Creating Trade Agreements with Democracies: Negotiation Strategies and Agreement Design

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Abstract

In this paper, we argue that the design of a trade agreement is influenced by characteristics of the negotiation process through which that agreement was created. The relative bargaining power of the states involved and the strategies they adopt will thus affect the way trade agreements are designed in important ways. Democracies and nondemocracies, in particular, vary in their relative bargaining power as well as in their preferences regarding the use of protectionist trade policies. We therefore expect the negotiating tactics of democracies and nondemocracies to differ, and thus the agreements resulting from negotiations among different groups of states to differ as well. We test this argument using two original datasets. Getting at the strategic choices states make in negotiations, the first dataset analyzes characteristics of the issues different states pushed to have included in the agreements negotiated under the purview of the GATT. Getting at the characteristics of the trade agreements that result from different types of negotiations, the second dataset analyzes the complexity of the preferential trade agreements negotiated by different groups of states. The results provide key insights into our understanding of trade agreement design.

Negotiations dealing with international trade are very different from negotiation to negotiation. Different types of states interact, different strategies are used, and the result is agreements that are designed in very different ways. Some end up being very complex while others are relatively short and simple. For example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement that was negotiated by twelve states in 2015 covers a wide range of issues – from trade in goods and textiles to policies regarding state-owned enterprises, and even rules covering the movement of business persons by dealing with the issue of temporary visas. The result was a 662 page agreement, the complexity of which was astounding.[1] In contrast, despite being negotiated by almost the same number of states,[2] the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Free Trade Zone Agreement signed in 1993 was an eight page agreement, simply covering issues related to custom duties and the harmonization of custom procedures. Why do we see such wide variation in trade agreements' design and complexity? What goes on in the negotiation process that makes negotiations dealing with the same basic issue – trade – result in such different agreements?

Understanding the design of international trade agreements is important, as it is likely to influence trade flows, trade volatility, and domestic economic reforms, as well as having non-trade-oriented effects on human rights protection and conflict (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000; Hafner-Burton 2005; Baier and Bergstrand 2007; Mansfield and Reinhardt 2008; Rickard and Kono 2013; Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014). The literature has thus worked to understand various aspects of agreement design such as flexibility clauses and the inclusion of provisions such as dispute settlement mechanisms (e.g., Rosendorff and Milner 2001; Maggi and Staiger 2008; Estevadeordal, et al. 2009; Kucik 2012; Mansfield and Milner 2012), as well as the "depth" of different trade agreements (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014). To date, scholars have tended to use domestic state characteristics to explain the rich variation across trade agreements. Yet, individual states, alone, cannot dictate how agreements are designed.

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[1]These page counts do not include annexes or schedules.

[2]The Trans-Pacific Partnership was negotiated between twelve states while the Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Agreement was negotiated between eleven.

The agreements are the result of an interactive negotiation process between a group of states. It is the interaction of the different states in these different groups that influences the design of trade agreements. This interactive process needs to be taken into account.

We take a first step toward understanding the negotiation process, itself, and how it impacts the design of trade agreements by focusing on how interactions between democracies, nondemocracies, and various combinations of the two are likely to play out. We then examine how that impacts the complexity of the resulting trade agreements. We focus this first cut on democracies and nondemocracies because they vary in their preferences regarding trade policy (Kono 2006; Hankla and Ruthy 2013), and also face different constraints in international negotiations (Schelling 1960). Focusing on this variation in preferences and constraints, we argue that the negotiation strategies used by democracies and nondemocracies are likely to differ. Democracies are likely to push for the inclusion of various forms of nontariff barriers, and will also push to have a greater number of issues, in general, included in the agreement. Negotiations involving democracies should therefore produce more complex trade agreements, and the greater the proportion of democracies negotiating a trade agreement, the more complex it is likely to be. Given the constraints democracies face in international negotiations, we argue that even having one democracy in a trade negotiation will produce a more complex agreement than an agreement negotiated only among non-democracies.

We test this argument using two original datasets. Getting at the strategic choices states make in negotiations, the first dataset analyzes characteristics of the issues different states pushed to have included in the agreements negotiated under the purview of the GATT. Getting at the characteristics of the trade agreements that result from different types of negotiations, the second dataset analyzes the complexity of the preferential trade agreements negotiated by different groups of states. We conclude by discussing the implications of these results and paths for future research.

Trade Negotiations and the Design of Trade Agreements

The goal of international trade negotiations is to break down barriers to trade across state borders. Doing so increases competition and therefore provides benefits in terms of lower domestic prices for the average consumer, and also provides benefits for exporting industries by opening up foreign markets. At the same time, however, the increased competition that results from trade liberalization imposes costs on domestic industries that now have to compete with foreign producers. The domestic political influence of these cost-bearing industries and related interest groups can be quite significant (Caddel 2014; Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000; Gilligan 1997; Grossman and Helpman 1994; Grossman and Helpman 1995).

Thus, while on the one hand, political elites work to break down barriers to trade by negotiating liberalizing agreements, they also have an incentive to secure protections for certain domestic industries (Bauer, de Sola Pool and Dexter 1967; Destler 1992; Grossman and Helpman 1994; Bailey 2001). The method for providing these protections, however, can vary widely. Available methods include fairly direct policies such as charging tariffs on imported goods, as well as more indirect policies such as imposing licensing or inspection regulations and minimum environmental standards on imported goods.

Democracies and nondemocracies have different preferences regarding which of these types of protectionist policies to use. They also have varying degrees of bargaining power in trade negotiations. Taking these two factors into account, we argue that characteristics of trade negotiations and the design of the resulting agreements will vary widely depending on the governing regimes of the states involved.

Democracies versus Nondemocracies: Variation in Trade Policy Preferences

Governing elites in different types of states – democracies and nondemocracies, in particular – have different preferences regarding the nature of the protectionist measures they would like to use to shield key domestic industries from the competition brought about by trade

liberalization. In particular, protectionist measures provide benefits to domestic industries, but also impose costs on consumers by preventing competition that results in the lowering of prices. The economic and political efficiency of different types of trade policies therefore varies from policy to policy and state to state.

Protectionist measures vary in their economic efficiency. Policies such as tariffs, which use direct channels to secure protections for domestic industries, are are more efficient than less direct trade instruments in achieving economic goals related to trade protection. Nontariff barriers, which utilize indirect channels to try to shield domestic industries from foreign competition, are less efficient in securing those protections (Magee, Brock, and Young 1989). However, because they are more straightforward, direct protectionist policies are also more transparent in the costs they impose on the average citizen (consumer). In contrast, the costs imposed by more indirect policies are harder to discern – i.e., they are more "obfuscated" (Magee, Brock, and Young 1989; Kono 2006). Indeed, Taylor (2015) shows empirically that it is more difficult for voters to discern the effects of less direct trade policies than it is for them to discern the effects of more direct ones.

Because direct measures are more transparent in their effects, while it is more economically efficient for elites to use direct trade instruments to secure protections for key domestic industries, it is not always the politically efficient choice. This is because the average citizen (consumer), who suffers costs from the use of protectionist policies, wields different levels of political power in different types of states. She can exert political influence in democracies, but has significantly less power over elites in nondemocracies.

Governing elites in nondemocracies thus have only one main constituency to consider when crafting trade policies – politically relevant domestic industries. They therefore have an incentive to use more economically efficient, direct policies in order to best appeal to domestic industries that want protection from international competition. Because their political power is not threatened by the average citizen who is negatively affected by these policies, using the more direct policies is not politically inefficient for nondemocratic elites.

Governing elites in democracies, however, need to appeal to both politically relevant domestic industries *and* the average citizen, who is a voter and a consumer. To help ensure that they do not lose the support of citizens who pay costs when protectionist policies are used, democratic elites have an incentive to use trade instruments whose negative effects are obfuscated and harder for the average citizen to identify – i.e., to use more indirect nontariff barriers to secure protections (Kono 2006). While less economically efficient, it is more politically efficient for democratic elites to use such indirect protectionist policies. It allows them to appeal to the interests of key domestic industries, while also lessening the likelihood that citizens will punish them at the polls for doing so.

Overall, we therefore expect nondemocratic elites have an incentive to use more direct protectionist policies, while democratic elites should have a preference for using indirect protectionist policies and working to obfuscate their effects.[3]

Democracies versus Nondemocracies: Variation in Bargaining Power

Democracies and nondemocracies not only vary in their trade policy preferences, but also in the leverage they are likely to be able to exert in trade negotiations. In particular, we argue that democracies are likely to have greater bargaining power in trade negotiations than nondemocracies. This bargaining power stems from the two-level game within which political elites must work. Political elites that face significant constraints at the domestic level have greater power in international negotiations than those that are less constrained (Schelling 1960; Putnam 1988). Democratic elites, being constrained at the domestic level by their need to appeal to citizens (consumers), are thus likely to have more bargaining power than nondemocracies (Schelling 1960).

Democracies must appeal to a broad selectorate at the domestic level – a selectorate made up of citizens (consumers) who tend to prefer lower consumption prices which stem from more liberalized trade. The political repercussions of agreeing to trade policies with transparent

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[3]This prediction is consistent with Kono (2006), who studies the trade policies used by individual states.

protectionist measures can be quite significant, potentially costing political elites votes in domestic elections (Bailey 2001; Rogowski and Kayser 2002). Because they are constrained at the domestic level regarding what they can accept, the threat by democratic elites to reject agreements at the international level that do not align with their policy preferences is credible (Schelling 1960; Putnam 1988). This ability to credibly threaten to walk away from the agreement provides them with bargaining power in trade negotiations.[4]

Elites in nondemocracies cannot make this same type of credible threat. They do not face a broad, consumer selectorate; their selectorate is small and more concerned with narrow industry interests than broad consumption prices.[5] While using direct protectionist policies might be preferable, agreeing to more indirect protectionist measures would not actually go against the interests of their selectorate. They therefore cannot make a threat to reject an agreement at the international level based on the argument that it would not be acceptable at the domestic level. The bargaining leverage that stems from democratic elites' ability to make credible veto threats while nondemocratic elites cannot puts democratic elites in a more powerful bargaining position vis-à-vis their nondemocratic counterparts.

Democratic elites not only have a greater ability to make credible threats to reject agreements that do not reflect their preferences, but their nondemocratic counterparts are likely to be flexible and willing to give in to their demands in return. In particular, political elites seek the most politically efficient trade policy in order to stay in power. For democracies, the only politically efficient policy is to use indirect trade measures – as these are the types of measures that allow them to cater to the interests of domestic industries and interest groups while at the same time preventing the loss of voter (consumer) support, their selectorate. Democracies are therefore likely to be rigid in their position pushing for more indirect trade instruments. For nondemocracies, however, both direct and indirect policies are politically

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[4]For examples of work that make the argument that the credible threat to walk away from the bargianing table lends bargaining power and/or demonstrate that argument empirically, see Fisher and Ury (1981); Raiffa (1982); Odell 2000; McKibben (2013, 2015).

