Paternalism and North-South Negotiations in GATT

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Abstract

Paternalistic rhetoric in global affairs implies that trade relations are governed through the developed countries' benevolence and empathy toward the developing world's economic concerns. It leads to the expectation that developed countries provide reciprocal or non-reciprocal trade concessions to the developing world. Experimental data and historical descriptions, dealing with foreign aid and humanitarian interventions, confirm such paternalistic suppositions (Baker 2015; Barnett 2011). Two data sets developed in this paper invalidate positive effects of paternalism for international trade. First, the paper provides a content analysis of 13 years of press releases from the U.S. Trade Representative's office coded for paternalistic rhetoric along with a brief historical context for understanding the developing world's advocacy for trade concessions. Next, using latent variable analysis, the effects of a quantitative index of 'paternalistic strength' are tested on the degree of trade reciprocity toward the developing world. Specifically, the paper validates two hypotheses: (1) Paternalism is negatively related to reciprocity in trade concessions, and (2) Developing countries' negotiation strength is positively related to reciprocity. The paper concludes that economic diversification and coalition-building, rather than paternalistic benevolence, explain trade concessions the developing world receives.

When asked for his views on Western Civilization, Mahatma Gandhi is famously supposed to have said it would be good idea. Poor countries are equally cynical about western governments' commitment to free trade. With good reason: America and Europe are forever lecturing developing countries about the need to open their markets, yet they do their best to keep out many poor-country exports.

> *The Economist* "White Man's Shame", September 23, 1999

Introduction

Did the colonial masters switch from policies of domination and racism to those of liberal internationalist benevolence when they left the lands they occupied? The canonical International Relations literature, at least in North America, mostly advances the cause of benevolence.¹ The end of colonization did not mean the end of racism but International Relations scholarship in the post-war era, with few important exceptions, emphasized the scope and consequences of a liberal internationalist order, without seriously considering the continuation of explicit or implicit racism toward the colonial or newly independent territories.² Crawford's (2002) important text on the rise of ideas that ended colonialism, including its racist underpinnings, does not dwell greatly on the continuation of racist ideas in the post-colonial era. In international economic relations, Sylvia Ostry's (2002) well-known phrase "grand bargain", summing up the results of the Uruguay Round of trade (1986-94), implies benevolence in that the developing world received concessions in agriculture and textiles in return for opening its markets to

¹ For benevolent references in the realist tradition, see Nye (1990) and Ikenberry (2001). In the liberal internationalist tradition, see Keohane (1984) and Simmons (2001). While constructivist scholarship has not ignored racism, its 'optimistic' ontological premise often analyzes the shift away from oppressive practices rather than their persistence (Keck and Sikkink 1999, Barnett 2011). Critical and Marxian scholarship tends to either ² These exceptions, often noting silence on matters of race in internationals relations, include Doty (1993), Mittelman (2009), Vitalis (2010), Bell (2013), Henderson (2013), and Chowdhry and Nair (2013)

services trade and signing restrictive intellectual property measures. More recently, Barnett (2011, 2012) writes forcefully about the positive externalities of paternalism, understood mostly as benevolent humanitarian assistance. But in doing so he returns International Relations to a consideration of historical racism that was ignored earlier, and this has spawned further debates on the racist underpinnings of current paternalism in international development and humanitarianism (Duffield and Hewitt 2013, Baker 2015).³

The relationship between the colonizers and the colonized was exploitative -whether understood through the framework of an international division of labor, coreperiphery relations, unequal exchange, or commodity chains (Foster and Carter 1976; Carodoso and Faletto 1979; Mintz 1985; Arrighi 1994). In the post-war era, few notable neo-classical trade economists doubted the efficacy of international trade to deliver benefits to developing economies (Singer 1950; Haberler et al 1958; Bacha 1978; Love 1980). Therefore, the idea that post-war economic institutions would automatically benefit the developing world was contested in the negotiations that led to post-war liberal institutions.⁴ The creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1948, nevertheless, provided a tantalizing possibility to uphold the primary principle underlying its preamble and its first article of enunciation -- namely, reciprocity or mutual exchange of concessions -- that would not allow trading states to discriminate against each other.

³ The 'return' to racism here recalls the origins of 20th century political science in colonial governance (Vitalis 2010), or the field of "interracial relations" with its *Journal of Race Development* between 1910-1919, which in 1922 became *Foreign Affairs* (Henderson 2013, 72).

⁴ For UN in general, see Mazower (2009), for GATT see Irwin (2009), for Bretton Woods institutions Helleiner (2014)

This study begins by examining the theoretical expectations that provide a case for reciprocity, and analyzes the paternalistic underpinnings of the post-war liberal internationalist institutions. Two broad hypotheses result from the theoretical literature: (1) developed country paternalism results in few trade concessions to the developing world, (2) developing world's advocacy and negotiations facilitate trade concessions that it receives. The scope and consequences of post-war paternalism are answered by modeling it as a latent variable whose influence must be gauged through a variety of behavioral factors.⁵

The study employs mixed methods and two original datasets to demonstrate its central suppositions. The paper first provides a short history of developed-developing country relations in the GATT, and then a content analysis of 13 years of press releases from the United States Trade Representative's office to show that over 93 percent of the paternalistic references the U.S. made around the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations were toward the developing world. The indicative historical and content analysis implies that paternalism is a form of identity, which shapes preferences and discourse, press releases in this case, in a latent way. Modeling paternalism as a latent variable, the study quantitatively answers the following question: did the developing countries receive reciprocal trade concessions at the Uruguay Round of trade talks (1986-94)? In doing so, it employs the hard test of sectors in which the developing world supposedly received trade concessions, namely merchandise trade analyzed further to examine concessions in

⁵ Latent variable analysis, originating in psychology, is also known as factor analysis and measures the behavioral effect of latent influences. Statistically, it examines the principal components from the correlation matrix of several variables (See Bartholomew et al 2011). In this paper, I extract these 'factors' from several international indices that might measure some latent paternalism.

agriculture. The data show that the developing world did not receive great concessions in merchandise trade or agriculture. Second, to the extent that the developing world received trade concessions, they resulted from developing world's negotiation strengths, including economic conditions and collective advocacy, rather than developed world's benevolence. The major quantitative findings, at multiple levels, are all statistically significant.

This study contributes to the theoretical debate on paternalism to demonstrate that its influence is behaviorally latent, and not benevolent. This empirically rigorous category seeks to show that historically derived paternalism stands in the way of an international order based on forms of reciprocity. The evidence confirms that the end of colonial racism did not did not lead to fairness in trade concessions.

Conceptualizing Reciprocity, Paternalism, and Negotiations

The study hypothesizes the causes for the differences in trade concessions received and given. The two clusters of causes deal with the paternalistic strength of developed countries, including former European colonizing states and the United States, and the Global South's negotiation strengths. Trade concessions are hard to measure, but negotiators generally accord attention to some form of exchange or fairness in making or receiving concessions. The trade concept of reciprocity, roughly the give and take of proportionate trade concessions for each country, provides an approximate measure of trade concessions. In reality, negotiators employ heuristics rather than strict mathematics when operationalizing reciprocity (Finger et al 1996).

Reciprocity

Reciprocity remains one of the most important norms in international diplomacy because it implies some sense of overall equality or balance, even fairness, in concessions. At a broad level, reciprocity can be understood as the basis of a social order (Elster 2007, Scott 2000), and provides the underlying glue of trust to social and economic interactions (North 1991, Greif 1993). Adam Smith's moral political economy is that of reciprocity in exchange. Reciprocity also provides legitimacy to international law: "Notions of reciprocity and a desire to depend on other nationals observance of rules lead many nations to observe rules even when they do not work" (Jackson 1997: 2). Even critiques of multilateral trading systems as offering unequal bargains implicitly reference reciprocity (Scott 2007; Jawara and Kwa 2003).⁶

The GATT preamble exhorts states toward "reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce." GATT/WTO's Article I mentions Most Favored Nation, which is operationalized in practice as reciprocity. Article XVIII bis of GATT specifically mentions "negotiations on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis."

