

TRADE, CONFLICT, AND COOPERATION:
How IOs affect Domestic Support for International Agreements

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ABSTRACT: Negotiating international agreements requires leaders to successfully play a two-level game, whereby they must reach an agreement at the international level and build a supporting coalition at the domestic level. With the United States withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), we are reminded that building a supporting coalition for international cooperation at the domestic level is a critical step to achieving international cooperation. This paper tackles the question of how the negotiation process, specifically the proposal process, affects domestic support for international agreements and the likelihood of cooperation. I argue that international organizations can enhance domestic public support for negotiated agreements when they are perceived as initiating or proposing the agreement. Using an innovative series of survey experiments imbedded in current event news coverage about economic, security, and environmental negotiations, I test competing explanations of how proposal power and IOs affect domestic support for international cooperation. The results show that IO proposals enhance support for international cooperation, and expand the domestic supporting coalition by increasing support among members of the opposition party. These findings suggest that when IOs act as third-party proposers in international negotiations, it expands the domestic win-set of supported agreements and enhances support for international cooperation.

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Negotiating international agreements requires the balancing of interests and interest groups at both the international and domestic levels, in what has been referred to as a two-level game (Milner, 1997; Putnam, 1988). In such negotiations, negotiators work at the international level to reach an agreement that must also be ratified at the domestic level. Since Putnam's introduction of two-level games, significant research has examined the factors that affect international negotiations, with particular attention paid to the domestic-level factors that affect the likelihood of ratification (Hug and König, 2002; Milner, 1997; Stasavage, 2004; Trumbore, 1998) and the strength of the negotiator's bargaining position (Chapman, Urpelainen, and Wolford, 2013; Mo, 1995). What has received significantly less attention, however, is how international factors affect domestic constraints that alter the willingness of domestic constituents to approve international agreements. Depending on the context of international negotiations, leaders can benefit from domestic constraints that enhance their bargaining leverage (Chapman, Urpelainen, and Wolford, 2013; Mo, 1995), but at other times leaders need to generate sufficient support from their domestic constituents to ratify or enact international agreements. Although the general public often turns a blind eye toward international negotiations, at other times it plays a critical role in shaping the win-set of international negotiations and determining if and/or how international agreements are implemented.

When domestic opposition impedes international cooperation, it generally does so in one of two ways. If negotiators expect that an issue will not receive sufficient domestic support to be enacted, the issue is often omitted from the negotiation agenda, thus limiting the realm for potential cooperation. Examples of such cases include the omission of the Irish's claim to Northern Ireland in the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which resulted from strong public opposition in Ireland (Trumbore, 1998), and the removal of a plethora of negotiating items from the Amsterdam Treaty due to domestic public opinion and ratification hurdles (Hug and König, 2002). Furthermore, domestic opposition can stall or prevent international agreements from taking effect, or even result in the rolling back of international cooperation. For example, insufficient domestic public support undermined the implementation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), one of the largest trade deals in history, which faced strong domestic opposition in the United States (Tang, 2016). Given the potential constraining effect of domestic constituents on the adoption and implementation of international agreements, this paper asks how the win-set of potentially ratifiable agreements can be expanded.

In this paper, I examine when and how international organizations (IOs) affect domestic support for international negotiations and the likelihood for international cooperation. I argue that when IOs

are perceived as proposing or initiating international agreements it can increase domestic support for the agreement and expand the win-set of potential agreements. The following section puts forth a theory and potential mechanisms connecting the negotiation proposal processes and international organizations to domestic public opinion. I then employ a series of innovative experiments, which use current events news coverage to test how proposal power affects support for international agreements. The results of the experiments show that in negotiations on economic, security, and environmental issues, proposal power has a significant effect on public support, and that IO's proposal power can expand the domestic win-set of potential agreements. Across economic, security, and environmental negotiations, IO proposals help domestic leaders gain increased support for international cooperation from the opposition party, which increases the likelihood an agreement can be successfully ratified or implemented. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of the findings and areas for future research.

Domestic Support for International Negotiations

When two actors, whether they be individuals, businesses, or states engage in negotiations, how the negotiations proceed and how offers and counteroffers are presented can substantively impact the outcome of the negotiations. When negotiations not only involve the negotiators, but also include an audience or principals to whom the negotiators are accountable, then the negotiators must also worry about how their competence and abilities are perceived. Depending on the composition of the audience, negotiators may have incentives to pander to more aggressive audiences and act belligerent (Kertzer and Brutger, 2016), which reduces the likelihood of cooperation (Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 2011; Stasavage, 2004). At other times, negotiators may be better off pursuing more diplomatic approaches that focus on integrative bargaining to appeal to more dovish audiences. In either case, negotiators often end up in situations where they have incentives to focus on "saving face" (Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 2011), which results in pursuing a negotiating process that will appeal to their constituents. In such situations, constituents or principals are often poorly informed about the specific substance and nuances of international agreements, so they look for cues to guide the formation of their beliefs (Berinsky, 2007, 2009; Guisinger and Saunders, 2017; Saunders, 2015). In the context of international negotiations, who proposes an agreement and the signal sent by such a proposal is one way in which audiences build opinions about negotiated agreements (Brutger, 2018).

When the public is in a position to act as a constraint at the domestic level, how the negotiations and the final outcome are perceived by the public can significantly impact whether or not an agreement is reached or ratified. In international politics this dynamic typically plays out in a two-level game, whereby a negotiator or leader is held accountable by an audience that may or may not observe the negotiation process, but does get to observe the final proposal. The audience's support of the final proposal, which may be required for an international agreement to take effect, will hinge on their perception of the agreement, which is influenced by both the substance of the agreement and the audiences' perception of the negotiation and proposal process (Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 2011). With this in mind, leaders or negotiators have a strong incentive to pursue an agreement that is acceptable at the international level, but also will be supported by a viable coalition at the domestic level.

One way in which leaders can influence public support for negotiated agreements is to exercise proposal power. A recent study examined proposal power in hypothetical negotiations and found that when a leader exercises proposal power – whereby the leader is viewed as initiating or proposing an agreement, as opposed to accepting it – she receives greater support from the home audience (Brutger, 2018). When the home leader proposes an agreement, as opposed to accepting a foreign leader's proposal, it sends a cue to the home audience that the leader endorses the agreement. This can help generate support since the audience views the proposal as coming from, and being endorsed by, a member of the national ingroup, as opposed to being associated with a foreign outgroup. Furthermore, endorsements of agreements, especially when it comes to international cooperation, have been shown to send informative signals that can increase approval and the likelihood of cooperation (Milner, 1997, 22). If proposal power functions similarly when negotiating international agreements across issue areas, then a leader can send a positive signal about the agreement to her domestic public by proposing the agreement, which can expand the potential win-set. Expanding the potential win-set at the domestic level increases the likelihood that an agreement can be reached at the international level (Trumbore, 1998), which improves the chance of international cooperation.

