

Pointing the Finger: How Economic and Military Linkages Affect the Targeting of Amnesty International's Advocacy Campaigns

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“Amnesty International is a worldwide movement of people who campaign for internationally recognized human rights to be respected and protected for everyone.

We believe human rights abuses anywhere are the concern of people everywhere ... Our mission is to conduct research and generate action to prevent and end grave abuses of human rights and to demand justice for those whose rights have been violated ... We do not support or oppose any government or political system and neither do we necessarily support or oppose the views of the victims/survivors or human rights defenders whose rights we seek to protect.”¹

International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) working on human rights issues commit themselves to revealing the violations of the world’s human rights offenders as “witnesses” and exposers of human rights abuses (Hopgood 2006, Redfield 2006). In so doing, human rights INGOs attempt to “name and shame”: to curb human rights abuses in targeted states by publicly recognizing abuses and calling for their cessation. As the preceding quote demonstrates, human rights INGOs seek to position themselves as impartial, open to accusing any state of human rights violations, regardless of that state’s political leanings or allegiances. We know, however, that INGOs are resource-constrained actors that face difficult choices in their advocacy efforts, including selecting the targets of their reporting, campaigns, and efforts to alert the press (Ron, Ramos and Rodgers 2005).

This paper addresses two related research questions. First, why do INGOs select certain targets for advocacy, but not others? Research on the effects of INGO advocacy campaigns, often referred to as “naming and shaming”, has far outweighed investigations into INGO decisions to pursue campaigns, despite the fact that INGO targeting decisions are of immense importance. This question is especially important when addressing the human rights advocacy targeting of Amnesty International (AI). AI has been key in establishing the normative frame for human rights, and its reporting on violations informs the US State Department’s annual *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, as and the CIRI and Political Terror Scale indices of human rights performance, two metrics which underpin the vast majority of quantitative studies of repression and human rights abuse (Alston 1990, Keck and Sikkink 1998, Cingranelli and Richards 2010, Wood and Gibney 2010, Wong forthcoming). Network analysis confirms the general belief that AI is at the center of human rights advocacy (Murdie, Brewington and Davis 2009). Because AI’s work fundamentally shapes how human rights are viewed today from a policy, ideational, and scholarly perspective, it is critical that we understand the factors that affect where AI focuses its reporting and advocacy.

Second, why do INGOs employ certain types of advocacy tactics in some target countries, but not in others? AI uses three main methods of advocacy: direct, grassroots mobilization through letter-writing, called Urgent Actions (UAs), issuing press releases to build support through the media, and crafting background reports that document and “witness” abuses. During the First Intifada, AI made Israel one of its highest priorities for human rights reporting. In 1991 alone, AI issued 67 background reports on human rights conditions and violations in Israel and the Occupied Territories – second only to the collapsing and chaotic Soviet Union. Clearly, Israel was a high priority for Amnesty. Yet that same year, AI issued only two UAs and one press

¹ “About Amnesty International” <http://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are/about-amnesty-international> (Accessed October 30, 2010).

release on Israel. At the other end of the spectrum, Amnesty issued no background reports as the Democratic Republic of Congo descended into widespread violence in 1996-1997, but singled that country out for 32 UAs and 22 press releases.

We build on prior work on the political economy of INGO decision-making (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Cooley and Ron 2002, Ron, Ramos and Rodgers 2005) and theorize that AI's targeting and tactical decisions are conditioned by two independent factors. First, internal organizational prerogatives guide AI to maintain its reputation as a relatively impartial source of information on human rights practices and maintain the support of rank-and-file members. Second, AI makes strategic decisions about how each target country's domestic factors and international linkages with influential Western states will enhance effectiveness of its advocacy. These calculations play a role in the decision to use reporting, press releases, or mobilization of more rank-and-file support for its efforts.

In particular, we argue that regime type of the target state has an effect on how AI advocates. Political democracy should affect targeting for direct, member-based advocacy (UAs) more strongly than indirect advocacy (press releases), and exert much less of an effect – if any – on basic cataloging of human rights abuses (background reports). Furthermore, we claim that economic and security linkages with the US and the UK – that is, international linkages between the target state and international human rights leaders – will affect advocacy options differently. While economic (trade, development assistance) and security (alliance patterns and arms transfers) linkages both enhance the perceived salience of violator states to AI's rank-and-file members, security relations are a more plausible mechanism for states to influence one another. Thus, while we expect both economic and security linkages to affect the targeting of states for direct, member-based advocacy (UAs), we expect that only security linkages will be associated with only the issuing of press releases. By contrast, neither economic nor security linkages will be significant determinants of targeting for background reports, as the purpose of these documents is to chronicle events.

We test this argument using data on AI's background reports and press releases, augmented by new data on AI's UAs. Controlling for the level of abuses and population, two variables that most clearly proxy objective need for advocacy, we find empirical patterns consistent with our theory: regime type matters most for UAs, with weakly authoritarian regimes being targeted more than hard authoritarian regimes and democracies, while press releases are associated with political democracy in a negative and linear fashion. Regarding international ties, we find that economic (trade, official development assistance) and security (alliance similarity, arms transfers, and militarized interstate disputes) linkages with the US – but not the UK – affect targeting for the various forms of advocacy in ways consistent with our theoretical expectations. While economic and security linkages have only weak or insignificant effects on targeting for background reporting, they both exert effects on targeting for UAs, while only security linkages matter for targeting for press releases. Robustness checks indicate these findings are not an artifact of the United States having closer relations with Latin America, a region that has received considerable attention from AI (Clark 2001, Hafner-Burton and Ron N.d.).

While focused on AI, this article contributes to the study of international relations more broadly. It develops a useful framework for thinking about the complex organizational incentives facing

INGOs that play multifaceted roles in global affairs. Far from being pure advocacy organizations, many INGOs provide a public good with their research, which informs policy discussions more broadly. This study provides evidence that INGOs can act simultaneously as relatively impartial reporters and strong issue advocates. Given that civil society is finding increased legitimacy as providers of information for policymaking (Clark, et al. 1998), this finding provides nuance for those concerned about INGO reporting bias.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section surveys the literature on INGO targeting generally and AI specifically. We then present our theoretical argument and hypotheses. The following section presents our data, estimation strategy, results, describes key findings. The final section concludes with an expanded discussion of the significance of these findings for the broader study of international relations.

