Disaggregating International Organizations

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Abstract

Empirical research has made noteworthy advances in the study of international organizations in the last decade. However, existing studies rely almost exclusively on aggregate counts of IO memberships that mask heterogeneity and that can lead to inferential errors. Disaggregating IO attributes allows for richer tests, in turn encouraging richer causal logics. We derive a number of novel hypotheses from an informational theory of IO agency. Using the Interstate Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset, we find that the least institutionalized organizations appear to increase conflict. Institutionalized IOs, and organizations with security mandates inhibit crises but also increase escalation within crises. Organizations whose members disagree actually discourage interstate crises.

Introduction

Research on the liberal peace has led to renewed interest in international organizations (IOs). IOs are said to form the third leg of the liberal pacific "triad" (Oneal and Russett 1999, 2001; Oneal et al. 2003; Pevehouse and Russett 2005). Initial efforts to integrate IOs into existing research programs, however, involved aggregate count variables of the number of IOs to which a state or dyad belonged in a given period. Counting IOs aggregates information at a level that ignores variation in the attributes of individual organizations and makes it difficult to infer facts and test theories involving IO agency. Unlike democracy (a characteristic of states) or trade (which links pairs of countries), IOs involve sets of countries, but also the relationship of individual members with specific organizations. By aggregating counts of memberships, existing research effectively assumes cumulative monotonic effects that treat all IOs as equally efficacious. While peace increases with IO membership, we still do not know whether this is because "more is better," or because joining many organizations increases the odds of belonging to the few organizations that really matter.

Recent studies have begun to use network analysis to address the extra-dyadic characteristics of IOs (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006; Dorussen and Ward 2008). These studies can capture the complex linkages tying together many states and IOs. However, much of the theoretical work on international organizations, particularly liberal and rationalist theories, focuses on how individual IOs alter incentives for individual states (Keohane 1998; Abbott and Snidal 1998). At the same time, theories and findings at the dyadic or systemic level will benefit if we have a better understanding of how states and organizations interact. At least initially, understanding IO influence requires research to move "down" to establish the micro-foundations of states and organizations.[1]

Disaggregating data on IO attributes provides better information, allowing for improved assessment and inference about the micro-foundations of IO influence. We begin with an informational theory that we introduced in previous research (Authors 2004). We extend the analysis with additional tests made possible by disaggregating these data. We rely on data from the International

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[1] The use of dual tracks to study individual ("micro") and aggregate ("macro") tendencies is perhaps best reflected in Economics. The evolution of this distinction has now come full-circle, as a sophisticated understanding of individual-level incentives eventually led macroeconomists to re-interpret macro theory in terms of micro-foundations. Perhaps in time it will be possible for researchers to "build up" to aggregate effects in international relations as well.

Crisis Behavior (ICB) project to test the effect of IOs on crises, escalation, and intensity. We find a number of individual-level IO attributes that significantly influence efforts to promote peace. In particular, we show that more is not better; some organizations may actually exacerbate conflict.

Counting IOs and Finding Out What Makes IOs Count

The earliest quantitative research in international politics began with international institutions (not states) as the unit of analysis (Alger 1961, 1966; Alger and Brams 1967).[2] Jacobson (1984) was among the first to systematically evaluate IO attributes, categorizing by mandate (security, economic, social, or general). Jacobson et al. (1986) used this typology to explain IO memberships, relying on the functionalist theoretical perspective. This work was later extended to study changes in the population of IOs (Shanks et al. 1996). Recent research returns to the task of differentiating between IOs. Boehmer et al. (2004) distinguish between economic and security IOs, but also identify the level of institutional structure. Institutionalized IOs reduce the risk of militarized conflicts, while minimally institutionalized organizations have no effect. Ingram et al. (2005) apply these data to show how different IO attributes influence trade flows. This change is not without consequence for those studying linkages between IOs and peace. As theories stressing networks or variation in IO attributes develop, strategies used to test these theories must adapt as well.

When using an aggregate count of IO memberships, the researcher is forced to assume that all IOs are effectively identical in their effect on the dependent variable. IO influence is also assumed to be cumulative. Like currency, higher numbers of IOs "buy" more peace.[3] Russett and Oneal note that a count variable is a necessary starting point but ultimately unrealistic (2001, page 170). Singer and Wallace (1970, page 522-523) identified the need to differentiate between IOs to avoid measurement error and spurious relationships thirty-five years ago. Certainly, the required data collection effort is far from trivial (Pevehouse et al. 2004). The danger is that the aggregate

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[2]Studies of international organizations (often the United Nations) in the 1960's applied quantitative techniques, but interest declined as results failed to advance theoretical insights. For reviews, see Alger (1970), Dixon (1977).

[3]Norway and Denmark belong to the Nordic Council for Reindeer Research, the Nordic Telecommunications Satellite Council, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. These institutions differ radically in their mandates, structure, and ability to compel state compliance. Whether these differences are salient for interstate peace, as we believe them to be, is ultimately an empirical question, one that requires disaggregation to begin to provide answers.

count approach — which satisfies fully neither the macro-foundations, nor the "macro" network perspective — will become entrenched.[4] The potential for a "virtuous cycle" between theory and data suggests the need for a both "true" network analysis and a focus on individual IO attributes.[5]

A count variable cannot fully capture the impact of indirect linkages or of social hierarchies. Countries that do not belong to any of the same organizations could still coordinate their behavior through other members of their respective IOs. Several research programs are exploring the effects of IO networks. For example, Dorussen and Ward (2008) examine both direct and indirect linkages between states through IOs and trade. Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2006; 2008) incorporate network effects into a dyadic analysis, capturing the effect of states' relative positions in IO networks. Ingram et al. (2005) adopt a similar approach to show that global trade flows are affected by the *structural equivalence* of states in a network (IO portfolio similarity). Ingram (2007) uses network analysis and state level variables to evaluate the determinants of IO survival and failure.

The potential hazards of aggregating behavior include ecological inference[6], omitted externalities, and a levels-of-analysis problem. First, the coding of a count variable implies that effects associated with IO memberships are *strictly additive*. Consider a pair of states $\{I, J\}$ that share memberships in four arbitrary IOs $\{a, b, c, d\}$. A count of IO memberships implies that the dyad $\{I, J\}$ is more peaceful, on average, than another dyad $\{L, M\}$ in which two states belong to only two IOs $\{a, b\}$. Now consider that some IOs may actually harm interstate peace. IOs are often assumed to be homogeneous (Keohane and Martin 1995; Kupchan and Kupchan 1995; Mearsheimer 1995a, 1995b; Ruggie 1995). A count variable operationalizes traditional dialectical alternatives, without allowing for more complex, diverging effects of institutions on peace. If, for example, $\{c, d\}$ increase conflict, then the second dyad can be more peaceful than the first. Given the possibility that some IOs bring peace while others are associated with an actual rise in conflict (Gallarotti 1991; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006; 2008), aggregate count variables may prove misleading.

