Popular Opposition to International Organizations: How Extensive and What Does this Represent?

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Abstract: This paper investigates popular opposition towards international organizations (IO), asking two questions. First, how extensive is this opposition and has it been getting stronger or weaker over time? Second, what explains this growing popular opposition to IOs, especially when the mass public knows little about them? Using survey data from the International Social Survey Programme's National Identity module, fielded across multiple countries in 1995, 2003, and 2013, it reports that on average and within most countries, citizen attitudes about IOs have become less positive over time. To explain these attitudes, this paper argues that citizens tend to group things that appear as "international" such as cross-border economic flows and IOs. While citizens might feel positively or negatively about these international factors, this grouping implies that they view them similarly, based on what they can feel from the international level related to their job and income. Thus, less (more) skilled citizens who are hurt by (who benefit from) economic globalization should express more negative (positive) views about IOs. Controlling for cultural attitudes socialized through education, we find that skill is a statistically significant and substantively strong predictor of IO attitudes. We also show how this individual-level skill difference gets larger in countries that are more or less-favorably exposed to economic globalization.

Within many democratic countries, there appears to be a new wave of political populism that includes opposition to a variety of international organizations (IOs) and agreements. As evidence on this point, the winner of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election successfully mobilized voters on such a platform, and the Trump administration's subsequent withdrawals in 2017 from both the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Paris climate agreement represent early steps consistent with an anti-IO agenda. More recently at the APEC summit in Vietnam, President Trump declared that "[w]hat we will no longer do is enter into large [international] agreements that will tie our hands, surrender our sovereignty and make meaningful enforcement practically impossible."[1] Indeed, before assuming office, Donald Trump also spoke in favor of leaving the World Trade Organization (WTO),[2] described the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as "obsolete,"[3] and identified the United Nations (UN) as "just a club for people to get together, talk and have a good time."[4]

Popular opposition to IOs is clearly not unique to the United States. In June 2016, almost 52 percent of the electorate across the United Kingdom voted in a referendum to exit the European Union (EU). And in France, Marine Le Pen campaigned in the French Presidential elections on a platform that also included a possible EU exit, although she was ultimately defeated in May 2017, revealing societal resistance to this populist agenda. But Euroskepticism nonetheless appears on the rise in most EU countries, including in Germany where 48 percent of its citizens reported

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[1] http://news.morningstar.com/all/dow-jones/us-markets/201711103875/trump-declares-new-world-trade-order-update.aspx (accessed November 11, 2017).

[2] http://thehill.com/policy/finance/289005-trump-suggests-leaving-wto-over-import-tax-proposal (accessed September 4, 2017).

[3] Michael R. Gordon and Niraj Chokshi. "Trump Criticizes NATO and Hopes for 'Good Deals' With Russia." *New York Times* January 15, 2017.

[4] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4067588/Donald-Trump-says-United-Nations-just-club-people-good-time.html (accessed September 4, 2017).

unfavorable attitudes about this regional IO, despite the obvious German political and economic power within it.[5]

One could certainly construct a detailed set of case studies designed to explain popular opposition to particular IOs in individual countries (e.g., why so many Americans opposed the TPP, why so many citizens in the United Kingdom voted to leave the EU, etc.). But focusing on these specific trees risks missing a larger forest of popular opposition to a variety of IOs across many countries. Thus, in this paper, we consider the more general pattern of anti-IO attitudes among the mass public, asking two related questions. First, how extensive are these anti-IO attitudes and have they been getting stronger or weaker over time? Second, how can we explain this popular opposition to IOs, especially when the mass public appears to know relatively little about specific international institutions like the WTO and the UN?[6]

To answer the first question, we make use of survey data from the International Social Survey Programme's (ISSP) National Identity module, which was fielded across 23 countries in 1995, 34 countries in 2003, and 32 countries in 2013.[7] This module contains a set of opinion questions related to three different dimensions of international organizations (enforcement, compliance, and national sovereignty). We find that for all dimensions, citizen attitudes in most countries have become less positive over time, consistent with a growing popular opposition to IOs. On this basis, societal opposition to IOs represents an important cross-national phenomenon that

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[5] Oliver Wright. "Euroscepticism on the rise across Europe as analysis finds increasing opposition to the EU in France, Germany and Spain." *Independent* June 7, 2016.

[6] Using a 2016 population-based American sample, Bearce and Cook (forthcoming) report that only 36 percent of respondents are willing to report themselves as familiar with the World Trade Organization and only 55 percent as familiar with the United Nations.

[7] http://www.gesis.org/issp/modules/issp-modules-by-topic/national-identity/ .

needs to be explained: why is there so much popular resistance, even hostility, towards international institutions?

Arguably, institutional theories from International Relations (IR) provide a minimum of explanatory power. Consider the regimes/institutions debate that began in the early 1980s between the grand IR theories (Krasner 1983). Per institutionalist theory, IOs could facilitate international cooperation through a variety of mechanisms, including reduced transaction costs, information provision, and a longer shadow of the future (e.g., Keohane 1984). But realists countered that due to a lack of centralized enforcement power, IOs actually create little, if any, international cooperation, and when it appears otherwise, a powerful state is acting behind or within the IO consistent with its own national interests (e.g., Mearsheimer 1994).

Not only do these two grand theories have little to say about individual-level attitudes, but it also becomes hard to see why citizens would oppose international regimes even when we try to extrapolate their logic downward. Perhaps citizens do not favor much involvement with IOs per the realist logic (i.e., they are ineffective in facilitating much international cooperation), but realism provides little explanation for broad popular opposition beyond the belief that the dues paid to various IOs exceed their contribution to international cooperation. And, of course, if citizens believe the institutionalist logic that IOs enhance international cooperation, then they would be expected to favor and not oppose them.

Constructivist theory, looking at which states effectively created these inter-governmental organizations and in whose national interests these international regimes tend to operate, perhaps offers more explanatory power (e.g., Murphy 1994). Per this constructivist logic, it is not hard to understand why citizens in smaller and poorer countries might oppose IOs: their policies largely reflect the interests of the large and powerful states that created them (e.g., U.S. dominance in the IMF leads to painful structural adjustment conditions). But even if this logic helps to explain citizen

attitudes in weaker countries, it offers much less value in explaining anti-IO attitudes *in more powerful countries*. Why should citizens in the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom, for example, hold anti-IO attitudes when their governments arguably dominate, even control, many of these international regimes?

