

# Keeping the Bad Guys Out? Democratization and the Accession Rules of International Organizations\*

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## Abstract

Democratizing states often form international organizations to solve their problems. In doing so, they face the question of institutional design. How do democratizing states design their international organizations? We analyze this question through the lens of accession rules. We argue that democratizing states have strong incentives to design organizations with strict accession rules. Such organizations are useful because they allow original members to regulate entry and signal their interest in cooperation to external audiences, such as established democracies. These functions are particularly useful for transitional democracies, given the important role that international organizations play in supporting their democratic consolidation. An empirical analysis of original data on accession rules in international organizations, 1965-2000, provides evidence for the hypotheses.

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# 1 Introduction

It is frequently claimed that democratization is linked to IO membership (Whitehead, 1996; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006). In particular, Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006, 141) emphasize how IO membership creates reputational signals due, in part, to the conditions imposed on membership: “Membership in IOs can help the leader of a democratizing country credibly commit to reform ... This mechanism stems from information provided by the organization about members’ actions, *conditions imposed by the organization for new members*, and the reputational impact of violating an IO’s rules” (emphasis added).

However, recent research has shown that democratizing states actually form their own organizations, rather than join existing ones (Poast and Urpelainen, 2013). Thus, are these new institutions still imposing strict conditions on IO membership and, if so, to what benefit? The signaling argument is clearly insufficient for explaining the choice of accession rules in IO *formation* by democratizing states. When forming an IO, democratizing states themselves need not meet the accession criteria. Instead, these rules will be imposed on other states. Therefore, the argument in Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) collapses.

Solving this puzzle is important for at least two reasons. First, it can shed light on *why* democratizing states create their organizations and, in turn, the governance problems faced by transitional democracies. Second, the analysis would contribute to research on the design of international institutions. According to scholars of rational design (Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, 2001), states design international institutions to solve cooperation problems. Analyzing the design features used by democratizing states reveals how these states seek to solve domestic problems, an issue previous design scholarship has largely ignored.

This article addresses the question of institutional design through the lens of *accession rules*. As Schneider and Urpelainen (2012) argue, accession rules are among the most important design features of any international institution. To a large extent, they determine the composition of the IO’s membership in the future. Lax accession rules encourage rapid expansion, while strict accession rules allow current members to be selective and impose conditions on new members. Over time, then, accession rules can be expected to have decisive effects on the policies that IOs formulate and

implement.

The theory we develop predicts that democratizing states have strong incentives to form organizations with *strict* accession rules, while they have little to gain from an IO that makes accession easy. An IO with strict accession rules allows democratizing states to maintain control of membership composition, which reduces the probability that autocracies opposed to democratization join the organization and sabotage its activities. At the same time, such an IO also emulates some of the most successful organizations formed by established democracies, such as the European Union. These two benefits – control of future membership and external legitimacy – can explain the choice of accession rules by democratizing states.

To test the argument, we collected data on the accession rules of all international organizations included in the Correlates of War dataset, 1965-2000. Based on the data for the over 300 organizations with available accession rules, it became clear that the most important barrier to accession are *voting rules*: the number of existing members that must approve a candidate's accession. While various conditions can be placed on membership, the only condition that ultimately matters is whether a sufficient number of existing members deem the candidate worthy. Explicit policy requirements are rare and geographic restrictions largely reflect the regional foci of organizations. In contrast, there is a lot of variation in how existing members vote on accession. To illustrate the important of voting rules, consider accession to the European Union. Schneider and Urpelainen (2012) highlight how, despite economically having one of the most advanced candidate states in the enlargement process, Slovenia's accession to the EU stalled in the early 1990s due to a dispute with Italy over expropriated Italian property in the border area. Although Italy had signed an international treaty to abstain from any demands, it nevertheless insisted on the return of the property in 1994 and vetoed negotiations on the association agreement. In doing so, Italy argued that Slovenian legislation on the purchase of land by foreigners was not in line with EU law. Slovenia's accession procedures could only proceed after Italy was satisfied with Slovenia's steps to rectify the dispute.

The results from the analysis support our theory. Democratization more than doubles the probability that a state forms an IO with strict accession rules, and the effect is statistically significant.

There is no such effect for forming an IO with lax accession rules or for joining an IO. Further analysis shows that when democratizing states form organizations with strict accession rules, they also achieve higher degrees of institutionalization more generally. Strict accession rules are used to govern and protect substantively important organizations that impose binding obligations on their members. Democratization results in the creation of organizations that matter.

The results bring together two important bodies of literature, one focusing on the IO-democratization relationship (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006; Poast and Urpelainen, 2013) and the other on institutional design (Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, 2001). The evidence shows that democratization induces states to create organizations with restricted entry. Accession rules allow democratizing states to create exclusive clubs for the governance of their domestic transition. Although scholars of institutional design have largely focused on international cooperation problems and students of democratization mostly neglected institutional design, our findings suggest that the two cannot be disentangled. Scholars of institutional design should consider the domestic context of design, and the literature on democratization can gain from investigating institutional design.

## **2 Democratization and the Choice of Accession Rules for International Organizations**

Building on Poast and Urpelainen (2013), we expect democratization to make countries form their own IOs. In doing so, they impose strict limitations on accession by new members. These limitations are useful because they allow democratizing states to maintain direct control over the membership composition of their organizations and signal their competence and identity as ‘real’ democracies to both domestic and external audiences.

### **2.1 Why Democratizing Countries Form International Organizations**

For several years, scholars of international relations thought that democratization makes countries join IOs (Moravcsik, 2000; Pevehouse, 2005; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006, 2008). This argument

is based on the idea that democratization creates demand for credible commitment to new policies that improve the economy and supply public goods to the electorate. Since IOs impose conditions on membership and constrain policy formulation, they would be one commitment mechanism that democratizing countries can use. Additionally, democratizing states gain from signaling their benign intent to domestic and external audiences. If a recently democratized state joins an IO, the requirements of membership increase the democratizing state's ability to pursue liberal political and economic reforms.

Empirical evidence does not support the original form of the theory. Poast and Urpelainen (2013) replicate the analysis in Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) but disaggregate the data between instances where states form versus join organizations. They find that democratization has no effect on joining, while it has a large, positive, and statistically significant effect on forming. They explain the new finding with reference to the idea that joining a desirable existing IO that imposes conditions on membership is difficult. For example, when East European countries sought membership in the European Union following the collapse of the Soviet Union, they had to wait for more than a decade for becoming full members.