In practice, negotiators understand reciprocity in strategic ways. Keohane (1986) notes that trade concessions involve "specific reciprocity" where states "exchange items of equivalent value" rather than diffuse reciprocity entailing future returns or

⁶ There is also some evidence that multilateral trade negotiations offer developing countries a better bargain toward reciprocity than preferential or bilateral trade arrangements (Marchetti and Roy 2012; Davis 2009). Multilateralism in general is held up to be more fair and reciprocal than bilateral arrangements (Ruggie 1992).

contributions to the provision of public goods. In making reciprocal trade concessions, negotiators also maintain a balance with their underlying domestic interests.

Negotiators often employ rules of thumb or heuristics in calculating reciprocity. The lexicon of multilateral trade concessions is notoriously slippery when speaking across issues and the variety of trade protections across multiple trade parties. A 50 percent tariff cut for a country with low tariffs is different from one with high tariffs. Larson (1998: 129) notes that during GATT's Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds of trade, negotiators often used rules of thumb to calculate the total trade that would be covered by the percentage reductions in tariffs. The Uruguay Round established guidelines for tariffs and also for converting or calculating, non-tariff rates in tariff terms. In interviews with Uruguay Round trade negotiators, Finger and Winters (2000:55-56) notes that diplomats did not carefully check reciprocity calculations at the Uruguay Round allowing for "dirty tariffication," wherein actual tariffs exceeded what the guidelines established. Toward the end of the Round, negotiators also widely expected developing countries to make tariff cuts averaging 25 percent, and33 percent for developed countries (Finger, Reincke and Castro, 1999: 8).

Paternalism

International relations scholarship has generally ignored paternalism and race as relevant categories for analyzing global politics.⁷ Understood in the context of trade relations, racism refers to paternalistic, patronizing, and discriminatory beliefs about groups of

 $^{^{7}}$ The issue of race is implicit in paternalism. Vitalis (2010) notes that paternalism is always toward the 'other' usually of a different skin color. Baker's (2015) data confirm this in a notion he terms racist paternalism.

countries, based usually on the color of skin.⁸ Instead of reciprocity, it could mean providing handouts (non-reciprocal concessions) or withholding reciprocal concessions, both from a position of power or superiority. Table 1 summarizes reciprocal, non-reciprocal, and paternalistic concessions.

A concept analogous to racism is paternalism, which implies benevolence, often from the perspective of economic strength understood as 'parental' caring, but in practice an arms-length relationship in cultural terms. Therefore, depending on the context, paternalism can be regarded as benevolent (Barnett 2012) or racist (Baker 2015). Understanding this shift from colonial racism to post-colonial paternalism, therefore, needs broad historical context.

The link between current paternalism and historical racism is easily made. Historically, European colonizers thought of the colonized as racially inferior. Even Darwin shared the conception of non-Europeans as 'barbarians'; liberal political philosophers in Europe in the 19th century believed in Europe's civilizing mission in the colonies (Mehta 1999). Edward Said's *Orientalism* is a commentary on this racism.⁹ Racism may have shaped the creation of post-war international institutions. Mazower's (2009) history of the origins of the United Nations connects its genesis to preservation of imperialism by other means: "A democratic imperial order had been preserved, thanks to the formation of the UN, even as fascist militarism had been defeated. The world of civilizing inferior races, and keeping them in order, could continue" (p. 21). He also

⁸ The history of racism, a word invented to denote "Judenrein" or the Nazi doctrine to get rid of Jews in the 1930s (Rattansi 2007), would call for a definition that goes beyond color of skin.

⁹ Banton (2002: 42-46) notes that the attribution of racism to pathology among the Nazis was a noble lie. Racism had been and was rampant all over Europe.

accords attention to well-known racists involved in the UN negotiations such as Jan Smuts of South Africa or Julian Huxley from the UK, who believed in aims such as the continuation of the civilizing mission.

Paternalistic notions regarding the developing world are subject of considerable scholarship. The work of anthropologists has been especially incisive. Escobar (1995: 44) highlights the "the top-down, ethnocentric, and technocratic approach" of international development efforts. The World Bank, for example, strives to create markets in areas where they purportedly do not exist. Ferguson (1994) and Guyer (2004) document the presence of markets and exchange in Lesotho and Equatorial Africa respectively -- Ferguson to evidence exploitation beginning in the 19th century, and Guyer to highlight the historical origins of exchange in pre-colonial Africa. The rollout of international development efforts, humanitarian assistance, and foreign aid usually comes coated with layers of paternalism to assist the developing world out of its misfortunes (Barnett 2011, Duffield and Hewitt 2013).

Paternalism, however, is not the same as racism. Paternalism implies benevolent, even if patronizing, efforts to assist the developing world. Racism entails denial of benefits, or conversely, the awarding of benefits or goodwill toward the racially similar. The empirical record of trade concessions to the developing world presented later varies between paternalism and racism. As the following sections demonstrate, despite benevolent promises of assistance, and somewhat limited sets of trade 'preferences', the developing world has not received unilateral trade concessions from the developed world. In particular, being a former European colony is negatively related to trade concessions, especially in agricultural negotiations. Figure 1 also indicates that countries that received

foreign aid during the Uruguay Round did not receive trade concessions in agriculture, recalling the logic of side-payments rather than trade concessions in Table 1.¹⁰

FIGURE 1 HERE

The literature on "outgroups" and culturally defined trade preferences supports these findings. Mansfield and Mutz (2009: 3) notes that anxiety about out-groups shapes trade preferences more than straightforward material considerations. Skonieczny (2001) shows that Americans' discursively constructing Mexico as inferior in accepting it as a trading partner in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).¹¹

Negotiations

Negotiation literature does not ascribe any a priori benevolent gains to the developing world. It posits the opposite: the developing world is disadvantaged in a "definitional inferiority" (Zartman 1971: 9).¹² The ability to garner gains in negotiations results usually from three factors related to any party's alternatives (Lax and Sebenius 1986). First, economic conditions may provide the basis of advantage from either a large market or a diversified trade portfolio. Most developing countries are disadvantaged due to their

¹⁰ Foreign aid is often taken to be a proxy for paternalism but it is hard to model in multiple regressions. Although Figure 1 is indicative of a perfectly hyperbolic relationship between aid and trade concessions, the relationship does not remain robust (even as a log-log regression) when modeled with multiple and control variables, and additional diagnostics. This may be due to the fact that foreign aid data contain a great deal of noise including emergency, developmental, capacity-building, and humanitarian aid. Therefore, an alternative, more robust, measure of paternalism is developed later that also addresses multiple behavioral dimensions.

¹¹ Beyond trade, Baker's (2015) experimental data show that subjects are more likely to provide foreign assistance when shown pictures of the racial other (Cameroon, Guyana) rather than the racially similar (Moldova, Armenia) even though the economic characteristics of the recipients are broadly similar.

