The Forces of Attraction: How Security Interests Shape Membership in Economic Institutions *

Christina L. Davis

Tyler Pratt

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Abstract

Multilateral institutions deepen the interaction among states as they seek mutual gains from cooperation. But prior relationships influence which states join institutions. We argue that discretion over membership allows states to exclude rivals and selectively offer the benefits of multilateral cooperation to the favored partners who become members. Accession presents a window for bargaining that facilitates linkages between security interests and the issue area regulated by the institution. Our argument departs from functional theories that suggest states target partners who offer the greatest gains from mutual policy adjustment. It allows for a broader range of security-based economic cooperation than realist theories about security externalities and explains the puzzle of why states allow entry even to those who may be unlikely to comply. We test these dynamics by analyzing membership patterns from 1949 to 2014 in 89 multilateral economic organizations. We demonstrate that security alignment has a large and significant effect on the probability of membership in economic organizations. Using a finite mixture model to examine the relative importance of economic and security considerations, we find that geopolitical alignment among states account for about *half* of the membership decisions in our sample. The geopolitical origins of IGO membership represent a new mechanism connecting the security and economic behavior of states.

1   Introduction

How do states choose their partners for cooperation in multilateral institutions? Existing research highlights both the desire for material gain in the issue area regulated by the institution and states' broader strategic goals. But there is little consensus over when and how states rank these varied interests. From the perspective of a functional view of institutions, common interests within a specific policy domain form the basis for cooperation. States with deepening interdependence pursue opportunities to profit from policy coordination and use institutions to solve market failures (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Keohane, 1984; Farrell and Newman, 2015).[1] For example, decisions on accession to the IMF, EU, or WTO have been explained by states' financial accounts and trade structure, which determine the potential gains from economic cooperation (e.g. Simmons, 2000; Schneider, 2009; Pelc, 2011). By contrast, realist theories posit that cooperation is shaped by concerns about the distribution of gains. Because those gains may enhance military power, states prefer to cooperate with partners who are unlikely to become adversaries in a future conflict (Gowa, 1989; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Gowa, 1994).[2] While this "security externality" logic explains bilateral trade flows among states, it is unclear when and how states weigh geopolitical interests in multilateral economic institutions that support non-discrimination.

We argue that security concerns shape multilateral cooperation through the politics of membership. Membership patterns in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) reflect a strategic effort by states to reinforce and expand their security coalitions. States exploit discretion over membership to grant entry to allies and exclude rivals, selectively offering the benefits of multilateral cooperation as patronage for favored partners. The institutional context delimits the scope of cooperation to members, which facilitates economic and security linkages by allowing states to more easily target material benefits to

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[1]The classic portrayal of cooperation as a Prisoner's Dilemma game points to the demand for an institution to provide information and credible enforcement that can support the Pareto-superior outcome.

[2]Systemic constraints may shift the value ascribed to such distributional consequences (Powell, 1991).

particular countries. Favoring accession of aligned partners enables states to construct political ties by sharing benefits, and excluding rivals from membership denies them the gains of cooperation. As a result, the politics of IGO membership facilitates linkages between security interests and other issue areas regulated by the institution.

Our linkage theory goes beyond the logic of market failure and security externalities. The strategic motivation for membership in our argument is distinct from institutional theories that delimit cooperation within a single issue area. The pursuit of mutual gains through institutional commitments are one dimension of cooperation, but many countries will strategically exploit these gains to reinforce broader geopolitical goals. Our argument also allows for a broader range of security-based cooperation than one would expect from the presence of security externalities alone. Joining multilateral economic institutions on the basis of geopolitical alignment connects economic and security interests through a channel outside of the bilateral aid and trade flows that are the focus of research on security conditions for economic cooperation. The use of IGO membership to build coalitions can explain asymmetrical transfers to allies and economic exchange outside of Cold War alliance structures. It can further account for decisions to include weak compliers while excluding potential contributors.

Membership in institutions is an important subject for political scientists because it is believed to shape the behavior of states. Empirical studies assess the power of institutions by comparing the policies of members and non-members. For example, the debate about the effectiveness of the multilateral trade regime assesses whether GATT/WTO members trade more with each other than non-members (Rose, 2004; Gowa and Kim, 2005; Goldstein, Rivers and Tomz, 2007). Environmental institutions are adjudged as consequential if members reduce pollution levels following entry (Young, 1999; Breitmeier, Underdal and Young, 2011). Others show that the number and type of shared institutional memberships alter patterns of trade and conflict (Russett and Oneal, 2001; Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom, 2004; Ingram,

Robinson and Busch, 2005; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006; Haftel, 2007; Mitchell and Hensel, 2007). Membership can also induce changes of behavior via socialization when members interact with each other (Johnston, 2001; Bearce and Bondanella, 2007).

Knowing whether and how institutions change behavior requires examining entry into them. While states may want partners who are willing to undertake significant policy reforms, rigorous screening for compliance is unusual among international organizations. For example, how can we explain why Turkey joined the OECD in 1961? Or, more recently, why the United States and Japan opted to remain out of the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank? In the former example, geopolitical motives including NATO solidarity motivated Turkey's entry into the OECD despite its low performance on economic indicators. In the latter example, those governments most qualified to join a development bank failed to do so because of strategic considerations.

We test our argument linking geopolitical alignment and IGO membership by examining membership patterns in economic organizations. Economic IGOs provide an opportunity to examine geopolitical motivations where institutional rules do not directly implicate security interests. We measure geopolitical alignment on the basis of common orientation of states in their foreign policy. Formal alliances are a starting point, but shared alliance portfolios, arms transfers, and common voting patterns in the United Nations offer additional indicators of geopolitical alignment.

We compare the influence of geopolitical alignment with the baseline expectation that states will prioritize economic interests when considering membership in economic IGOs. We use trade flows to gauge whether economic interdependence explains demand for institutionalized cooperation. One could expect that low levels of economic exchange would generate a need for rules to facilitate the expansion of ties, or the opposite relationship in which high trade flows would motivate rule creation to manage relations surrounding these interests. In either case, trade ties are one dimension that shapes state demand

for mutual cooperation.

In a series of empirical tests, we show that geopolitical alignment has a significant influence on the probability of IGO membership at every stage of multilateral cooperation, including decisions to form organizations and to join existing IGOs. To test trade-offs between economic and geopolitical considerations, we use a finite mixture model for the evaluation of competing theories (Imai and Tingley, 2012). We ask about the relative weight accorded to security ties versus trade ties in decisions to join multilateral organizations. We assess how each process performs in the approximately 485,000 state-IGO-year observations in our sample, which consists of 89 salient multilateral economic organizations in the period 1949-2014. The geopolitical logic motivates nearly half of membership decisions.

Our evidence highlights how security linkages influence the foundations of global economic governance. Many IGOs represent political clubs rather than efforts to solve market failures. We build on research about the security basis for economic cooperation (e.g. Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Mansfield and Bronson, 1997; Blanchard, Mansfield and Ripsman, 2000; Lake, 2009). We demonstrate that security linkages extend beyond bilateral exchanges like trade and aid, which are easily stopped Our evidence of security linkages in the arena of multilateral economic organizations represents a hard test for geopolitical influence because states have less direct control over the quid pro quo relationship.

The role of geopolitics should inform judgments about the effectiveness of institutions. We present evidence of the selection bias that confronts research on international institutions; the decision to join IGOs is endogenous to state preferences (e.g. Martin and Simmons, 1998). Skeptics have long claimed that ex ante power and interests make regimes "epiphenomenal" and cooperation shallow (Mearsheimer, 1994/5; Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, 1996).[3] We demonstrate that non-random selection occurs through

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[3]Some respond to this criticism with statistical models of selection using an instrumental variable to identify the effect of membership (e.g. Von Stein, 2005; Poast and Urpelainen, 2015), or matching to reduce heterogeneity across states in covariates that predict membership (e.g. Simmons and Hopkins, 2005; Lupu, 2013). But strong assumptions are necessary for such models, and they fail to explain the theoretical sources of variation in membership. We highlight the need to incorporate foreign policy preferences beyond those regulated by the institution as an important source of variation in who

screening members on the basis of economic ties *and* geopolitical relations. On the one hand, geopolitical determinants of membership offer a rebuttal to those who dismiss compliance as the result of screening for compliant states. On the other hand, research about how joint IGO membership encourages peace needs to account for the role of geopolitical alignment as a determinant of IGO membership.

The next section reviews the existing theoretical perspectives on IGO membership. Section 3 explains our argument about the role of geopolitical alignment as a force of attraction driving membership decisions. We specify observable implications to assess the theory's predictions for patterns of membership. Then we introduce our data on economic IGOs and present the results of our empirical analysis of membership in section 4. A final section concludes.

2 IGO Membership

Governments often grant themselves discretion about membership when they design international organizations. Vague membership rules enable founding members to strategically admit member states. Through formal and informal means, states establish entry barriers that favor their interests. Commodity organizations can include both producers and consumers, such as the International Cotton Advisory Committee, or focus exclusively on dominant producers, such as OPEC. Geographic restrictions can evolve, with regional organizations expanding and in some cases including non-regional members.[4] For example, several European states joined the Asian Development Bank as extra-regional members, and Japan joined the International Cotton Advisory Committee without being a producer. Even when organizations impose no membership restrictions, not all states choose to join. Consequently, most IGOs resemble limited membership clubs more than universal organizations.[5]

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joins institutions.

[4]For evidence that IGO membership patterns have become less regional over time, see (Greenhill and Lupu, 2017)

[5]Through selecting members, club-style IGOs engage states in the provision of an *impure* public good where benefits are excludable and congestion may diminish benefits so that membership will be limited (Cornes and Sandler, 1996, p. 4).

Several theories offer insights into how states make membership decisions. Demand-side explanations consider why states seek institutionalized cooperation in IGOs. Supply-side arguments examine how existing member states design institutions to limit or expand membership. We will develop our argument about how the political relations between states simultaneously shape the demand of potential members to join and the willingness of current members to expand. In doing so, we turn from *whether* states use IGOs to promote cooperation, to the question of *with whom*.