Literature Review

Comparatively few scholars have looked directly at INGOs as strategic organizations making tactical decisions regarding the targets of their advocacy, a gap that is likely driven by the fact that to date, many scholars interested in INGOs (or social movements) have focused on left-leaning principled activism and its policy effects (Bob 2012). This gap is surprising, considering that the watershed study in the field by Keck and Sikkink (1998) emphasizes that INGOs are moral actors that nevertheless behave strategically in four ways through information politics, symbolic politics, accountability politics, and leverage politics (see Chapter 1). In particular, they theorize that leverage politics allows transnational movements to use information and powerful state sympathizers to pressure violator governments into compliance with international norms. Among the four tactics, leverage politics is distinct because it underscores the way that INGOs use *other* states in support of their work. According to the boomerang pattern, INGO advocacy substitutes for ineffective advocacy at the domestic level, with INGOs lobbying intergovernmental organizations and/or powerful states in Europe, North America, and Asia to use their leverage over targeted states to change those states' behavior. This implies that INGOs should be strategic in their selection of targeting for advocacy, and that links with powerful Western governments will be associated with more frequent targeting.

The strategic incentives approach applies to the internal political economy of INGOs themselves. INGO behavior is conditioned by incentives to cultivate credibility in order to generate operating capital. Cooley and Ron's (2002) seminal piece on INGO activity demonstrates that INGOs respond not just to their moral imperatives, but to economic incentives, in some cases neglecting their "official" reasons to be in the field (e.g. helping refugees or prisoners of war) in order to establish a public image, or to grab funding. Others have extended analogies of the firm or interest groups to highlight the material interests of INGOs (Johnson and Prakash 2007, Prakash and Gugerty 2010, Bloodgood 2010). For instance, qualitative research demonstrates that AI and Human Rights Watch neglected economic, social, and cultural rights in favor of civil and political rights for organizational reasons up until the past decade (Roth 2004a, Chandhoke 2007, Goering 2007). Defending these positions, INGO leaders often cite efficacy and limited resources and the need to be able to build a causal story around violations in order to generate internal support, and that support for different types of campaigns changes over time. Furthermore, expanded economic opportunities for INGOs, as well as a rising norm that

accommodates INGOs as legitimate actors in international politics, has led to the growing importance of looking at INGOs as strategic actors that face resource internal preference-based constraints on their actions (Reimann 2006).

The most comprehensive quantitative treatment of AI targeting to date is Ron, Ramos and Rodgers (2005), which articulated how information politics from the boomerang pattern might work from an NGO's perspective. Controlling for the extent of human rights abuses (as reported by AI), population, and a host of other factors, they find that political democracy is not robustly associated with targeting for background reports or press releases. Regarding international linkages, they find some weak evidence that countries receiving more US military aid get targeted more frequently for background reports, but not press releases. Countries that receive more official development assistance (ODA) are somewhat less frequently targeted for background reports. In general, economic and security linkages with the United States are not significant determinants of targeting for press releases. More recently, Hafner-Burton and Ron (N.d.) have demonstrated that AI reports more on human rights conditions in Latin America than can be explained by the prevalence of abuses in the region. Their empirical findings confirm those of earlier qualitative studies (Clark 2001).

We expand on this literature in two key ways. First, we distinguish between types of INGO advocacy, which contributes to a better understanding of the effects of international linkages than previous efforts. The addition of data on UAs allows us to theoretically distinguish between efforts to engage in direct grassroots campaigns, more indirect attempts to get international media involvement, and the provision of knowledge on human rights abuses in the form of background reports. Because we focus on the strategic choice for AI to pick from among three distinct and complementary forms of advocacy, we allow for a consideration of how some international linkages might only effect country salience to AI members, versus those of higher salience to powerful Western states. Second, we test another facet of the boomerang pattern, leverage politics, to demonstrate how INGOs strategically think about how they can use their findings to get states to pressure one another for compliance with human rights. We consider a broader range of linkages that include military transfers but also ODA, alliance patterns, and trade linkages in order to test these theoretical arguments. As such, this paper accounts for more potential avenues by which the state-to-state ties in the boomerang pattern might be enacted.

Theory: A Model of Human Rights NGO Targeting

INGOs have limited resources, and as a result, face tradeoffs in reporting on different cases of human rights abuse. When selecting a case or an issue for advocacy, INGOs must weigh the severity of violation with perceptions about whether advocacy effort is likely to affect 1) political outcomes and 2) the organization itself, the factors which we highlight here. Our perspective, in effect, extends the groundwork laid out by Keck and Sikkink's boomerang pattern through their typology of advocacy tactics. Though our theory is generalizable, we apply it specifically to AI. Keck and Sikkink define information politics as "the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically usable information" and leverage politics as "the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence" (16). In AI's case, it can choose to engage in information politics through background reporting, or engage in leverage politics by either focusing attention on violator states in the Western press

(press releases) or engaging in direct advocacy with violator states, which uses information and grassroots participation (UAs) to pressure behavioral change. The choice and effect of these of advocacy instruments will be affected by differences in target state political institutions and linkages with powerful Western states.

Cooley and Ron (2002) argue that the proliferation of INGOs and donors in international politics has led to a multiple principals problem. INGOs must serve both populations they have identified as needing help (recipients) and their donors; they have two principals. For human rights INGOs, recipients are more appropriately conceived of as INGOs' beneficiaries. These principals might have orthogonal objectives and interests, and INGOs must balance them both through their actions. Not only do INGOs have to be responsive to conditions on the ground, they also have to follow the dictates of their funders. In other words, INGOs are both morally and materially-motivated. Ron, Ramos and Rodgers (2005) explored this point in great detail through the lens of information politics by testing the effect of multiple facets of INGO activity – not only do NGOs report, they also promote a particular agenda through advocacy.

Our analysis takes these two fundamental insights as our starting point. Similar to Cooley and Ron, we conceptualize INGOs as organizations with specific objectives that may be at odds with both recipients and donors, and like Ron, et al., we are interested in explicating what affects the choices that NGOs make for political action. Both existing perspectives emphasize the need for acknowledging the material constraints that face morally-driven actors, such as human rights INGOs. Human rights INGOs are interested in rectifying human rights abuses, but they are also motivated by the needs for establishing and expanding the organization itself. Thus, INGOs must balance its own organizational positioning interests with potential friction with donors, targets, and beneficiaries of their work.

For the most part, as described by Cooley and Ron and others, INGOs receive funding from foundations, states, and intergovernmental agencies. Thus, INGOs are beholden to these (often) large donors, many of whom have increasingly stringent limits on what INGOs can do with their funds (Barnett 2005, 2009). In the case of AI, however, these constraints are somewhat different. Because AI has generally refused donations from governments and foundations, it has relied upon its membership for financial support (Welch 2001, Winston 2001).² The International Secretariat in London, which is the global headquarters and nerve center for Amnesty's work, is funded through the contributions of its 52 national sections, mostly based in Europe and North America.

