Guilt by Association

The Link between Anti-U.S. Sentiment and the Legitimacy of Intergovernmental Organizations

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Abstract

I introduce the possibility of guilt by association: for an intergovernmental organization largely created by the United States or in which the U.S. wields more-formalized influence, an actor holding unfavorable perceptions of the U.S. likely also questions the legitimacy of the IGO. The rationale is two-fold. First, the U.S. possesses institutionalized influence (e.g., veto power, control over financial resources) within many of the world's most prominent IGOs and faces substantial difficulties in credibly committing to non-interference with organizational activities. Second, the U.S.'s leading role in designing and establishing many IGOs has enabled it to embed some of its own norms and values in existing multilateral institutions. Therefore, even if America could credibly commit to abstention from overt interference, it nevertheless may exert influence via *ideational* avenues. Employing a new dataset covering 35,397 people in 23 countries, I find strong support for the guilt-by-association hypothesis. People who hold unfavorable views of U.S. influence indeed are more likely to question the legitimacy of four prominent IGOs in which the U.S. wields substantial influence: the United Nations, World Trade Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. Extending the analysis, I find that powerful states such as Russia and Japan display similar though weaker relationships with these IGOs. The results – which are robust to additional controls and different model specification – shed new light on the possible consequences of anti-U.S. sentiment and previously unrecognized threats to IGO legitimacy. The findings elicit concern, because threats to the legitimacy of prominent IGOs may undercut states' ability to work multilaterally through intergovernmental organizations.

It has become rare to watch a news program or open a newspaper without encountering anti-U.S. sentiment: from protests to flag-burning to bomb plots. Of the 47 countries surveyed in 2007 by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, majorities in 13 countries – and pluralities in 17 others – expressed "no confidence at all" in U.S. president George W. Bush to "do the right thing regarding world affairs." Favorable opinions of the United States, moreover, fell in 26 of the 33 countries for which trend data was available.[1] By summer 2008, following a series of hearings at which a variety of experts testified, the U.S. House of Representatives had released a report finding that anti-U.S. sentiment had reached record levels around the world.[2]

Anti-U.S. sentiment is prevalent and cannot necessarily be rolled back quickly by a new presidential administration. But does it matter in international relations? Recent scholarship investigates whether a tarnished image undercuts the United States' ability to carry out initiatives *unilaterally* – by, for example, reducing the likelihood of other countries' acquiescence to American initiatives.[3] I propose a different possibility: guilt by association may threaten the legitimacy of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) with which the U.S. is closely associated, thereby undermining the ability of the U.S. and other states to act *multilaterally* when desired.[4]

Many of the world's most prominent IGOs are closely associated with the U.S., because the United States played a major role in their creation and/or maintains institutionalized avenues of influence within them. There may be advantages to this close association, but there can be a danger as well. Specifically, for IGOs largely created by the U.S. or in which U.S. influence is formally institutionalized, I hypothesize that an actor holding unfavorable perceptions of the United States likely also questions the legitimacy of the IGO itself. Because legitimacy is of central concern in the functioning of intergovernmental organizations, this guilt-by-association hypothesis points to an important way in which anti-U.S. sentiment may matter in international relations. Section I of the article provides the theoretical background for this hypothesis. Section II utilizes a new dataset covering 35,397 people in 23 countries, providing systematic evidence for a link between anti-U.S. sentiment and IGO legitimacy for four prominent organizations: the United Nations, World Trade Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. Section III summarizes the findings, discusses their implications, then concludes.

I. Guilt by Association

The U.S. and Prominent Intergovernmental Organizations

In the post-World War II era, the United States has played a central, even dominant, role in designing and maintaining intergovernmental organizations. Many of the world's most prominent IGOs – such as the United Nations, World Trade

[1] Pew Global Attitudes Project 2007, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256. Last accessed April 16, 2008.
[2] U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs. http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/tir061108.htm. Last accessed January 12, 2009.
[3] Katzenstein and Keohane 2006.
[4] An intergovernmental organization is "a formal, continuous structure established between [governmental] members from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the membership" (Archer 2001, 33).

Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund – were created under U.S. leadership and in order to promote liberalism and other professed U.S. values.[5] In the 1940s, for instance, Anglo-American concurrence on a set of Keynesian-inspired policy ideas garnered support for U.S. hegemony and postwar reconstruction, laying the foundations for the mandates of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.[6] In fact, both of these organizations are headquartered in the American capital, while the United Nations is headquartered in New York, further symbolizing the close relationship between the U.S. and some of the world's most visible IGOs.

Intergovernmental organizations, designed to be compatible with American notions of political order, have shaped the structure and rules of global governance in line with U.S. political and economic interests.[7] Recognizing the potential for powerful states such as the U.S. to instill their values in intergovernmental organizations, some observers go so far as to characterize IGOs as key mechanisms through which the universal norms of world hegemony are expressed. Robert Cox, for example, explicitly views intergovernmental organizations as products of the hegemonic world order. As such, he argues, IGOs embody rules that facilitate expansion of that order, legitimize norms and activities of the hegemon, absorb counter-hegemonic ideas, and co-opt elites from peripheral countries.[8]

The United States can – and often does – couple such *ideational* influence with more *institutionalized* means of influence within intergovernmental organizations. While the former rests on organizational values, the latter stems from organizational practices enabling particular states to wield influence through more formalized channels. By means of devices such as vetoes, permanent seats, and assessed financial contributions, the U.S. can control organizational resources and maintain the ability to initiate or block organizational actions. The United States faces substantial difficulties in credibly committing to non-interference with organizational activities, given its bevy of institutionalized avenues of influence in many prominent IGOs.

In the United Nations, the U.S. holds a permanent seat and veto in the Security Council and provides around 25 percent of the budgets for many of the UN's offshoot organizations.[9] In the World Bank, the U.S. enjoys an effective veto, the largest vote share, a permanent representative on the Executive Board, and the power to nominate the organization's president. In the IMF, the United States maintains the largest budget responsibility, the largest vote share, an effective veto, and a permanent representative on the Executive Board. Even in the World Trade Organization, which follows a one-country-one-vote system, semi-formal practices ensure U.S. participation in all major private negotiations.[10]

In designing and maintaining IGOs, the U.S. has heeded Rousseau's classic admonition, "The strongest is never strong enough to be always master, unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty."[11] Institutionalized influence –

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[5] Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 15.
[6] Ikenberry 1993, 58. The compromise, which later came to be known as "embedded liberalism," sought domestic stability amidst the pursuit of greater market openness (Ruggie 1982).
[7] Karns and Mingst 2004, 16, 252.
[8] Robert W. Cox, quoted in Archer 2001, 163-164.
[9] Junne 2001, 193.
[10] Steinberg 2002.
[11] Rousseau 1968, Chapter 3.

that is, organizational practices such as weighted voting, veto power, and permanent representation – commonly solidify the "rights" of the United States and other major powers. Meanwhile, embedded ideational influence – such as promotion of market openness or democratization – frequently delineate the "duties" of other members.

