that there was no notable difference (0.02,  $p < 0.44$ ). We also created a variable for the within-respondent difference in the trust measure and tested whether treatment assignment was correlated with changes in trust of the WTO across the two waves. We found that there was no effect of treatment assignment on changes in trust,<sup>22</sup> and thus we are confident that the trust of the WTO measure is capturing respondents' underlying view of the IO.

Our results with controls are displayed in Table 3. Most importantly for our analysis, the main-effects of biased membership and the veto treatments remain positive and significant, and the interaction effects between the veto vote and Republican and neutral membership and Republican both remain positive and significant. Not surprisingly, cooperative internationalism and trust of the WTO both have a positive effect as well,<sup>23</sup> although controlling for these factors does not eliminate the main-effects or the interaction effects of our treatments.<sup>24</sup> The controls themselves also perform as expected. The variables that have been associated with higher support for free trade, such as education, income, male, and white, all have a positive effect on support for the trade agreement (Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli, 2004; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Guisinger, 2016, 2017). The robustness of our primary results to this battery of controls shows that even including the most likely variables to alter perceptions of IOs and trade policy do not substantively change the interpretation of our results.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup>Results are reported in the appendix §9.

<sup>23</sup>Dispositions towards the outside world such as cosmopolitanism and internationalism affect individual attitude towards IOs and towards multilateral cooperation. Studies have found that cosmopolitanism helps account for individuals attitudes on economic openness (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006), and is correlated with elite qualities such as higher education, wealth, and political knowledge (Kertzer, 2013).

<sup>24</sup>Neither cooperative internationalism nor trust in the WTO have significant interaction effects with our treatments.

<sup>25</sup>In appendix §11 we also include political knowledge as a control variable and do not find a significant effect of political knowledge on support of the agreement. Our measure of political knowledge is aggregated from five questions on American trade issues and general knowledge about American politics and multilateral issues, the full wording of which is included in the appendix §10.

Table 3: Partisan Interaction with IO Treatments With Controls

	<i>Support for Agreement</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Biased	0.162** (0.082)	0.065 (0.148)		
Republican		-0.089 (0.188)		-0.094 (0.188)
Neutral	0.138* (0.082)	-0.103 (0.149)		
Equal Vote			0.145* (0.087)	0.055 (0.157)
Veto			0.175** (0.087)	-0.044 (0.156)
Weighted Vote			0.129 (0.087)	-0.065 (0.158)
Education	0.078*** (0.028)	0.063* (0.036)	0.078*** (0.028)	0.059 (0.036)
Income	0.036** (0.015)	0.042** (0.020)	0.036** (0.015)	0.043** (0.020)
Male	0.128** (0.056)	0.178** (0.073)	0.129** (0.056)	0.182** (0.073)
Age	0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
White	0.126* (0.070)	0.107 (0.094)	0.125* (0.070)	0.110 (0.094)
Cosmopolitan internationalism	1.071*** (0.185)	1.350*** (0.247)	1.072*** (0.185)	1.315*** (0.248)
Trust of WTO	1.132*** (0.111)	1.100*** (0.150)	1.132*** (0.111)	1.104*** (0.150)
Biased*Republican		0.158 (0.215)		
Neutral*Republican		0.359* (0.214)		
Equal Vote*Republican				0.029 (0.229)
Veto Vote*Republican				0.395* (0.227)
Weighted Vote*Republican				0.345 (0.229)
Constant	-1.285*** (0.166)	-1.151*** (0.241)	-1.283*** (0.166)	-1.121*** (0.241)
Observations	3,490	2,151	3,490	2,151

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

The dependent variable is a seven-point measure of support from -3 to 3, where higher values represent greater support. Columns 2 and 4 only include respondents who identified as either Democrat or Republican.

## Conclusion

Our study is one of the first to examine how the informational channel of IOs affects domestic support for international cooperation in the economic realm. While the literature on the informational channel of international organizations has focused on the United Nations Security Council (Voeten, 2005; Chapman, 2007, 2009, 2011; Fang, 2008; Thompson, 2006) and military interventions (Grieco et al., 2011; Chu, 2018a,b), our study makes the case that there are key differences in how information transmission from IOs occurs in economic institutions and multilateral trade initiatives. Using a national survey experiment based on a real proposal put forth in the WTO, we find that institutional design of international organizations has a significant effect on public support for trade. Both biased membership comprised of allies of the United States and US possession of veto power in IOs increase public support of proposed international trade agreements. In addition, we find interesting interaction effects of partisanship with our treatments, with Republicans having a much stronger positive reaction to US veto power in an IO than Democrats.

