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The European Union: A Fiscal Federalism Perspective

I. The Political Legitimacy of European Union: An Empirical Analysis of European's Membership Support, 1986-2008

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Abstract

Is the "ever closer union" (Treaty of Rome, 1957) dream fading? Rejection episodes of European centralization efforts highlight the decrease of European Union public support and points out that it might. The processes of European integration are driven forward, held back or redirected by actors belonging to political parties. Therefore, Party Politics is a key point at the intersection between European Integration and European Politics. Despite of EU setting more political priorities with the Maastricht Treaty, no European party defending its citizens best interests has really emerged. And yet the processes of European integration are driven forward, notwithstanding the fissure in citizens permissive consensus and EU decreasing legitimacy. This paper tests whether further integration with no politics will deepen the gap in European citizens EU-support and investigates if Europeans are ready for more politics at the supra-national level. More precisely, it examines if the basis for the creation of such parties is in place which basically can be translated into the existence of social class polarization in terms of (own) country EU-support in the initial Member States (EU12) and New-Accession Members (EU New10, EU New12). The central argument is that for pan-European parties to exist, they need to defend same values and interests European-wide; therefore, the crucial research question which is addressed is whether social class polarization, approximated by occupational categories, in terms of EU-support has emerged across all Member States, and in that case how it evolved over time. Empirical results using Eurobarometer Survey data, demonstrate pronounced differences in EU-support across social classes over time. Moreover, there exists a decreasing trend in EU-support for both EU-skeptics and EU-supporters, which have increasingly grown "out of love" with the European Union regardless of nationality. Not only individual trends in support emerge, but also country effects as the newer Members are more EU-enthusiasts than the older Member States. All in all, it concludes that Europe fulfills the base requirement for "open politicization" (Hix, 2008) which may be the road ahead for the European Union.

Keywords: European Union, Centralization, European Integration, Party Politics, European Party, Legitimacy, Class Polarization, EU-skeptics, EU-supporters.

1. Introduction

European integration studies have shown concerns with polity and policy but have given little attention to European Politics and as such it became poorly equipped to explain why public opinion has deviated from the permissive consensus manifested in the initial post-war European integration period. Meanwhile, the processes of European integration are driven forward, held back or redirected by actors belonging to political parties. The European Union (EU) is run by party politicians. Political parties belonging to national governing coalitions are to be regarded as a political sub-system of the EU decision-making bodies (Bulmer, 1983). The Council of Ministers is formed by national ministers across specialist portfolios, while the European Council encloses heads of governments, often leaders of political parties. The Union's political leadership is accountable to the European Parliament (EP) and to national parliaments as well. But the working of the EU is far from perfect, as the architecture of its institutions induces democratic deficit[1] on the one hand, given that representatives are are not directly elected by voters at EU level except for the Euro-parliamentarians (MEP), and policy gridlock[2] on the other due to institutional inefficiencies, since consensus is hard to be reached in the Council of Ministers with party politicians thrown together by circumstance (Hix, 1997).

Party Politics, therefore, is a key point at the intersection between European Integration and European Politics. Despite of EU setting more political priorities with the Maastricht Treaty[3], no European party defending its citizens best interests has really emerged. And yet the processes of European integration are driven forward, notwithstanding the fissure in citizens permissive consensus and EU decreasing legitimacy. Deepening the European integration and moving towards economic reforms has given rise to disagreements and opposition, highlighted by several rejection episodes of the European Integration process (Figure1).

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[1] Within EU, political legitimacy which refers to the popular consent given by the people to the governing authority, can be classified in two main categories (in Muntean, 2000): di*rect legitimacy w*hich derive from EU citizenry and originate from partisan competition EU-wide (e.g.: The European Parliament <EP> elections) and *indirect legitimacy* which derive from member states, having their citizen consensus.

[2] Consensus is hard to be reached in the EU Council with 27 Members and Qualified-Majority (triple majority: requiring 74% of votes, the majority of Members and 62% of populations).

[3] The European Union was built with the primer scope of economic cooperation (regarding coal, steel, nuclear power, etc.), but gradually became a political union as well, (European Commission, 2007). It became a political entity after Maastricht Treaty being signed, "by introducing the European citizenship, increased majority voting in the Council, expanded powers for the European Parliament, extending its policy competence in the areas of environment, home affairs, social (and worker) policy, and foreign and security policy" (Eichenberg, Dalton, 2007).

Figure1. EU Rejection Timing



It is important to highlight the high degree of heterogeneity across EU countries in terms of EU support and across their citizens most of all. Consequently, EU actions are perceived differently in each Member State, this resulting into different level of Union support across Europeans. Moreover, membership does not bring with it compliant masses and a permissive consensus cannot be counted on even among the established member-states of the EU. Decreasing popular legitimacy is highlighted not only be referendums results but also by the low turnout to the 2009 EP elections, of only 43% (TNS opinion in collaboration with EP).

This suggests that Euro-skepticism has come to characterize the political climate of European Union without knowing why and for how long. Hix (2008) argues, when trying to identify "What is Wrong with the European Union", that indirectly European policies have created winners and losers of the Integration process. In consequence, deepening and reforming the European Union without the formation of parties able to enforce their position across the EU system and defending their voters interests, might deepen even more the gap in citizens support. In this view, this paper comes in the support of Hix's theory and argues that further integration with no politics will indeed deepen the gap in European citizens EU-support[4]. Moreover, we further suggest that in order for true European Parties to exists, they need to represent Europe's citizens best interests. Therefore, we want to cast light on support differences over time, whether they are due to ideological beliefs or country effects in order to analyze if true-European parties contending own party ideologies, may represent European voters and pursue policy outputs from EU.

The research work aims at explaining empirically the evolution in time of EU popular support given that the EU political system "vitally depends on public compliance and acceptance of EU law" (Gabel 1998b). It investigate to what extent the European Union is

[4] EU-support refers in our setting to the degree of citizens feeling that (own) country membership in the European Union is considered "a good thing" (Eurobarometer Survey).

sustained by its citizens and what determines them to actually legitimate it. It further tests whether Europeans are ready for more politics at the supra-national level by examining EU-support in the initial Member States (EU12) and comparing it with the New-Accession Countries (EU New10, EU New12) insisting on human capital, which is approximated by occupational categories. A central argument is that for pan-European parties to exist, they need to defend same values and interests European-wide. Therefore, the crucial research question which is addressed is whether social class[5] polarization, which is approximated by occupation, has emerged across all Member States in terms of EU-support. The research contributes to the previous literature by empirically assessing whether direct legitimacy and "limited democratic politics" is opportune to "fix" the European Union faults (Hix, 2008), as it examines whether there exists or not consensus/ dissensus of social-classes as a precondition for the formation of true European parties, across a large time range. Therefore we actually test if a primary requirement for more democracy, as a possible way out of Eu's identity crisis, is fulfilled.

Pooled cross-sectional data is used for 1986-2008 period, originating from the Eurobarometer Surveys (EB) conducted on behalf of the European Union Commission for all the European Union Member States. The repetitive cross-sections are intended to track attitudes and behaviors among the European Union population and contains a wide range of demographic and attitudinal questions. In order to explain support determinants, Logit model is employed as well as Multinomial Logit, which exploit the structure of the data. Empirical results point out a division of social classes over time for both models. Therefore we report only Logit estimation results. Occupational types are segregated in two main classes: Euro-skeptics (e.g.:Farmers& Fishermen, Unemployed, Blue Collars) and Euro-supporters (e.g.: Managers, Professionals, High-Skilled White Collar). Regardless of occupational types, the support level has decreased over time: skeptics became even more anti-Europeans, while supporters decrease their level of support in time, as well. Additionally, important insights emerged regarding country effects. The most striking result is that most of the initial 12

[5] By social class it is ment the stratification of individuals in the society by economic groups. Contemporaneously, stratification typically refers to three layers: upper, middle and lower class, which may be further subdivided into smaller classes (e.g. occupational types). Accordingly, in this paper social classes are approximated by occupation. Sociology, however makes distinction between an analytical concept of social class (Marx, 1848 and Weber, 1849), and a more empirical concept such as socio-economic status approach, which notes the correlation of income, education and wealth with social outcomes without necessarily implying a particular theory of social structure (Warner, 1949). Dogan (2004) argues that the relevance of social class has declined over time, giving way to a different form of social identification (e.g. cultural and religious).