[5]See the argument by Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2003) regarding the variation in public versus private goods allocation based on regime type (and thus the size of the "selectorate".)

efficient – both allow them to cater to the interests of their domestic industries, which make up their selectorate. Because both direct and indirect policies are politically efficient, non-democratic elites have the ability to accept more indirect policies while still catering to their domestic selectorate. When democracies make demands for these types of policies, non-democracies can be flexible and accept them without losing selectorate support. Democratic elites can thus use threats to work to extract policy concessions from their nondemocratic counterparts, and those counterparts are likely to give those concessions in return. We therefore expect trade agreements negotiated between democracies and nondemocracies to better reflect the interests of democratic elites.

Deriving Empirical Expectations: The Negotiation Process

Given the variation in policy preferences and bargaining power of democracies and non-democracies in trade negotiations, we expect the bargaining strategies of these different types of states to differ. In particular, we expect democratic elites to be more likely to advocate for the inclusion of indirect protectionist trade instruments (i.e., NTBs), as well as being likely to put a greater number of issues on the table, more generally.

First, in order to appeal to import-competing industries and their related interest groups who have an interest in trade protection while trying to not lose the support of citizens who have an interest in lower consumption prices, we expect democratic elites to be more likely to adopt bargaining tactics bargain for trade policies that have relatively indirect protectionist effects (i.e., NTBs). In addition, there is a plethora of different types of nontariff barriers that can be included in a trade agreement – ranging from export subsidies to psytosanitary measures, from quotas to import licensing, and from intellectual property rights protections to anti-dumping measures. Because at least some of these types of policies are likely to be met with resistance from other states involved in the negotiation, democracies that seek to get at least some of these types of policies in the resulting agreement are likely to put as many on the table as possible, increasing the likelihood that at least some will be included

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in the resulting agreement. We therefore expect democracies to push for more NTBs to be included in trade agreements generally. For example, in the 1994 GATT Ministerial Meeting, several democracies including the United States, Switzerland, Sweden, and Belgium, as well as developing democracies such as Argentina and Honduras argued strongly to have labor rights protections included in the GATT agreement. Similarly, many democracies – both developed and developing – pushed for the inclusion of environmental issues as they relate to trade in future GATT negotiations. All are argued to be *de facto* nontariff barriers that inhibit free trade,[6] but those trade-inhibiting effects come through indirect channels by refusing to import goods that do not meet certain labor and environmental standards. This argument leads to a first testable hypothesis.

HYPOTHESIS 1A: *All else constant, in trade negotiations, democracies should push nontariff barrier policies more than nondemocracies.*

More interestingly, we also argue that democracies are likely to push for the inclusion of a greater number of substantive issues, in general, in trade negotiations. An increase in the number of issues being discussed decreases attention from any one particular policy, helping to obscure protectionist policies from public scrutiny. Including more issues also provides elites with leverage in the negotiations, allowing them to "give" on some issues – particularly issues that are not that important to them – in order to "win" and get various NTBs included in the resulting agreement. Indeed, this is a common negotiating tactic. As one diplomat explained in an interview, referring to "footnotes," which are a written record of a problem that a state has with certain issues in the text, "Sometimes [we] leave footnotes in a document as 'negotiating money' – footnotes that [we] have in order to trade them away

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[6]For example, illustrating the nontariff barrier nature of labor rights protections, the representative of Zimbabwe stated, "My delegation would also like to register its concerns regarding attempts by some contracting parties to bring labor standards, which would be used as non-tariff barriers against products from developing countries, under the ambit of the GATT" (GATT document MTN.TNC/MIN(94)/ST/78).

for support on other footnotes."[7] The political elites of democracies can use this tactic in order to get certain NTBs included in the resulting agreement. As an illustrative example, in the 1988 GATT Ministerial Meeting, states disagreed on whether trade in services should be included under the purview of the GATT. Extending GATT's competency to include trade in services would sweep many nontraditional sectors into the multilateral trade agreement, adding complexity to the existing trade framework. Consistent with our argument that democracies are more likely to push for the inclusion of additional issues, seventeen of the forty-five democracies involved in the negotiations pushed for the inclusion of services while only five of the forty-six nondemocracies did so. Similarly, seven democracies – Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Spain, Sri Lanka, and Trinidad and Tobago – pushed to have issues related to indebtedness included in the 1988 Ministerial Meeting while only three nondemocracies did so. Nineteen democracies pushed to include discussions of intellectual property rights protections in the meeting, while only four nondemocracies did so.[8] This argument leads to a second testable hypothesis regarding the negotiating tactics of democracies versus nondemocracies.

HYPOTHESIS 1B: *All else constant, in trade negotiations, democracies should push to include more issues, in general, than nondemocracies.*

Deriving Empirical Expectations: The Design of Trade Agreements

Because of the variation in trade policy preferences and bargaining power between democracies and nondemocracies, and the variation in the tactics they are likely to use, we should

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[7]This statement comes from an interview in 2005 with a diplomat in one of the EU state's permanent representation to the EU involved in the negotiations in the institutions of the Council of the European Union, the EU's main intergovernmental negotiating body.

[8]Note that this is not simply a developed versus developing country distinction. For example, developing country democracies were also pushing for the inclusion of many of these issues. Developing countries such as Jamaica, the Philippines, and India pushed for the inclusion of services. Developing democracies such as Jamaica, Sri Lanka, and Trinidad and Tobago pushed for the inclusion of the issue of indebtedness.

observe variation in the design of the trade agreements different types of states negotiate. One key dimension on which they should vary is their "complexity" – in the types of policies they use, the number of issues included, and their length.

First, democratic elites share an interest in obfuscating the protectionist measures they include in their trade agreements. To do so, they are likely to push to include more nontariff barrier policies in their trade agreements, and to push to include more issues, in general. We expect the agreements negotiated solely by democracies to include more NTBs, more issues, in general, and thus to be longer than the agreements negotiated by other groups of states (either nondemocracies or a mix of democracies and nondemocracies).[9] In other words, they are likely to be more "complex." Indeed, a simple analysis of the data on all PTAs formed since World War II shows that the average number of words in the PTAs forged among democracies is around 17,500 while the average number of words in PTAs forged among other groups of states is around 11,800.[10] PTAs negotiated by democracies are 50 percent longer than those negotiated by nondemocracies or a mix of democracies and nondemocracies. Similarly, on a scale from about -2 to 2, the average depth of PTAs among democracies is about .373, while the average depth is -.344 for PTAs made up of nondemocracies or a a mix of democracies and nondemocracies. Moreover, the average number of

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[9]We analyze the length of the agreement, as the rules for NTBs and nonstandard trade rules take more space and words to codify than more traditional/straightforward trade agreements that focus on tariff reductions (and the keeping of certain levels of tariffs on certain goods by not reducing those tariffs to zero). Moreover, tariff reductions on all the various types of goods are typically laid out in the annex to an agreement, not the agreement text itself, and not removing a tariff – keeping one of the most direct protectionist policies in place – would actually result in words *not* being included in the agreement, as the issues would simply not be mentioned. NTBs and other types of policies are laid out in the articles of the agreement itself, and because the agreement is focused on trade liberalization, need to be carefully justified and specified. We can therefore operationalize the complexity of an agreement by looking at the length of each agreement absent any annex. Operationalizing complexity as the number of words in a document is consistent with other works in the literature (e.g., Bommarito and Katz 2010; Turnbull-Hall, Carline and Richard Thomas 2012; McKibben and Taylor 2014). Operationalizing the complexity of policies in terms of their length is also consistent with the way political elites themselves view these policies. For example, a report of the Australian Parliament suggested ways to reduce complexity in legislation. A key method that was proposed was to reduce the "length of legislation" (Australian Government 2016). Similarly, the UK parliament has also commissioned reports finding that page length is associated with policy complexity (UK Government 2013).

[10]These word counts focus solely on the actual language of the trade instruments negotiated in a trade agreement. They therefore exclude annexes and tariff schedules.

provisions included in PTAs among democracies is 3, while PTAs not completely made up of democracies have, on average, 2 provisions.[11] In other words, PTAs among democracies are significantly more complex than PTAs formed by nondemocracies or a mix of democracies and nondemocracies. This leads to a first testable hypothesis regarding the design of trade agreements.

HYPOTHESIS 2A: *Trade agreements crafted in negotiations among democracies are likely to be more complex than trade agreements negotiated by nondemocracies or a mix of democracies and nondemocracies.*

In addition, given democratic elites' preference for using indirect protectionist policies in trade agreements and obfuscating their effects, and the bargaining power that stems from being highly constrained at the domestic level, we expect that the greater the proportion of democracies involved in the negotiation of a PTA, the stronger their ability to push through NTBs and additional issues, more generally. We therefore expect that the greater the proportion of democracies involved in the negotiation of a PTA, the more complex the resulting agreement is likely to be. This leads to a second testable hypothesis about the design of trade agreements.

HYPOTHESIS 2B: *All else constant, the greater the proportion of democracies involved in the negotiation of a trade agreement, the more complex the resulting agreement is likely to be.*

More importantly, we argue that because democracies are more constrained at the domestic level, and are thus rigid in their negotiating position with the ability to credibly

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[11]These data come from the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) dataset, which measures the depth of PTAs (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014). The first depth measure reported here is a latent trait analysis of PTA depth, and the second is an additive index of the total number of provisions that can be included in PTAs. These provisions include a discussion of tariffs, as well as issues such as trade in services, investment, standards, public procurement, competition, and intellectual property rights.

reject agreements that do not align with their policy preferences, a PTA that involves any number of democracies is likely to be more complex than PTAs that do not involve any democracies. Because the formation of PTAs requires consent from all participating actors, if nondemocracies want to reach an agreement, they need to concede and agree to have indirect protectionist policies and a wider variety of issues, more generally, included in the agreement. It is not only having a greater proportion of democracies that pushes an agreement toward complexity; a single rigid democracy can do so as well. Indeed, in an analysis of all PTAs constructed to date, the average number of words in PTAs that include at least one democracy is about 12,000 while the average number of words in PTAs that do not include at least one democracy is about 4,200. They are almost three times as long. Similarly, on a scale from about -2 to 2, the average depth of PTAs that include at least one democracy is -.071, while the average depth is -.885 for PTAs that do not include at least one democracy. Moreover, the average number of overall issues included in PTAs with at least one democracy is 2, PTAs without at least one democracy has, on average, only one issue.[12] In other words, PTAs with at least one democracy are significantly more complex than PTAs formed without any democracies. This leads to a third testable hypothesis regarding the design of trade agreements.

Hypothesis 2c: *All else constant, trade negotiations that include at least one democracy are likely to result in more complex agreements than than the trade agreements negotiated by nondemocratic states.*

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[12]These data again come from the DESTA project (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014). The first is a latent trait analysis of depth, and the second is an additive index of seven key possible issues.