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[4]Chan (2005) counts IOs in a sample of major powers, where coding IO attributes would be manageable.

[5]Alliance research benefitted from the COW typology (Singer and Small 1966; Small and Singer 1990) and from recent data distinguishing alliances along additional dimensions (Leeds et al. 2000; Leeds 2003a, 2003b; Long 2003).

[6]Aggregate data from the 1930 census suggested that immigrants to the United States had higher literacy rates. However, Robinson (1950) showed that immigrants were actually less literate. Immigrants tended to settle in Northern cities, where literacy rates were high relative to the national average. An ecological fallacy occurred because aggregate data confused variation in domestic literacy with the correlated decision of immigrants to move to prosperous places.

Even if every IO benefits interstate peace, organizations may vary in their influence. Imagine that the second pair of states $\{L, M\}$ joins a third IO, e (so that the IO portfolio becomes $\{a, b, e\}$). A count variable assumes that the first dyad, $\{I, J\}$ is more peaceful than the second dyad. If instead IOs vary in their effectiveness — if, for example, e is NATO, or if c and d are the World Road Association and the Cocoa Producers Alliance — then the second dyad, with fewer IOs, may in fact be less conflict prone, but this will be ignored, biasing reported results. Counting IOs thus conflates quantity with organizational effectiveness. Disaggregating IO count variables is necessary if researchers are to begin to detail those attributes of organizations that work best. Knowledge of this type in turn promises to allow the development of more effective institutional design.

Aggregate count variables also ignore the possibility of organizational externalities. A count variable estimates the effects of IOs exclusively within organizations. Membership may have its privileges, but both theoretical (c.f. Wendt 1999) and empirical (Mitchell 2002; Kadera et al. 2003) research suggests that IOs actively seek to externalize or impose certain behaviors on non-member states. Indeed, IOs that are interested in promoting peace among members of the organization have strong incentives to seek to modify the actions of non-members. Conflicts that occur between members and non-members can draw in other members or simply injure the interests of member states. International organizations mediate between members and non-members, impose sanctions, offer aid, or even intervene by force. Effective testing and theory development needs to allow for the possibility that IOs $\{f, g\}$, to which states I and J are not jointly members (say $I \{a, b, e, f\}$, and $J \{a, b, e, g\}$) have non-trivial effects on the interaction of I and J. Analysis of individual organizational memberships allows us to examine the effect of IOs outside joint member dyads.

Use of an IO count variable poses a third problem involving inferences across levels-of-analysis (Singer 1961). Suppose a country or dyad belongs to more than one IO. During a crisis it is unlikely that all of the IOs to which the state or dyad is a member will play an equally active role in attempting to resolve the conflict. This problem of inference grows with the number of IO memberships.[7] For example, Pevehouse and Russett (2005) show that dyads that share larger numbers of IOs with a high proportion of democratic members are less likely to experience disputes. Democra-

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[7]Singer and Wallace (1970, page 522) warned of possible spurious relationships between IO member data and war.

cies may operate differently in IOs, or states might operate differently in IOs which contain many democracies, or dyads in democratic-dominated IOs may select into the organizations differently from other dyads. The high proportion of democracies in IOs could also reflect neighborhood effects, since IOs and democracy cluster (Gleditsch 2003).[8] These competing interpretations involve claims about how individual IOs influence the decision calculus of particular states. Assessing and distinguishing among claims, and also providing insights that refine theory, requires analysis at the level of individual IOs. The analysis below introduces the IO-state-year unit of analysis, making it possible to examine the effect of IOs of different types on the conflict behavior of states.

The Informational Approach to IOs and Peace

Power influences victory and defeat, but other factors intervene in the decision of states to cooperate or fight (Blainey 1973; Fearon 1995). Force and negotiation are interdependent and nominally equivalent methods of addressing conflict. Since the weak and the powerful alike go to war and eventually find ways to resolve their differences, the processes that cause bargains to happen before or after fighting must play a large part in the cycle of contests. If these processes are largely a function of power, weak states and IOs would not matter much in international relations.[9] It is precisely because warfare can be affected by intangibles such as informational asymmetries, commitment problems, or indivisible goods, that relatively weak actors like international organizations can make an important difference. One potentially fruitful avenue to pursue in studying international organizations and peace is to look for ways that IOs affect these intangible determinants of war onset and remission. We introduce an informational theory of intergovernmental organizations and peace elsewhere (Authors 2004). Here, we extend these arguments, deriving a number of novel implications of the informational framework. We then assess a set of nine hypotheses using new data that captures individual level attributes of IOs and relationships with particular countries.

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[8]Studies using counts link IOs to democratization (Pevehouse 2002*a*), democratic consolidation (Pevehouse 2002*b*), the dissemination of democratic norms (Mitchell 2002; Mitchell et al. 2009; Shannon 2004) and corruption (Walker 2004). It remains unclear whether the relationships identified result from individual or ecological factors.

[9]A preoccupation with power is *exactly* why Realist theory views minor powers and IOs are largely irrelevant.

Fearon (1995) offers three explanations for war. The first two, issue indivisibility and commitment problems, are seen as less relevant because states can often side-step potential limitations or conversely, because the problem posed is so intractable that contests of this type appear rare and intervention is unlikely to succeed. The factors responsible for commitment problems — time-status inconsistencies due to significant changes in relative power — are seen as a cause of war precisely because they are not amenable to bargaining. Third parties may be able to serve as mediators, or encourage dialogue, but unless IOs and other international actors can address the power dynamic (which is not likely), it will be difficult to matter much in resolving the commitment problem. Conversely, addressing indivisibilities involves the relatively easy task of issue linkage or haggling, processes that may be helped by international organizations, but which occur regardless of whether IOs intervene or not. Whether much or only part of the story, we focus on informational factors as an area where IOs may best encourage peace. We offer a set of claims and several variables that represent the ability of IOs to affect international affairs, and their motivation for doing so.