Member States, some initially highly-supportive, such as Italy and France dramatically decreased their support. One of the main arguments explaining the decrease in support is that of "Post-Maastricht blues" (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007) that citizens suffer of, the EU setting political objectives they do not identify with. All in all, social class polarization has not only emerged but has been coherent across European Union citizens and time, moving along with the overall decrease in support (e.g in EU12, as time goes by, a Professional is less EU-supportive in 2008 in contrast to 1991, while a Blue Collar is more EU-skeptic in 2008 than in 1991). It can be further argued that the aim of providing clarity surrounding the question of "if" true-European parties creation fulfill the baseline condition to exist has been accomplished. The answer is yes, it has.

For the remaining sections, the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, a review of previous literature is provided, while Section 3 presents the data used and the descriptive statistics. Empirical strategy and results are presented in Section 4, while conclusions are presented in Section 5. Full estimations are given in the Appendix.

2. Related Literature

Political legitimacy has been already explored under many approaches. The aim of this section is to understand the evolution of EU public support in time, by reviewing some of the works connected to our topic.

Legitimacy[6] study originate from political science. The building stone can be affirmed to have been set by Easton[7] (1965, 1975). Schmidberger (1997), applied Easton theory at the European Union level trying to explain its legitimation process and differentiate between: "instrumental orientation" (specific support), "reflexive orientation" (trust) and "affective orientation" (diffuse support).

[6]Wimmel (2009) differentiate among EU democratic legitimacy components as follows: I. Concepts of Legitimacy (I.1 Legality, I.2 Acceptance/compliance, I.3 Normative justification); II. Objects of Legitimacy (II.1 EU political system, II.2 EU institutions, II.3 EU policy decisions); III. Variables of Legitimacy (III.1 Participation or Input, III.2 Process or Trough-put, III.3 Results or Output); IV. Standards of Legitimacy (IV.I Counterfactual Ideal-Type, IV.2 Nation-States, IV.3 International Organizations).

[7]In its work, he distinguish between specific and diffuse support, relative to short-term/long-term popular support, while trust in political institutions is placed somewhere in-between. Specific support is determined by political and economical outcomes; diffuse support (or affective support) is determined by values attached to the political system, while trust is generated in positive outcomes periods. Diffuse support is the key explanatory factor of political support when the policy outcome is negative, being actually referred to as a "reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants" (Easton 1965, 273).

On European legitimacy there have been developed two trenchant approaches: integrationist and utilitarian. The former states the fact that European Integration process is driven by elites, while the rest of population is educated to tag along, while the latter (which is the transcript of specific support), states that policy outcome and therefore political performance is the main force that drives public support depending on their cost/ benefits appraisal. As a illustration of the integrationist theory, Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) thought up of "permissive consensus" and therefore of a passive public consent toward integration. Treiber and Schmitt (1990) highlight the importance of negative/positive messages sent between elites and public on European topics. Exposition of the utilitarian approach start with the seminal work of Lipset[8] (1960) and is found in Gabel (1998b), Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) and many others works.

Additional theories refer to: cognitive mobilization[9] (Inglehart, 1970a), political values[10] (Inglehart (1970b, 1990)) , class partisanship[11] (Inglehart, Rabier, and Reif 1991), government support[12] (Gabel, 1998b) and democratic performance[13] (Garry, Tilley 2007 ,Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000).

Regardless of the theoretical approaches, little has been done to identify the trends in EU-support over time. Our approach cast further light to this matter. It comes in support of the utilitarian approach, insisting on human capital when explaining European Union citizen own country membership support across time. The existing literature is enriched by this work given that the empirical analysis is performed with the scope of identifying trends in EU-support according to occupational categories over a large time span, differentiating between EU-

[8]Lipset explicate how efficient political systems hold, even if not legitimate: high efficiency, high legitimacy generate stable political systems, otherwise would collapse; high legitimacy but low efficiency leads to political systems collapse on long-term, while low legitimacy and high efficiency would lead to the survival of political systems anyway. For the EU, it is difficult to always enjoy of its legitimacy, as not always policies reinforce its support.

[9]Cognitive mobilization theory, Inglehart (1970a), sustain that high-level political awareness and high level of political communication skills are the two characteristics which allow citizens to recognize and accept supranational politics.

[10]Political values theory sustain that political attitudes are built depending on the socioeconomic environment in individual development period, persisting in their maturity period.

[11]Class partisanship theory sustain that citizens support level towards integration is generated by the views of the party they support, independently of individual characteristics.

[12]Government support theory sustain that voter's attitude towards integration is connected to the government support level.

[13]EU citizens not satisfied with national democracy may see EU as highly democratic and support integration, while citizens satisfied with national democracy may see EU as suffering from a "democratic deficit" and may oppose integration.

Membership duration as well as using time-point data. Therefore the conceptual setting is different. Similar to Gabel and Whitten (1997), Eichenberg and Dalton (2007), we pool together data originating from Eurobarometer Survey (EB) and estimate support for initial Member States, with the distinction that the estimation method and sample composition, vary. We find similar results. On average, there exist discrepancy in support according to occupational types: the higher the skills, the higher the EU-support level, and vice-versa. Cerniglia and Pagani (2008), study mainly the allocation of powers between the European Union and its Member States, but they do estimate as well an Europeanism equation using Eurobaromater data for 1995-2003 period. Pooled OLS is employed, holding as main results that better educated Europeans, as well as better informed, White Collars, left-wing individuals have a higher propensity of being EU-supporters.

Gabel (1998b) provides useful finding, similar to our own, when estimating on a pooled sample of mixed Initial and Newly-Entered EU Member States. He documents that on average less-educated respondents, less skilled, border residents and low-income individuals are low-supporters, while high-educated, high-skilled individual, non-border residents and high-income individuals are high-supporters. McLaren (2002), provide further insights dividing country-groups by accession date (Initial vs. Later Entries) and using time-point data finds the same average trend in support in both groups: Manual Workers, Unemployed and low-educated individuals, are significantly less EU supportive. Cross-country analysis is covered also in Anderson and Reichert (1995), with similar trends in support being found.

Attempts to estimate the dimensions of EU-support in Candidate Countries are to be found in Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky (2002), as well as Elgün and Tillman (2007); however they do not insist on explaining support attitude across time, but rather capture support determinants on average trying to explain several EU-support theories at given time-points.

Our work is mainly inspired by Hix (2008). He "diagnoses" and proposes "the cure" for EU. He argues that going beyond economic union, the EU suffered of a "democratic deficit", its support being increasingly low. Moreover, economic reforms will automatically produce winners and losers, deepening further the gap. "Limited democratic politics" is proposed as a solution for EU loss of popularity and "democratic deficit", given the fact that open political competition instead of back-door politics may generate policy innovation and will help EU citizens understanding policy options. We complement Hix's work, by empirically

demonstrating that indeed social class polarization exists in terms of EU support, which makes Europe ready for more politics, with true European parties defending its citizens rights. Hix performs a more descriptive study in light of the utilitarian approach when analyzing EU support determinants. Eurobarometer data (Standard EB Survey and EB Elite Survey-Autumn 1996) indicate that individual cost / benefit evaluation of market integration process determine EU support/ rejection (e.g. elite/ mass, high-skilled/ low skilled workers support discrepancies). Furthermore, Hix argues that Unskilled Workers from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as higher income earners in the older Member States, which perceive economic gains from market integration are high EU supporters, while in the opposite case, losers, such as Manual Workers and civil servants in the older Members are less likely to support EU. We find some empirical evidence in this matter. Additionally when making costs/ benefits calculations, citizens also take into account the possible outcomes of European policies according to their policy preferences also (e.g. centrist EU social protection policy induced higher/ lower social protection and worker rights in Britain and respectively France). All in all, our contribution provides important evidence in support of "Limited democratic politics" (Hix, 2008) theory.