While political elites may be more cognizant of specific details such as vote shares, laypeople also are well aware of the U.S.'s ideational and institutionalized influence in many prominent IGOs. Observers across the globe, for instance, have publicized the International Monetary Fund's promotion of elements of the so-called Washington Consensus, a list of economic reforms deemed by American policymakers to be desirable for other countries. More recently, misconduct allegations against World Bank president Paul Wolfowitz prompted very public and worldwide debate concerning the appropriateness of U.S. leadership within the Bank, resulting in Wolfowitz's resignation in summer 2007. Scholars, too, have drawn attention to prominent IGOs' close association with the United States – finding, for example, that the U.S. attempts to gain allies among temporary members of the UN Security Council by using its influence in the IMF and the World Bank to provide favorable treatment in lending decisions.[12]

Jeopardizing IGO Legitimacy

In a world of widespread and difficult-to-reverse anti-U.S. sentiment, this intimate relationship between the United States and prominent IGOs poses the danger of guilt-by-association: if an IGO is closely associated with a state that is viewed unfavorably, that disfavor can taint the legitimacy of the IGO itself. Legitimacy stems from a variety of sources, including an IGO's ability to act justly and honestly, to base policies on desirable norms and values, to form governance structures in accordance with the law, or to represent different societal groups in a fair way.[13] The justness and appropriateness of an organization's value-driven behavior are jeopardized when a state that inculcated those foundational values is perceived unfavorably. Similarly, the correctness of procedures and the fairness of representation are called into question when a distrusted state possesses institutionalized means for influencing IGO activities.

Legitimacy, which is crucial in the realm of intergovernmental organizations, is a subjective quality, constituted by an actor's opinion.[14] If an actor views an IGO as a legitimate entity that ought to be obeyed, such a perception affects behavior by molding the actor's definitions of its own interests and options.[15] To attain legitimacy, intergovernmental organizations strive to distinguish themselves from their presumably self-serving members. IGOs claim to pursue the collective welfare of their international membership – and frequently trumpet their ostensibly neutral and technocratic methods of doing so.[16] Since intergovernmental organizations often must rely on moral suasion to elicit compliance and enforcement from states and other entities, attention to legitimacy is critical – not only for IGOs themselves but also for any state that wishes to preserve the

[12] Dreher et al. 2006, 2009.
[13] Junne 2001, 191. Conceivably, an IGO could be legitimate according to some of the criteria but illegitimate according to others.
[14] Karns and Mingst 2004, 9. Legitimacy is "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman 1995, 574).
[15] Hurd 1999, 381, 388, 400.
[16] Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 23.

ability to work multilaterally through intergovernmental organizations.

Given its ideational and institutionalized influence in prominent IGOs, however, the United States faces a fundamental tension between its desire to bolster IGO legitimacy and its inclination to dominate intergovernmental organizations. The U.S. and other powerful states confront repeated temptations to meddle in the activities of multilateral bodies, obtaining short-term gains at the expense of exposing the entities' non-neutrality.[17] The fact that a state has not succumbed to temptation is no guarantee that it never will, and major powers face substantial difficulties in credibly committing themselves to non-interference. Moreover, even if the U.S. could credibly commit to abstention from overt interference, its role in shaping organizational values may permit it to exert influence through ideational channels.

Because the U.S. possesses institutionalized and/or ideational influence in many prominent intergovernmental organizations, perceptions about the nature of U.S. influence matter. If the U.S. wields influence in an IGO, and U.S. influence is viewed negatively, then it is likely that the IGO will be viewed negatively as well. This rationale points to a hypothesis that can be tested empirically. For prominent IGOs such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (all of which were created largely by the U.S. or in which the U.S. possesses institutionalized avenues of influence), *an individual who holds unfavorable views of U.S. influence will be more likely to question the legitimacy of the IGO itself.*

This guilt-by-association hypothesis should hold among members of the general public. Indeed, a growing of body of scholarship draws attention to the importance of public opinion in international relations. Perhaps most fundamentally, domestic elites pay attention to public opinion. In democratic states, the reason for this is straightforward: laypeople vote, a fact that has been shown to shape both election behavior and policy choices.[18] But public opinion may be highly relevant even in autocracies, in which regime survival depends on leaders' ability to gain the support of "selectorates" that may be quite large and diverse. Public opinion, therefore, can shape elites' interactions with intergovernmental organizations. In addition, individual citizens increasingly bypass governmental elites in order to access the international arena directly, through demonstrations, referenda, lobbying, transnational civil society, and so on.[19]

In fact, recent Gallup polls in 72 countries indicate that laypersons' attention toward prominent intergovernmental organizations is rather high, thereby forming a basis for people to develop opinions about IGOs' legitimacy and associations with particular states. Out of a sample of 53,206 individuals, 68 percent reported familiarity with the

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[17] Abbott and Snidal 1998, 19.

[18] See, for example, Aldrich et al. 1989 or Shapiro and Jacobs 2000.

[19] According to some observers, public opinion's perceived irrelevance in international relations disappeared as European integration progressed, and its impact blossomed as groups such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace mobilized the mass media and transnational pressure from citizens to influence decision-making in IGOs (Reinalda and Verbeek 2004, 243). And while the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions currently do not provide referendum channels as formal as those of the European Union, consultative relations with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are becoming increasingly common in the World Bank and other multilateral institutions (World Bank 1995 and World Bank 1999). Moreover, in an effort to influence both governmental intermediaries and intergovernmental organizations themselves, individual citizens can and do take to the streets to express their opinions about IGO activities. For further discussion of the role of public opinion in international decision-making, see Niedermeyer and Sinnott 1995.

International Monetary Fund, 72 percent reported familiarity with the World Bank, and 84 percent reported familiarity with the United Nations.[20] Other public opinion sources echoes these results.[21]

II. Quantitative Analysis

Data

For prominent IGOs such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund, the guilt-by-association hypothesis predicts that an individual who holds unfavorable views of U.S. influence will be more likely to question the legitimacy of the IGO itself. Assessing this claim requires information concerning evaluations of American influence (the key explanatory variable), as well as legitimacy assessments for intergovernmental organizations (the dependent variable). The Asia Barometer datasets, which include approximations of both types of information, provides the opportunity to empirically investigate the possibility of guilt by association.[22]

Between 2003 to 2007, Tokyo University scholars and their in-country teams conducted face-to-face interviews with samples of the working age (i.e., 20-69) populations in 23 countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uzbekistan.[23] By employing face-to-face interviews, the researchers minimized non-

[20] Gallup International, Voice of the People 2005. The 72 surveyed countries are from all regions of the world and cover a wide range of development levels. Familiarity with the World Trade Organization was not investigated.