First, IOs vary in their ability to enact policies and decisions. Successful intervention, mediation, or sanctioning requires resources and organizational support. Some IOs are minimally institutionalized, lacking deliberative or administrative structures or resources to pursue cooperation among states. Given that IOs emanate from states, it should not be too surprising that many lack the structure or capabilities to significantly alter the incentives of powerful sovereign governments. Still, some IOs have a greater ability to influence than others. The most effective IOs will possess structures similar to states, including a non-ceremonial executive organ supported by a bureaucracy to implement decisions, a legislative body that formalizes discourse on policy issues, and some judicial process. We expect that efficacy increases as more of these functions operate in the IO. Conversely, minimally invasive IOs may attract states with more potential for conflict (Boehmer and Nordstrom 2003). Minimally institutionalized IOs may also increase conflict if a lack of structure and more fluid decision making creates greater uncertainty in decision making. Organizations that are ambiguous or indecisive about the nature or extent of planned third party actions increase the danger of misperception and bargaining failure. Minimally institutionalized IOs lack conflict resolution mechanisms to prevent or manage crises, even as they are unable to

provide public goods that might induce states to refrain from fighting. A lack of bureaucratic infrastructure usually means no established protocol for managing conflict, which in turn contributes to crisis onset as states are uncertain about whether (and how) the organization will intervene.

Hypothesis 1 *Institutionalized IOs should be more effective at discouraging interstate crises.*

Hypothesis 2 *Minimally institutionalized IOs should be associated with an increase in crises.*

Second, IOs vary in their mandate to manage conflict. Some IOs are established with the goal of creating or increasing regional or international stability. Other IOs are designed to capitalize on existing stable relations among states. Organizations that are the product of peace, and that lack any specific mandate to intervene in the political affairs of members or of other states, will of course have little influence over whether nations fight. While this could suggest that IOs with other mandates should have no effect, it is possible that economic organizations in particular may increase the onset of crises. Economic IOs are designed to create a surplus *as a result of membership* which can be a source of additional conflict, as nations compete over distribution (Fearon 1998; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2008). The benefits of membership can thus become the seeds of tension. This does not mean that trading states are more disputatious in general. If conflict discourages trade (Morrow 1999; Oneal, Russett and Berbaum 2003), then countries in economic organizations will tend to fight less than other states. However, this relationship is more directly attributable to economic and geographic variables, such as trade openness and the number of contiguous neighbors. Economic IOs create negative political externalities precisely because of the economic benefits of membership. In contrast, political and social IOs are designed to address problems that *precede membership*. Members should experience fewer crises as political and social cooperation is much of the purpose of these organizations, and no externality problem produces conflicting interests.

Hypothesis 3 *IOs with political or social mandates should inhibit interstate crisis behavior.*

Hypothesis 4 *IOs with economic mandates should (marginally) increase interstate crises.*

Third, the policy positions of members should influence IO effectiveness. Intuition suggests that differences among members interfere with an organization's ability to promote peace. This is

certainly the case if the organization is thought to compel cooperation, or if IOs are expected to socialize members and diminish preference heterogeneity. If instead, the critical issue for IOs in promoting peace is reducing uncertainty about the actions of the organization and of states, then preference heterogeneity is actually an asset. When organizations whose members do not often agree establish a consensus, this is more informative than if a group of like-minded states share their views, or attempt to communicate controversial information (Calvert 1985; Kydd 2003). As Schultz (1999; 2001) points out, opposition within a polity can reveal the credibility of government threats or statements. A leader's talk is more credible if she is confronted with other actors who have incentives to call her bluff. Credible communication limits bargaining failures and reduces conflict. IOs attempting to communicate resolve to a state can do so more successfully when members normally disagree. All IOs nominally preach peace, but only a few are willing and able to act to affect particular crises. By making it harder to bluff, member contention should lead organizations to make fewer threats, but these threats should also be inherently more credible.[10]

Hypothesis 5 *Member contention in IOs should be associated with a reduction in crisis behavior.*

While few organizations are powerful enough to coerce most states, a number of states are sufficiently capable to scuttle IO initiatives. Feuding between the Cold War superpowers, for example, meant that the United Nations pursued its peacekeeping and peace enforcement roles episodically (Meisler 1995; Mingst and Karns 1995). Rather than simply producing IO impotence, however, information theory suggests that conflict among major powers in an organization can actually *increase* interstate conflict.[11] As already discussed, uncertainty about what actions the IO might take can lead to bargaining failures and occasionally, to crises or wars. If attention by an IO indicates the possibility of intervention, then this prospect can be interpreted differently by participants in a conflict. Bargains that are otherwise acceptable may occasionally be rejected because one side is more optimistic about the probability, intensity, or duration of intervention, while the other side does not expect the IO to act. Minimally institutionalized organizations create uncertainty because decision making is chaotic and because decisions can be reversed or

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[10]Boehmer et al. (2004) average contentiousness scores for all IOs in which two states are members. Interpretation is far from obvious. The research design here allows us to use actual contentiousness scores for each institution.

[11]Ingram (2007) demonstrates that major powers tend to have a negative effect on the survival rate of IOs.

revisited, either by individual members critical to an operation, or to the organization as a whole. By the same reasoning, contending major powers open up the prospect that a powerful member of the IO will thwart initiatives of the organization. A critical test for our argument is whether preference heterogeneity does more to inhibit the actions by the IO (rendering the organization impotent), or informs participants and competitors (decreasing conflict). Power, preferences, and uncertainty interact in complex ways. Yet, presumably information revelation is a function of the predictability and decisiveness of the deliberative and administrative processes of the organization, while uncertainty increases with the ability of individual members to thwart, delay or befuddle these processes. The power of individual members decreases the transparency of decision making, while transparency increases with member contention. These contrasting effects should mean that the impact of contentiousness among major powers and other members lies somewhere between the revelatory effect of member contention and the confounding effect of major power contention. We cannot deduce the net effect of these two forces theoretically, but suspect that on balance they will be benign on balance. Particularly for more expensive institutionalized organizations, the IO must generate some surplus benefit (in this case peace) for states to have incentives to join.[12]

Hypothesis 6 *Major power contention in IOs should be associated with increased crisis behavior.*

Hypothesis 7 *Contention between major powers and other IO members should have contrasting effects — both decreasing and increasing uncertainty — leading to a modest decline in conflict.*

In contrast to other approaches, our argument suggests that having more IO memberships is not necessarily better. In fact, a multiplicity of intergovernmental organizations can create jurisdictional confusion and turf wars that again increase uncertainty, and contribute to conflict. Certainly, IO memberships reflect a condition of relative peace, but the more salient question is whether they also *effect* this condition, or whether peace itself causes a proliferation of IOs. Similarly, a country's level of international engagement is presumably also salient for the cumulative effect of IOs; states with significant international activity are more likely to join international organizations, and are

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[12]This does *not* mean that most nations are paid in peace. Many members may receive side payments. Our point is only that the net effect of the organization must be positive, or no member has an incentive to provide side payments.

also more likely to fight. Independent of the contribution of individual IOs to peace, we expect that the number of IO memberships actually has a modest *exacerbating effect* on crisis onset.