3. Descriptive statistics

The data employed in this study originate from two main sources: the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970-2002 (Data Set Edition 2.01) and Standard& Special Eurobarometer Surveys. Additional data on GDP growth rate, Unemployment rate, provided by OECD-IMF and Inflation rate provided by World Bank is also employed. The present trend file encloses questions from 86 Standard EB. In order to allow cross-temporal comparison, trend questions have been asked: the same questionnaire has been addressed in all the member countries for each survey. The trends refer to EU variables (e.g. Membership attitude, Benefit, Europeans attitude towards European Union,), Common policy allocation preferences, Socio-Political variables (e.g.: life satisfaction, happiness, democracy satisfaction, etc.), Political attitudes and electoral intentions (e.g: party preferences, vote intention, etc.) and demographic variables (e.g: age, gender, occupation, education, income, etc.).

Standard& Special[14] Eurobarometer Survey have been conducted on behalf of the

[14] Since 1990, Special Eurobarometer surveys investigate different aspects of Europeans life such as agriculture, biotechnology, energy, environment, gender roles, family, youth, elderly, health related issues, immigration, poverty, regional identity, science and technology, working conditions, consumer behavior, urban traffic etc.

European Union Commission. The Standard[15] EB Survey is a repeated cross-sectional survey. Several waves are available across time: individuals aged 15 and above were interviewed in all the European Union. For each EB survey new and independent samples are randomly drawn. Initially, the samples were extracted from the national population, while starting with EB Survey 41.1, the target population became the population of any nationality of EU member country, which reside in any of the Member States. The sample size, usually is of 1000 respondents per country (face-to-face interviews), with some exceptions (e.g: Luxembourg-300; Malta-500; Cyprus-500; Iceland-600; Germany-2000, 150; United Kingdom-1300). Given the heterogeneity of nations in terms of population size, weighting is used in order to adjust the sample size to each nation universe. The Eurobarometer Surveys which are considered for this study are as follows: EB Survey 60.1 (2003), EB Survey 62 (2004), EB Survey 63.4 (2005), EB Survey 66.1 (2006), EB Survey 68.1 (2007) and EB Survey 69.2 (2008).

Pooled cross-sectional data has been built using EB Trend file and Standard EB Surveys. It encloses 590,627 observations employed in this study for the 1986-2008 period in order to maintain reasonable sample size and to limit variations in terms of Member States (start from EU12 since 1986, up to EU27 in 2008). The variable of main interest regards (own) country EU Membership preference (EU variable) and is the crucial criterion that individual samples had to fulfill in order to be selected. Citizen's attitude towards its own country EU membership is considered as proxy for individual attitude towards European Union in general. Precisely, in each of the considered surveys, the question of main concern which is asked is:

"Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY'S) membership of the European Community is: a good thing/ neither good nor bad thing/ a bad thing/ do not know?" (Standard Eurobarometer Survey).

Since we are interested in explaining only support, the dependent variable is built as dichotomous EU-support variable and takes value 1 for individuals considering EU

[15] The Standard EB Survey started in 1973 at the initiative of the Commission of the European Community (at the time), and has been published biannually (Spring and Autumn) until present, for the European Union Member States as well as Candidate and Accession Countries. Public opinion studies have been conducted, however, since early 1970 for the 6 European Union Founding States. The Standard Eurobarometer Survey (EB1) initially covered only 9 EU Member States population: France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and Luxembourg. Progressively, the Eurobarometer surveys have included new countries, as follows: Greece in 1980 (EB14); Spain and Portugal in 1985 (EB24); Eastern Germany, Norway in 1990 (EB34); Finland in 1993 (EB39.0); Sweden and Austria in 1994 (EB42); Switzerland in 1999 (EB51.1); Iceland in 2003 (EB59.0 one time only); Cyprus, Malta, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Turkey in 2004 (EB62); Macedonia in 2007 (EB67.2).

membership as a good thing (considered to be EU supporters), while for individuals answering clearly that their country membership is a bad thing as well as for those saying that is neither good nor bad and do not know (considered to be EU skeptics), takes value 0. However, Multinomial Logit estimations are performed in order to exploit the structure of the data[16]. Standard controls are included for demographic, human capital variables, occupation, perceived (own) country benefits from the European Union and political orientation.

To start with, given the variation of the sample in terms of country[17], Logit model is employed initially for the first 12 EU Member States, capturing average trends in support. Further description of the data is given in Table1 which reports mean values of the individual characteristics. For the first 12 Members, the average level of support is 57% , while 12% of individuals are not supporters, 23% neutrals and 6% Do not know. On average, there are more women in the sample than men (52%). Most individuals (46%) finished full-time education after 22 years. Occupational types are quite unevenly represented in the sample (Blue Collars and Retired individuals hold a larger percentage than the rest of occupational types). In terms of political variables, most individuals are Centre Oriented and occasionally discus politics.

[Table1]

Additional estimations are run in order to capture variation in time of occupational types in determining support. Time-point data is employed for the following key-periods in Eu's history : 1991- the average level of European Union public support reached the highest value in its history, of 72%; 1997- the lowest level of average European Union[18] support, of only 46% (EB 35.1) is registered; 2004-the largest enlargement of EU took place, 10 new members joining, as well as the Constitutional Treaty being signed in Rome in October 2004 , but never ratified; 2007-Romania and Bulgaria joined EU and in December 2007 the Treaty of Lisbon was signed; 2008-in June 2008, Ireland rejected the Lisbon Treaty.

[16]Given the structure of the data, panel analysis can not be performed. Observations belong to different individuals over time, giving multiple answers in a random order.

[17] EU12 (1986-1994): France, Belgium, Netherlands, Deutsch land, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Spain, Portugal
EU15 (1995-2003): EU12+Austria, Finland, Sweden
EUnew10 (2004-2008): Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
EU25 (2004-2007): EU15+EUnew10
EUnew12 (2007-2008): EUnew10 + Bulgaria and Romania
EU27 (2007-2008): EU25+ Bulgaria, Romania

[18] In 1997 the Amsterdam Treaty was signed, amending previous EU and EC treaties; it also enriched citizen rights and attempted to establish more democracy by increasing European Parliament powers.

A better picture on the evolution of EU public support level is given in Figure2 which shows the average trend in support by year (1986-2008), aggregating across all Member States. On average throughout all Members, the general pattern of public support for "Europe" over the past years is characterized by an increasing trend for 1986-1991 period, a downturn thereafter, continuing until late 1998, followed by a consolidation of support ever since. In 1991[19] it is reached the highest level of support of 72%, declining afterwards. The decrease coincides with the completion of the Internal Market process and the setting-up of the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Therefore, fear of EMU implications may have induced the decrease in support but not only, since the decrease in support occurred for all countries regardless entering or not the Monetary Union. In fact, many Member States economies were hit by recession in 1991, after the Gulf war (EB43). Therefore economic recession, increasing elite controversies over the Single Market, as well as the French and Dutch protestation against more Europe induced the decreasing trend in support. Regardless of the economic recovery starting with 1993, high unemployment rate impeded shift in support. However, since 1997 the level of support never crossed bellow the 50% threshold, slightly increasing quite close to 60% for 2004 and 2007 when more enthusiastic countries entered the EU.

Figure2. EU Support, by Year



[19] 1991 is a turning point of support attitudes, decreasing up to 1997. Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) argue that with the Treaty of Maastricht the European Union evolved from having a pure economic scope to a more political one.

So EU never had 100% of popular support (most likely never will), but it did reached values quite high. Looking at average level of support in the individual Members, given in Figure3, we note very large variations, from 78% (Netherlands) to 35% (Austria). High preference heterogeneity is noted; specifically, among the oldest Member States, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Ireland are the most supportive, while United Kingdom, Finland, Sweden and Austria among the less supportive. On the other hand, among the later entries Romania, Lithuania and Poland are most EU-enthusiast, while the Czech Republic, Hungary and Latvia among the least. We may conclude therefore, that there exists division in average support both for the Initial and Newly-entered Members.

