Delegating the Power to Govern Security Affairs: The Composition of the UN Security Council*

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Abstract

This paper examines the nomination and election process of Council non-permanent members by focusing on whether elected members' policy preferences differ substantially from those of the permanent members such that they actually increase the heterogeneity of the Council. I argue and find that regional groups have a significant influence on the composition of the Security Council, and that countries representing the interests of the region are more likely to be elected as Council members. However, when I look at overall elected members, I find that countries with policy preferences closer to that of the United States are more likely to be elected, suggesting that the current electoral system works advantageously to pro-U.S. member states. The results also indicate that international norms have some influence on the selection process and that countries with a reputation for free-riding or transgressing international security norms are less likely to be elected. This paper provides two data sets: one on the elected members and the other on the candidates.

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1 Introduction

The UN Security Council is one of the six primary organs of the United Nations and it serves as a legislative organ specialized in international security. The Charter of the United Nations delegates the Security Council primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and gives its resolutions the power to bind all members of the United Nations.[1] Such important decisions are, however, determined by the fifteen members of the Council, consisting of five permanent and ten non-permanent members. The former were victorious allies from World War II (i.e., China, France, Russia, the Untied Kingdom, and the United States) and they have continuous membership and veto power. The remaining ten members are elected by the General Assembly and serve on the Security Council for two years. Although those elected members do not have the power to block resolutions on their own, they still have some influence over Council resolutions because the votes of the permanent members alone do not suffice to cross the required threshold to adopt resolutions (Bailey and Daws 1998). Therefore, countries elected to the Security Council can play an important role in shaping policies on global security and their composition affects the interests of all UN members. In this paper, I analyze which UN members are more likely to be elected as Council members and examine how the interests of regional groups and overall UN members affect the composition of this organization.

Given that members of a policy-making entity can have a strong influence on the decision-making process, its composition has been largely examined in political science in general. For example, in American Politics, committee selection has attracted substantial attention, and extensive theoretical and empirical analyses have been conducted on this topic (Groseclose 1994; Krehbiel 1992; Weingast and Marshall 1988). Moreover, such analyses have been extended into the other fields, and McElroy (2006), for example, examines committee assignments in the European Parliament. While there is skepticism about the idea that international organizations can be

[1] More precisely, only resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter have legally constraining power.

democratic (Dahl 1999), several scholars of international relations have also started analyzing the delegation to international organizations (Hawkins et al. 2006; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Pollack 1997). Yet, the majority of these studies are devoted to analyze the relationship between the administrative and legislative organs of international organizations, and a few scholars shed light on the relationship between UN members and the Security Council.

The composition of the Security Council has rather been addressed by normative studies or studies that utilize a game-theoretic model to analyze the link between international organizations and domestic politics. These studies argue that having a Council which consists of diverse preferences is important because it bolsters the perceived legitimacy of Council resolutions by reducing the influence of permanent members over the decision-making process (Caron 1993) and by allowing the Council to represent the wider population of UN members (Hurd 2008). Therefore, if the Council consists of members with heterogenous interests, it is more likely to promote members' compliance with resolutions (Barnett 1997), to help countries reveal information about their true intentions (Thompson 2006), and to help leaders signal their competence to domestic audiences (Chapman 2007; Chapman and Reiter 2004).[2] Although these theoretical arguments provide insights into the importance of heterogenous interests within the Council, few empirical analyses have been conducted to examine the actual composition of the Security Council. To the author's knowledge, there exist only two published papers on Council membership. Padelford (1960) conducts the first analysis of the elected members before the 1966 enlargement and criticizes the election procedures in place at the time for yielding inequality among regions. Malone (2000) conducts a more recent study on elected members and illustrates the presence of intense competition among Western European countries over Council seats. However, empirical evidence for the existence of heterogeneity among Council members' preferences has not been provided yet.

[2]Note that not all studies stress the importance of heterogenous interests within the Security Council. For example, Fang (2008) argues that international organizations help domestic leaders to signal their competence to their domestic audiences without referring to the preferences of the members. Moreover, some scholars, such as Voeten (2005), do not refer to the elected members when they argue for the heterogeneity of member preferences.

In this paper, I examine both the nomination and election process to identify factors affecting the likelihood that UN members gain seats on the Security Council.

I argue that the nomination process has a significant influence on the composition of the Security Council, and that countries representing the interests of the region are more likely to be elected as Council members. In order to examine the validity of this argument, I have collected two completely new data sets on Council membership: one on the elected members (1965-2008) and the other on the candidates (1991-2008). Using these data sets, I conduct both parametric and non-parametric analyses to examine the influence of members' policy preferences on the likelihood that they gain seats. The results support my argument; however, when I look at overall elected members, I also find that the current electoral system works advantageously to pro-U.S. countries and that it does not guarantee equitable geographical distribution set out in the UN Charter.

2 The Composition of the UN Security Council

Before analyzing the composition of the Security Council, I provide a brief history of Council membership, followed by illustrations of the benefits associated with Council seats and a description of the actual voting procedure.

2.1 Historical Background

The basic structure of the Security Council was proposed at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference held in August 1944. The United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China agreed that the Council would be an executive organ given the specialized functions of maintaining international peace and security and that the four countries plus France would have permanent membership with veto power.[3] They entitled themselves to such privileges on the ground that the Council would not

[3]The initial U.S. drafts of the UN Charter, such as the one proposed by Sumner Welles in early 1943 and by the Staff Charter, included the idea that the Council would consist of four permanent members (the current permanent five minus France) and seven representatives from various regional groups. (Hoopes and Brinkley 68, 76; Schlesinger

be able to enforce its decisions unless there exists a consensus among the major powers. The four powers also agreed that the Council should consist of a small number of countries based on the experience of the League of Nations. The League had adopted a unanimity rule with a relatively large membership,[4] which made it unable to respond to a crisis if a Council member was a party to the dispute (Goodrich 1947).[5] Therefore, the four powers determined that the size of the Council should be small and that only major powers have veto power so that even if middle-range powers such as Germany or Japan launched an attack, the Council could still take some countermeasures.[6]

At Dumbarton Oaks, Great Britain and the Soviet Union suggested that the Council consist of 11 members, six of which would be elected members. Although the United States proposed a sixth permanent seat for Brazil, none of the other major powers or Latin American countries supported that idea. Moreover, Great Britain proposed that the non-permanent members should be elected in accordance with their level of military contributions; however, this proposal was met with objections, particularly from the United States which insisted that this might prevent smaller states from gaining seats in the Council (Russell and Muther 1958). Accordingly, the four countries agreed that the Council would consist of five permanent members and six elected members.

At San Francisco, small states which had both an incentive to promote their own interests and fear of the collusion by the great powers expressed their objections against the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. A variety of amendments regarding Council membership were proposed. The Latin American states attempted to secure a permanent seat or, at minimum, obtain a definite allocation

2003, 40-41, 46)

[4]Initially, the League's Council consisted of four permanent members (Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan) and four elected members. However, the number of both permanent and non-permanent members later increased. In 1922, two non-permanent members were added. In 1926, Germany became the fifth permanent member, and three more nonpermanent seats were created. In 1933, one more non-permanent seat was added, and in 1934, the Soviet Union became the sixth permanent member. On the other hand, Germany, Japan, and Italy withdrew from the League of Nations in 1933, 1935, and 1937 respectively (Padelford 1960).

[5]For example, the Council was not able to take any action in the case of Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931, Italian aggression in Ethiopia in 1935 and the German annexation of Czechoslovakia in 1939. In all cases, the parties to the dispute blocked the resolutions.

[6]The founders of the Security Council assumed that cooperation among the allies would continue in the postwar world. Hence, the Council was not designed to act against any permanent members (Murthy 1995, 424).

of nonpermanent seats. Whereas smaller powers, especially Liberia, proposed an alphabetical rotation of non-permanent members so that all states could be guaranteed participation in the Council, middle-sized states, such as France, Canada, and Australia, suggested that non-permanent members should be elected based on their ability and willingness to contribute to international security. Moreover, India proposed that members should reflect population size and economic capability, and Australia suggested that retiring members should be eligible for immediate re-election (Russell and Muther 1958).