Hypothesis 8 *States with many IO memberships should be associated with interstate crises slightly more often than states with only a few memberships in intergovernmental organizations.*

Constraint of states by IOs is difficult and is probably limited to the most institutionalized organizations and, perhaps, the weakest states (Boehmer et al. 2004). IOs that can inhibit conflict create consequences similar to those predicted by deterrence theory (Fearon 2002). The most robust IOs, while they may occasionally succeed at preventing countries from acting through force, will also "select out" the weakest and least resolved countries from the sample of combatants (Smith 1999). Intervention tends to remove those countries from the sample for which the prospect of fighting is least appealing, while failing to prevent more resolved or capable combatants from pursuing force. Crises will be least common among states subject to highly institutionalized IOs, but when institutional inhibitions fail, and conflict ensues, these contests will appear to be more intense on average than contests among states not subject to IO intervention. IOs do not increase the intensity of violence in crises but instead ensure that states that might tend to have relatively minor skirmishes do not fight at all. The result is that crises among states belonging to the most institutionalized IOs are more likely to result in the most intense forms of military violence.

Hypothesis 9 *Crises among states in institutionalized IOs should more often result in war.*

Research Design and Analysis

The IO-state-year unit of analysis allows us to assess the effect of particular attributes of individual IOs on the crisis propensity among and between member and non-member states. Our analysis builds on previous work by the authors using conventional dyad-years, but coding IOs according to the level of institutionalization, type of mandate, and member contentiousness. Previous studies, including our own work, may result in misleading conclusions if IOs vary in their effectiveness, or if some organizations actually increase crisis behavior. It is important to note that our approach is unique in being able to identify contrasting tendencies among international organizations.

The sample for the study is based on all states as defined by the COW listing of members of the international system for the period 1965 to 2000 (Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke 2004).[13] Our dataset contains all combinations of states and IOs for each year. Most states are not members of most IOs. Given a dichotomous dependent variable (crisis onset or crisis intensity), we employ the logit estimator and use the Beck et al. (1998) technique of cubic splines to control for temporal dependence. We also adopt robust standard errors and control for clustering in state time-series.[14]

Despite the benefits of disaggregating to the unit level of analysis, there are also drawbacks. There are always tradeoffs in reducing complex interconnected social processes to manageable analytical dimensions. We consider our approach a "best fit" between necessary tests of propositions that are impossible to examine at the dyadic level of analysis given current limitations on sample and methods (Bennett and Stam 2000). There are also benefits and costs in the use of the dyad year unit of analysis that researchers have come to accept (Croco and Teo 2005). Like directed dyadic analysis, our approach risks "double counting" observations in an attempt to isolate theoretically relevant actors and causal processes (Schultz 2001). Double counting of states and dyads in directed dyadic analysis is deemed appropriate where theory differentiates characteristics of the observations (such as distinguishing an initiator from a target). The same is true here. IOs appear in observations per state precisely because the goal is to analyze the effects of IOs on individual state behavior.

A special concern of the monadic level of analysis is that the approach may fail to capture bilateral or multilateral interactions. An ideal approach to estimation would capture all aspects of interaction at every level, though this is usually not practical. A second best solution is to conduct focused analyses, each of which address particular econometric concerns, and then make reasonable inferences about how the results of these analyses interact. The results we present in the next section, when combined with our previous research at the dyadic level, give us confidence that the risk of errors of inference in this study due to strategic interaction are not severe. Indeed, if our estimates are confounded by strategic interaction, we would expect to find many more null results. We include a series of econometric controls designed to minimize bias due to the non-independence

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[13]The time period is determined by data availability. IO institutionalization codings exist only for this period.

[14]We also assessed all models while controlling for clustering in IOs. Combining a control for states and IOs is problematic, since this assumes a single, common process of dependence in both states and IOs. We re-ran all regressions with a variable coding the IO number, but this produced no substantive change in our findings.

of observations. Finally, we are mindful that our findings are not definitive, but believe that the way forward is to continue to tailor analytical techniques to the particulars of IO research.

Data

We create several variables designed to measure what we believe are salient characteristics of IOs for influencing crisis behavior. After summarizing the dependent variables, we discuss details of the IO data. We also review the construction of the other variables and econometric controls.

Dependent Variables

To date, most quantitative studies of IOs and peace have used the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (MID) to measure conflict (Gochman and Maoz 1984; Jones et al. 1996; Ghosn et al. 2004). However, exclusive attention to one data source risks incorporating any peculiarities of coding or sampling as substantive truth. The International Crisis Behavior project (ICB) offers data that uses a substantially different conception of conflict (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1992, 1997).[15] A foreign policy crisis occurs when a state has directed (or received) a hostile action against (or from) another state. The definition requires that a state's top foreign policy decision-makers perceive a heightened probability of military hostilities, a threat to basic national values, and a finite time within which to make decisions (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997).

There are several advantages to the ICB dataset in the study of IOs and peace. First, ICB coding rules do not require explicit militarization in order for a conflict between states to qualify as a crisis, so that the population of crises includes many cases in which explicit threats or uses of force are absent. Approximately twenty-five percent of the ICB crises do not qualify as MIDs. IOs may matter most in discouraging crises early in the escalation process. Compared to the population of MIDs, then, the focus on crises provides a more substantively rich empirical domain for the testing of hypotheses that relate to both the onset and escalation of crises. A second advantage of the ICB dataset is that we can avoid accidents or other low-level causes of conflict that may not be as amenable to anticipation or intervention by IOs. By definition, ICB crises involve explicit

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[15]We find similar results using MIDs, though the results are weaker in some cases for escalation. Isolated incidents or "accidents" are difficult to anticipate and often subside before IOs can react (Cater and Wermester 2000).

challenges that elicit decisions from a states highest ranking foreign policy leaders. MIDs, on the other hand, can arise out of circumstances in which forces act without direct authorization from officials. The theoretical mechanisms we advance about how IGOs affect the prospects for crises hinge on how top-level decision makers respond to information, incentives and constraints. Finally, the ICB dataset explicitly codes for the intensity of contests, allowing us to assess hypotheses about the effect of international organizations on not just the presence, but the scale of violence in a crisis.

We construct two dependent variables using ICB data. First, a country may direct a hostile action against another state (thereby triggering a crisis for the target) without perceiving the necessary conditions for crisis itself (Hewitt and Wilkenfeld 1999). A limited focus on only those states satisfying the ICB crisis conditions would exclude many countries that actually initiate confrontations and were directly involved in them. Since our interest is to examine the effect of IOs on the likelihood of crisis involvement, our ICB variable CRONSET equals 1 for the first year of a state's involvement in a crisis dyad (Hewitt 2003). Second, we code the intensity of the crisis from the ICB variable VIOL. We differentiate the highest level of violence, war, from lesser crises. This creates the most variation in IO effectiveness in terms of avoidance of full scale warfare.