Figure3. Average Level of EU Support by Country



Legend

BE Belgium	IE Ireland	AT Austria
BG Bulgaria	IT Italy	PL Poland
CZ Czech Republic	CY Republic of Cyprus	PT Portugal
	LT Lithuania	RO Romania
DK Denmark	LV Latvia	SI Slovenia
DE Germany	LU Luxembourg	SK Slovakia
EE Estonia	HU Hungary	FI Finland
EL Greece	MT Malta	SE Sweden
ES Spain	NL Netherlands	UK United Kingdom
FR France		

Deepening further this matter, we investigate the average trend in support by occupation, aggregating across all Member States, which is shown in Figure4. On average, an increasing trend in support by occupational category is observed. The higher the occupational status, the more supportive individuals are EU-wide: Professionals, Managers, Students, High-

Skilled White Collars are more EU-supportive than Unemployed, Blue Collars, Retired, Low-Skilled White Collars. This comes in support of our premise. We also note that on average the support level is high regardless of occupational categories.

Figure4. Average EU Support Level, by Occupation



Figures 5 and 6 cast further light in terms of change in support by country and allows comparisons between older and newer Member States. The decrease in support across periods is captured, for the initial 12 Member states and the 10 Newly-entered Member States, respectively[20]. For the oldest Members, a dramatic decrease in support is observed. Except for Denmark, there is captured a decreasing trend in support for all remaining States. Italy, Portugal and United Kingdom register the higher support drop of 35%, 25%, 25% . Also for several newly-entered Members a decrease in support is observed, but the percentage drop is smaller with respect to the older Members: 18% for Hungary, 14 % for Latvia and 11% for Lithuania. In addition, we can observe also a significant increase in support for Poland (13%), Malta (12%), Estonia (4%) and Slovakia (1%). Therefore, the trend in support is mostly decreasing in EU12; however in EU+10 the decrease is smaller than for the older members . This may be associated to the membership length longer/shorter or benefit gain/loss (e.g: newer Members may have more gain than losses on the short-run). In other words, the Older Members citizens may have perceived the EU bringing more disadvantages, while the opposite may have happened for some of the Newer Members.

[20]Time point descriptive statistics is given in the Appendix: Table 5.1, Table 6.1

Figure5. Change in support, by Country
(EU12, 1991/2008 % change)



Figure6. Change in support, by Country
(EUnew10, 2004/2008 % change)



However, the focus of our research is to study support dynamics in terms of social classes. Figures 7 and 8 capture the decrease in support across periods by social category, for the initial 12 Member states and the 10 Newly-entered Member States, respectively[21]. Not surprisingly, in the EU12 support drops for all individuals, intensively for low-supporters (except Farmers&Fishermen) and less for High-supporters. The opposite happens, surprisingly, in EU+10 (except for Professionals and Retired) countries. Therefore there seems to exist a trade-off in support between old and new Member States in terms of occupational categories: a decrease in support for all categories in the older members on the one side, while on the other, an increase in support for most occupational categories in newer members. So, on the one hand, the decrease in support for more developed EU countries citizens may highlight the fear of a more enlarged labor market, with cheaper costs of labor force coming from the newer members. On the other hand, the acknowledgement of a larger labor market benefits induced the increase in support for newly EU-citizens.

[21]Time point descriptive statistics is given in the Appendix: Table 7.1, Table 8.1

Figure7. Change in support by occupation
(EU12, 1991/2008, % change)



Figure8. Change in support by occupation



4. Empirical Strategy and results

Our main interest is to investigate the evolution of EU popular support, insisting on human capital impact. Given that we focus on explaining (only) support, Logit model is employed on different samples, in order to capture EU enlargement over time. In order to exploit the structure of the data given that we have multiple answers, Multinomial Logit is applied as well, however we do not report results as they confirm findings of Logit model.

From the previous section we have noticed that support has declined mostly for the initial 12 Member States. In this case, we employ the pooled-cross sectional data for the EU12

Members, and will initially look at average effects. The formal estimated regression is given by:

$$S_i^* = D'_i \alpha + O'_i \theta + Z'_i \lambda + C'_i \gamma + \nu_i, \text{ where}$$

S_i^* is the probability that individual "i" is a EU-supporter and is unobserved in practice, depending on: $S_i=1$ if $S_i^*>0$, that is if i is an EU-supporter

$S_i=0$ if $S_i^* \leq 0$, that is if i is an EU-skeptic

D_i represents a vector of demographic characteristics such as age, gender, education; O'_i represent a vector of occupational categories, its coefficient θ being our main variable of interest; Z'_i represents a vector of political orientation and political discussion frequency; C'_i represents a vector of country dummies; ν_i is the error term which is assumed to have a standard logistic distribution.

EU12 pooled model is re-estimated by enclosing Macroeconomic[22] data. Ulteriorly, in order to investigate if there exists consensus/ dissensus across social categories (approximated by professional status) in the 12 initial Member States, individual regressions are estimated using time-point data for 1991, 1997, 2004, 2007 and 2008. Additional estimations are performed for EU15 and the Newly-Entered Member States using 2004, 2007 and 2008 data.

Empirical results

In this section, we begin by presenting the results obtained from the model outlined above for the EU12 Member States. This is with a view of providing insights into the degree of EU-support insisting on the occupational categories and capturing average effects. Following this, results using individual samples are presented for EU12, EU15, as well as for newly-entered Member States (Eunew10-2004, Eunew12-2007). Individual estimations are repeated at different time points in order to capture dynamics in the evolution of both occupational and country effects when explaining EU (own) country membership support.

[22]The macroeconomic variables which have been included refers to:
- Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate provided by OECD and IMF which measure the results of economic activity. Represents the value at constant prices of final goods and services produced within a country during specified time period. The calculation of the annual growth rate of GDP volume allows comparisons of the dynamics of economic development over time and between economies of different sizes, regardless price levels.
- Inflation Rate provided by World Bank measure the country general price level based on the cost of a typical basket of consumer goods and services. The inflation rate is the percent change in the end of a period consumer price index (CPI.).
- National Unemployment Rate provided by OECD and IMF measure the percentage of unemployed from total civilian labor force. Data are period average.

Logit estimates on the pooled sample of the 12 European Union Member States are presented in Table2. Generally, discrepancy exists in support among occupational classes: Owners, Managers, High-Skilled White Collars, Low-Skilled White Collars and Retired are more supportive on average, having a positive and statistically significant effect on support probability, which could be explained given that they are better trained and the enlarged labor market offer more benefits to them, while Farmers and Fishermen, Blue Collars and Unemployed are less EU-supportive, negatively influence support. The underlined ranking came forward also in the Descriptive Statistics section and it may be explained by the opportunities as well as draw-backs that enlarged competition on the labor market may bring: the more skilled one is, the higher the probability of gaining, while the less skilled, the higher the probability of losing from market integration. In terms of education, the more educated individuals are, the more they support the EU. On the one hand, individuals which stopped full-time education between 15-21 years old are less likely to be EU-supporters, while on the other individuals stopping education after 22 or that are still studying, are more inclined to be EU-supporters the coefficients being statistically significant at 1% significance level. One way it can be looked at, the results suggest that higher level of education increase human capital and therefore increase the probability of having a better paid job and living standards which induces a higher level of EU-support. Also more information is gathered on a longer-term study, which induce different evaluation of the economic and political implications concerning European integration.

Looking at country effects, support is divided across different nationalities. Accordingly, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Ireland have a strong positive effect on support (in decreasing order), as well as Italy which positively influence support on average, while United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, France, Belgium and Greece have a strong negative effect on support probability, being less inclined towards European Union. There are several reasons which link a country perspectives in the EU with the levels of support. This may be also due to the economic costs/benefits timing discrepancies perceived by the large public: practically, costs are acknowledged on the short term while benefits become apparent only on the long-run; accordingly, individual asses European Integration differently, which implies different levels of support within and between Member States. Furthermore, not only economic factors may determine EU membership support but also a general consensus among party opinion and

publics in terms of EU might exist; therefore, Euroskeptic parties might be incentivated to exploit domestic frustrations with electoral purposes as well.