To answer our second question - how can we explain popular opposition to IOs, especially within the more advanced industrial countries? – we draw upon theory from political-economy behavior. Stated simply, our argument is that citizen attitudes about IOs map largely onto their attitudes about economic globalization, defined as the freer flow of good and services (i.e., international trade) and factors of production (e.g., labor and capital) across national borders. Economic globalization creates winners and losers among individuals within a national economy, and the latter set tends to include the less skilled, especially in the advanced industrial democracies. Citizens may not know much about specific IOs, but they associate them generally with international economic forces that they can feel at least indirectly. Individuals who potentially benefit from economic globalization, namely the more skilled, should thus hold more favorable attitudes about IOs. Conversely, the less skilled who are potentially hurt by international immigration, international trade, and international capital mobility would be expected to have less favorable IO attitudes.

This understanding leads to a series of testable hypotheses. The first is that pro-IO attitudes should be positively correlated with education, even when controlling for nationalist and globalist attitudes that might be socialized through education (an alternative explanation for a positive relationship between pro-IO attitudes and educational attainment). The second hypothesis seeks to exploit variation at the national-level, proposing that the skill difference at the individual-level should be influenced by the country's exposure to the forces of economic globalization, namely immigration, trade openness, and direction of capital flows.

Using a composite measure of IO attitudes drawn from the most recent wave (2013) of the ISSP's National Identity module, we find support for these hypotheses. Even when controlling for attitudes about nationalism and cosmopolitanism that may be socialized through education, skill is positively associated with a more favorable attitude about IOs. Indeed, this education effect is stronger than any other material variable, stronger than political partisanship, and stronger than nationalism in explaining IO attitudes. We also find that this observed difference in IO attitudes between more and less skilled individuals increases in countries with more immigrants, decreases in countries with greater trade protection, and also decreases in countries experiencing greater investment inflows. These results cannot be easily explained by cultural attitudes that have been socialized through education; instead, they offer further evidence that the mass public thinks about IOs based on their experience with economic globalization.

This understanding has some important policy implications. For those who believe that intergovernmental organizations offer an important mechanism to achieve greater international cooperation and stability in a variety of issue-areas, addressing citizen opposition to these structures stands as an important task ahead. Our results suggest that one way to reduce popular resistance to IOs might come from addressing citizen concerns about economic globalization. Arguments to the mass public about the various benefits of IOs are not likely to be persuasive unless they are accompanied by policies (e.g., worker retraining and unemployment compensation) to address their economic vulnerability to international economic shocks. We recognize that achieving the latter represents a very difficult political task, but it may be both a necessary and sufficient condition to halt rising populism against international organizations.

1. How much Popular Opposition to IOs?

Our efforts to document citizen attitudes towards IOs in order to answer the query above requires 1) a cross-national survey repeated over time to assess trends with 2) questions about international regimes, broadly defined. Concerning the latter, a question about a specific IO could be misleading in this effort since it may reveal attitudes about a single international regime that are inconsistent with broader attitudes about international agreements and institutions.[8] In this regard, one needs to be concerned about a phenomenon similar to the one observed in American politics where citizens express support for their particular Congressperson but then report non-support for Congress as an institution (Fenno 1978).

The International Social Survey Programme's National Identity module fits both of the criteria specified above. Regarding the first, it was fielded across 23 countries in 1995, 34 countries in 2003, and 32 countries in 2013 with approximately one thousand respondents per country in each wave. It is important to state, however, that the same set of countries does not appear in each wave and, even when they do, the respondents are not necessarily the same. Hence, it is not a true panel survey, but the large sample size for each country should facilitate a comparison across waves to assess trends.

In terms of the second criteria, the National Identity module includes three general questions about "international bodies" and "international organizations" repeated across the waves, although only the first question below appeared in the first wave (1995). Thus we can only assess a trend for the second two questions by comparing the responses in 2003 with those in 2013. All three IO

[8] In fact, Kaya and Walker (2014), using the 2000 Asia-Europe Survey, report results showing "that individual confidence in different international organizations, such as the WB [World Bank] and the WTO, has similar impacts on the dependent variable", concluding that "individuals are not discriminating in their opinions about different organizations when assessing each international organization" (ibid 833). Their conclusion offers an alternative justification for using questions about IOs on a more general basis.

questions (listed below) ask respondents how much they "agree or disagree with the following statement". For each question, the respondents have the same five options (not including "Can't choose" or "No answer, refused"): Agree strongly / Agree / Neither agree nor disagree / Disagree / Disagree strongly.

1. For certain problems, like environment pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions.

2. In general, [COUNTRY] should follow the decisions of international organizations to which it belongs, even if the government does not agree with them.

3. International organizations are taking away too much power from the [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] government.

These three questions have desirable properties in that they not only concern IOs on a general basis, they also potentially tap into different dimensions related to international regimes. The first concerns the legitimacy of IO enforcement, the second considers the desirability of compliance with IO decisions, and the third queries about an IO threat to national sovereignty. Given the wording of these questions, we treat agreeing with the first and second and disagreeing with the third as being consistent with a pro-IO attitude. Correspondingly, we find a general positive correlation among agreeing with the first question (labeled *IO Enforcement*), agreeing with the second question (labeled *IO Compliance*), and disagreeing with the third (labeled *IO Threat*). But the bivariate correlations among these attitudinal variables do not exceed 0.2, suggesting that they are capturing different dimensions related to IO attitudes.

Having discussed their desirable properties, it is also important to describe how they may be problematic in terms of their wording and discuss the bias that this question wording is likely to induce among respondents. The most problematic in this regard is the first question with both its prime about "environment pollution" and the tendency of respondents to agree (and not to disagree) with interview statements (Couch and Kenniston 1960, Bachman and O'Malley 1984).

Both of these factors should induce a pro-IO bias since we expect most respondents to be against pollution (and therefore in favor of international bodies) and to be more willing to agree (rather than disagree) with any statement. The second question is also likely to create a pro-IO bias but only due to this second factor: the tendency of respondents to agree, which is the response that we treat as being pro-IO for this question. Conversely, the third question is problematic in the opposite direction: in order to express a favorable attitude about IOs, the respondent must disagree with the statement. Hence, the wording of the third question is likely to create an *anti*-IO bias. Based on these bias considerations, we expect respondents should, on average, appear to be the most pro-IO in terms of the first question (*IO Enforcement*) and the least pro-IO in terms of the third (*IO Threat*).