Key Independent Variables

We organize IO attributes by institutionalization, mandate, and member contentiousness. We analyze four different IO membership variables, a dummy for IO membership, and three levels of increasing IO institutionalization. We conceive of mandate in terms of the primary focus of an organization (political, social, economic, or cultural). Contentiousness reflects member cohesion.

- IO Dummy: The simplest method to represent IO memberships is with a dummy variable. The *ALL IOs* dummy identifies, for each IO-state-year, whether a state is a member of that IO. Of roughly 1.5 million cases coded, 265,375 involve specific IO memberships, with the remaining 1,235,635 cases being made up of states that are not members of a given IO.

- IO Institutionalization: Following Boehmer et al. (2004), we score the institutionalization of IOs in three categories: minimal, structured, and interventionist, with each category in order

representing a higher level of institutionalization. As per our theory, we expect that IOs at these different levels should have heterogeneous effects on state conflict behavior.[16]

- IO Mandate: We begin by coding an ordinal variable reflecting the type of role framers of the IO anticipated when the organization was established, as formalized in the founding documents (political, economic, social, or cultural). In the analysis section, we use *IO Mandate* to construct a dummy variable matrix of three variables *Political*, *Economic*, and *Social*. The *Cultural* dummy is dropped to avoid the dummy variable trap.[17] We argue that mandate helps to determine the scope of IO activities and whether the IO considers itself obliged to seek to discourage conflict behavior. IO mandate may also determine whether members provide appropriate resources for activities designed to encourage international peace.

- IO Contention: We measure the level of agreement among IO members using data on the similarity of state voting patterns in the United Nations (Gartzke 1998, 2000).[18] We use the United States as the reference country to convert dyadic voting similarity scores into monadic values. The similarity of state preferences is measured for all members of a given IO. Standard deviations in similarity scores among members are then calculated for each IO for each year. *All Member Contention* provides values using all IO members in a given year. *Major Power Contention* measures standard deviations among major power members. *Floor – MP Contention* compares the similarity of mean scores for all states with those for major powers in the IO. Finally, *# Member States* is a count of the size of each organization.

- # Memberships: Processes at the micro level and at the macro (network) level are bound to be related. It is even possible that our analysis at the IO-state level is confounded by aggregate relationships. We include a count of the number of IO memberships for each state-year. The variable, which is equivalent to the current standard technique in the literature, indicates the aggregate effects of IO participation. Differences between *# Memberships* and our individual-level IO variables will also help to demonstrate the validity of our approach.

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[16]For a full description of institutional levels, coding rules, and other variables, see Boehmer et al. (2004).

[17]When including a series of dummy variables, one of the dummy variables must be excluded to avoid perfect collinearity with the constant. Results are consistent using all combinations of three mandate dummy variables.

[18]Affinity provides annual measures of the similarity of dyadic voting positions in the General Assembly (1946-1996).

Other Variables

A variety of other variables are associated with a country's decision to fight or cooperate. Realists and others claim that power is a critical determinant of conflict. Liberals view the determinants of state interests more broadly, arguing that such factors as regime type, trade ties, and population size are likely to affect state behavior. Political geographers (Mahan 1987[1890]; Mackinder 1962[1919]; Spykman 1944; Richardson 1960; Sprout and Sprout 1979[1965]; Most and Starr 1989) emphasize that proximity to other states, or to a country's region, influence whether states fight.[19] Since all of these variables may also affect IO membership, we assess their independent effects on conflict.[20]

Included in our model are variables from each of the perspectives mentioned above: the level of international activity (diplomatic recognition), military capabilities, regime type, trade openness, population, and the number of contiguous neighbors. In addition, we include two regional dummy variables for Europe and the Middle East. The Middle East is the most contentious, while Europe in the post World War II period is the least crisis-prone region. We view this bracketing of extremes as a reasonable way to address regional conflict heterogeneity (Lemke 2002; Bennett and Stam 2003). We also include cubic spline variables to control for temporal dependence (Beck et al. 1998).

Results

We examine several properties of IOs theorized to be critical to promoting peace in three tables. Table 1 differentiates IOs by their level of institutionalization. Table 2 distinguishes between IOs based on their mandates, and also on the contentiousness within IOs among member preferences. Table 3 evaluates the effect of IOs on crisis intensity (looking at wars), again using the ICB data.

Table 1 contains six regressions. The first two columns of coefficient estimates and standard errors include the dummy variable *All IOs*. The second pair of columns switches to a dummy variable coding minimally institutionalized IOs. The fifth and six columns of coefficient estimates and standard errors include, respectively, dummy variables for structured IOs, and for interventionist IOs. In the first column under "*All IOs*", we see that membership in an IO appears to increase a

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[19]See, Hensel (2000) for a review of the literature. Starr and Thomas (2005) critique simply "counting borders."

[20]Additional variables were produced using the EUGene software (Bennett and Stam 2001). Results are robust to other controls, including major power status, alliance status, nuclear weapons possession, and GDP per capita.

state's propensity to experience an ICB crisis. This result has been reported elsewhere (Gartzke et al. 2001; Oneal and Russett 1999) and is a source of potential concern among those who associate IOs with a blanket propensity to promote peace. Previous evidence from the aggregate (count) level suggests that the effect of IOs on conflict is shaped in part by the correlation between international activity and the frequency of IO membership (Boehmer et al. 2004). IO membership may be capturing the propensity of nations that are more active internationally also to fight more often.

<<Table 1 About Here >>

The second column in Table 1 adds the indicator of international engagement (*Dipl. Recognition*) and also a count variable of IO memberships. The level of diplomatic activity positively and significantly correlates with crisis behavior. States that are more engaged internationally are also more likely to experience conflict. Similarly, controlling for diplomatic recognition alters the apparent impact of IO membership. *IO Member* is now negative and highly statistically significant. On average, individual IO memberships tend to decrease crisis involvement once we control for variability in international activity. This provides considerable evidence that individual IOs discourage conflict, independent of the aggregate effect of the IO count variable. Finally, *# Memberships* is positive and moderately statistically significant. Additional analyses not reported here reveal that *either* of the additional variables in column two has the reported effects on *IO Member*. The fact that the aggregate IO count variable is *positive*, indicating that more IO memberships increase conflict, even controlling for individual IO influence and for state diplomatic activity, suggests reason for caution in using the "more is better" assumption required of existing IO count variables.