Keohane (1984) argues that demand for international institutions arises from their ability to resolve market failures. In his theory, international organizations help states reduce transaction costs and overcome information problems. This implies we should observe a membership selection process based on common interests within the issue area regulated by the institution.[6] Others point to domestic sources of demand for institutions and argue that democracy and democratic transitions increase demand for IGOs as a means to enhance credible commitments to policy reforms.[7]

Scholars focusing on the supply side of IGO membership contend that states adjust the rules and membership size of IGOs on the basis of enforcement concerns and the distribution of gains from cooperation (e.g. Martin, 1992; Kahler, 1992; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001; Drezner, 2007; Koremenos, 2016). In these circumstances, those unwilling to comply with the rules will not join. States may also restrict membership size to facilitate bargaining. A small group with similar preferences can more readily reach agreements because they can more easily monitor compliance (Kahler, 1992; Downs and Rocke, 1995; Thompson and Verdier, 2014). When IGOs provide public goods or resolve coordination

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[6]Research on regimes for trade, environment, and human rights examines how preferences and credible commitment problems specific to the issue area explain variation in membership (e.g. Bagwell and Staiger, 1999; Barrett, 2006; Simmons and Danner, 2010).

[7] Shanks, Jacobson and Kaplan (1996); Russett and Oneal (2001) argue democracy provides foundation for institutionalized cooperation, while others argue that transitions to democracy make states seek the added credibility that accrues from membership in international organizations (Pevehouse, 2002; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006; Poast and Urpelainen, 2015). Uncertainty about policy stability may also drive democratizing states to create new IGOs and erect rigorous screening criteria to demonstrate their readiness to cooperate (Poast, 2013; Kaoutzanis, Poast and Urpelainen, Forthcoming).

problems, however, wider participation is beneficial.[8] Economies of scale can also accrue because institutions facilitate a division of labor among members (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). The trade-off between depth of rules and breadth of participation generates conflicting incentives for the ideal membership size of institutions (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001, p. 796). States have adopted several approaches to this problem. In some cases, small groups set the rules and gradually expand to admit new members as their preferences converge (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, 1998; Jupille, Mattli and Snidal, 2013; Gray, Lindstadt and Slapin, Forthcoming). In other cases, states allocate different levels of decision authority across members (Gilligan, 2004; Stone, 2011; Hooghe and Marks, 2015). For these studies of institutional design, interests regulated by the regime determine the scope of membership.

Alongside the conventional view of international institutions as functional tools to solve market failures within a given issue area, it is common knowledge that states use economic statecraft to advance their foreign policy goals. Alliances shape trade flows (Gowa, 1994; Long and Leeds, 2006), and other sources of influence can skew trade toward states with good relations (Berger et al., 2013; Fuchs and Klann, 2013). States also allocate foreign aid with attention to strategic interests (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Bearce and Tirone, 2010; Bermeo, 2016). Do these same forces that shape bilateral flows influence decisions regarding multilateral cooperation? Some research suggests that multilateral regimes dilute such politics to neutralize the influence of foreign relations (Carnegie, 2014). The public believes that multilateral institutions reduces the ability of governments to politicize outcomes such as sending aid to favored allies (Milner and Tingley, 2013). Yet evidence of horse-trading within multilateral fora is widespread (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Vreeland and Dreher, 2014; Lim and Vreeland, 2013).

Dyadic relationships among states set incentives on both the demand and supply side of IGO membership. The appeal of joining an IGO depends in large part on the composition of its members. In

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[8]IGOs that provide public goods are susceptible to free-riding from other states (Stone, Slantchev and London, 2008).

discriminatory clubs, states select members on the basis of certain attributes rather than their ability to contribute to the joint mission of regulating the specific issue area.[9] This contrasts with modeling cooperation among anonymous states based on their relative size (e.g. Stone, Slantchev and London, 2008). Instead, membership outcomes are a function of both a new entrant's ability to contribute to the joint project and their intrinsic value to the group.

Increasing attention in the literature examines a relational approach to study international institutions. Donno, Metzger and Russett (2014) show that IGOs favor applicants with a lower security risk to avoid conflict among member states. Kaoutzanis, Poast and Urpelainen (Forthcoming) argue that democratizing states establish strict accession rules to screen out authoritarian states that could threaten the democratic consolidation process. Davis and Wilf (2017) argue that foreign policy shapes entry into the trade regime through faster applications on the demand-side and faster accession negotiations on the supply-side. States are also more likely to cooperate with partners with whom they are linked in existing networks of agreements (Kinne, 2013). These recent studies are an important step forward to show that states condition on more than just mutual interests on a narrow issue.

3   Geopolitical Alignment as Basis for IGO Membership

Security ties affect the probability of cooperation in at least two ways: security externalities and security linkages. In the first, cooperation on economic issues (e.g., trade) generates spillovers in the security realm because states recognize that the efficiency gains from international cooperation can be channeled into military power (Gowa, 1989; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Gowa, 1994). Both leaders and the general public believe that it will be safer to support cooperation with allies and exclude rivals (Carnegie and Gaikwad, 2017).

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[9]For discriminatory club good theory, see (Cornes and Sandler, 1996, p. 385).

There are limitations, however, to explanations based on security externalities. This logic largely applies to the bipolar era of clearly divided alliance structures and bilateral settings where individual states control the flow of material benefits.[10] But the end of the Cold War coincided with a surge of economic cooperation and an expanding scope for multilateral rules to govern these exchanges. Moreover, if states gain positive utility from augmenting the capability of allies, they should demand full compliance with an institution's rules in order to maximize income gains. In practice, however, existing members often relax rules to facilitate the entry of their geopolitical allies. For example, the United States encouraged other GATT members to allow Japan to enter the trade regime without requiring the removal of substantial trade barriers, and it advocated admitting Korea to the OECD despite reservations by Korea to limit its financial liberalization. These observations suggest that a second mechanism may drive the correlation between geopolitical alignment and IGO membership.

3.1   Linkage: Favoring Friends

In addition to the security externality logic, geopolitical alignment creates new incentives to pursue institutionalized cooperation as part of a coalition-building strategy. Institutions facilitate resource transfers that serve as bribes. Different preferences for security and economic cooperation underlie these linkages that increase the range for agreement.[11] For one state, economic gains motivate accession while for another state, enhanced leverage on security matters justify the economic exchange. The entry cost in terms of pre-accession policy reforms also shifts when including a broader set of interests. The institutional context is necessary to provide the exclusion mechanism that restricts cooperation within the subset of members and increases the credibility of the promised benefit to recipients.

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[10]Gowa and Mansfield (1993) argue that certainty over alliance structures during the bipolar period of the Cold War generated the security externality that supported higher levels of trade among allies. Bilateral exchanges are more conducive to this logic because they are narrowly targeted and reversible. Indeed, multilateral trade negotiations relied on a series of bilateral deals based on the principal- supplier rule to isolate the exchange of benefits (Hicks and Gowa, Forthcoming).

[11]See studies on linkage (e.g. Tollison and Willett, 1979; Sebenius, 1983; Lohmann, 1997; Davis, 2004; Poast, 2013).

The accession process of multilateral institutions can vary from the deposit of ratification instrument to a rigorous review and vote by current members.[12] Upon accession, members hold rights to participate in decision-making and obligations to contribute to joint projects. Most importantly, membership demarcates boundaries for the distribution of benefits achieved through cooperation.[13] In economic organizations, for example, direct benefits include preferential market access, coordination on regulatory standards, or financial assistance. In addition, closer association with a particular group of states through joint membership confers reputation benefits as states improve their standing in the eyes of investors or gain credibility vis a vis hostile states (Kydd, 2001; Gray, 2013; Brooks, Cunha and Mosley, 2014; Gray and Hicks, 2014).[14]

There are two levels whereby IGO accession forms the basis of security linkages. First, preferential entry into an IGO provides an advantage to states by giving them access to the generalized benefits of membership. Even organizations that aspire to universal scope require approval of members, which opens the possibility for discrimination. For example, entry into GATT was easier for Japan than China, many IGOs refuse to admit Taiwan, and the Universal Postal Union expelled South Africa in opposition to apartheid (Duxbury, 2011; Davis and Wilf, 2017). More exclusive organizations such as the OECD, EU, or Shanghai Cooperation Organization include a small group of like-minded states with hard bargaining at times of enlargement (Schneider, 2009; Cooley, 2012). The terms of entry also vary across states. Given the discretion over who joins, states can inject political relations as a criteria to favor friends. Once a state joins, it continues to draw on member benefits going forward without having to engage in repeated negotiations over access.

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[12]For both legitimacy reasons and to maximize bargaining leverage, most institutions with adopt a unanimity rule to approve entry by new states (Schneider and Urpelainen, 2012).

[13]As distinct from public goods, club goods allow for possibility of exclusion through limiting benefits to those who contribute to the provision of the club good (Cornes and Sandler, 1996).

[14]To the extent that international society holds structure, IGO membership informs the social categories of which states work together. Membership in IGOs represents one way for states to recognize sovereignty (Krasner, 1999, p. 15).

Second, after accession, states distribute favors through the IGO. A wide literature analyzes the use of IGOs to allocate side payments. Some show that international financial institutions provide more generous terms to strategic partners (Thacker, 1999; Stone, 2008; Copelovitch, 2010; Dreher et al., 2013). The United States applied the principal-supplier rule of the GATT such that the largest trade gains in the regime would accrue to its closest allies (Gowa and Kim, 2005). Joint membership also facilitates issue linkages that reward cooperation outside of the institution.[15] For example, temporary members of the UN Security Council receive more aid through UNICEF, the Asian Development Bank, and the European Union (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Lim and Vreeland, 2013; Mikulaschek, Forthcoming).

While such side-payments could be given directly in bilateral aid, multilateral institutions hold distinct advantages. The international institution supports burden-sharing across a larger group of states. It also offers political cover when the exchange relationship may arouse controversy at home or vis-a-vis other countries. By acting within the multilateral context, states "launder" their influence attempts (Abbott and Snidal, 1998, pp. 18).

Across these linkage strategies, states balance commitment and control. Membership promises an ongoing stream of benefits. Powerful states want to bring into IGOs those states who are most in need of side payments as part of long term relations of exchange (Lake, 2009). Although states could be expelled, multilateral decision processes raise a barrier that limits such extreme sanctions. In this way, IGO membership adds credibility to the commitment by one state to share benefits with another. At the same time, side payments offer flexibility for short-term demands. When a priority looms large for a powerful member, it can shift allocation to serve its goals (Stone, 2011).

Linkage policies within economic institutions strengthen security coalitions. Allies may use policy coordination outside of defense policies as one way to signal intentions and create commitments that

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[15]These are distinct from the types of *within regime* issue linkages that are emphasized in the literature on international institutions.

will support a credible alliance to deter adversaries (Morrow, 2000). Supporting the entry of a security partner into multilateral institutions is difficult to reverse, especially relative to annual trade or aid flows. Any costs from letting in states that may not otherwise be optimal partners for economic cooperation are justified by the added credibility for their alliance. For example, Turkey's membership in the OECD introduced greater heterogeneity among members' business practices and yet was worthwhile for the positive security signal attained through such cooperation. Easy entry is a form of patronage to favor allies or bribery to gain leverage over critical swing states in a broad security coalition. Henke (Forthcoming) demonstrates the utility of such diplomatic ties and favors for building multilateral military coalitions – alliances are neither necessary nor sufficient for the deployment of troops, and the costly bargaining to persuade others to support a particular mission can involve side payments in a multilateral forum.[16] Poast (2013) finds that even for the most challenging alliances of buffer states, linking alliance ties with trade provisions increases alliance performance.