[21] In the 2003-2007 Asia Barometer surveys, respondents were explicitly asked to indicate uncertainty or unfamiliarity concerning particular IGOs. Only 14 percent of the 35,397 Asian interviewees said that they had no opinion or did not know what to reply about the UN. For the WTO, World Bank, and IMF, the percentages were 19, 19, and 21 percent, respectively. Perhaps the most notable difference is that a greater percentage of the respondents exhibit familiarity with the International Monetary Fund, perhaps due in part to the IMF's highly visible intercession during the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s.

[22] Other datasets were considered but lacked sufficient information about the dependent variable, the key independent variable, or both. For example, the 2003 and 2004 Transatlantic Trends Surveys, administered in the United States and ten European countries, solicited opinions about U.S. influence but did not ask questions about IGOs. The 2004 Global Views survey merely asked foreign policy elites whether America should comply with UN and WTO rulings. The 1999-2001 Afro Barometers solicited trust assessments only for domestic institutions, while recent Latin Barometers measured respondents' familiarity with – but not perceptions of – various multilateral organizations. Studies conducted in Mexico and South Korea in 2004 employed IGO "feeling thermometers," which for present purposes are somewhat ambiguous. Unlike the Asia Barometer, which explicitly instructs respondents to consider whether an IGO can be trusted to operate in the best interests of society, feeling-thermometer questions do not specify which aspect of intergovernmental organizations are to be evaluated. Similarly, the Worldviews 2002 project asked Europeans whether institutions such as the United Nations should be strengthened, but linking such feedback to legitimacy or trust remains tenuous. It is unclear whether a respondent favors bolstering an institution because she already finds it legitimate and trustworthy… or because she does not. The 2005 Voice of the People poll, conducted in 72 countries, solicits opinions about IGOs but not about influential states.

[23] The field reports and other documentation indicate that various forms of multistage, stratified, clustered, and national probability sampling were employed. The researchers sought to use random and nationally representative sampling. However, resource constraints necessitated urban-focused surveys in a few

responses, resulting in a sample size of 35,397 individuals. Interviewees were asked how positively or negatively they perceive U.S. influence, and how much they trust or distrust the United Nations, World Trade Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund.

The Asia Barometer's sibling surveys in Europe, Latin America, and Africa currently do not ask about both IGO legitimacy and the influence of particular states. Nevertheless, Asia is an attractive starting point. Unlike some areas of the world, this region is neither uniformly rich nor uniformly poor, neither universally weak nor universally powerful. As Table 1 shows, the sampled countries vary substantially in terms of their influence within major IGOs, level of economic development, regime type, and duration of membership in intergovernmental organizations.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

I expect the guilt-by-association hypothesis to hold for both public and elite opinion – but due to the current unavailability of suitable data regarding the latter, here I investigate the former. In fact, examining public rather than elite opinion offers a relatively hard test. In light of elites' more intimate familiarity with states' less obvious inroads into particular IGOs, it is plausible that the conjectured link would garner even starker support in elite-based data than in public opinion data.

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables are based on the following question about the United Nations, World Trade Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund: "To what extent do you trust [each IGO] to operate in the best interests of society? If you don't know what to reply or have no particular opinion, please say so." Given that IGOs possess "the aim of pursuing the common interests of the membership," and legitimacy indicates that "the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate," inquiring about trustworthiness to operate in the best interests of society suitably captures the notion of IGO legitimacy. An individual who questions an institution's legitimacy is also likely to distrust that institution. In other words, one would expect ordinary people's perceptions of these two abstract concepts – if both were observable – to exhibit high positive correlation.

Figure 1 summarizes the 35,397 interviewees' responses. In the aggregate data, the results are similar across the four organizations. At the extremes, around five percent express substantial *distrust*, while 15 percent of the interviewees express substantial *trust*.

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countries (e.g., geographically expansive China). In each year, each country's sample consisted of approximately 800 to 1,000 interviewees. Different interviewees are selected each year. Due to the lack of a theoretically compelling reason why each country should not be considered equally important in examining IGO legitimacy, the responses from more populous countries are not weighed more highly in the analyses that follow. Each of the five years of data cover different sets of countries, approximately in three-year cycles – for example, the focus is on East Asia in 2003 and 2006, Southeast Asia in 2004 and 2007, and Central Asia in 2005. Subsequent robustness checks verify that the main results are the same regardless of whether countries surveyed only once are included or excluded in the analysis. Six other countries (Brunei, Laos, Myanmar, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and Vietnam) are not included because the researchers were prohibited from asking certain questions (e.g., about the trustworthiness of one's own government) that are central to the following analysis.

The majority of the responses fall in the middle: approximately 20 percent distrust the four institutions to a degree, and approximately 43 percent trust the institutions somewhat but not entirely. For each IGO, only 21 percent or less reported that they had no opinion or did not know what to reply. Laypeople report less distrust toward the United Nations than toward the other three organizations.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Disaggregating the data reveals greater distinctions among laypersons' perceptions of the four intergovernmental organizations. Opinions about the trustworthiness of particular IGOs are positively correlated, but certainly not perfectly: the correlations range from 0.59 (for the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations) to 0.79 (for the IMF and its sister institution the World Bank). Individual opinions follow a variety of patterns by country of residence as well, as illustrated by the examples in Table 2. For all four IGOs, Cambodians exhibit overwhelming trust, South Koreans exhibit substantial skepticism, and Philippinos or Uzbekistanis consistently lie between these two extremes. In other countries, interviewees more frequently single out particular IGOs. For instance, Chinese respondents express greater distrust for the UN than for the other organizations, while Indian respondents express less distrust toward the World Bank. Thais and Indonesians, meanwhile, hold more skeptical views of the International Monetary Fund than of the other IGOs. In short, respondents do not tend to answer identically to questions about the four IGOs – rather, they often hold distinctive views about each organization.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Overall, a substantial portion of the interviewees – about one-fourth – actively distrust the organizations. To assess the hypothesis that this skepticism is related to perceptions regarding particular states, I begin with probit analyses. The four dichotomous dependent variables – *Distrust toward UN, Distrust toward WTO, Distrust toward WB, Distrust toward IMF* – are coded 1 for responses of "distrust a lot" or "distrust a bit" and 0 for responses of "trust a lot" or "trust a bit." The simple probit approach is undertaken for ease of presentation and simulations with four dependent variables, and subsequent robustness tests indicate that the use of ordered probit models do not change the main results. Table 3 displays descriptive statistics for all dependent and independent variables.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

Key Independent Variable

The key independent variable is based on the following question: "Do you think the United States has a good influence or a bad influence on your country?" The question inquires about the individual's assessment of U.S. influence, not her opinion regarding specific *policies* of the U.S. – this is important, because displeasure with particular policies alone does not necessarily indicate the broader disfavor that may color people's perceptions of IGOs closely associated with particular states. An individual who views a

state's influence over IGOs (un)favorably also is likely to view that state's influence over his own country (un)favorably. In other words, because ordinary people's perceptions of these two types of influence – if both were observable – likely would exhibit high positive correlation, a state's influence on the respondent's own country is a suitable proxy for that state's influence on prominent multilateral institutions.