¹² Varieties of neo-realism support this claim. See Krasner 1991 and Drezner 2007.

export reliance on a few primary goods, as shown in the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis.¹³ The main thrust of the developing world's import substitution industrialization (ISI) efforts in the post-colonial era was to reduce resource dependencies and jumpstart development through economic diversification.¹⁴ Second, the developing world can practice negotiations tactics that result in concessions. Coalition-building with other countries is the most common (Narlikar 2005; Sell and Odell 2006; Singh 2008). Raiffa (1982:255) considers coalition-building to be the most important tactic distinguishing multilateral from bilateral negotiations. There are many other tactics that can be considered. These include: agenda-setting and voting rules (Steinberg 2002), trade-offs and linkages (Davis 2003), framing (Sell and Odell 2006), of the use of technical and legal knowledge (Breckenridege 2005; Smith 2006). Finally, the institutional context of negotiations may provide benefits. Multilateral negotiations through international institutions may be rule-based, less prone to the naked exercise of coercive power. The last point is important methodologically: if developing countries do not receive reciprocal concessions at multilateral negotiations, they are unlikely to receive them elsewhere.¹⁵

¹³ Economists Raúl Prebsich and Hans Singer argued in the 1950s that developing world commodities with high elasticity of supply/price resulted in inferior terms of trade for them (See, Bacha 1978)

¹⁴ ISI is rightly critiqued for equating development with a misconceptualized notion of 'modernization' rooted in European economic history. However, ISI is also important for understanding economic aspirations in the post-colonial era and

¹⁵ Until the Uruguay Round, the developing world was not really included in the multilateral trade negotiations (Winham 1985). The inclusion of the developing world in the negotiating rooms of GATT during the Uruguay Round, therefore, provides an especially important point of entry. I have also argued that the developing world's inclusion in the Uruguay Round was itself a result of its coalition-building and advocacy (Singh 2000).

Plan

Two broad hypotheses follow from the conceptual discussion above:

H1: Global North's paternalism is negatively related to reciprocity in trade concessionsH2: Global South's negotiation strength is positively related to reciprocity.

This paper follows a three-tiered research method that rests on qualitative and quantitative logic for enunciation. The qualitative method rests on the case-study method of most-likely "theory infirming" case (Odell 2001), which entails that a theory is invalidated if it does not hold in the most-likely place where we would find evidence for its support. GATT's multilateral rounds and the Uruguay Round, in particular, are chosen for their merits as the most-likely case. They also feature the effects of coalitions. For the purposes of this paper, the grouping between the developed and developing countries can be noticed since the days of GATT formation. Therefore, GATT history, briefly described in the next section, is replete with references to the benevolence of the developed world and provision of measures such as Special and Differential treatment and the Generalized System of Preferences. The second tier of this paper's method reports results from a content analysis of all USTR Press Releases from the 1982-93 period, obtained though U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, to provide a first glimpse of paternalistic rhetoric from the U.S. toward the developing world.¹⁶

¹⁶ As this content analysis is limited to the U.S., it is not employed later in multiple regressions, which test for reciprocity among multiple trade partners. Furthermore, the USTR press releases cover bilateral and multilateral issues: they are appropriate for getting a sense of U.S. trade stance toward countries but contain too much 'noise' to distinguish effectively between bilateral and multilateral issues.

In the third tier, data from GATT's Uruguay Round are employed to test Sylvia Ostry's (2002) "grand bargain" thesis. There is no doubt that the developing world made significant concessions in services and intellectual property. In fact, the Uruguay Round was launched after great opposition from the developing world to the inclusion of these issues (Sell 1998; Singh 2006). However, the results reported later invalidate the claim that the developing world received concessions in merchandise trade or agriculture. For now, the following section provides a brief contextual history of North-South trade relations in GATT.

A Brief History of Negotiations

The developing world does receive trade concessions in GATT's history. The relevant question is: does it receive reciprocal concessions? Second, to the extent that it receives any kind of trade concessions, do they result from North's benevolence or the South's advocacy?

Two major trade outcomes are examined here to provide a sense of the North-South negotiation history before the Uruguay Round: advocacy for infant industry, and the Generalized System of Preferences, which eventually developed into special and differential treatment.¹⁷ The two efforts examined here are important. The advocacy for infant industry started before the signing of the GATT in 1948 and resulted in the Part IV addition to GATT articles on economic development in 1964. Calls for special and differential treatment began shortly after the creation of UNCTAD and the G77 coalition

¹⁷ Infant industry meant temporary reprieve from international trade measures to develop domestic industry in the developed world. Systems of trade preferences, such as GSP, would allow developing country exports to reach developed world at preferential tariffs.

from the developing world in 1964. The Tokyo Round of trade negotiations (1974-79) formalized special and differential treatment into the Generalized System of Preferences.

GATT resulted from a failure in the United States to ratify the ambitious post-war trade organization, the International Trade Organization. The ITO was negotiated mostly between the U.S. and Britain although 55 countries signed the ITO charter in Havana in March 1948. Imperial preferences, or the system of preferential tariffs between the colonial powers and their respective colonies, dominated trade talks between the two powers: the U.S. argued against the protectionist and preferential measure that hurt American exports, while Britain's preferences resulted from reliance on a source of cheap raw materials. British Tories were also quite vocal in regarding imperial preferences as continuation of the empire (Irwin 2009). In this sense, ITO/GATT rules continued the kinds of imperial motivations that Mazower (2009) underscores for the creation of the United Nations in general. Britain won, and the colonizing powers were able to maintain imperial preferences. The colonies acquiesced because most of their trade connected them with former or existing colonial masters.

At the ITO and GATT negotiations, the developing world sought derogations for infant-industry to jumpstart industrialization, rather than imperial preferences. The issue came up in the ITO negotiations in 1946 and Article XVIII (c) allowed for restrictions on imports but it was a difficult measure to put into practice. Curzon (1965) provides several instances of these derogations being denied subsequently. It took almost two decades of strident advocacy to add Part IV (Articles XXXVI-XXXVIII) "Chapter on Trade and Development." to GATT in 1964, which attends to trade and development. This advocacy consisted of two parts. First, there was force of evidence. Several studies

in the 1950, culminating in the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis showed that the developing world faced declining terms of trade due of the elasticity of supply of primary products. GATT then appointed Committee III, headed by the Austrian School economist Gottfried Haberler, to examine the issue (Haberler et al 1958). The 1958 *Haberler Report*, as it came to be known, denounced protections that the developing world faced in the developed world. Following the *Haberler Report*, GATT held several meetings and developed countries made several promises, but nothing substantive resulted from these moves. Instead of tariff concessions, developed countries began to utilize the 'soft option' of foreign aid (Bauer and Woods 1961). Curzon (1965: 225) notes that this made "rich countries exhortations to free trade sound hypocritical."

Second, 30 developing countries coalesced in 1962 at the United Nations General Assembly and called for a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development by 1963 [UNGA Resolution 1785(XVII)]. The Soviet Union lent support, and UNCTAD was created in 1964 with Raúl Prebisch as its first director-general. While UNCTAD did not lead to direct trade concessions, it was important for developing world coalition formation. The most important of these coalitions was G77, also created in 1964, which has acted as a coalitional bloc for a wide variety of developing country interests including trade. G77 had 134 members in 2015. Despite UNCTAD and G77 creation, developing countries viewed GATT as the relevant forum for their interests. Hudec notes that the developing world carefully positioned the UNCTAD with GATT to advocate their interests: "although it did not seen so at the time, developing countries actually used the UNCTAD threat with a great deal of caution and patience" (Hudec 1987: 40).

The chief trade concession that the developing world received before the Uruguay Round was the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which granted zero or low non-reciprocal tariff preferences to specific products from developing countries. It resulted both from UNCTAD diplomacy and the formation of G77 (Whalley 1990; Narlikar 2000; Narlikar and Tussle 2004; Singh 2006). A 10-year GATT waiver for preferences was worked out in 1971. While European Economic Community adopted GSP in 1971, the United States was reluctant and adopted the scheme in 1974. The Tokyo Round in general deepened GSP through its Enabling Clause in 1979 that became the basis of special and differential treatment. The Enabling Clause allowed market access for the developing world on non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory bases, favorable treatment with respect to non-tariff barriers, special provisions for leastdeveloped countries, and acceptance of preferential trade among developing countries.