Table 1 presents, by country/question/wave, the percentage of respondents that expressed a pro-IO attitude by agreeing (either strongly or weakly) with *IO Enforcement* and *IO Compliance* and by disagreeing (either strongly or weakly) with *IO Threat*. These calculations exclude those who responded either "Can't choose" or "No answer, refused", so the pro-IO percentages in Table 1 would have been even smaller had we included these respondents. This table contains a lot of information, requiring us to begin with a discussion of its organization. The rows sort by country with the columns sorting by question and wave. The columns are grouped by question, showing each wave for that question, to make it easier to assess trends over time for each query. As mentioned above, only the *IO Enforcement* query was part of the module in all three waves, so it includes three columns. Both the *IO Compliance* and *IO Threat* questions were limited to the 2003 and 2013 waves, so they have only two columns.

The most important row in Table 1 comes at the top where we present the cross-national average for each question in each wave. Here one can observe that for *all three questions*, the percent of respondents expressing a pro-IO attitude has declined over time. And if one is concerned that the cross-national average in each column cannot be directly compared (despite the very large

sample size, which is often greater than 40,000 total respondents) because they include somewhat different countries in each wave, then it is important to note that much the same pattern appears within most country rows: a declining percentage of respondents expressing a pro-IO attitude for each question. There are certain exceptions, most notably the Philippines on all three questions. But the percentage of respondents expressing a pro-IO attitude rarely grows over time in the more advanced industrial democracies (the United States being an exception on *IO Compliance* and *IO Threat*).

One might argue that even if the trend is negative, a majority of respondents still expressed a positive attitude at least in terms of the first dimension (*IO Enforcement*) in all three waves. But we have already discussed how this query was strongly biased in a pro-IO direction based on both its "pollution" prime and the tendency of respondents to agree with interview statements. This latter consideration also suggests that the small percentage for the third query (*IO Threat*) disagreeing with this statement (24% in 2003 and 21% in 2013) likely overstates the popular opposition to IOs, or understates the extent of pro-IO attitudes. But even the second query (*IO Compliance*) with its weak pro-IO bias (based on the tendency of respondents to agree) still shows that only a minority of respondents is willing to express a pro-IO attitude (40% in 2003 and 37% in 2013). Indeed, among the countries surveyed in 2013, only the India and Mexico samples reveal a majority positive attitude in terms of *IO Compliance*. And in terms of *IO Threat* (and recognizing its downward bias), there is no country where a majority of respondents express a positive IO attitude in 2013 (with only the Venezuela sample showing a positive attitude in 2003).

On the basis of this evidence across countries and over time, we argue that societal opposition to IOs, especially in the more advanced industrial democracies, represents a growing phenomenon that needs to be explained. Indeed, it could even be argued based on this evidence that the median voter in most countries currently holds an attitude that is at least non-supportive of,

if not actually opposed to, international organizations. How can we account for this trend towards less positive attitudes about international regimes within the mass public?

2. Explaining IO Attitudes

Before offering our response to the question posed above, it is important to address why answering this question even matters. Perhaps societal opposition to IOs was relatively unimportant in the 20th century when international politics was conducted largely by elites, who held mostly positive attitudes about international regimes, with little corresponding input from the mass public even in more democratic countries (Jacobs and Page 2005, Gilens and Page 2014). The domestic ratification of signed international agreements, required in most democracies, sometimes brought these international commitments closer to citizens as voters. But if citizens were not so broadly opposed and not so easy to mobilize by a smaller set of anti-IO elites, then domestic ratification was a high probability political event.

But these circumstances appear to be changing in the 21st century. Making new international commitments and even maintaining existing ones may now require pro-IO elites to address these concerns within the mass public instead of simply trying to work around them (as was often possible before). But addressing citizen concerns about international regimes requires us to first understand on what basis citizens are becoming more opposed. Is this fundamentally an opposition to international law coming to overrule national sovereignty? Is this opposition based more on a lack of state power and the perceived inability to control the decision-making within IOs? Or is this growing citizen opposition to international organizations a different form of popular resistance to economic globalization?

The Argument

We argue here that this citizen opposition to IOs is indeed based largely on concerns about

economic globalization. From the outset, we recognize this argument may not appear as particularly counter-intuitive since international trade, a key feature of economic globalization, includes many prominent inter-governmental organizations (e.g., the WTO, the EU, the North American Free Trade Agreement). But this fact alone cannot establish the relationship between IO attitudes and concerns about economic globalization writ large since most citizens appear to know very little either about international regimes or about international trade (Eichenberg 2016; Holsti 2004; Bauer, Pool and Dexler 1968). And even if it seems obvious that ill-informed citizens would nonetheless make some connection between IOs and various international economic forces, this possibility still needs to be established, especially in a new research program on populist nationalism as it relates to international organizations. In this regard, it is important to consider what we should be able to observe *if* the variation in IO attitudes is driven largely by the forces of economic globalization. Our primary goal in this subsection will be to offer a set of testable hypotheses.

Our argument that citizen attitudes about international organizations map largely onto their attitudes about economic globalization is not based on individuals being able to understand the connection between IOs and the various globalized economic flows. Indeed, such an argument would be problematic for at least two different reasons. First, it requires a level of knowledge that most members of the mass public simply do not seem to possess (Hiscox 2006, Guisinger 2009). People typically learn about international economics and international organizations in college, and based on our ISSP survey data, a majority of respondents do not even attend college, much less complete it. Second, if citizens had more knowledge about international economics and organizations, then they might come to realize that at least two key features of economic globalization, namely international capital and labor mobility, are not strongly facilitated or regulated by IOs (unlike for international trade). International labor mobility lacks much regulation or even

coordination at the international level (Hollifield 2000),[9] being governed largely by policies set and enforced at the national level.[10] Conversely, international capital mobility emerged despite an international agreement at the Bretton Woods conference to constrain it (Goodman and Pauly 1993) and remains largely unregulated at the international level (Frieden 2006, 463-4; Rodrik 2011, 263-6). Based on this understanding, citizens hurt by international labor and capital flows might even be expected *to favor* (and not to oppose) IOs as a possible means to help redistribute international migration pressures away from their country and/or regulate international capital movements.