The empirical evidence reported in Poast and Urpelainen (2013) supports the idea that democratizing countries fail to join existing organizations in great numbers because credible commitment carries a cost. If an existing IO can enforce policy commitments, it also extracts concessions for membership. This means that while the organization may be "fit" for serving the needs of the democratizing state, becoming a member is often not a "feasible" strategy. The alternative for democratizing states is to form their own organizations, and this they have done.

The association between democratization and IO formation raises the question of these organizations are designed. If democratizing countries form organizations because they cannot join the existing ones, they still have to design the rules to achieve their goals. It is intuitively clear why democratizing states would want to join organizations with strict accession rules, given that barriers to accession allow credible commitment and signaling. But this logic cannot be applied to the design of a new organization. Since the original members are not subject to accession rules for new accession candidates, the imposition of strict accession rules does not allow credible commitment,

or signaling thereof. We now explain why democratizing states nonetheless prefer strict accession rules.

## 2.2 Choice of Accession Rules

In explaining how democratizing countries design IOs, we adopt a strategic perspective (Schneider and Urpelainen, 2012; Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal, 2013). We assume democratizing countries design their organizations to achieve their political and economic goals, which are mainly defined by the need to govern the democratic transition (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). These goals shape the design of the IOs that democratizing countries form. In particular, they have important implications for the design of accession rules.

Accession rules are important because they determine the composition of the IO's membership. As democratizing states design organizations, they must somehow prepare for changes in their rules, operations, and policies over time. These changes depend, first and foremost, on the composition of the membership. IO decisions are made by their members, regardless of the relative importance of formal voting rules and informal governance (Steinberg, 2002; Stone, 2011).

As democratizing countries design their organizations, their main interest is in the management of their transition toward democratic consolidation. Since the process in focus is formation, it is not possible for democratizing countries to tie their own hands through strict accession rules. As founding members, they need not worry about the rules for future accession candidates. Therefore, the reason for the design of voting rules must lie elsewhere than in tying one's own hands for credible commitment.

To understand the choice of accession rules, it is useful to distinguish between lax and strict accession rules. The two have different implications for the operation and growth of a previously founded IO. We argue that democratizing countries should not have a particularly strong preference for lax accession rules, while they do have incentives to design strict accession rules.

To begin with, consider the case of lax accession rules. All else constant, an organization with lax accession rules leaves the door open for new members. Such an IO may be expected to grow rapidly and have a diverse composition of members. The consequence of leaving the door

open for new members is that the existing members cannot easily maintain their power within the organization. If membership is easy to attain, all kinds of states join the organization, with potentially detrimental consequences for cooperation (Schneider and Urpelainen, 2012). According to Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1998), the deepening of cooperation slows down in an IO as less and less enthusiastic states join it.<sup>1</sup>

For democratizing states, this is a problem. As previous research has shown, their interest in IO membership stems from the need to manage the transitional polity and achieve democratic stability (Pevehouse, 2005; Poast and Urpelainen, 2013). This is difficult if all kinds of states who do not have an interest in supporting their democratization are eligible as members.

The founding members of the South African Development Community (SADC) faced precisely this danger of dilution, as they feared the membership of South Africa. The SADC was established to replace the more narrowly focused Development Coordination Conference (DCC), whose members had been ruled by non-white regimes for a number of years and had actively opposed apartheid and non-majority rule in South Africa (Prunier, 2008). In 1992, seven of the DCC's 13 original members were undergoing democratic transitions. At the same time, while South Africa had abolished the apartheid laws, it was not scheduled to have democratic elections until 1994. Until these elections, the democratizing former members of the DCC could not trust that the white government of South Africa, that had a history of intervention in their domestic affairs, would respect their internal democratic transitions. While desiring to consolidate their trading cooperation through the SADC, the former DCC states "urged South Africa to speed its transition from white rule to democracy, which they set as the condition for South Africa's membership in their community" (The Globe and Mail, 1992). By avoiding lax accession rules, these countries insured that their goals would not be thwarted or impeded by a renegade South African membership.

Another problem with lax accession rules is that they may signal to external audiences a lack of commitment to the organization. If an IO maintains open doors to anyone, it does not mimic the most exclusive organizations that established democracies are forming, such as the European Union or NATO. Fears about the future composition of the IO's membership undermine its credibility

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<sup>1</sup>But see Gilligan (2004) for why the broader-deeper trade-off does not exist for all kinds of organizations and treaties.

and legitimacy, which means that the reputational benefits of forming the organization in the first place become dissipated.

**Hypothesis 1.** *Democratization has no effect on the probability that a country forms an IO with lax accession rules.*

Consider now strict accession rules. In an organization with strict accession rules, entry is restricted. Such an organization grows only if the existing membership explicitly consents to expansion, with the accession candidate meeting the criteria imposed by the existing members. Accession is only possible if the candidate meets the conditions imposed on membership by the existing members. Consequently, the body of members making future decisions can be controlled by the original members.

For democratizing states, this type of an organization is useful for two reasons. First, it allows the democratizing states to regulate entry. The democratizing state can, for example, invite established democracies as members to learn from them, while keeping autocracies out. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) have previously noted that democratizing states tend to generate IO memberships with organizations that have many established democracies as members. This form of preferential attachment can be attained when democratizing states form organizations with strict accession rules.

Second, an organization with strict accession rules emulates the most ambitious organizations that established democracies have formed. As sociologists working on “world polity” theories have noted, states tend to mimic globally legitimate or dominant organizational forms (Meyer et al., 1997). For democratizing states, the relevant source of legitimacy are established democracies.

The creation of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) demonstrates this reasoning. Following the end of the Cold War, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia wanted to democratize and expand their ties with the democratic states of Western Europe. In this period, these three countries had strong concerns over Russia’s reactions to their internal liberalization. Historical experience and current events suggested that Russia continued to wield significant power over these three states (Polish News Bulletin, 1991). At the same time, the countries of Western Europe were uncertain about the capacity of their democratizing eastern neighbors to participate in



the intra-European system. To allay these fears, the three Eastern European countries coordinated foreign policies – earning them the nickname of the Visegrad Triangle – and created CEFTA to serve as an indication of their competence to their Western neighbors. In more than its name, CEFTA mimicked EFTA (the European Free Trade Agreement of 1960), whose members had gradually been integrated into the European Economic Community (EEC). CEFTA’s original goal to serve as a stepping-stone for accession to the EEC still permeates this IO, whose website states today that “the Agreement provides an excellent framework for the Parties to prepare for EU accession, thus continuing the tradition of the original CEFTA, whose founding members are now in the EU.” (CEFTA, 2013).