The flip side of favoritism for friends is the exclusion of rivals. This denies the benefits of the organization to rival states while holding out entry as a carrot to induce improved behavior. For example, China was close to having GATT accession approved when the Tiananmen massacre led to the suspension of negotiations. Similarly, the United States has wielded its veto over Iranian accession to the WTO as a bargaining chip in negotiations over its nuclear weapons program (Davis and Wilf, 2017). Russia's accession talks with the OECD were put on hold in response to its invasion of Ukraine. Once allowed into the organization, such leverage is severely diminished.[17]

States seek additional leverage in their relations with others by broadening and deepening their interactions through IGO membership. This argument differs from the kind of issue linkage posited in

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[16]In analysis of 41 U.S.-led coalitions between 1990 and 2005, Henke finds that states with more bilateral and multilateral institutional ties to the US are more likely to contribute troops even when controlling for alliance status.

[17]See Carnegie (2014) for an argument regarding why fear of such hold-up deters investment such that after entry into WTO, rivals gain the largest boost in trade.

functional regime theory because security interests lie outside the jurisdiction of the regime. States may accept lower regime effectiveness for the sake of extra-regime cooperation benefits. Furthermore, it reverses the expected sequence of cooperation. Neofunctional theorists would posit that joint work on technocratic issues arising around coordination dilemmas generates positive spillovers for later cooperation on more difficult topics (Haas, 1980). Our theory suggests a prior condition – those who cooperate on security matters are the most willing to engage together on other tasks such as regulating tariffs and coordinating foreign aid.

3.2 Testable Implications for Membership Patterns

To test our theory of IGO membership, we examine whether states with shared geopolitical alignment are also more likely to join the same organizations. Our research design uses observational data about state behavior, making it hard to infer causality. We consider IGO membership from multiple angles and take steps to mitigate potential threats to inference. We reduce heterogeneity within the sample of IGOs by focusing on organizations in a similar issue area. Using multiple measures of geopolitical alignment and exploring alternative model specifications reduces the risk of a spurious finding.

To evaluate our hypothesis, we compare the role of geopolitical alignment with the functional demand for membership based on interests within the issue area regulated by the IGO. The pursuit of mutual gains based on common interests underlies existing functional theories of international institutions. Since geopolitical alignment and interests within the issue area overlap entirely in the area of security organizations, looking outside security organizations provides a better test. In economic organizations, one can compare how economic interests contribute to demand for membership relative to the impact of geopolitical alignment.

We define geopolitical alignment as the common foreign policy interest of states. Geopolitical align-

ment overlaps with alliance structures — our primary operationalization of the concept — but can some-times differ in important cases. States ranging from Switzerland to Israel share common positions with the United States regarding questions of international security, but have never established alliance ties. The states of Southeast Asia emphasize non-intervention in domestic affairs as a shared principle guid-ing their security policies even while their alliance affiliations differ. For this reason, we employ several measures of geopolitical alignment in the empirical analysis below. Shared alliances, arms transfers, and similar voting in the United Nations serve as proxies for measuring a like-minded orientation to security issues that provides the basis for geopolitical alignment.

We also examine conditions that influence the importance of security interests. First, we distinguish between geopolitical alignment with all members of international organizations versus the most powerful member states. In principle, any existing member state can link accession of potential members to shared security interests. For example, Cyprus has repeatedly impeded Turkey's accession negotiations with the European Union due to longstanding foreign policy disputes. Below, we measure a state's geopolitical ties with all IGO members to assess how comprehensively the state shares foreign policy interests with existing members. However, the coalition-building role of IGO membership is likely to privilege ties with particularly powerful states. Here one would expect that geopolitical alignment with the the most powerful state in the IGO would be the central factor determining membership outcomes.[18] Powerful states seek to cement relationships with strategic partners through advocating their membership.

Second, we analyze whether the role of geopolitical alignment differs over the lifespan of an IGO. Establishing an IGO raises high transaction costs as states negotiate the IGO charter and set up head-quarters and financial base, while the gains of cooperation depend on whether their partners cooperate in repeated interaction going forward. On the one hand, security linkages could help states to overcome the

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[18]See Stone (2011) on why the most powerful state can use its proposal power and exit options as leverage to influence other states in the organization.

cooperation challenges. On the other hand, a focus on market failure would suggest rigorous screening for high compliance states would remove such extraneous factors at the critical stage of establishing the rules of the game. By looking separately at each stage, we test for whether the importance of geopolitics is limited to enlargement.

4   Empirical Analysis of IGO Membership Patterns

To test the effect of geopolitical alignment on institutional membership decisions, we examine patterns of state membership in salient, economic IGOs. First, we estimate the effect of geopolitical alignment and functional economic interests on the probability of IGO membership in a logistic regression model. Here we demonstrate that shared security interests are a powerful driver of state membership in IGOs. Geopolitical alignment influences state behavior in the process of initial entry and accession, and estimates of this influence are robust to a wide range of modeling choices. Second, we test the relative weight given to geopolitical and functional considerations in our sample of salient, economic organizations. We fit a finite mixture model to the IGO membership data in order to assess which observations are more consistent with geopolitics or economics, and to examine the conditions under which states privilege one over the other. The model reveals that geopolitical alignment drove a significant proportion of membership decisions in both the Cold War and post-Cold War period, and that non-democracies are more likely to favor geopolitics over economics when joining economic organizations.

4.1   Data

We test our hypothesis on a sample of 89 salient economic IGOs for the period from 1949 to 2014.[19] These represent a subset of the 534 IGOs included in version 3.0 of the Correlates of War (COW) International Organizations Dataset (Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke, 2004). We identify 399 IGOs

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[19]See the appendix for the full list of salient, economic organizations.

with an economic focus based on information from the Yearbook of International Organizations and the charter document that establishes each organization.[20] This includes dozens of prominent economic organizations (e.g., the World Trade Organization, European Union, and International Labor Organization) along with a large number of relatively obscure IGOs focused on narrow sub-issues (e.g., the African Groundnut Council and the Asian Vegetable Resource and Development Center). In order to focus on those IGOs where significant stakes offer the potential for meaningful side payments, we further subset the data to 89 *salient* economic IGOs based on their prominence in newspaper coverage.[21] None of the empirical results presented below are contingent on our exclusion of non-salient IGOs from the sample.

We conduct our analysis at the level of the state-IGO-year.[22] Testing membership in state-IGO units reflects the data-generating process more closely than a dyadic analysis of country pairs or monadic counts of total memberships. When a state joins an IGO, it makes an informed decision about a specific organization, including its relationship with the full set of member states in the organization. Our sample consists of all state-IGO pairings for 157 states in the 89 salient, economic IGOs from 1949-2014.[23] The dependent variable, *IGO Membership*, is a dichotomous measure of whether state i is a member of organization j in year t. *IGO Membership* is equal to 1 in 37.5% of the 484,916 state-IGO-year observations. In the tests below, we also subset this sample to assess whether geopolitical alignment has

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[20]The Yearbook of International Organizations is a compendium of information on over 68,000 international organizations produced by the Union of International Associations. Our coding relies on two categories of information: the goals of each organization ("aims") and the issue area listed for the organization ("subject"). We use software to parse these descriptions for keywords, such as "commerce", "development" or "finance", that indicate a focus on economic activity, broadly construed. A full list of keywords is available from the authors upon request. For those IGOs where we could locate founding charter document, we supplement the Yearbook coding with the information contained in the IGO charter document, which offers description of purposes and scope of activities.

[21]We define as salient any IGO which received at least 50 references in major newspapers in the year of its founding or the year 2014 when our sample ends. We code salience by searching the Lexis-Nexis database for newspaper references to each organization.

[22]This is similar to the approach employed in recent research on IGO membership (Poast, 2013; Donno, Metzger and Russett, 2014).

[23]IGOs enter the dataset in the year in which they are founded and continue until 2014 or until the organization ends. We include all states listed in the COW state system for which we have data on covariates. Covariate coverage primarily excludes small states (e.g., Grenada, Monaco, Brunei) or those where data is unavailable (North Korea).

different effects on joining an IGO as a founding member, joining later as an entrant by accession, or exiting the organization.[24]

We use formal alliances as our primary measure of geopolitical alignment.[25] We construct two variables to assess the geopolitical alignment between a state and existing members of an IGO. For an observation with state *i* and IGO *j*, *Average Alliances* measures the proportion of IGO *j*'s member states with which state *i* shares a formal alliance in a given year. For example, consider an observation focused on Turkey's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the year 1995. In that year, Turkey shared a formal alliance with 16 of the WTO's 108 member states. The *Average Alliances* measure for Turkey and the WTO in 1995 is therefore $\frac{16}{108}$ or 0.148. Compared with Iran's *Average Alliances* score of zero with WTO members in the same year, our model would estimate a higher probability for Turkey to be a member in 1995 than Iran.[26] The effect of *Average Alliances* reflects the overall tendency of states to seek out partners for cooperation with whom they share underlying security interests. In the sample, it ranges from 0 (56.1% of observations) to 1 (2.5% of observations) with a mean value of 0.09.

Our second variable, *Lead State Alliance*, indicates whether state *i* shares an alliance with the leading economic power among member states of IGO *j* during year *t*, with economic power measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP). For this variable, we constructed a list of lead states for each IGO in our sample (see table A1 in the Appendix). Although there is considerable stability in lead states, we employ a dynamic measure incorporating power shifts that change the lead state over time. The *Lead State Alliance* variable captures the patronage mechanism, in which powerful states use IGO membership to reinforce their geopolitical coalition. In our sample, states are allied with an IGO's most powerful

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[24]Donno, Metzger and Russett (2014) focus their analysis of IGO accession on the enlargement phase, but Poast (2013) demonstrate that conditions may differ for the politics of forming new IGOs or joining existing IGOs. We subject our hypotheses to empirical tests to determine whether the phase of entry matters for our argument.

[25]Data on alliances comes from version 4.1 of the COW Formal Alliances dataset (Gibler, 2009).

[26]Turkey joined GATT in 1951 and became one of founding members with start of WTO in 1995. Iran did not join GATT and has not yet been accepted as a member of the WTO.

member state in 21.7% of state-IGO-years.