The major powers also proposed amendments to the proposals. Great Britain again suggested the inclusion of the criterion that non-permanent members should be elected based on their contribution to international security. While the United States initially expressed its objections, the four powers finally agreed to amend the criteria for the selection of the non-permanent members by adding the security requirement as well as distributing the seats by region. Although this amendment was accepted, other amendments proposed by the smaller powers, such as immediate re-election and alphabetical rotation, were all rejected. As a result, the eleven-member Council was approved unanimously with a number of abstentions, and this agreement later became the Charter of the United Nations (Russell and Muther 1958).

Therefore, the initial purpose of distributing the seats by region was not to guarantee geographical representation (like the electoral systems of most democratic countries) but to give smaller states a chance of gaining seats. However, during the 1950s, newly interdependent states started to use this criterion to ameliorate the underepresentation of African and Asian states and to enlarge the Council to obtain equitable geographical distribution (Bailey and Daws 1998).[7] In December 1963, at the initiative of African and Asian states, the General Assembly decided to enlarge the Council membership from 11 to 15, beginning in 1966. Although UN membership has increased since then, the size and allocation of Council seats remains the same.

[7]Between 1945 and 1965, the total membership of the United Nations increased from 51 to 117. The proportion of Asian and African states rose from 25 to 50 percent.

2.2 States' Quest for Non-Permanent Seats

Since the votes of the five permanent members alone do not suffice to cross the required decision threshold, they need the support of at least four non-permanent members to pass a resolution. This suggests that non-permanent members have some power over Council decision making.[8] In addition to this voting power, temporary members are also believed to receive political and financial benefits. For example, Council members are able to obtain information on other members' interests through formal and informal meetings (Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander 1999). Council members may also enhance their reputation as contributors to the international community (Malone 2000). Moreover, recent studies point out the possibility that Council members receive financial benefits in exchange for their votes. For example, Kuziemko and Wallander (2006) demonstrate that developing countries are able to increase their foreign aid by extracting concessions from permanent members. They show that while a recipient country sits on the Security Council, on average total aid from the United States to that member has increased by 59 percent and total development aid from the United Nations has increased by 8 percent. Similarly, Dreher, Strum, and Vreeland (2009*a*; 2009*b*) show that both the World Bank and the IMF have increased their programs and loans toward Council member states. These studies suggest that UN Members have an incentive to seek Council seats and competition over Council seats has become increasingly intense recently (Malone 2000).

Yet not all UN Members can obtain seats on the Council. Whether a country actually becomes a Council member depends on the voting decisions of the entire UN membership. In the following section, I briefly describe the process of election for non-permanent members.

[8] Bailey and Daws (1998) calls this a *hidden veto*.

2.3 The Selection Process of Council Members

Ten out of the 15 members of the Council are elected by the General Assembly for a term of two years. Every year, half of the members are elected by secret ballot (Rule 94 of the General Assembly's Rules of Procedure).[9] In order to become elected, countries need the approval from two-thirds of the voting members (Article 18 (2) and Rule 85) and they are not allowed immediate re-election (Article 23 (2)).[10] Following the 1966 enlargement of the membership, the Council decided to allocate the ten non-permanent seats into five regional groups: three seats to the African group, two to Asia, one to Eastern Europe, two to Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC), and two to Western European countries and others (WEOG).[11] Every odd year, three countries are elected from Africa and Asia,[12] one country from GRULAC, and one from the Eastern European countries. In even years, two countries are elected from Africa and Asia,[13] one country from GRULAC, and two countries from WEOG. Table 1 presents the list of UN Members that belong to one of those regional groups,[14] and Table 2 shows the total number of times that each country has been elected between 1945 and 2009.[15]

Each regional group has its own set of rules and practices to select candidates. However, in almost all regions, candidates are initially determined based on the self-nomination.[16] Therefore,

[9]Throughout this paper, Article refers to the Article of the UN Charter and Rule refers to the Rules of the General Assembly's Rules of Procedure.

[10]The reason why it specifies "the voting Members" is because countries that fail to contribute to the United Nations for more than two years lose their vote at the General Assembly (Article 19).

[11]This allocation is pursuant to paragraph 3 of Resolution 1991 A (XVIII) adopted by the General Assembly on December 17, 1963. While this resolution does not distinguish between Africa and Asian states, in accordance with the established practice, three seats are allotted to African seats and two to Asian states. Moreover, there is an understanding that the Asian and African groups take turns to nominate an Arab member so that at least one Arab state serves on the Security Council. This practice is called "Arab swing seat" and except in 1967, both regions have been following this practice.

[12]Of these three seats, two are to be allotted to African states and one to Asian states.

[13]Of the two seats, one is allotted to African countries and the other is to Asian countries.

[14]Note that the United States and Kiribati do not belong to any regional groups.

[15]Countries which have never been elected are excluded from this table.

[16]On rare occasions, a candidate is determined by the regional group. For example, in the 2006 election, Guatemala and Ecuador were competing over one Council seat but neither of them achieved the required majority. After 47 rounds of inconclusive balloting, Guatemala and Ecuador finally agreed to step aside but proposed Panama as a consensus candidate.

Africa (53)			
Algeria	Angola	Benin	Botswana
Burkina Faso	Burundi	Cameroon	Cape Verde
Central African Republic	Chad	Comoros	Republic of the Congo
Côte d'Ivoire	Democratic Rep of the Congo	Djibouti	Egypt
Equatorial Guinea	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Gabon
the Gambia	Ghana	Guinea	Guinea-Bissau
Kenya	Lesotho	Liberia	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Mauritania
Mauritius	Morocco	Mozambique	Namibia
Niger	Nigeria	Rwanda	Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal	Seychelles	Sierra Leone	Somalia
South Africa	Sudan	Swaziland	Togo
Tunisia	Uganda	United Republic of Tanzania	Zambia
Zimbabwe			
Asia (53)			
Afghanistan	Bahrain	Bangladesh	Bhutan
Brunei Darussalam	Cambodia	China	Cyprus
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Fiji	India	Indonesia
Islamic Republic of Iran	Iraq	Japan	Jordan
Kazakhstan	Kuwait	Kyrgyzstan	Lao People's Democratic Republic
Lebanon	Malaysia	Maldives	Marshall Islands
Federated States of Micronesia	Mongolia	Myanmar	Nauru
Nepal	Oman	Pakistan	Palau
Papua New Guinea	Philippines	Qatar	Republic of Korea
Samoa	Saudi Arabia	Singapore	Solomon Islands
Sri Lanka	Syrian Arab Republic	Tajikistan	Thailand
Timore-Leste	Tonga	Turkmenistan	Tuvalu
United Arab Emirates	Uzbekistan	Vanuatu	Vietnam
Yemen	(Southern Yemen)		
Eastern Europe (23)			
Albania	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bulgaria	Croatia	Czech Republic
Estonia	Georgia	Hungary	Latvia
Lithuania	Montenegro	Poland	Republic of Moldova
Romania	Russian Federation	Serbia	Slovakia
Slovenia	TFY Republic of Macedonia	Ukraine	(Czechslovakia)
(Democratic Germany)	(Yugoslavia)		
Latin America and Caribbean (33)			
Antigua and Barbuda	Argentina	Bahamas	Barbados
Belize	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile
Colombia	Costa Rica	Cuba	Dominica
Dominican Republic	Ecuador	El Salvador	Grenada
Guatemala	Guyana	Haiti	Honduras
Jamaica	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama
Paraguay	Peru	Saint Kitts and Nevis	Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Suriname	Trinidad and Tobago	Uruguay
Bolivian Republic of Venezuela			
Western Europe and Others (28)			
Andorra	Australia	Austria	Belgium
Canada	Denmark	Finland	France
Germany	Greece	Iceland	Ireland
Israel	Italy	Liechtenstein	Luxembourg
Malta	Monaco	the Netherlands	New Zealand
Norway	Portugal	San Marino	Spain
Sweden	Switzerland	Turkey	United Kingdom
(Federal Republic of Germany)			