At the extremes, 16 percent of the 35,397 interviewees say that U.S. influence is good, while 8 percent say it is bad. The majority of responses fall in the middle: 31 perceive the United States somewhat favorably, 22 percent see U.S. influence as neither good nor bad, and 16 percent perceive the United States somewhat unfavorably. Only 7 percent of the responses are missing. The key independent variable *Negativity toward United States* is coded 0 for "good influence," 1 for "rather good influence," 2 for "neither good nor bad influence," 3 for "rather bad influence," and 4 for "bad influence. Thus, higher values indicate increasingly negative assessments. In the five years covered in the dataset, the variable's average value closely hovers around the overall mean of 1.66, ranging from a mean of 1.82 in 2003 to a mean of 1.49 in 2005. The guilt-by-association hypothesis predicts that the coefficient for *Negativity toward United States* will be positive, as well as statistically and substantively significant.

Control Variables

International relations scholarship suggests control variables. For one thing, an actor's opinions regarding technocratic systems likely shapes perceptions of the legitimacy of intergovernmental organizations. IGOs' cultivation of specialized knowledge in certain issue areas may enable states to obtain efficiency gains through delegation.[24] Numerous intergovernmental organizations become bureaucratic entities, pursuing their missions by "technocratic" – ostensibly rational, impartial, and non-violent – means.[25] The downside is that multilateral institutions remain vulnerable to the same path dependency, red tape, and parochialism frequently associated with domestic bureaucracies.[26] The following question controls for dislike of technocratic governance structures: "Do you think that a system whereby decisions affecting the country are made by experts (such as bureaucrats with expertise in a particular field), according to what they think is best for the country, would be very good, fairly good, or bad?" The variable *Negativity toward Technocracies* ranges from 0 to 2, with higher values indicating increasingly unfavorable assessments.

Distrust for one's own central government also may prompt distrust for intergovernmental organizations, although *a priori* the expected sign of the coefficient is not clear. If interviewees believe that a multilateral institution is a mere extension or aggregation of unsatisfactory state leadership, then perceptions of the two entities would be positively correlated.[27] On the other hand, if the "boomerang effect" (which portrays IGOs as participants in transnational advocacy networks that can alter outcomes by putting pressure on recalcitrant states) holds, then respondents may view an organization as an attractive alternative to a corrupt or inept national political system, and perceptions

[24] See, for example, Keohane 1984, Abbott and Snidal 1998, Hawkins et al. 2006.
[25] Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 5.
[26] Weber 1978; Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004; Stiglitz 2003.
[27] Klabbers 2001, 224; Brewer et al. 2004, 97. Looking only at the United Nations, for example, Torgler 2008 finds that a higher degree of trust in national institutions increases trust in the UN.

of the two entities would be negatively correlated.[28] To control for this, I use the responses to the following question: "To what extent do you trust your central government to operate in the best interests of society? If you don't know what to reply or have no particular opinion, please say so." The variable *Own Government's Untrustworthiness* is coded so that higher values indicate increasingly unfavorable assessments: 0 for "trust a lot," 1 for "trust a bit," 2 for "distrust a bit," and 3 for "distrust a lot."

Furthermore, an individual's nationalism or global exposure may shape her views of entities lying beyond her country's borders. Having little international contact may leave a person unsocialized into international norms and modes of cooperation.[29] Possessing a great deal of nationalistic pride may prompt hostility toward foreign things more broadly.[30] The control variable *Extent of Global Exposure* ranges from 0 to 6, based on a count of how many of the following situations pertain to a respondent: 1) has a relative living in another country, 2) has traveled abroad at least three times in the past three years, 3) has friends from other countries, 4) often watches foreign-produced programs on TV, 5) often communicates with people in other countries via the Internet or email, or 6) holds a job involving contact with organizations or people in other countries. The control variable *Extent of Nationalism* is based on answers to the question, "How proud are you of being your nationality?" – it is coded 0 for "not proud at all," 1 for "not really proud," 2 for "somewhat proud," and 3 for "very proud."

In addition, a person's perception of IGO legitimacy may be shaped not only by his views toward an influential state, but also by his opinions about the job that the intergovernmental organization itself is doing. While the Asia Barometer interviewers did not directly broach this topic, they did inquire about individuals' major anxieties. Four of these concerns – regarding war, fair trade, poverty, or global recession – relate to the core tasks of the UN, WTO, World Bank, and IMF, respectively. Individuals who believe that an IGO is doing a poor job of pursing its core task likely worry about that task. Therefore, I create four dichotomous variables – *Worries about War, Worries about Fair Trade, Worries about Poverty,* and *Worries about Global Recession* – set equal to one if the respondent cites the issue as a prominent fear, and set equal to zero otherwise. Each variable is added to its respective IGO's model to capture concerns about organizational performance that may be distinct from concerns about the influence of particular states. All models are run with country and year fixed effects, as well as heteroskedasticy-robust standard errors.