We also analyze alternative measures of geopolitical alignment. *S-scores* is a continuous measure of similarity across states' entire portfolio of alliances; it reaches its maximum (1) when two states have identical alliance portfolios.[27] This variable accounts for the importance of overlapping alliance partners as a way to identify common security interests. *Arms transfers* is a dichotomous indicator equal to one if two states exchange military hardware.[28] The willingness to conduct arms trade signifies cooperation to support the military strength of another state, although their presence may indicate anything from direct subsidies to help build the military capacity of allies to business transactions that are predicated on positive relations. *UN Ideal Point Similarity* is a continuous variable that increases as the UN voting records of two states converge (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten, 2017). This measure offers a broader perspective on the foreign policy orientation of states across a range of topics on the international agenda and has been widely used in the literature to measure geopolitical alignment (e.g. Thacker, 1999; Bearce and Bondanella, 2007; Copelovitch, 2010; Vreeland and Dreher, 2014). As with formal alliances, each alternative measure is operationalized to create both an "average" and "lead state" variable.

Trade with IGO members and trade with the IGO lead state measure the impact of shared economic ties.[29] We also control for monadic variables that proxy for the economic characteristics of states: income (GDP per capita, logged), market size (GDP, logged), and trade openness (total trade / GDP).[30] Conditioning on these economic variables addresses the possibility that economic flows and security

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[27]S-scores are calculated using the COW formal alliance dataset according to the methodology proposed by Signorino and Ritter (1999).

[28]Data on arms transfers is from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). See http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.

[29]Bilateral trade data is from the IMF Direction of Trade dataset. The "trade with members" variable measures average (logged) volume of imports and exports between state *i* and each member of IGO *j*. The "trade with lead state" variable measures (logged) trade volume with the lead state. We add one to each trade measure before taking the log to ensure values of zero trade are not excluded from the sample due to the mathematical transformation.

[30]As a robustness check, we also control for states' incoming and outgoing flows of foreign direct investment. Our main results are unchanged, and this model is shown in appendix table A3. We omit FDI from the primary model specifications due to data availability; including this variable reduces the dataset by approximately 48%.

interests are jointly determined.

We control for additional variables that may influence state demand to join IGOs and the willingness of members to accept their entry. Polity scores capture the tendency of democratic states to join and form IGOs with higher frequency (Russett and Oneal, 2001; Poast and Urpelainen, 2015). To control for the possibility that IGOs seek to screen out conflict-prone states (Donno, Metzger and Russett, 2014), we include a variable measuring the average number of fatal militarized disputes (MIDs) between state i and members of IGO j.[31]

Potential diffusion effects are addressed in several ways. A variable for total IGO membership accounts for the number of members in each IGO, which could exert positive attraction for other states to enter. Since the behavior of neighbors may exert stronger influence over states, we also include a variable for *Members from region* indicating the number of states residing in state i's geographic region that are members of IGO j. Separate control variables measure a state's average geographic distance from IGO j's member states, as well as shared colonial history.[32]

Finally, the design of the IGO influences its openness to additional members. An indicator for *Universal IGO* identifies those organizations where the IGO rules on membership do not contain any restrictions on new members joining the organization. Nine percent of the IGOs in the sample either advocate universal membership or do not include any reference to restrictions, and the rest are selective through means of negotiated terms of accession or specific limits on eligibility for membership such as commodity production, culture, or region.[33] For regional organizations we include both an indicator for whether the organization is defined in its name or charter as a regional institution, and an indicator for whether

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[31]Data on fatal MIDs are from the dyadic version of the COW Militarized Interstate Disputes Dataset (Ghosn and Bennett, 2003).

[32]Data on geographic distance and colonial linkages are from CEPII (Mayer and Zignago, 2011; Head, Mayer and Ries, 2010)

[33]This variable was coded from IGO treaty documents following broad criteria to differentiate between universal IGOs that explicitly encourage membership access for all states from those IGOs that limit membership to a subset of states.

the state belongs to the specific region of the IGO.[34] The interactive effect of *State-IGO Same Region* addresses the likelihood that regional IGOs accept members from their region at a higher rate than other states.[35] Following Carter and Signorino (2010), we model time dependence by incorporating a cubic polynomial for *t* in all models, and an indicator for the Cold War period (1947-1991) adjusts for baseline differences in membership rates during the bipolar era.

4.2 Logistic Regression Models

Our first set of tests consist of a series of logistic regression models predicting the dichotomous outcome variable, IGO membership. All independent variables are lagged by one year to mitigate potential simultaneity bias, and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. We estimate the following model of IGO membership for state *i* in IGO *j* and year *t*:

$$\Pr(\text{IGO membership}_{ijt} = 1) \quad = \quad logit^{-1}(\alpha + \beta_1 \text{Alliances}_{ijt-1} + \beta_2 X_{ijt-1} + \beta_3 D_{it-1}$$

$$+\beta_4 V_{ij} + \beta_5 M_j)$$

The model predicts IGO membership using our primary explanatory variable of geopolitical alignment, formal alliances, operationalized as either an *average* or *lead state* measure. All models further include a set of control variables X_{ijt} measured at the state-IGO-year level (e.g., Trade and fatal MIDs with IGO Members); state-level variables D_{it} (Trade Openness, GDP, GDP per capita, Polity); state-IGO variables V_{ij} (State-IGO Same Region); and IGO-level variables M_j (Universal Membership, Regional IGO).

We begin with a set of models using the *Average Alliances* measure of geopolitical alignment. Table

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[34]State regions are coded using the World Bank's "country and lending groups" classification scheme (http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups). IGOs are coded as regional if their IGO charter or organizational title references a specific geographic region.

[35]Several IGOs are regional in scope of work but allow states outside of the region to become members.

1 displays results for a reduced form specification (Model 1) as well as a full model which includes the control variables discussed above (Model 2). In these first specifications, we assess membership in the broadest sense, including states' entry into an IGO and each year of continued membership.[36] The regression results provide strong support for our primary hypothesis: as states share more alliances with an IGO's member states, they are significantly more likely to join the organization. In the full model, a one standard deviation increase in the *Average Alliances* measure increases the probability of membership, on average, from 36 to 40%. These models also provide support for the role of economic interests. Functional economic interest, as measured by trade with IGO members, has a positive and statistically significant association with IGO membership.

Model 3 examines state entry into IGOs. This model is estimated on a sample that omits continued membership once a state has joined an organization. This sample restriction acknowledges the possibility that state membership in IGOs is sticky: few states will reevaluate their membership decision in any given year. As in the previous models, geopolitical alignment with existing IGO members has a strong, positive association with entry. Trade ties are also associated with a higher probability of membership. Universal organizations without restrictive membership provisions have higher entry rates, and regional organizations tend to have a lower probability of entry.

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[36]This is consistent with Stone (2011), who theorizes participation in IGOs as an ongoing process of decisions to enter and continue cooperation. It also reflects the empirical studies of IGO membership that use the count of current memberships for a state in any given year. We later differentiate to consider separately the question of entry and exit.

Dependent variable: IGO Membership

	(1) Baseline	(2) Full	(3) Entry	(4) Formation	(5) Expansion	(6) Exit	(7) State & IGO FE	(8) Diff-in-Diff
Avg. Alliances	2.096*** (0.163)	2.490*** (0.227)	2.093*** (0.442)	1.309*** (0.230)	2.609*** (0.626)	0.258 (0.450)	4.131*** (0.468)	0.367*** (0.030)
Trade with Members	0.203*** (0.012)	0.300*** (0.054)	0.172*** (0.050)	0.203*** (0.038)	0.235*** (0.071)	−0.048 (0.064)	0.113* (0.053)	0.005*** (0.001)
Polity	−0.001 (0.003)	0.017** (0.006)	0.011 (0.013)	0.016 (0.006)	0.010 (0.016)	−0.024 (0.014)	0.036*** (0.012)	0.002*** (0.001)
GDP	−0.13*** (0.015)	0.062 (0.071)	0.033 (0.082)	−0.130** (0.040)	0.005 (0.102)	−0.071 (0.140)	0.010 (0.124)	0.016*** (0.004)
GDP per capita		−0.145** (0.045)	0.025 (0.072)	−0.031 (0.027)	−0.159*** (0.089)	−0.192** (0.090)	−0.014 (0.089)	0.002 (0.004)
Trade Openness		−0.025*** (0.006)	−0.044 (0.027)	−0.045 (0.044)	−0.053 (0.031)	−0.088 (0.054)	−0.026*** (0.006)	−0.0003* (0.0001)
Universal IGO		−0.006 (0.097)	0.625*** (0.123)	−1.510*** (0.297)	0.725*** (0.144)	−0.467* (0.268)		−0.002 (0.008)
Regional IGO		−1.375*** (0.129)	−2.997*** (0.147)	−3.637*** (0.177)	−2.825*** (0.219)	−1.497* (0.609)		−0.076*** (0.010)
Cold War		−0.142** (0.054)	−0.735*** (0.105)	−1.549*** (0.152)	−0.089 (0.058)	−1.711*** (0.374)	−0.567*** (0.084)	
Observations	484,916	484,916	312,325	6,630	305,698	181,811	312,325	484,916
# IGOs	89	89	89	70	89	88	89	89
# States	157	157	157	157	157	157	157	157

Table 1: *Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership.* Results of logit models estimating the effect of alliances on membership in salient, economic IGOs. Coefficient estimates are displayed with robust standard errors in parentheses. Models 2-6 include the following controls (not shown): *Fatal MIDs with Members, Members from Region, State-IGO Same Region, IGO Membership Size, Total State Memberships, Former Colony, Common Colonial History,* and a time polynomial. Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

22

Models 4-6 examine how geopolitical alignment shapes IGO membership at different stages in the evolution of a regime. Model 4 displays estimates from a model of IGO *formation*. This model excludes observations in the years before and after an IGO is created.[37] Model 5 examines state entry by accession when the organization expands in the years after it is created. As in model 3, we also exclude observations for a given state after it joins an IGO. Model 6 examines state exit from IGOs.[38] Results from these models are consistent with a strong effect of shared security interests on IGO membership, formation, and accession. In both periods of organizational creation and expansion, geopolitical alignment with IGO members has a significant association with entry. The coefficient on the *Average Alliances* variable is larger in the expansion stage, offering some evidence that geopolitics are relatively more important after an IGO has been created. In the model examining IGO exit, shared alliances do not significantly affect the likelihood of a state leaving the organization.