However, a challenge to exercising proposal power is that both the foreign and domestic leaders have an incentive to be viewed as the proposer. While this may be possible in some circumstances, if the leaders can each “spin” the framing of the negotiation to their domestic constituents, it is more likely that each country will engage in credit-claiming and attempt to be viewed as the proposer. This can create a contest to save face, whereby neither side wants to accept their adversary's position,

which can derail the negotiation and shrink the potential win-set. A possible alternative to leaders exercising proposal power, is for an international organization to be viewed as the proposer. If an IO can exercise proposal power in a way that increases domestic support, then the win-sets of each country can be expanded and neither party would have to worry about losing face by accepting their counterpart's proposal.

IO Proposal Power

To understand how IOs influence domestic audiences' beliefs about an international agreement, I examine and expand upon three strands of theories linking IOs to public opinion. First, in the security realm, international organizations have been shown to influence domestic public opinion by signaling information about the nature of foreign policies and their costs, and helping overcome significant information asymmetries between the public and leaders (Chapman and Reiter, 2004; Grieco et al., 2011; Thompson, 2009). Theories of how IOs transmit information to domestic and foreign audiences focus on how IO approval (or disapproval) sends a signal about the cost of the operation (Voeten, 2005), the intent of the operation to foreign audiences (Thompson, 2006), or the quality of the leader (Fang, 2008) or the policy (Chapman, 2007). These theories all suggest that IOs can provide valuable information about foreign policies, but they do so by focusing on how IO approval affects support for a specific policy action, such as launching a military engagement. While the importance of IOs for enhancing domestic support for international security engagements is important, existing theories tell us less about the question of how IOs may alter the negotiation process and expand the domestic win-set by acting as proposers or mediators of international agreements.

Information Transmission

Similar informational mechanisms are likely to apply across issue areas in foreign policy. Since the mass public is generally uninformed about the details of foreign policy (Holsti, 2004, 55), and rarely (if ever) privy to more information than the leaders negotiating international agreements, the public is likely to turn to cues about international agreements when forming an opinion about them (Berinsky, 2009; Guisinger and Saunders, 2017; Zaller et al., 1992). In the security realm, Grieco et al. (2011) show that many members of the public value the endorsement of an IO, either because they find it a more informative cue than a leader they distrust, or because they value the IO. These

mechanisms should also play out in other issue areas where the public wants to form an opinion on particular policies or agreements, but are not well informed of the specifics and do not already have an entrenched position derived from strong partisan cues (Guisinger and Saunders, 2017).

If IOs that propose international agreements affect domestic support by signaling information to domestic audiences about the agreement, this should be reflected in domestic audiences' beliefs about the agreement. Depending on the situation, IOs may be viewed as having expertise in a particular subject area or may be viewed as being more reliable sources of information than domestic or foreign proposers and thus they can provide an important source of information to domestic audiences. When domestic audiences are swayed by IO information transmission, they should view the IO's proposal as a sign of the quality or value of the agreement. The quality or value of the agreement should matter most by altering the public's opinion about how the agreement affects their self-interest or the national-interest, both of which have been found to significantly shape the public's views toward international trade and cooperation (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009; Prather, 2011). If the audience interprets the IO's proposal as a signal of the agreement's quality, *ceteris paribus*, an agreement proposed by an IO ought to be perceived as better for the individual or nation than the same agreement arrived at through other means.

Quality Information Hypothesis: When an IO proposes, domestic audiences should believe the agreement is better for them and their country than if the agreement was proposed through other means.

Enhancing Legitimacy

When an international agreement is proposed by an IO, it also has the potential to increase the perceived legitimacy of the agreement. Scholars of international relations have argued that IOs can enhance legitimacy by changing perceptions about procedural fairness (Hurd 2007), policy neutrality (Barnett and Finnemore 1999), and inclusiveness (Grant and Keohane 2005). When an international agreement is negotiated, the public may view it as more legitimate or fairer when it is proposed by a multilateral IO, as opposed to an agreement proposed by a single entity.

If this mechanism is at play, public opinion should shift due to perceptions of enhanced procedural fairness of working with an international body, or because the IO is perceived as a less biased third-party than the negotiating parties. If so, the public should believe that the agreement is fairer when it is proposed by an IO. Enhancing perceptions of fairness should also enhance overall support

for the agreement. A growing literature at the nexus of political psychology and international relations shows that perceptions of fairness play a significant role in shaping foreign policy attitudes (Brewer et al., 2004; Gottfried and Trager, 2016; Kertzer et al., 2014; Rathbun et al., 2016), suggesting that IO's ability to enhance beliefs about fairness could significantly change domestic support for international agreements.

Procedural Fairness Hypothesis: IO proposals should be perceived as fairer than proposals by other actors.

Of course, the procedural fairness mechanism would be conditional on how the IO is perceived by the public. If an IO has a good reputation and the public trusts it, then it can enhance the legitimacy of the process, and may also enhance the credibility of the information the public learns. In contrast, if an IO has bad reputation and is not trusted by the public, it is unlikely that the IO proposal would enhance the perceived legitimacy and fairness of the agreement, and in fact it could have a negative impact on domestic support.

IO Legitimacy Hypothesis: IO proposals should only have a positive effect on support for the agreement and perceived fairness among those who trust the IO.

Cheap Talk

Most realist theories of international relations suggest that IOs should have very little influence on perceptions about international negotiations. Short of being venues for states to exercise power, the realist tradition tells us that IOs should not have an independent effect on states' behavior (Mearsheimer, 1994; Waltz, 2010). This conception was nicely summarized by Chapman, who noted that “[a]ccording to the realist perspective, since enforcement capacity for most multilateral security IOs is so weak, audiences should disregard institutional decisions as essentially ‘cheap talk’, communicating little if anything about the costs of policy or likely policy outcomes” (Chapman, 2009, 738). If IOs are just venues for cheap talk, domestic audiences' support for international agreements proposed by IOs should be no different than agreements arrived at through other means.

Methods

To examine how IOs' proposal power affects domestic public support for international agreements and the size of the potential win-set of agreements, it is necessary to isolate the effect of the proposal process from the substance of the agreement. Unfortunately, using public opinion data on international negotiations and foreign policy does not allow these preferences to be decomposed, since the public always has a preference over the substance of the agreement and the means used to reach the agreement. This means that even if standard public opinion polls asked about support for competing proposals, say from the United States and Japan, differences in approval would be attributable to both who initiated the proposal and the different policy options each country put forth. Given the limitations of existing data to measure how the negotiation process affects domestic support for agreements and the potential win-set, I designed a series of three survey experiments imbedded in real-world contexts to measure how proposal power affects domestic support for international agreements.