Column three under the heading of "*Minimal*" institutionalization in Table 1 is the first to divide up the sample of IOs by level of institutionalization. We again see that *Minimal* IOs increase crisis behavior. Yet, in column four, when we add the count variables for IO membership and diplomatic missions, the exacerbating effect of minimally institutionalized IOs on crisis onset persists. Once we differentiate IOs by their level of institutionalization, *the additional count variables have no qualitative effect on the apparent impact of the individual level IO dummy.*[21] The effect of *# Memberships* and *Dipl. Recognition* in column two of the table seems to result more from conflating

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[21]Results for the "*structured*" and "*interventionist*" IO dummy are slightly weaker, but substantively unchanged.

IO heterogeneity than from any inherent consequence of these variables at the level of individual IOs. The aggregate count of IOs matters at the individual IO level only when we fail to represent contrasting individual level effects of variability in institutionalization on conflict. In other words, the spurious effect of aggregate membership and diplomatic recognition on IO membership, while still statistically significant, is rendered moot using the IO-state-year unit of analysis. These two control variables are no longer necessary when we disaggregate the effect of IO institutionalization.

Columns five and six in Table 1 complete our evaluation of the effects of IO institutionalization. Results for both sets of coefficient estimates are similar, suggesting that the critical threshold is between minimally institutionalized and structured IOs. As we hypothesized, institutionalized IOs inhibit the onset of crises, while less institutionalized organizations actually increase the likelihood of crisis. More broadly, the finding that states in minimally institutionalized IOs are more likely to experience crises appears at odds with constructivist accounts that emphasize the role of socialization and identity formation, processes that are orthogonal to the level of IO institutionalization. It could be that members in minimally institutionalized organizations are inherently more crisis prone (Boehmer and Nordstrom 2003). However, the observed effects are quite large substantively and we have taken care to incorporate variables commonly associated with variation in conflict behavior at the state level, such as capabilities, regime type, trade, population, and geography. The other possibility is that minimally institutionalized organizations actually increase crisis onset by adding to uncertainty about the likely actions of third parties, or through ineffective intervention or indecisive deliberations on collective policy preferences. While not definitive, these findings are consistent with our expectations about the contrasting effects of collective action and institutionalization.

Results for the other variables in Table 1 are largely as expected. Powerful countries have more crises while democracies are about as crisis prone as other regimes monadically (Weede 1992; Maoz and Russett 1992, 1993; Rousseau et al. 1996). States with more neighbors have more crises, but not to a dramatic extent. European nations experience fewer crises, even when taking into account greater IO participation, while states in the Middle East appear only marginally more likely to suffer crisis onset (Gochman and Maoz 1984; Gleditsch et al. 2002).[22] On the other hand, trade openness

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[22]See Sørli et al (2005) for an argument that the Middle East is not overly conflict prone in terms of the precipitants of disputes. Our results can be interpreted as suggesting that the Middle East is deficient in IO memberships.

is generally thought to decrease conflict behavior (Cobden 1903[1867]; Polachek 1980; Oneal 2003), but here it either marginally increases crises or has no effect. Similarly, population appears to reduce the likelihood of crisis, despite abundant speculation suggesting that populous states are more conflict prone (Malthus 1958[1798]; Choucri and North 1972, 1975, 1989; Tir and Diehl 1998).

Our theoretical argument suggests other dimensions along which to differentiate and evaluate IOs. Table 2 breaks down IOs based on an organization's mandate and the level of member contentiousness. The most effective IOs should be those that are authorized and equipped to intervene in the politics of member nations. Economic IOs and IOs limited in their scope to non-political activities should find it more difficult to intervene in the political affairs of members and non-members. In contrast, functionalist theories and some social constructivist arguments imply that all intergovernmental organizations are likely to play a role in discouraging conflict. Mitrany (1933, 1966), Haas (1961, 1964, 1989, 1990), and other functionalists specifically argue that economic and scientific IOs should be among the first organizations to promote peace, cementing relationships that gradually extend to political IOs, and then to international politics generally.[23]

<<Table 2 About Here >>

The first "All Obs." model includes all IO-state-years, while the second *Mandate* model samples on institutionalization, including only cases where a given state belongs to a given interventionist IO in that year. In both samples, the IO mandate variables significantly influence conflict behavior. IOs with a political mission appear to be the most effective at reducing crisis onset.[24] Social mandate IOs also seem to reduce conflict. The coefficient for the effect of political mandate increases by almost four times, suggesting that much of the effect of political IOs occurs among members and particularly within the most institutionalized IOs. The effect of social mandate IOs is not much affected by the sample, implying that these organizations influence members and non-members independent of institutionalization. Social IOs in particular fit the role of norm entrepreneurs envisioned by constructivists while political IOs function more as envisioned by institutionalists.

Economic IOs, on the other hand, actually increase crises relative to other IOs. Members in

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[23]Culture is the default category. We looked at numerous combinations of IO mandate, finding consistent results.
[24]Mansfield and Pevehouse (2008) also find that a political mandate makes IOs more potent in promoting peace.

interventionist economic organizations are particularly crisis prone. These organizations may recruit members that are predisposed to crisis, but the evidence suggests that economic IOs actually create conflict.[25] The fact that only economic IOs increase conflict suggests that the selection argument is not generally correct. By generating a surplus, these organizations create inherent tensions among members. Crises are far more likely among members of economic IOs than between members and non-members. Crises are also more likely to occur in the most institutionalized organizations. These relationships imply that observed effects result from the organization, not its membership.

Table 2 also reports two regressions assessing member preference heterogeneity and IO effectiveness. The first *Contention* regression ("*All Obs.*") contains all observations in the IO-state-year sample. The second regression model samples only members of the most institutionalized (interventionist) IOs. Each model includes four contention variables. *All Member Contention* reports the standard deviation in the divergence of preferences for each IO member state relative to the United States. *Major Power Contention* codes only the contentiousness of major power members of the IO. *Floor – MP Contention* explores whether differences between major powers and other members affect IO effectiveness. *# Member States* counts the number of IO members.

Functionalists like Haas, and constructivists like Wendt (1999) argue that consensus building is an important determinant of interstate peace, and that international organizations in particular build a sense of common identity among members. While certainly not definitive, the results for the contentiousness variables in Table 2 suggest quite a different relationship. Institutional theories argue that organizational structure plays less of a role in transforming state preferences, but matters more for managing contention among IO members (Keohane 1998). The institutionalist argument suggests that interventionist organizations should be better at handling contention than less institutionalized organizations. Again, this is not what we see.[26] In both the "All Obs." and "Interventionist" samples, organizations with heterogeneous member preferences are much less conflict prone than organizations with homogenous interests. Indeed, the similarity of coefficients

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[25]By diverting trade, organizations like preferential trading agreements (PTAs) (c.f. Viner 1950; Bhagwati and Panagariya 1996), can create conflict between members and non-members (Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1997; Hiscox 2003). Our results suggest instead greater tension among members of an organization, or between organizations.