We conceptualize AI's decisions about targets and tactics the following way. First, we determine whether the primary target of the reporting/advocacy campaign is the violator state or powerful Western states, i.e., whether the advocacy intends to use leverage or information politics. Direct methods, such as UAs, targets violator governments, while indirect methods, such as press releases, targets violator governments indirectly by attempting to focus media attention in the West. Second, we determine whether the mode of reporting/advocacy is implemented at the secretariat level, or whether it requires the active participation of AI's rank-and-file members.

² Under the leadership of International Executive Committee Chair Peter Duffy (1989-1991), the Secretariat began developing its own means to fundraise, but this is a very minor part of its finances.

Background reports, press releases, and UAs are issued by the AI secretariat, but only UAs require the active participation of AI members.

Table 1 here

If the target of advocacy is the violator government, then domestic institutional factors that affect perceived receptiveness should be correlated with targeting. If the target is not the perpetrator government, but Western media outlets or other states, then domestic institutional factors that of targeted states should not necessarily be correlated with targeting. In democracies and regimes with elections, officials suffer electorally if their actions are in conflict with their constituency's desires, or if they appear indecisive in their resolve. As such, officials in democracies can anticipate potential audience costs and account for them in their decision-making, and thus, their intractability on issues such as the death penalty, in spite of repeated attempts by NGOs to change their behavior, is a function of both constituent preferences and political calculation.³ Elected officials have already accounted for audience costs, and act on human rights (among other things) in accordance with those calculations. Thus, the fact that a democracy or hybrid regime engages in human rights violations may signal that the audience "costs" of doing so are in fact a net domestic benefit, and NGO criticism, especially *international* NGO condemnation, does not change these costs dramatically. The utility of the information provided by an NGO may be limited as well in states with a relatively free media that already provides the citizenry with alternative sources (Slantchev 2006).

The effect of political democracy on indirect advocacy, however, is more ambiguous. On the one hand, targeting for background reporting and press releases might fall disproportionately on authoritarian regimes because these regimes effectively block reporting on human rights abuses and are largely insulated from domestic opposition. This is what Murdie and Urpelainen call "strategic substitution" (N.d.). On the other hand, the boomerang pattern suggests that leverage politics should be less sensitive to domestic political institutions in targeted countries. Because the leverage politics capitalizes on international linkages, it expands rulers in violator states' calculations of costs and benefits beyond the domestic audience. Thus, we might expect that indirect advocacy would not be correlated with regime type in the violator country.

H₁: Political democracy will be negatively associated with the frequency with which a country is targeted for UAs, but democracy will not matter less/matter less for press releases and background reporting.

We expect that international security and economic linkages with major Western powers – the US and the UK – should affect the frequency of targeting in ways that vary across the methods of advocacy. These linkages can affect country salience, or the importance of a particular country to AI members, and leverage potential, or the perceived ability of powerful Western states to influence human rights practices in target countries. Salience is a function of the readily available information on a country, and should matter for direct advocacy efforts that try to engage ordinary citizens. Leverage potential is largely a function of a country's dependence on

³ This also accounts for instances where audiences costs appear not to work (Schultz 2001), as governments can anticipate them and act in preparation for possible audience costs.

the US or UK for security and development, and should matter primarily for indirect advocacy that attempts to employ leverage politics.

Three different kinds of international linkages work to increase both country salience and leverage potential: alliance membership, arms transfers, and ODA. AI members in the United States and UK are likely to be more sensitive to human rights abuses occurring in countries that are allies of these countries. Alliance patterns reflect diplomatic and security relationships that explicitly confer legitimacy on foreign states. Arms transfers and ODA represent highly visible policy choices that receive large amounts of domestic in the US and UK reporting and are among the issues that have most motivated AI members. AI's focus during the 1980s on relatively small Latin American countries like El Salvador and Guatemala was in large part driven by those countries dependence on US military and development aid (Carleton and Stohl 1985, Clark 2001, Hopgood 2006).

In terms of leverage potential, it is relatively straightforward to assert that the US and UK should, *ceterus paribus*, have more influence over their allies than over countries with which they have no alliances and whose voting records in multilateral organizations, such as the UN, are in opposition to US and UK positions. ODA and arms transfers are either from the government directly (ODA) or require explicit governmental approval (arms transfers). Both negative aid conditionality – the suspension of ODA transfers in response to human rights abuses – and positive aid conditionality – providing more ODA after improvements in human rights performance – are documented means by which Western donor countries, including the United States and UK, attempt to curb abuses (Poe 1992, Rich 2004, Carey 2007). Arms transfers provide the very weapons violator states need to repress their populations and ODA generally confers significant political benefits on the state actors that control its targeting and expenditure. For these reasons, blocking arms transfers and cutting/reducing aid hold out the specter of significant costs, and the potential for positive inducements, for violator governments. Historical examples of explicit issue linkage between arms sales and human rights conditions in purchasing states include the European Union's embargo of arms sales to China following the Tiananmen Square massacres of 1989, the US Leahy-Feingold Amendment of 1994⁴, and the US Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2009, which ostensibly restricts arms transfers to those countries whose militaries employ child soldiers.⁵ Thus, alliance patterns, arms transfers, and ODA should both heighten salience for AI members and increase leverage potential.

By contrast, trade linkages should increase country salience but do not confer leverage potential. Regarding salience, international trading partners are the subjects of more news reporting in general (Wu 2000), and country-of-origin labeling makes every trip to the supermarket or department store a reminder of the availability of goods from abroad. The economic literature on home bias – the tendency to prefer domestic goods to international goods – indicates that consumers are highly aware of goods' country of origin (Lewis 1999). In terms of leverage,

⁴ The Leahy-Feingold Amendment restricted arms sales to Indonesia due to concerns about mass human rights abuses in East Timor, the island that at the time had been occupied by Indonesia since 1975.