Instead, our argument is based on citizen ignorance about these various international economic flows and the presence (or absence) of international organizations related to them. We do assume that citizens can, at least indirectly, feel international economic pressure, especially as it relates to their job and income. But they cannot clearly relate this job/income pressure to *specific* international flows (either trade, immigration, or capital flows) or to *specific* IOs. From this ignorance, we argue that citizens largely tend to group things that appear as "international" or "foreign" such as cross-border flows and international institutions of all types (including, but not limited to, economic IOs). While they might feel positively or negatively about various international factors, this grouping implies that they should view them similarly, based on what they can feel from the international level, namely as it relates to their job and income. Citizens who are hurt by economic globalization should thus not only view these various international economic flows in an

[9] As Triandafyllidou (2017, 215) described the International Organization of Migration: "There is no formal institutionalised framework for the governance of international migration in the way for instance that it exists for trade…. Institutions like the International Organization for Migration (IOM) while transnational in nature are mainly service providers depending on individual states for their services." As Thomas (2016, 899) similarly discussed, "the International Organization of Migration (IOM)… [is] not a treaty-based organization (like the UN or World Trade Organization (WTO)), despite the name, but an agency established by governments for the purpose of managing migrant resettlement and return."

[10] The obvious and important exception here is the EU's free movement of workers, which regulates immigration policy *among EU member-states*. But each EU member-state sets its own national immigration policy vis-à-vis non-member-states.

unfavorable light, they should also express more negative views about international organizations. Conversely, citizens who are either better positioned to adjust to external economic shocks or actually benefit from economic globalization should have more favorable attitudes about IOs.

This argument clearly implies a correlation among attitudes related to various international factors. But showing that international attitudes correlate with other international attitudes is not a particularly interesting or compelling test for our argument (Fordham and Kleinberg 2012). So instead we consider how a *material* factor, helping to identify whether an individual is more or less advantaged by the various flows related to economic globalization, might influence attitudes towards IOs. Especially in more developed national economies, individuals with greater education arguably benefit more from economic globalization. This is especially true per a factoral framework where a country successfully trades from production using its abundant factors with human capital, or education, being a relatively abundant factor in most advanced industrial democracies (Alt et al. 1996). Correspondingly, individuals with less skill, or education, are arguably disadvantaged not only by free trade but also by immigration given the low-skill composition of the global labor pool (Docquier et al. 2011; Dumont, Spielvogel, and Widmaier 2010). Indeed, if we believe that higher-skill workers could shift down to lower-skill positions when they lose their job, but lower-skill workers cannot shift up to higher-skill positions, then individuals with more education are arguably better positioned to absorb global economic shocks even in less developed national economies.

Since we assume that individuals feel international economic pressure based on their skill level with more educated individuals generally experiencing greater benefits or fewer costs associated with international trade, international labor mobility, and international capital mobility, we also expect education to influence individual-level attitudes about international organizations in a similar direction. We thus advance our first hypothesis (H1) concerning the effect of skill: *individuals with more (less) education should hold more (less) favorable attitudes about international organizations.*

Since H1 only takes advantage of the variation at the individual-level based on skill, but we assume that individuals can feel national-level pressure related to economic globalization, we also offer a second general hypothesis (H2) that exploits national-level differences: the education effect on attitudes about international organizations should increase in countries that are more exposed or less-favorably exposed to economic globalization. Since H2 is written generally, we need to restate it for the three specific features related to globalization (e.g., international labor mobility, international trade, and international capital mobility). In terms of international labor mobility, we posit H2a: *the education effect on attitudes about international organizations should increase (decrease) in countries with more (less) immigrants.* In terms of international trade, we expect the following (H2b): *the education effect on attitudes about international organizations should increase (decrease) in countries that have more (less) open trade policies.*

Since capital mobility can be considered a structural feature of the international political economy (Andrews 1994), meaning that all countries are basically exposed on this dimension, the more interesting variation concerns the net direction of capital flows: in or out of the national economy. Inward capital flows indicate investment, potentially bringing jobs to lower skilled workers. Conversely, outward capital flows, including off-shoring/out-sourcing, have the reverse effect, jeopardizing the employment and income of lower skilled workers. We thus advance H2c: *the education effect on attitudes about international organizations should increase (decrease) in countries with lesser (greater) inward investment.*

The Model

We test these four hypotheses (H1, H2a, H2b, and H2c) using data from the most recent (2013) wave of the ISSP's National Identity module, which asked respondents across 32 countries all three IO queries (*IO Enforcement*, *IO Compliance*, and *IO Threat*). Since these queries arguably capture different dimensions but use the same response scale (with the *IO Threat* responses inverted so that more favorable opinions of international organizations in each dimension are all associated with

larger numbers), we simply take their average value following Mansfield and Mutz (2009), effectively giving each question the same weight, to create our primary dependent variable labeled *Pro-IO*.

Our primary independent variable is *Education*, a 7-point ordinal indicator of one's level of education: no formal=0/ primary school=1/ lower secondary=2/ upper secondary=3/ post-secondary but non-tertiary=4/ lower-level tertiary=5/ upper-level tertiary=6.[11] With this material independent variable, we are trying to capture individual-level vulnerability to a variety of external economic shocks with the expectation that less economic vulnerability, or more *Education*, should be positively associated with *Pro-IO* attitudes. We recognize that education is an imperfect and noisy measure of this concept, but this fact is more likely to create a Type II error, or false negative. A bigger concern, and one more likely to create a Type I error (false positive), is that education, however measured, is also likely correlated with pro-international socialization (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006).

Since there is no way to clean socialization from our *Education* variable, we need to control for both positive and negative attitudes related to the international level that might be socialized in or out through education. We thus include two attitudinal variables as controls. Based on the expectation that education may socialize individuals to be less nationalistic, and thus more favorable to internationalism, we first control for *Nationalism* using the respondent's answer to the following query: "I would rather be a citizen of [COUNTRY] than of any other country in the world."[12] Second, based on the expectation that education may directly socialize pro-international, or global, values, we also control for *Cosmopolitanism* using the respondent's answer to the following query: "I feel more like a citizen of the world than of any country."[13]

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[11] GESIS 2015, 202.

[12] GESIS 2015, 43.

[13] GESIS 2015, 97.