As ignoring macroeconomic performances would not be recommended when analyzing consensus (Netjes, 2004), the model is re-estimated including GDP growth rate, Unemployment rate and Inflation rate which serve as proxies for the national economy conditions. Results are given in the third column of Table 2. Wald test confirm that macroeconomic variables improve the significance of the model; however, only inflation has a small positive and significant effect. Thus, high levels of inflation may drive toward greater support for European integration, individuals being more supportive towards a supranational institution. However, when reestimating the model accounting for macroeconomic conditions, occupational coefficients remain quite unchanged, while time does not have a constant effect on support probability in either estimations. Surprisingly, country effects vary: now, the average support for Greece, United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, France and Belgium (in decreasing order) citizens decreased, the impact being strongly negative and statistically significant, while for the remaining countries the results are not significant. As a first observation, the decrease in support at country level is registered for several countries among the founders (Germany, France and Belgium) and some of those whom entered soon after (Greece, United Kingdom and Denmark). Reestimating the model including only GDP growth rate, or national unemployment rate we find a strong negative significant effect. Therefore little economic growth as well as high unemployment rate has a negative impact on country EU membership; keeping everything else constant, macroeconomic conditions deepen even more the gap in EU-support which could be interpreted as a blame-game for national economic disadvantages in the long-run. To the extent that citizens share this perspective, one can apply this hypothesis to individual-level attitudes toward national economic performance and European integration, which as we have seen is two-fold divided between blame games and hope for resolution. Turning to the impact of other regressors, discussing politics plays an important role, the more citizens discuss politics, the higher the probability of being a EU-supporter. Political orientation has a positive effect on support probability, although for individuals which identify themselves as extremists, the effect diminishes significantly. Therefore, open debate and more politics at the European Union level would actually be helpful in order to increase popular support which confirms our initial assumption.

Table2-Pooled Model (Logit, robust results)

Pooled Model (Logit, EU12) Variables	Macro-No Coef.	Macro-YES Coef.
Female	-0.25***	-0-25***
Age	-0.01***	-0.01***
Age2	0.00***	0.00***
Civil status (ref. Divorced)		
Single	0.20***	0.19***
Married	0.16***	0.16***
Widowed	-0.05*	-0.04*
Education (ref. Stopped education under 14)		
Stopped education between 15-21	-0.19***	-0.18***
Stopped education after 22	0.11***	0.11***
Still studying	0.43***	0.42***
Professional status (ref. Student)		
Farmer& Fisherman	-0.06***	-0.06***
Professional	0.62***	0.62***
Business Owner	0.03*	0.03
Manager	0.54***	0.54***
High Skilled White Collar	0.22***	0.22***
Low Skilled White Collar	0.04**	0.03**
Blue Collar	-0.22***	-0.22***
Supervisor	-0.04	-0.04
Unemployed	-0.22***	-0.22***
Retired	0.03**	0.03***
Political orientation (ref. Extreme Left)		
Left	0.38***	0.38***
Center	0.35***	0.36***
Right	0.49***	0.49***
Extreme Right	0.02*	0.02*
Political discussion (ref. Never)		
Frequently	0.60***	0.61***
Occasionally	0.40***	0.40***
Do Not Know	-0.20***	-0.20***
Country (ref. Spain)		
France	-0.40***	-0.42***
Belgium	-0.21***	-0.33***
Netherlands	0.53***	0.27
Germany	-0.53***	-0.59***
Italy	0.13***	0.27

Luxembourg	0.62***	0.53
Denmark	-0.76***	-0.91***
Ireland	0.45***	0.25
United Kingdom	-1.07***	-1.25***
Portugal	-0.01	-0.19
Greece	-0.12***	-2.06***
Time dummy (ref. 1986)		
1987	0.02	0.02
1988	0.02	0.02
1989	0.14***	0.14***
1990	0.28***	0.28***
1991	0.44***	0.44***
1992	0.11***	0.11***
1993	0.04	0.04
1994	-0.27***	-0.27***
1995	-0.26***	-0.26***
1996	-0.45***	-0.45***
1997	-0.43***	-0.43***
1998	-0.21***	-0.21***
1999	-0.18***	-0.18***
2000	-0.24***	-0.24***
2001	-0.22***	-0.22***
2002	-0.10***	-0.10***
2003	-0.27***	-0.28***
2004	0.11***	0.11***
2005	-0.29***	-0.04
2006	-0.12***	-0.12***
2007	0.10***	0.10***
2008	-0.19***	-0.20***
Macroeconomic variables		
GDP Growth Rate	-	-0.03
National Unemployment Rate	-	-0.06
Inflation Rate	-	0.12***
Constant	0.29***	0.63
Pseudo R2, Observation number	8%, 479218	8%, 479218

Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 3[23] present individual models regressions for EU12 Members at different time-points, capturing support dynamics. We are interested in observing if social class differentiation

[23] Table3 is given entirely in the Annex.

over time exists; the question of main interest is now answered: Farmers and Fishermen, Blue Collars, Unemployed have a negative and statistical significant effect on support level, individuals being EU-skeptics; while Professionals, Managers, High Skilled White Collars categories have a positive impact on support level, maintained over time. Therefore the higher-skilled, the more EU-supportive individuals are, while the lower-skilled one is, the less EU-supportive he is. Therefore, differentiation over occupational categories is kept as time goes by.

Looking at country effects at different time points, we can divide them as well into EU-supporter and EU-skeptic categories. Within the EU12, Ireland and Luxembourg seem to be the most supportive, while Germany and United Kingdom the least, followed by Denmark. There are also outliers such as Portugal, Italy and Greece, which shift in terms of support.

Table3-Individual samples (Logit, robust results)

Table4-Individual models: EU12 Variable	Model-1 EU12-1991	Model-2 EU12-1997	Model-3 EU12-2004	Model-4 EU12-2007	Model-5 EU12-2008
Farmer& Fisherman	-0.24***	0.00	-0.50**	-0.22	-0.08
Professional	0.82***	0.59***	0.12	0.24*	0.51***
Business Owner	0.06	0.04	-0.23*	-0.17	0.17
Manager	0.52***	0.56***	0.38***	0.28**	0.35***
High Skilled White Collar	0.30***	0.25***	0.16	-0.01	0.20**
Low Skilled White Collar	0.12**	0.06	-0.11	-0.16	-0.03
Blue Collar	-0.13***	-0.15***	-0.59***	-0.29***	-0.18*
Supervisor	0.11	0.04	-0.34*	0.18	-0.53**
Unemployed	-0.10*	-0.18***	-0.41***	-0.37***	-0.27**
Retired	0.10**	-0.08**	-0.02	-0.17*	-0.04
France	-0.53***	-0.35***	-1.14***	-0.79***	-1.14***
Belgium	-0.43***	-0.38***	-0.26*	-0.01	-0.25*
Netherlands	0.69***	0.86***	-0.49***	-0.11	-0.22*
Germany	-0.51***	-0.66***	-1.00***	-0.49***	-0.71***
Italy	0.05	0.44***	-0.91***	-0.93***	-1.28***
Luxembourg	0.23**	1.00***	0.48	0.40	-0.02
Denmark	-1.04***	-0.39***	-1.15***	-0.72***	-0.78***
Ireland	0.03	1.23***	0.21	0.08	0.21
United Kingdom	-1.09***	-0.73***	-1.80***	-1.81***	-1.88***
Portugal	0.14**	0.07	-0.66***	-0.41***	-0.67***
Greece	-0.21***	0.26***	-0.87***	-0.53***	-1.06***
Constant	0.59***	-0.31	1.36	0.79***	0.57
Peudo.R2, Observation umber	6%, 37273	9%, 47609	10%,10295	11%, 11255	11%,11104

Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Furthermore, in order to go into deeper aspects and to identify trends in support, marginal effects estimates of individual models for EU12 are given in Table4[24]. Although results are not significant for all occupational categories in all samples they show that types are still divided in two main classes maintained over time: skeptics and supporters, as previously argued. Regardless of occupational types, the support level has decreased over time; skeptics became even more anti-Europeans (i.e. under ceteris paribus, being a Blue Collar, decreased the probability of being an EU-supporter by 4% in 1997, while in 2007 by 7%), while supporters decrease their level of support, as well (i.e. under ceteris paribus, being a Manager increased the probability of being an EU-supporter by 14% in 1997, while in 2008 by only 7%). These two tendencies, are an explanation of the overall decreasing popular support of EU. We have now answered our research question: not only that we have seen that social class polarization exists in terms of occupational categories, but we found also the support level decreases over time for both classes. Therefore we can clearly differentiate between EU-skeptics (e.g: Farmers and Fishermen, Blue Collars and Unemployed) and EU-supporters (e.g: Professionals, Managers and High Skilled White Collars). Interesting insights regard the deepening gap in support across occupational categories: for example being a Farmer or Fishermen in 1991 decreased support probability by 5%, while in 2004 by 12% on the one side and on the other, being a Manager in 1991 increased support probability by 10%, and by 9% in 2004. The occupational gap increased therefore, between these categories[25] between 1991 and 2004.