**Hypothesis 2.** *Democratization has a positive effect on the probability that a country forms an IO with strict accession rules.*

We can further test our theory by examining the propensity of democratizing countries to *join* existing organizations. If democratizing states use accession rules to regulate entry to their own organizations, then democratization should not have an effect on a state’s propensity to join an existing IO regardless of accession rules. Since previous scholarship has argued that strict accession rules are desirable in existing organizations because they allow democratizing states to signal credible commitment to policy reform (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006), this placebo test can be used to further test the theory.

**Hypothesis 3.** *Democratization has no effect on the probability that a country joins an IO with lax or strict accession rules.*

### 2.3 Accession Rules and Level of Institutionalization

Above, we have argued that democratizing states want to form organizations with strict accession rules. The argument is based on two components, namely, protecting the governance of the organization and emulating the most ambitious IOs formed by established democracies. A secondary implication of the argument, therefore, is that the organizations transitional democracies form must themselves achieve some degree of institutionalization. They cannot exist only on paper or lack the ability to implement policies.

**Hypothesis 4.** *When democratizing states form organizations with strict accession rules, these organizations will be characterized by high levels of institutionalization in general.*

## 2.4 Causal Mechanisms

Above, we proposed two reasons why democratizing countries would prefer organizations with strict accession rules. Since these causal mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, they should not be considered competing. However, their relative importance can be evaluated with further empirical analysis.

The first causal mechanism we have emphasized is the need to keep undesirable members out of the organization. If this causal mechanism is valid, then democratizing states should be more likely to form organizations with strict voting rules in regions that have many autocracies. Compared to other democratizing states and established democracies, autocracies have no normative interest in supporting processes of democratization.

**Hypothesis 5.** *The positive effect of democratization on the probability that a country forms an IO with strict accession rules decreases as the number of established democracies in the region increases.*

The other possibility is that democratizing countries are trying to mimic established democracies in their region. Given the continued relevance of regions in world politics, a democratizing state's primary concern is to secure the support of established democracies that it can consider neighbors. In this case, we would expect the opposite pattern.

**Hypothesis 6.** *The positive effect of democratization on the probability that a country forms an IO with strict accession rules increases as the number of established democracies in the region increases.*

This is precisely the pattern of international cooperation that appeared in the 1990s in Europe. As described above, in early 1990s, several Eastern European states were undergoing democratic transitions and interested in shifting their attention from Russia to the EEC. To secure the support of these Western European democracies, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia created CEFTA in 1992 (Bouzas, 1999). This IO mimicked in name and substance (including strict accession rules) the EFTA, an older Western European IO that had served as a stepping-stone for accession into

the ECC for the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Portugal, and includes members Sweden, Austria, and Finland, which were scheduled to accede to the ECC in 1995.

Another way to shed light on causal mechanisms is to examine if strict accession rules actually work. If their goal is to keep undesirable members outside and/or credibly signal serious cooperation, then one would expect them to reduce the participation of states whose membership is not helpful for the democratic transition. Based on the argument above, this would mean that fewer autocratic countries would join organizations with strict accession rules, especially if the original membership comprises democratizing countries.

**Hypothesis 7.** *An IO with strict accession rules admits fewer autocracies than an IO with lax accession rules, and the effect is particularly large when democratizing states participated in the design of the IO.*

### 3 Research Design

Empirically evaluating our hypotheses on democratization and IO membership cannot be accomplished in a single test. We must conduct a test for forming an IO and a test for joining an IO. The unit of analysis for our tests is the country-year from 1965 to 2000, the years for which there is annual data on IO membership. Our tests seek to identify how *Democratization* influences the probability of country  $i$  joining or forming an IO with weak or strict voting rules for accession at time  $t$ . The dataset we use is the Correlates of War International Governmental Organization.

#### 3.1 Dependent Variables

We have two dependent variables. The first dependent variable captures if country  $i$  formed an IO with weak or strict voting rules for accession at time  $t$ . It scores ‘0’ if the country did not, ‘1’ if the country formed an organization with lax voting rules, and ‘2’ if an organization with voting rules was formed. Notably, these categories are *not* ordered. We do not expect the same factors to determine the formation of organizations with lax and strict accession rules. These are two fundamentally different outcomes. The second dependent variable is otherwise similar except that

it focuses on the joining, not forming, of IOs.

While a more detailed description of the coding system used to derive the difference between lax and strict voting rules is provided in the Appendix, the following three examples demonstrate the variation captured in these the two Dependent Variables. A country that formed or joined the International African Migratory Locust Organization, for example, falls into the ‘0’ category of the Dependent Variables, as the rules of this IO do not explain if its member-states have to vote for the accession of an applicant state. Lax voting rules, which include all voting requirements short of a super-majority, are captured by category ‘1’ of the Dependent Variables. A country that formed or joined the African Intellectual Property Organization would receive this score as accessions to the latter IO take place after the approval of “la majorité de ses membres.” Strict voting rules refer to super-majoritarian requirements for approval of accessions, which may include 2/3rds, 3/4ths, or unanimous approvals from the current members. Since the European Coal and Steel Community required that its member-states “act unanimously” on the approval of a future accession, the countries that formed or joined that IO fit into category ‘2’ of the Dependent Variables.

We also coded all of the organizations for other restrictions on accession but found them less important. First, some IOs impose *geographic restrictions on membership*. Some of these IOs limit accessions to countries of a broader geographic area, such as a continent. Other IOs are designed to allow accession of states from a narrow geographic region, such as the Caribbean or East Africa. To capture this variation, we construct a variable that ranges from 0 to 2. It scores ‘0’ if an IO has no geographic limitations, a ‘1’ for broad and a ‘2’ for narrow geographic restrictions respectively. Second, other IOs require *specific policies*. Some IOs require that applicants fulfill certain defined prior conditions before applying for membership. To become party, for example, to the Inter-American Commission of Women, an applicant state has to first become a member of the Organization of American States. Other IOs, however, have the power to impose idiosyncratic “terms and conditions” to each applicant. A state that desires, for example, to join the Inter-American Development Bank has to abide by “such terms as the Bank may determine” (Interamerican, N.d.). Similarly to geographic restrictions on membership, this variation is captured through a variable ranging from 0

to 2, with ‘0’ going to IOs with no conditions, ‘1’ to those with some specific conditions, and ‘2’ to the IOs with the power to impose unpredictable case-by-case requirements.