The U.S. and European records summarize both the restrictive and the manipulative aspects of GSP implementation. As the Tokyo Round ended, Meier (1980) noted that the developed countries granted these preferences "begrudgingly", noting them as instances of trade diversion and protection, and slipped in exceptions, escape clauses, and quantitative restrictions. An early study (Karsenty and Laird 1987) showed that GSP exports to the "donor" countries were only two percent higher than what they would have been without the preferences. In the U.S., restrictions applied to the coverage of products, countries, and the scope of the agreement. In 1996, GSP applied to 4500 products from 140 countries to a total of \$16.9 billion, but this was less than 2 percent of the total U.S. trade and 16 percent of the total imports from developing countries (Holliday 1997: 8-11). A majority of the benefits accrued to a small number of countries,

with the top ten countries accounting for 85 percent (Holiday 1997: 13), and top four (Honk Kong, Korea, Taiwan and Brazil) accounting for 50 percent of the benefits (Karsenty and Laird 1987).

The 1960s and 1970s as a whole, even in Western economic thinking were about economic exceptions and carve-outs, and preferences for the developing world were consistent with this logic.¹⁸ However, economist T.N. Srininvan writes that in opting for special and differential treatment, the developing countries misguidedly stepped out of the GATT system. "Instead of demanding and receiving crumbs from the rich man's table, such as GSP and a permanent status of inferiority under the 'special and differential' treatment clause, had they participated fully, vigorously, and on equal terms with the developed countries in the GATT and had they adopted an outward-oriented development strategy, they could have achieved far faster and better growth" (Srinivasan 1998: 27).

Paternalism in U.S. Trade Policy

The author's content analysis of 13 years of 1925 pages of press releases from the United States Trade Representative's office addresses trade policy at the level of its rhetoric, which is important for this study's claim about paternalistic identity. The content analysis is a first attempt at operationalizing a measure for the rhetoric of the developed world toward to the developing world for the period leading up to and including the Uruguay

¹⁸ In the post-civil rights era in the United States, carve-outs and exceptions were represented through the creation of quotas in general, and the redefinition of public interest in the U.S. regulatory agencies to cater to balance the needs of marginalized groups.

Round (1982-1993).¹⁹ Michael Barnett's (2012) context for understanding what he calls 'weak paternalism' is apt: it exists within a framework of "institutions, information and knowledge" (p. 506) and sanctioned through liberal democracies. Barnett seeks to develop an operational category for this paternalism. Most of his evidence accounts for the presence of paternalistic actions in humanitarian efforts, which are then related to motivations for actors. There is a problem of endogeneity here: good paternalistic things happen, therefore, paternalistic motivations are good, especially when held accountable through domestic institutions and society in paternal countries. For this reason, it is necessary to first account for the presence of paternalism regardless of whether or not it is beneficial to the paternalized.

This section offers an independent measure for the presence of paternalism. Press releases from the USTR are an official record of the positions that the U.S. undertakes on trade issues. While press releases may serve a strategic function of persuading trading partners, they are still a valid measure of the trade policy positions that the U.S. undertakes. A content analysis of nearly 1925 pages of press releases covering just about every issue area and trading partner gets around many of the empirical problems confronted in operationalizing and finding a valid measure of paternalism.²⁰

¹⁹ These press releases were obtained from two successive Freedom of Information Act requests to the United States Trade Representative in Washington, DC. 1994 press releases are not analyzed. While the agreement was signed in March 1994, negotiations ended December 15, 1993.

²⁰ As a negotiation scholar I have often conducted in-depth interviews of negotiators. In the case of paternalism, which is extremely value-loaded, I did not think in-depth interviews could yield meaningful measures. The case of developing country negotiators being bullied and manipulated is already well-documented, and developed country negotiators are unlikely to admit to paternalism even if they are aware of it. Nevertheless, my conceptualization of the issue reflects years of conversations with trade diplomats in Geneva over successive years.

The content analysis of the USTR press releases offered here mentions 129 countries as the U.S. trade partners, and seven grouped trading partners (Andean countries, Caribbean or Caricom countries, Central and European Countries, developing countries, European Community, Latin American countries, and all trading partners taken collectively). The content analysis or codings were conducted manually using NVivo software, where the classifications for data are called nodes, which can then be reclassified and aggregated for further analysis.

The codings recorded the dominant sentiment toward each trading partner mentioned in each press release: favorable, unfavorable, mixed, neutral or paternalistic (see Appendix A at the end of the paper for operational definition). Each country or group was only coded once even if the press release mentioned it more than once. The purpose was to determine which countries and trading groups prompt a press release, and multiple mentions of the same country within a press release was unnecessary. Multiple press releases involving the same country (on the same issue) demonstrate the importance of the issue or country and each press release was recorded separately. Thus, for example, U.S.-EU steel negotiations in the mid-1980s produced several press releases as also semi-conductors and Japan.

After the manual coding, data for countries and groups was also categorized for some macro level results for trading partners into the following three groups: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), non-OECD, and Central and East European Countries (all in mutually exclusive categories). The OECD and non-OECD distinction is important. Most of the GATT issues were discussed among developed world in the OECD forums, including the scope of the Generalized System of

Preferences in 1960s and 1970s, or the services trade and intellectual property agenda in the 1970s and 1980s.²¹ Often the technical details were worked out at the OECD before being "multilateralized" over to the GATT and WTO. The OECD is, therefore, a relevant forum for determining if the United States was paternalistic toward other developed paternalistic states (OECD) and those that are developing (non-OECD). OECD countries were coded as such if they were members prior to 1994: only Japan and Turkey were non-'western' members of the OECD club prior to 1994, which also included Australia and New Zealand. After 1994, Chile, Korea, Mexico and several East European states were admitted to the OECD. The non-OECD group, even though it includes two Western states (Cyprus and Grenada), corresponds roughly to the conceptualizations of the Global South as comprising developing and middle-income economies in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

Coding Results

The results reported here pertain to the tone or sentiment toward the trading partner. Each mention of the 136 countries and groups was coded for the characterization of the trading country or group in one of the five following ways for tone: favorable, unfavorable, mixed, neutral, and paternalistic. Only the dominant characterization was recorded, thus each press release warranted only one characterization for tone. This yielded 1462 references for tone, which are summarized in Table 2. These data show that 69 percent of the total references from the United States toward the non-OECD countries were paternalistic, while only 16 percent of the total references to the OECD

²¹ See Matz 1970 for GSP, Sell 1999 for intellectual property, and Drake and Nicolaides 1992 for services.

countries were paternalistic.²² However, 40 percent of the total references from the United States toward OECD were unfavorable, but only 14 percent toward the non-OECD were unfavorable. The dominant tone of the trade policy toward U.S.'s major trading partners is quite aggressive (unfavorable in tone), while toward the developing world it was paternalistic or benevolent.²³ Over 93 percent of the total 710 paternalistic references were directed toward the non-OECD countries, excluding those in Central and Eastern Europe. It is important to remember that the tone does not mean concessions received or given.

[TABLE 2 HERE]

Most of the references to paternalism toward the developing world pertained to the granting of preferential access which includes the following in the period covered here: the Generalized System of Preferences, Sugar Rate Quotas, Multi-Fibre Arrangement, Caribbean Basin Initiative, Andean Trade Preferences, and Enterprise of the Americas Initiative. In terms of trade issues that garnered paternalistic references, 18 percent pertained to agricultural issues, 14 percent to investment issues, 8 percent to intellectual property, 5 percent to manufacturing, and 3 percent to services. The highest number of paternalistic press releases was in the "several issues" category, which included GSP. The annual reports on GSP renewal and petitions against issuing GSP, latter mostly from U.S. producers or interest groups, were often the longest press

²² These data are aggregations of the country level data. NVivo can also report on the number of press releases that mention an OECD or a non-OECD country. Although the two are related, number of press releases that mention an OECD or non-OECD country provides a different (and lower number) because it does not count each country separately and then aggregate them. The aggregation of country-level data was more appropriate in this case because the number of times a country warrants a paternalistic reference is important in this case.