Empirical Analysis

To test our argument about characteristics of the trade agreements that states negotiate and join, we constructed two original datasets. The first dataset codes key characteristics of the multilateral GATT ministerial negotiations undertaken since the conclusion of the Kennedy Round in 1968. To gather this information, we qualitatively analyzed the notes and minutes from the Ministerial Meetings of the GATT.[13] We used these meeting notes to identify the list of issues being debated in each of the Ministerial Meetings, coding which states chose to take official positions on those issues and their direction of support on each one.[14] The second dataset measures PTAs' complexity as well as the democratic nature of their membership. This dataset covers all PTAs that have enterd into force since 1945. This includes those still in force as well as those that have been terminated or superseded.[15]

To code our key independent variables related to the democratic nature of states, we draw on the Polity IV data (Marshall, Monty, and Keith Jaggers 2002). We code a "democracy" as a state with a Polity IV score greater than 6 (e.g., Tir 2010).[16] In addition to being a characteristic of each state, the democracy variable is also used to code the democratic nature of a group of states involved in a trade agreement. A PTA is considered a "PTA among democracies" if all members of the PTA fit the definition of a democracy, a "mixed PTA" if at least one, but not all states fit the definition of a democracy, and a "PTA among nondemocracies" if no state in the PTA fits the definition of a democracy. We code the proportion of PTA members that are democracies as the number of states that fit the definition of a democracy divided by the total number of members in a PTA. These are the

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[13]Specifically, we begin with the Ministerial Meeting of 1973, which was the first of these meetings that followed the closure of the Kennedy Round. We continue to code all of the Ministerial Meetings through the closure and implementation of the Uruguay Round.

[14]In the "Codebook" section of the Web Appendix, we provide a detailed description of how these data were coded.

[15]The Web Appendix includes a list of the Ministerial Meetings included in the analysis of GATT negotiations (Table 1) and a list of all PTAs included in the data (Table 2).

[16]We also run models that define a democracy in a "looser" way as a state with a Polity IV score greater than 0 (e.g., Simmons and Danner 2010). The results of these models are reported in Tables 6 and 7 of the Web Appendix, and the results are consistent with those reported here.

key independent variables in our various analyses.

Analyzing the Negotiation Tactics of Democracies

Directly analyzing the process of multilateral trade negotiations, hypotheses 1a and 1b provide predictions about the types of negotiation tactics democracies are likely to use in trade negotiations. Hypothesis 1a predicts that democracies are likely to focus on non-tariff barriers to a greater degree than nondemocracies, and hypothesis 1b predicts that they are also likely to work to put more issues on the table in the negotiations. Models 1 through 4 test these predictions. Analyzing negotiating behavior in the GATT ministerial rounds (the more prominent and politicized negotiations in the GATT context, which involve actual government officials), the unit of analysis is country-ministerial round. The dependent variable in these models captures the degree to which issues were pushed in a given GATT ministerial meeting by a given state. For Models 1 and 2, which analyze the discussion of NTBs, the dependent variable is therefore the percent of NTBs that were pushed by a given state. For Models 3 and 4, which analyze the overall discussion of issues, the dependent variable is the percent of the overall number of issues discussed in the ministerial meeting that were pushed by a given state.

The first model in each set is a baseline model, including only the relevant explanatory variable of interest (democracy). These are Model 1 for the NTB analysis and Model 3 for the analysis of the overall discussion of issues. The second model in each set includes relevant control variables. First, we control for the level of development of a state to account for the fact that development status is likely associated with a state's bargaining power in trade negotiations as well as with the democratic nature of a state. To take these potential effects into account, we include a measure of a state's GDP per capita. The measure is logged to account for skewness. We also include dichotomous variables indicating whether a state was a member of one of the three major regional PTAs that participated and spoke in these GATT ministerial meetings (the European Community/Union, ASEAN, and the

Andean Community). The models including these control variables are Model 2 for the NTB analysis and Model 4 for the analysis of issues discussed, overall. The models are run as standard OLS regressions with negotiation fixed effects to control for the fact that there are likely very particular characteristics of each Ministerial meeting that will influence states' bargaining strategies.[17]

[Table 1 here]

The results in Table 1 provide empirical evidence in support of the predictions of hypotheses 1a and 1b. In Models 1 and 2, a positive coefficient is associated with the "Democracy" variable, indicating that democracies tend to push NTB-related issues to a greater degree than non-democracies, even when the wealth of a state is taken into account in the analysis. This positive effect is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in both models. Substantively, the results provide additional support for our argument. They show that in these GATT negotiations, being a democracy is associated with about a 4 to 8 percent increase in the percent of NTB-related issues a state is likely to push for in the negotiations. While this might seem like a small increase, the average percent of NTB issues pushed by a state is about 10 percent. An increase in 4 to 8 percent when the average is only 10 percent is therefore substantively significant. These statistical and substantive results provide empirical support for hypothesis 1a, which argues that democracies are more likely to push for the inclusion of NTBs in trade negotiations than nondemocracies.

The results in Table 1 go even further in helping us understand the variation in strategies between democracies and nondemocracies in trade negotiations. Across both Models 3 and 4, a positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level is associated with the "Democracy" variable. Providing empirical evidence in support of our argument, this indicates that being a democracy is associated with pushing forward

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[17]We achieve this by including year fixed effects, as Ministerial meetings were separated by several years. Note, in some years two Ministerial meetings were held. We treat these together because the negotiations were clearly linked, meaning that they jointly influenced the negotiation process. There is no clear separation of negotiations in one versus the other.

significantly more issues in GATT trade negotiations, and this result holds even when the development status of a state is taken into account in the analysis. Substantively, the results show that in these GATT negotiations, being a democracy is associated with about a 4 to 10 percent increase in the issues pushed by a state. Given that on average, states push about 16 percent of issues in GATT negotiations, an increase of 4 to 10 percent is substantively significant. The statistical and substantive results therefore provide empirical support for hypothesis 1b, showing that in trade negotiations, democracies are likely to push to have more issues on the table than nondemocracies. Together, Models 1 through 4 provide evidence in support of our argument that in trade negotiations, democracies' strategies are different than those of nondemocracies. This empirical support is particularly interesting, as there is a perceived general cleavage in the GATT/WTO along developmental lines. The fact that our results hold even when controlling for level of development shows that even if such cleavage exists, democracies – both developed and developing – tend to act similarly in their pushing for NTBs and more issues.

Analyzing the Complexity of Democracies' Trade Agreements

Understanding the variation in democracies' and nondemocracies' strategies in trade negotiations, we can begin to understand better how trade agreements negotiated by different groups of states come to be designed in certain ways. Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c predict that the the complexity of PTAs will vary based on the degree to which democracies were involved in the negotiations that created them. To test these predictions, the key dependent variable is the complexity of a PTA. The unit of analysis is "PTA event." An observation is taken for each PTA each time it changes membership and/or an updated agreement is drafted.[18] We expect the complexity of these PTAs to be influenced in important ways by

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[18]For example, the formation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) counts as a PTA event. And when Finland and Sweden leave to join the European Community, a change in membership of the EFTA occurs. This is also considered a PTA event because the composition of the PTA changed. As another example, the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) revised the agreement in 1995 with the inclusion of the Brno Amendment, which allowed for the accession of any European state to the agreement at the consent of all Parties.

the characteristics of the states involved in their creation.

We test hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c by analyzing three sets of OLS regression models. All three operationalize the dependent variable – complexity of a PTA – using originally collected data that counts the number of words in each PTA.[19] This measure of complexity is consistent with other works in the literature (e.g., Bommarito and Katz 2010), as well as with political reality.[20] We check the robustness of our analysis with alternative operationalizions of complexity using the DESTA data that measures the depth of PTAs (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014). The results of these models are consistent with those reported here, and are reported in Tables 3 and 4 in the Web Appendix.[21] In all models, standard errors are clustered by year.[22]

For each hypothesis, we run two models. The first is a baseline model including only the variable of interest, which captures the democratic nature of the states in a PTA. The second model in each set includes relevant control variables – the average GDP per capita of the states in a PTA, the number of PTA members, whether or not the PTA involves the European Union, and dichotomous variables to control for the region within which the members of a PTA reside.[23] We include these latter measures because different regions not only differ in the degree to which they are made up of democracies, but also because the complexity of the PTAs formed by different regions likely differ. For example, Europe's PTAs would likely have more complicated policy than those negotiated in other regions because

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[19]The word count does not include schedules and annexes, as there is significant missing data on the word count of schedules and annexes. The missingness is not random, as some countries tend to post all parts of their agreements while others do not. Because it is therefore likely to non-randomly skew the results, we focus on the words in the agreement itself.

[20]For evidence, consider policy reports solicited by both the British and Australian governments to assess the sources of complexity in legislation and recommend measures to simplify subsequent laws and policy. These reports highlight the length of legislation as a primary source of complexity and suggest minimizing the number of pages for the sake of simplicity and public comprehension (United Kingdom government 2013; Australia government 2016).

[21]We adopt the word count measure as our main complexity measure because the data collection of word count allowed us to include a wider range of PTAs than are included in the DESTA data.

[22]Models are also run clustering standard errors by PTA, as there can be multiple PTA events (our unit of analysis) for the same PTA. The results are consistent with the results discussed here, and are reported in Table 5 of the Web Appendix.

[23]If a PTA spans regions, both regions are coded 1.

it has a long tradition of trade agreements – with subsequent agreements building on and adding to previous ones.[24] Controlling for region also helps us account for variation in PTA preponderance. For example, very few PTAs were formed by states in Northeast Asia, but there are many PTAs that involve European states.

Models 5 and 6 test hypothesis 2a, analyzing the complexity of PTAs formed among democracies relative to the complexity of PTAs formed by other groups of states. Models 7 and 8 test hypothesis 2b, analyzing the complexity of PTAs when there is a greater proportion of democracies involved in the PTA formation. Models 9 and 10 test hypothesis 2c, analyzing the complexity of PTAs that were formed with at least one democracy. Based on the predictions of these hypotheses, we expect the various democracy measures to exert a positive and statistically significant effect on the complexity of a PTA. The results of these models are reported in Table 2.

[Table 2 here]

The results in Table 2 provide empirical support for our argument about the complexity of democracies' trade agreements. First, we argue that democracies have a preference for more complex trade policy. PTAs formed among democracies should therefore be more complex than PTAs formed among either nondemocracies of a mix of regimes. As evidenced by the positive coefficient associated with the "PTA among democracies" variable in Models 5 and 6, there is a positive relationship between PTAs formed among democracies and the complexity of a PTA. This positive relationship is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Substantively, the results show that PTAs formed among democracies have about 5,600 to 6,600 more words than other PTAs, all else constant. Given a mean of about 13,000 words in a PTA, this increase is not only statistically significant but also substantively significant. It is about a 43 to 51 percent increase relative to the average number of words in a PTA. Models 5 and 6 therefore provide empirical support for hypothesis 2a.

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[24]See the evolution/development of the EEC/EU, for example.