Furthermore, country trends are also captured; higher explanatory power can be attributed to nationality rather than occupation which suggests that not only economic conditions determine membership support, but also nationality. And as already seen, some countries are more EU-enthusiasts than others. These results corroborate to the average effects as we distinguish different levels of support across EU nationalities. Accordingly, being a citizen of the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Germany and Belgium (in decreasing order), decreases the probability of being a supporter, as for example by 47% (UK) to 6% (Belgium) in 2008. On the other hand, being a citizen of Luxembourg an Ireland, increases the probability of support. Concerning the outliers, Italians, Greeks and Portuguese indeed shifted from being pro-Europeans to anti-Europeans over time. Several low-supportive countries decreased even

[24] Table4 is given entirely in the Annex.
[25]Occupational gap in support exists for the same samples also between Managers and Blue Collars. Given not all results are statistically significant, comparisons can not be computed for all types across all samples.

more the support level over time (e.g: France, Germany, United Kingdom), while other low-supportive countries slightly increased their support level (e.g: Belgium and Denmark).

Table4-Individual samples-marginal effects (Logit, robust results)

Table5. Marginal effect (EU12) Variable	Model-1 EU12-1991	Model-2 EU12-1997	Model-3 EU12-2004	Model-4 EU12-2007	Model-5 EU12-2008
Farmer& Fisherman	-0.05**	0.00	-0.12*	-0.05	-0.02
Professional	0.16***	0.15***	0.03	0.06	0.13**
Business Owner	0.01	0.01	-0.05	-0.04	0.04
Manager	0.10***	0.14***	0.09**	0.07*	0.09**
High Skilled White Collar	0.06***	0.06***	0.04	0.00	0.05
Low Skilled White Collar	0.02*	0.01	-0.03	-0.04	-0.01
Blue Collar	-0.03**	-0.04***	-0.14***	-0.07**	-0.04
Supervisor	0.02	0.01	-0.08	0.04	-0.13*
Unemployed	-0.02	-0.04***	-0.10***	-0.09**	-0.07
Retired	0.02*	-0.02*	-0.01	-0.04	-0.01
France	-0.10***	-0.09***	-0.27***	-0.19***	-0.28***
Belgium	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.06**	0.00	-0.06**
Netherlands	0.13***	0.21***	-0.11***	-0.03	-0.05*
Germany	-0.10***	-0.16***	-0.24***	-0.12***	-0.18***
Italy	0.01	0.11***	-0.21***	-0.22***	-0.32***
Luxembourg	0.04**	0.25***	0.11**	0.10**	0.00
Denmark	-0.20***	-0.10***	-0.27***	-0.17***	-0.19***
Ireland	0.01	0.31***	0.05	0.02	0.05*
United Kingdom	-0.21***	-0.18***	-0.42***	-0.43***	-0.47***
Portugal	0.03**	0.02	-0.15***	-0.10***	-0.17***
Greece	-0.04***	0.06***	-0.20***	-0.13***	-0.26***
France	-0.10***	-0.09***	-0.27***	-0.19***	-0.28***
Constant	0.12***	-0.08**	0.32***	0.19**	0.14*
Pseudo R2, Observation number	6%, 38140	9%, 48555	10%, 10309	11%, 11408	11%, 11231

Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Further estimations ran individually for EU15 and later entries are given in Table 5[26]. On a large scale, the results validate our previous findings in terms of EU-support discrepancies, by occupational categories and by country. Regardless of sample composition in terms of Member States, whether we look at the newly entered countries or the initial ones, the trends in support emerging are maintained in all samples: Professionals, Managers and High Skilled White Collars are more EU-enthusiasts, while Farmer and Fishermen, Blue Collars and

[26] Table5 is given entirely in the Annex.

Unemployed are EU-skeptics. However there are also exceptions noted for Low Skilled White Collars and Retired: the 2007 sample highlights different trends between Member States for these occupational categories. As an example, on the one hand being a Low Skilled White Collar in the EU15 countries, negatively influences the support probability, while in the newly entered countries it has a positive and statistically significant effect. Therefore, it seems like there have been indeed winners and losers of the EU enlargement which we have individuated. Moreover, now all of the EU15 countries are EU-skeptic. For the newer Members, support is divided between being skeptic or not: Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania are more enthusiastic while Hungary and Latvia are definitively more skeptics.

Table5 Individual Models (EU15/ EUNew10/EUNew12)

Variable	EU 15, 2004	EU new10,2004	EU15, 2007	EU new12, 2007	EU15,2008	Eunew12, 2008
Farmer& Fisherman	-0.47**	-1.02***	-0.25	-0.83***	-0.08	-0.33**
Professional	0.15	0.48***	0.23*	0.76***	0.51***	-0.06
Business Owner	-0.20*	-0.05	-0.15	0.67***	0.17	0.26*
Manager	0.40***	0.61***	0.26***	0.88***	0.35***	0.55***
High Skilled White Collar	0.18**	0.39***	0.02	0.28**	0.19**	0.37***
Low Skilled White Collar	-0.13	-0.01	-0.17*	0.44***	-0.05	0.18
Blue Collar	-0.58***	-0.16	-0.30***	0.17	-0.19**	0.04
Supervisor	-0.37**	-0.29	0.17	0.13	-0.52***	0.05
Unemployed	-0.40***	-0.13	-0.37***	0.11	-0.27**	0.07
Retired	-0.01	-0.09	-0.16*	0.26**	-0.04	0.16
France	-1.14***	-	-0.79***	-	-1.13***	-
Belgium	-0.26*	-	-0.01	-	-0.25**	-
Netherlands	-0.49***	-	-0.11	-	-0.21*	-
Germany	-1.01***	-	-0.49***	-	-0.70***	-
Italy	-0.92***	-	-0.94***	-	-1.29***	-
Luxembourg	0.47	-	0.40	-	-0.02	-
Denmark	-1.15***	-	-0.72***	-	-0.77***	-
Ireland	0.21	-	0.08	-	0.20	-
United Kingdom	-1.80***	-	-1.81***	-	-1.88***	-
Portugal	-0.66***	-	-0.41***	-	-0.67***	-
Greece	-0.88***	-	-0.54***	-	-1.07***	-
Finland	-1.71***	-	-1.61***	-	-1.53***	-
Sweden	-1.80***	-	-1.24***	-	-1.24***	-
Austria	-1.41***	-	-1.64***	-	-1.60***	-
Czech R (Cyprus Republic (ref.))	-	-0.41		0.10	-	-0.21
Estonia	-	0.00	-	0.69**	-	0.34
Hungary	-	-0.02	-	0.02	-	-0.77***
Latvia	-	-0.62**	-	-0.28	-	-1.04***
Lithuania	-	0.71**	-	1.11***	-	0.48*
Malta	-	-0.12	-	0.69	-	0.64
Poland	-	-0.02	-	1.42***	-	0.64**
Slovakia	-	0.03	-	0.69**	-	0.27
Slovenia	-	-0.08	-	0.69**	-	0.05
Bulgaria	-	-	-	0.51*	-	0.05
Romania	-	-	-	1.42***	-	0.60**
Constant	1.39***	-0.08	0.86***	-1.34***	0.67***	-0.42
Pseudo R2, Observations	10%, 12815	6%, 7252	11%, 14056	10%, 10078	11%,13820	8%, 10132

Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

5 .Conclusive Remarks

Political behavior certainly model the European process as previous referendums rejection proves, as well as low EP election turn-outs. With the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union citizens have increasingly demonstrated an ambivalence in terms of their EU-support, showing that "permissive consensus" has come to an end. Therefore it is in the best interest of policymakers to consider what are the driving forces of EU political support. Citizens political attitudes may reflect their perceptions of economic conditions and may be influenced by personal and national considerations. In fact, there has been an decrease in EU political support level, quite alarming. Several reasons justify this trend. Economic cost/ benefit perception on the short and respectively long-run, may be one of the explaining factors as well as blame-games for adverse economic conditions. Eichenberg and Dalton (2007), suggest that as Europeans became aware of European Monetary Union (EMU) implications, their support attitude changed, fearing of budget austerity in the transitional period. Nevertheless, across time, political debates may be an explaining factor in terms of European Integration as well.