²³ As shown later, this tone does not mean who receives trade concessions.

releases. They list countries and quotas granted in specific products. In the case of petitioners, these press releases list petitioners seeking revocation of GSP usually on the grounds of workers rights, or insufficient intellectual property rights laws. In terms of countries, of the total 710 paternalistic tone references in the data set, high-low paternalism references included countries as follows:

- 20 or more paternalistic references: Colombia (21), Brazil (20)
- 10-19 paternalistic references: Thailand (19), Mexico (18), Honduras (17),
 Argentina (15), Costa Rica (15), Malawi (14), India (15), Belize (10)
- 0-9 paternalistic references: Cote d'Ivoire (9), Chile (6), Egypt (4), Turkey (5), all EC states (0), Japan (0).

The GSP press releases almost always carried a replicated statement of the extent of benevolence from the United States. This statement from the 31 March 1983 press release is a typical instance:

"The Generalized System of Preferences is a program of unilateral tariff preferences granted by the United States to developing countries to assist in their economic development. Nineteen other industrialized countries also maintain GSP programs. At present, the United States grants duty-free treatment on approximately 3,000 products from 140 developing countries and territories. Since the program's implementation in 1976, the value of imports receiving GSP treatment has risen from \$3.0 billion to \$8.4 billion in 1982. GSP imports account for three percent of total U.S. imports."

Other paternalistic references include those praising the developing world for signing trade and investment agreements with the United States thereby allowing them to benefit from U.S. foreign direct investment and consumption. The first bilateral investment treaty (BIT) was with Egypt in 1982. As of 2015, the United States had signed 48 BITS, almost all of them with developing and East European countries. Before the close of the Uruguay Round, Turkey was the only OECD country to sign a BIT with

the United States. A typical statement of paternalism is the following, pertaining in this case to the announcement of the signing of BIT with Bangladesh on 12 March 1986 in which USTR Clayton Yeutter is quoted: "Developing countries such as Bangladesh, which recognize the importance of direct investment to their long-term economic development plans, now are taking actions to attract such investment. I hope that more countries follow the leadership Bangladesh has shown."

Another instance is preferential access granted to Andean countries under the Andean Trade Preference Act. The 16 April 1993 press release admitting Ecuador to ATPA notes: "The ATPA fulfills the U.S. commitment to improve access to the U.S. market for exports from the Andean nations. It is designed to help the beneficiary nations encourage their people to export legitimate products instead of illicit drugs. The United States supports the strong efforts of the Government of Ecuador to combat drug trafficking and to modernize its economy" (USTR 1993).

At face value this could be taken as a measure of net benefits from paternalism (access to U.S. markets and investments, curtailing illicit trade). However, as pointed out in the last section, the preferential system of GSP diverted from the task of trade liberalization and over time may have contributed to creating systems of dependence among developing countries that were not particularly competitive.²⁴ For example, Goldstein et al (2007, 54-56) note that many non-multilateral trade measures have expanded trade in the long run. The exception is GSP and non-reciprocal preferential

²⁴ In the currently underway Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations (2001-), the Asia-Pacific-Caribbean (APC), roughly corresponding to the G77 coalition, and the G33 coalitions have argued for continuation of preferential treatment. This has divided the developing world, including emerging powers. Brazil and China have argued for trade liberalization, while India and South Africa have been hesitant. The G20 coalition has often featured these mixed preferences.

trade arrangements, which have a negative effect on expansion of trade (reciprocal PTAs have a positive effect).

The Uruguay Round (1986-94)

Developing countries were important players in the Uruguay Round as a result of their collective advocacy. They had been mostly excluded from the negotiating rooms of the Tokyo Round and the preferential codes or tariffs signed among developed countries. Therefore, they boycotted the signing of the Tokyo Round agreement in April 1979. Winham's (1986: 376) history of the Tokyo Round concludes that "the developing countries were not essential to the process and the accords did not directly address their perceived needs."²⁵

The developing world was opposed to the inclusion of high-tech issues such as intellectual property and services in trade, which delayed the launch of the next multilateral trade round from 1982 to 1986. The G10 coalition, chiefly identified with India and Brazil, led this opposition. The deadlock to start the round was broken with a group of moderate states that included both developing and developed countries and came to be known as the *café au lait* coalition after its leaders Switzerland and Colombia (café au lait evolved into the coalition known as the Friends of Services group with up to 44 members). Uruguay Round purportedly offered the developing world a Faustian "grand bargain": in return for concessions in services and intellectual property, the developing world received concessions in agriculture and a phase-out of the quantitative

²⁵ Keeping in mind the rising advocacy from the developing world in UNCTAD and GATT, Winham (1986) also notes that these countries "tend to make revolutionary demands" and that "negotiations are not an appropriate method" for such action (p. 377).

restrictions for textiles and clothing, which had existed through the Multi-Fiber Arrangement, dating back to 1961.

The remainder of this essay presents the quantitative results for tariff concessions the developing world received as a whole in merchandise trade, and specifically in agriculture. One of the major agreements to emerge was the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, which was touted as the measure to reduce agricultural tariffs and subsidies in the developed world. URAA converted non-tariff measures into tariffs; classified subsidies into boxes from most protectionist to least protectionist, and a 20 percent reduction on export subsidies mostly from the developed world.

In order to examine tariff reductions, the following analysis presents three interrelated types of dependent variables. These data from Finger et al (1996) are fairly comprehensive because they include tariff equivalents of non-tariff concessions in agriculture, and also measure concessions by taking into account both bound and applied rates before and after the Uruguay Round. At the broadest level in models below, reciprocity is measured through tariff concessions received minus given for merchandise trade, further analyzed for agriculture trade. However, data for these dyads, concessions received minus given, is limited to around 45 observations in the complete data, and it does not yield meaningful insights.²⁶ Therefore, this study provides results from merchandise trade concessions received and agriculture trade concessions received, which raises the observations to above 75 countries in available data. These data are not paired with concessions given but, importantly, with a bigger sample size, they can account better for explanatory factors such as effects of being a former colony or being

²⁶ For the European Union data provided are those of EU12, which negotiated during the Uruguay Round.

part of a developing country coalition. In addition, while concessions received is not a reciprocal measure per se, the 79 to 123 countries included here in different models, from the total of 123 countries who signed the Uruguay Round agreement, made up at least 95 percent of the trade among WTO members. Therefore, one can assume that these concessions were informed with some overall notion of 'specific reciprocity' (Keohane 1986) implying congruence between concessions received and given.

[TABLE 3 HERE]

Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for all independent and dependent variable. Two sets of independent variables are presented to test for negotiations and paternalism. Where relevant, the data is for 1990, which served as the mid-way point of negotiations for the Uruguay Round from 1986-1993 and also a time when the broad framework for concessions was in place.

Paternalism is measured as a latent variable through a factor analysis of three indices -- one each for cultural, political, and economic factors -- which are themselves derived from many variables: cultural distance from a hybrid colonizer, values of the affinity index for the U.S. in the UN General Assembly, and the index of export market concentration.²⁷ The factors analysis yields a "Paternalism Strength Index" (PSI) that addresses the cultural, political, and economic differences among developed and developing countries, and the relative strength of the developed countries. The cultural distance indicator is a composite index calculated from Hofstede's four-part criteria

²⁷ The cultural distance data are from Hofstede 2015 employing his original four dimensions, UNGA data uses s3un values from Voeten 2015, and the Export Market Index is from WITS 2015.

measuring cultural distances of countries from each other from 0 to 100.²⁸ These indicators are: power distance (PD) measuring degree of inequality in society, individualism (IDV) measuring connections of people to each other, degree of masculinity (MAS) in society, and the uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) that measures reactions to the unknown in any society. In order to calculate the cultural distance of countries, I first computed an index for a 'hybrid colonizer' derived from average scores in the index for six countries: Britain, France, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and United States. Then cultural distance was calculated for each country from this hypothetical colonial power.²⁹

The affinity index taken from Anton Strezhnev and Erik Voeten's "United Nations General Assembly Voting Data" provides values for least (-1) to most similar (+1) for voting with the United States in 1990. The Export Market Concentration index from the World Bank is employed for export diversity, which gives higher values for a reporter country that exports a particular product divided by the number of countries that report importing the product that year.³⁰ The index takes account of all products exported. Countries with large number of products to a large number of countries would earn high scores. Thus the United States earns 21.28, India 6.22, and Trinidad and Tobago earns a 2. The export diversification index is a good proxy for the economic dependencies between the North and South that affixed the developing world into

²⁸ While each of the four dimensions varies between 0 and 100, the cultural distance values can range higher than 100, in this case I highest value is 128.