Results

Table 4 presents the results of the four probit models. The findings strongly support the guilt-by-association hypothesis. Across the four IGOs, the coefficient on *Negativity toward United States* is positive and statistically significant at the one-percent level. Using assessments of IGO trustworthiness as stand-ins for assessments of IGO legitimacy, an actor holding unfavorable perceptions of U.S. influence is more likely to question the legitimacy of intergovernmental organizations largely created by the U.S. or

[28] Risse-Kappen 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998.
[29] See, for example, Wendt 1992, 1999.
[30] See, for example, Huntington 1998 (although, admittedly, his discussion broadens "nationalism" to include civilization-wide pride).

in which the U.S. could intervene.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

In general, the controls are statistically significant and display the expected signs. Distrust toward each intergovernmental organization indeed is more likely when respondents hold unfavorable views of technocratic systems. The WTO, World Bank, and IMF – all of which are charged with narrower, more economics-focused responsibilities than is the UN – exhibit larger positive coefficients for *Negativity toward Technocracies*. Interviewees with more global exposure display less skepticism concerning intergovernmental organizations. Distrust for one's own central government is positively and significantly correlated with distrust toward each of the four IGOs. Thus, although the received literature does not generate a strong *a priori* expectation about the sign of *Own Government's Untrustworthiness*, the estimates in Table 5 provide preliminary evidence that ordinary people consider intergovernmental organizations and their own national governments to be complements rather than substitutes. The four variables capturing concerns about the organizations' core tasks – regarding war, fair trade, poverty, and global recession – are significant at conventional significance levels only for the United Nations and World Bank. In the latter case, those who worry about poverty indeed are more likely to distrust the World Bank; in the former case, those who worry about war are less likely to distrust the UN. Finally, more-nationalistic respondents actually are less likely to distrust these four IGOs. This may indicate that nationalism, rather than necessarily challenging multilateralism, also involves pride regarding participation and recognition in the international community.

Estimated Probabilities

Due to the non-linearity of the probit models, the sign and statistical significance of a given coefficient are more directly informative than the size of the number itself. To make the findings more intuitive, I employ simulations to calculate the estimated probabilities that a representative individual distrusts each IGO, for different values of the key independent variable *Negativity toward United States*. Table 5 displays the results. The baseline prediction, which is obtained by setting all of the independent variables (including the controls) at their mean values, appears in bold in the middle row. The prediction differs somewhat across the four intergovernmental organizations but hovers around 27 percent.

[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

Comparing the table's rows further corroborates the guilt-by-association hypothesis. Holding all other variables at their means, the predicted probability of distrusting the IGOs jumps to between 33 and 38 percent when U.S. influence is perceived to be "rather bad" and jumps even further, to between 37 and 43 percent, when U.S. influence is perceived to be "bad." This constitutes a movement of as much as 13 percentage-points from the baseline value in a single direction. The movement is considerable, particularly when one recognizes that these changes in the value of *Negativity toward United States* shift the estimated probability up or down by over one-

third of the baseline prediction.

Changes in the value of *Negativity toward United States* display a similar, but smaller, effect in the other direction. Holding all other variables at their means, the predicted probability of distrusting the IGOs falls to between 23 and 29 percent when U.S. influence is perceived to be "rather good" and falls even further, to between 19 and 24 percent, when U.S. influence is perceived to be "good." While the average change from the baseline is +12 percentage-points when assessments of the U.S. become worse, the average change is only -7 percentage-points when assessments of the U.S. become better. In other words, the "damage" inflicted by unfavorable views exceeds the "repairs" manifested by favorable views.

Robustness Checks

To probe the robustness of the main results, I re-run the probit models with a number of additional controls. Previous research does not offer clear-cut predictions about the expected effect of factors such as age, gender, and socioeconomic status, but it does suggest that such demographic variables may be correlated with trust in international entities.[31] Furthermore, studies indicate that people sometimes translate their general skepticism about human nature into beliefs about the untrustworthiness of international actors in particular.[32] Even individuals who are not inherently skeptical about human interactions may find political interactions especially difficult to understand or monitor. To control for the potential influence of these factors, I add the following variables. I include the interviewee's *Age* and *Age-Squared* to check whether age has an impact but at an increasing or decreasing rate. The variable *Male* is binary, set equal to one for male respondents. Likewise, *High School Graduate* is binary, set equal to one for respondents who have completed high school.[33] *Generally Distrusting* is coded 1 if the interviewee agrees with the statement, "In general, you can't be too careful in dealing with people." *Political Confusion* is measured from 0 to 4, based on reactions to the statement, "Politics and government are so complicated that sometimes I don't understand what's happening" – higher values signal stronger agreement.

These enlarged probit models (whose results, to conserve space, are not shown) produce no changes in the main findings, but some of the additional controls are significant at conventional levels. Specifically, males and those who are confused by politics are *more* likely to distrust the four IGOs, while high school graduates are *less* likely to do so. As additional checks, I re-run the enlarged probit models, using data only from those countries that were surveyed multiple times between 2003 and 2007 – this has no impact on the main results. I also re-run the enlarged models as ordered probit rather than simple probit – again, the key findings remain unaffected.[34]

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[31] For example, Alesina and LaFerrara 2002, focusing mainly on the United States, find that trust in others increases with age and income, and is higher among men than among women. Concerning international trust, Brewer et al. 2004 find a negative relationship with age and a positive but statistically insignificant relationship with education.

[32] Brewer and Steenbergen 2002, 42-43; Conover and Feldman 1984; Torgler 2008.

[33] The datasets do not offer adequate information to control for income or political ideology.

[34] For the ordered probit models, I created two variants of the ordered dependent variable, in order to ensure that the results are not driven by the way in which "don't know" answers are treated. One version – *UN Untrustworthiness v1, WTO Untrustworthiness v1, World Bank Untrustworthiness v1, and IMF Untrustworthiness v1* – treats responses of "haven't considered/don't know/no answer" as missing data.

Neither multicollinearity among independent variables in each model, nor correlated error terms across models, prompt any cause for concern. As expected, variance inflation factors – which descibe how much multicollinearity increases the variance of each estimator – are somewhat high for *Age* and its quadratic version *Age-Squared*. But none of the other variables exceed the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10, and the mean VIF hovers around 5.1 for each equation, comparing reassuringly to the mean VIF of 1.0 that would result if there were absolutely no collinearity among variables.[35] Likewise, treating the four equations as a system of seemingly unrelated regressions recalculates the standard errors to address the possibilities of correlated error terms, but this has no impact on the main findings.

Extensions

The guilt-by-association hypothesis receives strong support in the quantitative analyses. For prominent IGOs such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (all of which were created largely by the U.S. or in which the U.S. possesses institutionalized avenues of influence), an individual who holds unfavorable views of U.S. influence indeed is more likely to question the legitimacy of the IGO itself. Could this logic hold more generally, linking perceptions of an IGO's legitimacy to perceptions of other states that possess ideational and/or institutionalized influence within the IGO?

To probe such an extension of guilt by association, I incorporate additional variables to capture perceptions of three other countries about which the Asia Barometers inquired: Russia, Japan, and Pakistan. This permits evaluation of a more detailed hypothesis. Specifically, the association should be 1) strongly positive for a state that possesses both institutionalized and ideational influence in a given IGO, 2) weaker but still positive for a state that possesses only one of the types of influence in a given IGO, and 3) negligible for a state that possesses neither type of influence in a given IGO.