Table 1: Regional Groups

Country	#	Country	#	Country	#
Brazil	10	Tunisia	3	Botswana	1
Japan	10	Uganda	3	Burundi	1
Argentina	8	Ukraine	3	Cape Verde	1
Canada	6	Zambia	3	Croatia	1
Colombia	6	Bangladesh	2	Czech Republic	1
India	6	Benin	2	Djibouti	1
Italy	6	Bolivia	2	Gambia	1
Pakistan	6	Burkina Faso	2	German Democratic Republic	1
Belgium	5	Cameroon	2	Guinea-Bissau	1
Egypt	5	Congo	2	Honduras	1
Netherlands	5	Cote d'Ivoire	2	Iran	1
Panama	5	Czechoslovakia	2	Kuwait	1
Poland	5	Democratic Republic of the Congo	2	Liberia	1
Australia	4	Ethiopia	2	Madagascar	1
Chile	4	Germany, Federal Republic of	2	Malta	1
Denmark	4	Finland	2	Mauritania	1
Mexico	4	Germany	2	Namibia	1
Nigeria	4	Greece	2	Niger	1
Norway	4	Guinea	2	Oman	1
Peru	4	Guyana	2	Paraguay	1
Philippines	4	Hungary	2	Qatar	1
Romania	4	Iraq	2	Republic of Korea	1
Spain	4	Jamaica	2	Rwanda	1
Turkey	4	Jordan	2	Sierra Leone	1
Venezuela	4	Kenya	2	Singapore	1
Yugoslavia	4	Lebanon	2	Slovakia	1
Algeria	3	Libya	2	Slovenia	1
Austria	3	Mali	2	Somalia	1
Bulgaria	3	Mauritius	2	South Africa	1
Costa Rica	3	Morocco	2	Sri Lanka	1
Cuba	3	Nepal	2	Sudan	1
Ecuador	3	Nicaragua	2	Thailand	1
Gabon	3	Portugal	2	Togo	1
Ghana	3	Senegal	2	Trinidad and Tobago	1
Indonesia	3	Tanzania	2	United Arab Emirates	1
Ireland	3	Zimbabwe	2	Uruguay	1
Malaysia	3	Angola	1	Vietnam	1
New Zealand	3	Bahrain	1	Yemen People's Republic	1
Sweden	3	Belarus	1		
Syria	3	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1		

Table 2: Frequency of Serving on the Security Council (1946-2009)

if a country wants to sit on the Council, it needs to announce its candidacy and obtain support from the group. Such a country needs to inform the chair of the regional group of its intention to run and simultaneously submit a circular note to all members of the Untied Nations to inform its candidacy.[17] Note that the announcement normally takes place many years ahead and smaller countries tend to announce their candidacies far in advance in order to deter other countries' entry and to have enough time for campaigning. For example, Kazakhstan put its bid for the 2010 election in 1997, whereas India indicated its intention to run in the same election only in 2007 (Security Council Report 2009).[18]

If there are more candidates than seats available, regional groups may step in and reduce the number of candidates based on the rules or practices. The African group is the only regional group that has codified rules for the nomination process. According to "the Rules of Procedure of the AU Ministerial Committee of Candidatures within the International System," the African group allocated three seats into five subregions (the Northern Africa, the Central Africa, the Western Africa, the Eastern Africa, and the Southern Africa) so that the Northern Africa and the Central Africa share one seat, the Western Africa holds one seat, and the Eastern Africa and the Southern Africa share one seat. This rule also states that each subregion nominates its candidate based on the rotation principle; however, in practice, this principle has been frequently overridden by many factors, such as states' incentives to run for election more frequently.[19] In the 2009 election, Gabon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo showed their interests in the Central African seat, and Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Togo were initially competing over the seat for the Western Africa.[20] If there are many applicants, the African group attempts to persuade some candidates to withdraw so that the group can submit a clean slate of candidates. Yet, occasionally, countries pursue their

[17]Some regional groups have several subregional groups. If that country is a member of a subregional group, it first announces all members of the subregions to obtain their support.

[18]Security Council Report is available at $http://www.securitycouncilreport.org$

[19]Note also that countries can change their affiliation from one subgroup to another. In 2004, for example, Mauritania left the West Africa group and became a member of the North Africa group.

[20]To check whether a subregion selects its nominees in accordance with the rotation principle, I examined the data of candidates between 1965 and 2008. However, I was not able to find any evidence of strict rotation in those subregions.

bids until the election is held at the General Assembly. In other regional groups, there is no codified rule and therefore, competition over the seat tends to become intensified. However, this does not necessarily eliminate the influence of regional groups on the nomination process because few countries have an incentive to run for election if they do not have enough support from their region. For example, St. Vincent and the Grenadines originally showed its intent to run for election in 2010; however, it withdrew its bid once it found out that not all Caribbean states would support its candidacy (Security Council Report 2010).

If the number of candidates is the same as the number of seats available, the chair of the group informs the president of the General Assembly of the clean slate, and the group endorses the candidate. Although the UN members tend to respect the decisions of the regional groups, a formal ballot is still required even in the case of a clean slate, as these are elections to a principal organ of the United Nations (The General Assembly decision 34/401, paragraph 16).[21] The election at the General Assembly becomes more important if regional groups fail to reach a consensus. If no candidate obtains the required majority, voting continues until a country receives the required majority, making the election a lengthy process.[22] In 1979, for example, Cuba and Colombia competed over one assigned seat and members cast votes more than 155 times until a newly endorsed candidate, Mexico, was elected (Verbatim Record of the General Assembly 1979).[23] Therefore, while the five regional groups have the privilege of selecting candidates, they still need to consider whether the whole body of members will support their candidates.

[21]However, there is no guarantee that the endorsed candidates are always elected. An ambiguous case happened in 2000 when the African group endorsed the Sudan as its candidate. Soon after the endorsement, Ugandan president showed his objection against the candidacy of the Sudan because it was still under Security Council sanctions (S/RES/1044, 1054). As a result, Mauritius that had declared its candidacy three months prior to the election was elected (A/55/PV.32).

[22]If the first ballot is inconclusive, then there will be a restricted ballot limited to those two states which are not elected but obtained the largest number of votes in the first ballot. If the third restricted ballot is still inconclusive, then there will be a nonrestricted ballot limited to the countries from the target region. If the third nonrestricted ballot is still inconclusive, then the following three ballots are restricted to those two states that obtained the largest number of votes in the previous ballot. This process continues until a country obtains the required majority.

[23]In most of the time, however, election does not last so long because a candidate that obtains fewer number of votes tends to withdraw from the race after a couple of balloting.

The presence of relatively democratic procedures for electing temporary members suggests that it is not easy for major powers to influence the election outcome. Voting is by secret ballot, and this prevents major powers from finding out the voting decisions of other members. Moreover, the United States does not belong to any regional group, making it even harder for the United States to control the election process.[24] Indeed, in the 2001 election, despite the presence of strong U.S. opposition, Syria was elected as a temporary member (Eldar 2008). In this paper, I analyze whether a democratic procedure actually brings democratic representation by allowing heterogenous interests within the Council. But before I analyze Council members' policy preferences, I discuss issues of delegation and introduce several approaches to derive testable hypotheses.

3 Issues of Delegation and Council Membership

Given that the Security Council is delegated authority to handle security affairs, it is expected to make decisions on behalf of all UN members. While UN members want the Security Council to consist of members that can overcome collective action problems so that the Council can take actions promptly (Lindley 1996), they also have an incentive to elect members representing their own interests. In this section, I address the issues of delegation and introduce approaches to provide insights on how UN members select Council members.

3.1 The Nomination Process and the Regional Interests

One of the most widely used approaches in political science to analyze issues of delegation is the principal-agent theory. It argues that principals, who have an interest in implementing specific tasks, delegate authority to a smaller group of agents in order to reduce transaction costs. The principal-agent approach has been extensively employed in studies of domestic politics in order to analyze the roles of committees in the U.S. Congress (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Weingast and

[24]Note that, however, the United States attends the meetings of the WEOG as an observer.