Model 7 re-estimates the entry model with both state and IGO fixed effects. The fixed effects model accounts for unobserved heterogeneity across IGOs and states that may influence their approach to membership. The control variables that do not vary over time or country are dropped in this specification. The estimated effect of geopolitical alignment is even stronger. Functional economic interest, as measured by trade with IGO members, also has a positive and statistically significant association with IGO membership. The final column (Model 8) uses a difference-in-differences specification to examine how changes in geopolitical alignment influence shifts in IGO membership among state-IGO pairs.[39] The coefficient estimates suggest a strong effect of geopolitical alignment: a one standard deviation shift in

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[37]As a result, the sample for IGO formation is considerably smaller than other specifications. Nineteen of the 89 IGOs in our sample are created before 1950, dropping them from the sample.

[38]IGO exit models examine when states that are already members of an IGO choose to leave the organization. Observations enter this sample once a state joins an IGO, and remain in the sample until the state exits or the IGO ceases to exist. We use rare events logit because instances of exit are very infrequent, occurring in only 0.28% of observations.

[39]We use a linear probability model due to concerns that non-linear models like logit violate the common trend assumption underlying the difference-in-differences approach (Lechner, 2011). This model examines the full set of observations for states prior to entering and IGO and maintaining membership once they member. We remove the "Cold War" indicator in this specification, since the difference-in-differences model requires adding fixed effects for each year.

Average Alliances increases the probability of membership by 7.34%. This effect is much larger than any other predictor.[40]

To assess the robustness of our findings, we estimate the full model (Model 2) with the three alternative measures of geopolitical alignment (*S-scores*, *UN Ideal Point similarity*, and *Arms transfers*). We also estimate the same model with the lead state operationalization of each measure. In almost every case, geopolitical alignment has a positive and statistically significant effect on IGO membership. Figure 1 displays the substantive effect of a one standard deviation increase in the geopolitical alignment variables on the probability that a state is a member of an IGO.[41] These results emphasize the large substantive impact of geopolitical alignment. Shifting the *Average Alliances* variable by one standard deviation above the mean (from .094 to .297) increases the probability of IGO membership, on average, by more than 3.4%. Moving the *Lead State Alliance* variable from 0 to 1 increases probability of membership by more than 8%. These are substantial effects, given a baseline IGO membership rate of only 36%. Only the arms transfers measure fails to reach significance, with others having a comparable magnitude.

The alliance measure reveals a larger effect of geopolitical alignment with an organization's most powerful member state: an alliance with the IGO lead state increases the probability of membership the same amount as adding an alliance with 50% of other IGO members. This finding is consistent with the importance of ties with patron states that exercise influence over the organization and have the greatest incentive to support membership for their allies and exclude their rivals. The other geopolitical alignment measures, however, do not show this gap. Trade with IGO members is included for comparison.

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[40]Empirical results are robust to alternative specifications, including the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side and a first differences model.

[41]Predicted probabilities and confidence intervals are generated via 1000 clustered bootstrap simulations of Model 2. In each simulation, a "new" sample is drawn from the dataset and the model is re-estimated. The change in predicted probability is measured by moving continuous variables from the sample mean to one standard deviation above the mean, and dichotomous variables from zero to one.

**Effect of Geopolitical Alignment on Probability of IGO Membership**

Figure 1: *Substantive Effect of Geopolitical Alignment*: The figure displays the change in the predicted probability of membership when shifting a variable of interest. Predicted probabilities and confidence intervals are generated via 1000 bootstrapped simulations of the full model (Model 2). The change in predicted probability is measured by moving continuous variables from the sample mean to one standard deviation above the mean, and dichotomous variables from zero to one.

We re-estimate the models presented above in different samples of economic IGOs to ensure our findings are not contingent on the selection of salient economic organizations. First, we look at all economic IGOs (salient and non-salient). Second, we estimate the effect of alliances in only salient, economic IGOs with universal membership provisions. Third, we compare how alliance patterns shape membership in regional vs. non-regional organizations in our salient, economic sample. Figure 2 shows the effect size of the average alliance measure of geopolitical alignment when compared across these five different samples. Geopolitical alignment has a positive, statistically significant association with membership in all cases. The effect of geopolitical alignment is smallest in universal IGOs. Absent any discretion to exclude states, membership in these organizations is less open to power politics. There

is also a substantially smaller effect of alliances on membership in regional organizations compared to IGOs without a regional focus. The constrained pool of potential members for regional organizations may mitigate the use of geopolitical alignment as a membership criterion.

**Effect of Avg. Alliances on Pr(IGO Membership)**

Figure 2: *Effect of Alliances in Different Samples of Economic IGOs*: The figure displays the change in the predicted probability of membership when shifting the Alliances with Members variable from the sample mean to one standard deviation above the mean. Predicted probabilities and confidence intervals are generated via 1000 bootstrapped simulations of the full model (Model 2).

We also compare the effect of geopolitical alignment in economic organizations with IGOs focused on other issue areas. As expected, security-oriented IGOs feature the strongest association between alliance patterns and institutional membership. Compared to economic IGOs, the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the average alliance measure is approximately twice as large in security organizations. Among economic IGOs, those with a narrow mandate restricted to economic policy appear to have more geopolitical influence than those that are more broadly categorized.[42] Geopolitical alignment

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[42]Some IGOs such as regional organizations will include economic policies along with other policies in their mandate, which leads us to categorize them as broadly economic. The set of narrow economic IGOs focus exclusively on economic policies.

exhibits the smallest pull in decisions to join environmental IGOs (see Figure 5 in the Appendix). The ordering across these issue areas supports the logic that states use the institutional venue for building a security coalition, whether directly coordinating security policies or drawing on economic benefits. The environmental organizations that regulate by restricting harmful policies for the sake of public good provision offer fewer opportunities for side payments to allies.

The large and significant effect of geopolitical alignment on IGO membership is robust to several alternative specifications and additional control variables. To address potential endogeneity between alliances and IGO membership, we separately examine whether sudden reversals in states' geopolitical orientation has an impact on IGO membership. In cases where states experience sharp breaks in their alliance patterns — defined as changing at least ten alliances in a given year (e.g., Cuba following the Cuban Revolution) — we ask whether they are more likely to exit IGOs populated by their former allies and enter organizations with their new alliance partners. Both entry and exit behavior show a significant correlation with these states' new geopolitical orientation. These results are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix.

We confirm our results are not driven solely by NATO by excluding NATO member states and re-estimating the regression models. In addition, we assure our findings are not limited to the Cold War period by estimating a model with separate coefficients for geopolitical alignment in the Cold War and post-Cold War era. In both cases, shared security interests exert a strong influence on IGO membership. Results are also robust to the use of defense pacts instead of all alliances, the addition of a control for states' total alliance memberships, a control variable measuring geographic distance between a state and existing members of an IGO, and the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable as a covariate. See Table A3 in the Appendix for these results.

Another potential concern is the possibility that membership in some IGOs may automatically trigger

an alliance among members in the COW alliance dataset. The difference-in-difference and fixed effects specifications confirm that the relationship between geopolitical alignment and IGO membership does not arise solely from a statistical correlation induced by entry into IGOs that also represent alliances. As an additional check, we re-estimated all models after removing eight IGOs which the COW dataset codes as constituting an alliance among member states.[43] The effect of geopolitical alignment remains robust to the exclusion of these organizations. See Table A4 in the Appendix for these results.

4.3   Finite Mixture Model

We have seen that across a large sample of state membership patterns in salient economic institutions, geopolitical alignment is a significant predictor of IGO membership. This is important evidence for the effect of geopolitical alignment, but it leaves two additional questions unanswered. First, how powerful is our hypothesized geopolitical model compared to the functional economic explanation? Second, under what conditions do states privilege geopolitical considerations over economic interests? To answer these questions, we estimate a finite mixture model. This class of statistical models allows for heterogeneous processes to drive outcomes. For example, we may expect that the geopolitical model determines state membership in one subset of observations while a functional economic model drives membership in another. Mixture models have been shown to be particularly effective at testing a set of rival theories which compete to explain the same outcome. As Imai and Tingley (2012, p. 218) explain, in a mixture model "each observation is assumed to be generated either from a statistical model implied by one of the rival theories or more generally from a weighted combination of multiple statistical models under consideration." This is a useful tool if multiple theories overlap in the sample. In a single unified framework, researchers can obtain the parameters for each model and also judge the relative explanatory

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[43]The eight IGOs are the Commonwealth of Independent States, Economic Community of West African States, League of Arab States, Western European Union, Mano River Union, Gulf Cooperation Council, Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, and Arab Maghreb Union.

power of competing theories by estimating which observations are more consistent with one theory over the other.

The mixture model assumes state membership decisions are driven by two distinct, underlying processes. In our case, we hypothesize that some decisions are consistent with the geopolitical alignment logic and others are consistent with a functional explanation.[44] The assumed data generating process is as follows. Each observation is assigned a probability distribution over the two competing models. In our case, for example, an observation may have a 25% likelihood of assignment to the geopolitical model, and a 75% likelihood for the functional economic model. This assignment stage is guided by a set of *model-predicting* variables which help determine which model is most appropriate. For state *i* and IGO *j* in year *t*, the probability of assignment to the geopolitical model (π_G) is:

$$\pi_{G,ijt} \;=\; logit^{-1}(\delta + \delta_1\text{Cold War}_t + \delta_2\text{Polity}_{ijt-1} + \delta_3\text{Universal}_j)$$

The *model-predicting* variables are akin to scope conditions, helping inform the relative applicability of each competing model. In our mixture model, we include three variables that influence the scope of the geopolitical and economic models. These variables are measured at different levels of analysis, matching the multilevel nature of our state-IGO-year sample. The first is an indicator for the Cold War period, reflecting the realist expectation that geopolitical considerations will be strongest when the distribution of power is characterized by bipolarity.[45] The second is a measure of domestic regime type (Polity scores), capturing the liberal notion that the structure of state-society relations shapes foreign policy decisions.[46] Third, we allow for the institutional design of the IGO to influence when states privilege

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[44]Specific observations may be driven by any weighted average of the two competing theories, though in our results, the majority of observations are driven primarily by one of the two competing logics. See Figure 6 in the Appendix for the distribution of observations to each model.

[45]Waltz (1964) argues a bipolar distribution of power results in a more stable alliance system than multipolarity, and one in which clearly defined patron-leaders have the capability to manage competing blocs.