Our analysis is primarily interested in voting rules because, as suggested in the introduction, we view this as the most important of the various accession criteria: if a sufficient number of existing members desire that a state joins the IO, then it does not matter the extent to which the states have met the other criteria. This point is perhaps most vividly illustrated with respect to geographic restrictions and Turkey’s accession to NATO in the 1950s. The British and Americans were completely aware of Turkey’s strategic importance and military capabilities (Yeşilbursa, 1999, 79). However, the British and Americans initially chose to exclude Turkey from NATO because, in addition to disagreement about whether Turkey’s geographic location made NATO the appropriate security apparatus, the British and Americans questioned Turkey’s willingness to project capabilities outside of Turkey (Helicke, 2012, 72). To remedy this uncertainty, the Turkish government needed to signal its willingness to use its forces to support the Western powers. As the Turkish Foreign Minister Koprülü stated on June 1, 1950, “our foreign policy, which has been oriented towards the West since the Second World War, will take a more energetic form in this direction” (Helicke, 2012, 73). On July 25, 1950 the Turkish government, quite unexpectedly, announced that it would be the second UN member, after the United States, to send troops to to Korea (Helicke, 2012, 73). Immediately following this, it reapplied for NATO admission and, after first being designated an ‘associated member’ in September 1950, was granted full membership (along with Greece) in 1952 (Yeşilbursa, 1999, 77).

To illustrate the dependent variable, consider Table 1. The upper panel shows the number of democratizing states that join (blue) or form (red) at least one organization in any given year. Based on a first look, there seems not to be a significant difference, with the exception of the year 1995 (our results hold if we exclude this year from the analysis). However, the importance of democratization starts to become clear if one looks at the pattern of non-democratizing states in the lower panel. With the exception of five years, the number of states that join at least one IO is equal to or higher than the number of states that form one in every year of the analysis. This descriptive evidence suggests that democratizing states have a higher relatively propensity to form

new IOs than do other states. While democratizing states both join and form IOs, the importance of formation in their portfolio is greater compared to non-democratizing states.

[Figure 1 about here.]

### 3.2 Key Independent Variable: Democratization

Our primary independent variable is *Democratization*. It is a binary variable that equals 1 if the -10 to 10 Polity IV score of state  $i$  is 6 or higher at time  $t$  but was below 6 at time  $t - 5$ .<sup>2</sup> Otherwise, it scores zero. This specification captures all political transitions that make a country a democracy, as indicated by competitive elections and institutional constraints on the executive’s authority. In the main analysis, we compare the effect of democratization against the baseline of *all* other states.

### 3.3 Estimation Approach

Because our dependent variable has multiple unordered outcomes, we use a multinomial logit model. A multinomial logit estimates the probability that the actual outcome  $Y$  will take on each of a set of discrete possible outcomes given a vector of independent control variables ( $X$ ) that include the key independent variable *Democratization* and a series of control variables (described below). Given  $J$  outcomes, a multinomial logit estimates  $J - 1$  equations which show the effects of the variables on the likelihood of a particular outcome occurring. For example, the formation model considers the three outcomes of form no IO ( $J = 0$ ), form IO with weak voting criteria ( $J = 1$ ), and form IO with strict voting criteria ( $J = 2$ ). Formally, our model is expressed as

$$\Pr(Y_i = j) = \frac{\exp^{X\beta_j}}{\sum_{k=0}^2 \exp^{X\beta_k}} \quad (1)$$

where

$$X = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * Democratization_{i,t} + \sum_{h=1}^n \beta_h * Control_{h,i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (2)$$

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<sup>2</sup>There is no standard in international relations for when a state should be considered a democracy on the Polity scale. For example, some studies use a rather conservative measure of  $polity \geq 7$  (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2008), while others adopt a more generous coding of  $polity \geq 5$  (Lai and Reiter, 2000; Gibler, 2008). We following Jaggers and Gurr (1995); Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr (2010) by using the middle of these two options.

for each county  $i$  in year  $t$ , and  $Y$  pertains to either forming IO or joining an IO, depending on the test being performed. Estimates are relative to a base category, which in this case is form/join no organization ( $J = 0$ ). Hence, we report below results that indicate the impact of *Democratization* on the probability of forming an IO with weak voting criteria relative to forming no IO and we report results that indicate the impact of *Democratization* on the probability of forming an IO with strict voting criteria relative to forming no IO.

### 3.4 Control Variables

To control for confounding factors, we include several control variables in our models.<sup>3</sup> For summary statistics, see the online appendix.

First, we suspect that the decision of a state to join or form an IO will be, in part, a function of the number of IOs to which the state already belongs. Therefore, we include a variable that measures the number of total IOs in which state  $i$  is a member in year  $t$ .

Second, we include a number of other variables drawn from Mansfield and Pevehouse (2008). The variable *Year* simply indicates the year of the observation. This allows us to account for possible temporal trends. *Former Communist* is coded 1 for states that previously had communist governments, beginning in the first year after communist rule. One may suspect that states in the Soviet bloc had unusually strong reasons to form or join new organizations, given that the

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<sup>3</sup>In their study of democratization and IO formation, Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) include several additional variables that we omit because these variables are either highly collinear with the variables already in our model or because they do not, in actuality, capture a variable that confounds the relationship between democratization and joining/forming an IO. The supplemental analysis packet contains results from models that include these variables and the results are nearly identical to our main models.

The variables highly collinear with those in the model include *Autocratization* (a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the Polity IV score of state  $i$  changes from above -7 to below or equal to -7 between years  $t - 5$  and  $t$ , or if the Polity IV score of state  $i$  changes from above or equal to 7 to below 7 between years  $t - 5$  and  $t$ , zero otherwise), and *Stable Democracy* (which equals 1 if state  $i$  remains democratic between years  $t - 5$  and  $t$ , zero otherwise). Those that we do not think confound the relationship between democratization and international organizations are *Major Power* (a dichotomous variable coded 1 if state  $i$  is considered a great power in year  $t$ ), *Dispute* (the number of militarized interstate disputes involving state  $i$  that are ongoing in year  $t$ ) and *Hegemony* (the relative size of the largest state in the international system, calculated using GDP data). Based on the history of COW identified major powers, being a major power does not appear to impact whether or not a state is a democracy. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2008) mention how hegemonic states may provide the resources to enable IOs to properly function, but it is unclear how hegemonic states, by themselves, relate to democratization. With respect to disputes, though we think the relationship is tenuous, one could argue that states become involved in a high number of militarized disputes for the purpose of avoiding democratization (as a type of diversionary war), while military conflict might prevent states from becoming members of IOs.

international institutions established by the Soviet Union had recently collapsed. Since recently independent states may have a stronger need to become IO members, the variable *Independence* is the number of years state  $i$  has been an independent nation-state as of year  $t$ . Finally, Mansfield and Pevehouse include a variety of dummy variables capturing a state’s geographic region. We also include these region dummies so as to account for regional heterogeneity not captured by our other variables.