The experiments are imbedded in news stories of current events about trade, security, and environmental negotiations to measure how audiences reacted to different proposal processes across issue areas. The experiments were based on actual news coverage, which was then modified to include the desired treatment conditions. This was done to provide respondents with a realistic portrayal of how the events were reported by the media and to enhance the validity of the study for understanding how audiences respond to international negotiations. The experimental framework allows me to isolate the effect of changes to the proposer on public approval, while holding the policy outcomes constant. In this manner, the experiments provide a unique test of how the negotiation process, specifically the proposal process, affects domestic support for agreements and the potential win-set that a domestic coalition will support.

The studies were fielded in the fall of 2017 by Survey Sampling International (SSI) as part of an omnibus panel study of Americans, with 3,144 completing the trade study, 2,856 completing the security study, and 1,568 completing the environmental study.¹ SSI uses population targets, as opposed to quotas, which for this study were based on census demographics for gender, age,

¹For examples of published political science studies using SSI, see Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances (2014); Brutger and Kertzer (2018); Healy, Malhotra, and Mo (2010); Popp and Rudolph (2011); Malhotra and Margalit (2010); Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo (2013); Kertzer and Zeitsoff (2017)

education, and income, which yielded a broadly representative sample.² The advantage of using a panel for this particular study is that it allowed some questions to be administered weeks apart from one another, which had important benefits that will be discussed below.

In each of the three studies, respondents read a brief news report about the issue being negotiated. The experiments randomized who proposed the agreement, while the other components were held constant. The randomly assigned proposer was either an international organization, Republican leaders, Democrat leaders, foreign leaders, or a specific foreign country's leaders. This set of proposers allows me to measure how proposals made by IOs are viewed relative to a variety of other potential proposers, which include both domestic and foreign leaders. After reading the news story, respondents were presented a bulleted summary of the story and were asked whether they supported, opposed, or neither supported nor opposed the proposed agreement. They were then asked how strongly they supported or opposed the agreement, or if they selected neither they were asked if they leaned either way. This resulted in a seven-point dependent variable measuring the degree of support from each respondent.

In addition to the main dependent variable, respondents were also asked a series of questions about the agreement. These questions were designed to help measure how peoples' perceptions of the agreement changed based off of the proposer. Respondents answered two questions that were designed to get at the mechanism of procedural fairness and legitimacy. These questioned asked respondents to evaluate how fair they believed the agreement was and how much they trusted who proposed the agreement. The second set of questions examined perceptions of individual and national interest, and asked the respondents to evaluate how good they believed the agreement was for themselves and for the United States. Each of these questions had a five-point response scale where higher values corresponded to increased perceptions of fairness, trust, and self- and national-interest.³ After completing the survey, respondents were debriefed and directed to articles that provided a detailed description of the proposed reforms.

The first experiment focused on trade negotiations about agricultural subsidies for farmers, which remains one of the most contentious issues of trade politics. The wording of the experiment was based off of real proposals that were put forth in preparation for the WTO's eleventh ministerial conference (Bridges, 2017). In the experiment the proposer was randomly assigned to be either *The*

²The sample demographics are reported in the appendix §1.

³The complete wording of the questions are displayed in the appendix §2.

World Trade Organization (WTO), Republican leaders, Democrat leaders, German Leaders, Chinese leaders, or Foreign leaders. The text of the trade experiment with the Republican leaders as the proposers read as follows:

Agricultural Subsidies and Trade Reform Plan

Republican leaders are proposing an international agreement to limit the use of agricultural subsidies that countries can provide farmers. The goal of the agreement proposed by the Republican leaders is to limit the use of subsidies that may advantage some countries' farmers more than others.

Some of the specifics:

*Along with outlining proposed new upper limits on trade-distorting agricultural domestic support, the proposal suggests ways to address the special needs of developing country governments and the special treatment for specific products.

The WTO was selected as the proposer for the trade experiment because the scenario for the study was drawn from a debate that took place in the context of the WTO and because proposal power has played a major, although controversial, role in WTO negotiations. In his analysis of WTO negotiations, Odell (2009, 276) highlights the importance of proposal power, arguing that agreement is more likely when the WTO mediator takes bold action and proposes a negotiating text. In comparing the deadlock of the 1999 Seattle negotiation to the agreement reached in the 2001 Doha meeting, Odell (2009) emphasizes the effect of different strategies taken by the Chairs of the WTO General Council, noting that during the Seattle round Chairman Mchumo failed to exercise proposal power and instead merely presented competing positions, which bogged the negotiations down and ultimately contributed to the failure of the meeting. In contrast, for the Doha meeting Chairman Harbinson proposed "a single text ... a risky compromise intended to look balanced" (Odell, 2009, 289), which contributed to the parties reaching an agreement. Similar proposal tactics have been influential during other WTO negotiations, most notably during the Uruguay Round when Director General Dunkel issued the "Dunkel Draft", which was seen as a decisive step in moving the negotiations forward and highlights the ability of the IO to act as a proposer when the stakes are high. Given the role of proposal power within the WTO, it represents one of the most important IOs to study in the realm of trade negotiations.

The second experiment focused on international cybersecurity and was based on a plan to promote international cybersecurity cooperation, which was endorsed by NATO allies at the Wales Summit in September 2014 (NATO, 2017). The experiment randomly assigned the proposer, who was either *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Republican leaders, Democrat leaders,*

*German Leaders, or Foreign leaders.*⁴ The text of the security experiment with the Republican leaders as the proposers read as follows:

Cybersecurity Information Sharing Plan

Republican leaders are proposing an international agreement requiring allied countries to commit to sharing cyber information. The goal of the agreement proposed by the Republican leaders is to increase preparedness to defend against cyber threats.

Some of the specifics:

*The proposal sets out arrangements for the exchange of a variety of cyber defense-related information and assistance to improve cyber incident prevention, resilience and response capabilities.

The final experiment focused on environmental concerns and was based on a carbon tax plan that had originally been proposed by a group of Republicans in 2017 (John, 2017). Once again, the experiment randomly assigned who proposed the agreement so either *The United Nations FCCC, Republican leaders, Democrat leaders, German Leaders, Chinese leaders, or Foreign leaders* proposed the plan. The text of the environmental experiment with the Republican leaders as the proposers reads as follows:

Carbon Tax Plan

Republican leaders are proposing an international agreement requiring states to commit to a substantial new carbon tax, and then to offset the pain higher prices cause the middle class by returning all money raised to their taxpayers. The logic behind the carbon tax proposed by the Republican leaders is that it makes polluting the atmosphere – such as by burning coal, oil and natural gas – more expensive. And it creates an incentive for companies and people to move toward cleaner, renewable sources of energy.