Roughly speaking, the U.S. fits in the first category, Russia and Japan fit into the second, and Pakistan fits into the third. For example, for over 40 years Russia (within the Soviet Union at the time) refused involvement with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, waiting until the 1990s to become a member of these organizations. Today, however, it is among the top-ten members in terms of financial contributions and vote share in both IGOs. Russia worked closely with the United States in the 1940s to design and launch the United Nations. And although Russia provides nowhere near as much of the funding for the family of organizations under the UN umbrella, it does join the U.S. as a permanent, veto-holding member of the Security Council. Russia has been involved in membership negotiations with the World Trade Organization in recent years, but it has not yet joined the WTO.

Japan, meanwhile, is a founding member of the WTO and was actively involved in its design. Japan's position in World War II prevented the country from participating

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This variable ranges in value from zero (for "trust a lot") to three (for "distrust a lot"). The other version – *UN Untrustworthiness v2, WTO Untrustworthiness v2, World Bank Untrustworthiness v2, and IMF Untrustworthiness v2* – treats responses of "haven't considered/don't know/no answer" as a neutral category within the ordering. This variable ranges in value from zero (for "trust a lot") to two (for "haven't considered/don't know/no answer") to four (for "distrust a lot").

[35] Gujarati 2003, 351-353, 362-363.

in the negotiations that created the IMF, UN, and World Bank, but the country has striven to make up for this lack of ideational influence by seeking more institutionalized influence. Thus far, it has failed to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, but it does contribute substantial financial resources to the United Nations system. In the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, Japan has succeeded in becoming the second most powerful member (after the U.S.) in terms of financial contributions and vote shares.[36]

Pakistan is a founding member of the WTO but was peripheral in determining the organization's design. The country exhibits little institutionalized nor ideational influence in the other three organizations. In fact, the country did not exist yet when the IMF, UN, and World Bank were designed in the 1940s.

In sum, then, I expect the coefficient on *Negativity toward United States* to continue to be strongly positive across the models, even with the addition of variables controlling for perceptions of other countries. In general, the coefficients on *Negativity toward Russia* and *Negativity toward Japan* should be somewhat smaller but still positive, reflecting the fact that these two states tend to possess either ideational or institutionalized influence, but not both simultaneously. There should be no discernible relationship between *Negativity toward Pakistan* and perceptions of the legitimacy of these four IGOs, in which Pakistan wields little influence. Like *Negativity toward United States*, these three new variables are based on the question "Do you think [Russia, Japan, or Pakistan] has a good influence or a bad influence on your country?" and range in value from 0 to 4, with higher numbers indicating increasingly negative assessments. Table 6 displays the results of the probit models.

[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

In the general, the theoretical expectations are borne out empirically. The coefficient on *Negativity toward Pakistan* is statistically significant only at the ten-percent level for the IMF and is statistically insignificant at conventional levels for the UN, WTO, and World Bank. For both Russia and Japan, the coefficients are positive but substantially smaller than the positive coefficients on *Negativity toward United States* – in all cases, the coefficients are significant at the one-percent level. Somewhat surprisingly, there is a positive relationship between perceptions of Russian influence and perceptions of the WTO's legitimacy, despite the fact that Russia is not yet a member of the World Trade Organization – perhaps this is due to the attention that Russia's sometimes-contentious membership negotiations have attracted in the international press. Across the four IGOs, the coefficient on *Negativity toward United States* remains statistically and substantively significant despite the inclusion of additional variables. Due to missing data issues, the results should be interpreted cautiously: interviewees from 2007 drop out because the questions about Russia and Pakistan were not asked that year, and interviewees from Japan drop out because interviewees were not asked about

[36] World Bank. Votes and Subscriptions. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,contentMDK:20124831~isCURL:Y~menuPK:64020035~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036,00.html. Last accessed April 16, 2008. International Monetary Fund. Members' Funding and Voting Shares. http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm. Last accessed April 16, 2008.

their perceptions of their own country's influence. Nevertheless, Table 6 provides suggestive evidence that the guilt-by-association hypothesis pertains not only to the United States, but also more generally.

III. Discussion

Summary

Anti-U.S. sentiment – which is currently prevalent but cannot necessarily be rolled back quickly by a new presidential administration – matters. Potential danger lies in the fact that many of the world's most prominent IGOs are closely associated with the U.S. The rationale is two-fold. First, the U.S. often possesses *institutionalized* avenues of influence within intergovernmental organizations. As such, it confronts repeated temptations to meddle in the activities of multilateral bodies and faces substantial difficulties in credibly committing itself to non-interference. Second, the U.S.'s prominent role in designing and establishing many IGOs has enabled it to embed some of its own norms and principals in existing multilateral institutions. Therefore, even if America could credibly commit to abstention from overt interference, it nevertheless may exert influence via *ideational* avenues. Thus, IGOs largely created by the U.S. or in which U.S. influence is more formally institutionalized face the possibility of guilt by association: an actor holding unfavorable perceptions of the United States likely also questions the legitimacy of the IGO itself.

Quantitative analyses, using new datasets from 35,597 people in 23 countries, support the hypothesis for the United Nations, World Trade Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. An actor holding unfavorable perceptions of U.S. influence indeed is more likely to question the legitimacy of these four intergovernmental organizations, in which the U.S. possesses ideational and/or institutionalized influence. According to simulations, the baseline probability that an individual will distrust an IGO hovers around 27 percent. The predicted probability jumps as high as 43 percent, an increase of up to 13 percentage-points, if U.S. influence is thought to be bad. This movement is substantial, constituting a shift of over one-third of the baseline prediction.

These findings are both statistically and substantively significant, are robust to different model specifications, and are not plagued by multicollinearity or by correlated errors terms across models. What is more, further analyses (incorporating perceptions concerning the influence of Russia, Japan, and Pakistan) suggest that guilt by association holds not only for the U.S., but also more generally. It is states' institutionalized or ideational influence within IGOs that permits perceptions about an IGO's legitimacy to be intertwined with perceptions about states. Thus, guilt by association certainly is pertinent for the U.S., which maintains close relations with many of the world's most prominent intergovernmental organizations – but the concept also applies more broadly, to other states that possess institutionalized and/or ideational influence within IGOs. The more extensive the avenues of influence, the greater the danger of guilt by association. Specifically, the results suggest little threat from states that possess neither type of influence in a given IGO, but much greater threats from states that possess one or both types.