Third, we include a number of additional variables. To capture important global trends, we include *Number of IOs Globally*, accounts for the trend of increasing international institutionalization over time (Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan, 1996). This variable helps guard against conflating the effect of democratization with the effect of a general tendency towards increased international institutionalization. Finally, we use World Bank data to include the country’s population and GDP per capita (in constant 1995 US \$). We include GDP per capita because we suspect that country wealth will not only be correlated with democratization (Przeworski et al., 2000), but possibly also with the perceived need of the country’s leaders to seek IO membership. Population is included as larger countries might be more prone to join IOs out of simple scale effects.

## 4 Results

We present the empirical results in three sets. First, we examine the effect of democratization on the choice of accession rules. Second, we investigate the kinds of international organizations that are being formed. Finally, we summarize a series of robustness checks.

### 4.1 Main Models

Table 1 reports the results without control variables. The columns show two multinomial logit equations, one for forming and the other for joining an IO. In the models, there are two statistically significant coefficients, one for forming an IO with strict accession rules and another for joining an organization with lax accession rules. However, the coefficient for strict voting criteria is smaller than the coefficient for weak voting criteria. Since the models are nonlinear, however, the coefficients do not shed much light on substantive effects.



[Table 1 about here.]

Table 2 adds control variables to the equation. This produces two important effects on the results. First, the coefficient on joining an IO with lax accession rules is no longer significant. As soon as we account for other important factors, such as the time trend and regional patterns, the relationship between democratization and joining IOs with lax accession rules becomes weaker and more uncertainty. Second, the coefficient for forming an IO with strict accession rules is now larger and has a higher level of significance. It is also larger than the coefficient for IO formation with lax accession rules. This suggests that accounting for contextual factors strengthens the evidence for the theory, though again it is important to remember that these are not substantive effects.

[Table 2 about here.]

The control variables contain some interesting results. Perhaps most importantly, former communist and newly independent countries are not particularly active in IO formation, regardless of the choice of accession rules. However, the coefficient for former communist countries is statistically significant for joining IOs. This may reflect the relatively high pre-existing institutional density in Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Another useful observation is that GDP per capita is strongly associated with the formation of organizations with strict, but not lax, accession rules. This suggests that wealthy countries try to regulate the membership of their organizations by controlling the accession of other countries.

The regression output does not tell the full story, however, given that the multinomial logit is a nonlinear model. Figure 2 simulates the effect of democratization on the formation and joining of IOs with lax or strict accession rules. The simulation is based on using the models in Table 2. The marginal effect of the *Democratization* variable is derived in two steps. First, we compute the predicted probability of forming/joining an IO when *Democratization*=0, with all other variables set to their mean if continuous or to their proportion if dichotomous. Second, we compute the predicted probability of forming/joining an IO when *Democratization*=1, similarly holding other variables to their mean or proportion. Third, we compute the percentage change between these two values. Finally, we produce 10,000 simulated values of these predicted probabilities in order to

generate the confidence intervals.

[Figure 2 about here.]

As the table shows, the only statistically significant substantive effect is that for forming an IO with strict voting rules. This is consistent with the theory. However, the confidence intervals around the effect of democratization on forming organizations with lax accession rules are very wide. While the estimated effect of democratization on the formation of IOs with strict rules is more than four times the corresponding effect for lax rules, the difference is not statistically significant due to the considerable uncertainty surrounding the latter coefficient. In interpreting our results, it is important to keep this caveat in mind.

## 4.2 Robustness

In supporting information, we report results from several robustness checks. First, we run our main analysis again with observations from the year 1995 removed. Our results remain robust. Second, we examine the effect of democratization on forming and joining organizations with additional control variables for states that are established democracies or autocracies. The inclusion of these controls amounts to changing the baseline of comparison, and the results remain robust.

We also examine the effect of democratization on IOs with two other accession rules, geographic and policy conditions. We find no effect of democratization on these rules, suggesting that their choice of accession rules is voting. This is understandable. Geographic rules generally do not constrain membership of neighboring countries, and they cannot be conditioned on policy or institutional reform by accession candidates. Policy conditions are too clumsy and rigid in a constantly evolving world.

## 4.3 Analysis by Type of International Organization

Next, we examine the kinds of international organizations that democratizing states form. For this, we rely on institutionalization data from Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004) and Ingram, Robinson, and Busch (2005). While their coding of institutionalization has some weaknesses, it is

nonetheless useful for evaluating broad patterns of institutionalization in the IO universe. Specifically, we examine if democratizing states form organizations that are highly institutionalized with actual constraints on state behavior. The results are reported in Table 3. As the table shows, the only statistically significant effect of democratization on the formation of an IO is for the highly institutionalized type. Consistent with our hypotheses, this suggests that democratizing states are using strict accession rules to protect substantively important organizations.

[Table 3 about here.]

#### 4.4 Testing the Causal Mechanism

To this point we have shown that democratization is associated with the formation of IOs with strict voting rules. While consistent with our theoretical expectations, we wish to empirically identify the mechanism explaining this association. In particular, we seek to identify if these rules are used to keep autocracies out of the new organizations.

We begin by looking for patterns in the quantitative data that are consistent with our mechanism. First, if there are few established democracies in a region, then strict accession rules could come handy for keeping dictatorships out of the organizations. If there are many established democracies, strict accession rules would signal a serious interest in international organization to these external audiences. Therefore, we estimate a model whereby the effect of democratization on the formation of an organization with strict voting rules is conditioned by the proportion of established democracies in the democratizing state's region. The model includes the democratization variable, the proportion of other states in the region that are established democracies as the region modifying variable, and the interaction between the two variables.