³⁰ The Export Market Index in this case is a better measure of paternalistic relations than the Herfindhal-Hirschman Market Concentration Index. The former examines the dispersion of products across trading partners, while the latter only examines trading partners.

producing a few primary commodities for export markets. Core-periphery arguments about the world economy often reference the lack of economic diversification in the developing world (Wallerstein 1974; Cardoso and Faletto 1979). One of the central economic relationships of the colonial era was relegation of the colonies to production of a few export commodities (agricultural or more resources). Therefore, the inclusion of the export diversification index here is relevant. While not part of the factor analysis, a dummy variable is also presented separately to note former colonial status of a country: this dummy is almost synonymous with the G77 coalition that arose from advocacy for UNCTAD. If paternalism were benevolent, we would expect that being a former colony or being a member of G77 would garner trade concessions.³¹

Except for the Hofstede's cultural distance scores, based on a survey of 117,000 IBM employees around the world, the other data are for 1990 (or, if unavailable, the closest year after 1990). The assumption in Hofstede's scores is that cultures change slowly and, therefore, the values are relevant. They are especially relevant for this paper evaluating paternalism in the 1960s and 1970s prior to the Uruguay Round, and for this paper's historical perspective ascribing relevance to colonization and subsequent paternalism.

The negotiation variables are tested through measures of export diversity (economic conditions) and coalitional strength. Therefore, a few models below present

³¹ In reality, the former colonizers were quick to kick ex-colonies to the curbs, especially in agriculture. The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community is an example. The former colonizers included important members of the European Economic Community, which in the past wanted to preserve imperial preferences, but as the CAP evolved, they wanted to preserve their own agricultural tariffs and subsidies (van Reisen 2007). The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union can be connected to the region's desire to boost its food production in the post-colonial era (Laurent 1983).

the export market concentration index as separate from its role in the paternalism strength index, this time to account for negotiation advantage. High values on export diversity improve a country's alternatives in a trade negotiation and provide them with options for negotiation trade-offs and linkages. The major coalitions examined in this paper follow from Narlikar (2003), which examines the role of each coalition carefully for the Uruguay Round. The four most important coalitions for the Uruguay Round were: G77 and G10 from the developing world, Cairns Group that included developed and developing countries to argue for agricultural liberalization, and the Café au Lait group that was a group of moderate countries that moves the Uruguay Round forward and was later important for services negotiations. G77, G10, and the Cairns Group are relevant for this essay.³² However, G77 is almost coterminous with being a former colony and therefore, to eliminate multicollinearity only the dummy for former colonial status is employed in the models later. Table 4 summarizes the expected signs of coefficient for each of independent variable. An analysis is now provided for each of the three categories of negotiations analyzed here.

[TABLE 4 HERE]

Explaining Trade Concessions

At the broadest level of reciprocity or percentage of concessions given and received in merchandise trade, it is hard to say much with the limited number of observations (45) in the full dataset. Most importantly, the relationship between the paternalism strength

³² The Café au Lait group was important for services negotiations and, therefore, it is not a relevant coalition for merchandise trade. Preliminary tests did not show any benefits accruing to this coalition.

index and reciprocity in merchandise trade is not statistically significant. Therefore, the findings below pertain to merchandise and agricultural concessions received following the notion of specific reciprocity.

Merchandise Concessions Received

The models presented in this section provide the first test of the relative importance of paternalism versus negotiation strength in determining trade concessions. The broad hypotheses -- concessions are positively related to paternalistic and negotiation strength -- are confirmed in the findings for 79 to 124 countries (depending on the model in Table 5) for concessions received in merchandise trade. In the descriptive data (Table 3), concessions received vary from .028 to 6.999 implying that every country received some concession. The most important finding from Model A in Table 5 is that every one unit increase in paternalism (from minimum of -.74 for Bhutan to a maximum of 2.9 for the United States) results in more than one-third percent increase in concessions received (the percentage increases to 0.4 in Model B with multiple variables). The model predicts that United States with a 2.9 PSI value received 1.3 percent more concessions than Zambia with a -.73 value, and 1.2 percent more than India with a -.35 value (in actuality Indian concessions were greater than predicted here). These findings are corroborated in the other three models. The sign for PSI remains significant at 99 percent level in Model B and the variable predicts concessions received even better with other relevant and control variables brought into the analysis, indicating the robustness of this variable.

[TABLE 5 HERE]

Model C tests the influence of the Export Market Concentration index separately as a negotiation variable. This index, as mentioned earlier, captures elements of trade diversification and, at higher values, decreasing degrees of paternalistic control in negotiations. During the colonial era, European powers ensured paternalistic control through exclusive trade and extraction in the colonies. This pattern continued in the postcolonial era through practices such as imperial preferences. The degree of export diversification is positive and significant at the 99 percent level.³³ Models C & D show that export market concentration index by itself is a relatively good predictor of concessions received, establishing its importance for negotiations.

Surprisingly, the coalitional variables do not perform so well. Three of the coalitional variables -- G10, Cairns Group, and European colony as a proxy for G77 -- have negative signs and are not statistically significant.³⁴ This could mean any of the following: (1) developing country coalitions did not matter for concessions received; (2) developing country coalitions were punished for coalescing, or (3) they received negative concessions. The only coalition with a statistically significant result is ASEAN countries and the sign is positive meaning that they received on average almost two-thirds of a percent more than other countries. The U.S. courted ASEAN heavily during the Uruguay Round, and also threatened them with trade sanctions for intellectual property and

³³ The UN affinity index is not used here due to multicollinearity (the reason for undertaking the factor analysis in the first place).

³⁴ European colony overlaps with G77 and exhibits multicollinearity with it. Therefore, I employed European colony as a variable, and as a proxy for G77. The other reason was practical. Despite literature searches and several requests to G77 offices, I was not able to obtain a list of G77 members during the Uruguay Round.

services agendas and therefore might have received more merchandise concessions in return.³⁵

Table 5 models confirm that paternalistic strength matters for receiving concessions. In terms of negotiations, if developing countries diversify their exports, they are able to garner concessions, but coalition building was less effective for obtaining merchandise concessions. The more than average concessions India made in merchandise trade (as seen in raw data) might also indicate that India was 'punished' for being a leader of G10 and other coalitions from the developing world.³⁶

The developed world patrons could argue that most of the concessions in manufactured products for the developing world came in the form of GSP concessions. However, the case for limited benefits from GSP was outlined earlier. The developed world could also argue that most of the developing country concessions received in merchandise trade were in agriculture and textile and clothing. The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing did not become effective, in a limited way at first, until 2005 and thus its effect is hard to gauge from the applied rate of tariffs in the data used here for 1995. However, the extent of agricultural concessions received is evaluated next.

Agricultural Concessions Received

The four models presented on agricultural concessions also confirm the supposition that the developing world did not receive disproportionate agricultural benefits during the Uruguay Round. In fact, they confirm the opposite: the developed world received most

³⁵ This is the only place in the paper, which confirms the 'grand bargain' thesis.