Some of the specifics:

*An Escalating Carbon Tax: The Republican leaders propose starting the tax at \$40 a ton, with an understanding it would eventually have to be raised to \$50 or more to have the desired impact on consumption and emissions.

*Carbon Dividends: All revenue from the new tax would be rebated back to taxpayers. Such a plan could strengthen the economy, benefit working-class, and reduce regulations, the Republican leaders argued. These benefits accrue regardless of ones views on climate science.

⁴China was not used as a proposer for this experiment since it is not part of the NATO alliance.

Results

The main-effects of the experiments are displayed in Table 1, with the IO proposing as the benchmark to which all other proposal treatments are compared. Beginning with the trade experiment, it is clear that proposal power has a significant effect on domestic public support for the agreement. The WTO proposing the agreement resulted in the highest strength of support across all proposal treatments. The left two columns of Table 1 show that all other treatments had lower support scores, and the strength of support was significantly lower for all treatments except the Democrat leaders proposing, which was slightly lower than support for the IO proposal, but not significantly so. These results show that the IO proposing can help strengthen domestic support for a trade agreement, and that there is no other proposer, of the many examined in these studies, that generates higher support for a trade agreement than the IO. Importantly, the second column of Table 1 also shows that the results are robust to the inclusion of controls for partisanship, income, education, and age.⁵

The second study, which focuses on security cooperation, finds a similar pattern as the trade study. As is shown in the third column of Table 1, the IO proposing results in the highest average strength of support for the cybersecurity agreement. This adds further support to the positive role IOs can play in building a domestic coalition in support of international cooperation. One interesting component of the security results is that there is not a significant difference in support between the IO proposing and the domestic proposers, whether they are Democrat or Republicans, which demonstrates that domestic leaders are not sacrificing domestic support for the agreement when the IO proposes, as opposed to claiming credit for initiating the agreement themselves. In contrast, when the proposal is put forth by foreign leaders, whether they be generic foreign leaders or German, then there is a significant decline in support.

Lastly, the environmental experiment also finds that IO proposals can have a strong positive effect on support. Consistent with the earlier results, there are no other proposers that generate significantly higher support for the agreement than the IO. This confirms that IO proposals can be an effective strategy for building a strong supporting coalition amongst the domestic audience. Interestingly, the IO proposal generates significantly higher support for the agreement than either the Democrat or Republican proposals. This demonstrates that a domestic leader seeking to build a supporting coalition for the agreement can benefit from the IO proposal.

⁵The results are also robust to the inclusion of ideology instead of party identification.

Table 1: Effect of Proposer on Support for the Agreement

	Trade		Security		Environment	
Democrat Proposal	-0.109 (0.102)	-0.094 (0.104)	-0.028 (0.120)	0.018 (0.122)	-0.270 (0.185)	-0.318* (0.181)
Republican Proposal	-0.256** (0.102)	-0.247** (0.104)	-0.118 (0.121)	-0.073 (0.122)	-0.379** (0.184)	-0.391** (0.180)
Foreign Proposal	-0.199* (0.102)	-0.206** (0.104)	-0.273** (0.120)	-0.274** (0.121)	-0.226 (0.184)	-0.188 (0.180)
Chinese Proposal	-0.486*** (0.102)	-0.472*** (0.104)			-0.351* (0.184)	-0.362** (0.180)
German Proposal	-0.229** (0.103)	-0.231** (0.104)	-0.291** (0.120)	-0.275** (0.122)	0.178 (0.185)	0.136 (0.180)
Democrat		0.112 (0.072)		0.218** (0.090)		0.623*** (0.123)
Republican		0.158** (0.075)		0.106 (0.097)		-0.337** (0.132)
Income		0.053*** (0.017)		0.064*** (0.021)		0.039 (0.029)
Edu		0.062*** (0.020)		0.101*** (0.025)		0.061* (0.035)
Age		-0.006*** (0.002)		0.008*** (0.002)		-0.015*** (0.004)
Constant	0.383*** (0.072)	0.295* (0.155)	0.676*** (0.085)	-0.541*** (0.192)	0.757*** (0.130)	1.172*** (0.304)
Observations	3,144	3,053	2,856	2,759	1,568	1,564

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The baseline category to which all other treatments are compared is the IO proposal. The support variable ranges from -3 to +3, with higher values corresponding to greater support for the proposed agreement.

Across all three experiments, public support is consistently high when the IO proposes. This finding shows the power of IOs for enhancing domestic support for international agreements and suggests that IOs can play an important role in expanding the potential win-set that domestic audiences are willing to support. These results demonstrate that if a leader is engaged in an international negotiation and needs to broaden the domestic coalition that supports the agreement, allowing an IO to take credit as the proposer of the agreement can generate the highest domestic support for the agreement.

IO Proposal and Information about Self- and National-Interest

To test the *Quality Information Hypothesis*, which predicted that the IO proposal would enhance beliefs about how good the agreement is to the individual or their country, respondents were asked to evaluate “how good for you” and “how good for the United States” do you believe the agreement is? The responses ranged from “not good at all” to “very good” on a five-point scale, with higher values corresponding to beliefs that the agreement is good for them or their nation. Using these measures as the dependent variables, Table 2 looks at the treatment effects for each study on self- and national-interest, with the baseline comparison being the IO proposal.

The effects of the treatments on perceptions of how good the proposal is for the individual and the nation are more nuanced than the main-effects on support for the agreement. For the trade experiment, the self-interest measure is not significantly affected by any of the treatments, except when China proposes, in which case Americans believe the agreement is significantly worse for themselves. Consistent with a more sociotropic understanding of the impact of trade policy, the national-interest measure is significantly higher when the IO proposes as opposed to any of the foreign proposers, whether it be Chinese, German, or generic foreign leaders. These results suggest that the IO proposing can shift perceptions about how good a trade deal is for the US, and as long as it is not proposed by foreign leaders the public is likely to believe it is good for their country.

In contrast to the trade experiment, the IO proposal in the security experiment does not result in many significant shifts in beliefs about how good the agreement is for self- or national-interest. The IO proposal is viewed as being better for the individual than a generic foreign proposal, but there are no other significant effects, suggesting that the utility of the cybersecurity agreement is not viewed differently regardless of who proposes it, even though the IO proposal treatment had a significant positive effect on support for the agreement. This suggests that the positive effect of the

IO proposal on support in the security experiment is not functioning through beliefs about self- or national-interest.