[46]See Moravcsik (1997) for an overview of this literature.

geopolitical or economic considerations in their membership decisions. Specifically, we include the indicator for whether an IGO's charter contains a provision for limiting membership or aims to achieve universal membership.[47]

For each observation, the outcome (IGO Membership) is generated via a weighted combination of the geopolitical and functional economic models.

$$\text{Geopolitical: } \Pr(\text{Membership}_{ijt}) \quad = \quad logit^{-1}(\alpha + \beta_1 \text{Alliances}_{ijt-1} + \beta_3 D_{ijt-1})$$

$$\text{Economic: } \Pr(\text{Membership}_{ijt}) \quad = \quad logit^{-1}(\alpha_2 + \delta_1 \text{Trade}_{ijt-1} + \delta_3 D_{ijt-1})$$

We specify the geopolitical model using the *Average Alliances* variable and the control variables included in the full model from Table 1 (Column 2) while excluding the measure of trade ties. The functional economic model excludes the alliances variable and instead includes *Trade with Members*.[48] These specifications make it possible to identify a "geopolitical" and "economic" model *a priori*.[49]

We first provide results for the two competing models — geopolitics versus functional economic preferences — that drive patterns of state membership in economic IGOs. The mixture model is estimated using the *flexmix* package in R (Grun and Leisch, 2008). Table 3 displays coefficient estimates from the geopolitical (Column 1) and economic (Column 2) components of the mixture model, as well as a pooled model of IGO membership formation for comparison (Column 3).[50]

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[47]The "rational design" literature argues states select institutional design provisions that reflect the underlying cooperation problem states face. Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001) hypothesize that IGOs will adopt exclusive membership provisions when they confront a particularly severe enforcement problem or there is pervasive uncertainty about state preferences.

[48]Importantly, even though both models include the same array of control variables, the parameter associated with each of these variables is allowed to vary across the two theories. For example, we may find in the geopolitical model that a state's polity score has a positive association with IGO membership, while in the economic model polity may have a negative effect.

[49]As a robustness check, we repeat the estimation with two identically specified models, to allow the data to inform whether there is a separation in the sample that accords with our theoretical expectations. We also fit a mixture model using the full sample of economic IGOs. In both cases, the results are consistent with those reported below.

[50]Coefficients and standard errors for the two mixture components are obtained by estimating a weighted logistic regres-

In the geopolitical model, the estimated effect of *Average Alliances* is nearly twice as large as the original pooled estimate (shown for reference in Column 3). A one standard deviation (0.20) increase in the *Average Alliances* variable is associated with a 6.7% increase in the probability of IGO membership. The larger effect suggests that among the observations identified by the model as consistent with a geopolitical logic, security relationships have a very powerful influence on IGO membership decisions. The key independent variable in the economic model, *Trade with Members*, is similarly larger in magnitude than its counterpart in the pooled model.[51] Some control variables have different effects across the two models. States with higher polity scores tend to join fewer IGOs among observations consistent with the geopolitical model, with the coefficient becoming statistically indistinguishable from zero in the economic model. GDP emerges as an important factor in the geopolitical model. Trade openness at the country level as distinct from bilateral trade ties has a negative association with membership for the observations sorted into the economic model. IGOs with universal membership eligibility have significantly higher rates of state membership only among observations driven by the geopolitical model, with the relationship switching in the economic model.

The mixture model specification allows us to compare the total explanatory power of each competing theory in the sample. In our case, the model estimates that the geopolitical explanation is nearly as powerful as the functional model in explaining membership in economic institutions: approximately 48.2% of observations in the sample are consistent with the geopolitical model, while the remaining 51.8% are more accurately explained by the functional economic model.[52] This is notable given that the

sion, with weights corresponding to each observation's assignment to the two competing models. For example, if the mixture model estimates a particular observation is 90% consistent with the geopolitical model and 10% consistent with the economic model, the observation is assigned a weight of .9 in the geopolitical logit model (Column 1 of Table 3) and .1 in the economic logit model (Column 2).

[51] Increasing *Trade with Members* by one standard deviation (3.84) is associated with a 16.71% increase in the probability of IGO membership, compared to a 7.75% increase in the pooled model.

[52] We calculate this measure by summing over all observations' probability of assignment to Model 1 (Geopolitics) and Model 2 (Economics).

	Dependent variable: IGO Membership		
	Geopolitical Model	Economic Model	Pooled Model
Average Alliances	5.541*** (0.233)		2.490*** (0.227)
Trade with Members		0.944*** (0.054)	0.300** (0.054)
Polity	−0.017** (0.008)	0.007 (0.007)	0.017** (0.006)
GDP	0.178*** (0.056)	−0.058 (0.056)	0.062 (0.071)
GDP per capita	−0.117** (0.050)	−0.445*** (0.041)	−0.145** (0.045)
Trade Openness	0.006** (0.003)	−0.227*** (0.009)	−0.025*** (0.006)
Universal IGO	0.383*** (0.111)	−0.393** (0.130)	−0.006 (0.097)
Regional IGO	−2.313*** (0.225)	−1.259*** (0.150)	−1.375*** (0.129)
Fatal MIDs with Members	−3.029 (3.153)	4.274*** (0.3442)	1.014*** (0.292)
Existing Members from Region	0.079*** (0.007)	0.448*** (0.014)	0.134*** (0.011)
Cold War	−0.078 (0.067)	−0.447*** (0.063)	−0.142** (0.054)
Observations	233,682	251,234	484,916

Table 2: *IGO Membership: Geopolitical vs. Economic Models*. Models 1-2 display results of a finite mixture model which assumes IGO Membership is driven either by a geopolitical process (Model 1) or an economic process (Model 2). Model 3 is a pooled specification in which all observations are assumed to arise from the same data-generating process. All are estimated by a logistic regression with cubic polynomial terms to correct for time dependence (not shown). Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

**Share of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model by Year**

Figure 3: *Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model over Time*: The figure displays the proportion of state-IGO-year observations estimated to be consistent with the geopolitical model by the finite mixture model for each year in the sample.

sample is constructed only of economic institutions, which constitute a set of "most likely cases" for the functional model. When we measure trade and alliances with the lead state in an IGO, the mixture model assigns an even greater proportion of observations to the geopolitical model with 59 % of observations being sorted as geopolitical on the basis of alliance ties to the lead state(see Table A5 in the Appendix).

The model further allows us to explore the conditions under which geopolitical alignment tends to drive state membership decisions. Because each observation is assigned to a weighted combination of the competing geopolitical and economic models, we can assess the circumstances under which the geopolitical logic dominates functional economic considerations. For example, one possibility is that geopolitics drove IGO membership during the Cold War, but has a negligible impact in the post-Cold War era. We can reject this hypothesis by examining the assignment of state-IGO-year observations to

**Share of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model, GATT/WTO**

Figure 4: *GATT-WTO Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model over Time*: The figure displays the proportion of state-IGO-year observations estimated to be consistent with the geopolitical model by the finite mixture model for the GATT and WTO. The line demarcates the institutional change from GATT to WTO in 1995.

the geopolitical model over time. Figure 3 demonstrates that states were slightly more likely to consider geopolitics in their IGO membership decisions during the Cold War, but even post-Cold War period observations are driven by the geopolitical model approximately 46% of the time.

The closer examination of specific institutions also tests how reform of the rules may impact the conditions of membership. Figure 4 displays the percent of observations consistent with the geopolitical model in the case of the GATT and WTO. These are treated as separate IGOs given the change in scope of rules and new membership decision for entry into the WTO in 1995. The average assignment of geopolitical observations to the GATT was high among IGOs at 0.53, while the assignment of geopolitical observations to the WTO was slightly below average at 0.47. The broader temporal trend follows

the larger pattern observed in Figure 3. Consistent with the analysis of Davis and Wilf (2017), the end of Cold War and institutional reforms led to a smaller effect of geopolitical alignment on membership decisions without eliminating its importance.

We can similarly compare the power of the geopolitical and functional economic models across a range of other dimensions (See figure 5 and Table A6 in the Appendix). Democratic states, for example, appear to be systematically less geopolitical in their approach to IGO membership than their less democratic counterparts. Approximately 35% of state-IGO-year observations with democratic countries are consistent with the geopolitical model. Among non-democracies, 60% of observations are driven primarily by geopolitical alignment. IGOs with universal membership provisions tend to be sorted into the geopolitical model at higher rates than selective organizations (60% vs. 48%).

Finally, the mixture model can track changes in particular states' IGO membership behavior over time. This provides a useful validation exercise to ensure our results are revealing genuine patterns of behavior instead of statistical artifacts. Figures 7-11 in the Appendix demonstrate how Russia, Iran, China, the United States, and Japan have shifted over time in the attention each state devotes to geopolitical considerations when making institutional membership choices. Notably, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the outward turn of China starting in the 1970s with restoration of ties lead to a reduction of the two countries share of observations attributed to geopolitics. Nevertheless, Russia and China remain at higher levels than the United States, which appears generally to have lower share of its IGO membership decisions fit within a geopolitical logic. The US case may also be skewed by its joining most organizations and then exercising geopolitics from within vis-a-vis the entry of other states. This outward geopolitics is not captured as part of the US membership decisions, but rather in the target states that are recruited or excluded. We can indirectly examine whether the United States is playing this gate-keeping role by comparing how adherence to the geopolitical model differs in IGOs where the United States is

Figure 5: *Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model for Different Samples and Measures*:
The figure displays the proportion of state-IGO-year observations estimated to be consistent with the
geopolitical model by the finite mixture model. Each bar in the histogram represents a different sample
for the specified subset of observations. The left graph uses the average state alliance measure, and the
right graph shows estimates from the lead state alliance measure.

a member to IGOs where it is not. Approximately 52.4% of observations from organizations with U.S.

membership are assigned to the geopolitical model, compared to 48.8% in organizations without the

United States. For the Iranian example shown in figure 8, we observe that the period of alliance ties

with the United States during the fifties and sixties appears in the form of more geopolitical decisions on

membership, and the break of relations with the United States in 1979 following the Iranian Revolution

corresponds to the lower level of geopolitical logic as alliances are less important for Iranian membership

patterns – although still higher than most countries.

Japan appears to be among the least geopolitical in its determination of membership decisions, which

conforms to the post-war choices to privilege economic growth and rely on its steady alliance with the

United States. Exclusion as a former enemy politicized some of its entry decisions in the 1950s, but the

Japanese government sought to renew ties with a world that had been broken during the war; it applied to join any organization possible as part of this strategy to restore its position within international society. Then, the end of the Cold War increased uncertainty for Japan both in relation to the United States and the rising power of China. Japan began to pay more attention to geopolitics in its foreign aid policies in the 1990s, and appendix Figure 11 reveals the slight uptick in proportion of IGO membership decisions that reflect a geopolitical logic. The decision to remain outside the Chinese-initiated AIIB suggests we may see more geopolitics in the future of Japan's engagement with international organizations.