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Going one step further and taking into account the negotiation process itself, we argue that democracies are likely to have greater bargaining power than nondemocracies in the process of negotiating a trade agreement because they are more constrained at the domestic level (Schelling 1960; Putnam 1988). Given democracies' preference for more complex policies, hypothesis 2b predicts that the greater the proportion of democracies involved in a PTA, the more complex that PTA is likely to be, and hypothesis 2c predicts that PTAs that include at least one democracy are likely to be more complex than PTAs in which no democracy is rigidly pushing for more complex policies. Models 7 through 10 test this argument, and the empirical results support for it. A positive coefficient is associated with the "Proportion of Democracies in PTA" variable in Models 7 and 8, indicating that PTAs with a greater proportion of democracies are likely to be more complex than PTAs that include a lower proportion of democracies. This positive relationship is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Substantively, the results show that a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of democracies is associated with a PTA having about 2,000 to 2,400 more words. This is about a 15 to 18 percent increase relative to the average number of words in a PTA. Going from the minimum proportion of democracies (0) to the maximum proportion of democracies (1), the number of words in a PTA increases by about 7,200 to 9,000 – a 55 to 69 percent increase relative to the average number of words. Given the greater bargaining power of democracies, we further argue that a PTA with any number of democracies will be more complex than a PTA between only nondemocracies. Models 9 and 10 support this argument, with a positive and statistically significant coefficient associated with the variable indicating that a PTA was formed with at least one democracy. Substantively, a PTA that has at least one democracy is likely to have about 5,800 to 9,100 more words than a PTA formed only among nondemocracies – 45 to 70 percent greater relative to the average number of words in a PTA. This provides empirical support for hypothesis 2c.

Overall, our argument is empirically supported by analyses of states' strategies in GATT negotiations and the complexity of PTAs. Democracies and nondemocracies likely differ in

important ways in how they approach trade negotiations. The design of the agreements resulting from negotiations among different types of states is therefore likely to differ, as well.

Conclusion

In this paper, we argued that trade agreements and the negotiations to create them are likely to vary, depending upon the regime type of the states involved. In doing so, we not only look at differences in the characteristics of the trade agreements that political elites from different types of regimes choose to construct, but we also begin to unpack the black box of the trade negotiations, themselves, that created those agreements. The political elites of democracies, who tend to prefer to use indirect and complex trade protection policies, will use negotiating strategies that push to have various types of nontariff barriers included in the agreement more than their nondemocratic counterparts, and will push to have more issues on the table in the negotiations. PTAs formed among democracies are therefore likely to be more complex than PTAs formed among other groups of states. Going even further, the constraints that democratic elites face at the domestic level also gives them bargaining leverage in trade negotiations relative to their nondemocratic counterparts. When more democracies are involved in the negotiation of a PTA, we therefore expect the resulting PTA to be more complex than PTAs formed among groups of states less dominated by democracies. Moreover, because of the bargaining leverage democratic elites have, negotiations that involve any number of democracies are likely to result in more complex PTAs than PTAs formed among nondemocratic states. An analysis of the negotiating strategies used by political elites and the complexity of the resulting agreements provides empirical evidence consistent with this argument.

This argument and the empirical results have important implications for our understanding of trade negotiations and the resulting trade agreements. Following our argument, if blocs

of democracies continually push greater numbers of substantive issues in trade agreements, and use less direct mechanisms to control trade, the resulting agreements will inevitably be more complex and large. While this may make the agreement more politically palatable for democratic elites to accept, their political opposition are more likely to be able to find reasons to oppose and delay the ratification of the agreement when there are a greater number of policies on the table to challenge. Moreover, because these policies are more complex, they are more easily framed in ways that benefit the interests of the opposition, further helping to challenge the ratification process.[25] Interestingly, this means that because democracies push to have complex agreements and because nondemocracies are more likely to concede and accept more complex trade agreements because of the rigidity of democracies' positions, complexity can help forge agreements at the international level. At the domestic level, however, this same complexity is likely to challenge the ratification process. Agreements might be more likely to be reached, but less likely to be implemented. This might help to explain the slow and even failed ratification of negotiated agreements. For example, in 2015, a highly complex Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement was reached at the international level between a group of democracies and nondemocracies. However, at the domestic level ratification of the agreement was challenged in significant ways. The United States even withdrew from the agreement. Because of the central position that the United States holds in the potential PTA, the question of whether or not the United States will ratify the agreement, despite having accepted it at the international level, is therefore a critical one. The challenge to reaching an agreement versus getting an agreement ratified is thus a key empirical problem that our argument helps us to understand better.

Overall, while much scholarship has focused analyses of trade on democracies and how different forms of democratic institutions impact trade policy, we seek to focus on variation between different types of regimes. In explaining how democratic and nondemocratic elites differ in both their negotiation tactics and in the complexity of the trade agreements they

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[25]For an argument about how the complexity of trade agreements impacts political elites' ability to frame those policies, see McKibben and Taylor (2014).

create, we not only shed additional light on democracies' trade policies, but we also help us to begin to understand the trade policies of nondemocracies, as well as how democracies and nondemocracies interact in international trade negotiations. Future research can continue down this path to further expand our understanding of how states interact in trade negotiations and the characteristics of the resulting agreements. In particular, the democratic nature of states is only one of many different state characteristics. How do states other state characteristics influence how they interact in trade negotiations? Or international negotiations, more generally? And what are the implications for the resulting agreements? Future research can address these type of questions.

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Table 1: Democracies Pushing NTB Issues and Pushing Any Issue in GATT Negotiations

DV: percent of NTBs/issues pushed

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
	Pushing NTBs	Pushing NTBs	Pushing Any Issue	Pushing Any Issue
Democracy	.077**	.048**	.102**	.043**
	(.019)	(.024)	(.013)	(.015)
EU member		-.034		.153**
		(.033)		(.020)
ASEAN member		-.007		.117**
		(.048)		(.026)
Andean Community member		-.052		-.032
		(.050)		(.031)
GDP per capita (ln)		.028**		.019**
		(.009)		(.006)
Constant	.107**	-.109	.152**	-.002
	(.020)	(.074)	(.014)	(.045)
Observations	386	385	391	390
R^2	.088	.114	.192	.374
F statistic	9.23	6.04	22.92	28.48
prob > F	.000	.000	.000	.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$

Standard errors in parentheses.

Negotiation (year) fixed effects included in models.

Table 2: Complexity of PTAs Among Democracies

DV: number of words in PTA (in thousands)

	Model 5 PTA among democracies	Model 6 PTA among democracies	Model 7 Mixed PTAs	Model 8 Mixed PTAs	Model 9 At least one democracy	Model 10 At least one democracy
PTA among democracies	5.595** (2.602)	6.585** (2.045)				
Proportion of democracies in PTA			7.184** (1.988)	9.041** (2.103)		
PTA with at least one democracy					9.091** (1.392)	5.784** (1.551)
Average GDP per capita (ln)		4.362** (1.274)		3.779** (1.233)		4.347** (1.357)
Africa region		1.870 (1.240)		2.210* (1.291)		1.132 (1.314)
Americas region		7.903** (2.446)		7.979** (2.289)		9.055** (2.305)
Asia region		-2.506* (1.280)		-2.197* (1.295)		-2.589* (1.394)
Europe region		-14.159** (3.134)		-14.544** (3.109)		-13.955** (3.100)
Number of PTA members		0.227** (0.078)		0.252** (0.081)		0.174** (0.079)
PTA with EU		5.318** (1.676)		1.727 (1.746)		5.133** (1.753)
Constant	11.866** (1.388)	-26.119** (10.115)	8.798** (1.544)	-23.899** (10.130)	4.851** (0.775)	-29.437** (10.980)
Observations	649	599	649	599	649	599
R^2	0.010	0.234	0.011	0.231	0.009	0.220
F statistic	4.62	11.12	13.06	9.82	42.66	10.29
prob > F	.036	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000

$* \ p < 0.10$, $** \ p < 0.05$; Standard errots are in parentheses and clustered by year.

Web Appendix for:

"Creating Trade Agreements with Democracies: Negotiation Strategies and Agreement Design"

This web appendix has three parts. Part I describes the data. Table 1 presents all of the GATT Ministerial Meetings that are included in the analysis of GATT negotiations. Table 2 presents all PTAs that are included in the PTA dataset. Part II of the Web Appendix then provides a detailed codebook describing how the statements countries made in the GATT Ministerial Meetings were coded, as well as all the issues identified in each of those negotiations. Part III of the Web Appendix lays out various robustness checks of the empirical analyses performed in the paper.

PART I: DATA DESCRIPTION

TABLE 1: GATT/WTO MINISTERIAL MEETINGS INCLUDED IN THE DATA

Ministerial Meeting	Negotiation Round
Ministerial Meeting of 1973	Tokyo
Ministerial Meeting of 1982	Between rounds
Ministerial Meeting of 1982 (spec)	Between rounds
Ministerial Meeting of 1988	Uruguay
Ministerial Meeting of 1988 (spec)	Uruguay
Ministerial Meeting of 1994	Uruguay

TABLE 2: PTAs Included in the Data

PTA	YEAR	MEMBERS
Afghanistan - India	2003	2
African Economic Community	1991	52
Agadir Agreement	2007	4
Albania - Bosnia and Herzegovina	2004	2
Albania - Bulgaria	2003	2
Albania - Croatia	2003	2
Albania - Kosovo	2003	2
Albania - Macedonia	2002	2
Albania - Moldova	2004	2
Albania - Romania	2003	2
Albania - Serbia Montenegro	2004	2
Albania - Turkey	2008	2
Algeria - Tunisia	2008	2
Andean Community	1969	6
Andean Community Automotive Agreement	1999	3
Andean Countries - Argentina	2000	6
Andean Countries - Brazil	2005	6
Andean Countries - MERCOSUR	2004	8
Arab Common Market	1965	7
Arab Countries - Morocco	1999	21
Arab Maghreb Union	1989	5
Arab Trade Convention / Treaty on Transit Trade	1953	7
Argentina - Chile	1991	2
Argentina - Cuba	1999	2
Argentina - Mexico	1986	2
Argentina - Paraguay	1989	2
Argentina - Uruguay	1974	2
Argentina - Uruguay 1982	1982	2
Argentina - Uruguay 1984	1984	2
Armenia - Cyprus	1996	2
Armenia - Georgia	1998	2
Armenia - Iran	1997	2
Armenia - Kazakhstan	2001	2
Armenia - Kyrgyzstan	1995	2
Armenia - Moldova	1995	2
Armenia - Russia	1993	2

PTA	Year	Members
Armenia - Turkmenistan	1996	2
Armenia - Ukraine	1996	2
Arusha Agreement I	1968	9
Arusha Agreement II	1969	12
ASEAN - China	2003	11
ASEAN - China Services	2007	11
ASEAN - India	2010	11
ASEAN - India Goods	2009	11
ASEAN - Japan	2003	11
ASEAN - Korea	2006	11
ASEAN - Korea Services	2007	11
ASEAN Services	1995	10
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand	2009	12
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) FTA	1992	10
Australia - China	2015	2
Australia - Japan	2014	2
Australia - Malaysia	2012	2
Australia - New Zealand FTA	1965	2
Australia - Papua New Guinea	1977	2
Australia - South Korea	2014	2
Australia - Thailand	2005	2
Australia-Chile	2009	2
Australia-New Zealand (ANZCERTA)	1983	2
Australia-New Zealand (ANZCERTA) Services	1988	2
Azerbaijan-Georgia	1996	2
Azerbaijan-Ukraine	1996	2
BAFTA	1994	3
BAFTA Agriculture	1996	3
BAFTA NTBs	1997	3
Bahrain - Jordan	2005	2
Bangkok Agreement (APTA)	1976	7
Bangladesh - India	2006	2
Belarus - Serbia	2009	2
Belarus - Ukraine	2006	2
Belize - Guatemala	2006	2
Bhutan - India 1949	1949	2
Bhutan - India 1972	1972	2
Bhutan - India 2006	2006	2