⁵ However, the act can be circumvented in cases of demonstrated national interest; in October, 2010, US President Barack Obama exempted Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and Yemen from the CSPA; the act was only applied to Somalia and Myanmar. See Brian Knowlton, "4 Nations With Child Soldiers Keep U.S. Aid," *New York Times* October 28, 2010.

however, trade relations should not be significant in and of themselves. The general finding is that economic sanctions typically have drastic and negative effects for civilian populations in targeted countries (Ascherio et al. 1992, Garfield, Devin and Fausey 1995, Lopez and Cortright 1997, Ali and Shah 2000), while having weak or indeterminate effects on targeted countries' policy resolve, resulting in occasional authoritarian backsliding (Tsebelis 1990, Pape 1997, Peksen and Drury 2010). These effects have not gone unnoticed among NGOs: AI's internal debates about tactics confirm a reticence to try and politicize general trade in these ways: AI does not demand trade sanctions because of worries that such policies would mostly harm the very populations they seek to protect.⁶

The incentives to target countries with higher perceived salience to AI members and greater leverage potential for the US and UK should differ across the various forms of advocacy. According to our theory, background reporting represents AI's attempt to promote respect for human rights via information politics: the dissemination of information about abuses. Because of AI's central role in the human rights network, many NGOs, government agencies, and scholars rely on AI's reporting of abuses. The value of this reporting is related to its perceived impartiality; in order to preserve its status as an impartial chronicler of human rights abuses and conditions, AI should not disproportionately target countries with linkages to major Western powers.

H2: Economic and security linkages with the US and the UK will not be associated with the frequency of AI targeting for background reporting.

Alternately, background reporting may constitute another form of written advocacy, intended for powerful Western democracies by using information about abusive alliance partners to sway them into action. This is classic leverage politics following the boomerang pattern. If that were the case, then we would expect linkages that confer leverage potential – alliance patterns, arms transfers, and ODA – should be correlated with the frequency of targeting for background reporting. But because background reports are issued by the AI headquarters and thus do not require the active mobilization of rank-and-file members, their use will not be linked to activities that only produce political salience, i.e. trade.

H3: Alliance membership with, arms transfers from, and ODA from the US and UK will be positively associated with the frequency with which a country is targeted for AI background reporting, but trade flows will not.

Press releases are emblematic of AI's use of leverage politics because they are attempts to sway international governments. Thus, targeting for press releases should correlate with linkages that confer leverage potential: alliance patterns, arms transfers, and ODA. Similarly, as press releases are issued by the AI secretariat, their targeting should not correlate with linkages that affect salience but that do not confer leverage, i.e., trade.

⁶ In 2001, AI's International Council voted on a set of criteria by which to evaluate economic sanctions. Since then, AI has issued judgments on sanctions, including a 2009 document on the use of sanctions in Cuba (see "The US Embargo against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights" (2009)).

H4: Alliance membership with, arms transfers from, and ODA from the US and UK will be positively associated with the frequency with which a country is targeted for AI press releases, but trade flows will not.

UAs are distinct from background reporting and press releases because they require the active participation of AI members, and as such AI has strategic incentives to target countries with higher salience more frequently in order to engage its members. However, because the advocacy targets repressive regimes directly, leverage potential is not as significant a concern. Thus UA should correlate with both security linkages, which heighten both salience and leverage potential, and trade, which heightens salience.

H5: Alliance membership with, arms transfers from, and ODA from the US and UK, and trade flows will be positively associated with the frequency with which a country is targeted for AI urgent actions.

Dependent Variables

We estimate the effects of domestic political institutions and economic and security linkages with the US and UK on three different types of AI targeting. AI engages in two types of indirect advocacy – background reports and press releases. AI background reports are lengthy, in-country research-based documents that are primarily written for an audience of human rights professionals, government officials, IGO officials, and academics. Within AI, these documents are held to high evidentiary standards, and as such there can be a significant time lag between abuses and publication (Stroup forthcoming). Press releases, meanwhile, are intended for the general public and non-specialized media, and because they seek to cover and shape responses to current events, are based on less rigorous research. Ron, Ramos and Rodgers originally coded these data from the *Amnesty International Cumulative Guide 1962–2000*; while their original coding covered the period 1986–2000, the data have been coded back to 1975 (Ron, Ramos and Rodgers 2005, Hafner-Burton 2008).

To measure NGO direct advocacy, we use a new dataset of 12,865 UAs targeting 171 countries 1975–2004. Direct communication with violator governments has long been Amnesty’s claim to fame. The Secretariat issues UAs, based on assessments by the relevant regional research teams. Each UA represents a dossier issued by the Secretariat to national-level offices, documenting the name of the individual whose rights might have been abused, a description of known circumstances around his/her abuse, the government or actor that perpetrated the violation, and contact information for relevant officials that might be able to put an end to the abuses. Multiple UAs may be issued for a single individual; multiple individuals may be covered under any given UA. These dossiers are distributed at the national-level to interested individuals in the UA Network, who then write letters in immediate response to the appeal the violations detailed in the dossier. The country-year mean of UAs is 2.42, though the data are skewed, with 40% UAs of country-years not being targeted at all, and only 5% of country-years being targeted more than ten times. *Amnesty reporting* and UAs are relatively strongly correlated. This is to be expected, as both are measures of the concerns and priorities of the same organization; however, not all countries targeted for UAs are also targeted for background reports and/or press releases and vice versa. Figure 1 shows the top 10 targets for AI advocacy from 1975–2000. While most of

these countries are populous and have poor human rights records in general, this is not uniformly the case. Guatemala, a country of fewer than 15 million people, received more attention from AI between 1975 and 2000 than China. The United States is in the 90th percentile worldwide for compliance with human rights standards, yet is second most-often targeted country. This is due almost entirely to the United States' use of capital punishment (Thompson 2008).

Figure 1 in here

Independent Variables

We operationalize regime type using the potential target country's revised combined Polity score, commonly referred to as *Polity2*. *Polity2* subtracts the Polity AUTOC score from the DEMOC score, producing a 21-point scale ranging from 10 (strong democracies) to -10 (strong autocracies). Because we are interested in whether the effect of political democracy is curvilinear, i.e., that strong autocracies and strong democracies might display different dynamics than intermediate or hybrid regimes, we include the *squared Polity2* term as well (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2009).

We operationalize economic linkages with the United States and the UK two ways. First, we include trade flows. We do not include measures of participation in free trade agreements, as bilateral and multilateral agreements that address trade do so ostensibly to increase flows between countries. To the extent that these treaties have effects that do not operate through trade, these effects will not be captured. In our preliminary analyses, we included measures for overall trade flows (inflows + outflows), outflows (from country X to the US or UK) and inflows (from the US or UK to country X) (Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins 2009). For reasons to be addressed in the discussion, we focus on (log) trade outflows—flows from potential target countries to the US and UK. Second, we include Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the US and UK to potential target countries (Findley et al. 2009). ODA consists of uncompensated transfers from donor governments and aid agencies to developing country governments that are intended to promote economic development and welfare. It does not include military aid.