Together, the findings from the mixture model provide a more nuanced picture of how geopolitical alignment shapes membership in economic institutions. The fact that the mixture model identifies two distinct pathways to IGO membership suggests that states routinely make tradeoffs between maximizing economic gains and exploiting institutions for geopolitical purposes. The findings also highlight the ongoing importance of geopolitical alignment in comparison to economic considerations. Whereas other studies find that politicized aid and trade flows were largely contingent on the Cold War period, multilateral economic institutions continue to reflect the importance of security ties to international cooperation as viewed through the lens of membership in these organizations. To the extent that membership shapes policy outcomes, the geopolitical logic that conditions a large share of IGO membership patterns launches an even broader array of policies that will find their origin in security relationships.

5   Concluding remarks

This paper demonstrates that geopolitical alignment increases the probability that states will be members of the same international economic institutions. This relationship holds both when institutions form and when they expand. An analysis in a mixture model reveals that about half of the observations of state membership in economic IGOs are better explained by a geopolitical model than the by the economic

ties that dominate in a market failure account of cooperation. States weigh both security and economic interests when making decisions about multilateral economic cooperation, and our evidence indicates that in many cases the former loom larger than the latter.

By linking security ties within multilateral economic institutions, states bolster their security coalitions. The strong effect of security ties with the most powerful member state of each IGO underscores the patronage role of IGO membership. The larger importance of security ties for non-regional IGOs reflects the greater reliance on institutions in a context where information asymmetries about other states are high. While we focus on multilateral economic organizations, geopolitical alignment has an important impact on all IGOs. As one would expect, the largest effect occurs for security IGOs, and geopolitics are less apparent in environmental IGOs where there are fewer side-payments to offer. Our findings are not limited to the Cold War – political relations continue to shape decisions about membership today.

We develop a theory by which states seek additional benefits from using institutional venues as a tool of economic statecraft. The security logic of IGO membership challenges institutionalist theories by introducing a different source of demand for institutions. This opens the possibility for more impact by the institution on state behavior because entry is not simply derivative to states' policy interest in the issue area. States that join for other reasons related to foreign policy are susceptible to pressure to reform policies. Domestic mobilization of interest groups, reputation, and socialization processes may trigger unexpected cooperation among these states (Johnston, 2001; Simmons, 2009).

Yet subordinating institutional participation choices to security interests could also undercut institutional effectiveness. Others have shown that the allocation of loans by international financial institutions is conditional on geopolitical interests (e.g. Thacker, 1999; Lim and Vreeland, 2013; Vreeland and Dreher, 2014). Our findings highlight that discrimination begins even sooner and extends more broadly because states determine membership on the basis of security interests. Just as political allocation under-

mines the efficacy of foreign aid (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Dreher et al., 2013), the geopolitics of IGO membership may distort the credibility of institutional commitments. As more states join an institution due to geopolitical alignments the institution may experience lower compliance levels and an inability to reach consensus on rules.

Membership motivated by geopolitics makes the phenomenon of institutional proliferation more likely. Given the potential inefficiencies that emerge when an IGO expands, states will build new institutions to address the shortcomings of existing IGOs that have become congested through overexpansion. Furthermore, proliferation inheres in the logic of geopolitical membership as each new IGO represents an opportunity to forge ties with allies and exclude rivals.

The foreign policy role of IGOs should moderate any assessment about institutional effects. When states form club-style IGOs that favor entry by friends, they lower the level of compliance relative to a meritocratic process with rigid entry conditions. Evaluating outcomes based on policy reforms and gains observed within the issue area neglects the broader foreign policy benefits of membership. If states use institutions as tools of economic statecraft, future research must evaluate how effective they are to build alliance cohesion and broaden support for common foreign policy orientation beyond the economic goals of any specific institution. Identifying a causal relationship between institutions and peace becomes even more difficult, however, in light of our evidence of the geopolitical bias in membership. To the extent that states join IGOs because they already have common security interests, a spurious relationship could generate the observed correlation between IGO membership and peace.

The question of why and how states cooperate is fundamentally connected to the question of *who* states choose as partners for cooperation. Joining an institution is not the same as signing a contract with an anonymous actor. In the small community of states, political relations provide a rich context as both sources of information and mutual interests.

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6 Appendix

Table A1: Salient, Economic IGOs with Lead State

(IGOs with Universal Membership Provisions in Bold)

	ORGANIZATION	LEAD STATE
1	African Export/Import Bank	USA (1997-2008)
2	African Development Bank	Nigeria (1963-1966, 1970-1981), Egypt (1967-1969), France (1982), USA (1983-2014)
3	African Union	South Africa (2002-2011), Nigeria (2012-2014)
4	Africare	Nigeria (1976-1981), France (1982), USA (1983-2014)
5	Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa	Saudi Arabia (1974-2014)
6	Arab Fund for Social & Economic Development	Egypt (1968-1971), Saudi Arabia (1972-2014)
7	Arab Maghreb Union	Algeria (1989-2014)
8	Arab Monetary Fund	Saudi Arabia (1977-2014)
9	Arctic Council	USA (1996-2014)
10	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	USA (1989-2014)
11	Asian Development Bank	USA (1966-2014)
12	Asian Productivity Organization	Japan (1961-2008), China (2009-2014)
13	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	Philippines (1967-1969), Indonesia (1970-1997, 1999-2014), Thailand (1998-1998)
14	Bank for International Settlements	USA (1948-1964, 1994-2014), West Germany (1965-1969), Japan (1970-1993)
15	Black Sea Economic Council	Russia (1992-2014)
16	Caribbean Examinations Council	Jamaica (1972-1977, 1989-1999), Trinidad-Tobago (1978-1988, 1990-2013), Barbados (2014-2014)
17	Caribbean Community	Jamaica (1973-1977, 1989-1999), Trinidad-Tobago (1978-1988, 1990-2013), Haiti (2014-2014)
18	Caribbean Development Bank	UK (1969-1987), Italy (1988-1988), West Germany (1989-1989), Germany (1990-2006), China (2007-2014)
19	Central American Integration System	Guatemala (1991-2012), Dominican Republic (2013-2014)
20	Common Market for East and South Africa	Sudan (1994-1994, 1997-1997), Kenya (1995-1997), Egypt (1998-2014)
21	Commonwealth of Independent States	Russia (1991-2014)
22	Commonwealth Secretariat	USA (1965-1968), UK (1969-2014)
23	Council of Europe	UK (1949-1960), West Germany (1961-1989), Germany (1990-2014)
24	Economic Community of Central African States	Cameroon (1985-2000), Angola (2001-2011)
25	Economic Community of West African States	Nigeria (1975-2014)
26	Economic Cooperation Organization	Iran (1985-1989, 1991-1992), Turkey (1990, 1993-2014)
27	Eurasian Development Bank	Russia (2006-2014)
28	European Free Trade Association	UK (1960-1972), Sweden (1973-1982, 1984-1992), Switzerland (1982-1983, 1986-2013), Norway (2014)

	ORGANIZATION	LEAD STATE
29	European Organization for Safety Air Navigation	UK (1960-1960), West Germany (1961-1989), Germany (1990-2014)
30	European Atomic Energy Agency	France (1958), West Germany (1959, 1965-1989), USA (1960-1964), Germany (1990-1992)
31	European Bank for Reconstruction & Development	USA (1990-2014)
32	European Coal & Steel Community	France (1952-1958), West Germany (1959-1989), Germany (1990-1992)
33	European Economic Community	France (1958-1958), West Germany (1959-1989), Germany (1990-1992)
34	European Patent Organization	West Germany (1977-1990), France (1991-1998, 2008-2013), UK (1999-2007, 2014)
35	European Space Agency	West Germany (1975-1989), Germany (1990-2014)
36	European Union	Germany (1993-2014)
37	Food & Agricultural Org	USA (1948-2014)
38	General Agreement Tariff & Trade	USA (1948-1995)
39	Global Environment Fund	USA (1994-2014)
40	Global Green Growth Initiative	UK (2010-2014)
41	Gulf Cooperation Council	Saudi Arabia (1981-2014)
42	Int'l Fund for Agriculture & Development	USA (1977-2014)
43	Int'l Cocoa Organization	Russia (1973-1977), Japan (1978-2003), Brazil (2004-2014)
44	Int'l Finance Corporation	USA (1956-2014)
45	Int'l Telecomm. Satellite Organization	USA (1974-2001)
46	Inter-American Development Bank	USA (1959-2014)
47	Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought Protection	Sudan (1986-1991, 1993-2014), Kenya (1992-1992, 1995-1997)
48	International Organization of Vine and Wine	Germany (2004-2014)
49	International Renewable Energy Agency	USA (2013-2014)
50	Int'l Atomic Energy Agency	USA (1957-2014)
51	Int'l Civil Aviation Org	USA (1948-2013)
52	Int'l Coffee Org	UK (1963-1964), Nigeria (1973-1976), USA (1977-1995, 2005-2014), Japan (1996-2004)
53	Int'l Cotton Adv Comte	USA (1948-2014)
54	**Int'l Council for Exploration of Sea**	UK (1948-1955), Russia (1956-1971), USA (1972-2014)
55	Int'l Energy Agency	USA (1974-2014)
56	Int'l Grains Council	USA (1949-2014)
57	**Int'l Labour Org**	USA (1948-1977, 1980-2014), Japan (1978-1979)
58	**Int'l Maritime Org**	Canada (1948-1948), UK (1949-1949), USA (1950-2014)
59	Int'l Monetary Fund	USA (1948-2014)

Table A1: Salient, Economic IGOs with Lead State (Continued)

	ORGANIZATION	LEAD STATE
60	**Int'l Telecom Union**	USA (1948-2014)
61	**Int'l Whaling Comm**	USA (1948-2014)
62	Islamic Development Bank	Saudi Arabia (1974-1986, 2001-2002), Turkey (1987-2009), Indonesia (1994-1997, 2010-2014)
63	Latin American Economic System	Brazil (1976-2000, 2005-2014), Mexico (2001-2004)
64	League of Arab States	Egypt/UAR, Saudi Arabia (1972-2014)
65	Mano River Union	Guinea (1980-2007), Cote d'Ivoire (2008-2014)
66	MERCOSUR	Brazil (1991-2014)
67	Multilateral Investment	USA (1988-2014)
		Guarantee Agency
68	Non-Aligned Movement	India (1961-1990, 1993-2014), Iran (1991-1992)
69	Nordic Investment Bank	Sweden (1976-2014)
70	North American Free Trade Agreement	USA (1993-2014)
71	Org for Econ Coop and Development	USA (1961-2014)
72	Org of Petroleum Exporting Countries	Venezuela (1960-1972), Iran (1973, 1975-1992), Saudi Arabia (1974, 1978-2014), Indonesia (1993-1997, 2007)
73	Org. Eastern Caribbean States	St Lucia (1981-1984, 1990-2014), Antigua-Barbuda (1985-1989, 1997-2009)
74	Pan-Am Union/Org of Am States	USA (1948-2014)
75	Permanent Court of Arbitration	USA (1948-2014)
76	South Asian Assoc Regional Coop	India (1985-2014)
77	Southern African CU	South Africa (1969-2014)
78	Southern African Dev. Community	Zimbabwe/Rhodesia (1992-1995), South Africa (1996-2014)
79	UN Industrial Development Org	Russia (1966-1977), Japan (1978-2008), China (2009-2014)
80	United Nations	USA (1948-2014)
81	**Universal Postal Union**	USA (1948-2014)
82	West African Economic	Cote d'Ivoire (1994-2014)
	& Monetary Union	
83	Western European Union	UK (1955-1960), West Germany (1961-1989), Germany (1990-2011)
84	World Bank	USA (1948-2014)
85	**World Health Org**	USA (1948-2014)
86	**World Intell Prop Org**	USA (1970-2014)
87	World Meteorological Org	Russia (1948-1948), USA (1949-2014)
88	World Tourism Org.	USA (1975-1998), Japan (1999-2008), China (2009-2014)
89	World Trade Org	USA (1995-2014)