PTA	Year	Members
BIMST-EC	1997	6
Bolivia - Chile	1995	2
Bolivia - Mexico	1994	2
Borneo Free Trade Area	1962	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina - Bulgaria	2004	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina - Croatia	2003	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina - Macedonia	2002	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina - Romania	2002	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina - Slovenia	2002	2
Botswana - Zimbabwe	1988	2
Brazil - Guyana	2001	2
Brazil - Suriname	2005	2
Brazil - Uruguay	1986	2
Brunei Darussalam - Japan	2008	2
Bulgaria - Finland	1975	2
Bulgaria - Israel	2002	2
Bulgaria - Latvia	2002	2
Bulgaria - Lithuania	2002	2
Bulgaria - Macedonia	2000	2
Bulgaria - Moldova	2004	2
Bulgaria - Serbia - Montenegro	2003	3
Bulgaria - Turkey	1999	2
Canada - Chile	1997	2
Canada - Colombia	2011	2
Canada - Costa Rica	2002	2
Canada- Costa Rica	2002	2
Canada - EC (CETA)	2014	29
Canada - Honduras	2013	2
Canada - Israel	1997	2
Canada - Jordan	2009	2
Canada - New Zealand	1981	2
Canada - Panama	2010	2
Canada - Peru	2009	2
Canada - Portugal	1954	2
Canada - South Korea	2014	2
Canada - Spain	1954	2
Canada - United States	1988	2
Canada US Automotive Products Trade Agreement (APTA)	1965	2

PTA	Year	Members
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)	1973	15
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Services	1997	13
Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA)	1965	12
CARICOM - Colombia	1994	16
CARICOM - Costa Rica	2004	16
CARICOM - Cuba	2001	16
CARICOM - Dominican Republic	1999	16
CARICOM - Venezuela	1993	16
Central America - Chile	2002	6
Central America - Dominican Republic	1998	6
Central America - Mexico	2001	4
Central America - Panama	2003	6
Central American Common Market (CACM)	1961	6
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR)	2006	7
Central American Free Trade Area (CAFTA)	1958	5
Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)	1994	10
Chile - China	1997	2
Chile - Colombia	1993	2
Chile - Colombia 2006	2006	2
Chile - Ecuador	1994	2
Chile - Ecuador 2008	2008	2
Chile - Hong Kong	2012	2
Chile - India	2007	2
Chile - Japan	2007	2
Chile - Korea	2004	2
Chile - Malaysia	2010	2
Chile - Mexico	1991	2
Chile - Mexico 1999	1999	2
Chile - Panama	2008	2
Chile - Peru	1998	2
Chile - Peru 2006	2006	2
Chile - Thailand	2013	2
Chile - Turkey	2009	2
Chile - Venezuela	1993	2
Chile - Vietnam	2011	2
China - Costa Rica	2010	2
China - Hong Kong	2004	2
China - Iceland	2013	2

PTA	Year	Members
China - India	1984	2
China - Macao	2004	2
China - New Zealand	2008	2
China - Pakistan	2003	2
China - Pakistan FTA	2007	2
China - Pakistan Services	2009	2
China - Peru	2010	2
China - Singapore	2009	2
China - Switzerland	2014	2
Colombia - Costa Rica	1984	2
Colombia - Costa Rica 2013	2013	2
Colombia - Israel	2013	2
Colombia - Mexico - Venezuela	1995	3
Colombia - Nicaragua	1984	2
Colombia - Northern Triangle	2007	4
Colombia - Panama	1993	2
Colombia - Panama 2013	2013	2
Colombia - South Korea	2013	2
Colombia Mexico Venezuela	1994	3
Colombia Peru EC	2012	29
Common Economic Zone	2004	4
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)	1994	21
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)	1994	10
Costa Rica - Mexico	1982	2
Costa Rica - Mexico 1995	1995	2
Costa Rica - Panama	1973	2
Costa Rica - Peru	2011	2
Costa Rica - Singapore	2010	2
Costa Rica - Venezuela	1986	2
Cotonou Agreement	2003	106
Croatia - Lithuania	2003	2
Croatia - Macedonia	1997	2
Croatia - Moldova	2004	2
Croatia - Serbia	2002	2
Croatia - Slovenia	1999	2
Croatia - Turkey	2003	2
Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)	2010	2
Cuba - Ecuador	2000	2

PTA	YEAR	MEMBERS
Cuba - Guatemala	1999	2
Cuba - MERCOSUR	2006	5
Cuba - Mexico	1985	2
Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC)	1966	6
Czech Republic - Estonia	1996	2
Czech Republic - Israel	1996	2
Czech Republic - Latvia	1995	2
Czech Republic - Lithuania	1995	2
Czech Republic - Slovakia Republic	1993	2
Czech Republic - Slovenia	1994	2
Czech Rpublic - Turkey	1997	2
Czechoslovakia - Finland	1974	2
Dominican Republic - Panama	1987	2
East African Community	2000	5
East African Community of 1967	1967	3
EC - Albania	2006	29
EC - Algeria	1976	29
EC - Andorra	1991	29
EC - Bosnia and Herzegovina	2008	29
EC - Bulgaria	1993	26
EC - Cameroon	2009	29
EC - CARIFORUM	2008	44
EC - Central America	2013	34
EC - Chile	2003	29
EC - Cote d'Ivoire	2009	29
EC - Croatia	2002	28
EC - Cyprus	1973	16
EC - Czech Republic	1992	16
EC - Ecuador	2014	29
EC - Egypt	1977	16
EC - Egypt Euro-Med	2001	29
EC - Estonia	1995	16
EC - Estonia Europe Agreement	1998	16
EC - Faroe Islands	1997	29
EC - Finland	1986	13
EC - Georgia	2016	29
EC - Greece	1961	10
EC - Hungary	1992	16

PTA	YEAR	MEMBERS
EC - Iceland	1973	13
EC - Israel	1975	16
EC - Israel Euro-Med	2000	29
EC - Jordan	1977	16
EC - Jordan Euro-Med	2002	29
EC - Korea	2011	29
EC - Latvia	1995	16
EC - Lebanon	1972	10
EC - Lebanon 1977	1977	16
EC - Lebanon Euro-Med	2003	29
EC - Lithuania	1995	16
EC - Macedonia	2001	29
EC - Malta	1971	16
EC - Mexico	2000	29
EC - Moldova	2014	29
EC - Montenegro	2008	29
EC - Morocco	1976	16
EC - Morocco Euro-Med	2000	29
EC - Norway	1973	13
EC - OCT	2001	54
EC - Palestine	1997	29
EC - Poland	1992	16
EC - Portugal	1972	11
EC - Romania	1993	26
EC - San Marino	2002	29
EC - Serbia SAA	2008	29
EC - Slovak Republic	1992	16
EC - Slovenia	1997	16
EC - South Africa	2000	29
EC - Spain	1970	11
EC - Sweden	1972	13
EC - Switzerland and Liechtenstein	1973	30
EC - Switzerland Bilateral I Carriage of Goods and Passengers by Rail	2002	29
EC - Switzerland Bilateral I Free Movement of Persons	2002	29
EC - Switzerland Bilateral I Government Procurement	2002	29
EC - Switzerland Bilateral I Trade in Agricultural Products	2002	29
EC - Syria	1977	29
EC - Tunisia	1976	13

PTA	YEAR	MEMBERS
EC - Tunisia Association Agreement	1969	10
EC - Tunisia Euro-Med	1995	29
EC - Turkey	1963	16
EC - Turkey Customs Union	1996	29
EC - Vietnam	2016	29
EC - Yugoslavia	1973	13
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC)	1999	6
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS-CEEAC)	1983	11
Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL)	1978	3
Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS)	1975	16
Economic Cooperation Organization	1985	10
Ecuador - Mexico	1993	2
EFTA - Albania	2011	5
EFTA - Bosnia and Herzegovina	2015	5
EFTA - Bulgaria	1993	8
EFTA - Canada	2009	5
EFTA - Central American States	2014	7
EFTA - Chile	2004	5
EFTA - Colombia	2011	5
EFTA - Croatia	2002	5
EFTA - Czech Republic	1992	8
EFTA - Egypt	2007	5
EFTA - Estonia	1996	5
EFTA - Finland	1961	9
EFTA - Gulf Cooperation Council	2014	10
EFTA - Hong Kong	2012	5
EFTA - Hungary	1993	8
EFTA - Israel	1993	8
EFTA - Jordan	2002	5
EFTA - Korea	2006	5
EFTA - Latvia	1996	5
EFTA - Lebanon	2007	5
EFTA - Lithuania	1996	5
EFTA - Macedonia	2001	5
EFTA - Mexico	2001	5
EFTA - Montenegro	2012	5
EFTA - Morocco	1999	5
EFTA - Palestine	1999	5

PTA	YEAR	MEMBERS
EFTA - Peru	2011	5
EFTA - Poland	1993	8
EFTA - Romania	1993	8
EFTA - SACU	2006	9
EFTA - Serbia	2010	5
EFTA - Singapore	2003	5
EFTA - Slovak Republic	1993	8
EFTA - Slovenia	1995	5
EFTA - Spain	1979	8
EFTA - Tunisia	2005	5
EFTA - Turkey	1992	8
EFTA - Ukraine	2012	5
Egypt - Jordan	1967	2
Egypt - Jordan 1998	1998	2
Egypt - Morocco	1999	2
Egypt - Syria	1991	2
Egypt - Turkey	2007	2
El Salvador - Honduras - Taiwan	2008	3
El Salvador - Nicaragua Free Trade Area	1951	2
El Salvador - Panama	1970	2
El Salvador - Venezuela	1986	2
Equatorial Customs Union	1964	5
Estonia - Bulgaria	2002	2
Estonia - Faroe Islands	1998	2
Estonia - Hungary	1998	2
Estonia - Slovak Republic	1998	2
Estonia - Slovenia	1997	2
Estonia - Turkey	1998	2
Estonia - Ukraine	1996	2
Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC)	2000	6
Eurasian Economic Union	2015	5
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)	1953	6
European Community (EC)	1958	28
European Economic Area (EEA)	1994	31
European Free Trade Association (EFTA)	1960	8
Faroe Islands - Finland	1992	2
Finland - German Democratic Republic	1975	2
Finland - Hungary	1974	2