We operationalize security linkages three ways. First, we include a measure of alliance patterns and foreign policy similarity. We use Signorino and Ritter's policy portfolio similarity measures (1999). This measure uses a combination of alliance membership patterns and United Nations voting data to produce a single measure, ranging from 0 (no manifest interest commonality) to 1 (complete manifest interest commonality), on an annual basis. Second, we include (log) arms transfers to potential target countries. Both the US and the UK are major exporters of small arms and heavy military equipment, with the US accounting for 40% of total sales, and the UK 7%, to developing nations from 2002-2009 (Grimmett 2010). Because the variable captures arms transfers, rather than just sales, it captures the cumulative effect of sales, in-kind military aid, and aid that is tied to purchases of US and/or UK military hardware. Data are from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms Transfers Database (SIPRI 2010).

Control variables

The most important controls are the extent of human rights abuses, population, and civil conflict incidence. If the purpose of AI targeting is to name human rights abuse and shame abusers into curbing these abuses, we would expect that Amnesty would target countries with worse human rights records more often. To operationalize the prevalence of human rights abuses in a society, we use the Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Wood and Gibney 2010). The PTS is a widely used index that measures physical integrity rights violations, such as extrajudicial killing, torture or similar physical abuse, disappearances, and political imprisonment, committed by the state or its agents. The PTS provides codings based on AI's annual report, *The State of the World's Human Rights*, and on US State Department country reports. We use the AI-derived coding because it allows us to assess the effect of both domestic and international factors affecting AI's targeting while controlling for AI's evaluation of human rights conditions in the country. This is the most direct practical measure of AI's assessment of a country's "need" for human rights advocacy. The scale ranges from 5 ("Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals") to 1 ("Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare"); we use the inverse of the PTS in our analyses, so that higher values represent greater respect for human rights.

Second, our models include controls for (log) population, as we expect more populous countries to be targeted more often; data are from Gleditsch (2002). There are several reasons why we expect this to be the case. First, regarding background reports and press releases, larger countries should provide more "bang for the buck": a background report on Equatorial Guinea, with a population of just over 1 million, illuminates the adverse conditions of fewer people than a similar report targeting China. Regarding UAs, larger countries, for any level of aggregate respect for human rights, will have more individuals that would be potential targets for individual abuse. We expect that these two variables should be highly significant, as they represent the most objective, non-political factors that would condition human rights reporting and advocacy: the extent of abuse and the number of abused.

Third, we control for the incidence of civil conflict, as governments fighting internal wars have been demonstrated to perform significantly worse in respecting human rights, and as such may draw increased scrutiny (Poe and Tate 1994). We include a control for peace years, a count variable of the years a country has been at peace, as we expect that AI attention should decrease the longer a country experiences domestic peace.

Fourth, we control for geographic proximity. Trade flows are highly negatively correlated with geographic proximity: countries tend to be more economically linked to their neighbors than to distant lands (Frankel and Romer 1999). Moreover, it is plausible that military linkages are more common with neighbors than with far-flung countries, and general country salience is likely a function of distance as well. Including the capital-city-to-capital-city distance to the US and distance to UK will allow us to discern empirically the effect of trade and military alliance from more general proximity effects (Gleditsch and Ward 2001). We control for level of economic development with (log) real GDP per capita and include a time trend to account for a general linear trend in AI's reporting and UA activity over the sample period (Gleditsch 2002). Finally, we control for whether a potential target country is involved in a militarized interstate dispute

(MID) with the US or UK. MID is “cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state” (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004).

Estimation

Because the distributions of the dependent variables, AI reporting and UAs, are highly skewed, we use negative binomial regression. Negative binomial models are similar to other event count models, such as Poisson regression, but are more appropriate for over-dispersed data. The interpretation of coefficient estimates for negative binomial models is not intuitive: for a one unit change in the independent variable, the log of expected counts of the dependent variable is expected to change by the regression coefficient, given the other independent variables in the model are held constant. As with other maximum likelihood estimators, the size of the marginal effect is contingent on the values of all other independent variables. In order to address cross-country heteroskedasticity, we estimate Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on countries. We estimate models with and without lagged dependent variables. Our theory is not truly dynamic, in the sense that reporting and/or UA targeting at time t is not necessarily a function of reporting and advocacy efforts at $t-1$ (Keele and Kelly 2006). However, all forms of AI and media reporting are strongly auto-correlated ($r > 0.7$); concerns about autocorrelation are warranted. Thus, we report estimates for both. All explanatory variables are lagged one year.

The US and the UK have very similar alliance patterns and UN voting records, trade patterns, and considerable overlap in the countries to which they donate ODA. This introduces problematic levels of multi-collinearity into the models. Thus, we present models estimating the effects of US and UK linkages separately.

Results

Across all core specifications, two variables that proxy need (in-country human rights conditions, population) are highly significant and in the expected directions: AI targets countries with worse human rights records and larger populations more often for all types of advocacy. The third, civil conflict incidence is only significant for *background reports*. This does not mean that AI does not target countries embattled in civil conflict; rather, it suggests that the effect of conflict operates indirectly, through its effect on AI’s own assessments of human rights conditions (as measured by the PTS) on the ground. Controlling for AI’s assessment of levels of abuse, civil conflict cases do not receive extra emphasis in the form of press releases or UAs. The positive and significant coefficient on background reporting is supportive of the public goods-providing hypothesis: AI invests effort in cataloging and identifying abuses during civil conflicts – independent of their assessments of the prevalence of abuses during those conflicts. While press releases and UAs do not increase with civil conflict incidence, they do decline with the return to peace: the coefficients on press releases ($p < 0.10$) and UAs ($p < 0.01$) are significant and negative across all specifications. AI consistently targets wealthier countries more often for background reporting, though the evidence is weak or inconclusive for press releases and UAs. This finding is consistent with the fact that domestic civil societies may be stronger in more developed countries, making more information available to AI in generating reports. This finding

is consistent with the way that Amnesty often gathers information: local informants that gather data and pass it on to either a national section or the international office directly. Thus, Amnesty will always have more information on states that are more tolerant of civil society and where they have a national section or organized groups. Alternately, AI may find human rights abuses more intolerable in more wealthy societies, and thus may place greater emphasis on them.⁷

Regime type is associated with targeting across targeting types, though the robustness of the results varies. Regarding background reports and press releases, there is weaker evidence that AI targets autocratic governments more than democratic governments, with targeting increasing in a linear fashion. The coefficient on Polity2 is negative and significant in both specifications with US linkage variables, and negative but insignificant with the UK linkage variables. Regarding UAs, however, the relationship is more robust: across three of four specifications, there is a strongly significant negative, though curvilinear, effect of political democracy on the frequency of targeting. The curvilinear effect, as evidenced by the statistically significant coefficient on Polity2², indicates that targeting peaks when regimes are weakly authoritarian (Polity2 = 5), but that it is lower for the most authoritarian regimes and lowest for highly democratic regimes.