Table 2: Effect of Proposer on Self- and National-Interest

	Trade		Security		Environment	
	Self	National	Self	National	Self	National
Democrat Proposal	-0.035 (0.056)	0.018 (0.058)	-0.003 (0.066)	0.065 (0.068)	-0.193* (0.106)	-0.200* (0.105)
Republican Proposal	0.002 (0.056)	0.029 (0.058)	-0.005 (0.066)	0.038 (0.068)	-0.365*** (0.105)	-0.315*** (0.105)
Foreign Proposal	-0.021 (0.056)	-0.109* (0.058)	-0.123* (0.066)	-0.087 (0.068)	-0.174* (0.105)	-0.258** (0.105)
Chinese Proposal	-0.170*** (0.056)	-0.235*** (0.058)			-0.308*** (0.105)	-0.365*** (0.105)
German Proposal	-0.032 (0.056)	-0.096* (0.059)	-0.069 (0.066)	-0.091 (0.068)	0.031 (0.105)	-0.057 (0.105)
Constant	3.067*** (0.039)	3.073*** (0.041)	3.205*** (0.047)	3.225*** (0.048)	3.380*** (0.074)	3.430*** (0.074)
Observations	3,108	3,109	2,827	2,825	1,568	1,567

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The baseline category to which all other treatments are compared is the IO proposal. The self- and national-interest variables range from 1 to 5, with higher values corresponding to beliefs that the agreement is better. The full wording of the self- and national-interest questions are in the appendix §2.

Lastly, the results for the environmental experiment are quite striking. The IO proposal is viewed as significantly better for self- and national-interest than the domestic proposal and the Chinese and generic foreign proposals. This shows that the IO can provide significant information about the agreement, which fundamentally changes how the public believes they and their country will be affected by the proposal. One explanation for the strong effect of the environmental treatment could be that it involves a tax on carbon, and that the public is more likely to believe a tax will directly impact them, as opposed to trade policy reforms, which may be viewed as a policy that is more likely to affect the country as a whole, but not the individual. Interestingly, even the domestic proposals,

be they from Democrat or Republican leaders, are viewed as generating significantly worse outcomes than the IO proposal for both the individual and country, demonstrating that there are some issues in which the public believes an IO can provide a better policy for them than their domestic leaders.

Overall, the results provide some support for the *Quality Information Hypothesis*. The evidence in favor of the information hypothesis is strongest in the trade and environmental scenarios, but surprisingly does not receive strong support in the security experiment. Why the mechanism plays out differently across issue areas remains an open question, and one that future research should pursue. It is likely the case that the public believes trade and environmental policy are more likely to have a direct affect on the nation and themselves than the cybersecurity policy, in which case other security operations with higher salience or national impact may be more likely to affect how the public perceives their self- and national-interest.

Procedural Fairness and Legitimacy

To test the procedural fairness hypothesis, which argues that IO proposals should be viewed as fairer than other types of proposals, I now examine the effects of the treatments on respondents' perceived fairness of each agreement. For each study respondents were asked to rate how fair they believed the agreement is, with responses placed on a five-point scale from "Not fair at all" to "Very fair" with higher values corresponding to higher perceived fairness. The results are displayed in Table 3.

There is mixed support for the procedural fairness hypothesis. In the Security experiment, there is no evidence that respondents view the agreement proposed by the IO as being fairer than agreements proposed by other actors. Similarly, in the trade experiment there is little evidence that IO proposals enhance fairness, with the one exception being that American respondents view the IO proposal as fairer than a Chinese proposal. However, this says less about the IO proposal than it does about American's perception that Chinese proposals are particularly unfair, which is clearly illustrated by the fact that all types of proposals are viewed as fairer than the Chinese proposal. The only study to find broad support for the procedural fairness hypothesis is the environmental study, where the IO proposal is viewed as fairer than than both of the domestic proposals and the Chinese proposal This suggests that Americans are skeptical of their leaders ability to propose fair environmental agreements, and they are more likely to view the IO (and German) proposal as being fair.

To further understand how IOs shape perceptions of fairness, I test the IO legitimacy hypothesis,

Table 3: Effect of Proposer on Fairness

	Trade	Security	Environment
Democrat.Proposal	0.031 (0.058)	0.002 (0.067)	-0.199* (0.105)
Republican.Proposal	0.037 (0.058)	-0.003 (0.067)	-0.296*** (0.105)
Foreign.Proposal	-0.019 (0.058)	-0.064 (0.067)	-0.117 (0.105)
Chinese.Proposal	-0.125** (0.058)		-0.183* (0.105)
German.Proposal	0.014 (0.059)	-0.057 (0.067)	0.050 (0.105)
Constant	3.021*** (0.041)	3.203*** (0.047)	3.331*** (0.074)
Observations	3,110	2,826	1,567

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The baseline category to which all other treatments are compared is the IO proposal. The fairness variable range from 1 to 5, with higher values corresponding to higher perceived fairness. The full wording of the fairness questions are in the appendix §2.

which argues that IO proposals should only increase support and perceptions of fairness among those people who trust the IO.⁶ To test this hypothesis, each respondent was asked about the United Nations, NATO, the World Trade Organization, and a number of other IOs. For each IO, respondents were asked “How often do you trust each of these organizations to do what is right?” with responses ranging from “Always” to “Never” along a five-point scale. One potential concern with the measure is that respondents’ trust in the IO could be influenced by exposure to the experiments. A number of approaches were taken to address this concern. First, in the omnibus study, the trust in IOs questions were administered well after respondents read the trade, security, or environment experiments so that any spillover effects should have been minimized. Second, the trust in IO questions were asked in both the first and second waves of the panel, which allows us to measure whether there were any significant differences in trust in IOs that might have resulted from being exposed to the trade, security, or environmental experiments. Reassuringly, there were no significant differences in the trust scores across panel waves,⁷ so we can be confident that the measures capture baseline levels of trust that were not affected by the experiments.

For the first analysis using the trust data, I divide the sample into those with high and low levels of trust for each IO. Respondents are considered to have relatively high trust of an organization if they “Always” or “Most of the time” trusted the organization to do what is right, whereas respondents are coded as having low trust if they trusted the organization to do what is right only “some of the time” or “never”. In Table 4 the results are displayed with the IO proposing as the baseline.

The results lend qualified support to the IO legitimacy hypothesis. In support of the hypothesis, I find that only one treatment effect is significant among those who have low trust in the IO, and the significant comparison is once again with the Chinese trade proposal, which has the lowest support among the low trust respondents. The null results among the low trust respondents is perfectly consistent with the IO legitimacy hypothesis, which predicted that only those who trust the IO should have increased support for the agreement. Furthermore, there are large and significant effects among those with high trust of the IO in the trade and security studies, but not for the environmental study.⁸ When switching from the strength of support for the agreement to the perceived fairness of

⁶This follows a similar line of logic as Grieco et al. (2011), who found that individuals who value an institution more are more likely to increase their support in response to the institution’s endorsement.