Our results are in contrast to past findings in the information transmission of security IOs literature, where the public tended to perceive decisions from neutral IOs as more legitimate, and favor IOs with member states more ideologically distant from the US and with more fair voting rules. Our study provides evidence that the mechanisms through which the public responds to IO information functions differently for trade policy than security issues. We leave to future research to examine how these mechanisms function across other areas of international cooperation. Our results also yield insights into how variation in institutional design affects support of multilateral proposals by the public. Our study advances the argument that institutional design of international institutions does matter for “variation in institutional effects” (Martin and Simmons, 1998, p.757), and suggests that there is ground for future research in probing the question of *how* different aspects of institutional design exert various forms of influence on outcomes of interest to across issue areas.

Practically speaking, our study advances understanding of the microfoundations of public opinion preferences towards international trade. When attempting to build a domestic coalition that will support an international trade agreement, policy makers can emphasize different aspects of the negotiation process, such as voting rules used to reach the decision or key members of the negotiating group, to enhance domestic support. Because multilateral trade agreements are negotiated in two-level games where agreement needs to be reached by states at the international level and

approval gained by each state from their respective constituency (Putnam, 1988; Trumbore, 1998), sustaining a domestic coalition is critical to the maintenance of the international trade system. One does not have to look far from home for examples of what can happen when domestic support wanes for international agreements, as occurred in the US with regard to the TPP and resulted in Congress failing to ratify the agreement under President Obama and Trump’s eventual withdrawal from the agreement. Although trade has sometimes been a back-burner issue for the public, its increased salience, particularly for the most important trade deals, has reinforced what trade representatives and other stakeholders in international trade negotiations have often been aware of — that “governments negotiate under the watchful eye of public opinion” (The Cercle européen of Confrontations, 2001).

Our results suggest that governments should be intentional about choosing the most effective framing and negotiating forum for trade agreements as a strategy of eliciting more public support. Public preferences for trade agreements are not only a function of individuals’ prior opinions on trade and their demographic characteristics; the international institutional framework in which the trade agreement is proposed affects public support for the agreement, with the public more inclined to support agreements put forth by IOs with biased membership and veto voting rights for their home country. While public support for globalization and multilateral trade cooperation has been waning in many developed Western countries (Goldstein, 2017), there is reason to believe that trade agreements backed by international institutions that enhance public perceptions of trust of the proposer and the benefits to the public can still elicit strong public support.

## References

- Ahn, Taehyung. 2011. "Politics at the Water's Edge: The Presidency, Congress, and US Policy toward North Korea." *Pacific Focus* 26 (dec): 336–359.
- Barker, David C., Jon Hurwitz, and Traci L. Nelson. 2008. "Of Crusades and Culture Wars: "Messianic" Militarism and Political Conflict in the United States." *The Journal of Politics* 70 (apr): 307–322.
- Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. 1999. *The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations*. Vol. 53 Cambridge University Press (CUP).
- Bearce, David H., and Brandy Jolliff Scott. 2018. "Popular Opposition to International Organizations: How Extensive and What Does this Represent?" Political Economy of International Organizations Conference Presentation. [http://wp.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/PEIO11\\_paper\\_31.pdf](http://wp.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/PEIO11_paper_31.pdf).
- Bearce, David H., Cody D. Eldredge, and Brandy J. Jolliff. 2016. "Does Institutional Design Matter? A Study of Trade Effectiveness and PTA Flexibility/Rigidity." *International Studies Quarterly* 60 (apr): 307–316.
- Bearce, David H., and Thomas R. Cook. 2017. "The first image reversed: IGO signals and mass political attitudes." *The Review of International Organizations* (dec): 307–316.
- Bechtel, Michael M., and Kenneth F. Scheve. 2013. "Mass support for global climate agreements depends on institutional design." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 110 (jul): 13763–13768.
- Beinart, P. 2008. *Red and Blue Nation? Consequences and Correction of America's Polarized Politics*. Brookings Press chapter When politics no longer stops at the water's edge: Partisan polarization and foreign policy, pp. 151–167.
- Berinsky, Adam J., Michele F. Margolis, and Michael W. Sances. 2014. "Separating the Shirkers from the Workers? Making Sure Respondents Pay Attention on Self-Administered Surveys." *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (November): 739–753.
- Brewer, Paul R., Kimberly Gross, Sean Aday, and Lars Willnat. 2004. "International Trust and Public Opinion About World Affairs." *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (jan): 93–109.
- Brutger, Ryan. 2017. "Domestic Politics of International Compromise." Working paper.
- Brutger, Ryan, and Joshua D Kertzer. 2018. "A Dispositional Theory of Reputation Costs." *International Organization*: 1–32.
- Büthe, Tim, and Helen V. Milner. 2013. "Foreign Direct Investment and Institutional Diversity in Trade Agreements: Credibility, Commitment, and Economic Flows in the Developing World, 1971–2007." *World Politics* 66 (dec): 88–122.
- Chapman, Terrence. 2011. *Securing Approval: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Authorization for War*. University of Chicago Press.
- Chapman, Terrence L. 2007. "International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and Institutional Legitimacy." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (feb): 134–166.
- Chapman, Terrence L. 2009. "Audience Beliefs and International Organization Legitimacy." *International Organization* 63 (oct): 733.