[26]Our results are substantially the same using just IOs with a political mandate. While contention is informative, it probably also conditions the count of memberships; outlier countries, such as "rogue states" participate in fewer IOs and are associated with higher levels of interstate conflict (Caprioli and Trumbore 2005).

and significance levels across the two samples suggests as before that most of the influence of organizations is among members, and that the level of institutionalization plays little or no part in the effect of member contention on crises. Another interesting finding is that the membership size of the organization is associated with a substantial increase in crisis propensity. Rather than being socialized or better integrated into the global community, large IOs experience more conflict.

Small organizations with relatively contentious member preferences tend to be more peaceful than large organizations with cohesive memberships. Major power contention works in the opposite direction, increasing conflict. While organizations containing major powers may be better able to influence conflict through coercion and restraint, multiple major power members that disagree tend to make the organization ineffective, and possibly even fractious. These results are consistent with our hypothetical expectations. Differences in major power interests inhibit the ability of IOs to carry out their missions to resolve conflicts. Member contention has contrasting effects, with small groups able to reduce uncertainty among members while larger groups face added ambiguity due to an increased opportunity for dissension and spoilers that may, or may not, derail action.

Major powers will tend to hold organizations together through side payments, obtaining in return disproportionate influence over the policies of the organization. Preference heterogeneity in IOs dominated by major powers is as likely to affect the size of side payments as it is to influence policy success. In the absence of major powers that can impose their will, IOs must rely on persuasion and information. Organizations made up of members with different interests may prove more persuasive as mediators, since biased members can more credibly inform potential crisis participants when it may be wiser to back down or to accept compromises (Kydd 2003). A smaller group can also overcome collective action problems and act quickly. Finally, we suggest that member preference heterogeneity increases the credibility of an organization's threats or claims, since bluffing is more difficult (Schultz 1999, 2001), and inaction becomes increasingly likely.

The results in Table 2 should not be read as evidence that institutional factors do not matter, only that institutions are less relevant to member contention. Table 3 reports coefficients and standard errors for three regressions in which the dependent variable (coded from VIOL) identifies whether a crisis involved a war. The major finding is not contained within any column of coefficients,

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but can be found by comparing coefficients and significance levels for the three different IO dummies. The more heavily institutionalized the organization, the *more likely* that crises will involve war. When combined with the results shown in Table 1 which show that highly institutionalized IOs are capable of reducing the chances of crisis onset, the findings represent a classic selection effect. If highly institutionalized IOs are more successful at inhibiting less serious crises, then the crises that do occur involving members of institutionalized IOs will tend to be more intense. The deterrent effect of the most institutionalized IOs leads states that engage in crisis behavior *despite costs imposed by the organization* to be more likely to fight intensely. Less resolved or capable states that are successfully deterred by the constraining effect of interventionist IOs do not have crises.

<<Table 3 About Here >>

The findings from Table 3 suggest two things. First, IOs appear to have both institutional and informational effects on crisis behavior. This makes sense, given that the two instruments are largely complementary. Institutions can both constrain and inform. Second, even if IOs are not informing in all the ways suggested by the informational argument, they probably should be. The fact that interventionist IOs are associated with an *increase* in crisis intensity, while this coincides with a decline in the frequency of crises, suggests that closer attention to informational mechanisms may improve the performance of IOs and allow them to further reduce human suffering.

Conclusion

While much remains unknown or speculative in international relations, the role and efficaciousness of international organizations is particularly poorly understood. IO research also appears especially amenable to systematic statistical techniques. Information theory recognizes that IOs are not homogenous, or even monotonic, in their effects on conflict. We can begin to move away from bald dichotomies and overly simplistic uni-causal explanations by suggesting that key differences exist among IOs, ranging from the level of institutionalization, to mandate, and to contentiousness. We find considerable support for differentiating between those IOs that have the motive, ability, and resources to intervene successfully in potential conflict situations, and those that do not.

Choosing to focus on the characteristics of individual IOs necessitates the move to a new unit of analysis. A research design based on the IO-state-year allows us to test hypotheses about attributes of individual IOs. Theories of international organization hinge in the end on their ability to associate organizational attributes with the presence or absence of interstate cooperation and conflict. Those theories that fail to pass "first muster" are of necessity suspect. While the evidence here is not definitive, our results suggest that the informational approach achieves this necessary threshold. No less than nine hypotheses involving institutionalization, mandate, member contention, major power status, and crisis intensity appear substantiated by the findings reported here.

Further research seems appropriate, as is often the case in the academic enterprise. Subsequent systematic empirical studies promise to tap a substantial domain of the unknown, yielding useful new evidence to further discipline and inspire new theory. Future efforts should embrace the application of new theoretical perspectives and advances in research techniques, and commit to gathering data that moves beyond aggregate counts of state memberships in IOs. The dimensions of IO heterogeneity in this paper are surely not the only ways to capture relevant differences. However, we have shown that these differences are relevant, and that they matter at a level, and often in ways, that were not previously contemplated or examined in research on international organizations. We see our findings as providing substantial justification for greater focus on the micro-foundations of international organizations and their influence on interstate behavior.

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Table 1: IO Institutionalization and Interstate Crisis Behavior (IO-state-years)