While political democracy is at least weakly associated with fewer targets across all types of targeting, an analysis of marginal effects indicates that it matters much more for UAs than for background reports or press releases.⁸ Figure 2 plots predicted numbers of targets for background reports and UAs across the range of values for regime type with the values of other variables held constant at their means. A hypothetical move from full democracy (Polity2 = 10) to full autocracy (Polity2 = -10) is associated with only a 29% increase in the expected count of background reports, but a more than doubling (230%) in the expected count of UAs. A similar change is associated with a 45% increase in press releases. In related work, we demonstrate that media shaming, especially in the form of Western press coverage, is more effective at improving aggregate human rights performance in more autocratic political systems. Thus, with background reports and press releases, AI may be seeking to focus media attention on those countries in which the domestic press and opposition has the least power to bring about awareness of gross human rights violations. In this way, AI targets those cases where the expected effect of press attention is greatest (Author cite 2011). Relatedly, AI is more likely to use UAs for autocratic regimes because of a lack of, or weakness of, civil society components that can normally criticize the state. If we think of mobilizing individuals as a way to supplement or lead to state action, AI will generate more grassroots support in cases where a domestic movement to motivate state action is less likely. These findings fit in well with the logics of both information and leverage politics. Places that repress civil society mean that AI plays a big role in providing information about abuses, and these places thus necessitate the use of powerful states as leverage in order to change state behavior.

The US and UK linkage variables have differential effects across background reporting, press releases, and UAs. Economic and security linkages with the US and UK do not, in the main,

⁷ Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers (2005) cite an AI manager in the New York office as saying “large countries influence small countries ... ‘The fish stinks from the head,’ and we need to make the richer countries respect human rights first” (571).

⁸ Using table 1 (US linkage variables, lagged DV) as our core specification. Differences on coefficient estimates across samples for regime type variables were very small.

affect the targeting of background reports. Across the four core specifications, only two coefficients are statistically significant: (log) ODA from US ($p < 0.10$, non-LDV model) and MID with the UK ($p < 0.05$, non-LDV model).

Generally, the findings indicate that the UK does not play as large of a role in AI's strategic considerations than the US. Security linkages do exert a systematic effect on the targeting of press releases, but only with the US: countries with similar alliance patterns and voting behavior in the UN to the US, and those that receive larger volumes of arms transfers from the US, are targeted more often. Across both US linkage specifications, the coefficients on US foreign policy similarity and (log) arms transfers from US are positive and significant. A quartile-to-quartile shift in US foreign policy similarity (equivalent to going from Russia in 2000 to France in the early 1990s) is associated with a 26% increase in the frequency of targeting. A similar shift in US arms transfers produces only a 6.3% increase in the frequency of targeting. The only evidence of strong links between AI targeting for press releases and UK linkage variables is negative: in both specifications, UK ODA donations and MIDS with the UK are negatively associated with targeting of press releases. The effect of ODA is modest—a quartile-to-quartile shift produces a 16% decrease in the frequency of targeting—while the effect of a MID is larger. Engaging in a MID with the UK the previous year decreases the frequency of targeting by 55%.

UAs clearly correlate with US economic and security linkages, particularly trade from the potential target country and foreign policy similarity. The coefficient on (log) trade to US is positive and significant in both US specifications. Moreover, the substantive effect is large. A quartile-to-quartile shift in (log) trade to US is associated with a 48.3% increase in the frequency of targeting. Interestingly, the effect of trade is only apparent when using trade to the United States – neither overall trade nor trade from the US to a potential target country had any effect. If targeting decisions are in part driven by perceived country salience to AI rank-and-file members, this makes sense from an informational perspective. While the destinations of US exports may be opaque to many members, every product sold in the US bears a country of origin marker.

Recipients of ODA from the US also see increased scrutiny. The coefficients on Log ODA from US are weakly significant ($p < 0.10$) under both specifications. The marginal effect is smaller than for trade: a quartile-to-quartile shift is associated with a 17.8% increase in the frequency of targeting.

Foreign policy similarity to the US increases the frequency of targeting for UAs, while similarity to the UK decreases it. Across the specifications, the coefficients on US foreign policy similarity and (log) arms transfers from US are positive and significant, while the coefficients for UK foreign policy similarity are negative and significant. A quartile-to-quartile shift in US foreign policy similarity is associated with a 27% increase in the frequency of targeting for UAs. Results for UK were of similar magnitude but in the opposite direction. The coefficient estimates on arms transfers and MIDs with the US were not significant; a MID with the UK, however, decreases the frequency of targeting by 45.6%.

The strongly divergent results for foreign policy similarity to the UK and US suggest that the broader results could be driven by Latin American and Caribbean cases. The UK and US have similar alliance patterns and diplomatic relationships outside of the Western hemisphere, where

the US has significantly more influence. Are these divergent results driven by Latin American and Caribbean cases, where AI has demonstrated more interest in the past? The short answer is no: most of the effects of UK and US economic and security linkages are not changed by the inclusion of a dummy coding for Latin American and Caribbean countries.⁹

Taken together, these findings suggest four broad conclusions. First, domestic political institutions in potential target countries and those countries' international linkages with the US and the UK shape AI's advocacy efforts, and do so in predictable ways given the organization's internal political economy. As a donor-driven organization, AI produces a public good of human rights research, attempts to guide the press agenda and international opinion, and activates its membership to participate directly in advocacy campaigns. AI faces a distinct set of incentives and constraints in each of these domains. These organizational imperatives at once encourage AI to be relatively neutral in its background reporting on abuses, but disproportionately target countries with stronger economic and security ties to the United States, in particular, for its press releases and UAs. Moreover, the domestic political institutions in target countries help to determine whether AI's advocacy efforts will be met with success or simply ignored, and as such, result in a clear tendency to focus its direct efforts at more authoritarian governments.