⁷The difference in average trust of the IOs across sample waves is: WTO: 0.02 ($p < 0.37$); NATO: 0.02 ($p < 0.2$); UN: -0.004 ($p < 0.87$).

⁸Similar results are obtained when analyzing the results using interaction models, which are

the agreement, similar results are also obtained, which are displayed in the appendix, §3.

Although the evidence is somewhat supportive of the IO legitimacy hypothesis, it is not conclusive. The treatment effect of the IO proposal is not always larger among those with high levels of trust compared to those with low trust of the IO. In fact, there appears to be an important connection between the partisanship of the proposer and the levels of trust of the IO. Among those respondents who have high trust in the IO, there is generally higher support for *both* the IO proposal and the Democrat proposal. Conversely, those in the low trust group have higher support for *both* the IO and the Republican proposals. While the evidence points in favor of the IO legitimacy hypothesis, it also suggests that the role of partisanship deserves further scrutiny, which will be considered in more detail later in the paper.

Table 4: Effects of Proposer among High/Low IO Trust Subgroups on Support for Agreement

	Trade		Security		Environment	
	High Trust	Low Trust	High Trust	Low Trust	High Trust	Low Trust
Democrat.Proposal	0.103 (0.216)	-0.171 (0.171)	0.304 (0.195)	-0.268 (0.224)	0.071 (0.268)	-0.392 (0.324)
Republican.Proposal	-0.645*** (0.208)	0.075 (0.178)	-0.473** (0.195)	0.281 (0.227)	-0.450* (0.263)	0.034 (0.337)
Foreign.Proposal	-0.057 (0.210)	-0.164 (0.174)	-0.346* (0.198)	-0.153 (0.226)	-0.093 (0.266)	-0.166 (0.318)
Chinese.Proposal	-0.369* (0.211)	-0.289* (0.171)			-0.320 (0.267)	-0.149 (0.319)
German.Proposal	-0.087 (0.216)	-0.180 (0.176)	-0.159 (0.199)	-0.288 (0.218)	-0.078 (0.255)	0.214 (0.350)
Constant	0.730*** (0.150)	0.056 (0.124)	1.178*** (0.141)	0.186 (0.155)	1.520*** (0.186)	-0.244 (0.228)
Observations	848	1,107	1,062	809	597	509

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The baseline category to which all other treatments are compared is the IO proposal. The support variable ranges from -3 to +3, with higher values corresponding to greater support for the proposed agreement. The sample is divided into those who have high or low trust in each particular IO.

displayed in the appendix, §3.

While the earlier results provide strong and consistent evidence of the positive influence of IOs on support for international agreements, I now analyze whether these results are robust to controlling for other factors that may influence support for international agreements and the proposers. I begin by using the full five-point measure of trust in the IOs. The results with controls for trust in the WTO, NATO, and the UN are displayed in models 1, 3, and 5 of Table 5 respectively. As expected, trust in the IO has a positive and significant effect on support for the IO's proposal of the agreement. Importantly, all of the main-effects of the treatments remain substantively unchanged with the inclusion of this control.

Table 5 also shows the results while controlling for cooperative internationalism (CI) in models 2, 4, and 6. The cooperative internationalism measure is based on questions drawn from Kertzer et al. (2014) that follow the classic "Wittkopf-Holsti-Rosenau" framework of militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism (Holsti and Rosenau, 1988; Wittkopf, 1986).⁹ Controlling for CI helps differentiate the effect of the IO from general support for international cooperation and proposals from international sources. Even after controlling for CI, the main-effects of the IO proposals remain largely unchanged, giving us greater confidence in the robustness of the treatment effects.

Building a Coalition Across Party Lines

A key challenge to building a sufficient domestic coalition to ratify or implement international agreements is garnering support from members of the opposition party or parties. With this in mind, I now turn to an analysis of how a leader can build a stronger domestic coalition for international cooperation that includes support from her own party and also from the opposition party. In the US context, this means focusing on how Democrats and Republicans can enhance support among the opposition party. This is especially important when it comes to analyzing the informational role of IOs, given that Grieco et al. (2011) have shown that IOs have greater influence among members of the public who do not have confidence in their leader. In the polarized environment of domestic politics, it is reasonable to assume that members of the public have less confidence in leaders from opposition parties, and thus I expect that IO proposals will be especially influential amongst this group. This means when IOs are viewed as proposing international agreements leaders can benefit from increased support from members of the opposing party and an expanded win-set, which can increase the likelihood of cooperation and facilitate the implementation of international agreements.

⁹The full wording of the questions is included in the appendix §3.

Table 5: Results Controlling for Trust of the IO and Cooperative Internationalism

	Trade		Security		Environment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democrat Proposal	-0.076 (0.103)	-0.072 (0.104)	-0.020 (0.121)	-0.038 (0.121)	-0.208 (0.176)	-0.200 (0.174)
Republican Proposal	-0.265** (0.103)	-0.255** (0.104)	-0.125 (0.121)	-0.113 (0.121)	-0.375** (0.175)	-0.302* (0.172)
Foreign Proposal	-0.190* (0.103)	-0.159 (0.103)	-0.285** (0.120)	-0.313*** (0.121)	-0.109 (0.174)	-0.102 (0.172)
Chinese Proposal	-0.475*** (0.103)	-0.480*** (0.103)			-0.291* (0.174)	-0.298* (0.173)
German Proposal	-0.232** (0.104)	-0.217** (0.104)	-0.274** (0.120)	-0.284** (0.120)	0.185 (0.175)	0.202 (0.173)
Trust of WTO	0.257*** (0.028)					
Cooperative Internationalism		0.264*** (0.035)		0.452*** (0.044)		0.884*** (0.058)
Trust of NATO			0.411*** (0.036)			
Trust of UN					0.635*** (0.043)	
Constant	-0.360*** (0.109)	-0.599*** (0.146)	-0.579*** (0.139)	-0.961*** (0.184)	-1.186*** (0.178)	-2.538*** (0.249)
Observations	3,047	3,038	2,755	2,751	1,525	1,546

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The baseline category to which all other treatments are compared is the IO proposal. The support variable ranges from -3 to +3, with higher values corresponding to greater support for the proposed agreement. The trust of the WTO, NATO, and UN are measured from 1 to 5 and the cooperative internationalism variable is an index compiled from the questions displayed in the appendix §3.