- Chaudoin, Stephen. 2014. "Audience Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes." *International Organization* 68 (04): 877–911.
- Chu, Jonathan. 2018a. "Information Transmission by International Organizations: A Reassessment." Working paper.
- Chu, Jonathan. 2018b. "International Organizations and American Public Opinion on Humanitarian War." Working paper.
- Davis, Christina. 2016. "Membership Conditionality and Institutional Reform: The Case of the OECD." Working paper.
- Davis, David R., Amanda Murdie, and Coty Garnett Steinmetz. 2012. "'Makers and Shapers': Human Rights INGOs and Public Opinion." *Human Rights Quarterly* 34 (1): 199–224.
- Fang, Songying. 2008. "The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (apr): 304–321.
- Goldstein, Judith. 2017. "Trading in the Twenty-First Century: Is There a Role for the World Trade Organization?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (may): 545–564.
- Grant, Ruth W., and Robert O. Keohane. 2005. "Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics." *American Political Science Review* 99 (feb).
- Gray, Julia. 2013. *The company states keep: International economic organizations and investor perceptions*. Cambridge University Press.
- Gray, Julia, and Raymond P Hicks. 2014. "Reputations, perceptions, and international economic agreements." *International Interactions* 40 (3): 325–349.
- Greenhill, Brian. 2018. "How Can International Organizations Shape Public Opinion? Analysis of a Pair of Survey-Based Experiments." *The Review of International Organizations*: Forthcoming.
- Grieco, Joseph M., Christopher Gelpi, Jason Reifler, and Peter D. Feaver. 2011. "Let's Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War." *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (may): 563–583.
- Guisinger, Alexandra. 2009. "Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?" *International Organization* 63 (july): 533–557.
- Guisinger, Alexandra. 2016. "Information, Gender, and Differences in Individual Preferences for Trade." *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 37 (jul): 538–561.
- Guisinger, Alexandra. 2017. *American opinion on trade: Preferences without politics*. Oxford University Press.
- Guisinger, Alexandra, and Elizabeth N. Saunders. 2017. "Mapping the Boundaries of Elite Cues: How Elites Shape Mass Opinion across International Issues." *International Studies Quarterly* 61 (june): 425–441.
- Haidt, Jonathan, and Jesse Graham. 2007. "When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions that Liberals may not Recognize." *Social Justice Research* 20 (may): 98–116.
- Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. 2006. "Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade." *International Organization* 60 (apr).