Implications

These findings are important, for at least two main reasons. First, they provide concrete evidence for a mechanism by which anti-U.S. sentiment matters in international relations. Particularly in recent years, anti-U.S. sentiment has prompted concern among the media, polling groups, scholars, the public, and policymakers. As one observer states, "When these perceptions affect the interests of the United States and its citizens, their prosperity and security, they matter."[37] Yet while a great deal of evidence verifies the prevalence and intensity of anti-U.S. sentiment, and a number of scholars have investigated its causes, relatively little work carefully considers its possible impact. Even the analyses that do exist – for example, suggesting that anti-U.S. sentiment may undermine American soft power,[38] or arguing that it may have delayed rather than immediate effects on American policies[39] – do not explore the possibility that such disfavor could taint the legitimacy of intergovernmental organizations with which the United States is closely associated. This article shows that, in fact, it can. What is more, the simulations suggest that perceptions of IGO legitimacy are more greatly affected by unfavorable assessments of U.S. influence than by favorable ones. Thus, while anti-U.S. sentiment itself may be difficult to reverse, undoing its impact on intergovernmental organizations may be even more challenging.

Second, the findings contribute to the theoretical dialogue concerning IGO legitimacy. Much has been written, for example, about the danger posed to IGO legitimacy by issues such the "democratic deficit" in their governance structure.[40] The concept of guilt by association highlights the fact that intergovernmental organizations in which particular states possess preponderant institutionalized influence may find their legitimacy to be tightly intertwined with perceptions of those states. Even IGOs with an ostensibly democratic governance structure face similar challenges, due to the ideational influence exerted by those states that shaped the organization's underlying norms and values. The specter of guilt by association arises not only from world powers such as the U.S., but also from other prominent states. From a practical standpoint, the possible drawbacks of institutionalized and ideational influence must be carefully considered when policymakers design or reform intergovernmental organizations.

So why should we be concerned? As discussed in Section I, legitimacy is a subjective quality, constituted by an actor's opinion, which in turn affects behavior by shaping how the actor views its interests. Perceived legitimacy is crucial for intergovernmental organizations, because multilateral institutions often must rely on moral suasion to elicit compliance and enforcement. If an IGO's association with a disfavored state weakens the IGO's legitimacy, states and other actors may be less willing to participate in and comply with the organization's activities. This, in turn, undermines states' ability to work multilaterally through intergovernmental organizations, which are key actors in the provision of international collective goods.[41] In addition, as one observer points out, "The worst happens when… no member state really recognizes itself in and identifies with the organization and its overall multilateral

[37] Brooks 2006, 153.
[38] Chiozza 2005, 2006.
[39] Katzenstein and Keohane 2006.
[40] See, for example, Moravcsik 2004; Nye 2001.
[41] See, for example, Kindleberger 1973; Lake 1993.

mission."[42] When intergovernmental organizations – the chief legitimizing agents of global politics – are undermined, the legitimacy of the international order itself is threatened.[43] Given the severity of the potential consequences, this issue warrants further attention, expanding the investigation to other IGOs and other respondents, as well as analyzing the interactions between public and elite opinion in the international realm.

[42] Coicaud 2001, 527.
[43] Karns and Mingst 2004, 257.

Appendix

Table 1: Variation across Countries in the 2003-2007 Asia Barometer Datasets

Source: websites of the IMF, World Bank, UN Human Development Reports, Polity IV Project, United Nations, and World Trade Organization.

	IMF Vote Share	WB Vote Share	PPP-adjusted GDP per Capita (US$)	Polity IV Project Score	IMF/WB Accession Year	UN Accession Year	WTO/ GATT Accession Year
Afghanistan	0.08	0.03	---	---	1955	1946	---
Bangladesh	0.25	0.32	2,053	+6	1972	1974	1972
Bhutan	0.01	0.05	---	-8	1981	1971	---
Cambodia	0.04	0.03	2,423	+2	1970	1955	2004
China	3.66	2.78	5,896	-7	1945	1945	2001
Hong Kong	---	---	34,833	---	---	---	1986
India	1.89	2.78	3,139	+9	1945	1945	1948
Indonesia	0.95	0.94	3,609	+7	1954	1950	1950
Japan	6.02	7.86	31,267	+10	1952	1956	1955
Kazakhstan	0.18	0.20	7,857	-6	1992	1992	---
Kyrgyzstan	0.05	0.08	1,927	+3	1992	1992	1998
Malaysia	0.68	0.52	10,276	+3	1958	1957	1957
Maldives	0.01	0.04	5,261	---	1978	1965	1983
Mongolia	0.03	0.04	2,107	+10	1991	1961	1997
Nepal	0.04	0.08	1,550	-6	1961	1955	2004
Philippines	0.41	0.44	4,614	+8	1945	1945	1979
Singapore	0.40	0.04	28,077	-2	1966	1965	1973
South Korea	1.33	0.99	20,499	+8	1955	1991	1967
Sri Lanka	0.20	0.25	4,390	+6	1950	1955	1948
Taiwan	---	---	---	+10	---	---	---
Tajikistan	0.05	0.08	1,356	-3	1991	1992	---
Thailand	0.50	0.41	8,090	+9	1949	1946	1982
Uzbekistan	0.14	0.17	1,869	-9	1992	1992	---

Polity IV Project Score is per Polity's 2005 Report. PPP-adjusted GDP per Capita (US$) is per 2007/2008 UN Human Development Report. The date of a country's accession to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IRDB) is used as the date of the country's accession to the World Bank.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has been manifested as the World Trade Organization since 1995, but countries that were GATT members prior to the changeover display the year of their GATT accessions. At the time of this writing, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan hold observer status in the WTO but are not yet full members.

Figure 1: The Dependent Variables – Distrust toward Four Prominent IGOs

Source: Pooled 2003-2007 Asia Barometers.

"To what extent do you trust [each IGO – the United Nations, World Trade Organization, World Bank, or International Monetary Fund] to operate in the best interests of society? If you don't know what to reply or have no particular opinion, please say so."



Due to rounding, totals may not sum to exactly 100 percent.

Table 2: The Dependent Variable – Portion of Distrustful Responses, by Country and IGO

Source: Pooled 2003-2007 Asia Barometers.

	PORTION OF INTERVIEWEES WHO DISTRUST:			
	United Nations	**World Trade Organization**	**World Bank**	**International Monetary Fund**
Cambodia	8%	10%	8%	11%
China	35%	25%	21%	27%
India	23%	21%	15%	20%
Indonesia	23%	28%	31%	34%
Philippines	15%	19%	18%	20%
South Korea	42%	47%	46%	46%
Thailand	19%	19%	17%	24%
Uzbekistan	20%	23%	21%	21%

For ease of presentation, only the portion of interviewees in each country who reported distrusting a particular IGO "a bit" or "a lot" are shown, while trustful responses and responses of "don't know/no answer" are not included. The total number of interviewees varies by country but is never less than 1,600 for the countries listed here.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics

Source: Pooled 2003-2007 Asia Barometers.