To measure the effect of IO proposals on members of the opposition party, I consider the incentives for leaders who could either propose the agreement themselves or allow an IO to propose the agreement. Given this comparison, I examine the effect of the IO proposing on subsets of the population, specifically Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. Table 6 shows the results for Democrat respondents with the baseline comparison being the IO proposing the agreement. Notably, if a leader who is a Democrat has the option of proposing the agreement or allowing an IO to propose, her constituents who are Democrats are indifferent between the two options in all three experiments, as is shown in the first row of Table 6.¹⁰ However, if a Democrat leader is considering the same situation, but wants to increase support among Republicans, she is significantly better off when the IO proposes the agreement, as is shown in the first row of Table 7. For all three studies, Republican respondents are significantly more likely to support the agreement when it is proposed by an IO instead of a Democrat. When an IO proposes the agreement, instead of a Democrat, the Democrat leader does not lose any support from her own party, but does significantly increase support for the agreement among Republicans. These results clearly show that across economic, security, and environmental negotiations, leaders who are Democrats can generate much higher support for international agreements and cooperation when an IO proposes it, as opposed to the leader exercising her own proposal power.

The results also tell a similar, although more nuanced story, for Republican leaders. As with Democrat leaders, Republican leaders will get significantly higher support for international agreements from the opposition party when the IO proposes it, as opposed to the Republican leader proposing, which is shown in the second row of Table 6. This confirms that IO proposals avoid the potentially alienating effects of party cues, which can significantly reduce support for policies from those outside the party. However, unlike a Democrat leader, the Republican leader sacrifices some of her core-constituents' support when the IO proposes, which is shown in the second row of Table 7. For the trade and security studies, but not the environmental study, Republican leaders get more support for their proposals amongst republicans than they do when the IO proposes. This suggests that Republican leaders face a trade-off when they consider whether to exercise their own proposal power or allow an IO to be the proposer. If their party-constituents already have strong support for the agreement, or are willing to toe the party-line, then the IO proposal represents an opportunity

¹⁰There is not a statistically significant difference between the Democrat proposal and the IO treatment in any of the studies, among Democrat respondents.

to increase support among Democrats and build a broader coalition that may be helpful when ratifying the agreement or implementing it. However, if the Republican leader is only concerned about maximizing support for the agreement within her party, then she is better off claiming credit and being viewed as the proposer.

Lastly, Table 8 shows how independents respond to proposals from Democrats and Republicans versus IOs. Independents appear to be less susceptible to the cues of who is proposing the agreement, and only have a strong reaction in the environmental study. This means that a domestic leader does not run a significant risk of alienating independents when an IO proposes, and in fact the environmental experiment suggests that Republican leaders can increase domestic support for an agreement among independents when the IO proposes.

Table 6: Democrat Respondents Only: Effect of IO Proposing versus Domestic Leaders

	Trade	Security	Environment
Democrat.Proposal	-0.037 (0.183)	0.214 (0.205)	0.396 (0.293)
Republican.Proposal	-1.205*** (0.178)	-0.456** (0.201)	-0.741** (0.297)
Constant	0.716*** (0.128)	0.856*** (0.146)	1.165*** (0.211)
Observations	494	573	281

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The baseline category to which all other treatments are compared is the IO proposal. The support variable ranges from -3 to +3, with higher values corresponding to greater support for the proposed agreement. The analysis in this table is conducted on the subset of respondents who identified as Democrats.

Table 7: Republican Respondents Only: Effect of IO Proposing versus Domestic Leaders

	Trade (1)	Security (2)	Environment (3)
Democrat.Proposal	-0.481** (0.198)	-0.448** (0.226)	-1.273*** (0.364)
Republican.Proposal	0.689*** (0.205)	0.395* (0.235)	0.352 (0.360)
Constant	0.325** (0.139)	0.836*** (0.157)	0.493* (0.251)
Observations	464	456	214

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The baseline category to which all other treatments are compared is the IO proposal. The support variable ranges from -3 to +3, with higher values corresponding to greater support for the proposed agreement. The analysis in this table is conducted on the subset of respondents who identified as Republicans.

Table 8: Independent Respondents Only: Effect of IO Proposing versus Domestic Leaders

	Trade (1)	Security (2)	Environment (3)
Democrat.Proposal	0.171 (0.161)	0.075 (0.191)	-0.303 (0.292)
Republican.Proposal	-0.112 (0.161)	-0.129 (0.191)	-0.577** (0.286)
Constant	0.132 (0.115)	0.430*** (0.135)	0.577*** (0.203)
Observations	588	644	287

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The baseline category to which all other treatments are compared is the IO proposal. The support variable ranges from -3 to +3, with higher values corresponding to greater support for the proposed agreement. The analysis in this table is conducted on the subset of respondents who identified as Independents or “other”.

Conclusion

The theory and results presented in this paper put forth the first examination of how proposal power by international organizations shapes domestic public support for international agreements. The evidence drawn from experiments on economic, security, and environmental issues consistently points to IOs ability to enhance domestic support for international agreements, expanding the domestic win-set and increasing the opportunity for cooperation. This evidence suggests that in situations when leaders are negotiating on the international stage and they are concerned with building a supporting domestic coalition for ratification or implementation of the agreement, IO's proposal power can change perceptions of the agreement and help build a viable supporting coalition.

The paper also highlights that IOs can play an especially important role in helping domestic leaders gain the support of opposition-party members. This is a critical step in building a coalition to ratify or implement international agreements, and thus has important consequences for the strategic incentives for leaders' foreign policy negotiations. Given that domestic audiences are less likely to trust opposition leaders than their own leaders, IOs can provide a valuable cue to domestic audiences about potential agreements. This cue is found to enhance individuals' views about the benefits of the agreement to their self- and national-interest. Furthermore, across all the issue areas studied, IO proposals consistently generate substantial increases in support for international agreements among members of the domestic audience who are not from the leader's political party. This means IOs can expand a leaders' domestic supporting coalition for international cooperation and provide a unique mechanism that a leader can seek to take advantage of when making the case domestically for the agreement.

Given the rise of popular opposition to international economic cooperation and integration, this paper tackles an increasingly important question of how support for international cooperation can be enhanced and how leaders can expand the win-set of potential agreements when facing domestic constraints. Although the majority of international negotiations do not generate significant attention from domestic audiences, those that do are likely to address the largest and most politically sensitive issues in international relations. This means that when the domestic public is in a position to affect whether an international agreement is ratified or not, or whether international cooperation is continued, the stakes are likely to be high. This paper argues that in such circumstances the public reacts to how international agreements are proposed, shaping their views based on cues

they receive from the negotiation process. When leaders want to increase domestic support and expand the win-set of potential agreements, then they need to be keenly aware of who is required to build a viable domestic coalition and how those groups respond to the proposal process. In such situations leaders may be better off allowing an IO to propose, since domestic audiences in each of the negotiating countries may observe the IO proposal, which increases support for the agreement and makes ratification or implementation of the agreement more likely at the domestic level.