The results are reported in Table 4. Due to the presence of a continuous modifying variable and interaction term, we follow Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) by considering the effect of democratization across the range the modifying variable's values. These results are shown in Figure 3. Consistent with our expectations, when there are few autocracies in the region, democratization increases the probability of forming an IO with strict voting rules. Indeed, we estimate that democratization increases the probability of forming an IO with strict voting rules by almost 200

percent when there are no established democracies in the region. While the confidence intervals are wide at the left hand side of the figure, they do not include zero. As we increase the percentage of democracies in the region, the effect of democratization on the formation of an IO with strict voting rules begins to decrease. Eventually, the effect becomes negative once approximately 70 percent of the other countries in the region are established democracies. However, the effect is statistically insignificant at these higher levels.

[Table 4 about here.]

[Figure 3 about here.]

While highly suggestive of our proposed mechanism, the wide confidence intervals mean that it is difficult to be certain that the proportion of democracies truly has a modifying effect on democratization (i.e. one could draw a straight horizontal line inside the confidence intervals in Figure 3). Given the large degree of uncertainty around this first result, we now move to a second test. In this test, we consider the number of autocracies that actually join an IO *after* its creation. To accomplish this we computed, for each IO, the number of autocracies that had joined the IO during the five years following the IO's creation (i.e. not counting autocracies that may have been initial members of the IO). Having computed this figure for the IOs for which we having voting criteria data, the mean number of autocracies that joined an IO since creation is 2.68 (over 303 IOs), with a minimum value of -6, and a maximum value of 49.

Next, we divide the data into those IOs with strict voting rules and those IOs with non-strict voting rules. We find that, consistent with expectations, IOs with strict voting rules had, on average, fewer autocracies join after 5 years (an average of 1.57 autocracies over 70 IOs) compared to IOs with non-strict voting rules (an average of 3.01 autocracies over 233 IOs).

While these initial numbers are insightful, testing our mechanism requires conditioning on the involvement of democratizing states in the creation of the IO. Therefore, we conduct simple regression analysis where the number of autocracies that joined an IO after 5 years is regressed (using Ordinary Least Squares) on whether or not the IO had strict voting rules. We conduct this regression over two groups: those IOs where no democratizing states were involved in the IOs' creation

and those IOs where at least one democratizing state was involved in the IOs' creation. The results from this analysis are reported in column (1) of Table 5. In these regressions, the coefficient on the strict voting criteria independent variable captures the number of additional/fewer democracies that are in the IO due to the strict voting criteria. The results from these simple regressions tell us that having strict voting rules results in 1.2 fewer autocracies when no democratizing states are involved in IO creation and 2.6 fewer autocracies when democratizing states are involved in IO creation. This is consistent with our proposed mechanism.

One drawback of the results in column (1) is they do not account for features of the IOs that might confound the relationship between strict voting rules and the number of autocratic states to join the IO. Therefore, column (2) reports the results when we control for whether the IO has a high or moderate level of institutionalization, whether the IO has a political or technical function, the proportion of IO members located in Africa, Latin America, or Europe (regions with a notable number of democratizations), and the year of the observation. Doing so slightly reduces the size of the coefficient on the strict voting criteria variable when one considers those IOs where no democratizing states were involved in the IOs' creation and those IOs where at least one democratizing state was involved in the IO's creation. However, the size of the coefficient is still over twice as large when at least one democratizing state was involved in the IOs' creation compared to having no democratizing states involved in the IO's creation. This again is consistent with our proposed mechanism.

Since the number of autocracies to join an IO after 5 years is a count variable, not a continuous variable, column (3) takes the same variables as the model in column (2) and applies them to a negative binomial count model. One limitation of this model is that it can only consider non-negative values. Therefore, we must remove observations where the change in the number of autocracies was negative. This removes 18 observations from the group of IOs where at least one democratizing state was involved in the IOs' creation and 26 observations from the group of IOs where no democratizing states were involved in the IOs' creation. While the size of the coefficient on strict voting criteria is substantially decreased in both groups, the size of the coefficient is still over twice as large when at least one democratizing state was involved in the IOs' creation compared

to having no democratizing states involved in the IO's creation. Moreover, it should be noted that the coefficient on strict voting criteria is now statistically significant when the model is estimated on the group of at least one democratizing state was involved in the IOs' creation. These results are again consistent with our expectation that democratizing states include strict voting criteria in IOs for the purpose of reducing the number of autocracies.<sup>4</sup>

[Table 5 about here.]

Overall, quantitative analysis provides suggestive but uncertain evidence. Therefore, we seek to supplement this analysis by considering in the next section comparative qualitative evidence.

## 5 Comparative Case Studies

To complement the statistical results, this section presents the events that led to the adoption of strict accession rules by two specific IOs, the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). While there is no mention of accession rules in the debates on the creation of these two IOs, the reasoning used for their creation together with the statements made at the time of the IOs' founding offer valuable support to our statistical conclusions. These brief case studies suggest that the democratizing founders of these two IOs chose strict accession rules to signal their commitment to democracy and to prevent undesirable countries from becoming members of their IOs.

### 5.1 CEFTA

The Central European Free Trade Agreement was signed in Krakow, on December 21, 1992, by the three democratizing states of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Among its many provisions, the three countries of the Visegrad triangle decided to use strict accession rules to regulate entry of future members into their Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA).

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<sup>4</sup>In the appendix, we report results from tests that consider changes in the number of established democracies since creation. They show that while the coefficient on the strict voting criteria variables in the OLS models are still negative, their magnitude is substantially smaller. This is also the case in the negative binomial models. Also, the coefficient on the strict voting criteria variable is insignificant when a negative binomial model is applied to the sample of IOs with at least one democratizing state involved in the IOs' creation.

Following the fall of the communist bloc and the end of the Warsaw Trade Organization, the countries of eastern Europe had to reorganize their security arrangements and their internal political structures. Additionally, their domestic economies were in serious trouble. At the time, these three countries were “all still in the middle of a deep production and employment decline and undergoing a protracted, very painful, and politically highly sensitive restructuring of their economies” (Rudka and Mizsei, 1994, 16). After repeated efforts to achieve cooperation from the West (either the EC or NATO) and a few failed attempts to start regional cooperation, the countries of the Visegrad triangle created CEFTA as a way to improve their economies. Important economic reasons thus formed the basis of this international institution, which led to trade liberalization between its member states (Rudka and Mizsei, 1994).

From the very beginning, however, the members of the Visegrad triangle realized that much more was at stake in the creation of CEFTA. In their effort to become the “Benelux of the East” (Rudka and Mizsei, 1994, 18), the three original CEFTA members aimed to attract the attention of the EC. All three countries had become associate members of the EC in 1991. Yet, full entrance into that western IO was the primary political goal of their international relations (Richter and Tóth, 1994). These countries thus perceived CEFTA as an “antichambre” for their accession to the EC (Ágh, 1996, 17). In this effort, the use of strict accession rules functioned as a signaling mechanism through which the Visegrad countries expressed their desire to create an IO that looked and operated in an EC-compatible manner.