Marshall 19881988). Recent IR studies have applied this approach to analyses of the relationship between states and international organizations (Hawkins et al. 2006; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Pollack 1997). According to this approach, UN members delegate the power to handle security affairs to the Security Council in order to reduce transaction costs or asymmetric information (Martin and Simmons 1998). By transferring the power to implement specific tasks to several specialized agents, the United Nations attempts to maximize the amount of benefits it receives. Delegation returns benefits especially when there exists a congruence of interests between principals and agents. However, agents do not always have similar interests to principals. If the interests of these two players are incompatible, agents may behave against principals' will by pursuing their own self-interests. According to this approach, agency slack is the central problem of delegation, and that principals have an incentive to screen agents *ex ante* so that agents will produce the desired results *ex post*.

Suppose that all UN members seek to elect countries that represent their interests, then I argue that the composition of the Security Council is largely determined by the nomination process and that regional groups play an important role in shaping the composition of the Security Council. As a result, countries representing the interests of the region are more likely to become nominees and get elected at the Assembly. As we have seen, in order to be elected as a non-permanent member, a UN member need to become a nominee of the regional group. Countries that wish to be a nominee must first announce their candidatures in the regional group and wait for endorsement from the group. If it is a clean slate, the candidate is usually endorsed by the group and elected at the General Assembly. If there are more candidates than the number of seats assigned to the group, these candidates need to obtain support from other members, including those belonging to the same regional group. Gaining support from the members in the same group is particularly important because if sufficient number of members support a candidate, it may make other candidates withdraw from the race. Running for election is costly,[25] and failure to obtain Council seats also increases political

[25]For example, Malone (2000) illustrates that, in 1998, Canada spent nearly 1.3 million U.S. dollars for the cam-



Figure 1: The Distributions of Ideal Points Estimates for Each Regional Group

costs to the leader (Malone 2000). Therefore, few candidates pursue their bids all the way through election if there is no regional support. As mentioned before, in the 2010 election, St. Vincent and the Grenadines withdrew from the race when it found that it did not obtain support from Caribbean states. In 1995 and 2003, the African regional group persuaded Libya to withdraw its candidature, and in the 2006 election, GRULAC successfully persuaded Venezuela and Guatemala to drop out even after the elections started (Security Council Report 2009).[26] These examples suggest that the regional groups have a significant influence on the nomination and election process, and that only those members that are supported by the group tend to remain in the race.

In this sense, the regional group is playing a similar role to the political party in domestic politics. In the U.S. legislative literature, Cox and McCubbins (1993) argue that committee assignments are influenced by party leaders who have an incentive to serve the interests of the party as a whole. Legislators become members of a party when they share policy allegiances similar to the party position and hold a belief that the party will promote their chances of re-election. In return, parties attempt to increase their influence on policy outcomes by assigning members who represent the party's interests to the committees. Accordingly, the party contingents are representative of the party and the median of a committee contingent is close to the median of that party. Although in the regional groups, there is no country that plays the role of party leaders, each regional group has a country that holds the presidency in the meeting and it is expected to serve as an arbitrator

paign.

[26] Instead of these two countries, Panama was elected.

by coordinating the interests of members.[27] This partisan selection model is widely cited in the literature of committee assignments; however, one may think that their model is developed to explain committee assignments in the U.S. Congress, and that there are several reasons we should not directly apply their approach to studies of the Security Council. For example, countries in the same region may not share the same policy preferences as party members tend to do because the regional group is based on the geographical proximity and not ideological proximity. Although this criticism has a point, the existing literature on the UN voting tends to find that members in the same region tend to form voting coalitions at the Assembly (Kim and Russett 1996), and when we look at the distributions of ideal points estimates for each regional group, we can see that countries in the same region tend to have similar policy preferences (Figure 1).[28] It shows that countries in the African, Asian, and Latin American regional groups tend to have policy preferences in the right dimension and countries in the Eastern European Group and the WEOG in the left dimension. This suggests that the regional groups can play a role analogous to political parties, and we expect that their representatives tend to have policy preferences close to the median of the regional group.

3.2 The Election Process

Although the previous approach focuses on the nomination process, others may contend that other UN members also attempt to influence the composition of the Security Council through election. Even if countries wish to have Council members represent their regional interests, once the election takes place at the Assembly, there is no guarantee that their preferred candidates are elected. No regional group by itself has enough members to satisfy the two-third majority of the Assembly required to have their nominees elected, and this allows other UN members to influence the election outcome. The regional preferences are likely to be ignored especially when there are more

[27] Although to my knowledge, there is no study that analyzes the roles of the presidency in the regional group, several studies find that countries holding the presidency tend to play the role of arbitrator in an international organization (Mattila 2004).

[28] I use the ideal point estimates for the year of 2001 of Voeten (2004) to plot these histograms.

candidates than the number of seats to fill in. Through election, countries in other regional groups attempt to elect candidates whose policy preferences are closer to their own. Based on existing studies that analyze the voting patterns, I develop several testable hypotheses of UN members' voting behavior at the General Assembly.

The theoretical literature on democratic representation states that the position which would be preferred by a majority of voters is the position of the median voter. If we place each voter's policy preference on the left-right ideological continuum and assume that the preferences of citizens are single-peaked, voters would elect the median voter because this is the only position that cannot be defeated by a majority. Given that the position of the median voter is defined by having exactly half of the voters on either side, it is the position which would encounter the minimum number of opposing votes. For this reason, the existing literature argues that the position of the median voter would be the normative standard at which the electorate's preferences and the positions of the government converge (Powell 2000). Therefore, this approach expects that countries which are closer to the positions of the median voter are more likely to be elected as non-permanent members.

In contrast, the collective goods approach argues that countries whose policy preferences are closer to the global hegemon are more likely to obtain seats in the Council. Given that resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are binding to all UN members, this approach theorizes that when the Security Council functions, it provides public goods by establishing regulations and international norms. While there may exist a difference in the level of benefits each UN member receives (Voeten 2008), the maintenance of international peace and security benefits all UN Members (nonexcludability) and consumption by one country does not reduce the amount available to other countries (indivisibility). Since there is no mechanism to prevent the Council from adopting resolutions that promote the interests of Council members, one may suspect that Council decisions are beneficial only for the permanent members or Council members which engage in the decision-making process. However, it is the small powers that tend to be the victims of aggression and need the involvement of the United Nations because they do not have enough

resources to remove transgressors on their own. Therefore, a Council with a swift and effective decision-making process is beneficial to all UN members, and members in general have an incentive not to elect members that may slow down or paralyze the decision-making process and cause a suboptimal provision of the goods (Olson 1965; Martin 1992; Voeten 2008). Although the collective goods approach had been applied to studies of international organizations (Conybeare 1980; Russett and Sullivan 1971; Sindal 1979), it became particularly prominent with the emergence of the theory of hegemonic stability (Gilpin 1981; Keohane 1980; Kindleberger 1973), which states that international organizations are established by a dominant power (the 'hegemon') to maintain its influence in international politics. While the hegemon provides order for its own sake, smaller powers also benefit from a stable global order because it reduces the likelihood of being a victim of aggression. As long as countries whose policy preferences are closer to that of the hegemon sit on the Council, the Security Council functions efficiently without being paralyzed by countries with conflicting interests. Accordingly, collective goods approach expects that in order to maintain the current order, UN members have an incentive to elect countries whose policy preferences are closer to that of the leading country so that the Council functions efficiently without being paralyzed by the anti-hegemon states.

3.3 The Roles of International Norms

So far, I have discussed issues of delegation by focusing on the members' incentives to have Council members represent their own interests. In contrast, scholars who stress the importance of international norms tend to argue that the Charters of the United Nations and Council resolutions can also influence the composition of the Security Council. They believe that norms can influence the behavior of states and that they give states an incentive to reward countries that contribute to the maintenance of international security and punish those that fail to contribute. According to Martin (1992), international organizations can foster members' contribution by sanctioning free-riders through denial of their 'entitlements.' Considering membership of the Security Council as one of

these entitlements, they argue that they select Council members based on the level of contributions.

The Charter of the United Nations sets out that the General Assembly shall elect non-permanent members with "due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution" (Article 23 (1)). The status of financial contributions is published every month by the United Nations as an official document, and so it provides information about a member's contributions relative to all the other UN members. Since the implementation of Council's resolutions largely depends on members' financial contributions, this approach argues that countries that disbursed the payment should be rewarded more than those did not. UN members are also expected to contribute to the United Nations through the provision of military forces to UN peacekeeping operations. The United Nations does not have its own military troops and it relies on members' troop contributions to implement resolutions. Therefore, UN members also have an incentive to elect countries based on their level of contribution to peacekeeping operations.