PTA	YEAR	MEMBERS
Finland - Latvia	1992	2
Finland - Lithuania	1992	2
Finland - Poland	1976	2
France - Monaco	1963	2
France - Tunisia Customs Union Convention	1955	2
Georgia - Kazakhstan	1999	2
Georgia - Russia	1994	2
Georgia - Turkey	2008	2
Georgia - Turkmenistan	2000	2
Georgia - Ukraine	1996	2
Georgia - Uzbekistan	1995	2
Ghana - Upper Volta	1961	2
Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP)	1989	44
Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA/PAFTA)	1998	17
Group of Three Auto Agreement	2004	3
Group of Three FTA	1995	3
Guatemala - Mexico	1984	2
Guatemala - Mexico 1999	1999	2
Guatemala - Panama	1974	2
Guatemala - Taiwan	2005	2
Guatemala - Venezuela	1985	2
Guinea - Morocco	1997	2
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)	1982	6
Honduras - Mexico	1984	2
Honduras - Panama	1973	2
Honduras - Venezuela	1986	2
Hong Kong - New Zealand	2010	2
Hungary - Israel	1998	2
Hungary - Latvia	2000	2
Hungary - Lithuania	2000	2
Hungary - Turkey	1998	2
Iceland - Bosnia and Herzegovina Agriculture	2015	2
Iceland - Canada Agriculture	2009	2
Iceland - Chile Agriculture	2004	2
Iceland - Colombia Agriculture	2014	2
Iceland - Egypt Agriculture	2007	2
Iceland - Faroe Islands	1993	2
Iceland - Faroe Islands 2006	2006	2

PTA	YEAR	MEMBERS
Iceland - Gulf Cooperation Council Agriculture	2014	7
Iceland - Israel Agriculture	1993	2
Iceland - Jordan Agriculture	2002	2
Iceland - Korea Agriculture	2006	2
Iceland - Lebanon Agriculture	2007	2
Iceland - Macedonia Agriculture	2001	2
Iceland - Mexico Agriculture	2001	2
Iceland - Peru Agriculture	2011	2
Iceland - Serbia Agriulture	2011	2
Iceland - Singapore Agriculture	2003	2
Iceland - Tunisia Agriculture	2005	2
Iceland - Turkey Agriculture	1992	2
Iceland - Ukraine Agriculture	2012	2
Iceland-Albania Agriculture	2011	2
Iceland-Montenegro Agriculture	2012	2
Iceland-Morocco Agriculture	1999	2
Iceland-Palestine Agriculture	1999	2
Iceland-SACU Agriculture	2006	6
India - Japan	2011	2
India - Korea	2010	2
India - Malaysia	2011	2
India - Maldives	1981	2
India - Nepal	1991	2
India - Singapore	2005	2
India - Sri Lanka	2001	2
India - Thailand	2004	2
Indonesia - Pakistan	2012	2
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)	1986	8
Iran - Syria	2006	2
Iraq - Jordan	1953	2
Iraq - Jordan 2002	2002	2
Iraq - United Arab Emirates	1977	2
Ireland - UK Free Trade Area	1965	2
Israel - MERCOSUR	2007	5
Israel - Mexico	2000	2
Israel - PLO	1994	2
Israel - Poland	1998	2
Israel - Romania	2001	2

PTA	Year	Members
Israel - Slovak Republic	1997	2
Israel - Slovenia	1998	2
Israel - Turkey	1997	2
Japan - Indonesia	2008	2
Japan - Malaysia	2005	2
Japan - Mexico	2005	2
Japan - Mongolia	2015	2
Japan - Peru	2011	2
Japan - Philippines	2008	2
Japan - Singapore	2002	2
Japan - Switzerland	2009	2
Japan - Thailand	2007	2
Japan - Vietnam	2009	2
Jordan - Kuwait	1986	2
Jordan - Kuwait 2001	2001	2
Jordan - Lebanon	1992	2
Jordan - Lebanon 2002	2002	2
Jordan - Libya	1992	2
Jordan - Morocco	1999	2
Jordan - PLO	1995	2
Jordan - Qatar	1980	2
Jordan - Saudi Arabia	1962	2
Jordan - Singapore	2005	2
Jordan - Sudan	1966	2
Jordan - Sudan 2003	2003	2
Jordan - Turkey	2009	2
Kazakhstan - Kyrgyzstan	1995	2
Kazakhstan - Ukraine	1998	2
Korea - Turkey	2012	2
Kuwait - UAE	1972	2
Kyrgyzstan - Moldova	1996	2
Kyrgyzstan - Russia	1993	2
Kyrgyzstan - Ukraine	1998	2
Kyrgyzstan - Uzbekistan	1998	2
Laos - Thailand	1991	2
Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA)	1960	11
Latin American Integration Association (ALADI)	1981	13
Latvia - Norway	1992	2

PTA	Year	Members
Latvia - Poland	1999	2
Latvia - Slovak Republic	1997	2
Latvia - Slovenia	1996	2
Latvia - Sweden	1992	2
Latvia - Switzerland	1992	2
Latvia - Turkey	2000	2
Latvia - Ukraine	1995	2
Latvia Ukraine Agriculture	1998	2
Lebanon - Syria	1993	2
Lithuania - Norway	1992	2
Lithuania - Poland	1997	2
Lithuania - Slovak Republic	1997	2
Lithuania - Slovenia	1997	2
Lithuania - Sweden	1991	2
Lithuania - Switzerland	1992	2
Lithuania - Turkey	1998	2
Lome I	1976	54
Lome II	1981	67
Lome III	1985	78
Lome IV	1990	84
Macedonia - Moldova	2004	2
Macedonia - Romania	2004	2
Macedonia - Turkey	2000	2
Macedonia - Ukraine	2001	2
Malawi - South Africa	1990	2
Malawi - Zimbabwe	1995	2
Malaysia - Pakistan	2008	2
Malaysia - Turkey	2015	2
Mano River Union (MRU)	1973	4
Mauritania - Morocco	1986	2
Mauritius - Pakistan	2007	2
Mauritius - Turkey	2011	2
Melanesion Spearhead Group (MSG)	1993	4
MERCOSUR - Bolivia	1997	5
MERCOSUR - Chile	2000	6
MERCOSUR - India	2009	6
MERCOSUR - Mexico	2002	6
MERCOSUR - Mexico Auto	2002	6

PTA	YEAR	MEMBERS
MERCOSUR - Peru	2005	6
MERCOSUR - Southern African Customs Union (SACU)	2004	10
MERCOSUR services	1997	5
Mexico - Nicaragua	1985	2
Mexico - Nicaragua 1997	1998	2
Mexico - Panama	1985	2
Mexico - Panama 2014	2014	2
Mexico - Paraguay	1993	2
Mexico - Triangulo Norte	2001	4
Mexico - Uruguay	1986	2
Mexico - Uruguay 2003	2003	2
Moldova - Bosnia and Herzegovina	2004	2
Moldova - Romania	1995	2
Moldova - Serbia and Montenegro	2004	2
Moldova - Ukraine	2005	2
Montenegro - Turkey	2008	2
Morocco - Saudi Arabia	1966	2
Morocco - Tunisia	1999	2
Morocco - Turkey	2006	2
Morocco - UAE	2003	2
Namibia - Zimbabwe	1993	2
New Zealand - Singapore	2001	2
New Zealand - Taiwan	2013	2
New Zealand - Thailand	2005	2
Nicaragua - Panama	1973	2
Nicaragua - Venezuela	1986	2
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)	1994	3
Norway - Albania Agriculture	2011	2
Norway - Bosnia and Herzegovina Agriculture	2015	2
Norway - Canada Agriculture	2009	2
Norway - Chile Agriculture	2004	2
Norway - Colombia Agriculture	2014	2
Norway - Egypt Agriculture	2007	2
Norway - Faroe Islands	1993	2
Norway - Gulf Cooperation Council Agriculture	2014	7
Norway - Israel Agriculture	1993	2
Norway - Jordan Agriculture	2002	2
Norway - Korea Agriculture	2006	2

PTA	Year	Members
Norway - Lebanon Agriculture	2007	2
Norway - Macedonia Agriculture	2001	2
Norway - Mexico Agriculture	2001	2
Norway - Montenegro	2012	2
Norway - Morocco Agriculture	1999	2
Norway - Palestine Agirulcture	1999	2
Norway - Peru Agriculture	2011	2
Norway - SACU Agriculture	2006	6
Norway - Serbia Agriulture	2011	2
Norway - Singapore Agriculture	2003	2
Norway - Tunisia Agriculture	2005	2
Norway - Turkey Agriculture	1992	2
Norway - Ukraine Agriculture	2012	2
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) AKA Treaty of Basseterre	1981	7
Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUUAM)	1997	5
Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUUAM) 2001	2001	5
Pacific Alliance	2012	5
Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA)	2006	11
Pakistan - Sri Lanka	2005	2
Palestine - Turkey	2005	2
Panama - Singapore	2006	2
Panama - Taiwan	2004	2
Paraguay - Venezuela	2008	2
Peru - Singapore	2009	2
Peru - Thailand	2005	2
Peru - Venezuela	2012	2
Poland - Faroe Islands	1999	2
Poland - Turkey	2000	2
Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States	1982	18
Program for Integration and Economic Cooperation (PICE)	1986	2
Protocol on Trade Negotiations (PTN)	1973	18
Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD)	1964	3
Romania - Turkey	1998	2
Russia - Ukraine	1994	2
Saudi Arabia - UAE	1978	2
Serbia - Romania	2006	2
Serbia - Turkey	2009	2

PTA	YEAR	MEMBERS
Singapore - Australia	2003	2
Singapore - Korea	2006	2
Slovak Republic - Slovenia	1993	2
Slovak Republic - Turkey	1998	2
Slovakia - Slovenia	2004	0
Slovenia - Macedonia	1996	2
Slovenia - Turkey	2000	2
South Africa - Zimbabwe	1965	2
South Africa Southern Rhodesia Customs Union	1948	2
South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA)	2006	7
South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA)	2008	8
South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA)	1995	7
South Korea - Peru	2011	2
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA)	1981	12
Southern African Customs Union (SACU)	2004	5
Southern African Development Community (SADC)	1992	15
Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)	1980	9
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)	1991	5
Switzerland - Albania Agriculture	2011	2
Switzerland - Bosnia and Herzegovina Agriculture	2015	2
Switzerland - Canada Agriculture	2009	2
Switzerland - Chile Agriculture	2004	2
Switzerland - Colombia Agriculture	2011	2
Switzerland - Egypt Agriculture	2007	2
Switzerland - Faroe Islands	1995	2
Switzerland - Gulf Cooperation Council Agriculture	2014	7
Switzerland - Israel Agriculture	1993	2
Switzerland - Jordan Agriculture	2002	2
Switzerland - Korea Agriculture	2006	2
Switzerland - Lebanon Agriculture	2007	2
Switzerland - Macedonia Agriculture	2001	2
Switzerland - Mexico Agriculture	2001	2
Switzerland - Montenegro	2012	2
Switzerland - Peru Agriculture	2012	2
Switzerland - SACU Agriculture	2006	6
Switzerland - Serbia Agriulture	2010	2
Switzerland - Singapore Agriculture	2003	2

PTA	YEAR	MEMBERS
Switzerland - Tunisia Agriculture	2005	2
Switzerland - Turkey Agriculture	1992	2
Switzerland - Ukraine Agriculture	2012	2
Syria - Turkey	2007	2
Taiwan - Nicaragua	2008	2
Tajikistan - Ukraine	2002	2
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement	2006	4
Treaty on the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)	2000	7
Tunisia - Turkey	2005	2
Turkey - Bosnia and Herzegovina	2003	2
Ukraine - Turkmenistan	1995	2
Ukraine - Uzbekistan	1996	2
United States - Albania	1998	2
United States - Australia	2005	2
United States - Bahrain	2006	2
United States - Chile	2004	2
United States - Colombia	2012	2
United States - Israel	1985	2
United States - Jordan	2001	2
United States - Korea	2012	2
United States - Morocco	2006	2
United States - Oman	2009	2
United States - Panama	2012	2
United States - Peru	2009	2
United States - Singapore	2004	2
United States - Vietnam	2001	2
Uruguay - Venezuela	2008	2
Yaounde I	1964	24
Yaounde II	1971	30

Notes: This list refers to all PTAs collected in the data and includes agreements that have been superseded, expired or continue to be enforced (as of 2015). Year refers to the date the agreement was signed and members refers to the greatest number of members recorded for the given PTA throughout its respective events. PTAs with a * indicate observations where the number of words are missing. The dataset drew on data from the World Bank, McGill's Preferential and Regional Trade Agreements Database, the World Trade Organization (which includes lists of all PTAs notified to the WTO), the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) database, the European Free Trade Association site, the US Trade Representative's site, as well as other case-specific sites to fill in missing PTAs that have been dissolved or superseded.