Apart, however, from acting a signal for the EC, the strict accession rules allowed the CEFTA founders to prevent undesirable candidates from entering into CEFTA. Even before CEFTA was created, the Visegrad countries were aware of Ukraine’s desire to be a CEFTA member. In May 1992, at a press conference with Polish President Lech Walesa, Ukrainian President Kravchuk told the press that “a triangle is an excellent geometrical figure, but a quadrilateral is an even better one” (Burant, 1996, 1129). The pressure from Ukraine was reiterated by a few Ukrainian parliamentary deputies and several officials from Ukraine’s defense and foreign ministries (Burant, 1996). While Walesa was sympathetic to Ukraine’s request, Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall and Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel rejected the offer. They preferred to create an IO among

cohesive partners. They also chose to have strict accession rules as a way to keep undesirable states out of their IO. Ukraine's chances to join would ultimately depend on the vote of all CEFTA members, which would allow the Visegrad countries to judge the "pace of economic and political reform in Ukraine" (Larrabee, 1996, 259). At the time of CEFTA creation, these reforms were so meager in Ukraine that contemporary commentators suggested it was more realistic that CEFTA would first expand to Slovenia (Rudka and Mizsei, 1994). That, it did in 1996, while the strict accession rules have kept Ukraine out up to this date.

## 5.2 SADC

The Southern African Development Community was formed on August 17, 1992, with the adoption of the Windhoek declaration and the SADC Treaty. Its founding members included all the former members of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), an IO that was formed in 1980 as a way to counter the power of the apartheid regime in South Africa. The SADCC, however, was not successful. Twelve years after its creation, its members were still unable to counter the economic prowess and military power of South Africa (Gwaradzimba, 1993). The SADCC states, therefore, decided to form an institution that would be more influential, and which would contribute to the centralized coordination of the region with the goal of achieving faster economic growth for their countries (Tsie, 1996).

In forming this IO, strict accession rules allowed the members of the SADC to keep the undesirable state of South Africa out until it became a fully democratic state. While the transition away from apartheid had begun in 1990, the founders of SADC did not want to admit a non-majority-ruled South Africa. Stemming from their own colonial histories and their efforts to end apartheid through the SADCC, the SADC founders insisted on preventing South Africa from becoming a member of their institution until its full democratization. In their eyes, as apartheid was ending, it was "only a matter of time before a new South Africa is welcome to join the family of free and majority-ruled States of the region" (SADC Treaty, 1992) The "conventional wisdom assumed that South Africa would automatically want to be a member of SADC" (Gwaradzimba, 1993, 56). Indeed, before he was elected president, Nelson Mandela wrote that the African National Congress



would “look forward to a beneficial association” with the SADC (Mandela, 1993, 92). But, as the events in South Africa showcased, the end of apartheid was not a guaranteed conclusion. In this milieu, a strict accession provision provided a safeguard to the SADC founders, who could thus ensure that only a majority-ruled South Africa would join their ranks.

Apart from striving for the end of apartheid, the SADC founders had other goals in mind. After all, as the executive secretary of SADCC, Simba Makoni, stated in 1987 “[w]e have made it clear that the relevance and validity of SADCC will not end the day that a people’s flag is raised in Pretoria” (Gwaradzimba, 1993, 56). To the contrary, SADC founders were heavily pre-occupied with coordinating the development and integration of basic infrastructure, investment and production systems in their region, with the goal of achieving equitable and balanced development (Du Pisani, 1993). In this effort, they had for long depended on the help from foreign donors, who were euphemistically named “International Cooperating Partners” (Mandaza, Tostensen, and Maphanyane, 1994, 80). These cooperating partners included, among others, the United States, the European Community, and the Nordic countries, which all were in favor of the democratization efforts undertaken by the SADC members. In this context, the use of strict accession rules allowed the SADC founders to signal their determination to promote regional democratization to these donor countries.

While the available information for our case studies does not allow us to examine the debates during the formation of these two IOs, the available information allows us to trace the use of accession rules in both the CEFTA and the SADC. As the events surrounding the creation of both IOs illustrate, the IO founders could use accession rules as a signal of their commitment to democracy and as a tool to prevent other states to disrupt the cohesion of their union. Since these two IOs were created by democratizing states in need of economic and political progress, they illustrate how accession rules can be used strategically to further the goals of democratizing states.

## **6 Conclusion**

Democratizing states form international organizations to help manage their transition and promote democratic consolidation. As they form organizations, they face the challenge of institutional

design. We have investigated this problem through the lens of accession rules. We have argued that as democratizing states design their organizations, their incentive is to use strict accession rules to regulate entry. This allows them to prevent undesirable members, such as autocracies hostile to their democratic transition, and to signal to established democracies their commitment to following their lead in international organization.

The findings resolve some significant puzzles in the study of international organization. Most importantly, they shed light on the problems that democratizing states face as they apply international strategies to govern their own transitions. Although scholars of international institutions initially thought that democratizing makes countries join international organizations (Moravcsik, 2000; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006), this conjecture is not supported by the data. Instead, democratizing states form their own organizations (Poast and Urpelainen, 2013). But what do they expect to achieve with this strategy? By looking at accession rules, we have shown that they are concerned about the possibility of undesirable members and the impression their cooperation leaves on external audiences.

At the same time, our results clearly leave open several important questions. Perhaps most importantly, our results on causal mechanisms did not resolve the relative importance of keeping out undesirable members and signaling to external audiences. To address this issue, further theorizing and empirical analysis is clearly needed. In addition to case studies of organizations formed by democratizing states, the issue could be addressed by constructing more detailed measures of the connections that democratizing states have to other states in their geographic surroundings. For example, transitional democracies could rely on strict accession rules if they are surrounded by hostile countries, regardless of the regime types of the latter.

More generally, the study testifies to the importance of institutional design in international organization. As democratizing states seek international strategies to manage their democratic transitions, they must somehow overcome standard problems of cooperation. According to our results, restrictions of entry are an important instrument that democratizing states apply to deal with cooperation problems.

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
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Figure 1: Number of States Forming or Joining IOs, per year.

(a) Number of Democratizing States



(b) Number of Non-Democratizing States






Figure 2: Substantive Effect of Democratization on IO Forming or Joining an IO (by Strictness of Voting Criteria).