We recognize that IO attitudes may also be strongly determined by partisanship, with the expectation that in the current populist environment, those on the political right, especially the far right, should be more opposed to international organizations regardless of their economic vulnerability. We thus include three partisan dummy variables: *Leftist* indicating those who reported as voting for a left-wing party in the last general election, *Rightist* indicating those who reported as voting for a non-fascist right-wing party in the last general election, and *Far Right*, separating out those who reported as voting for a fascist party in the last general election.[14]

Since *Education* is not randomly assigned to respondents, we also need to control for a set of material factors that might select individuals into different levels of educational attainment. These begin with *Income*, indicating the respondent's household income, measured in terms of 2013 American dollars, calculated from national currency units using its exchange rate versus the American dollar. Next we include *Employed*, a dichotomous variable indicating if the respondent is currently working. Our material independent variables also include *Age,* indicating the respondent's age in 2013, and *Male*, a dummy variable coded as 1 for respondents who reported as identifying with this gender. Finally, *Urban* is a dummy variable coed as 1 for respondents who report as living in an urban area.

Our base specification also includes the national-level variables that will later be interacted with *Education* to test the three components of H2. To proxy the extent of immigration into the national economy, we measure the country's immigration stock as a percent of the total population in 2010, the closest year prior to the administration of this survey instrument (in 2013) since these data are only available every five years (World Bank 2016). This national-level variable is labeled *Immigrant Stock*. To operationalize trade openness, we use the weighted most favored nation (MFN)

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[14] GESIS 2015, 350.

tariff rate across all products in 2013 (World Bank 2016). Larger values of this national-level *Tariff Rate* variable indicate more trade protection and smaller values indicates less.

Finally, to capture capital flows into the national economy, we focus on inward direct and other investment as a share of GDP in 2013, the year this survey instrument was administered (International Monetary Fund 2016). More positive value for *Investment Inflows* indicate greater capital inflows in terms of foreign direct investment and other investment (primarily bank loans), the two investment categories that can be most directly linked to job creation (unlike more speculative portfolio investment). A negative value for *Investment Inflows* indicates capital outflows associated with these investment categories. Descriptive statistics for these variables (and others to be discussed later) are reported in Table 2.

Testing H1

Table 3 presents our estimates of *Pro-IO* attitudes testing the first hypothesis that individuals with more education should hold more favorable attitudes about international organizations. The first model (3.1) includes all of the right-hand side variables described above estimated with country random effects (with country fixed effects, we will lose the national-level variables). Consistent with H1, *Education* is positively signed (0.032) and statistically significant with greater than 99 percent confidence. Furthermore, the effect of *Education* on *Pro-IO* attitudes is substantively large. Using the results from model 3.1, the second column of Table 3 provides the estimated effect of a one standard deviation increase in each independent variable. Using this metric, not only is the effect of *Education* larger than that of any other material variables (*Income*, *Employed*, *Age*, *Male*, and *Urban*), its substantive impact is greater than any of the partisanship variables (*Leftist*, *Rightist*, and *Far Right*) and also stronger than the attitudinal control *Nationalism*. Among the individual-level variables, only *Cosmopolitanism* shows a larger substantive effect than *Education*. Indeed, its strong association with *Pro-IO* should not be surprising given that both variables are attitudes about the international level,

and we expect to observe a high correlation when an attitude is regressed on another similar attitude (Fordham and Kelinberg 2012).

In model 3.2, we present a second estimate of *Pro-IO* attitudes, this time including country fixed effects instead of random effects. As noted above, the three national-level variables (*Immigrant Stock*, *Tariff Rate*, and *Investment Inflows*) drop from the model since they are perfectly collinear with the fixed effects. But one can observe how the individual-level coefficients are almost identical with either random or fixed effects. Most importantly for H1, the *Education* coefficient does not change through three decimal places. Consistent with these results, a Hausman test suggests that we should prefer the more efficient random effects specification, which will also allow us to retain the national-level constitutive terms when they are interacted with individual-level *Education* to test H2a, H2b, and H2c below.

In response to these results, one might argue that even with the attitudinal control variables, *Education* still picks up on socialized attitudes about IOs and not primarily on individual-level vulnerability to international economic shocks. But our second set of hypotheses are designed to isolate the effect of these external shocks on the national economy based on the expectation that the positive *Education* effect on *Pro-IO* attitudes should increase in countries that are more exposed (or less-favorably) exposed to economic globalization. Indeed, if *Education* functions simply as a proxy for socialized attitudes about IOs, then we would not expect to find much support for the three versions of our second hypothesis. Stated differently, it is hard to conceive of a purely attitudinal story that would account for the same set of expected results.

Testing H2

Having already described our three national-level variables (*Immigrant Stock*, *Tariff Rate* and *Inward Investment*), we restate the three manifestations of H2 in terms of these specific variables

below. These hypotheses will be tested by interacting individual-level *Education* with each of these national-level variables, creating cross-level multiplicative terms. So that the individual-level *Education* constitutive term can be clearly interpreted (i.e., the effect of *Education* when a single national-level variable is equal to zero), these hypotheses are considered sequentially in Table 4: model 4.1 tests H2a, model 4.2 tests H2b, and model 4.3 tests H2c. And to retain the national-level constitutive term, we estimate these models using a random effects specification.

H2a: The positive relationship between *Education* and *Pro-IO* attitudes should increase in countries with a greater *Immigrant Stock*.

H2b: The positive relationship between *Education* and *Pro-IO* attitudes should attenuate (i.e., move in a negative direction) in countries with a higher *Tariff Rate*.

H2c: The positive relationship between *Education* and *Pro-IO* attitudes should also attenuate in countries receiving more *Investment Inflows*.

The interaction results in Table 4 are best demonstrated visually. So in Figure 1, we plot the marginal effect of *Education* on *Pro-IO* attitudes from model 4.1 for the full range of *Immigrant Stock* within our 32-country sample. At the mean value for this national-level variable (8.63), the marginal effect of *Education* is 0.032, which is identical to the average effect of *Education* observed in Table 3. But at our maximum value for *Immigrant Stock* (26.5), this marginal effect more than doubles to 0.076 consistent with H2a. And at both points, these marginal effects are statistically significant with greater than 99 percent confidence. Conversely, this skill effect on *Pro-IO* attitudes largely disappears with an *Immigration Stock* that is less than 3 percent of the total population, which accords with our expectation that in countries with fewer immigrants, less skilled citizens should be less opposed to IOs compared to more skilled citizens, thus resulting in a smaller attitude difference based on education.