Second, regime type matters more for advocacy efforts that communicate directly with potential target governments – UAs – and less (or not at all) for advocacy efforts targeted primarily at Western governments, IGOs, the international media, and academic audiences: background reports and press releases. This is broadly consistent with earlier findings derived from the information politics model of AI reporting (Ron, Ramos and Rodgers 2005, table 5), but counter to its theoretical expectations. Ron, Ramos and Rodgers interpret this non-finding in terms of countervailing effects (democracies have fewer human rights abuses, which would lead to less reporting, but are characterized by more free-flowing information, which would lead to more reporting), but levels of abuses are already explicitly modeled – both in their models and ours. Alternately, we interpret the strong finding regarding UAs, and the weak or non-finding regarding background reports and press releases, as evidence of the organizational imperatives. AI wants to be perceived as an impartial reporter that disseminates information on violator states to other actors (especially background reports, but also press releases), but also recognizes the institutional incentives that condition potential target government receptivity to direct advocacy with their UAs. Letters from abroad are unlikely to sway democratically elected leaders, who face a political environment of greater domestic legitimacy, in which certain abuses may in fact be sources of political support. Thus, we see that all advocacy is not alike, and that AI has a strategic reason to use different advocacy methods based at least in part on the regime type in violator states.

Third, AI's advocacy efforts follow the US flag, and not the UK. Since we control explicitly for AI-derived assessments of the prevalence of human rights abuses in potential target countries, the possibility that this is due to selection effects – that the US trades and has alliances with

⁹ The dummy variable for Latin America is positive and highly significant for UAs, and renders the effect of policy similarity to the US insignificant under the LDV specification. However, it does not affect the statistical or substantive significance of the trade or aid variables. Controlling for Latin America and the Caribbean actually increases the magnitude of the effect of foreign policy similarity on press releases. For expanded discussion and regression tables, see Appendix 1 (to be published online).

systematically worse abusers – is remote. Earlier research on AI reporting confirms a bias toward reporting on the US and wealthier countries, but our findings suggest that this increased scrutiny extends to those countries that have stronger security and economic linkages with the US. While an emphasis on states with stronger ties to the United States is consistent with the boomerang model of NGO advocacy, wherein NGOs press powerful Western governments to exert influence over their allies and aid recipients, the non-findings regarding UK linkages are not. However, AI's position as a donor-driven organization, and the fact that the US has the largest and one of the most economically influential sections, helps to explain the discrepancy.

Fourth, AI's uses advocacy methods in accordance with different kinds of international linkages. While the targeting of press releases follows the security relationships of potential target states with the United States, the targeting of UAs follows trade relationships and, to a lesser extent, aid relationships. Of most interest is that UA targeting is conditioned by trade ties, but only in terms of the trade coming into the US. This speaks to how AI accounts for the political salience of states in the minds of potential supporters in its biggest national section, as it is very clear where goods come from, but not always where goods go. Supporters may be more aware of ties to countries from which consumers receive products.

Conclusions

That organizations make choices is not a controversial point – we know from an ample literature from organizational sociology and international relations that organizations have moral and material interests, and they act in ways to forward those interests. However, there has been a tendency to assume that those organizations proclaiming to “do good” (such as human rights INGOs) provide public goods by providing information on bad policies of states and other actors. On the whole, we think this is a correct assumption, but requires elaboration. In this paper, we have provided a rationale with which to understand why NGOs target the countries that they do in their various advocacy efforts, and why they might choose particular tactics to go about pursuing a case.

INGOs are strategic actors engaged in the business of political change. As such, who they target with their advocacy, and furthermore, the method of advocacy they choose, is an important facet of their work, as these factors dictate to a certain degree what we have come to know about human rights violations, and how we understand what it means to uphold human rights. INGOs and transnational actors, as Keck and Sikkink rightly point out, engage in different kinds of politics. While INGOs are important conduits of information and engage in various activities to help frame the information they provide, this paper has emphasized a further role that INGOs play: that of using information strategically in order to encourage other states to bandwagon against human rights violating states. Put differently, not all naming and shaming techniques are equal, and they are not one-size-fits-all. Depending on the violator state in question, an INGO may employ one advocacy method, or it might use several in conjunction.

In this paper, we present the logic that INGOs use to select between various targets and methods of advocacy, thereby illustrating that conventional understandings of what shapes human rights reporting – such as regime type, severity and extent of human rights abuse, and previous reporting – matter for whom they choose to report on, but not necessarily how they go about

doing so. Instead, what shapes advocacy method INGOs use is predicated upon organizational imperatives – funders, membership – and the structure of international relations. INGOs use abusive states’ friends against them by leveraging information on human rights violations to pressure other governments to act against their allies. We find that economic ties (trade) encourage INGOs to solicit their rank-and-file members to act, because such ties create political salience for ordinary citizens. Trade relationships, particularly incoming goods, are much more obvious to the regular consumer than other types of relationships. Thus, INGOs use salient economic ties to help convince citizens to act against human rights violating states, in this case, participating in UAs. By contrast, security alliances and foreign aid, which are characterized by state-to-state transactions, provide much more support for INGOs to use leverage politics. If they can get states to alter their security or aid relationships with violator states, INGOs can hurt the governments in power by denying them access to weapons and funds that such states use to actively repress their populations. INGOs can apply leverage politics most effectively through press releases.

INGOs, however, also form the backbone of our current understanding of human rights in the world. They provide a public good when they write background reports, which chronicle a chain of events in a particular country, and help shape our understanding of the context of human rights abuses. Background reports, however, are not for everyone; only those with an strong desire to know details about certain regimes or regions will read these often lengthy accounts. These reports exist as historical record, for future researchers and policymakers alike, but they are not things that INGOs would use in leverage, or even information politics. Shorter statements and case dossiers provide much more palatable ways of disseminating information on human rights abuses to a broader, international public that can act against abusive states.

By forging the perspective presented in this paper, we refine our current understandings of INGOs in the international system. The pioneering work in IR has largely focused on how INGOs have had an effect on political outcomes; more recently, much more serious research has been undertaken to parse out differences between various non-state actors, and how these differences have political consequences. Our contribution extends analyses one step further by developing an argument around how and why INGOs choose the cases, targets, and tactics that they do. Instead of positing an assumption of either a public goods or an organizational choice, our analysis demonstrates that INGOs pursue multiple goals throughout their cases, and elect to use different kinds of tactics under different external conditions. We show that while ascriptive characteristics, such as regime type, do matter for how INGOs approach abusive states, the relationships between violator states and other states also shape the way that INGOs will act. The INGOs from which we draw our data provides an illustration of the theory. Regime type, a mainstay of human rights analysis, seems to affect only more direct methods of advocacy with states – that is, those that do not rely on the boomerang effect. The data also reveal that the relationships between violators and the USA is what counts, as American influence overshadows UK military or economic ties. As we expect, the types of ties – whether military or economic – shape different NGO tactics. This is consistent with the logic that we present here: NGOs take into account different types of relationships between states before deciding on potential state partners and the ways in which it will disseminate information about abuses. While AI does provide a significant global public good in the form of their in-depth reporting on human rights

abuses, AI is an advocacy organization first and foremost, and the results of our analysis indicate that organization prerogatives affect their advocacy efforts in predictable ways.