- Healy, A. J., N. Malhotra, and C. H. Mo. 2010. "Irrelevant events affect voters' evaluations of government performance." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 107 (July): 12804–12809.
- Hiscox, Michael J. 1999. "The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization." *International Organization* 53 (sep): 669–698.
- Holsti, Ole R. 2004. *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*. University of Michigan Press.
- Holsti, Ole R., and James N. Rosenau. 1988. "The Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Leaders." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32 (jun): 248–294.
- Hurd, Ian. 2008. *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council*. Princeton University Press.
- Hurwitz, Jon, and Mark Peffley. 1987. "How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model." *The American Political Science Review* 81 (dec): 1099.
- Ikenberry, G. J. 2001. *After victory: Institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major wars*. Princeton University Press.
- Johnson, Boris. 2016. "Boris Johnson exclusive: There is only one way to get the change we want - vote to leave the EU." *The Telegraph* (March).
- Jost, John T. 2006. "The end of the end of ideology." *American Psychologist* 61 (7): 651–670.
- Jost, John T., Brian A. Nosek, and Samuel D. Gosling. 2008. "Ideology: Its Resurgence in Social, Personality, and Political Psychology." *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 3 (mar): 126–136.
- Jost, John T., Christopher M. Federico, and Jaime L. Napier. 2009. "Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities." *Annual Review of Psychology* 60 (jan): 307–337.
- Jost, John T., Jack Glaser, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Frank J. Sulloway. 2003. "Political conservatism as motivated social cognition." *Psychological Bulletin* 129 (3): 339–375.
- Jost, John T., Jaime L. Napier, Hulda Thorisdottir, Samuel D. Gosling, Tibor P. Palfai, and Brian Ostafin. 2007. "Are Needs to Manage Uncertainty and Threat Associated With Political Conservatism or Ideological Extremity?" *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 33 (june): 989–1007.
- Kaltenthaler, Karl C., Ronald D. Gelleny, and Stephen J. Ceccoli. 2004. "Explaining Citizen Support for Trade Liberalization." *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (dec): 829–852.
- Kaltenthaler, Karl, and William J. Miller. 2013. "Social Psychology and Public Support for Trade Liberalization." *International Studies Quarterly* 57 (dec): 784–790.
- Kam, Cindy D. 2012. "Risk Attitudes and Political Participation." *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (jul): 817–836.
- Kertzer, Joshua D. 2013. "Making Sense of Isolationism: Foreign Policy Mood as a Multilevel Phenomenon." *The Journal of Politics* 75 (jan): 225–240.
- Kertzer, Joshua D., Kathleen E. Powers, Brian C. Rathbun, and Ravi Iyer. 2014. "Moral Support: How Moral Values Shape Foreign Policy Attitudes." *The Journal of Politics* 76 (jul): 825–840.
- Kertzer, Joshua D., and Thomas Zeitzoff. 2017. "A Bottom-Up Theory of Public Opinion about Foreign Policy." *American Journal of Political Science* 61 (June): 543–558.

- Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions." *International Organization* 55 (oct): 761–799.
- Kreps, Sarah, and Sarah Maxey. 2017. "Mechanisms of Morality: Sources of Support for Humanitarian Intervention." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (apr): 1-29.
- Kupchan, Charles A, and Peter L Trubowitz. 2007. "Dead center: The demise of liberal internationalism in the United States." *International Security* 32 (2): 7–44.
- Lake, David A. 2009. *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Cornell University Press.
- Lü, Xiaobo, Kenneth Scheve, and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2012. "Inequity Aversion and the International Distribution of Trade Protection." *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (apr): 638–654.
- Malhotra, Neil, and Yotam Margalit. 2010. "Short-Term Communication Effects or Longstanding Dispositions? The Public's Response to the Financial Crisis of 2008." *The Journal of Politics* 72 (july): 852–867.
- Malhotra, Neil, Yotam Margalit, and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo. 2013. "Economic Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing between Prevalence and Conditional Impact." *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (jan): 391–410.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety." *International Organization* 63 (jul): 425.
- Martin, Lisa L., and Beth A. Simmons. 1998. "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions." *International Organization* 52 (oct): 729–757.
- Mayda, Anna Maria, and Dani Rodrik. 2005. "Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others?" *European Economic Review* 49 (August): 1393-1430.
- Mcentire, Kyla Jo, Michel Leiby, and Mathew Krain. 2015. "Human Rights Organizations as Agents of Change: An Experimental Examination of Framing and Micromobilization." *American Political Science Review* 109 (july): 407–426.
- Milner, Helen V., and Dustin Tingley. 2012. "The choice for multilateralism: Foreign aid and American foreign policy." *The Review of International Organizations* 8 (sep): 313–341.
- Mutz, Diana C, and Eunji Kim. 2017. "The Impact of In-group Favoritism on Trade Preferences." *International Organization* 71 (4): 827-850.
- Oatley, Thomas, and Jason Yackee. 2004. "American Interests and IMF Lending." *International Politics* 41 (sept): 415–429.
- Odell, John S. 2009. "Breaking Deadlocks in International Institutional Negotiations: The WTO, Seattle, and Doha." *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (jun): 273–299.
- Popp, Elizabeth, and Thomas J. Rudolph. 2011. "A Tale of Two Ideologies: Explaining Public Support for Economic Interventions." *The Journal of Politics* 73 (jul): 808–820.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games." *International Organization* 42 (jun): 427.
- Rathbun, Brian. 2004. *Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans*. Cornell University Press.
- Rho, Sungmin, and Michael Tomz. 2017. "Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest?" *International Organization* 71 (apr): S85–S108.