In Figure 2, we plot the marginal effect of *Education* across the full range of *Tariff Rate* values in our 32-country sample from model 4.2. At the mean value for this national-level variable (3.32),

the marginal effect of *Education* is 0.033, which is very close to the average effect of *Education* observed in Table 3. But in countries with a more open trade policy, the *Education* effect grows; indeed, when *Tariff Rate* is equal to zero, the marginal effect of *Education* more than doubles to 0.079. Conversely, in national contexts with a more closed trade policy, where lower-skilled citizens should feel a lesser threat to their job and income from this specific feature of economic globalization, the marginal effect of *Education* on *Pro-IO* attitudes not only diminishes consistent with H2b, but it loses statistical significance as the average *Tariff Rate* approaches five.

Finally in Figure 3, we plot the marginal effect of *Education* from model 4.3 across the full range of country values for *Investment Inflows*. At the mean value for this national-level conditioning variable in our 32-country sample (-0.17), the marginal effect of *Education* is 0.032, which is again identical to the average *Education* effect observed in Table 3. With more outward flowing capital (i.e., more negative values for *Inward Investment*), this marginal effect grows, more than doubling to 0.070 at our sample's minimum value (-15.39) for this national-level variable. Conversely, the positive relationship between *Education* and *Pro-IO* attitudes attenuates with larger values of this conditioning national-level variable, becoming statistically insignificant when *Investment Inflows* is greater than four percent of GDP, consistent with H2c.

Globalization Attitudes

Although not explicitly stated as hypotheses in this paper, our argument about how citizens tend to group "international things," especially IOs and cross-border economic flows, implies that not only should attitudes about international organizations be correlated with attitudes about various dimensions of economic globalization (e.g., immigration, trade, and foreign investment), but that the same combination of factors predicting *Pro-IO* attitudes should also predict more favorable attitudes related to economic globalization. Stated differently, we should be able to observe that *Education*

and its interaction with a nation-level feature related to economic globalization should be associated with more favorable attitudes related to that feature in the same way that it was associated with *Pro-IO* attitudes in Table 4. Making this demonstration is especially important given our argument that citizens form their IO attitudes based largely on the *economic* pressure or opportunity that they can feel from the international level.

Fortunately, the ISSP's National Identity module has questions related to all three dimensions of economic globalization that were considered as national-level factors in Table 4. To capture citizen attitudes about immigration openness, we use the query "Do you think the number of immigrants to [COUNTRY] nowadays should be..."[15] to create an attitudinal dependent variable labeled *Favor Immigration*, which was coded as 4 if respondents selected increased a lot, 3 if increased a little, 2 if it should remain the same, 1 if decreased a little, and 0 if they chose decreased a lot. For citizen attitudes about trade openness, we take their response to the statement that "[COUNTRY] should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy"[16] to create a dependent variable labeled *Favor Free Trade*, coded as 4 if they disagreed strongly, 3 if they disagreed, 2 if they neither agreed nor disagreed, 1 if they agreed, and 0 if they agreed strongly with this statement.

Finally, to capture attitudes related to foreign investment, we use the query "Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in [COUNTRY]"[17] to create the dependent variable labeled *Favor Foreign Investment*, coded as 4 if they disagreed strongly, 3 if they disagreed, 2 if they neither agreed nor disagreed, 1 if they agreed, and 0 if they agreed strongly with this statement. Descriptive statistics for these attitudinal dependent variables appear at the top of Table 2. We also show in

[15] GESIS 2015, 121.

[16] GESIS 2015, 79.

[17] GESIS 2015, 85.

Table 5 how *Pro-IO* attitudes, our dependent variable in Table 4, are positively and significantly correlated with favorable attitudes about these three different dimensions of economic globalization (*Favor Immigration*, *Favor Free Trade*, and *Favor Foreign Investment*).

In Table 6, we follow the same sequence of models based on the right-hand side specification as shown in Table 4, but now replacing the *Pro-IO* attitude dependent variable with the economic attitude that corresponds with each globalization feature. This structure thus matches *Favor Immigration* (as the dependent variable) with *Immigrant Stock* (as the interaction variable) in model 6.1, *Favor Free Trade* with *Tariff Rate* in model 6.2, and *Favor Foreign Investment* with *Investment Inflows* in model 6.3. The goal here is to show how the same interaction of *Education* with the national-level globalization variable predicts favorable economic policy attitudes in much the same way as they predicted *Pro-IO* attitudes in Table 4. Comparing across tables, one can observe how the signs on the *Education* constitutive and interaction terms are the same in Table 6 as they were in Table 4. And where they were significant in Table 4, they are also significant in Table 6.

With this demonstration in Table 6, one can better see how the results in Table 4 are consistent with the proposition that *Pro-IO* attitudes effectively represent attitudes about economic globalization with the more skilled, and therefore less vulnerable (or more favorably exposed), having more favorable attitudes. Thus, as citizens feel about economic globalization based on their skill level, they also react to IOs as another albeit less tangible "international thing."

A Placebo Test

In arguing that IO attitudes are based largely on the economic pressure or opportunity that citizens can feel from the international level according to their skill level, it is also important to demonstrate that these attitudes are not similarly based on national power, or vary according to realist capability indicators. We consider this something like a placebo test: with an argument that

IO attitudes are derived from international economic factors, it is useful to show that they are not formed so strongly from international security considerations.

To make this demonstration, we use two different measures of national power. The first is the logged value of Gross Domestic Product measured in current US dollars (*GDPln*) using data from the World Bank (2016). The second is the country's Composite Index of National Capability score (*CINC*), measuring national power based on total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditures (Correlates of War 2017). Descriptive statistics for these two national-level variables are presented at the bottom of Table 2.

In Table 7, we add in sequence - since these two national power measures are collinear - each national power measure, interacting it with *Education* to parallel the structure used in Table 4 to estimate *Pro-IO* attitudes. In model 7.1, one can observe that while the *GDPln* constitutive terms is weakly significant, its interaction with *Education* is strongly insignificant, showing how the skill effect on IO attitudes does not vary based on national power considerations. And in model 7.2, we can see much the same non-result when *Education* is interacted with national-level *CINC* as an alternative power measure. In short, the effect of *Education* on *Pro-IO* attitudes does not vary based on just any national-level considerations. It does vary with those related to economic globalization as shown in Table 4, but not with those related to national power as demonstrated in Table 7.

3. Discussion

This paper has investigated opposition within the mass public towards IOs, asking two related questions. First, how extensive is this popular opposition and has it been getting stronger or weaker over time? Second, what explains this growing opposition to IOs, especially when the mass public appears to know very little about most IOs? Using survey data from the International Social

Survey Programme's National Identity module, fielded across multiple countries in 1995, 2003, and 2013, we have reported that on average and within most countries, citizen attitudes about IOs have indeed become less positive over time, consistent with an anti-international populist trend in many developed democracies.