D.V.: CRONSET (Crisis)	ALL IOs		MINIMAL		STRUCTURED	INTERVENTIONIST
IO Member [1]	**0.0444** †	**−0.0490** ***	**0.0210** ***	**0.0184** ***	**−0.0210** ***	**−0.0231** ***
	(0.0198)	(0.0113)	(0.0030)	(0.0034)	(0.0045)	(0.0057)
# Memberships		**0.0091** †		**0.0090** †		
		(0.0036)		(0.0036)		
Dipl. Recognition		**0.0059** ***		**0.0058** ***		
		(0.0017)		(0.0017)		
CINC Score	5.8758 ***	6.5116 ***	5.8758 ***	6.5001 ***	5.8795 ***	5.8797 ***
	(1.6816)	(0.7921)	(1.6919)	(0.7915)	(1.6921)	(1.6920)
Polity	−0.0014	−0.0285	−0.0011	−0.0286	−0.0011	−0.0011
	(0.0143)	(0.0185)	(0.0143)	(0.0186)	(0.0143)	(0.0143)
Trade Openness [3]	0.9208 †	−0.0208	0.9264 †	−0.0161	0.9256 †	0.9256 †
	(0.4185)	(0.3040)	(0.4213)	(0.3044)	(0.4211)	(0.4211)
Population [3]	−0.5757	−1.3868 ***	−0.5740	−1.3851 ***	−0.5746	−0.5746
	(0.3480)	(0.1815)	(0.3494)	(0.1815)	(0.3494)	(0.3494)
# Contig. States	0.0404 †	0.0456 †	0.0404 †	0.0457 †	0.0404 †	0.0404 †
	(0.0183)	(0.0192)	(0.0184)	(0.0192)	(0.0184)	(0.0184)
Europe [1]	−0.4153 ***	−0.8754 ***	−0.4129 ***	−0.8765 ***	−0.4131 ***	−0.4131 ***
	(0.1246)	(0.1287)	(0.1249)	(0.1288)	(0.1249)	(0.1249)
Middle East [1]	0.1953 †	−0.0222	0.1972 †	−0.0223	0.1972 †	0.1972 †
	(0.0974)	(0.0992)	(0.0976)	(0.0993)	(0.0977)	(0.0977)
Intercept	−0.3041 *	−0.7222 ***	−0.3064 *	−0.7319 ***	−0.2959 †	−0.2961 †
	(0.1185)	(0.1932)	(0.1183)	(0.1938)	(0.1178)	(0.1177)
N	1,238,142	901,850	1,238,142	901850	1,238,142	1,238,142
Log-likelihood	−155,175.77	−119524.93	−155,181.92	−119531.25	−155,183.46	−155,183.40
$\chi^2_{(12,14,12,14,12,12)}$	10,182.92 ***	9862.59 ***	10,087.55 ***	9925.66 ***	10,162.43 ***	10,145.83 ***

Signif.: † = 5%, ∗ = 1%, ∗∗ = 0.5%, ∗∗∗ = 0.1%. Code: [1] = dummy, [2] = natural log, [3] = $\frac{coefficient}{(1\times10^6)}$.

Values in parentheses are robust standard errors, significance tests two-tailed. Spline results are suppressed.

Table 2: IO Mandate, Member Contention and Interstate Crises (IO-state-years)

D.V.: CRONSET (Crisis)	MANDATE		CONTENTION	
	All Obs.	Interventionist	All Obs.	Interventionist
Political Mandate [1]	**-0.0143** ***	**-0.0521** ***		
	(0.0020)	(0.0078)		
Social Mandate [1]	**-0.0095** ***	**-0.0135** **		
	(0.0015)	(0.0044)		
Economic Mandate [1]	**0.0080** †	**0.0701** ***		
	(0.0036)	(0.0104)		
All member Contention			**-19.5218** ***	**-19.1756** ***
			(2.9952)	(3.0559)
Major Power Contention			**10.7668** ***	**10.8909** ***
			(2.3226)	(2.3275)
Floor − MP Contention			**-3.7152** †	**-3.5014** †
			(1.5390)	(1.5897)
# Member States [3]			**130.9067** **	**246.5744** **
			(47.1148)	(80.6875)
CINC Score	5.8620 ***	6.3149 ***	5.9554 **	6.6423 ***
	(1.6917)	(1.6983)	(1.9374)	(1.9475)
Polity	−0.0009	−0.0005	0.0060	0.0063
	(0.0143)	(0.0150)	(0.0136)	(0.0142)
Trade Openness [3]	0.9310 †	0.9768 †	0.8688 †	0.8422 †
	(0.4235)	(0.4707)	(0.3845)	(0.4114)
Population [3]	−0.5690	−0.6452	−0.5157	−0.6153
	(0.3492)	(0.3534)	(0.3765)	(0.3749)
# Contiguous States	0.0404 †	0.0423 †	0.0276	0.0287
	(0.0184)	(0.0195)	(0.0159)	(0.0171)
Europe [1]	−0.4148 ***	−0.4342 ***	−0.2255 †	−0.2494 †
	(0.1254)	(0.1268)	(0.1065)	(0.1069)
Middle East [1]	0.2002 †	0.2169 †	0.1981 †	0.2088 †
	(0.0978)	(0.1036)	(0.0919)	(0.0981)
Intercept	−0.2991 †	−0.3675 **	0.2130	0.0443
	(0.1185)	(0.1294)	(0.5346)	(0.5372)
N	1,247,515	122,467	1,247,515	122,467
Log-pseudolikelihood	-155,327.57	-15,737.05	-149,500.75	-15,111.55
$\chi^2_{(14,14,15,15)}$	10,642.02 ***	919.29 ***	11,649.13 ***	892.42 ***

Signif.: † = 5%, ∗ = 1%, ∗∗ = 0.5%, ∗ ∗ ∗ = 0.1%. Code: [1] = dummy, [2] = natural log, $[3] = \frac{coefficient}{(1 \times 10^6)}$.

Values in parentheses are robust standard errors, significance tests two-tailed. Spline results are suppressed.

Table 3: IO Institutionalization and Interstate Crisis Behavior (IO-state-years)

D.V.: VIOL (War)	MINIMAL	STRUCTURED	INTERVENTIONIST
IO Member [1]	**0.0022**	**0.0380** †	**0.0622** **
	(0.0138)	(0.0188)	(0.0204)
CINC Score	7.6256 ***	7.8412 ***	7.8798 ***
	(1.6123)	(1.5456)	(1.5231)
Polity	−0.0377	−0.0385	−0.0382
	(0.0319)	(0.0319)	(0.0320)
Trade Openness [3]	−2.3444 ***	−2.4175 ***	−2.4354 ***
	(0.6588)	(0.6435)	(0.6384)
Population [3]	−0.8083	−0.8209	−0.8327
	(0.5630)	(0.5485)	(0.5495)
# Contig. States	−0.1044 †	−0.1056 †	−0.1056 †
	(0.0466)	(0.0465)	(0.0465)
Europe [1]	0.4723	0.4378	0.4238
	(0.3111)	(0.3104)	(0.3096)
Middle East [1]	0.4456	0.4251	0.4186
	(0.2307)	(0.2292)	(0.2286)
Intercept	−0.4513	−0.4302	−0.4264
	(0.3045)	(0.3057)	(0.3060)
N	98,334	65,454	63,046
Log-pseudolikelihood	-55,897.96	-37,253.22	-35,908.86
$\chi^2_{(8,8,8)}$	37.32 ***	43.37 ***	49.76 ***

Signif.: † $= 5\%$, $* = 1\%$, $** = 0.5\%$, $*** = 0.1\%$. Code: [1] $=$ dummy, [3] $= \frac{coefficient}{\left(1 \times 10^6\right)}$.

Values in parentheses are robust standard errors, significance tests two-tailed.