- Scheve, K. F., Slaughter M. J. 2001. *Globalization and the perceptions of American workers*. Institute for International Economics.
- Scheve, Kenneth F., and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. "What determines individual trade-policy preferences?" *Journal of International Economics* 54 (aug): 267–292.
- Stone, Randall W. 2004. "The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa." *American Political Science Review* 98 (nov): 577–591.
- Tago, Atsushi, and Maki Ikeda. 2015. "An 'A' for Effort: Experimental Evidence on UN Security Council Engagement and Support for US Military Action in Japan." *British Journal of Political Science* 45 (nov): 391–410.
- The Cercle européen of Confrontations. 2001. "Issues and strategy for a new WTO round of multilateral negotiations." In *Conference with representative of civil society organised by the Cercle européen of Confrontations*, . Brussels.
- Thompson, Alexander. 2006. "Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission." *International Organization* 60 (jan).
- Thompson, Alexander. 2009. *Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq*. Cornell University Press.
- Trubowitz, Peter, and Nicole Mellow. 2005. "Going Bipartisan: Politics by Other Means." *Political Science Quarterly* 120 (sept): 433–453.
- Trumbore, Peter F. 1998. "Public Opinion as a Domestic Constraint in International Negotiations: Two-Level Games in the Anglo-Irish Peace Process." *International Studies Quarterly* 42 (sep): 545–565.
- Trump, Donald J. (realDonaldTrump). 2018a. "China, which is a great economic power, is considered a Developing Nation within the World Trade Organization. They therefore get tremendous perks and advantages, especially over the U.S. Does anybody think this is fair. We were badly represented. The WTO is unfair to U.S." Twitter. April 6, 2018.
- Trump, Donald J. (realDonaldTrump). 2018b. "While Japan and South Korea would like us to go back into TPP, I dont like the deal for the United States. Too many contingencies and no way to get out if it doesnt work. Bilateral deals are far more efficient, profitable and better for OUR workers. Look how bad WTO is to U.S." Twitter. April, 2018.
- Trump, Donald, and Joe Kernen. 2018. "Read President Trump's full remarks on trade deals to CNBC." CNBC.
- Voeten, Erik. 2005. "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force." *International Organization* 59 (july): 527-557.
- Wallace, Geoffrey PR. 2017. "Supplying protection: The United Nations and public support for humanitarian intervention." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* (apr): 1-22.
- Wittkopf, Eugene R. 1986. "On the Foreign Policy Beliefs of the American People: A Critique and Some Evidence." *International Studies Quarterly* 30 (dec): 425.

# INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, INFORMATION TRANSMISSION, AND PUBLIC OPINION: MAKING THE CASE FOR TRADE

## Supplementary Appendix

Ryan Brutger\* and Siyao Li†

---

\*Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania, Department of Political Science, Email: brutger@sas.upenn.edu

†PhD Candidate, University of Pennsylvania, Department of Political Science, Email: siyaoli@sas.upenn.edu

# 1 Survey sample characteristics

Our analysis comes from a sample of 3696 American voters fielded in the fall of 2017 by Survey Sampling International (SSI) as part of the first wave of an omnibus panel study. Table 1 shows the demographic characteristics of our sample.

Table 1: Survey sample characteristics

Gender	
Male	0.447
Female	0.553
Age	
18-29	0.176
30-44	0.262
45-64	0.364
65+	0.198
Education	
High school or below	0.282
Some college	0.211
College/university	0.331
Graduate/professional school	0.176
Race	
White	0.817
Hispanic	0.079
African American	0.057
Asian	0.047
Income	
Low income	0.455
Middle class	0.407
High income	0.137

## 2 Balance across treatments

Table 2 shows the distribution of the sample across treatment conditions and the control condition. Randomization achieved a well-balanced sample across the conditions, with demographic groups evenly distributed across them. Each value in the table shows the proportion of population in a treatment that belongs to the corresponding demographic characteristic.