While the UN Charter posits that members should reward major contributors to the organization, international norms may also play a role of preventing countries that infringe on the Charter or resolutions from sitting on the Council. The Charter of the United Nations prohibits the use of force except for the purpose of self-defense. Article 2 (4) states that UN members are supposed to refrain "from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state...." Although this article does not stipulate that members should not elect countries that recently launched a military attack, it may work to prevent these transgressors from gaining seats because other members have an incentive to punish these members by not electing them. In addition to the use of force, scholars argue that UN members may also attempt to punish members that violate Council resolutions. In the UN literature, it is often said that the Security Council itself contributes to the formation of international norms (Claude 1966). Resolutions such as those prohibiting the possession of weapons of mass destruction can have impacts on the behavior of states,

and transgressing those resolutions is considered a threat to international security and other UN members have an incentive to punish them by not electing them as Council members. This means that UN members attempt to punish countries that attempt to possess weapons of mass destruction by not electing these members as Council members.

Therefore, scholars who stress the roles of international norms expect that countries that contribute to peacekeeping operations or share the financial burden are more likely to gain seats on the Security Council, and countries that fail to comply with important security norms by engaging in military disputes or having nuclear weapons are less likely to be elected as non-permanent members.

4 Research Design

Now I offer a brief description of my data and variables. In order to analyze the composition of the Security Council, I have collected new data sets on the elected members and candidates. I coded those data by hand from the verbatim records of the plenary meeting of the General Assembly (1946-2008*c*). Until the enlargement of 1966, candidates were selected based on the different regional groups.[29] For this reason, I focus only on the elections held between 1965 and 2008. The data contain members which are potential candidates. Therefore, permanent members, countries which do not belong to any regional groups (such as Israel (1949-1999), Estonia (1991-2003), and Kiribati), countries whose regional groups are not allocated any seats assignments in a given year (i.e., Eastern European countries in even years and countries in WEOG in odd years), outgoing members, and countries which continue to sit on the Council in the following year are excluded from the data set.

[29]The initial distribution of the non-permanent seats was determined by the Gentlemen's Agreement concluded in London, 1946. According to this agreement, two seats are allotted to Latin America and one each to the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the British Commonwealth. Moreover, in 1964, the Council members were elected by consensus and no election was held.

4.1 Dependent Variable

I utilize two dependent variables, both of which are dichotomous. The first variable measures whether a country becomes a candidate for a non-permanent member seat. It is coded 1 if the country becomes a candidate and 0 otherwise. The second variable measures whether a country is elected as a non-permanent member. It takes a value of 1 if the country is elected and 0 otherwise. Note that serving as a non-permanent member is a relatively rare event and that in the aggregate countries serve on the Security Council 3.9 percent of the time. Although the second variable is available between 1965 and 2008, the first variable is only available from 1991 to 2008.

4.2 Explanatory Variables

The key independent variable is UN Members' ideological preferences, called *Ideology*. Ideology is a set of ideal point estimates which measure countries' left-right locations. I use two different operationalizations for this variable. The first variable takes into account changes in state preferences, and the second variable has countries' fixed policy positions. Although the first variable is preferable, its observations are restricted from 1991 to 2001. Given that ideal point estimates are scaled only in a relative fashion, and a set of ideal point estimates generated based on the observations of a particular year and a set of estimates in a different year are not in general compatible. In order to locate these ideal points in a common policy space, we need to bridge sets of ideal points estimates using resolutions that appear in consecutive years. The existence of such resolutions allows us to scale different sets of ideal points estimates relative to one another. However, frequent repetition of resolutions is not common in the UN General Assembly because once an issue is resoled, it is removed from the agenda. This makes obtaining ideal points that vary across sessions extremely difficult. Therefore, I use both variables to conduct my research. The first variable is based on Voeten (2004) and it measures countries' year-to-year left-right placement on a -4.0 and

+4.0 scale.[30] The second variable has the estimates of the first-dimension W-NOMINATE scores (Clinton, Jackman, Rivers 2004; Poole and Rosenthal 1985; 1991) that I obtained using the pooled Assembly roll-call votes between 1965 and 2008 (Voeten and Merdzanovic 2009). These scores measure countries' left-right placement on a -1.0 to +1.0 scale. Following Voeten (2000), I treat an abstention as equivalent to a negative vote and I have excluded votes in which less than 2.5 % of members vote in the minority and countries which cast less than 25 votes.[31] The mean and median of the second variable are 0.248 and 0.350, respectively.[32] Since the observations of nominees are available from 1991, I use the first variable for the analysis of the nomination process and the second variable for the election process. For parametric regressions, I also include a quadratic term $Ideology^2$ to allow for a non-monotonic relation between *Ideology* and the likelihood of being elected, and *Median-Ideology* which measures the absolute distance between the median of the regional ideal point estimates and the ideal point estimates of nominated members or elected members. According to the partisan selection model, both countries whose policy preferences are closer to the median of the regional group are more likely to become nominees and elected members. Therefore, I expect that the coefficient estimate of *Median-Ideology* takes a negative value. In contrast, democratic representation approach contends that countries whose policy preferences are closer to the median voter are more likely to obtain seats, suggesting that countries whose policy preferences are closer to 0.350 are most likely to obtain seats. The collective good approach posits that countries whose policy preferences are closer to the United States are more likely to be elected. Since the United States' ideal point is the leftmost on the dimension (-0.990), the expectation according to this perspective is that the coefficient of *Ideology* would be negative.

Normative approach argues that countries that contribute to the United Nations are more likely to obtain seats and countries that fail to contribute to the organization or violate international norms are less likely to be elected. In order to examine the effects of international norms, I have collected

[30] I appreciate the courtesy of Erik Voeten in sharing his data with me.
[31] Only Kiribati did not meet this condition.
[32] The median is the midpoint of Saint Kitts (0.348) and Peru (0.351)

the variables that measure members' contribution to the United Nations. *Peacekeeping* measures the total number of UN-led peacekeeping operations to which a country dispatches military forces (including observers, police, or troops). All operations to which the country sent at least one personnel are counted.[33] Since there are no official documents on troop contributions, I collected this variable from various sources.[34] Normative approach expects that the more operations to which a country deploys its troops, the more likely it is to obtain Council seats. Therefore, I expect the coefficient to take a positive value. *ECOSOC* is a binary variable which is coded 1 if a country is a member of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) when the Council election is held. ECOSOC is another principal organ of the United Nations which serves as the main forum for the discussion of social, economic, and humanitarian issues, and it also makes recommendations to the General Assembly through consultation with its specialized agencies. ECOSOC currently has a membership of 54 states, which are elected by the General Assembly for a term of three years.[35] Unlike the Security Council, outgoing members are eligible for immediate re-election, but Council decisions are not binding on member states. While it is often under criticism for a lack of effectiveness, states which become members of ECOSOC are considered to be contributing to the United Nations. In addition, ECOSOC members may have the opportunity for self-promotion through bargaining with other ECOSOC members. Hence I expect the coefficient of *ECOSOC* to take a positive value.

Assessment measures the percentage assessments of each country's contribution to the UN regular budget. The assessment shares are based on the level of economic development, such as the GDP of member states. These are determined by the General Assembly currently on a biannual

[33]Hence, this variable does not measure the size and type of contributions. I chose to use this variable partly because the documents on the number of troops that countries contribute to each operation are missing, especially for the earlier operations, and partly because contributing to various operations would seem to be less self-serving than sending a large number of troops to one operation.

[34]The main source of operations between 1965 and 1996 is Blue Helmet, between 1997 and 2000 is the Military Balance, and between 2001 and 2008 is the website of UN peacekeeping.