Effect of Avg. Alliances on Pr(IGO Membership)

Figure 6: *Effect of Alliances in Different Issue Areas*: The figure displays the change in the predicted probability of membership when shifting the Alliances with Members variable from the sample mean to one standard deviation above the mean. IGOs are coded as "broadly" part of an issue area if there is any mention of topics related to the issue in the IGO charter document or the description in the Yearbook of International Organizations, and "narrowly" part of an issue area if there is no mention of another issue. Predicted probabilities and confidence intervals are generated via 1000 quasi-bayesian monte carlo simulations of the full model (Table 1, Model 2).

| | (1) | (2) |
	Entry	Exit
New Alliance with Members	0.346***	
	(0.103)	
Dropped Alliance with Members		1.629***
		(0.403)
Trade with Members	0.095***	0.157
	(0.015)	(0.099)
Polity	0.014*	0.031
	(0.006)	(0.016)
GDP	0.152**	0.050
	(0.051)	(0.146)
GDP per capita	−0.032	0.132
	(0.044)	(0.141)
Trade Openness	−0.018***	0.009
	(0.004)	(0.072)
Universal IGO	0.163	−0.001
	(0.099)	(0.199)
Regional IGO	−1.331***	1.940***
	(0.135)	(0.521)
Cold War	−0.082	−1.907*
	(0.054)	(0.815)
Observations	4,782	14,284
# IGOs	60	76
# States	31	69

Table A2: *Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership: Sudden Reversals in Geopolitical Orientation.* These models examine cases where states experience sharp breaks in geopolitical alignment, defined as adding or dropping at least ten alliances with members of the IGO in a given year. Model 1 tests whether adding alliances with members increases the probability of entry and Model 2 tests whether dropping alliances with members increases the probability of exit. The sample includes the five year span after a state experiences a sharp break in geopolitical alignment. Models include all control variables used in Table 2 in the main text, and are estimated using *bayesglm()* to prevent overfitting in maximum likelihood estimation. Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A3: *Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership: Additional Models.* Coefficient estimates are displayed with robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include the following controls (not shown): *Trade Openness, Universal IGO, Regional IGO, Fatal MIDs with Members, Members from Region, State-IGO Same Region, IGO Membership Size, Total State Memberships, Former Colony, Common Colonial History,* and a time polynomial. Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

	(1) FDI	(2) Lagged DV	(3) Excl NATO	(4) CW Interaction	(5) Defense Pacts	(6) Alliance Count	(7) Distance
				Dependent variable: IGO Membership			
Avg. Alliances	2.168*** (0.239)	1.271*** (0.161)	2.885*** (0.192)	2.573*** (0.191)	2.347*** (0.221)	2.904*** (0.267)	2.476*** (0.230)
Cold War * Avg. Alliances				−0.196 (0.284)			
Trade with Members	0.551*** (0.056)	0.093*** (0.028)	0.292*** (0.055)	0.300*** (0.054)	0.300*** (0.054)	0.291*** (0.053)	0.299*** (0.054)
Polity	0.025** (0.008)	0.034** (0.007)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.017** (0.006)	0.014* (0.006)	0.015* (0.006)	0.018** (0.007)
GDP	−0.075 (0.082)	0.032 (0.044)	0.094 (0.068)	0.062 (0.071)	0.062 (0.070)	0.053 (0.066)	0.064 (0.072)
GDP per capita	−0.209** (0.043)	−0.004 (0.037)	−0.157*** (0.047)	−0.145** (0.045)	−0.013** (0.046)	−0.130** (0.043)	−0.147** (0.046)
Cold War	−0.057 (0.051)	−0.142** (0.054)	−0.176*** (0.060)	−1.549*** (0.152)	−0.089 (0.058)	−1.711*** (0.374)	−0.567*** (0.084)
Incoming FDI	−0.060* (0.026)						
Outgoing FDI	0.006 (0.010)						
Observations	250,541	478,286	409,650	484,916	484,916	484,916	312,325
# IGOs	89	89	89	70	89	89	89
# States	143	156	131	157	157	157	157

55

Dependent variable: IGO Membership

	(1) Full	(2) Entry	(3) Formation	(4) Expansion	(5) Exit	(6) State & IGO FE	(7) Diff-in-Diff
Avg. Alliances	2.399***	2.055***	1.446***	2.453***	0.413	4.059***	0.370***
	(0.241)	(0.465)	(0.250)	(0.246)	(0.414)	(0.420)	(0.033)
Trade with Members	0.293***	0.162***	0.184***	0.305***	0.311***	0.313*	0.005***
	(0.060)	(0.055)	(0.039)	(0.062)	(0.103)	(0.107)	(0.001)
Polity	0.019***	0.012	0.013*	0.019***	−0.025*	0.007	0.002***
	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.001)
GDP	0.075	0.040	−0.096**	0.078	−0.126	−0.286**	0.017***
	(0.075)	(0.084)	(0.041)	(0.078)	(0.141)	(0.128)	(0.004)
GDP per capita	−0.146***	0.024	−0.040	−0.160***	−0.163*	0.120	0.002
	(0.046)	(0.072)	(0.027)	(0.047)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.004)
Trade Openness	−0.029***	−0.042	−0.044	−0.030***	−0.017	−0.024***	−0.001*
	(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.042)	(0.005)	(0.030)	(0.003)	(0.0001)
Universal IGO	−0.003	0.627***	−1.465***	0.018	−0.498*		−0.002
	(0.096)	(0.122)	(0.297)	(0.099)	(0.261)		(0.008)
Regional IGO	−1.297***	−2.857***	−3.644***	−1.207***	−1.501*		−0.074***
	(0.132)	(0.149)	(0.181)	(0.134)	(0.671)		(0.010)
Cold War	−0.143**	−0.754***	−1.090***	−0.093	−0.205***	−0.221***	
	(0.056)	(0.107)	(0.172)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.058)	
Observations	444,254	247,203	6,004	305,698	179,176	444,254	444,254
# IGOs	81	81	63	81	80	81	81
# States	157	157	154	156	157	157	157

Table A4: *Effect of Alliances on IGO Membership.* Results of logit models estimating the effect of alliances on membership in salient, economic IGOs. The sample excludes IGOs which the COW alliance dataset codes as constituting an alliance. The following controls are included (not shown): *Fatal MIDs with Members, Members from Region, State-IGO Same Region, IGO Membership Size, Total State Memberships, Former Colony, Common Colonial History,* and a time polynomial. Statistical significance is denoted by: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

**Sorting of Observations into Geopolitical Model**

Figure 7: *Assignment of Observations to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the frequency with which observations in our sample of state membership in salient, economic IGOs are sorted into the geopolitical model. In the finite mixture model, each state-IGO-year observation is assigned a weighted mixture of the economic and geopolitical models. A value of one on the x-axis indicates an observation is wholly generated by the geopolitical model. The figure reveals two clusters of observations: one group that is primarily consistent with the geopolitical model (around .7 on the x-axis) and one group that is more consistent with the economic model (around .3).

**Share of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model, Russia**

Figure 8: *Russia: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of Russia's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2).

Share of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model, Iran

Figure 9: *Iran: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of Iran's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2).

**Share of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model, China**

Figure 10: *China: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of China's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2).

**Share of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model, USA**

Figure 11: *United States: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of the United States's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2).

**Share of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model, Japan**

Figure 12: *Japan: Percent of Observations Assigned to Geopolitical Model*: The figure displays the estimated proportion of the Japan's IGO membership observations assigned to the geopolitical for each year. Estimations are from the fitted finite mixture model (Table 2).

| | Dependent variable: IGO Membership | | |
	Geopolitical Model	Economic Model	Pooled Model
Alliance with Lead State	1.671*** (0.109)		1.179*** (0.104)
Trade with Lead State		0.344*** (0.019)	0.063** (0.013)
Polity	−0.014* (0.008)	0.011 (0.009)	0.006 (0.007)
GDP	0.170*** (0.055)	0.423*** (0.055)	0.218*** (0.056)
GDP per capita	0.031 (0.045)	−0.509*** (0.055)	−0.058 (0.046)
Trade Openness	0.005* (0.003)	−0.195*** (0.012)	−0.014*** (0.004)
Universal IGO	0.359*** (0.106)	−0.218 (0.166)	0.084 (0.102)
Regional IGO	−1.516*** (0.174)	−1.178*** (0.174)	−1.339*** (0.131)
Fatal MIDs with Members	3.215 (3.110)	5.295 (5.537)	11.028*** (3.940)
Existing Members from Region	0.097*** (0.008)	0.813*** (0.020)	0.155*** (0.012)
Cold War	−0.249*** (0.064)	−0.640*** (0.078)	−0.119** (0.058)
Observations	276,252	192,640	468,892

Table A5: *IGO Membership: Geopolitical vs. Economic Lead State Models*. Models 1-2 display results of a finite mixture model which assumes IGO Membership is driven either by a geopolitical process (Model 1) or an economic process (Model 2) with respect to the lead state of an IGO. Model 3 is a pooled specification in which all observations are assumed to arise from the same data-generating process. All are estimated by a logistic regression with cubic polynomial terms to correct for time dependence (not shown). Statistical significance is denoted by: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$.

	1	0
Cold War	0.531	0.464
Universal IGO	0.599	0.478
Regional IGO	0.469	0.516
Democratic State	0.353	0.599

Table A6: *Percent of Observations Consistent with Geopolitical Model*: The table shows the percent of observations assigned to the geopolitical model for a range of independent variables. Estimated assignment is from the finite mixture model described in Table 2.