To explain these IO attitudes, we have argued that citizens tend to group things appearing as "international," including cross-border economic flows and international organizations. While citizens could feel positively or negatively about these various international factors, this grouping implies that they should view them similarly, based on what they can feel from the international level as it relates to their job and income. This logic implies that less skilled citizens who are hurt by economic globalization should hold more negative views about IOs. Conversely, more skilled citizens who benefit from economic globalization should express more positive IO attitudes.

Controlling for cultural attitudes socialized through education, we found that skill is a statistically significant and substantively strong predictor of more positive IO attitudes. We also hypothesized that this individual-level skill difference should get larger in countries that are more exposed and/or less-favorably exposed to economic globalization pressures. Consistent with this expectation, we also found that our education effect increased in countries with more immigration, deceased in countries with greater trade protection, and decreased in countries with more investment inflows. These results are hard to explain simply in terms of attitudes that might be socialized through education; instead, they suggest that individuals based their attitudes about IOs largely on their experiences related to economic globalization. In this sense, IO attitudes largely reflect attitudes about economic globalization.

We now conclude with a discussion of the policy implications associated with these results. First, it seems clear that the mass public is increasingly mobilized against international organizations, contrary to the view of many elites that these structures provide both greater economic stability and

military security since the end of, and even during, the Cold War. It seems unlikely that the mass public was ever highly supportive of IOs, but their general ignorance and indifference allowed elites to create, maintain, and even upgrade international institutions, facilitating cooperation among sovereign nation-states over the last half-century or more. But in the 21st century, the relative indifference of the mass public towards IOs appears to be turning into more active hostility. And if the continued participation of democratic governments in IOs requires a reduction of hostility within, if not active support among, the mass public, then elites will need to address citizen concerns about these international regimes.

But second, if we understand citizen opposition to IOs as being driven by their concerns about economic globalization, then we might have a very rudimentary map for addressing this opposition. The understanding that IO opposition among the less skilled comes primarily from the negative job and income effects that they can feel from the various cross-border economic flows related to globalization suggests that elitist arguments about IOs (e.g., they reduce transaction costs and provide greater information, facilitating decentralized enforcement and lengthening the shadow of the future) are not likely to be persuasive when directed at the mass public. Instead, elites will need to address citizen concerns about economic globalization. Perhaps this can be done through worker training and retraining programs and through greater unemployment insurance and other compensation programs for those disadvantaged by economic openness (Hays, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt 2005; Scheve and Slaughter 2007). Achieving greater economic compensation for the less skilled may be a very difficult political task in many advanced industrial democracies with significant budget constraints, but it may nonetheless be a necessary condition for addressing citizens concerns about IOs. The latter is the bad news, but the good news is that it may also be a sufficient condition for addressing these concerns: if citizens, especially those with less skill, can feel better about

migration, free trade, and capital mobility, then this may be enough to help them feel better about other "international" things such as IOs.

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Table 1: Percentage of Respondents Expressing a Favorable IO Attitude.

	% agreeing with *IO Enforcement*			% agreeing with *IO Compliance*		% disagreeing with *IO Threat*	
Wave:	1995	2003	2013	2003	2013	2003	2013
N=	28,654	40,414	40,196	40,526	38,834	39,540	38,269
Cross-national average	75	72	64	40	37	24	21
Australia	66	65		28		25	
Austria	76	71		31		23	
Belgium			74		44		21
Bulgaria	78	75		52		17	
Canada	78	69		34		28	
Chile		80		48		19	
Croatia			63		28		17
Czech Republic	74	68	64	33	28	19	11
Denmark		64	60	51	43	24	20
Estonia			36		35		18
Finland		58	53	32	27	23	19
France		85	75	43	45	24	19
Georgia			57		33		28
Germany	88	80	74	35	31	36	34
Hungary	87	76	59	32	38	26	16
Iceland			66		49		35
India			68		58		15
Ireland	68	67	58	39	28	32	21
Israel		61	56	45	48	22	19
Italy	92						
Japan	70	69	66	35	24	30	17
Korea (South)		78	78	32	35	9	14
Latvia	59	52	40	36	33	25	13
Lithuania			57		29		18
Mexico			72		53		21
Netherlands	72	80		38		25	
New Zealand	72	55		24		26	
Norway	71	67	54	42	36	22	22
Philippines	64	72	74	23	26	35	42
Poland	80	69		40		24	
Portugal		77	79	48	38	18	10
Russia	87	82	65	53	42	22	22
Slovakia	65	71	61	29	28	18	13
Slovenia	82	80	71	49	49	24	20
South Africa			66	48	41	25	20
Spain	81	64	71	46	44	20	11
Sweden	82	73	64	39	33	19	20
Switzerland		79	71	47	37	46	31
Taiwan		80		50		17	

Turkey			59		45		20
United Kingdom	74	68	57	26	24	14	10
United States	73	62	62	30	32	31	35
Uruguay		81		34		17	
Venezuela		83		74		53	

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics.

	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.
Attitudinal DVs				
Pro IO	2.14	0.64	0	4
Favor Immigration	1.39	1.12	0	4
Favor Free Trade	1.57	1.18	0	4
Favor Foreign Investment	1.76	1.32	0	4
Individual-level IVs				
Education	3.39	1.59	0	6
Nationalism	2.10	1.04	0	4
Cosmopolitanism	1.80	1.22	0	4
Leftist	0.23	0.42	0	1
Rightist	0.23	0.42	0	1
Far Right	0.02	0.12	0	1
Income (thousands)	51	216	0	14340
Employed	0.55	0.50	0	1
Age	47.09	16.84	15	96
Male	0.49	0.50	0	1
Urban	0.43	0.50	0	1
National-level IVs				
Immigrant Stock	8.63	6.56	.22	26.5
Tariff Rate	3.32	1.88	0	7.38
Investment Inflows	-0.17	5.98	-15.39	8.06
GDPln	26.56	1.70	22.99	30.30
CINC	0.02	0.03	0.00003	0.14

Table 3: Models of *Pro-IO* testing H1.