[35]The enlargement of the membership of ECOSOC took place twice. In 1966, it expanded from 18 to 27 members following the General Assembly resolution 1991 (XVIII) adopted in 1963. Likewise in 1973, the membership increased from 27 to 54, which is three times as large as its original size.

basis. The current maximum assessment for a single member is 22 percent and the minimum is 0.001 percent. I obtain the assessment shares from the Status of Contributions to the United Nations Regular Budget (1975-2008*b*), Statement of Assessment of Member States' Contribution to the United Nations Regular Budget (1965-2008*a*), and the Yearbook of the United Nations (1965-2008*d*). The observations are available from 1965 to 2008. This variable not only measures members' level of financial contributions but also captures the economic strength of member states because the assessment is determined based on the economic development. Therefore, I use this variable as a control for members' economic power. While normative approach expects that the coefficient estimate of this variable has a positive sign because members reward high contributors, scholars who hold a power-politics view also believe that this variable has a positive effect because economic giants are more likely to obtain support by using side-payments. *Outstanding* is a binary variable which is coded 1 if Members' payment is uncollected by December 31 of the election year and 0 otherwise. Although assessment shares are determined based on members' economic development, they are not necessarily tantamount to actual contributions. Therefore, to test the hypothesis derived from the collective goods approach, I have collected this variable from the Status of Contributions to the United Nations Regular Budget between 1975 and 2008.[36] I expect the coefficient to be negative.

Next, I have collected the variables that measure countries' compliance behavior with international norms. *MID* measures the number of conflicts that a country initiates in a given year. More precisely, it counts the number of disputes starting from the first election day of the previous year to the day before the first election day of the current year. I collect this variable using the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) data at the participant level (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004). This variable is available between 1965 and 2001. The maximum number of conflicts that a country initiates during this period is 21 and the mean is 0.26. Since Article 2(4) of the UN Charter

[36]On December 17, 1975, the General Assembly decided to publish a document showing the amounts assessed, paid and owned to the regular budget for each Member (on a biannual basis) beginning on December 31, 1975 (see the document A/10500).

prohibits the use of force, the initiation of war is expected to adversely affect the likelihood of being elected as a Council member. Therefore, I expect the coefficient to be negative. *Nuclear* is a dummy variable which is coded 1 if a country has conducted a nuclear test. Since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) specifically prohibits countries other than the five permanent members to possess nuclear weapons, countries which violate this treaty are considered a threat to international peace and security and other members will refrain from electing them. Accordingly, I expect the coefficient of this variable to be negative.

I also include variables to test realists' hypotheses. *CINC* is a variable which I employ from the COW data set (Singer 1987; Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972) to measure the military strength of each country. The observations are available from 1965 to 2007. According to realists, militarily strong countries are more likely to be elected, so I speculate that the coefficient is positive.[37] *U.S. (Economic/Military) Aid* measures the combined amount of U.S. economic and military aid to other UN Members (in 2007 U.S. dollars, in millions). The source of this variable is the U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook) custom country report.[38] I include this variable as a control for the effect of the United States on countries' voting decisions. Several recent studies find the U.S. influence on international organizations (Dreher, et al. 2009*b*; 2009*a*; Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Wang 1999). Therefore, I expect the coefficient of *U.S. Aid* to be positive.

To control for the effects of other variables, I include the following variables based on hypotheses derived from several different perspectives. First, recent studies are concerned with whether international institutions possess democratic characteristics (Dahl 1999). To examine whether UN Members embrace democratic representation, I employ variables such as regional dummies, regime type, and population size. Regional dummies include five dummy variables, *Africa*, *Asia*, *Eastern Europe*, *Latin America*, and *WEOG* (a baseline variable) and I use them to examine the

[37] Although I originally intended to include a variable that controls for the size of population, I found that the correlation between *CINC* and *Population* was high (0.821). Therefore, in this paper, I only report the results of regressions with *CINC* variable.

[38] I accessed the report at the website $http : //gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do?\_program = /eads/gbk/countryReport\&unit = R$ in October 2009.

differences of effects among the regional groups in the election process. They are coded 1 if a country belongs to a regional group and 0 otherwise. If the election procedure is democratic, there will be equitable representation among five regional groups. Therefore, I expect that the coefficients of these variables are not statistically significant. I also include a variable for *Democracy*, using the polity 2 dictatorship/democracy score from the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). The original variable ranges from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic) and is available between 1965 and 2008. Based on this variable, I create a dummy variable by coding 1 if the polity 2 score is greater than or equal to 6, and 0 otherwise.[39] If democratic countries are elected more often than nondemocratic states, as the latter are deemed to lack legitimacy by representatives of other countries (Rehfeld 2006), the coefficient will take a positive value.

Finally, I include a cubic polynomial approximation, *Time*, *Time*^{2}, and *Time*^{3} to control for temporal dependence (Beck, Katz, Tucker 1998; Carter and Signorino 2009). *Time* counts the length of the spell of not serving on the Council. The year that a country enters the United Nations is coded 0, and the variable increases by one each year; in the year after the country is elected as a Council member, the variable is reset to 0. For a country which has never been elected as Council members, this is equal to the lapsed time since its entry to the United Nations. This variable ranges from 0 to 56. *Time*^{2} and *Time*^{3} are the squared and cubic terms of *Time*, respectively. Since the correlation is relatively high, I de-mean them by subtracting the variable's mean from each observation. Note that when I run regression, I multiply *CINC* by 100, and divide *US Aid* by 1000, *Population* by 10^7, and *Time*, *Time*^{2}, and *Time*^{3} by 10 in order to avoid numerical instability. I report clustered standard errors in parentheses.

[39]This coding follows the preceding literature. Also note that observations for some countries (such as Iceland) are missing from the Polity IV project.

5 Results

In this section, I report the results of my empirical analyses. I first present the results of the nomination process, and then present the results of the election process.

5.1 Nominated Members

In order to test the hypothesis derived from the partisan selection model, I run regressions which use whether the member becomes a candidate as the dependent variable.[40] Table 3 presents the results of regressions with different specifications. Model I includes both *Ideology* and $Ideology^2$ and Model II includes *Median-Ideology*. The coefficient of *Ideology* is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This suggests that as countries' ideal points estimates become smaller, they are more likely to become candidates. *Median-Ideology* is negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent level, supporting my argument. It suggests that countries whose policy preferences are closer to the median of the regional group tend to announce their candidatures more frequently than other countries. Figure 2 shows the expected probabilities of the influence of *Median-Ideology* on the likelihood that a country announces its candidature. I plot these probabilities by using the coefficients obtained in Model I and Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).[41] We observe that the likelihood that a country whose policy preferences are identical to the regional median becomes a nominee is about 2.5 percent; however, as the country's ideology departs from the median, the probability becomes closer to zero. Although one may think that 2.5 percent is a small effect, given that less than 4 percent of UN members can serve on the Council, it indeed has a significant impact on the selection process.

The coefficient of *Peacekeeping* is positive and statistically significant in both models. It ap-

[40] Ideally, I would like to run separate regressions for each regional group. However, due to the lack of observations, I was not able to do so without running a risk of obtaining biased results. Therefore, I only present the results with aggregated data. Also, due to space limitations, I only provide the interpretation of *Median-Ideology* in this section.

[41] For the rest of the paper, I plot predicted probability holding other continuous variables at their means and binary variables at their medians. The bold line in the center shows the average predicted probabilities and the two additional lines report 95 percent confidence intervals.

Variables	Model I		Model II	
Constant	-2.817***	(0.368)	-3.070***	(0.355)
Ideology	-0.459***	(0.145)		
Ideology^2	0.034	(0.073)		
Median-Ideology			-0.696*	(0.386)
Peacekeeping	0.111**	(0.048)	0.125**	(0.052)
ECOSOC	0.569*	(0.304)	0.516	(0.315)
Assessment	-0.180**	(0.089)	-0.088	(0.076)
Outstanding	-0.718**	(0.351)	-0.754**	(0.341)
MID	-0.348	(0.218)	-0.293	(0.203)
Nuclear	-5.026***	(1.431)	-6.211***	(1.596)
CINC	1.107***	(0.263)	1.183***	(0.306)
US Aid	0.247	(0.264)	0.262	(0.236)
Democracy	0.273	(0.313)	0.629**	(0.288)
Time	0.832***	(0.240)	0.849***	(0.234)
Time^2	-0.514***	(0.163)	-0.434**	(0.172)
Time^3	0.051	(0.064)	0.029	(0.061)
Log Likelihood	-213.5169		-215.4886	
Observations	1254		1254	

Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.
$^*p < 0.1$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$ (two-tailed).