Table 2: Balance across treatments and control

	Treatment Condition					
	Control	Biased membership	Neutral membership	Veto vote	Equal vote	Weighted vote
Gender						
Male	0.479	0.445	0.439	0.439	0.448	0.438
Female	0.521	0.555	0.561	0.561	0.552	0.562
Age						
18-29	0.171	0.185	0.168	0.181	0.179	0.170
30-44	0.256	0.276	0.250	0.271	0.267	0.252
45-64	0.373	0.343	0.383	0.346	0.362	0.381
65+	0.200	0.196	0.199	0.203	0.191	0.198
Education						
High school or below	0.270	0.283	0.284	0.274	0.291	0.285
Some college	0.192	0.220	0.208	0.191	0.231	0.219
College/university	0.356	0.327	0.327	0.338	0.304	0.339
Graduate/professional school	0.182	0.169	0.182	0.196	0.173	0.156
Race						
White	0.834	0.804	0.823	0.817	0.809	0.815
African	0.067	0.092	0.070	0.082	0.082	0.078
Hispanic	0.043	0.062	0.058	0.061	0.057	0.061
Asian	0.057	0.042	0.049	0.041	0.051	0.045
Income						
Low income	0.457	0.456	0.455	0.457	0.454	0.454
Middle class	0.389	0.411	0.410	0.390	0.419	0.421
High income	0.154	0.133	0.136	0.152	0.126	0.125

### 3 Proportion of support by party

Table 3: Proportion of respondents who support the trade proposal

	Treatment Condition					
	Control	Biased membership	Neutral membership	Veto vote	Equal vote	Weighted vote
All: Support	0.377	0.442	0.435	0.449	0.440	0.425
All: Do not support	0.623	0.558	0.565	0.551	0.560	0.575
Democrats: Support	0.451	0.507	0.483	0.493	0.533	0.458
Democrats: Do not support	0.549	0.493	0.517	0.507	0.467	0.542
Republicans: Support	0.380	0.478	0.474	0.517	0.416	0.494
Republicans: Do not support	0.620	0.522	0.526	0.483	0.584	0.506

Support category includes respondents who indicate they strongly support, somewhat support, or lean towards supporting the trade proposal. Do not support category includes those who are indifferent to the proposal.

### 4 Additional response questions to experiment

#### *Fairness of agreement*

On a scale of 1-5, how fair do you believe the proposed subsidy agreement is?

1 - Not Fair at All (1)

2 (2)

3 (3)

4 (4)

5- Very Fair (5)

#### *Trust of the proposer (WTO)*

On a scale of 1-5, how much do you trust those who proposed the agreement?

1 - Do Not Trust at All (1)

2 (2)

3 (3)

4 (4)

5- Trust Completely (5)

*Benefit to individual interest*

On a scale of 1-5, how good for you do you believe the proposed subsidy agreement is?

1 - Not Good at All (1)

2 (2)

3 (3)

4 (4)

5- Very Good (5)

*Benefit to national interest*

On a scale of 1-5, how good for the United States do you believe the proposed subsidy agreement is?

1 - Not Good at All (1)

2 (2)

3 (3)


4 (4)

5- Very Good (5)

## **5 Mediation analysis**


Figure 1 plots the Average Causal Mediation Effects (ACME), Average Direct Effects (ADE) and Total Effects in which the biased membership treatment's effect on support for the trade proposal is mediated through trust of proposer for the entire sample. Figure 2 plots the ACME, ADE and Total Effects in which the veto vote treatment's effect on support for the trade proposal is mediated through benefit to self for the entire sample. The models control for pre-treatment measures of respondents' education, gender, age, level of cosmopolitan internationalism, trust of WTO, support for US negotiating more trade agreements, and ideology. Support for the proposed agreement is measured on a seven-point scale, and each of the potential mediators is measured on a five-point scale. The treatments are compared against the control group, and analysis is conducted using the mediation package by Imai (2010).

Figure 1: Mediation analysis of support for the biased membership treatment



Mediation analysis shows that support for the proposal in the biased membership treatment condition is mediated through trust of proposer (0.16,  $p < 0.00$ ).