³⁶ India gave tariff concessions of 3.82 percent in merchandise trade and received 1.21 percent.

of the concessions. The Uruguay Round bargain was purportedly based on a grand bargain whereby the developing world received concessions in agriculture and textiles in return for signing on to restrictive intellectual property provisions and for liberalizing services markets. This is not a valid supposition.

The Paternalism Strength Index performs even better in evaluating agricultural concessions. Taken by itself (Model A in Table 6) shows that every one unit increase in the paternalism index accounts for 1.92 percent increase in agricultural concessions received, which vary from zero to 17.7 percent. If this was the only variable in consideration, the United States received 6.26 percent higher concessions than India and 6.6 percent higher than Guatemala because of its paternalistic strength.

[TABLE 6 HERE]

Furthermore, other variables also indicate that the developing world was at a disadvantage in agricultural negotiations. Being a former colony reduces agricultural concessions by 2.76 percent (Model C). G77 is almost coterminous with being a former European colony that thus this coalition did not bestow any advantages.³⁷ The G10 sign is also negative, though statistically insignificant, as is the one for ASEAN. The latter might be due to ASEAN's overall gains in merchandise trade.

The pro-trade Cairns Group in agriculture, which included both developed and developing countries, did yield positive benefits to its members at the Uruguay Round. Both models 6 B & C demonstrate this positive and statistically significant relationship. In terms of negotiation advantages, the sign for the export market concentration index, showing diversity in products and markets, is also positive and statistically significant. As

³⁷ Significant exceptions include Iran and Thailand, members of G77 that were never colonized.

noted earlier, the export market concentration index suggests a break from paternalistic patterns of dependency and also the ability to indulge in trade-offs and linkages at international negotiations. Model D with 106 observations also confirms the main findings for Model C for the export market concentration index, European colony, and the Cairns Group.

The World Bank data used here for agricultural concessions received needs further context. First, as mentioned earlier, these data include the tariff equivalents of non-tariff barriers for agriculture (Finger et al 1996, p. 6). Therefore, they are a complete measure of the protections in agriculture, which often feature several types of non-tariff barriers. Second, the data do not standardize the size of the agricultural concessions to the rule-of-thumb formula that emerged at the Brussels meeting of the GATT in 1990: namely 33 percent cuts for the developed world, and 25 percent cuts for the developing world. In other words, it shows concessions as made instead of adjusting them on the basis of what was expected from developed or developing countries. If these data were standardized for the formula expectations, the inequity of concessions would be higher.

Final Analysis

Paternalism does not result in trade concessions for the developing world. Negotiations do. Theoretically, this study unpacks the circularity of reasoning in notions of benevolent paternalism: good things happen therefore the developed world is benevolent. Instead of such endogeneity, this study shows that the good things that happen, such as preferential treatment, are quite limited and might result from developing world's advocacy. One of the contributions of this study is the development of an independent measure of

paternalistic strength and then testing its effect on notions of reciprocity. Testing effects of paternalism on things that are not paternal (trade concessions in this case) also avoids circularity of reasoning.

Developing countries are confounded with paternalism at trade negotiations. They are rewarded if they play by the rules of the game the powerful outline. These include rewards for good behavior such as forming moderate coalitions with the developed world (Cairns Group). They are punished for being a colony or forming a hardline coalition such as G10 with others in the developing world. Most importantly, despite marginal gains, the qualitative and quantitative evidence in this paper supports discrimination: the developing world is either provided marginal carve-outs (GSP) or limited trade concessions (Uruguay Round). Table 1 summarized the paternalistic and the non-paternalistic concessions that the developing world receives. This paper suggests that receiving GSP or foreign aid weakens the 'negotiation hand' of the developing world for receiving trade concessions.

My findings demonstrate that paternalism does not result in reciprocal trade concessions. As such they do not negate earlier findings of material benefits from paternalism to the developing world resulting from benevolence (Barnett 2011) or racism (Baker 2015). However, they seek to demonstrate that normatively an international order suffused with paternalistic notion will assign developing countries to a position of inferiority. The hard won concessions will be attributed to paternalism, and the developing world's negotiation options would be overlooked.

The three levels of evidence in this paper show that the developing world does not receive trade concessions from paternalistic countries. This may follow the logic of

consequences but paternalism is also a historical identity, or logic of appropriateness. The first two types of evidence provided in this study also imply this identity.³⁸ The descriptive evidence points toward historical continuity and the content analysis points to it as an everyday discursive practice. When GATT was created, the developing world remained excluded from trade negotiations and found it hard to receive derogations for infant industry, which would have allowed it to diversify its manufacturing and export bases. The provision of GSP was a begrudging concession. At the level of US trade policy, the content analysis of the USTR press releases shows that 93 percent of the paternalistic references the U.S. made during the Uruguay Round were toward the developing world. The near absence of paternalistic references from the U.S. toward the OECD is also interesting.

The quantitative study demonstrates that the developing world did not receive any "grand bargain" in the Uruguay Round. This is especially important for the analysis of the most likely case where the terms would be favorable – namely, agricultural negotiations at the Uruguay Round. They also did not receive disproportionately better benefits for being a former colony or member of any of the developing country

³⁸ March and Olsen 1998. Logic of consequences is about the distributional outcomes from known preferences. Logic of appropriateness follows from historically derived institutions, in this case paternalism, that shape actor preferences, In invoking the role of identity shaping preferences, rather than only distributional consequences that follow from given preferences, I am mindful of a wealth of literature on this topic especially Katzenstein (1996), Wendt (1999), and Hausman (2012). I have previously explored meta-preferences in general in Singh (2013), in services trade in Singh (2009), and cultural goods (Singh 2011).

coalitions. In fact, our data confirm the opposite: the developed world received disproportionate benefits in these negotiations.³⁹

These results are important but not surprising. Negotiation history of the Uruguay Round further validates the conclusions. In the end game of the Uruguay Round, the agreement on agriculture was shaped mostly between the European Union and the United States, which led to the Blair House accord in November 1993. At that time, the two great powers decided that the subsidy cuts, which could have favored developing world agriculture exports, were to be based on the higher 1992 prices than the lower base year of 1988-90 that had been decided earlier. This allowed actual cuts to be lower than if the earlier base year was used. Second, the Uruguay Round barely made a dent in export subsidies. Third, URAA also imposed high costs on the developing world through sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) technical barriers to trade. Finger (2008) notes that large parts of the technical assistance to the developing world went into these programs. He cites an African government official: *"They want us to understand SPS so that we will import more chicken"* (Italics original, p. 305)

The 'proof' of paternalism provided in this paper can be summarized in two ways:

Historically, throughout the GATT era, the developed world made many
 "promises' to the developing world but there is very little to show for these
 promises in material terms. Before the Uruguay Round, the only substantial

³⁹ A realist might note that my results confirm that great powers make the weak acquiesce. However, the negotiation strength of the weak belies acquiescence, and the presence of a paternalistic identity might be alien to a realist (though perhaps consistent with notions of evangelizing ideas such as manifest destiny). In the canonical Melian dialogue, the Athenian patrons do not talk as sweetly as the current paternalistic powers.

concession the developing world received was the Generalized System of Preferences, whose benefits were marginal and ambiguous.

(2) The end of the Uruguay Round heralded an agreement on agriculture that would benefit the developing world. This was a noble lie.

The WTO's Doha Round of trade negotiations launched in November 2001 has remained deadlocked over agricultural negotiations. Former G10 members such as India and Brazil are reluctant to accept a deal that resembles the Uruguay Round. India's commerce minister Nirmala Sitharaman's noted in 2014: "our cause is never heard.... Our co-operation over and over again just makes us look as if we are not being assertive enough." (*Financial Times* in July 2014). Two months later, the United States settled a long running dispute with Brazil over cotton with \$300 million it paid to the Brazil Cotton Institute rather than reduce the billions of dollars in export subsidies paid to its own cotton farmers (Singh 2014). This essay helps to place empty promises and hushmonies from the developed world in a historical and quantitative perspective.