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Binary Dependent Variables					
Distrust toward UN	30,589	0.28	0.45	0	1
Distrust toward WTO	28,527	0.31	0.46	0	1
Distrust toward WB	28,673	0.29	0.45	0	1
Distrust toward IMF	27,857	0.33	0.47	0	1
Ordered Dependent Variables ("don't know" answers treated as missing)					
UN Untrustworthiness v1	30,589	1.13	0.80	0	3
WTO Untrustworthiness v1	28,527	1.20	0.79	0	3
WB Untrustworthiness v1	28,673	1.14	0.80	0	3
IMF Untrustworthiness v1	27,857	1.23	0.80	0	3
Ordered Dependent Variables ("don't know" answers treated as neutral)					
UN Untrustworthiness v2	35,397	1.49	1.13	0	4
WTO Untrustworthiness v2	35,397	1.61	1.10	0	4
WB Untrustworthiness v2	35,397	1.54	1.11	0	4
IMF Untrustworthiness v2	35,397	1.65	1.10	0	4
Key Independent Variable					
Negativity toward USA	32,925	1.66	1.19	0	4
Control Variables					
Negativity toward Technocracies	32,302	1.05	0.68	0	2
Own Government's Untrustworthiness	34,251	1.19	0.87	0	3
Extent of Global Exposure	35,397	1.03	1.20	0	6
Extent of Nationalism	35,001	2.51	0.74	0	3
Worries about War	35,397	0.39	0.49	0	1
Worries about Fair Trade	35,397	0.08	0.27	0	1
Worries about Poverty	35,397	0.62	0.49	0	1
Worries about Global Recession	35,397	0.15	0.36	0	1
Age	35,397	38.30	12.15	20	69
Age-Squared	35,397	1,614.7	1003.96	400	4,761
High School Graduate	35,244	0.65	0.48	0	1
Male	35,397	0.49	0.50	0	1
Generally Distrusting	34,620	0.69	0.46	0	1
Confusion about Politics	34,408	1.27	0.99	0	4
Multiple Surveys	35,397	0.73	0.44	0	1
Negativity toward Russia	25,607	1.60	0.98	0	4
Negativity toward Pakistan	24,585	2.09	0.94	0	4

Table 4: Results from Core Probit Models

Source: Pooled 2003-2007 Asia Barometers.

	DEPENDENT VARIABLES			
	Distrust toward United Nations	*Distrust toward World Trade Organization*	*Distrust toward World Bank*	*Distrust toward International Monetary Fund*
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES				
Negativity toward United States	0.145*** (0.008)	0.148*** (0.008)	0.131*** (0.008)	0.135*** (0.008)
Own Government's Untrustworthiness	0.264*** (0.011)	0.265*** (0.012)	0.279*** (0.012)	0.270*** (0.012)
Negativity toward Technocratic systems	0.030** (0.013)	0.057*** (0.013)	0.077*** (0.014)	0.063*** (0.013)
Extent of Nationalism	-0.044*** (0.013)	-0.065*** (0.013)	-0.033** (0.014)	-0.023* (0.014)
Extent of Global Exposure	-0.036*** (0.008)	-0.032*** (0.008)	-0.036*** (0.009)	-0.036*** (0.009)
Worry about War	-0.057*** (0.019)	---	---	---
Worry about Fair Trade	---	0.024 (0.034)	---	---
Worry about Poverty	---	---	0.050** (0.020)	---
Worry about Global Recession	---	---	---	-0.038 (0.025)
Constant	-1.394*** (0.086)	-0.812*** (0.079)	-1.055*** (0.083)	-1.162*** (0.082)
Observations	27,047	25,515	25,093	24,501

* significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%

Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models run with country and year fixed effects.

Table 5: Estimated Probabilities, Based on Core Probit Models

Source: Pooled 2003-2007 Asia Barometers.

		ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF DISTRUSTING:				
		United Nations	World Trade Organization	World Bank	International Monetary Fund	Average Change from Baseline
IF U.S. INFLUENCE IS DEEMED TO BE:						
	Bad	0.38	0.43	0.37	0.42	+ 0.12
	Rather Bad	0.33	0.37	0.33	0.38	+ 0.07
	Baseline (Mean)	**0.26**	**0.30**	**0.27**	**0.31**	**---**
	Rather Good	0.23	0.27	0.24	0.29	- 0.03
	Good	0.19	0.22	0.21	0.24	- 0.07

The estimates were produced with Clarify software (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003), based on 1,000 simulations using the parameter estimates from the core probit models. Baseline probability is calculated with all variables at mean values. Other probabilities are calculated by setting all variables except the variable of interest at mean values. All probabilities are significant at the one-percent level.

Table 6: Results from Enlarged Probit Models, with Opinions re: Russia and Pakistan

Source: Pooled 2003-2007 Asia Barometers.

	DEPENDENT VARIABLES			
	Distrust toward United Nations	*Distrust toward World Trade Organization*	*Distrust toward World Bank*	*Distrust toward International Monetary Fund*
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES				
Negativity toward United States	0.135*** (0.011)	0.129*** (0.011)	0.121*** (0.011)	0.130*** (0.011)
Negativity toward Russia	0.064*** (0.014)	0.079*** (0.014)	0.077*** (0.015)	0.043*** (0.015)
Negativity toward Japan	0.043*** (0.013)	0.065*** (0.013)	0.048*** (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)
Negativity toward Pakistan	0.007 (0.014)	0.016 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.025* (0.014)
Own Government's Untrustworthiness	0.246*** (0.015)	0.256*** (0.015)	0.276*** (0.015)	0.257*** (0.015)
Negativity toward Technocratic systems	0.023 (0.017)	0.046*** (0.017)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.057*** (0.017)
Extent of Nationalism	-0.054*** (0.016)	-0.075*** (0.016)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.013 (0.017)
Extent of Global Exposure	-0.025** (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.023** (0.011)	-0.024** (0.011)
Worry about War	-0.035 (0.024)	---	---	---
Worry about Fair Trade	---	0.052 (0.040)	---	---
Worry about Poverty	---	---	0.051** (0.024)	---
Worry about Global Recession	---	---	---	-0.071** (0.033)
Constant	-1.563*** (0.150)	-1.345*** (0.146)	-1.487*** (0.150)	-1.433*** (0.147)
Observations	17,231	16,574	16,352	15,995

* significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%

Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models run with country and year fixed effects. Respondents from Japan drop out of the analysis, because interviewees were not asked to assess their own country's influence. In the 2007 Asia Barometer, interviewees were not asked for their opinions about the influence of Russia or Pakistan.

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