Figure 2: Mediation analysis of support for the veto treatment



Mediation analysis shows that support for the proposal in the veto treatment condition is mediated through benefit to self (0.18,  $p < 0.01$ ).

## 6 Effects of Race

Table 4: Race Interaction with IO treatments

	<i>Support for Agreement</i>	
	Membership	Voting Rule
White	0.089 (0.183)	0.089 (0.183)
Biased	0.208 (0.187)	
Equal		0.142 (0.199)
Neutral	0.068 (0.189)	
Biased*White	-0.049 (0.209)	
Neutral*White	0.060 (0.211)	
Veto*White		0.065 (0.200)
Weighted Vote		0.217 (0.199)
Equal*White		-0.002 (0.222)
Veto Vote*White		0.142 (0.223)
Weighted Vote*White		-0.133 (0.223)
Constant	0.307* (0.164)	0.307* (0.164)
Observations	3,563	3,563

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## 7 Comparison of Republicans/conservatives and Democrats/liberals in neutral membership condition

Table 5: Differences in supplementary variable for Democrats and Republicans in the neutral membership condition


<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Fairness of agreement	Trust of proposer	Benefit to nation	Benefit to self
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Republicans	-0.057 (0.063)	-0.183*** (0.064)	-0.073 (0.063)	-0.093 (0.057)
Constant	3.239*** (0.041)	3.079*** (0.042)	3.229*** (0.041)	3.259*** (0.037)
Observations	948	949	949	949

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01


Only Trust of proposer is significantly different for Democrats and Republicans in the neutral membership condition. Notice also that Republicans have *less* trust of proposer than Democrats, which does not explain why Republicans support the proposal proposed with neutral membership more. Respondents who did not identify as either Democrat or Republican are omitted from this model.

Figure 3: Conditional marginal effects of neutral membership treatment (Partisanship)



Marginal effects of neutral membership treatment on support for proposal conditional on partisanship. Figure corresponds to column 1 of table 2 in paper, where the interaction of neutral membership treatment and partisanship is statistically significant at the 10% level. Confidence intervals set at 95%. Respondents who self identify as Republicans tend to support the proposal when treated with the neutral membership treatment.

Figure 4: Conditional marginal effects of neutral membership treatment (Ideology)



Marginal effects of neutral membership treatment on support for proposal conditional on ideology. Figure corresponds to column 2 of table 2 in paper. Confidence intervals set at 95%. Respondents who self identify as conservatives (Ideology=4, 5) tend to support the proposal when treated with the neutral membership treatment.

## 8 Questions on Cooperative Internationalism

For questions on cooperative internationalism, we ask respondents to select the response among *strongly agree*, *somewhat agree*, *neither agree nor disagree*, *somewhat disagree*, and *strongly disagree* that describes how they feel about each of the statements below:

1. The United States needs to cooperate more with the United Nations.
2. I consider myself a citizen of the world.
3. It is essential for the United States to work with other nations to solve problems such as overpopulation, hunger and pollution.
4. Promoting and defending human rights in other countries is of utmost importance.
5. Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed country is of utmost importance.
6. Protecting the global environment is of utmost importance.

## 9 Trust of WTO as a baseline variable

Table 6 shows that there is no significant effect of treatment assignment on changes to respondents' trust in the WTO in the first wave and the second wave of the omnibus study. We also tested whether there was a difference between the first-wave and second-wave trust measures and found no notable difference (0.02,  $p < 0.44$ ). The Trust of WTO variable we collected can therefore be reliably used as a baseline variable in our study that controls for respondents' underlying view of the WTO.

Table 6: Effect of treatment assignment on trust of WTO

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Difference in Trust of WTO	
	(1)	(2)
WTObias	0.034 (0.070)	
WTOneut	-0.003 (0.070)	
WTOequal		0.059 (0.074)
WTOveto		0.056 (0.074)
WTOweight		-0.067 (0.074)
Constant	0.019 (0.060)	0.019 (0.060)
Observations	1,781	1,781
<i>Note:</i>	* $p < 0.1$ ; ** $p < 0.05$ ; *** $p < 0.01$	

## 10 Questions on political knowledge

We measure respondents' political knowledge by asking five questions on a range of issues. This variable is collected in the second wave of the omnibus study. The questions are phrased as follows:

*The following questions will ask you about political events and processes. Many people don't know the answers to questions like these. Please answer to the best of your ability.*

1. What is the Paris Agreement?
  - A. An international climate change agreement
  - B. An international counter-terrorism agreement
  - C. A security agreement signed between the US and France
  - D. A trade agreement signed in Paris
  
2. In 2016 the U.S. exported the most to which country?
  - A. China
  - B. Canada
  - C. Russia
  - D. United Kingdom
  
3. Equifax is what type of company?
  - A. A consumer credit reporting company
  - B. An international telecommunications company
  - C. A financial investment company.
  - D. An international banking company
  
4. Fast track authority in the U.S. does what?
  - A. Ensures high-priority patients are treated first in hospitals.
  - B. Limits Congress' ability to amend trade deals.
  - C. Allows imports to enter the country through expedited screening.
  - D. Allows the President to suggest the Supreme Court to consider a case in the next session.
  
5. To the best of your knowledge, Mike Pence's current office is:
  - A. Secretary of State
  - B. Senator

C. Vice President

D. Federal Reserve Board Chairman

## **11 Partisan interaction results with political knowledge included as control**

Political knowledge has been shown to be an important conditioning factor on people's support for US foreign policy (Kertzer, 2013). In addition, people could need a degree of political knowledge to be able to process and interpret signals from IOs (Bearce and Cook, 2017). In our results shown in table 7 however, the level of political knowledge does not significantly affect respondent support for the WTO proposal, suggesting that IO membership and voting mechanisms are used by the public as heuristic shorthands for judging the proposal. Our finding is also more in line with Guisinger (2009, p.544), who find that variations in political knowledge is not correlated with other individual characteristics that are linked to trade preferences.

Table 7: Partisan Interaction with IO Treatments With Controls including Political Knowledge

	<i>Support for Agreement</i>			
	Membership	Membership*Party	Voting Rule	Voting Rule*Party
Biased	0.209*	0.076		
	(0.116)	(0.206)		
Republican		-0.215		-0.217
		(0.262)		(0.262)
Neutral	0.191*	0.003		
	(0.115)	(0.205)		
Equal			0.258**	0.113
			(0.123)	(0.217)
Veto Vote			0.207*	-0.055
			(0.123)	(0.217)
Weighted Vote			0.136	0.061
			(0.123)	(0.218)
Education	0.024	0.008	0.025	0.004
	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.042)	(0.054)
Income	0.075***	0.074***	0.074***	0.075***
	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.028)
Male	0.072	0.105	0.071	0.109
	(0.080)	(0.104)	(0.080)	(0.104)
Age	-0.001	-0.008**	-0.001	-0.008**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Cosmopolitan internationalism	1.219***	1.472***	1.229***	1.461***
	(0.261)	(0.350)	(0.261)	(0.350)
Trust of WTO	1.147***	1.053***	1.142***	1.056***
	(0.156)	(0.211)	(0.156)	(0.211)
Political knowledge	-0.037	-0.041	-0.038	-0.040
	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.035)	(0.046)
Biased*Republican		0.345		
		(0.303)		
Neutral*Republican		0.431		
		(0.301)		
Equal*Republican				0.267
				(0.324)
Veto Vote*Republican				0.541*
				(0.322)
Weighted Vote*Republican				0.354
				(0.320)
Constant	-1.104***	-0.684*	-1.114***	-0.670*
	(0.241)	(0.353)	(0.242)	(0.354)
Observations	1,752	1,097	1,752	1,097

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

The dependent variable is a seven-point measure of support, where higher values represent greater support. Columns 2 and 4 only include respondents who identified as either Democrat or Republican.

## References

- Bearce, David H., and Thomas R. Cook. 2017. "The first image reversed: IGO signals and mass political attitudes." *The Review of International Organizations* (dec): 307–316.
- Guisinger, Alexandra. 2009. "Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?" *International Organization* 63 (july): 533-557.
- Imai, Kosuke, Luke Keele Dustin Tingley Teppei Yamamoto. 2010. *Advances in Social Science Research Using R*. Springer-Verlag chapter Causal Mediation Analysis Using R.
- Kertzer, Joshua D. 2013. "Making Sense of Isolationism: Foreign Policy Mood as a Multilevel Phenomenon." *The Journal of Politics* 75 (jan): 225–240.