APPENDIX A NODE CLASSIFICATION DESCRIPTIONS FOR UNITED STATES' SENTIMENT TOWARD TRDING PARTNERS

PATERNALISITC.

Moralistic, preachy, or patronizing statements toward the trade partner, often pointing out or providing benefit of non-reciprocal market access, or FDI from the United States. Offers of assistance, and measures that are also beneficial to the U.S. but announced as if it helps the other country only (including GSP, BITs). Most GSP press releases contain language of "help" to the developing world. Also includes patronizing and manipulative statements such as telling countries like China & India that they should be willing to bring their laws in tune with international rules.

FAVORABLE

Praise for the trading partner (often after signing a treaty), lists benefits for the U.S., withdrawal of trade sanctions with praise. Praises partner for agreeing to U.S. trade restrictions such as VERs, OMAs, and MFA, etc.

UNFAVORABLE

Critiques foreign trade policies and positions, lists costs imposed on the U.S., threatens sanctions, full of 'asks' from trading partner without listing 'gives', points out distortions in the trading partner's policy but omits that of the U.S. in the same issue, initiates investigations such as Section 301, points out something is lacking in the trade partner's policies or something that the U.S. is withholding (e.g. MFN withheld to Romania in 1990), points out trade barriers in partner and often critical of them.

MIXED

Mix of favorable and unfavorable nodal classifications. Also includes press releases that delay favorable or unfavorable assessments of the trading partner. Does not include paternalistic statements.

NEUTRAL

None of the other classifications. Neither praising nor critiquing trade partners.

TABLE 1

PATERNALISM VERSUS TRADE LIBERALIZATION CONCESSIONS

PATERNALISTIC	COMBINATION:	NEGOATIATED TRADE
CONCESSIONS	PATERNALISM AND	LIBERALIZATION
	TRADE CONCESSIONS	CONCESSIONS
 Side payments Moral statements Trade capacity- building assistance Affixing developing world in dependency narratives Foreign aid 	 Preferential schemes (often negotiated) Special and differential treatment Some forms of quotas (e.g. sugar) 	 Reduction of subsidies Decreasing tariffs Eliminating quotas Elimination of other tariff and non-tariff barriers

Source: adapted from J.P. Singh, Development Objectives and Trade Negotiations: Moralistic Foreign Policy or Negotiated Trade Concessions? *International Negotiation*. 15: 367-389. 2010

FIGURE 1:

Percentage Agriculture Concessions Received and Official Development Assistance as Percentage of GNP




TABLE 2

CHARACTERIZATION OF SENTIMENT TOWARD TRADING PARTNERS IN USTR PRESS RELEASES 1982-93

	Paternalistic	Favorable	Unfavorable	Mixed	Neutral	Total
Total	710	234	291	129	98	1462
Non OECD	662	92	134	38	40	966
	(69)	(10)	(14)	(4)	(4)	(100)
OECD	19	86	133	58	40	336
	(6)	(26)	(40)	(17)	(12)	(100)
CEES*	25	18	8	9	3	63
	(40)	(29)	(13)	(14)	(5)	(100)
Partners	4	38	16	24	15	97
Collectively	(4)	(39)	(16)	(25)	(15)	(100)

Note: Parenthetical figures are rounded percentages of the total references to each group

*Central and East European States

Source: Author's content analysis of United States Trade Representative Press Releases (1982-93)

Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	Max
Dependent			Deviation		
Merchandise Concessions Received Minus	52	.235	1.34	-4.61	2.27
Given					
Merchandise Concessions Received	140	1.253	.918	.028	6.999
Agriculture Concessions Received	116	1.856	3.028	0	17.732
Independent: Paternalism					
Paternalism Strength Index	86	.000	.807	739	2.94
Distance form Hybrid Colonizer	96	78.675	20.917	22.7	128
Independent: Negotiations					
Export Market Concentration	184	3.669	4.358	1.1	26.79
European Colony (G77)	217	.641	.481	0	1
G10	215	.047	.211	0	1
Cairns Group	214	.065	.247	0	1
ASEAN	217	.032	.177	0	1
Control Variables GDP Per Capita 1990 (Constant Prices)	177	8864.153	146333.94	141.37	109705

TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Dependent variables	Independent variable	Expected sign of coefficient	Theoretical explanation
(1) merchandise	Cultural distance	negative	paternalism toward culturally distant groups
concessions received (2) agriculture	Colonized status	negative	Former European colonies do not receive trade concessions
concessions received	Index of Export Market Concentration	positive	higher scores indicate better BATNA, allow for trade offs and linkages
	G77 (same as colonized status)	positive	coalitional pressures
	G10	positive	coalitional pressures
	Cairns Group	positive	coalitional pressures
	ASEAN	positive	coalitional pressures
	Paternalism Strength Index (PSI): includes cultural distance, affinity index score for US, and index of export market concentration	positive	Countries that score high have diversified export markets, vote with and are culturally contiguous to the U.S.

TABLE 4: VARIABLES AND EXPECTED SIGNS OF COEFFICIENTS

TABLE 5: MERCHANDISE CONCESSIONS RECEIVEDEXPLAINED WITH PATERNALISM AND NEGOTIATION INDICATORS

DV:	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D
Merchandise	(robust			(robust
Concessions	standard			standard
Received and	errors)			errors)
Given				
Paternalism	.367***	.399***		
Strength Index	(.062)	(.089)		
Export Market			.027*	.038***
Concentration			(.009)	(.011)
Index				
Cultural			005	
Distance			(.004)	
European			224	208
Colony			(.185)	(.193)
(historical)				
G10		128	108	289
		(.176)	(.168)	(.188)
Cairns Group		171	184	107
		(.127)	(.1797808)	(.147)
ASEAN		.510**	.635**	.17
		(.237)	(.247)	(.268)
GDP Per Capita		.000		.000
Constant Prices		(.000)		(.000)
Constant	1.253***	1.341***	1.622***	1.358 ***
	(.061)	(.104)	(.289)	(.184)
R-squared	.245	.297	.288	(0.0662) robust
	-0			standard errors
No. of	79	76	83	124
Observations				

OLS Estimates, standard error in parentheses Statistical significance: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01

Note: Model 3 omits GDP Per Capita at Constant Prices to allow for six independent variables with 83 observations. However, its inclusion leaves the main results unchanged.

TABLE 6: AGRICULTURE CONCESSIONS RECEIVED EXPLAINED WITHPATERNALISM AND NEGOTIATION INDICATORS

DV: Agricultural	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D
Concessions			(robust	(robust
Received and			standard	standard
Given			errors)	errors)
Paternalism	1.921***	1.662***		
Strength Index	(.405)	(.546)		
Export Market			.147*	.129*
Concentration			(.078)	(.077)
Index				
Cultural			.021	
Distance			(.028)	
European			-2.763**	-1.895*
Colony			(1.352)	(1.009)
G10		359	124	387
		(1.166)	(.718)	(.636)
Cairns Group		1.819*	2.158**	1.878**
		(.982)	(.951)	(.927)
ASEAN		452	-1.801	-1.144
		(1.494)	(1.152)	(.823)
GDP Per Capita		.000		.000
1990 (constant		(.000)		(.000)
prices)				
Constant	1.945***	1.338**	.852	2.031*
	(.429)	(.531)	(1.425))	(1.203)
R-squared	0.2404	0.2900	0.3285	0.3227
No. of	73	73	78	106
Observations				

OLS Estimates, standard error in parentheses Statistical significance: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01

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