	3.1	Effect of 1 S.D. increase	3.2
Education	0.032*** (0.008)	0.05	0.032*** (0.008)
Nationalism	-0.015* (0.008)	0.02	-0.016* (0.008)
Cosmopolitanism	0.079*** (0.010)	0.10	0.078*** (0.010)
Leftist	0.026 (0.022)	0.01	0.025 (0.022)
Rightist	-0.061** (0.029)	0.03	-0.062** (0.029)
Far Right	-0.315*** (0.083)	0.04	-0.318*** (0.083)
Income	0.00004*** (0.00001)	0.01	0.00004*** (0.00001)
Employed	0.013 (0.014)	0.01	0.013 (0.014)
Age	-0.007* (0.0004)	0.01	-0.0007* (0.0004)
Male	0.001 (0.011)	0.0005	0.001 (0.011)
Urban	0.053*** (0.016)	0.03	0.053*** (0.016)
Immigrant Stock	-0.0007 (0.004)	0.0005	
Tariff Rate	0.025*** (0.009)	0.05	
Investment Inflows	-0.003 (0.004)	0.02	
R^2	0.049		0.045
Estimation:	Random Effects		Fixed Effects

N=26,497.
Robust standard errors clustered on country.
Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two tailed).

Table 4: Random Effects Models of *Pro-IO* testing H2.

	4.1 H2a	4.2 H2b	4.3 H2c
Education	0.011 (0.012)	0.079*** (0.013)	0.031*** (0.007)
Nationalism	-0.015* (0.009)	-0.015* (0.009)	-0.015* (0.009)
Cosmopolitanism	0.079*** (0.010)	0.078*** (0.010)	0.078*** (0.010)
Leftist	0.026 (0.022)	0.027 (0.021)	0.026 (0.028)
Rightist	-0.063** (0.029)	-0.065** (0.028)	-0.062** (0.028)
Far Right	-0.313*** (0.083)	-0.310*** (0.082)	-0.311*** (0.083)
Income	0.00004*** (0.00001)	0.00004*** (0.00001)	0.00004*** (0.00001)
Employed	0.011 (0.014)	0.008 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)
Age	-0.0008** (0.0004)	-0.0009*** (0.0004)	-0.0008* (0.004)
Male	0.002 (0.011)	0.004 (0.0109)	0.002 (0.0104)
Urban	0.055*** (0.015)	0.054*** (0.016)	0.054*** (0.0157)
Immigrant Stock	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.0007 (0.0038)	-0.0004 (0.0038)
Tariff Rate	0.024*** (0.0097)	0.069*** (0.014)	0.023** (0.010)
Investment Inflows	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.006 (0.006)
Education Immigrant Stock*	0.0024* (0.0014)		
Education Tariff Rate*		-0.014*** (0.003)	
Education Investment Inflows*			-0.0025** (0.0011)
R^2	0.051	0.052	0.051

N=26,497.
Robust standard errors clustered on country.
Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two tailed).

Table 5: Bivariate Correlations between the Attitudinal Dependent Variables.

	Pro IO	*Favor Immigration*	*Favor Free Trade*	*Favor Foreign Investment*
Pro IO	1.00			
Favor Immigration	0.16***	1.00		
Favor Free Trade	0.06***	0.16***	1.00	
Favor Foreign Investment	0.10***	0.17***	0.30***	1.00

Table 6: Random Effects Models of Globalization Attitudes.

	6.1	6.2	6.3
DV:	*Favor Immigration*	*Favor Free Trade*	*Favor Foreign Investment*
Education	0.021 (0.018)	0.166*** (0.026)	0.058*** (0.012)
Nationalism	-0.067*** (0.013)	-0.181*** (0.011)	-0.170*** (0.012)
Cosmopolitanism	0.095*** (0.020)	-0.047*** (0.013)	-0.005 (0.017)
Leftist	0.090** (0.037)	-0.015 (0.029)	0.022 (0.033)
Rightist	-0.145*** (0.045)	0.031 (0.029)	-0.078** (0.035)
Far Right	-0.625*** (0.159)	-0.329*** (0.109)	-0.653*** (0.204)
Income	0.00002 (0.00002)	0.00005 (0.00005)	0.00004** (0.00002)
Employed	-0.008 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.019)	0.037* (0.021)
Age	-0.0010* (0.0007)	-0.0032*** (0.0007)	-0.004*** (0.001)
Male	0.034* (0.019)	0.133*** (0.025)	0.005 (0.020)
Urban	0.027 (0.030)	0.114*** (0.013)	0.068*** (0.025)
Immigrant Stock	-0.038*** (0.011)	-0.008 (0.009)	0.031* (0.018)
Tariff Rate	0.004 (0.044)	-0.018 (0.044)	-0.064 (0.052)
Investment Inflows	0.003 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.009)	0.0004 (0.0142)
Education Immigrant Stock*	0.006*** (0.002)		
Education Tariff Rate*		-0.026*** (0.007)	
Education Investment Inflows*			-0.008*** (0.002)
R^2	0.058	0.096	0.141
N	27,784	29,464	29,398

Robust standard errors clustered on country.
Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two tailed).

Table 7: More Random Effects Models of *Pro-IO*.

	7.1	7.2
Education	0.022 (0.127)	0.038*** (0.008)
Nationalism	-0.016** (0.008)	-0.016** (0.008)
Cosmopolitanism	0.079*** (0.010)	0.078*** (0.010)
Leftist	0.026 (0.022)	0.026 (0.022)
Rightist	-0.061** (0.029)	-0.061** (0.028)
Far Right	-0.315*** (0.083)	-0.313*** (0.083)
Income	0.00004*** (0.00001)	0.00004*** (0.00001)
Employed	0.013 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)
Age	-0.0007* (0.0004)	-0.0007* (0.0004)
Male	0.001 (0.011)	0.002 (0.010)
Urban	0.053*** (0.016)	0.053*** (0.016)
GDPln	0.023* (0.018)	
CINC		2.46 (1.74)
Education GDPln*	0.0004 (0.0049)	
Education CINC*		-0.424 (0.380)
R^2	0.049	0.047

N=26,497.
Robust standard errors clustered on country.
Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two tailed).

Figure 1: The Marginal Effect of *Education* Conditioned on *Immigrant Stock*.



Figure 2: The Marginal Effect of *Education* Conditioned on *Tariff Rate*.



Figure 3: The Marginal Effect of *Education* Conditioned on *Investment Inflows*.



The y-axis indicates the marginal effect. The x-axis indicates the value of the conditioning national-level variable. Dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. Diamonds on the bold marginal effect line indicates minimum, mean, and maximum value for the conditioning national-level variable from Table 2.