This paper argued that European citizens policy preferences is important to consider since different classes may have different political and economical goals and perceptions, when discussing political legitimacy of EU as a supranational institution. Since its objectives changed from purely economical to political, pan-European parties need to exist in order to represent European voters and pursue policy outputs from EU. This process has not been yet completely fulfilled, although empirical works prove that parliamentarians vote according to transnational European party line, rather than national lines (Hix, Noury, Roland, 2007). The main task set was to test whether or not class polarization has emerged and if so, what is its dynamics over time, as a precondition of pan-EU parties to exist and look after voters best interest.

Pooling together different Eurobarometer Survey data sets, we have investigated the determinants of EU citizenry support by capturing average trends and its dynamics by using time-point data. Empirical analysis pointed out a division of social classes in terms of support which is maintained over time. Occupational types are divided in two main classes: skeptics (e.g.:Farmers& Fishermen, Unemployed, Blue Collars) and supporters (e.g.: Managers, Professionals, High-Skilled White Collar). Moreover, regardless of occupational types, the support level has decreased over time: skeptics became even more anti-Europeans, while

supporters decrease their level of support as well, which explains the overall decreasing popular support of the European Union. These results corroborate our premise. Social class polarization exists and has been maintained over time, across European Union citizens. As such we can clarify the argument regarding "if" true-European parties creation fulfill the baseline condition to exist; the answer is yes. Regardless of Member States, support trends are maintained in all samples. Moreover, discrepancies in support over occupational categories exist within countries (for EU12) suggesting that different needs characterize occupational types, and between countries (EU15/ Eunew12). When comparing occupational types over old and new EU Members, statistically significant contrasting results are noted for Low Skilled White Collars and Retired individuals. The 2007 sample highlights different trends; Low Skilled White Collars asses in quite opposing manners their country membership in the EU: while being a Low Skilled White Collars in the EU15 has a negative influence on support probability, for the Eunew12 it has a positive influence on support. This suggests, according to Hix (2008), that indeed the integration, or, in this case enlargement process benefited more to the newly entered countries. This may be explained by the opportunities an integrated market offer in terms of free movement of persons, labor, services and capital they started to benefit from. Contrasting result are obtained also for other less-skilled individuals (i.e. Blue Collars, Unemployed) but also for higher-skilled (i.e. Busines Owners). However, these later results are not statistically significant in all samples. All in all, results show that with some exceptions in terms of occupational categories, trends in support does not differ very much for either newer and older Member States.

Additionally, our results provide a number of interesting insights regarding country effects. The most striking is that most of the initial 12 Member States, some initially highly-supportive, such as Italy and France dramatically decreased their support. Worsening economic conditions but also controversial political debates might be the cause. Also, it might be the result of reducing central budget transfers for the older Member States in favor of the newly-entered. This paper comes in the support of Hix's (2008) empirically demonstrating support gaps, as well as anticipates the results of Tucker, Pacek & Berinsky (2002) work, where evidence for partisan preferences depending on EU membership support is found (e.g.: voters which support country EU membership prefer EU-enthusiast political parties, while those whom do not favor country EU membership prefer "Euro-skeptic" parties).

Appendix

Table1. Summary statistics

Variable	Mean
Stopped education between 15-21	0.19
Stopped education after 22	0.46
Still studying	0.09
Female	0.52
Single	0.24
Married	0.61
Widowed	0.08
Age	44.39
Age2	2295.27
Farmer& Fisherman	0.02
Professional	0.03
Business Owner	0.05
Manager	0.08
High Skilled White Collar	0.09
Low Skilled White Collar	0.08
Blue Collar	0.14
Supervisor	0.01
Unemployed	0.06
Retired	0.21
Left	0.20
Centre	0.37
Right	0.17
Extreme Right	0.17
Frequently Political Discussion	0.15
Occasionally Political Discussion	0.55
Do Not Know Frequency	0.01
France	0.07
Belgium	0.07
Netherlands	0.07
Germany	0.11
Italy	0.06
Luxembourg	0.03
Denmark	0.07
Ireland	0.07
United Kingdom	0.09
Portugal	0.06
Greece	0.06

Figure5.1 Change in support, by Country

(EU12, 1991/2008 percentage change)



Figure6.1 Change in support, by Country

(EU new10, 2004/2008 percentage change)



Figure7.1 Change in support by occupation
(EU12, 1991/2008, percentage change)



Figure8.1 Change in support by occupation
(EU new10, 2004/2008, percentage change)



Table3-Individual models-EU12

Variable	Model-1 EU12-1991	Model-2 EU12-1997	Model-3 EU12-2004	Model-4 EU12-2007	Model-5 EU12-2008
Stopped education between 15-21	-0.23***	-0.29***	0.36***	0.39***	0.38***
Stopped education after 22	0.07**	0.04*	1.00***	1.14***	1.06***
Still studying	0.56***	0.48***	0.73***	0.64***	0.85***
Female	-0.22***	-0.28***	-0.33***	-0.25***	-0.40***
Single	0.06	0.17***	0.37***	0.16*	0.14
Married	0.15**	0.15***	0.20**	-0.09	0.16**
Widowed	0.05	-0.01	0.04	-0.41***	-0.03
Age	0.00	0.00	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.02***
Age2	0.00	0.00	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***
Farmer& Fisherman	-0.24***	0.00	-0.50**	-0.22	-0.08
Professional	0.82***	0.59***	0.12	0.24*	0.51***
Business Owner	0.06	0.04	-0.23*	-0.17	0.17
Manager	0.52***	0.56***	0.38***	0.28**	0.35***
High Skilled White Collar	0.30***	0.25***	0.16	-0.01	0.20**
Low Skilled White Collar	0.12**	0.06	-0.11	-0.16	-0.03
Blue Collar	-0.13***	-0.15***	-0.59***	-0.29***	-0.18*
Supervisor	0.11	0.04	-0.34*	0.18	-0.53**
Unemployed	-0.10*	-0.18***	-0.41***	-0.37***	-0.27**
Retired	0.10**	-0.08**	-0.02	-0.17*	-0.04
Left	0.41***	0.36***	0.25***	0.61***	0.46***
Center	0.48***	0.31***	-0.05	0.30***	0.27***
Right	0.70***	0.38***	-0.04	0.39***	0.22***
Extreme Right	0.14***	-0.07*	-0.42***	0.05	0.08
Frequently Political Discussion	0.59***	0.56***	0.50***	0.46***	0.71***
Occasionally Political Discussion	0.38***	0.34***	0.41***	0.36***	0.45***
DO Not Know Frequency	-0.26**	-0.38***	0.28	-0.58	-0.52
France	-0.53***	-0.35***	-1.14***	-0.79***	-1.14***
Belgium	-0.43***	-0.38***	-0.26*	-0.01	-0.25*
Netherlands	0.69***	0.86***	-0.49***	-0.11	-0.22*
Germany	-0.51***	-0.66***	-1.00***	-0.49***	-0.71***
Italy	0.05	0.44***	-0.91***	-0.93***	-1.28***
Luxembourg	0.23**	1.00***	0.48	0.40	-0.02
Denmark	-1.04***	-0.39***	-1.15***	-0.72***	-0.78***
Ireland	0.03	1.23***	0.21	0.08	0.21
United Kingdom	-1.09***	-0.73***	-1.80***	-1.81***	-1.88***
Portugal	0.14**	0.07	-0.66***	-0.41***	-0.67***
Greece	-0.21***	0.26***	-0.87***	-0.53***	-1.06***
Constant	0.59***	-0.31	1.36	0.79***	0.57
Peudo.R2, Observation umber	6%, 37273	9%, 47609	10%, 10295	11%, 11255	11%, 11104