Part II: GATT Ministerial Negotiations Codebook

The following GATT/WTO Ministerial Meetings are included:
> 1994
> 1988 and the 1988 *spec meeting*
> 1982 and the 1982 *spec meeting*
> 1973

For each of the ministerial meetings, countries are recorded on how they speak for a given issue in the trade negotiations where,
> 0 = did not speak on the trade issue/trade instrument
> 1 = pushed *against* the trade issue/trade instrument
> 2 = commented on issue, but not directionally (or was explicitly noncommittal)
> 3 = pushed *for* the trade issue/trade instrument

States that are members in a custom union (e.g. European Community) are reported with their own delegate's statements as well as the statements of the union's representative where appropriate. In the event that the state's national minister chose to make a statement on an issue that was also discussed by the union's representative, the member state's individual statement takes precedence in the coding.

Trade Issues and Trade Instruments by Ministerial Meeting:

> 1994
> > v1 **Trade & The Environment:**
> > Should this issue be included in future WTO negotiations?
> > v2 **Labor Rights:**
> > Should this issue be included in future WTO negotiations?
> > v3 **Accession to WTO:**
> > Openness to new members
> > v4 **Agriculture:**
> > Satisfaction with UR agreement(s) on issue
> > v5 **Services:**
> > Satisfaction with UR agreement(s) on issue
> > v6 **Textiles:**
> > Satisfaction with UR agreement(s) on issue
> > v7 **Tropical Products:**
> > Satisfaction with UR agreement(s) on issue
> > v8 **DSM:**
> > Satisfaction with UR agreement(s) on issue and place in WTO
> > v9 **Human Migration:**
> > Should this issue be included in future WTO negotiations?
> > v10 **Differential treatment for LDCs:**
> > Getting this in the WTO and going forward

v11 **Net food importers:**
Agricultural trade & efficacy of food importers

v12 **Intellectual Property**
Satisfaction with UR agreement(s) on issue and place in WTO

v13 **China Accession:**
Opinion on China joining WTO

v14 **Trade & Development:**
Importance and efficacy of trade for development of LDCs

v15 **Trade & Monetary Problems:**
Need to consider monetary problems

v16 **Trade & Democracy:**
Importance of WTO & trade for democratization

v17 **Trade & Competition Policy:**
Satisfaction with UR agreement(s) on issue

v18 **Technical Assistance:**
Need to help LDCs in their trade

1988

v19 **Agriculture:**
Need for more eliminating barriers in the UR negotiations

v20 **Tropical Products:**
Satisfaction with progress in eliminating barriers in the UR negotiation

v21 **Intellectual Property:**
Need for agreement & (consistent) protection in the issue area

v22 **Trade-related Investment:**
Need for agreement in the issue area

v23 **Services:**
Need for agreement in the issue area

v24 **Textiles:**
Satisfaction with progress in eliminating barriers in the UR negotiations

v25 **DSM:**
Need to reform system in the Uruguay Round

v26 **Differential Treatment:**
Importance to keep in future trading system

v27 **Indebtedness:**
Need to consider debt of LDCs in trading systems

v28 **Trade & Environment:**
Need for agreement in issue area

v29 **Trade & Labor Rights:**
Need for agreement in issue area

v30 **Safeguards:**
Need for commitment to this in the final agreement

v31 **Subsidies:**
Satisfaction with progress in the Uruguay Round in the issue area

v32 **Multilateralism:**

Need for multilateral vs. regional/bilateral approaches
v33 **Standstill & Rollback:**
Satisfaction on commitments to these in the Uruguay Round
v34 **NTBs:**
Satisfaction with progress in the Uruguay Round in the issue area

1988 (spec meeting)
v35 **Bovine Meat:**
Support of the withdrawal of 1985 Canada & New Zealand proposal
v36 **International Dairy Agreement:**
Should the US be invited to observer to the agreement?
v37 **International Dairy Agreement:**
Should minimum prices on butter increase in September (New Zealand proposal)?
v38 **Spain & Portugal join EEC**
Favor the effect of their joining upon international trading system
v39 **Trade & Development**
Maintain commitment to the GSP and Part IV as priority

1982
v40 **MFN & Part IV**
Need to continue the most favored nation treatment of LDCs
v41 **Agriculture**
Need to open up/extend agriculture in subsequent negotiating rounds
v42 **Safeguards**
Should safeguards be strengthened?
v43 **DSM**
Need for adjustment and changes to strengthen mechanisms
v44 **Services**
Does this sector fall within the competency of GATT?
v45 **Textiles**
Should GATT assume priority for this sector after MFA?
v46 **Quantitative Restrictions**
Need for more commitment to reduce/eliminate quotas (and other core NTBs)
v47 **Structural Adjustment**
Is there a need to adjust trading policies for LDCs undergoing adjustment?
v48 **Subsidies**
Ongoing concern for government (export) subsidies in the GATT
v49 **Codes**
Satisfaction with "unilateral" context of plurality Codes
v50 **Standstill & Rollback**
Need to include in subsequent negotiating rounds
v51 **Tropical Products**
Does this sector fall within the competency of GATT?
v52 **Raw Materials/Natural Resources**

Need to focus attention on this sector within the GATT

v53 **Fisheries**
Treatment of fisheries in subsequent negotiating rounds

v54 **Multilateralism**
Danger of bilateralism to multilateral trading system

v55 **High Technology**
Should this area be included in subsequent negotiating rounds?

v56 **VERs**
Is this a dangerous coercive tool in trading system?

v57 **Indebtedness & LDCs**
Should indebted LDCs receive favorable treatment?

1982 (spec meeting)

v58 **International Dairy Agreement**
Satisfaction of members to agreement

v59 **Agriculture**
Should this sector fall within the competency of GATT in the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN)?

v60 **Tropical Products**
Should this sector fall within the competency of GATT in MTN?

v61 **Safeguards**
Do safeguards need to be changed in the MTN?

v62 **Part IV**
Should this be restructured in the MTN?

v63 **Services**
Should this sector fall within the competency of GATT in the MTN?

v64 **Textiles**
Should this sector fall within the competency of GATT in the MTN?

v65 **Indebtedness**
Need to consider debt for LDCs in trading relationships

v66 **Differential Treatment/MFN**
Need to recommit to differential treatment for LDCs

v67 **Most Favored Nation**
Need to recommit to most favored nation system in MTN?

v68 **Dispute Settlement Mechanism**
Need to restructure in the upcoming MTN?

v69 **Generalized System of Preferences**
Need to restructure in the upcoming MTN?

v70 **Structural Adjustment**
Need to include this issue in upcoming MTN?

v71 **Standstill & Rollback**
Need to commit to this in upcoming MTN?

1973

v72 **LDCs**
Importance of LDCs in MTN

v73 **Monetary System**
Should this issue be included in GATT negotiations?

v74 **Tariffs**
Need to reduce/eliminate tariffs toward harmonization

v75 **NTBs**
Need for further reductions in the upcoming MTN

v76 **Agriculture**
Should this issue be on the agenda in the MTN?

v77 **Draft Declaration**
Satisfaction and approval of the document

v78 **Tropical Products**
Should this issue be on the agenda in the MTN?

v79 **Globalized System of Preferences (GSP)**
Should this take special attention in the MTN?

v80 **Reciprocity**
Should LDCs be expected to have similar application of reciprocity toward them?

v81 **Textiles**
Should this issue be on the agenda in the MTN?

v82 **Safeguards**
Should this apply uniformly to countries in the GATT?
(i.e. not change the current procedures for LDCs vs. developed countries)

v83 **Primary Products**
Should this take special attention in the MTN?

Notes:

- China was an "observer" in the Ministerial Meetings (1982; 1988; 1994)
- Colombia was an "observer" in the Ministerial Meetings (1973)
- Costa Rica was an "observer" in the Ministerial Meetings (1973)
- Ecuador was an "observer" in the Ministerial Meetings (1973; 1982; 1988)
- El Salvador was an "observer" in the Ministerial Meetings (1973; 1988)
- Bolivia was an "observer" in the Ministerial Meetings (1973; 1982)
- Bulgaria was an "observer" in the Ministerial Meetings (1982)
- Hong Kong was an "observer" in the Ministerial Meetings (1982)
- Mexico was an "observer" in the Ministerial Meetings (1982)
- Sudan was an "observer" in the Ministerial Meetings (1982)
- Thailand was an "observer" in the Ministerial Meetings (1982)
- Venezuela was an "observer" in the Ministerial Meetings (1982)
- Russia was an "observer" to the Ministerial Meetings effective 1990 (acceded in 2012)
- Taiwan was an "observer" in the Ministerial Meetings until its accession (2002)
- Ukraine was an "observer" in the Ministerial Meetings until its accession (2008)
- Uzbekistan is an "observer" to the WTO

- **NTB Issues**:
  - v2 Labor Rights
  - v9 Human Migration

- o v17   Trade & Competition Policy
- o v22   Trade-related Investment
- o v29   Trade and Labor Rights
- o v30   Safeguards
- o v31   Subsidies
- o v34   NTBs
- o v42   Safeguards
- o v46   Quantitative Restrictions
- o v48   Subsidies
- o v55   High Technology
- o v56   Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs)
- o v61   Safeguards
- o v75   NTBs
- o v82   Safeguards

- **Substantive Issues for Purview of GATT**:
    - o v1   Trade and the Environment
    - o v4   Agriculture
    - o v5   Services
    - o v6   Textiles
    - o v7   Tropical Products
    - o v12   Intellectual Property
    - o v19   Agriculture
    - o v20   Tropical Products
    - o v21   Intellectual Property
    - o v23   Services
    - o v24   Textiles
    - o v28   Trade and the Environment
    - o v35   Bovine Meat
    - o v36   Dairy Agreement
    - o v37   Dairy Agreement
    - o v41   Agriculture
    - o v44   Services
    - o v45   Textiles
    - o v51   Tropical Products
    - o v52   Raw Materials/Natural Resources
    - o v53   Fisheries
    - o v58   Dairy Agreement
    - o v59   Agriculture
    - o v60   Tropical Products
    - o v63   Services
    - o v64   Textiles
    - o v73   Monetary System
    - o v76   Agriculture
    - o v78   Tropical Products
    - o v81   Textiles
    - o v83   Primary Products

Part III: Robustness Checks

This part of the web appendix presents various robustness checks for the analyses performed in the paper.