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SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX TO:

TRADE, CONFLICT, AND COOPERATION:
How IOs affect Domestic Support for International Agreements

February 1, 2019

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1 Sample Demographics

Table 1: Study Demographics

Trade Study		Security Study	Environmental Study
Demographic Trait:	Proportion	Proportion	Proportion
Age 18-29	0.18	0.17	0.16
Age 30-44	0.26	0.27	0.32
Age 45-59	0.28	0.26	0.38
Age 60+	0.28	0.29	0.15
Male	0.45	0.45	0.39
Income 0-50	0.48	0.48	0.47
Income 50-100	0.33	0.33	0.34
Income 100-150	0.12	0.11	0.12
Income 150+	0.08	0.08	0.07
Democrat	0.34	0.35	0.35
Republican	0.29	0.27	0.28
Independent	0.28	0.29	0.28

2 Supplementary Questions

Trade Study:

On a scale of 1-5, how good for you do you believe the proposed subsidy agreement is?
[1-Not Good At All ... 5-Very Good]

On a scale of 1-5, how good for the United States do you believe the proposed subsidy agreement is? [1-Not Good At All ... 5-Very Good]

On a scale of 1-5, how fair do you believe the proposed subsidy agreement is?
[1-Not Fair At All ... 5-Very Fair]

On a scale of 1-5, how much do you trust those who proposed the agreement?
[1-Do Not Trust At All ... 5-Trust Completely]

Security Study:

On a scale of 1-5, how good for you do you believe the proposed cyber information sharing plan is? [1-Not Good At All ... 5-Very Good]

On a scale of 1-5, how good for the United States do you believe the proposed cyber information sharing plan is? [1-Not Good At All ... 5-Very Good]

On a scale of 1-5, how fair do you believe the proposed cyber information sharing plan is?
[1-Not Fair At All ... 5-Very Fair]

On a scale of 1-5, how much do you trust those who proposed the agreement?
[1-Do Not Trust At All ... 5-Trust Completely]

Environmental Study:

On a scale of 1-5, how good for you do you believe the proposed carbon tax plan is?
[1-Not Good At All ... 5-Very Good]

On a scale of 1-5, how good for the United States do you believe the proposed Carbon Tax plan is? [1-Not Good At All ... 5-Very Good]

On a scale of 1-5, how fair do you believe the proposed carbon tax plan is?
[1-Not Fair At All ... 5-Very Fair]

On a scale of 1-5, how much do you trust those who proposed the agreement?
[1-Do Not Trust At All ... 5-Trust Completely]

3 Cooperative Internationalism Questions

For measures of cooperative internationalism, we draw questions from Kertzer et al. (2014) that follow the classic “Wittkopf-Holsti-Rosenau” framework of militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism (Holsti and Rosenau, 1988; Wittkopf, 1986). We ask respondents to select the response among *strongly agree*, *somewhat agree*, *neither agree nor disagree*, *somewhat disagree*, and *strongly disagree* that describes how they feel about each of the statements below. For the analysis, the response orders are reconstructed so that higher values correspond to higher levels of cooperative internationalism. The responses are then added together into an index, which is rescaled to values from zero to one for ease of interpretation.

1. The United States needs to cooperate more with the United Nations.
2. I consider myself a citizen of the world.
3. It is essential for the United States to work with other nations to solve problems such as overpopulation, hunger and pollution.
4. Promoting and defending human rights in other countries is of utmost importance.
5. Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed country is of utmost importance.
6. Protecting the global environment is of utmost importance.

4 Trust of IO Models

Table 2: Trust of IO Interacted with Proposer Treatments

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	TR_tot_supp (1)	CS_tot_supp (2)	CT_tot_supp (3)
Democrat.Proposal	-0.171	-0.268	-0.392
High.WTO.Trust	0.675***		
High.NATO.Trust		0.992***	
High.UN.Trust			1.764***
Republican.Proposal	0.075	0.281	0.034
Foreign.Proposal	-0.164	-0.153	-0.166
Chinese.Proposal	-0.289		-0.149
German.Proposal	-0.180	-0.288	0.214
Democrat.Proposal:High.WTO.Trust	0.274		
High.WTO.Trust:Republican.Proposal	-0.720***		
High.WTO.Trust:Foreign.Proposal	0.107		
High.WTO.Trust:Chinese.Proposal	-0.080		
High.WTO.Trust:German.Proposal	0.093		
Democrat.Proposal:High.NATO.Trust		0.572*	
High.NATO.Trust:Republican.Proposal		-0.753**	
High.NATO.Trust:Foreign.Proposal		-0.192	
High.NATO.Trust:German.Proposal		0.130	
Democrat.Proposal:High.UN.Trust			0.463
High.UN.Trust:Republican.Proposal			-0.484
High.UN.Trust:Foreign.Proposal			0.073
High.UN.Trust:Chinese.Proposal			-0.171
High.UN.Trust:German.Proposal			-0.292
Constant	0.056	0.186	-0.244
Observations	5 1,955	1,871	1,106

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The baseline category to which all other treatments are compared is the IO proposal. The support variable ranges from -3 to +3, with higher values corresponding to greater support for the proposed agreement. The trust variables are dichotomous indicators for whether the respondent has high trust (1) or low trust (0).

Table 3: Effects of Proposer among High/Low IO Trust Subgroups on Fairness

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	TR_fair		CS_fair		CT_fair	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democrat.Proposal	0.043 (0.120)	0.031 (0.099)	0.162 (0.108)	-0.220* (0.128)	-0.181 (0.150)	-0.245 (0.187)
Republican.Proposal	-0.325*** (0.116)	0.246** (0.103)	-0.197* (0.108)	0.155 (0.129)	-0.400*** (0.148)	-0.119 (0.195)
Foreign.Proposal	-0.089 (0.117)	-0.070 (0.101)	-0.054 (0.110)	-0.102 (0.129)	-0.130 (0.149)	-0.122 (0.184)
Chinese.Proposal	-0.300** (0.117)	-0.017 (0.099)			-0.227 (0.149)	-0.169 (0.184)
German.Proposal	-0.086 (0.120)	0.030 (0.102)	-0.059 (0.110)	-0.122 (0.124)	-0.084 (0.143)	-0.105 (0.203)
Constant	3.404*** (0.083)	2.783*** (0.072)	3.527*** (0.079)	2.878*** (0.088)	3.880*** (0.104)	2.711*** (0.132)
Observations	847	1,107	1,061	808	597	509

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The baseline category to which all other treatments are compared is the IO proposal. The fairness variable ranges from 1 to 5, with higher values corresponding to greater perceived fairness. The sample is divided into those who have high or low trust in each particular IO.

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