**Note:** Effect derived by computing the predicted probability of forming/joining an IO when *Democratization*=0 and the predicted probability of forming/joining an IO when *Democratization*=1 (and all other variables set to their mean – if continuous – or to their proportion – if dichotomous) and then computing the percentage change between the two values. Baseline predicted probabilities are: 11 percent (strict form); 5 percent (weak form); 11 percent (strict join); and 2 percent (weak join).



Figure 3: Marginal Effect of Democratization on Pr(IO Form), As Proportion of Democracies in Region Increases



Note: 0.90 Confidence Intervals.

Table 1: Form a New IO versus Joining an Existing IO, by Voting Strictness (Multinomial Logit Results)

	Form a New IO	Join an Existing IO
<i>Weak Voting Criteria</i>		
Democratization	0.73 (0.47)	0.75*** (0.24)
Constant	-4.54*** (0.15)	-3.03*** (0.07)
<i>Strict Voting Criteria</i>		
Democratization	0.59*** (0.21)	0.04 (0.20)
Constant	-2.68*** (0.06)	-1.94*** (0.04)
Number of Observations	5136	5136
Base Category = No Voting Criteria		
Standard errors in parentheses		
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		

Table 2: Form a New IO versus Joining an Existing IO, by Voting Strictness (Multinomial Logit Results with Controls)

	Form a New IO	Join an Existing IO
<i>Weak Voting Criteria</i>		
Democratization	0.33 (0.51)	0.26 (0.27)
N. America	-0.98 (0.82)	-1.04** (0.44)
S. America	-0.47 (0.63)	-0.82** (0.34)
Oceania	-45.56 (0.00)	-0.46 (0.45)
Asia	-46.24 (0.00)	-0.59** (0.30)
Europe	-2.13** (1.00)	-1.19*** (0.39)
Middle East	-1.47* (0.84)	-1.01*** (0.35)
Former Communist Country	1.42 (1.34)	1.29*** (0.39)
Newly Independent Country	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Year	-0.74*** (0.20)	-0.67*** (0.11)
Number of IO Memberships	0.14*** (0.04)	0.04*** (0.01)
Global Number of IOs	0.10*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.02)
WBDI:GDP per capita (constant 1995 US\$)	0.14 (0.20)	0.04 (0.08)
WBDI:Population, total	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Constant	1440.77*** (390.48)	1314.97*** (224.15)
<i>Strict Voting Criteria</i>		
Democratization	0.70*** (0.23)	-0.18 (0.23)
N. America	-0.91*** (0.33)	-0.40 (0.27)
S. America	-1.46*** (0.30)	-0.49** (0.22)
Oceania	-0.86** (0.41)	-0.03 (0.29)
Asia	-0.13 (0.23)	0.00 (0.18)
Europe	-0.97*** (0.31)	0.09 (0.22)
Middle East	-0.34 (0.24)	-0.51** (0.22)
Former Communist Country	0.21 (0.38)	1.56*** (0.23)
Newly Independent Country	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Year	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.05** (0.02)
Number of IO Memberships	0.06*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Global Number of IOs	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)
WBDI:GDP per capita (constant 1995 US\$)	0.18*** (0.06)	0.09* (0.05)
WBDI:Population, total	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Constant	170.23*** (64.88)	98.40** (43.73)
Number of Observations	4043	4043

Base Category = No Voting Criteria

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 3: Relationship between Democratization, Strict Voting Rules, and Institutionalization (Coefficient on Democratization Variable)

	Form New Organization	Join Existing Organization
High Institutionalization	0.72** (0.31)	-0.06 (0.35)
Moderate Institutionalization	0.17 (0.33)	0.28 (0.54)
Low Institutionalization	0.39 (0.33)	0.10 (0.23)

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Note:** Coefficient produced from simple bivariate logit model. Dependent variable in each model equals 1 if IO has strict voting rules and respective level of institutionalization. Results for constant term available in online appendix.

Table 4: Effect of Democratization on Pr(IO Form), Conditional on Proportion of Democracies in Region

Democratization	1.04** (0.51)
Proportion of Established Democracies in Region	1.13*** (0.21)
Democratization × Proportion of Established Democracies in Region	-1.57 (1.05)
Constant	-3.03*** (0.10)
Number of Observations	4685
Model with control variables not reported, but produces similar results.	
Standard errors in parentheses	
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	

Table 5: Regressions of Number of Autocracies Joining IO 5 years after creation

Estimation Approach:	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Negative Binomial
<i>Sample: IOs with at least One Democratizing States at Creation</i>			
Strict Voting Criteria	-2.57 (2.29)	-2.36 (2.27)	-0.81** (0.34)
<i>Control Variables</i>			
Political IO		-0.45 (2.73)	-1.00** (0.47)
Technical IO		3.43 (2.74)	0.19 (0.38)
Highly Institutionalized IO		2.01 (2.92)	0.93* (0.49)
Moderately Institutionalized IO		3.59 (2.29)	0.88** (0.36)
Proportion of IO members in Africa		-56.66 (44.26)	-8.32 (7.10)
Proportion of IO members in Latin America		-86.18* (51.14)	-34.82*** (13.47)
Proportion of IO members in Europe		-80.51** (37.84)	-40.26*** (8.54)
Year of Observation		-0.10* (0.05)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Constant	5.35*** (1.22)	200.25* (104.80)	112.64*** (25.95)
$\alpha$			0.07 (0.21)
Number of observations	96	96	78
<i>Sample: IOs with No Democratizing States at Creation</i>			
Strict Voting Criteria	-1.22 (0.91)	-1.02 (0.91)	-0.29 (0.41)
<i>Control Variables</i>			
Political IO		1.42 (1.19)	0.27 (0.42)
Technical IO		-0.37 (0.91)	-0.57 (0.42)
Highly Institutionalized IO		1.01 (1.40)	-0.13 (0.54)
Moderately Institutionalized IO		1.49* (0.80)	0.42 (0.32)
Proportion of IO members in Africa		-3.46 (11.21)	-5.42 (5.35)
Proportion of IO members in Latin America		-15.46* (8.24)	-24.18*** (6.14)
Proportion of IO members in Europe		-20.90** (10.04)	-29.47*** (6.27)
Year of Observation		-0.00 (0.02)	-0.02** (0.01)
Constant	2.04*** (0.41)	8.48 (36.62)	42.06** (18.35)
$\alpha$			0.93*** (0.17)
Number of observations	208	208	182

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1