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Table 1: Amnesty International's Choices of Tactics

		Participatory?	
		Yes	No
Leverage Politics?	Yes		Press releases
	No	UAs	Background reporting

Table 1. Domestic institutions, US economic and security linkages, and Amnesty International advocacy efforts

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Background reports		Press releases		UA Campaigns	
DV _{T-1}	0.095*** (0.010)		0.119*** (0.016)		0.070*** (0.010)	
POLITICAL TERROR SCALE _{T-1}	-0.180*** (0.031)	-0.358*** (0.040)	-0.402*** (0.057)	-0.486*** (0.070)	-0.399*** (0.048)	-0.614*** (0.052)
LOG POPULATION _{T-1}	0.177*** (0.029)	0.288*** (0.044)	0.165*** (0.039)	0.193*** (0.048)	0.128*** (0.042)	0.170*** (0.051)
LOG GDP PER CAPITA _{T-1}	0.203*** (0.052)	0.393*** (0.075)	0.115* (0.063)	0.157** (0.077)	0.097 (0.071)	0.169** (0.084)
POLITY2 _{T-1}	-0.013** (0.006)	-0.016* (0.009)	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.020** (0.009)	-0.060*** (0.008)	-0.072*** (0.010)
POLITY2 ² _{T-1}	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)
CIVIL CONFLICT INCIDENCE _{T-1}	0.206** (0.081)	0.290** (0.115)	0.046 (0.105)	0.135 (0.116)	-0.080 (0.107)	0.055 (0.126)
YEARS SINCE CONFLICT _{T-1}	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.004)
LOG TRADE TO US _{T-1}	0.001 (0.021)	-0.002 (0.033)	0.033 (0.035)	0.051 (0.041)	0.106*** (0.035)	0.126*** (0.047)
LOG ODA FROM US _{T-1}	0.002 (0.004)	0.012* (0.007)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.007)	0.010* (0.005)	0.012* (0.006)
US FOREIGN POLICY SIMILARITY _{T-1}	0.109 (0.182)	0.378 (0.316)	0.940*** (0.301)	1.011*** (0.350)	0.981*** (0.293)	1.736*** (0.335)
LOG ARMS TRANSFERS FROM US _{T-1}	-0.004 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.028)	0.055** (0.024)	0.063** (0.027)	-0.012 (0.021)	0.020 (0.044)
MID WITH US _{T-1}	0.024 (0.123)	0.004 (0.121)	-0.019 (0.222)	0.151 (0.242)	-0.213 (0.130)	-0.443** (0.185)
LOG DISTANCE FROM CAPITAL TO US _{T-1}	-0.128 (0.080)	-0.065 (0.119)	0.108 (0.123)	0.167 (0.146)	-0.086 (0.120)	-0.129 (0.153)
TIME TREND	0.024*** (0.004)	0.038*** (0.006)	0.110*** (0.008)	0.136*** (0.008)	0.023*** (0.006)	0.035*** (0.007)
CONSTANT	-49.233*** (8.905)	-79.404*** (12.624)	-222.491*** (15.101)	-273.843*** (15.422)	-46.724*** (12.168)	-70.550*** (13.884)
Observations	2,623	2,623	2,623	2,623	2,623	2,623

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2. Domestic institutions, UK economic and security linkages, and Amnesty International advocacy efforts

VARIABLES	(7) Background reports	(8)	(9)	(10) Press releases	(11) UA Campaigns	(12)
DV _{T-1}	0.094*** (0.009)		0.122*** (0.016)		0.081*** (0.009)	
POLITICAL TERROR SCALE _{T-1}	-0.210*** (0.030)	-0.393*** (0.047)	-0.445*** (0.059)	-0.537*** (0.072)	-0.337*** (0.056)	-0.585*** (0.092)
LOG POPULATION _{T-1}	0.179*** (0.032)	0.292*** (0.049)	0.225*** (0.045)	0.269*** (0.055)	0.244*** (0.044)	0.353*** (0.063)
LOG GDP PER CAPITA _{T-1}	0.193*** (0.049)	0.348*** (0.063)	0.206*** (0.058)	0.256*** (0.068)	0.235*** (0.059)	0.352*** (0.075)
POLITY2 _{T-1}	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.036*** (0.007)	-0.027** (0.012)
POLITY2 ² _{T-1}	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)
CIVIL CONFLICT INCIDENCE _{T-1}	0.189** (0.082)	0.291** (0.122)	-0.023 (0.106)	0.078 (0.125)	-0.063 (0.103)	0.121 (0.123)
YEARS SINCE CONFLICT _{T-1}	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.004)
LOG TRADE TO UK _{T-1}	-0.018 (0.025)	-0.016 (0.037)	0.036 (0.037)	0.059 (0.043)	-0.005 (0.035)	0.001 (0.046)
LOG ODA FROM UK _{T-1}	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.016** (0.008)	0.000 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.007)
UK FOREIGN POLICY SIMILARITY _{T-1}	-0.280 (0.222)	-0.244 (0.371)	0.397 (0.376)	0.527 (0.464)	-1.188*** (0.360)	-1.518** (0.755)
LOG ARMS TRANSFERS FROM UK _{T-1}	0.014 (0.020)	0.035 (0.033)	-0.025 (0.028)	-0.017 (0.035)	0.009 (0.025)	0.076* (0.043)
MID WITH UK _{T-1}	-0.228 (0.151)	-0.497** (0.208)	-0.791*** (0.152)	-0.697** (0.350)	-0.562*** (0.162)	-1.412*** (0.258)
LOG DISTANCE FROM CAPITAL TO UK _{T-1}	-0.133*** (0.051)	-0.111 (0.080)	0.162** (0.070)	0.207** (0.080)	0.242*** (0.081)	0.340*** (0.124)
TIME TREND	0.023*** (0.004)	0.039*** (0.007)	0.107*** (0.008)	0.133*** (0.007)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.036*** (0.008)
CONSTANT	-47.037*** (8.946)	-80.463*** (13.318)	-216.981*** (15.218)	-269.569*** (14.945)	-43.461*** (11.381)	-77.363*** (15.174)
OBSERVATIONS	2,622	2,622	2,622	2,622	2,622	2,622

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 1: Top ten targets of Amnesty International background reporting, press releases, and UAs, 1975-2004.