Tables 3 and 4 report the results of robustness checks of the analysis testing hypotheses 2A, 2B, and 2C using alternative measures of PTA complexity. Table 3 reports the results of analyses that operationalize PTA complexity using the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) measure of PTA depth based on a latent trade analysis of PTAs. Table 4 reports the results of analyses that operationalize complexity using DESTA's measure of depth based on an additive index of the number of provisions included in the PTA. Across all models, the results reported in the paper hold. First, PTAs among democracies are more complex than those forged among other groups of states (either all nondemocracies or a mix of democracies and nondemocracies). This is evidenced by the positive and statistically significant coeffiient associated with the "PTA among democracies" variable in Models 1 and 2 in Table 3 and Models 7 and 8 in Table 4. Second, the greater the percentage of democracies included in a PTA, the more complex that PTA is likely to be. This is evidenced by the positive and statistically significant coefficient associated with the "Proportion of democracies in PTA" variable in Models 3 and 4 in Table 3 and Models 9 and 10 in Table 4. Finally, even having just one democracy in the negotiations is likely to make a PTA more complex. A positive and statistically significant coefficient is associated with the "PTA with at least one democracy" variable in Models 5 and 6 in Table 3 and Models 11 and 12 in Table 4. Regardless of whether complexity is measured using the PTA's word count (as in the paper), DESTA's latent trait analysis of PTA depth (Table 3), or DESTA's additive index of PTA provisions (Table 4), our argument about democracies' effect on PTA complexity holds.

Table 5 also reports the results of a robustness check of the analysis testing hypotheses 2A, 2B, and 2C. These models cluster the standard errors by PTA instead of year. The results reported in the paper hold, as described in the results reported in Table 3 and 4. A positive and statistically significant coefficient is associated with the democracy measures across all six models clustering standard errors on PTA instead of year, as reported in Table 5.

Tables 6 and 7 report the results of a robustness check of all analyses in the paper using a loose definition of democracy rather than a strict one. The strict definition used in the paper codes a state as being a democracy if its Polity score is greater than 6. This follows Tir (2010). The loose definition used here codes a state as a democracy if its Polity score is greater than 0, following Simmons and Danner (2010). Even using this looser definition of democracy, the results reported here are consistent with those reported in the paper. In Models 13 and 14 in Table 5, a positive coefficient is associated with the "Democracy" variable. While it does not reach statistical significance in Model 14, it is significant at the 95 percent confidence level in Model 13. This provides evidence that democracies are more likely to push for NTBs to be included in trade agreements. In Models 15 and 16 in Table 5, a positive and statistically significant coefficient is associated with the "Democracy" variable, showing that democracies are more likely to try to push a greater number of issues

into trade agreements. The models in Table 6 provide support for our argument about how these varying strategies are likely to affect the complexity of trade agreements. PTAs forged among democracies are likely to be more complex than other PTAs, as illustrated by the positive and statistically significant coefficient associated with the "PTA among democracies" variable in Models 17 and 18. The greater the percentage of democracies included in a PTA, the more complex it is likely to be, as evidenced by the positive and statistically significant coefficient associated with the "Proportion of democracies in PTA" variable in Models 19 and 20. Finally, having at least one democracy is associated with more complex agreements, as shown by the psotive and statisticlaly signifiant coefficient associated with teh "PTA with at least one democracy" variable in Models 21 and 22. Regardless of whether democracy is measured with a strict definition of looser definition, our argument about the strategies democracies are likely to use in the negotiation of trade agreements and the effect those strategies have on the resulting agreements' complexity holds.

Overall, the robustness checks reported here provide additional support for the argument presented in the paper.

Table 3: Complexity of PTAs Among Democracies; DESTA latent trait analysis measure for complexity

DV: DESTA latent trait analysis measure of PTA depth

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
PTA among democracies	0.716**	0.577**				
	(0.085)	(0.091)				
Proportion of democracies in PTA			0.952**	0.888**		
			(0.096)	(0.132)		
PTA with at least one democracy					0.802**	0.546**
					(0.099)	(0.134)
Average GDP per capita (ln)		0.514**		0.448**		0.538**
		(0.070)		(0.069)		(0.067)
Africa region		0.065		0.134		0.102
		(0.096)		(0.104)		(0.105)
Americas region		0.192		0.144		0.210
		(0.146)		(0.142)		(0.144)
Asia region		-0.040		0.002		-0.022
		(0.082)		(0.083)		(0.084)
Europe region		0.124		0.018		0.088
		(0.136)		(0.132)		(0.142)
Number of PTA members		0.014**		0.018**		0.010**
		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)
PTA with EU		-0.564**		-0.909**		-0.654**
		(0.130)		(0.169)		(0.161)
Constant	-0.344**	-5.118**	-0.753**	-4.796**	-0.894**	-5.632**
	(0.100)	(0.586)	(0.084)	(0.568)	(0.091)	(0.558)
Observations	620	581	620	581	620	581
R^2	0.097	0.319	0.134	0.326	0.077	0.296
F statistic	70.37	44.29	98.28	53.56	65.76	36.71
prob > F	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered by year.

Table 4: Complexity of PTAs Among Democracies; DESTA index measure for complexity

DV: DESTA index measure of PTA depth

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
PTA among democracies	1.151**	0.946**				
	(0.181)	(0.177)				
Proportion of democracies in PTA			1.543**	1.379**		
			(0.184)	(0.231)		
PTA with at least one democracy					1.194**	0.843**
					(0.157)	(0.231)
Average GDP per capita (ln)		1.056**		0.960**		1.098**
		(0.149)		(0.147)		(0.140)
Africa region		0.251		0.347		0.291
		(0.197)		(0.213)		(0.219)
Americas region		0.220		0.149		0.278
		(0.250)		(0.248)		(0.248)
Asia region		-0.013		0.055		-0.006
		(0.174)		(0.186)		(0.187)
Europe region		-0.542**		-0.701**		-0.557**
		(0.200)		(0.195)		(0.202)
Number of PTA members		0.017		0.021*		0.009
		(0.010)		(0.011)		(0.011)
PTA with EU		-0.352		-0.887**		-0.495
		(0.277)		(0.327)		(0.326)
Constant	1.904**	-7.635**	1.235**	-7.190**	1.096**	-8.474**
	(0.160)	(1.277)	(0.118)	(1.241)	(0.139)	(1.204)
Observations	656	616	656	616	656	616
R^2	0.071	0.281	0.097	0.281	0.044	0.259
F statistic	40.57	24.90	70.08	44.49	57.80	21.71
prob > F	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

$* \ p < 0.10$, $** \ p < 0.05$

Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered by year.

Table 5: Democracies and the Complexity of PTAs

DV: number of words in PTA (in thousands)

	Model 13 PTA among democracies	Model 14 PTA among democracies	Model 15 Mixed PTAs	Model 16 Mixed PTAs	Model 17 At least one democracy	Model 18 At least one democracy
PTA among democracies	5.595** (2.408)	6.585** (2.232)				
Proportion of democracies in PTA			7.184** (2.976)	9.041** (2.866)		
PTA with at least one democracy					9.091** (1.571)	5.784** (1.966)
Average GDP per capita (ln)		4.362** (1.008)		3.779** (1.033)		4.347** (1.020)
Africa region		1.870 (2.427)		2.210 (2.604)		1.132 (2.593)
Americas region		7.903** (2.846)		7.979** (2.757)		9.055** (2.826)
Asia region		-2.506 (2.023)		-2.197 (2.085)		-2.589 (2.123)
Europe region		-14.159** (2.480)		-14.544** (2.518)		-13.955** (2.493)
Number of PTA members		0.227* (0.122)		0.252** (0.122)		0.174 (0.115)
PTA with EU		5.318 (3.805)		1.727 (3.925)		5.133 (3.733)
Constant	11.866** (1.247)	-26.119** (8.445)	8.798** (1.773)	-23.899** (8.470)	4.851** (0.850)	-29.437** (8.307)
Observations	649	599	649	599	649	599
R^2	0.010	0.234	0.011	0.231	0.009	0.220
F statistic	5.40	12.39	5.83	12.68	33.47	12.73
prob > F	.020	.000	.016	.000	.000	.000

Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered by PTA.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table 6: Democracies Pushing NTB Issues and Pushing of Any Issue in GATT Negotiations; Loose measure of democracy

DV: percent of NTBs/issues pushed

	Model 19 Pushing NTBs	Model 20 Pushing NTBs	Model 21 Pushing Any Issue	Model 22 Pushing Any Issue
Democracy	0.060**	0.025	0.091**	0.031**
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.013)
EU member		-0.024		0.160**
		(0.033)		(0.020)
ASEAN member		-0.017		0.108**
		(0.048)		(0.026)
Andean Community member		-0.041		-0.024
		(0.050)		(0.031)
GDP per capita (ln)		0.032**		0.022**
		(0.009)		(0.005)
Constant	0.110**	-0.142**	0.152**	-0.024
	(0.020)	(0.071)	(0.014)	(0.044)
Observations	386	385	391	390
R^2	0.072	0.107	0.162	0.368
F statistic	7.40	5.66	18.70	27.79
prob > F	.000	.000	.000	.000

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$
Standard errors in parentheses.
Negotiation (year) fixed effects included in models.

Table 7: Complexity of PTAs Among Democracies, Loose definition of democracy

DV: number of words in PTA (in thousands)

	Model 23	Model 24	Model 25	Model 26	Model 27	Model 28
PTA among democracies	6.967**	7.075**				
	(2.781)	(1.622)				
GDP per capita (ln)		4.838**		4.409**		4.648**
		(1.357)		(1.322)		(1.379)
Africa region		2.791**		2.632**		1.332
		(1.238)		(1.251)		(1.312)
Americas region		7.630**		8.340**		8.861**
		(2.360)		(2.272)		(2.272)
Asia region		-2.260*		-2.424*		-2.966**
		(1.238)		(1.309)		(1.408)
Europe region		-14.819**		-14.603**		-14.427**
		(3.158)		(3.130)		(3.210)
Number of PTA members		0.240**		0.238**		0.177**
		(0.082)		(0.083)		(0.080)
PTA with EU		5.763**		2.570		5.149**
		(1.656)		(1.739)		(1.764)
Proportion of democracies in PTA			8.883**	9.015**		
			(2.965)	(1.890)		
PTA with at least one democracy					8.104**	8.574**
					(1.695)	(2.146)
Constant	10.850**	-31.352**	6.901**	-30.749**	5.456**	-34.769**
	(0.695)	(10.905)	(1.383)	(10.887)	(1.435)	(11.591)
Observations	649	599	649	599	649	599
R^2	0.019	0.241	0.013	0.230	0.004	0.221
F statistic	6.28	10.90	8.97	9.88	22.87	9.98
prob > F	.016	.000	.004	.000	.000	.000

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered by year.