Table4-Individual models (EU12, Marginal effects)

Variable	Model-1 EU12-1991	Model-2 EU12-1997	Model-3 EU12-2004	Model-4 EU12-2007	Model-5 EU12-2008
Stopped education between 15-21	-0.04***	-0.07***	0.08***	0.09***	0.09***
Stopped education after 22	0.01**	0.01***	0.23***	0.27***	0.26***
Still studying	0.11***	0.12***	0.17***	0.15***	0.21***
Female	-0.04***	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.06***	-0.10***
Single	0.01	0.04***	0.09***	0.04	0.03
Married	0.03**	0.04***	0.05*	-0.02	0.04*
Widowed	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.10***	-0.01
Age	0.00	0.00	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01**
Age2	0.00	0.00	0.00**	0.00***	0.00**
Farmer& Fisherman	-0.05**	0.00	-0.12*	-0.05	-0.02
Professional	0.16***	0.15***	0.03	0.06	0.13**
Business Owner	0.01	0.01	-0.05	-0.04	0.04
Manager	0.10***	0.14***	0.09**	0.07*	0.09**
High Skilled White Collar	0.06***	0.06***	0.04	0.00	0.05
Low Skilled White Collar	0.02*	0.01	-0.03	-0.04	-0.01
Blue Collar	-0.03**	-0.04***	-0.14***	-0.07**	-0.04
Supervisor	0.02	0.01	-0.08	0.04	-0.13*
Unemployed	-0.02	-0.04***	-0.10***	-0.09**	-0.07
Retired	0.02*	-0.02*	-0.01	-0.04	-0.01
Left	0.08***	0.09***	0.06**	0.15***	0.11***
Center	0.09***	0.08***	-0.01	0.07***	0.07***
Right	0.14***	0.09***	-0.01	0.09***	0.06**
Extreme Right	0.03***	-0.02	-0.10**	0.01	0.02
Frequently Political Discussion	0.12***	0.14***	0.12***	0.11***	0.18***
Occasionally Political Discussion	0.07***	0.08***	0.10***	0.09***	0.11***
Do Not Know Frequency	-0.05**	-0.09***	0.07	-0.14	-0.13
France	-0.10***	-0.09***	-0.27***	-0.19***	-0.28***
Belgium	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.06**	0.00	-0.06**
Netherlands	0.13***	0.21***	-0.11***	-0.03	-0.05*
Germany	-0.10***	-0.16***	-0.24***	-0.12***	-0.18***
Italy	0.01	0.11***	-0.21***	-0.22***	-0.32***
Luxembourg	0.04**	0.25***	0.11**	0.10**	0.00
Denmark	-0.20***	-0.10***	-0.27***	-0.17***	-0.19***
Ireland	0.01	0.31***	0.05	0.02	0.05*
United Kingdom	-0.21***	-0.18***	-0.42***	-0.43***	-0.47***
Portugal	0.03**	0.02	-0.15***	-0.10***	-0.17***
Greece	-0.04***	0.06***	-0.20***	-0.13***	-0.26***
Constant	0.12***	-0.08**	0.32***	0.19**	0.14*
Pseudo R2, Observation number	6%, 38140	9%, 48555	10%, 10309	11%, 11408	11%, 11231

Table5 Individual Models (EU15/ EUNew10/EUNew12)

Variable	EU 15, 2004	EU new10,2004	EU15, 2007	EU new12, 2007	EU15,2008	Eunew12, 2008
Stopped education between 15-21	0.35***	0.50***	0.40***	0.28***	0.38***	0.17**
Stopped education after 22	0.98***	0.89***	1.10***	0.62***	1.05***	0.75***
Still studying	0.71***	0.64***	0.69***	1.08***	0.86***	0.64***
Female	-0.33***	-0.27***	-0.26***	-0.07	-0.40***	-0.13***
Single	0.34***	0.28**	0.17**	0.25**	0.11	0.22**
Married	0.19***	0.00	-0.06	0.28***	0.15**	0.17**
widowed	0.02	0.02	-0.40***	-0.08	-0.05	0.09
Age	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.01	-0.03***	-0.01
Age2	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00	0.00***	0.00
Farmer& Fisherman	-0.47**	-1.02***	-0.25	-0.83***	-0.08	-0.33**
Professional	0.15	0.48***	0.23*	0.76***	0.51***	-0.06
Business Owner	-0.20*	-0.05	-0.15	0.67***	0.17	0.26*
Manager	0.40***	0.61***	0.26***	0.88***	0.35***	0.55***
High Skilled White Collar	0.18**	0.39***	0.02	0.28**	0.19**	0.37***
Low Skilled White Collar	-0.13	-0.01	-0.17*	0.44***	-0.05	0.18
Blue Collar	-0.58***	-0.16	-0.30***	0.17	-0.19**	0.04
Supervisor	-0.37**	-0.29	0.17	0.13	-0.52***	0.05
Unemployed	-0.40***	-0.13	-0.37***	0.11	-0.27**	0.07
Retired	-0.01	-0.09	-0.16*	0.26**	-0.04	0.16
Left	0.25***	-0.06	0.61***	0.20**	0.44***	0.28***
Centre	-0.02	-0.20*	0.30***	0.15**	0.26***	0.21***
Right	0.03	0.15	0.43***	0.52***	0.25***	0.45***
Extreme Right	-0.35***	0.06	0.10	0.55***	0.12	0.36***
Frequently	0.51***	0.57***	0.46***	0.70***	0.70***	0.48***
Occasionally	0.41***	0.59***	0.35***	0.36***	0.42***	0.28***
Do Not Know Frequency	0.24	0.27	-0.59	-0.10	-0.51	0.32
France	-1.14***	-	-0.79***	-	-1.13***	-
Belgium	-0.26*	-	-0.01	-	-0.25**	-
Netherlands	-0.49***	-	-0.11	-	-0.21*	-
Germany	-1.01***	-	-0.49***	-	-0.70***	-
Italy	-0.92***	-	-0.94***	-	-1.29***	-
Luxembourg	0.47	-	0.40	-	-0.02	-
Denmark	-1.15***	-	-0.72***	-	-0.77***	-
Ireland	0.21	-	0.08	-	0.20	-
United Kingdom	-1.80***	-	-1.81***	-	-1.88***	-
Portugal	-0.66***	-	-0.41***	-	-0.67***	-
Greece	-0.88***	-	-0.54***	-	-1.07***	-
Finland	-1.71***	-	-1.61***	-	-1.53***	-
Sweden	-1.80***	-	-1.24***	-	-1.24***	-
Austria	-1.41***	-	-1.64***	-	-1.60***	-
Cyprus R(ref.)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Czech R	-	-0.41		0.10	-	-0.21
Estonia	-	0.00	-	0.69**	-	0.34
Hungary	-	-0.02	-	0.02	-	-0.77***
Latvia	-	-0.62**	-	-0.28	-	-1.04***
Lithuania	-	0.71**	-	1.11***	-	0.48*
Malta	-	-0.12	-	0.69	-	0.64
Poland	-	-0.02	-	1.42***	-	0.64**
Slovakia	-	0.03	-	0.69**	-	0.27
Slovenia	-	-0.08	-	0.69**	-	0.05
Bulgaria	-	-	-	0.51*	-	0.05
Romania	-	-	-	1.42***	-	0.60**
Constant	1.39***	-0.08	0.86***	-1.34***	0.67***	-0.42
Pseudo R2, Observations	10%, 12815	6%, 7252	11%, 14056	10%, 10078	11%,13820	8%, 10132

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