Table 3: Likelihood of Being a Candidate

pears that as the number of operations to which a country sends its troops increases, it is more likely to become a candidate for Council member. The coefficient of *ECOSOC* is positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level in Model I but not statistically significant in Model II, suggesting that further investigation is required to be conclusive. I also have mixed results for the effect of *Assessment*. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant in Model I while it is not statistically significant in Model II. This leaves the effect of *Assessment* on the nomination process inconclusive. The coefficient of *Outstanding* is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level in both models, meaning that countries which fail to disburse the full amount to the UN regular budget are less likely to become candidates. *MID* has the expected negative sign but it is not statistically significant in both models, suggesting that further investigation is needed to be conclusive. The coefficient of *Nuclear* is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in both models, meaning that countries which violate international norms (i.e., the NPT) are less



Figure 2: The Effect of Median-Ideology

likely to become applicants. The effect of *CINC* is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in both models. This means that countries with large military capabilities are more likely to become candidates. The coefficient of *US Aid* is positive but not statistically significant at the conventional level in both models, leaving the effect of U.S. foreign aid on the nomination process inconclusive. The coefficient of *Democracy* is positive and statistically significant in Model II but not statistically significant in Model I, suggesting that the influence of domestic politics on the nomination process is not clear. The coefficients of *Time* and its squared and cubic terms are jointly statistically significant. This means that as the length of time not serving on the Council increases, countries are more likely to become candidates up to a point but after that they are less likely to become applicants.

Overall, most of the coefficients have the expected sign. For those which do not, the effect may be obscured by correlations with other variables or small samples. For example, the correlation between *CINC* and *Assessments* is 0.570, which possibly affects the sign of *Assessment*. Moreover, the number of observations is relatively small, which may cause biased results. Accordingly, we need further investigation before we can determine the effect of such variables as *Assessment* on the likelihood that a country becomes a nominee.

5.2 Elected Members

Table 4 presents the results of regressions with elected members as the dependent variable. The first and second columns show the results of logistic regressions with different specifications.[42] I also run a partially linear model to examine the effect of *Ideology* without imposing a particular functional form and present the results in column 5.[43] In column 3 and 4, I present the results from logistic and OLS regressions with specifications comparable to column 5.[44]

5.3 Logistic Model

In this subsection, I mainly discuss the results in columns 1 and 2. The coefficient of *Asia* is negative and statistically significant in both Model I and II. The coefficient of *Africa* is negative but insignificant in both models. *Latin America* has mixed results. Its coefficient is positive in Model I but negative in Model II. However, neither is statistically significant. The coefficient of *Eastern Europe* is positive but not statistically significant in either model. These results suggest that the current voting system disadvantages Asian states but its effects on other regional groups remain uncertain.

In Model I, the coefficient of *Ideology* is negative and not statistically significant whereas the coefficient of its squared term is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In order to closely look at the effect of *Ideology*, I employ a partially linear model and present the result in the next subsection. In Model II, *Median-Ideology* has a negative coefficient which is statistically significant, supporting the argument that the regional groups influence the election outcome. It suggests that as the distance between policy preferences of the regional median and

[42]Note that ideal points estimates I use in this section are not time dependent. When I use time-varying ideal points estimates, I obtain results similar to the ones of Model II in Table 3. The only significant difference is that *Assessment* becomes statistically significant with the elected members as the dependent variable.

[43]For identification purposes, I exclude the constant term. Moreover, to examine the effect of ideology on the likelihood of gaining seats in general, I do not include the regional dummies.

[44]In order to examine the selection effect, I also run a Heckman bivariate probit model. However, I find that the correlation parameter ρ is not statistically significant at the conventional level, so I do not report the results.

Variables	Logit (Model I)	Logit (Model II)	Logit (Model III)	OLS (Model IV)	PLM (Model V)
Constant	-2.925*** (0.493)	-2.424*** (0.371)	-3.031*** (0.294)	0.054*** (0.011)	
Asia	-1.034* (0.548)	-1.015*** (0.348)			
Africa	-0.370 (0.566)	-0.450 (0.334)			
Latin America	0.033 (0.584)	-0.318 (0.363)			
Eastern Europe	0.683 (0.499)	0.449 (0.337)			
Ideology	-0.297 (0.518)		-0.819*** (0.295)	-0.049*** (0.018)	
Ideology^2	0.968** (0.472)		0.606 (0.427)	0.039* (0.022)	
Median-Ideology		-1.602** (0.643)			
Peacekeeping	0.097** (0.040)	0.082* (0.042)	0.090** (0.040)	0.005** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)
ECOSOC	0.414* (0.211)	0.397* (0.212)	0.531** (0.202)	0.019** (0.008)	0.019* (0.010)
Assessment	-0.033 (0.075)	0.041 (0.085)	-0.083 (0.067)	0.001 (0.005)	0.0002 (0.008)
Outstanding	-0.503** (0.223)	-0.529** (0.226)	-0.274 (0.209)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.006)
MID	-0.301* (0.160)	-0.295* (0.162)	-0.294* (0.162)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.007** (0.003)
Nuclear	-2.128* (1.124)	-2.542** (1.218)	-2.123** (0.994)	-0.104 (0.062)	-0.113 (0.072)
CINC	0.775*** (0.185)	0.867*** (0.215)	0.696*** (0.163)	0.037*** (0.010)	0.040*** (0.014)
US Aid	0.280*** (0.104)	0.306*** (0.102)	0.344*** (0.092)	0.014 (0.012)	0.017 (0.019)
Democracy	0.266 (0.274)	0.272 (0.259)	0.314 (0.270)	0.011 (0.009)	0.014 (0.009)
Time	0.749*** (0.198)	0.761*** (0.200)	0.665*** (0.189)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.019*** (0.005)
Time^2	-0.538*** (0.161)	-0.519*** (0.160)	-0.569*** (0.162)	-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.017*** (0.003)
Time^3	0.020 (0.073)	0.009 (0.079)	0.034 (0.072)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)
Log Likelihood	-465.603	-464.2834	-473.045	-610.5661	
Observations	3026	3026	3026	3026	3026

For Model I-III, clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses and for Model IV, standard errors are presented.
For Model V, bootstrapped standard errors are presented for the linear term. $^*p < 0.1$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$ (two-tailed).

Table 4: Likelihood of Being Elected



Figure 3: Expected Probabilities that a Country is Elected as a Council Member.

a member increases, that member is less likely to be elected as a Council member. The expected probabilities with the coefficients of Model I look similar to the ones in Figure 1, so I do not report the results here. The plot of the expected probabilities suggests that the probability that a country with ideal point around the regional median is elected is about 4 percent and as the distance from the regional median becomes closer to 1.2, the likelihood decreases to zero. The effect of peacekeeping operations is statistically significant in Models I and II. The positive sign implies that as the number of peacekeeping operations to which countries deploy troops increases, they are more likely to be elected. In Figure 3, using the coefficients of Model I, I plot the predicted probabilities for Asian (a) and Western European (b) countries. If states dispatch their troops to 10 peacekeeping operations, the average likelihood that they obtain Council seats increases by 2 percent for Asian states and 7 percent for Western European countries. Although uncertainty rises as the number of operations increases, troop-contributing Western European countries are on average far more likely to obtain seats than non-troop-contributing countries.

Models I and II suggest that countries which are currently members of the ECOSOC are more likely to serve on the Security Council than non-ECOSOC members. The coefficient of *ECOSOC* is positive and statistically significant at the conventional level. To interpret the effect, I present

fitted values in Table 5. If a country becomes a member of the ECOSOC, the likelihood that it serves as a non-permanent member increases from 0.9 percent to 1.3 percent for Asian states and from 2.5 percent to 3.7 percent for Western European countries. I have mixed results for *Assessment*. Its coefficient estimate is negative in Model I but positive in Model II. As before, neither of them is statistically significant. This is possibly due to the high correlation between *Assessment* and *CINC* (0.613), which leaves the effect of *Assessment* uncertain. The status of *Outstanding* appears to have a negative effect on Council membership. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant in both models. Using the coefficients of Model I, I obtain fitted values and present them in Table 5. If a country withholds its payment, the average likelihood of gaining a seat drops from 1.5 percent to 0.9 percent for Asian states and from 4 percent to 2.5 percent for Western European countries.

The coefficient of *MID* has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant in both Model I and II. Using the coefficients in Mode I, I plot the predicted probability for Western European countries in Figure 3 (c). If a country initiates four new military disputes, its likelihood of being elected, on average, drops from 3 percent to 1 percent for Western European countries. The coefficient of *Nuclear* has the expected negative sign with statistical significance in Model I and II. Using the coefficients of Model I, I present fitted values in Table 5. If a country has conducted a nuclear test, the average likelihood of gaining a seat decreases from 0.9 percent to 0.1 percent for Asian states and from 2.5 percent to 0.3 percent for Western European countries. Hence, these results suggest that violation of international norms may have a negative impact on the likelihood of obtaining seats. Since *MID* is not statistically significant in the nomination process, we can infer that international norms may not discourage transgressors from announcing their candidatures but other members tend not to support these countries becoming Council members.

CINC has positive effects on the Council composition and its coefficient is statistically significant in both models. Using the coefficients obtained in Model I, I generate the predicted probabilities of serving on the Council. Figure 3 reports the results for both Asian (e) and Western European

	ECOSOC = 0	ECOSOC =1	Outstanding = 0	Outstanding = 1	Nuclear = 0	Nuclear = 1
Asia	0.009	0.013	0.015	0.009	0.009	0.001
WEOG	0.025	0.037	0.040	0.025	0.025	0.003

Table 5: Fitted Values

(f) countries. As countries' military capabilities increase from 0 to 0.04, the likelihood of being elected increases by 10 percent for Asian states and 30 percent for Western European countries. While *CINC* appears to have significant effects, few countries possess military capabilities greater than 0.01, meaning that for the majority of countries, *CINC* has only a decent influence on the election process. In both Model I and II, the coefficient of *U.S. Aid* is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that as the amount of U.S. aid increases, recipients are more likely to be elected as Council non-permanent members. Using the coefficients obtained in Model I, I generate the predicted probabilities of serving on the Council. Figure 3 reports the results for Asian (g) and Western European (h) countries. As the amount of aid increases from 0 to 2000 millions, the average likelihood of being elected increases by 1 percent for Asian states and 2.5 percent for Western European countries.[45] The coefficient of *Democracy* is positive but not statistically significant in both models. This suggests that UN members do not necessarily elect democratic countries more often than non-democratic countries.

The coefficients of *Time*, $Time^2$, and $Time^3$ are jointly statistically significant. Using the results of Model I, I plot the predicted probabilities for Western European countries (Figure 3 (d)). This figure suggests that for up to 35 years since its last experience on the Council, a country is more likely to be re-elected but after this period, the likelihood of being elected decreases. Therefore, countries which have served on the Council appear to be more likely to become elected than countries which have never elected as non-permanent members.

[45] Although it appears that the effects of aid have a significant impact on countries in WEOG, not so many Western European countries receive a large amount of foreign aid.

5.4 Partially Linear Model

Now I look at the effect of *Ideology* more closely. Figure 4 (a) presents the expected probability of being elected using the coefficients in Model I.[46] It suggests that, on average, preference outliers (i.e., countries with extreme policy preferences) are more likely to become elected than countries with moderate preferences. Although uncertainty increases as the value of ideology gets closer to -1.0 or 1.0, the upper confidence interval also takes a u-curve shape. However, there is a chance that the imposition of the quadratic functional form may indeed be producing this outcome. In order to examine the effect of countries' ideological preferences on the likelihood of gaining Council seats without imposing the assumption of a quadratic functional form, I conduct a non-parametric analysis. More specifically, I employ a partially linear model which is a method used to analyze the effects of policy preferences nonparametrically while estimating other variables linearly (Härdle, Liang, and Gao 2000). I select the bandwidth using the normal reference rule and employ the Gaussian Kernel. The results of the linear regression are presented at column 5 of Table 4.[47] Note that the coefficient estimates of *US Aid*, *Outstanding*, and *Nuclear* lost significance in Model V, though the signs of the coefficients remain the same.[48]

Figure 2 (b) presents the predicted probability of being elected using the coefficients of Model V with the 95 percent bootstrapped confidence interval. The figure suggests that countries whose policy preference is on the left side of the dimension are most likely to become elected and countries with moderate policy preferences are least likely to obtain seats on the Council. Countries with policy preferences around -0.9 are 11 percent more likely to gain seats than countries whose ideal points are around -0.2. However, unlike Figure 2 (a), countries whose policy preferences are on the right side of the dimension are not necessarily more likely to get elected than countries

[46]Note that since I use the second variable of *Ideology* to examine the election process, Figure 4 is not compatible with Figure 1.

[47]Note that for identification purposes, I exclude the constant value in Model V.

[48]Regarding *Outstanding*, given that the significance of *Outstanding* also disappears in Model III, this may result from the exclusion of regional dummies. Note also that in Model V, the coefficient of *Assessment* seems much smaller than in Model IV; however, when I bootstrap, the mean becomes 0.001, suggesting that the difference between these two models is smaller than it appears.



(a) Ideology: Model I (b) Ideology: PLM

Figure 4: The Effect of *Ideology* on the Likelihood of Gaining Seats

with moderate ideal points. Indeed, countries whose ideological preferences are around zero are approximately 1.5 percent more likely to become Council members than countries on the rightmost side of the dimension. The confidence interval shows that uncertainty increases as countries' ideal points get closer to -1.0 or 0, and there are uncertainties of ten percent for countries with ideal points around -1.0. Countries whose ideal points are on the right side of the dimension have less uncertainties (approximately 3 percent differences at maximum) though uncertainty gradually increases as ideal points get closer to 1.0. This figure suggests that imposing an assumption of a quadratic functional form can lead us to a biased result and that a partially linear model is useful to analyze the actual effect of *Ideology* on the likelihood that a country gains a Council seat.

Given that the median of the UN members is 0.350 and the ideal point estimate of the United States is the leftmost on the dimension (-0.990), Figure 4 (b) seems to reject the democratic representation approach which expects that the median voter is most likely to be elected, but support the collective goods approach which posits that pro-U.S. countries are associated with a higher likelihood of gaining seats. However, we have already found evidence that UN members tend to elect countries representing the interests of the regional group. These apparently incompatible results suggest that the current voting system advantages countries with policy preferences in the left dimension, and that despite members' willingness to elect countries representing the regional

interests, the current system does not provide equitable geographical distribution set out in the Charter of the United Nations.

6 Conclusion

This paper examines the composition of the UN Security Council by focusing on the policy preferences of Council members. While the existing studies of Council membership tend to stress the importance of having heterogeneity among members' preferences, few empirical analyses have examined the actual composition of this organization. Using two newly collected data sets on Council membership, I explore whether elected members' policy preferences differ substantially from those of the permanent members such that they actually increase the heterogeneity of the Security Council. Based on the partisan selection model, I argue and find that the nomination process has a significant impact on Council membership, and that countries representing the interests of the region are more likely to be elected as Council members. However, when I look at overall elected members, I find that countries whose policy preferences are closer to the United States are more likely to be elected as Council members. This finding means that the current voting system does not provide equitable geographical distribution set out in the Charter of the United Nations, and that reforming the current procedures is necessary in order to allow the Council to consist of members with more varied policy preferences.

The results suggest that military capabilities and U.S. aid are associated with the composition of the Security Council, supporting realists' argument that international organizations reflect the distributions of capabilities in the international system. However, my results also indicate that international norms have some influence on the selection process. Members that contribute to the United Nations by disbursing payments, dispatching troops to UN peacekeeping operations, or serving in other UN organs, are more likely to be elected as Council members whereas countries that threaten international security by possessing nuclear weapons or engaging in international

conflicts are less likely to obtain seats in the Council. This means that international norms, such as the Charter of the United Nations and Council resolutions, play a role in shaping states' behavior and that they give members an incentive to refrain from sending free-riders or transgressors to the Council.

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